Chapter XII: Part I: , Page 1203; Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 295; and (5)

My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the defendant’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, “The sinking of S. S. _Sheaf Mead_.” That is Document D-644, which I put in as Exhibit GB-192. If I might read the opening paragraph:

“The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on
27 May 1940. . .”

THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not?

COL. PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a British report. It includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the log.

THE PRESIDENT: It bears the words, “top secret”?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top secret document. That was some while ago.

“The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on
27 May 1940, with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of
the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an
exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to
upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man
was Kapitänleutnant Öhrn of _U-37_: The following extract from
his log for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks
for itself as to his behaviour.”

Again turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the second page, the time is marked on the document as 1554.

“Surface. Stern is underwater.”—referring to the ship which has
been torpedoed—“Stern is underwater. Bows rise higher. The
boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of
complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up
quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of
the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck
down the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a
boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs
outstretched. Bursting and crushing. Then all is over. A large
heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name.
The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats.
We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He
says, hardly turning his head, ‘Nix Name.’ A young boy in the
water calls, ‘Help, help, please!’ The others are very composed.
They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred
is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint
off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow,
5,006 gross registered tons.”

“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.

Then the next page of that document contains an extract from the report of the chief engineer of the _Sheaf Mead_. The relevant paragraphs are the first and the last:

“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side,
that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about 5 yards
away. The submarine captain asked the steward the name of the
ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our
lifebuoys, but this had the name Greatafield on it, as this was
the name of our ship before it was changed to _Sheaf Mead_ last
January.”

In the last paragraph:

“She had cut-away bows, but I did notice a net-cutter. Two men
stood at the side with boat-hooks to keep us off.

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us
in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing.
Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any
assistance whatever.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any suggestion in the German report that any warning was given?

COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was not.

Under the time 1414 there is a description of the sighting of the ship and the difficulty in identifying; and then at the top of the page:

“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in
quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern
yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also
prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square,
dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope
a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an A/A gun or something
similar. Fire! It cannot miss. . .”—and then the sinking.

Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual documents by which the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial.

I go to the next document in the document book, C-191, which I put in as Exhibit GB-193. That is a memorandum by the German naval war staff, dated 22 September 1939. It sets out:

“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to
sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.”

Reading from the third sentence:

“In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as
the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way
that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political
situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out,
U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters
where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be
situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English
units are to be expected, the measures desired by Flag Officer
U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not
to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken
approval of the Naval Operations Staff.

“U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth, and the
sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as
due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary
cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have
received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without
lights.”

Now I go to the next document, C-21, which I put in as Exhibit GB-194. My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the War Diary of the German naval war staff of the German Admiralty. The second extract, at Page 5, relates a conference with the head of the naval war staff, report of the 2 January 1940, and then reading:

“1) Report by Ia”—that is the Staff Officer Operations on the
naval war staff. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn’t you read above that, Paragraph 1/b?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. It is important. The others are much to the same effect. If I might read it:

“Report by Ia.”—This is one report by Ia on the directive of
Armed Forces High Command of 30 December.

“According to this, the Führer, on report of Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are to be
treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and
Britain; (b) in the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked
without warning. For external consumption these attacks should
be given out as hits by mines. Both measures may be taken with
immediate effect.”

The next extract, a report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer Operations on the naval war staff on the directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December:

“Referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in
connection with ‘Fall Gelb’.

“In consequence of this directive, the Navy is authorized,
simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, to
sink by U-boats, without any warning, all ships in those waters
near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this
case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that
mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by,
U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.”

And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940:

“. . . pursuant to the Führer’s consent on principle (see
minutes of report of Commander-in-Chief Navy of 30 December) to
authorize firing without warning while maintaining the pretence
of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockade
zone. . . .”

Well, then the order is given to Flag Officer U-boats carrying out that decision.

The next extract, dated the 18th of January 1940, adds to some extent, and if I may read it:

“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following
directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order
concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.

“The Navy is authorized, with immediate effect, to sink by
U-boats without warning all ships in those waters near the enemy
coasts in which the use of mines is possible.”—My Lord, that is
an extension of the area.—“U-boats must adapt their behavior
and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be
maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines.
Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are
exempted from these attacks.”

Well, then there is a note emphasizing the point about maintaining the pretense of mine hits and the last extract is, I think, purely cumulative.

The next document, C-118, I put in as Exhibit GB-195. This is an extract from the B.d.U. War Diary, that is to say the defendant’s war diary. It is dated the 18th of July 1941, and it consists of a further extension of that order by the cutting down of the protected categories.

“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being,
attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational
area of the North Atlantic, the Führer has ordered the
following:

“1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S.
convoys, or independently are authorized in the original
operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S.
blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S. to
Iceland.”

As the members of the Tribunal will have seen from these orders, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be sunk while those of another could not. It would be easy to put before the Tribunal a mass of orders and instances to show that the attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times. The point is that the defendant conducted the U-boat war against neutrals with complete cynicism and opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not.

My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book, D-642, which I put in as Exhibit GB-196. My Lord, this is a series of orders; the first, I should say, of a series of orders leading up to the issue of an order which enjoined the U-boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews, which is the purpose of this order, not merely to give them no assistance but deliberately to annihilate them.

My Lord, in the course of my proof of this matter, I shall call two witnesses. The first witness will give the Court an account of a speech made by the defendant at the time that he issued the order describing the policy, or his policy toward the recovery of Allied troops: that it must be stopped at all costs.

The second witness is the officer who actually briefed crews on the order.

My Lord, this document is an extract from the standing orders of the U-boat command, an extract from Standing Order Number 154, and it is signed by the defendant:

“Paragraph e) Do not pick up men or take them with you. Do not
worry about the merchant ship’s boats. Weather conditions and
distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own
ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as
possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war
in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that order, the copy we have, is not dated, but a later order, Number 173, which was issued concurrently with an operational order, is dated the 2d of May 1940. The Tribunal may take it, it is earlier than the 2d of May 1940. My Lord, that is a secret order.

THE PRESIDENT: Earlier than May 1940?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Earlier than May 1940.

It was, however, in 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous shipbuilding capacity, that the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-boats and of the defendant; and the defendant was guilty of an order which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.

My Lord, the next document in the document book shows the course of events, Document D-423, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-197. It is a record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, on the 3 of January 1942.

“The Führer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador
the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic,
emphasizing that what he considers his most important task is to
get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are
being re-organized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-boats
operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now
be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off
Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”

And then, after further details:

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer
pointed out that, however many ships the United States built,
one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For
that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning
with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible.
Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the
sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in
enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes
a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our
attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason
he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be
taken prisoner, which is in most cases not possible on the sea,
U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the
lifeboats.

“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Führer’s comments,
and said that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow these
methods.”

My Lord, the next document, D-446, I put in as Exhibit GB-198. I do not propose to read it. It is an extract from B. d. U. War Diary of the 16th of September 1942; and it is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the order I complain of was issued, and the Defense will, no doubt, wish to rely on it. It records an attack on a U-boat which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner _Laconia_, when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft.

My Lord, the next document, D-630, I put in as Exhibit GB-199. It contains four documents. The first is a top secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from the defendant’s headquarters, dated 17th of September 1942:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of
ships sunk; and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and
handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the
rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still
apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of
importance to your boat.

“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”

Now, My Lord, that is, of course, a very carefully worded order. Its intentions are made very clear by the next document on that same page, which is an extract from the defendant’s war diary; and I should say there, as appears from the copy handed in to the Court, the war diary is personally signed by the Defendant Dönitz. It is the war diary entry for the 17th of September 1942:

“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn”—and I
would draw the Tribunal’s attention to the word “again”—“to the
fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships
which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for
the conduct of warfare for annihilating enemy ships and their
crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the captains and
chief engineers still stand.”

The last two documents on that page consist of a telegram from the commander of the U-boat _Schacht_ to the defendant’s headquarters and the reply. _Schacht_ had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the _Laconia_. The telegram from _Schacht_, dated the 17th of September 1942, reads:

“163 Italians handed over to _Annamite_. Navigating officer of
_Laconia_ and another English officer on board.”

And then it goes on setting out the position of English and Polish survivors in boats.

The reply sent on the 20th:

“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was
wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for
the rescue of English and Poles.”

It is a small point, but of course “detailed” means before the bombing incident had ever occurred.

And then as for the next document, D-663, that was issued later and may not yet have been inserted in the Tribunal’s Document Book; D-663 I put in as Exhibit GB-200. My Lord, this is an extract from an operation order, “Operation Order Atlantic Number 56,” dated the 7th of October 1943, and the copy put in is part of sailing orders to a U-boat. As I shall prove through the second witness, although the date of this order is the 7th of October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued very much earlier, in the autumn of 1942.

“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to
every convoy, a special ship of up to 3,000 gross registered
tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after
U-boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with
a shipborne aircraft and large motorboats, are strongly armed
with depth charge throwers, and are very maneuverable, so that
they are often taken for U-boat traps by the commander.”

And then, the last sentence:

“In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their
sinking is of great value.”

If I might just sum up those documents, it would appear from the War Diary entry of the 17th of September that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued, but we have not captured them. It may be they were issued orally and that the defendant awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the _Laconia_ afforded the opportunity and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent is very clear when you consider it in the light of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious and he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.

You will be told that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous, as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and that the notorious action of the U-boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_ and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as he himself swore, on his own initiative.

I would make the point to the Tribunal that if the intention of this order was to stop the rescue attempts in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, first of all it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154.

Second, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy.

Third, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on standing by or surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended.

Fourth, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently.

And fifth, if, in fact—and the Prosecution do not for one moment accept it—the defendant did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.

My Lord, I would call my first witness, Peter Heisig.

[_The witness, Peter Josef Heisig, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

PETER JOSEF HEISIG (Witness): My name is Peter Josef Heisig.

THE PRESIDENT: Say this: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: Peter Josef Heisig, are you an Oberleutnant zur See in Germany?

HEISIG: I am Oberleutnant zur See in the German Navy.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And were you captured on the 27th of December 1944, and now held as a prisoner of war?

HEISIG: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear an affidavit on the 27th of November 1945?

HEISIG: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that your signature? [_Document D-566 was submitted to the witness._]

My Lord, that is the Document D-566.

HEISIG: That is the document I signed.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that in as Exhibit GB-201.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you take your mind back to the autumn of 1942? What rank did you hold at that time?

HEISIG: I was senior midshipman at the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you attending a course there?

HEISIG: I took part in the training course for U-boat officers of the watch.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the last day of the course?

HEISIG: On the last day of the course, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the U-boats, reviewed the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And what happened at the end of this tour?

HEISIG: At the end of his visit—not at the end but rather during his visit—Grossadmiral Dönitz made a speech before the officers of the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you fix the date of his visit?

HEISIG: I remember the approximate date; it must have been at the end of September or the beginning of October 1942.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, will you give the Tribunal—speaking slowly—an account of what Admiral Dönitz said in his speech?

HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz said in his speech that the successes of the U-boats had declined. The strength of enemy air control was responsible for that decline. New antiaircraft guns had been developed which would in future make it possible for the U-boats to fight off enemy aircraft. Hitler had personally given him the assurance that U-boats would be equipped with these antiaircraft guns before all other branches of the Armed Forces. It could be expected therefore that the successes of former times would be reached again within a few months. After speaking about his good relations with Hitler, Grossadmiral Dönitz discussed the German armament program.

A question by an officer regarding a newspaper article which stated that the Allied countries were building more than a million tons of merchant shipping every month, Admiral Dönitz answered by saying that he doubted the credibility of this estimate and said it was based on an announcement by President Roosevelt. He then spoke briefly about President Roosevelt, about the American production program and armament potential, and added that the Allies had great difficulty in manning their ships. Allied seamen considered the route across the Atlantic dangerous, because German U-boats were sinking Allied ships in great numbers. Many of the Allied seamen had been torpedoed more than once; these facts spread and make the seamen reluctant to go to sea again. Some of them were even trying to shirk a crossing of the Atlantic, so that the Allied authorities were compelled, if it became necessary, to retain the men aboard by force of law. Such indications were favorable to the Germans. From the facts that, firstly, the Allies were building very many new merchant ships and, secondly, that the Allies were having considerable difficulties in manning these newly built ships, Admiral Dönitz concluded that the question of personnel was a very grave matter for the Allies. The losses in men affected the Allies especially seriously, because they had few reserves and also because. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t want to interrupt you, but did he say anything about rescues at all? You have told us about the Allied losses and how serious they were.

HEISIG: Yes, he mentioned rescues, but I would like to speak about that later.

Grossadmiral Dönitz said that the losses of the Allies affected them very seriously, because they had no reserves and also because the training of new seamen required a very long time. He could not, therefore, understand it, if submarines were still. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, just a moment. I don’t think we want to hear the whole of Admiral Dönitz’ speech. We want to hear the material part of it.

COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, you have dealt with the question of losses. Will you come to the crucial part of the speech, at the end, and deal with that? What did the Grand Admiral go on to say?

DR. THOMA: The testimony of the witness does not concern me directly, but I have an objection to raise. According to German law and according to the German Code of Criminal Procedure, the witness must say everything he knows about a matter. If he is asked about a speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz, he must not, at least according to German law, relate only those parts which, in the opinion of the Prosecution, are unfavorable to the defendant. I believe this principle should also apply in these proceedings, whenever a witness is questioned.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not bound by German law. I have already said that the Tribunal does not desire to hear from this witness all of Admiral Dönitz’ speech.

It will be open to any of the counsel for the defendants to cross-examine this witness. Your intervention is therefore entirely unnecessary.

COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, will you deal with the crucial parts of the Grand Admiral’s speech?

HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz continued, saying approximately that under the circumstances he could not understand how German U-boats could still rescue the crews of the merchant ships they had sunk, thereby endangering their own ships. By doing that, they were working for the enemy, since these rescued crews would sail again on new ships.

The stage had now been reached in which total war had to be waged also at sea. The crews of ships, like the ships themselves, were a target for the U-boats; thus it would be impossible for the Allies to man their newly-built ships; and moreover it could then be expected that in America and the other Allied countries a strike would break out, for already a part of the seamen did not want to go back to sea.

These results could be expected if our tactics would render the war at sea more vigorous. If any of us consider this war or these tactics harsh we should also remember that our wives and our families at home are being bombed.

That, in its main points, was the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, about how many officers were present and heard that speech?

HEISIG: I have no experience in fixing the number of people present at large indoor gatherings. I can only give you a rough estimate: approximately 120 officers.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States prosecutor wish to ask any question?

[_There was no response._]

The Soviet prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

The French prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

Now, any of the defendants’ counsel may cross-examine the witness.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I represent Grossadmiral Dönitz.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will understand that what I said to Dr. Thoma was not intended to interfere with your cross-examination; it was only intended to save time. The Tribunal did not desire to hear unimportant passages in the Defendant Dönitz’ speech. Therefore, they did not want to hear them from this witness. However, you are at liberty to ask any questions that you please.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oberleutnant Heisig, did you yourself take part in an action against the enemy?

HEISIG: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On which boat were you, and who was your commander?

HEISIG: I was on U-877, under Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please repeat your answer.

HEISIG: I served on U-877 in an action against the enemy, and the commander was Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you successful in action against enemy ships?

HEISIG: The boat was sunk on its way to the area of operations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before you were able to sink an enemy ship?

HEISIG: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How was the boat sunk?

HEISIG: By depth charges. Two Canadian frigates sighted the U-boat and destroyed it through depth charges.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your testimony today differs in an essential point from the statement you made on the 27th of November. How did you come to make this statement of the 27th of November?

HEISIG: I made the statement in defense of my comrades who were put before a military court in Hamburg and sentenced to death for the murder of shipwrecked sailors.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your statement begins by saying that you had received reports that German sailors were being accused of murder and that you therefore considered it your duty to depose the following affidavit.

What reports had you received, and when?

HEISIG: At the beginning of the Hamburg proceedings against Kapitänleutnant Eck and his officers I was a prisoner of war in Great Britain; there I heard on the radio and read in newspapers that these officers were to be tried. Since I knew one of the accused officers, Leutnant August Hoffmann, very well and had spoken with him on this subject on two or three occasions, I considered it to be my duty to come to his assistance and to his defense.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you not told in your interrogation on the 27th of November that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been confirmed?

HEISIG: That—I don’t remember whether it was on the 27th of November, I only remember that I was told here that the death sentence had been carried out. I no longer remember the date, as I was interrogated several times.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you have knowledge of the circumstances, do you maintain that the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz mentioned in any way that fire should be opened on shipwrecked sailors?

HEISIG: No; we gathered that from his words; and from his reference to the bombing war, we gathered that total war had now to be waged against ships and crews. That is what we understood, and I talked about it to my comrades on the way back to the Hansa.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speak slowly, please.

HEISIG: We were convinced that Admiral Dönitz meant that. He did not express it clearly.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak about this point with any of your superiors at the school?

HEISIG: I left the school on the same day. But I can remember that one of my superiors, whose name to my regret I do not recall—nor do I recall the occasion—once spoke to us about this subject and advised us that, if possible, only officers should be on the bridge ready to annihilate shipwrecked sailors, should the possibility arise, or should it be necessary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One of your superiors told you that?

HEISIG: Yes, but I cannot remember in which connection and where. I received a lot of advice from my superiors on many things.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it at the school?

HEISIG: No; I left the U-boat Training Division on the same day.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you instructed at the school in the standing orders of war?

HEISIG: Yes; we were instructed in the standing orders of war.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these standing orders mention anywhere that shipwrecked sailors were to be fired on or their rescue apparatus destroyed?

HEISIG: The standing orders did not mention that. But—I think one can assume this from an innuendo of Captain Rollmann, who was then officers’ company commander—a short time before that, some teletype message had arrived containing an order prohibiting rescue measures and demanding that sea warfare should be fought with more radical, more drastic means.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you think that the prohibition of rescue measures is identical with the shooting of shipwrecked sailors?

HEISIG: We came to this. . .

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please, answer my question. Do you think these two things are identical?

HEISIG: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I am afraid the Tribunal will have to adjourn now; and I have an announcement to make. You may cross-examine tomorrow.

DR. THOMA: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: As I have already said, the Tribunal will not sit in open session this afternoon.

The announcement that I have to make is in connection with the organizations which are alleged to be criminal under Article 9 of the Charter, and this is the announcement:

The Tribunal has been giving careful consideration to the duty imposed upon it by Article 9 of the Charter.

It is difficult to determine the manner in which the representatives of the named organizations shall be permitted to appear in accordance with Article 9, without considering the exact nature of the case presented for the Prosecution.

For this reason, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that, at this stage of the Trial, with many thousands of applications being made, the case for the Prosecution should be defined with more precision than appears in the Indictment.

In these circumstances, therefore, it is the intention of the Tribunal to invite argument from the Counsel for the Prosecution and for the Defense, at the conclusion of the case by all prosecutors, in regard to the questions hereinafter set forth.

The questions which need further consideration are as follows:

1. The Charter does not define a criminal organization, and it is therefore necessary to examine the tests of criminality which must be applied and to decide the nature of the evidence to be admitted.

Many of the applicants who have made requests to be heard assert that they were conscripted into the organization, or that they were ignorant of the criminal purposes of the organization, or that they were innocent of any unlawful acts.

It will be necessary to decide whether such evidence ought to be received to rebut the charge of the criminal character of the organization, or whether such evidence ought more properly to be received at the subsequent trials under Article 10 of the Charter, when the organizations have been declared criminal, if the Tribunal so decides.

2. The question of the precise time within which the named organization is said to have been criminal is vital to the decision of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal desires to know from the Prosecution at this stage whether it is intended to adhere to the limits of time set out in the Indictment.

3. The Tribunal desires to know whether, in the light of the evidence, any class of persons included within the named organizations should be excluded from the scope of the declaration, and which, if any.

In the indictment of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Prosecution have reserved the right to request that Politische Leiter of subordinate grades or ranks, or of other types or classes, be exempted from further proceedings without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them.

Is it the intention of the Prosecution to make any such request? If so, it should be done now.

4. The Tribunal would be glad if the Prosecution would also:

(a) Summarize in respect of each named organization the elements which in their opinion justify the charge of being a criminal organization.

(b) Indicate what acts on the part of individual defendants, indicted in this Trial—in the sense used in Article 9 of the Charter—justify declaring the groups or organizations of which they are members to be criminal organizations.

(c) Submit in writing a summary of proposed findings of fact as to each organization, with respect to which a finding of criminality is asked.

The Tribunal hopes it is not necessary to say to the Prosecution that it is not seeking to interfere with the undoubted right of the Prosecution to present its case in its own way, in the light of the full knowledge of all the documents and facts which it possesses, but the duty of the Tribunal under Article 9 of the Charter makes it essential at this time to have the case clearly and precisely defined.

This announcement will be communicated to the Chief Prosecutors and to Defense Counsel in writing.

The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTY-FOURTH DAY
Tuesday, 15 January 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Counsel for the Defense wish to cross-examine this witness? [_Referring to Peter Josef Heisig, interrogated the previous day._]

[_There was no response._]

Then, Colonel Phillimore, do you wish to re-examine?

COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord; I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: Before I call my second witness, Karl Heinz Moehle, an affidavit by him is the next document in the document book.

[_Karl Heinz Moehle took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

KARL HEINZ MOEHLE (Witness): Karl Heinz Moehle.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down, if you wish.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Karl Heinz Moehle, you held the rank of Korvettenkapitän in the German Navy?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You served in the German Navy since 1930?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what decorations you hold?

MOEHLE: I received the Submarine War Medal; the Iron Cross, Second Class; the Iron Cross, First Class; the Knight’s Cross; the War Service Cross, First and Second Class; and the German Cross in Silver.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear to an affidavit covering a statement you have made on the 21st of July 1945?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I made such a statement.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you that document and ask you to say whether that is your affidavit.

[_Document 382-PS was submitted to the witness._]

MOEHLE: Yes, this is my affidavit.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that document in, which is 382-PS, and it becomes Exhibit GB-202.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the autumn of 1942 were you head of the 5th U-boat Flotilla?

MOEHLE: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you stationed at Kiel?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: How long did you hold that appointment altogether?

MOEHLE: For 4 years.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that from June 1941 until the capitulation?

MOEHLE: That is correct.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What were your duties as commander of that flotilla?

MOEHLE: My main duties as Flotilla Commander consisted of the fitting out of U-boats which were to be sent to the front from home bases, and giving them the orders of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any special responsibility to U-boat commanders in respect of the orders?

MOEHLE? Yes, Sir; it was my responsibility to see that outgoing U-boats were provided with the new orders of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any responsibility in explaining the orders?

MOEHLE: The orders of the U-boat command were always very clear and unambiguous. If there were any ambiguities I used to have these ambiguities cleared up myself at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?

MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before leaving for an operational cruise went through a so-called commander’s briefing.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will go back, if I may, for two or three questions. Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?

MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before sailing on a mission went through a briefing session at my office.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And what did that briefing session consist of? Were there any questions on the orders?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir, all experiences of previous patrols and any questions of the ship’s equipment were discussed with the commander at that session. Also, the commanders had an opportunity at the briefing to clarify any uncertainties, which might have existed in their minds, by asking questions.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Apart from your briefing sessions, did commanders also go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters for briefing?

MOEHLE: As far as that was possible it was done, especially from the moment when the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats had transferred his office from Paris to Berlin.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order in the autumn of 1942 dealing with lifeboats?

MOEHLE: Yes. In September 1942 I received a wireless message addressed to all commanders at sea, and it dealt with that question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you this document.

My Lord, that is the exhibit I have already put in as GB-199.

THE PRESIDENT: What other number has it?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is Document D-630.

[_Turning to the witness._] Is that the order you are referring to?

MOEHLE: Yes, that is the order.

COL. PHILLIMORE: From the time when you were captured until last Friday had you seen that order?

MOEHLE: No, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows, I think, that the account of the order in your statement was given from recollection?

MOEHLE: Yes, only from recollection.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, after you got that order did you go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters?

MOEHLE: Yes, at my first visit to headquarters after receipt of the order, I personally discussed it with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch who was a specialist on the staff of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what was said at that meeting?

MOEHLE: At that meeting I asked Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch how the ambiguity contained in that order—or I might say, lack of clarity—should be understood. He explained the order by two illustrations.

The first example was that of a U-boat in the outer Bay of Biscay. It was sailing on patrol when it sighted a rubber dinghy carrying survivors of a British plane. The fact that it was on an outgoing mission, that is, being fully equipped, made it impossible to take the crew of the plane on board, although, especially at that time, it appeared especially desirable to bring back specialists in navigation from shot-down aircraft crews to get useful information from them. The commander of the U-boat made a wide circle around this rubber boat and continued on his mission. When he returned from his mission he reported this case to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. The staff officers reproached him, saying that, if he were unable to bring these navigation specialists back with him, the right thing to do would have been to attack that crew, for it was to be expected that, in less than 24 hours at the latest, the dinghy would be rescued by British reconnaissance forces, and they. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t quite get what you said would have been the correct action to take. You were saying the correct thing to do would have been. . .

MOEHLE: The right thing to do would have been to attack the air crew as it was not possible to bring back the crew or these specialists, for it could be expected that that crew would be found and rescued within a short time by British reconnaissance forces, and in given circumstances might again destroy one or two German U-boats.

The second example. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did he give you any second example?

MOEHLE: Yes, the second example I am going to recount now.

Example 2. During the first month of the U-boat warfare against the United States a great quantity of tonnage—I do not recollect the exact figure—had been sunk in the shallow waters off the American coast. In these sinkings the greater part of the crews were rescued, because of the close proximity of land. That was exceedingly regrettable, as to merchant shipping not only tonnage but also crews belong, and in the meantime these crews were again able to man newly-built ships.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have told us about the ambiguity of the order. Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz worded his orders?

MOEHLE: I do not quite understand the question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz normally worded his orders?

MOEHLE: Yes. In my opinion, the order need only have read like this: It is pointed out anew that rescue measures have to be discontinued for reasons of safety for the submarines. This is how, I think, the order should have been worded—if only rescue measures had been forbidden. All. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that if it had been intended only to prohibit rescue measures it would have been sufficient to refer to the previous order?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; that would have been enough.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that previous order also marked “top secret”?

MOEHLE: I do not remember that exactly.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the propaganda at the time with regard to crews?

MOEHLE: The propaganda at that time was to the effect that the enemy was having great difficulty in finding sufficient crews for his merchant marine and. . .

THE PRESIDENT: The question as to the propaganda at that time is too general a question for him to answer.

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Honor pleases, I don’t press it.

[_Turning to the witness._] From your knowledge of the way orders were worded, can you tell the Tribunal what you understood this order to mean?

MOEHLE: The order meant, in my own opinion, that although rescue measures remained prohibited, on the other hand it was desirable in the case of sinkings of merchantmen that there should be no survivors.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And was it because you understood this to be the meaning that you went to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters?

MOEHLE: I did not go to the headquarters of the U-boat command on account of this order alone; these visits took place at frequent intervals in order to discuss other questions also and to have the opportunity of keeping constantly in touch with the views and opinions of the U-boat command, as I had to transmit them to the commanders.

COL. PHILLIMORE: How did you brief commanders on this order?

MOEHLE: At these briefing sessions I read the wording of the wireless message to the commanders without making any comment. In a very few instances some commanders asked me about the meaning of the order. In such cases I gave them the two examples that headquarters had given to me. However, I added, “U-boat command cannot give you such an order officially; everybody has to handle this according to his own conscience.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order about rescue ships?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you say what the date of that order was?

MOEHLE: I do not remember the exact date, but I think it must have been about the same as the order of September 1942.

COL. PHILLIMORE: May the witness see the Document D-663 which I put in yesterday?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is the German copy of the document that I am showing him; the original is being held.

[_Document D-663 was submitted to the witness._]

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I recognize that order.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You will note that the date on that document is the 7th of October 1943.

MOEHLE: Yes, this order is laid down there in the general Operational Order Atlantic Number 56. According to my recollection, this order was already contained in the previous effective Operational Order Number 54, that is in a wireless message containing practical experiences and instructions. I cannot remember exactly. The date is October 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, is that order in the index here?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, that is the Document D-663, which I put in yesterday as Exhibit GB-200. If it is omitted from the index, Your Lordship will remember it is the document which, as I explained yesterday, we just received.

THE PRESIDENT: Where does it come in?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It comes in after D-630.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. Thank you.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship will remember the order; it deals with rescue ships attached to convoys, and it was on the last sentence that I relied.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I only wanted to get the words of it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir. My Lord, also I have the original here now and if it is thought necessary the witness can see it, but he has seen a copy.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you remember an order about entries in logs?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. At the time, the exact date I do not remember, it had been ordered that sinkings and other acts which were in contradiction to international conventions should not be entered in the log but should be reported orally after return to the home port.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you care to say why it is that you are giving evidence in this case?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; because when I was taken prisoner it was claimed that I was the author of these orders, and I do not want to have this charge connected with my name.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for examination by my colleagues and for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any counsel for any defendant wish to ask the witness any questions?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Lieutenant Commander Moehle, since when have you been in the U-boat arm?

MOEHLE: Since the end of 1936.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz personally?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since when?

MOEHLE: Since October 1937.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you see him here in this room?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where?

MOEHLE: To the left in the rear.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz as an admiral to whom none of his flotilla chiefs and commanders could speak?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Or was the opposite the case?

MOEHLE: He could be approached by everybody at any time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Have you yourself been a commander of a U-boat?

MOEHLE: Yes, on nine operations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For how long?

MOEHLE: From the beginning of the war until April 1941.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many ships did you sink?

MOEHLE: Twenty ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After sinking ships, did you destroy the rescue equipment or fire at the survivors?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have an order to do that?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had the danger passed for a U-boat after the attack on a merchantman?

MOEHLE: No; the danger to the U-boat does not end when the attack is over.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not?

MOEHLE: Because in most instances when a ship is sunk, the ship is in a position to send SOS messages and give its position, and thus bring striking forces to attack the U-boat at the last minute.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there a maxim in the U-boat arm that fighting comes before rescuing?

MOEHLE: I never heard of that rule put in that way.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Prior to the order of September 1942 did you know of any other orders by which rescue work was prohibited if it entailed danger to the U-boat?

MOEHLE: Yes, but I do not know when and where this order was laid down. It had been ordered that, as a matter of principle, the safety of one’s own boat takes precedence.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this ordered only once, or in several instances?