Chapter XI: Section 3 (8)

COL. POKROVSKY: The photostatic copy of the original document, in the German language, is at present at the disposal of the Tribunal. May I continue?

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is this the original?

COL. POKROVSKY: It is a photostat.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that we must insist upon having the original.

COL. POKROVSKY: The original document is at the disposal of the Soviet Government and, if the Tribunal wishes, it can be sent for and presented to the Tribunal a little later. The photostat is certified.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must have the original documents. After the original documents have been produced and exhibit numbers given to them, they will remain in the hands of the Tribunal. Of course, the subject of the translations is quite a different one, but for the purpose of insuring that we get really genuine evidence we must have the originals deposited with the General Secretary.

COL. POKROVSKY: I note the wish of the Tribunal and we shall give instruction for the original documents to be submitted to the Tribunal, although in this case we have followed the established precedent where the Tribunal considers it sufficient to accept the certified photostats. We can submit the original, but we shall have to do it somewhat later, as not all the requisite material is in Nuremberg at the present time.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so long as you undertake to do it. But I do not think you are right in saying that it is the practice that has been already established, because we have been demanding the production of the original document from the French prosecutors, and they have been produced.

COL. POKROVSKY: We shall take the necessary measures so that the Tribunal will receive, although of course somewhat later, all the original documents from which the present photostats were taken. May I now continue? I now continue the quotation. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I imagine that you will be able to produce tomorrow the originals of the documents which were referred to today.

COL. POKROVSKY: I cannot promise that, because not all the originals are here. A considerable part of these documents are unique and consequently not kept in Nuremberg. Here we keep only a certain part of the originals. All that I can do is to submit, in the future, the originals at our disposal. Those which we do not have here we shall request the Soviet Government to send over in exchange for the photostats. This we can do.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal had better adjourn for the purpose of considering this matter.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the matter of the deposition of original documents, and they wish the following procedure to be adopted:

In the first place, they want original documents deposited with the General Secretary of the Tribunal, wherever possible. Secondly, where it is impossible for original documents to be deposited, or highly inconvenient, they will accept photostat copies of the original documents, provided that a certificate accompanies the photostat document that it is a true copy of an original document, and that the original is an authentic document, giving the origin of the original document and the place of its present custody. Thirdly, they will accept photostat copies for the present, on the undertaking of counsel that certificates, such as I have indicated, will be furnished as soon as possible.

Is that clear, Colonel Pokrovsky?

COL. POKROVSKY: I would ask the Tribunal to explain one point to me. Do I understand that the Tribunal only confirms its former decision and practice, which was established in connection with the presentation of the document in evidence by my American and British colleagues, or is it something new that the Tribunal is introducing? I am asking this because a similar document to the one which caused the interruption in my presentation today has already been accepted as a photostat in the same Trial under Exhibit Number USA-95 or Document 2788-PS. Therefore, it is not quite clear to me whether I am dealing with a new decision or with the confirmation of an old practice.

THE PRESIDENT: I think what you have stated is true, that this particular document does not appear to have any certificate that it is a true copy. But the Tribunal expects that the United States will produce such a certificate that it is a true copy of an authentic document and will state the origin and the custody of the original document.

COL. POKROVSKY: Pray forgive me, but I consider that the question which I wish to elucidate is of equal interest to all the prosecutors. Am I, and with me all the representatives of the Prosecution, to understand the decision of the Tribunal to mean that we are to present supplementary documentation in support of all photostats, including the photostats previously accepted by the Tribunal, or does it only refer to documents which the Soviet Delegation will present in the future?

THE PRESIDENT: If a document had been accepted in photostatic form and there has been no certificate that it was a true copy of an authentic document, then such a certificate must be given. And we desire that the certificate should also show that the document was authentic, and the place of its present custody. And that applies equally to all the chief prosecutors.

COL. POKROVSKY: Now, I understand that the Tribunal is confirming its former practice which means that we can present a photostat, but that they must be certified and that the originals should be presented whenever possible. Have I understood you correctly?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we desire originals, if possible. If it is impossible or if it is highly inconvenient, then we will accept photostats. And in the meantime, and for your convenience—because this practice has not been perhaps adequately stated before—we will accept photostat copies without certificate, on your undertaking that you will have the certificate later on. Is that clear?

COL. POKROVSKY: I understand. The former practice will continue in operation.

If the Tribunal will permit me, I shall draw your attention to the paragraph the misunderstanding about which led to the interruption of my presentation. I have in mind the three last lines of Page 196 of the document book before you:

“The final aim of the forthcoming negotiations between the
Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovakian Government is to
avoid entering the Government by widening the scope of their
demands and by formulating them with ever-increasing precision.
In the course of negotiations it must be pointed out very
clearly that the sole partner in these negotiations with the
Czechoslovakian Government is the Sudeten German Party, and not
the Reich Government. . . .”

Now I can omit a few lines and go on to Page 199:

“. . . for purposes of further collaboration Konrad Henlein was
advised to maintain the closest possible contact with the Reich
Minister and with the leader of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle,
as well as with the German Minister in Prague, who was
representing the Reich Foreign Minister there. The task of the
German Minister in Prague was to uphold, unofficially, the
Sudeten German Party’s demands, especially in private
discussions with Czechoslovakian statesmen, by referring to them
as reasonable, but without exerting any direct influence on the
scope of the Party’s demands.

“Finally, the question of the advisability of the Sudeten German
Party’s collaboration with the other national minorities in
Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks, was discussed. The
Reich Minister decided that ‘the Party should be given a free
hand to contact the other national groups with activities of a
parallel nature which might be considered useful. Berlin, 29
March 1938.’”

Mr. President, Your Honors, you will find on Page 200, Volume I, Part 1 of the document book, a list of those present at the conference of 29 March 1938, in Berlin. The part which I shall quote is marked with a red pencil:

“Reichsminister Von Ribbentrop, State Secretary Von Mackensen,
Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker, Minister Plenipotentiary to
Prague Eisenlohr, Minister Stiebe, Legationsrat Von Twardovsky,
Legationsrat Altenburg, Legationsrat Kordt (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs). Others of the group were SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz,
Professor Haushofer (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle), Konrad
Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, Dr. Kuenzel, Dr. Kreisel (Sudeten
German Party).”

It is not difficult to draw the correct conclusions as to the genuine intentions of the fascist conspirators with respect to Czechoslovakia, if only from the sole fact that among those attending the conference were such people as the Defendant Ribbentrop, two ministers, two representatives of the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, including one Obergruppenführer of the SS, the prospective Secretary of State of the Czecho-Moravian Protectorate, Karl Hermann Frank, and the leader of the so-called Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein, a paid _factotum_ and _agent provocateur_ of Hitler.

German diplomatic missions directed the activities of Nazi Party branches abroad. For this purpose the leader of the AO, Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, was appointed State Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

On 3 June 1938 two documents were prepared by SS-man Lorenz, a participant of the conference to which I have just called the attention of the Tribunal. I shall read both of them. The first one, referring to the interview with Ward Price, indicates that Henlein was under the direct control of the SS, and it was to the SS that he was responsible for his activities. This document also contains the direct threat to resort to a “radical operation” in order to bring about the solution of the so-called Sudeten German problem.

I will read this short document into the Record under Document Number USSR-270 in full; it is on Page 202, Volume I, Part 1, of the document book:

“Regarding the interview with Ward Price which appeared in the
foreign press, SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz requested an
explanation from Henlein. Henlein stated about as follows:

“Ward Price was present at the burial of those executed in the
town of Eger. He asked Henlein’s collaborator, Sebekovsky, to
arrange a meeting with Henlein for him. Henlein knew of the
interview given by the Führer to Ward Price. He had a talk with
Ward Price over a cup of tea. There was no real interview. The
conversation about the Sudeten German and the Czech problems
took the form of a talk about appendicitis. In this connection
Henlein said that one could suffer chronic attacks of
appendicitis, but the best thing was a radical operation. Later
on, when Ward Price published an account of this conversation,
Henlein intended to disavow him. But at that moment, an order
came through the Legation in Prague from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, that Henlein should settle the matter with Ward Price
amicably, since the latter was in the Führer’s confidence and
was in no way to be insulted by Sudeten Germans. When Henlein
met W. P. again, he backed out, putting the blame on the members
of the Sudeten German Party. For this reason, he wrote a letter
to W. P., thus settling the matter. Lorenz.”

The second document, which is on Page 203, which is our Document Number USSR-268, shows that, upon direct orders of the SS and the leaders of the Hitlerite conspiracy, Henlein negotiated with the Czech Government for the settlement of the Sudeten German question solely to create a provocation, and that these negotiations were closely followed by the leaders of the fascist conspiracy who guided Henlein’s further steps.

I would now like to quote from that document:

“In his conversation with SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz, Henlein
put the following question: ‘What shall I do if Czechoslovakia,
under foreign pressure, suddenly fulfills all my demands and as
counterdemand asks me to enter the Government?’

“It was quite clear that this question at that moment would not
be acute, and that further lengthy and painful negotiations were
inevitable. Nevertheless he asked for instructions on his
possible line of action regarding this problem, in case he were
not able to communicate with Germany.

“He himself suggested the following: If Czechoslovakia accedes
to all my requests I will answer, ‘Yes,’ but I will insist upon
the change of its foreign policy. This the Czechs would never
accept. Henlein was promised that this question would be
elucidated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lorenz.”

A very brief excerpt from a top-secret document of state. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t it time to break off? It is now a quarter past 5.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 February 1946, at 1000 hours._]

FIFTY-FIFTH DAY
Saturday, 9 February 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. POKROVSKY: May I continue with my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.

COL. POKROVSKY: The end of the session prevented me yesterday from quoting a brief excerpt from a very secret, a very important state document, dated 22 September 1938. I propose to begin today’s work as from this point, and to read into the record the first six lines of the document submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-267 (Document Number USSR-267), which you will find, Your Honors, in Volume I, Part 1, Page 202 of your document book. This brief excerpt shows with absolute clearness the questions about the meaning of the so-called Sudetendeutsche Freikorps, the existence of which was briefly referred to in former sessions.

I quote the first six lines from notes made after a telephone conversation which took place in Berlin between one of the leaders of the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the Government in Berlin, at 1900 hours on 22 September 1938. Permit me to read these six lines into the record:

“Herr Schmidt, from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, telephoned
at 1900 as follows:

“The Command of the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps has just
communicated the following:

“First Lieutenant Köchling transmitted the following Führer
order: ‘Freikorps has to carry out the occupation of regions
evacuated by the Czechs. Large-scale operations, however, may be
executed only with the Führer’s personal approval.’”

The rest of this document, signed by Von Stechow, is of no interest and I will not read it into the record.

As far as I can judge, the minutes of Hitler’s reception of the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chvalkovsky, on 21 January 1939—that is shortly before the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia—are of great interest. Hitler’s mendacious and pompous statements with respect to the independence of small nations, statements recorded in the document I am about to quote, are characteristic of his perfidious tactics.

The document which I am going to read into the record as Exhibit Number USSR-266 (Document Number USSR-266) you will find, Your Honors, on Page 203, Part 1 of Volume I of our document book:

“Chvalkovsky began by thanking the Führer for having done his
country the honor of receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs
twice within 3 months. He had come here to inform the Führer
that he had strictly fulfilled the promise made to him on 14
October although this had cost him a very great deal of
trouble. . . .

“The Führer thanked him for his statements. The foreign policy
of a people is determined by its home policy. It is quite
impossible to carry out a foreign policy of type ‘A’ and at the
same time a home policy of type ‘B.’ It could succeed only for a
short time. From the very beginning the development of events in
Czechoslovakia was bound to lead to a catastrophe. This
catastrophe had been averted thanks to the moderate conduct of
Germany.

“Had Germany not followed the National Socialist principles
which do not permit of territorial annexations the fate of
Czechoslovakia would have followed another course. Whatever
remains today of Czechoslovakia has been rescued not by Beneš,
but by the National Socialist tendencies.”

I omit a few sentences and continue:

“For instance, the strength of the Dutch and Danish armies rests
not in themselves alone but in realizing the fact that the whole
world was convinced of the absolute neutrality of these states.
When war broke out, it was well known that the problem of
neutrality was one of extreme importance to these countries. The
case of Belgium was somewhat different, as that country had an
agreement with the French General Staff. In this particular case
Germany was compelled to forestall possible eventualities. These
small countries were defended not by their armies but by the
trust shown in their neutrality.”

You will find a further part of this quotation on Page 207:

“Chvalkovsky, backed by Mastny, again spoke about the situation
in Czechoslovakia and about the healthy farmers there. Before
the crisis, the people did not know what to expect of Germany.
But when they saw that they would not be exterminated and that
the Germans wished only to lead their people back home, they
heaved a sigh of relief.

“World propaganda, against which the Führer had been struggling
for so long a time, was now focused on tiny Czechoslovakia.
Chvalkovsky begged the Führer to address, from time to time, a
few kind words to the Czech people. That might work miracles.
The Führer is unaware of the great value attached to his words
by the Czech people. If he would only openly declare that he
intended to collaborate with the Czech people—and with the
people, themselves, not with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs—all foreign propaganda would be utterly defeated.

“The Führer concluded the conversation by expressing his belief
in a promising future.”

These notes are signed by Hewel.

It would now be opportune to refer once again to a document which has already been mentioned in the Tribunal. I mean a so-called top-secret document, for officers only, of the 30th of May 1938. It bears the number OKW 42/38, and under Document Number 388-PS has already been presented to the Tribunal by my honorable colleagues of the United States Delegation. The Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. likewise referred to this document in his opening statement.

Formulating the gist of the fascist conspiracy against Czechoslovakia, Hitler announced that it was his irrevocable decision to defeat Czechoslovakia in the immediate future and by one single military operation. He divided his task into two parts: political and military. Then, with his characteristic and unbounded cynicism, he declares—his quotation is to be found on Page 209 of Volume I, Part 1 of the document book:

“The most favorable, both from the political and military
standpoint, would be a lightning blow to be delivered under the
pretext of some incident which will provoke Germany to abrupt
action. . . .”

The document bears Hitler’s signature. Such was the authentic program of Hitler and his accomplices concerning Czechoslovakia, drawn up for a long time in advance of the day when Chvalkovsky requested that criminal “to address from time to time a few kind words to the Czech people.”

Even if in his public utterances Hitler sometimes used what Chvalkovsky called “kind words,” the line of the actual relations was developing in an entirely different direction. But even this is not all. We shall postpone the question of the provocative incident until the end.

The notes to the report on Fall Grün of 24 August 1938 have already been read into the record in the most important part, as Document Number 388-PS. Here are two additional paragraphs which should be read. Your Honors will find on Page 214 of Volume I of the document book:

“Fall Grün will start with the creation of an incident in
Czechoslovakia which will give Germany a pretext for military
intervention.

“It is of the greatest importance to fix the exact day and hour
for staging the incident.

“This incident must be provoked under weather conditions
favorable for our superior air force in carrying out the
operation and it should be timed in such a way that the
respective notification should authentically reach us by midday
of X-1 Day. This will enable us to follow it up immediately by
issuing the order X, on X-1 Day, at 1400 hours.”

The document concluded as follows—see Page 215 of your document book:

“The purpose of these statements is to show how greatly
interested the Armed Forces are in the incident, and that they
should know well in advance the intentions of the Führer,
inasmuch as the organization of the incident will be entrusted,
in any case, to the Abwehr.”

The document is signed by Jodl. These are not mere words. This is a plan of infamous provocation; a plan which, as we already know, has been carried into effect.

Document Number 388-PS has already been accepted by you as evidence presented by the Delegation of the United States. I should like only to stress one point: The murderers and invaders not only develop in cold blood the plans of their crimes but are also anxious to put them into effect under the most advantageous conditions possible for themselves. They need fine weather and at least 24 hours for the final preparation. Moreover, they need an incident, provoked by themselves, to justify their foul crimes in the “eyes of at least some part of the world community.” This latter fact demonstrates that the Hitlerites themselves were perfectly aware of the criminality of their actions.

In passing, I wish to draw your attention to one point: OKW bears direct responsibility for the criminal character of these actions. They cannot plead, “We know not what we did.” The _agents provocateurs_ and aggressors, in the uniform of the highest ranks of the German Army, were the first to name themselves _agents provocateurs_ and aggressors.

Finally, I have to inform the Tribunal that one of the ultimate aims of the fascist invasion of Czechoslovakia was the liquidation of this historically constituted Slav state.

On Page 36 of the official report of the Czechoslovak Government, the original of which was submitted to you yesterday, we can read the following quotation from a statement made by Hitler in the summer of 1932 in the presence of Darré, Rauschning, and other high fascist officials. I shall quote this excerpt, which is on Page 38 of the Volume I, Part 1 of your document book:

“The Bohemian-Moravian Basin . . . will be colonized with German
peasants. We shall transplant the Czechs to Siberia or the
Volhynian district. They must get out of Central Europe. . . .”

This statement by Hitler is quoted in the Czechoslovak report from Rauschning’s book _Hitler Speaks_, Page 46.

I consider it necessary to read into the record a passage from the Czechoslovak report, which immediately follows the above-mentioned quotation—Page 36 of the Russian translation, the last paragraph at the end of the page. You will find this quotation on Page 39, Volume I, Part 1 of the document book, in the last paragraph of this page:

“This criminal plan was approved by Karl Hermann Frank,
Secretary of State of the Reich Protector in Prague from 17
March 1939 and Minister of State in Prague from 1943, known to
the world as the Butcher of Lidice. Interrogated on this point
by Colonel Ecer, in Wiesbaden on 29 May 1945, Frank declared:

“‘The plan for the evacuation of the Czech people to the East,
as mentioned above and decided in Party circles, roughly
coincides with the passage quoted.’”

The Defendant Neurath was Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia from 17 March 1938 to 28 September 1941. He did much to destroy Czechoslovakia as a state entity.

Appendix 1 to the Report of the Czechoslovak Government reads as follows—you will find this extract on Page 167 of Volume I, Part 2 of the document book: “The Reich Protector was the highest of the Reich authorities, agencies, and officials in the Protectorate.” The Defendant Neurath must not escape responsibility for these crimes.

My colleagues of the Soviet Delegation will submit evidence to show the Tribunal the upheaval in the life of the work-loving Czech people, from the moment that the Hitlerite aggressors began to put into practice their plan for the destruction of Czechoslovakia as a state entity.

When we turn to the material concerning the aggression against Poland, we find there many features in common with the crimes of the conspirators directed against Czechoslovakia.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I think it is only a mistake in the translation into English, but it is stated in our copy that the Defendant Neurath was Reich Protector for Czechoslovakia and Moravia from the 17th of March 1938. No doubt you said 1939. Did you?

COL. POKROVSKY: I am afraid that what I said was not quite correctly heard. I said from 17 March 1938 to 28 September 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: It should have been 1939, should it not?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, if I am not mistaken, that would be correct.

I take the liberty of repeating that when studying the documents with regard to the aggression against Poland, we find there many features in common with the crimes which the conspirators committed against Czechoslovakia. I have in mind the systematic violation of treaties and solemn declarations, false assurances, the creation of a paid Fifth Column organized on a military footing, and the sudden infliction of a treacherous blow. This can be proved by a whole series of documents.

An official report of the Polish Government contains a detailed list of the treaties violated by the conspirators. We submit the document to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USSR-93 (Document Number USSR-93). Inasmuch as we are concerned with the facts of common knowledge and of those already commented on in the opening statements of the prosecutor, I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this part of the Polish report without further proof, namely of the first two articles of the Count “Crimes against Peace.”

I wish to read into the record four lines from Paragraph 3 of this Count which begins on Page 219 of your document book. This concerns the Polish-German declaration of 26 January 1934:

“Both governments are convinced that the relations between their
respective countries will in this manner develop fruitfully and
lead to the establishment of neighborly relationships which will
contribute to the well-being not only of both their countries,
but of the other peoples of Europe as well.”

The Defendant Von Neurath signed this declaration on behalf of Germany.

I now deem it necessary to read into the record an excerpt from a declaration made by the Defendant Göring during his visit to Warsaw on 16 February 1937, which is contained in the report of the Polish Government. You will find this excerpt which I want to quote, on Page 220, Volume II, Part 1 of the document book. Göring made this declaration to the representatives of the Polish Government. I quote:

“On the German side, there is no desire whatever to deprive
Poland of any part of her territory. Germany is completely
reconciled to her present territorial status. Germany would not
attack Poland and has no intention of seizing the Polish
Corridor. We do not want the Corridor. I say sincerely and
categorically that we do not need the Corridor. Just as Germany
trusts and believes that Poland has no intention of seizing
Eastern Prussia and the remaining part of Silesia, so can Poland
believe that Germany has no intention of depriving her of any
rights and possessions.”

I think that Paragraph 6 of the Polish official report also deserves to be read in full. This paragraph is on Page 220 of your document book—Point 6:

“On 5 November 1937 the Polish and German Governments issued
identical declarations concerning the treatment of minorities.
The declaration concludes with the following passage:

“‘The above principles should in no way affect the duties of the
minorities of complete loyalty to the state to which they
belong. They have been inspired by a desire to secure for the
minorities equitable conditions of life and harmonious
collaboration with the nationals of the state in which they
live—a state of affairs which will contribute to the
progressive strengthening of the friendly and good-neighborly
relations between Poland and Germany.’”

On 2 September 1939 Polish antiaircraft units brought down a German aircraft near Posen. A secret order issued by the Wehrmacht was found on the pilots. It contained, among others, the following sentence—this quotation you will find on Page 224, Volume I, Part 2 of the document book: “Reservists of German race should attempt to avoid being mobilized in the Polish Army and should join the German Army.”

Then follows the detailed enumeration of insignia by which all people “who assist the German Army” would be recognized. The order states that they will be supplied with—I quote one paragraph as it is stated in the original Polish report on the same page, that is 224: “2. For weapons—pistols of type Numbers 14 and 34 and also, in certain cases, with grenades of the Czech type.” It is quite obvious that the latter was done for the purpose of provocation. The order bore the signature of “Major Reiss.”

Inasmuch as this fact is ascertained in the manner provided for by Article 21 of the Charter, I request you to accept the fact stated by me as evidence.

I wish to submit to the Tribunal one more excerpt from Exhibit Number USSR-93. The part quoted is on Page 7, Paragraph 23 and it bears the customary red pencil mark used in our work for convenience. You will find that quotation on Page 223, Volume I, Part 2 of the document book:

“Evidence gathered by the Polish Army in the course of the
campaign of September 1939 indicates the following:

“a) As regards the diversionist activities in southwestern
Poland, those activities were organized beforehand and were only
carried out by agents dropped by parachutes. German espionage
was organized by special emissaries posing as travelling
teachers who trained spies and diversionists. Every year a
number of young Germans would leave every German colony to
proceed to the Reich. There they received special training, and
upon their return to Poland, did penance. They contacted the
local authorities, told them about cruelties of the Nazi and
expressed their joy at having returned to their ‘dear homeland.’
But these same Germans retained constant contact with their
agents in Germany and supplied them with information either by
mail or through the travelling teachers.

“b) Besides the agents who were recruited among the young people
and appointed to collaborate with the German section of the
population, there also existed a group of leaders and
instructors, consisting of officers who were supplied with
regular passports and who came to Poland long before the
outbreak of hostilities.”

Thanks to evidence discovered in the course of investigation, the Polish Government has ascertained that the main diversionist nucleus consisted of Hitler Youth groups known as the Hitler Jugend. The Defendant Schirach was, as we know, the leader of this fascist organization.

In Paragraph 21 of our Exhibit USSR-93, we find information on this subject, which deserves to be read into the record. Volume I, Part 2, Page 223.

Here are the details relating to the organization of the system of diversionist activities:

“a) The agents were recruited mainly from among the groups of
young people known as the Hitler Jugend, and also among men and
women, mainly of German nationality, who were recruited in
Poland.

“b) Special courses, lasting from 2 weeks to 3 months, were
organized for these agents on Reich territory.

“c) The members of these courses were split up into two
categories. The first consisted of individuals possessing a
thorough knowledge of the Polish language who were entrusted
with special missions to be carried out in the rear of the
Polish Army. The second category consisted of individuals who
were to mingle with the crowds of Poles fleeing from the war and
the air-raids.

“d) Shortly before the war the students went through an
additional course of instruction in special camps where they
were assigned to ‘districts for diversionist activities.’”

And now I shall turn to the documents, demonstrating the falsehood and hypocrisy of other declarations made by the Hitlerite conspirators on international questions concerning Poland. For this purpose, I shall quote Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the section entitled “Crimes against Peace,” again our Exhibit Number USSR-93. These would be the last paragraphs on Page 4 and the top of Page 5 of the Russian text: In your document book these quotations are marked on Page 220 of Volume I, Part 2, and on Page 221. I shall announce it when I pass on to Page 221.

“Paragraph 7: On 5 November 1937 the then Polish Ambassador was
received by Hitler in the presence of the Defendant Von Neurath.
On this occasion Hitler declared:

“‘There will be no changes in the legal and political status of
Danzig. The rights of the Polish population in Danzig will be
respected. The rights of Poland in Danzig will not be violated.’

“Twice on this occasion, Hitler repeated with pathos, ‘Danzig
ist mit Polen verbunden (Danzig is bound to Poland).’

“Paragraph 8: The first hints of the changes in the status of
Danzig were made by the Defendant Ribbentrop on 25 October 1938.
He hinted at the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich in
exchange for an extension of the German-Polish pact for 25 years
and a guarantee of the German-Polish frontiers. Poland was to
keep the Danzig railroads and to retain economic facilities in
return for her assent to the building of an ex-territorial
Autobahn and a railroad through Pomerania.

“This proposal was rejected.

“Paragraph 9”—this is Page 221, Volume I, Part 2 of the
document book.—“Later on, during his visit to Warsaw, the
Defendant Ribbentrop assured the Polish Government that there
would be no _fait accompli_ on the territory of the Free
City—25-27 January 1939.”

It is known that during the last months preceding 1 September 1939 concentrations of German mobilized military forces were carried out. Border clashes then took place. I think that the cause of these clashes will become quite obvious after I have read into the record the notes on Fall Grün, Document Number 388-PS, signed by Jodl.

On 15 April 1939 the late President of the United States of America, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, made an appeal to the world and to the leaders of Germany and Poland with a view to preventing further complications in Europe.

On 28 April and 5 May 1939 the Polish Government proposed to the Government of Hitler Germany a practical solution for the problem of the Free City of Danzig.

On 23 August 1939 the King of Belgium addressed to the world a radio appeal for peace.

On 24 August 1939 the President of the United States of America appealed once again to the leaders of the Reich and Poland.

The Polish Ambassador in Berlin, acting on the advice of the British Ambassador in Warsaw, had a conference with Ribbentrop on 31 August.

I should like to quote two paragraphs, 18 and 19, of Exhibit Number USSR-93, marked with red pencil on Page 6 of the Russian original; in your document book they are found on Page 222, Volume I, Part 2:

“18. The German note stating the conditions for the settlement
of the conflict with Poland was broadcast over the German radio
on 31 August 1939, at 9 p.m. This note, however, was not handed
to the Polish Ambassador until the evening of 1 September 1939.
This was a few hours after German Armed Forces, both from the
air and the land, were in the process of seizing Polish
territory, in the early hours of 1 September 1939.

“19. In this way Germany attacked Poland in violation of her
international assurance, without a previous declaration of war
and at a time when her actions had convinced the Polish
Government that further negotiations between the two countries
were pending, with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement
of this dispute.”

I have at my disposal the original document concerning the Danzig question, found by the Red Army in the archives of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I present it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-185 (Document Number USSR-185), and I must inform you that acting upon a request formulated yesterday, we have added to the photostat copy already on our files, the original copy of this highly important historical document. It has now been placed at the disposal of the Tribunal.

On the first page you will see a telegram form, which proves that on 1 September 1939 at 5 a.m. a telegram was handed in at the telegraph office at Danzig; this telegram, registered as Number 0166, consisted of 202 words and was addressed to the Führer and Reich Chancellor in Berlin. On the second page you will see the text of this telegram of 202 words, which bears the seal of the Gauleiter of the Nazi Party in Danzig. I take the liberty of reading to you these 202 words which form a part of the history of the fascist conspirators’ Crimes against Peace:

“Telegram to the Führer.

“My Führer:

“I have just signed, and by this act have put into force, the
following basic state law providing for the reunion of Danzig
with the German Reich:

“Basic state law of the Free City of Danzig of 1 September 1939,
concerning the reunion of Danzig with the German Reich.

“For the purpose of relieving the dire needs of the people and
the state of the Free City of Danzig, I promulgate the following
basic state law:

“Article I:

Hereby the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig is
immediately abrogated.

“Article II:

Legislative and executive power will, in the future, be
exercised exclusively by the Chief of State.

“Article III:

The Free City of Danzig, together with its territory and
population, immediately becomes an integral part of the German
Reich.

“Article IV:

Until the definite decision about the introduction of the Law of
the German Reich by the Führer, all the laws, the Constitution
excepted, in force at the moment of the promulgation of the
present basic law, remain in force.

“Danzig, 1 September 1939. Signed: Albert Forster, Gauleiter.

“I beg you, my Führer, on behalf of Danzig and of its
population, to approve this basic state law and to confirm by
Reich statute the reunion with the German Reich.

“Danzig enthusiastically extends to you, my Führer, a feeling of
endless gratitude and eternal devotion.

“Heil to you, my Führer. Albert Forster, Gauleiter.”

And now that the documents which establish the actual line of conduct of the fascist conspirators with regard to Poland have been submitted to the Tribunal, it seems to me opportune to refer, be it only summarily, to excerpts from Fall Weiss as well as from the statements and pronouncements by Hitler and Ribbentrop, after which I shall read into the record a new document, which is Exhibit Number USSR-172 (Document Number USSR-172). This document represents the secret notes by Bormann concerning a conversation on Poland which took place in Hitler’s apartment on 2 October 1940.

On 30 January 1934 Hitler made a speech in his capacity of Chancellor of the Reich. It concerned a number of problems, including relations with Poland. There is no need to quote it in detail. At present, only two or three sentences can be of interest to us. I quote excerpts from Document Number TC-70:

“. . . It seems to me that we must show, by a concrete example,
that disagreements, however indisputable, need not prevent the
finding of a _modus vivendi_ which would serve usefully the
cause of peace as well as the welfare of both nations.”

I shall now skip several paragraphs and quote one of the concluding sentences. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, it is pointed out to me, and I intervene for the purpose of getting the record correct, that the document is dated not the 30th of January 1934, but 30 January 1943. Do you agree with this?

COL. POKROVSKY: In my report I see the date 30 January 1934.

THE PRESIDENT: That is right, yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: I shall continue the quotation which concludes Hitler’s pronouncement:

“The German Government is resolved and prepared to develop its
political and economic relations with Poland, in accordance with
the present agreement, in such a way as to ensure that a period
of useful co-operation may follow one of fruitless reticence.

“The Chancellor has here expressed his particular satisfaction
with the clarification of relations between Danzig and Poland.”

On 26 September 1938 Hitler again spoke of Poland in one of his usual speeches. I consider it essential to quote a short excerpt from this speech—Document Number TC-29:

“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that
of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and
Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted
to prevent it.”

I do not consider it necessary to read the entire document, and I will therefore omit a few sentences.

“Precisely a year later it was possible to reach an agreement
which, in the first place, definitely eliminated the danger of a
conflict for a period of 10 years.

“We are all convinced that this agreement will lead to a lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which have to
exist side by side, and neither can eliminate the other.

“A state with a 33 million population will always strive for an
outlet to the sea.

“Because of that, a way for understanding had to be found. It
has been found and will be more and more consolidated.”

In absolute conformity with this official and, from beginning to end, deceitful speech of Hitler’s, the Defendant Ribbentrop, speaking in Warsaw on 25 January 1939, stated—this quotation will be found in Document Number 2530-PS:

“It is a fundamental part of German foreign policy in accordance
with the firm will of the Führer of the German people that the
friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based on the
existing treaty, be strengthened progressively and deepened.”

Omitting one paragraph of this document, which has already been read in court and submitted to the Tribunal as the Document Number 2530-PS, I wish to repeat only one sentence of it:

“Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with
complete confidence upon the solid basis of their mutual
relations.”

Need I remind the Tribunal that in the Document L-79 already presented, which is a record of the conference on 23 May 1939 at Hitler’s new Reich Chancellery, among the many other openly aggressive declarations and statements of policy by Hitler, this man uttered the following sentence:

“Thus, there is no question of sparing Poland, and the decision
remains to attack Poland at the first opportunity. It is
impossible to expect a repetition of the operation against
Czechoslovakia. This time it will mean war.”

It must be stated in all fairness that this war was a surprise for Poland only. The fascist conspirators had, for a long time, carefully prepared for it. I now turn to Document C-120, a considerable part of which has already been read into the record. I should like to submit several excerpts from this document concerning the conspiracy of the Hitlerites directed against Poland, excerpts which have not yet been read into the record. I should like to draw your attention to individual sentences, which naturally did not attract the attention of the counsel who offered this document in evidence because they deal with relatively small details. But now these sentences are decisive and are of primary importance. They are highly characteristic and essential to a correct evaluation of the material I am about to present.

In the Document Number C-120 (Exhibit Number GB-41), marked, “for commanding officers only; top secret; matter for Chief of Staff; only through officer; General Headquarters of the Armed Forces WFA 37/39 Chefs (L-Ia)” just preceding the text of the document the subject is indicated as follows:

“Subject: Instructions for the Armed Forces for 1939-1940.
Directive concerning the uniform preparation of the Armed Forces
for 1939-1940 is hereby restated.”

This sentence clearly and definitely indicates that already previously, that is, before 3 April 1939, there existed some other directives on this very question.

The following is said in Paragraph 3 of the document cited:

“Opinions of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as
the data for the calendar schedule, will be submitted to the OKW
on 1 May 1939.”

Already by 1 May 1939 Germany had a revised, modernized, and detailed plan for an aggression against Poland. And Hitler, while playing the part of one insulted by Poland, waited only for a suitable moment to declare that he had no choice but to destroy the Polish State.

In one of the appendices to the document quoted—it is also listed as Document Number C-120 (Exhibit Number GB-41) but was not read into the record—there is one feature of great importance. The document is signed by Hitler and bears the date 11 April 1939. It was prepared in five originals only. I offer in evidence a copy of the second original.

“Directive concerning the uniform preparation of the Armed
Forces for 1939-1940.

“I will expound, at a later date, the future objectives of the
Armed Forces as well as the preparations for war which follow
therefrom.

“Until the directive becomes effective, the Armed Forces must be
ready to accomplish the following tasks:

“I) Securing the frontiers of the German Reich and protection
from sudden air offensives; II) Fall Weiss; III) Occupation of
Danzig.

“Signed: Hitler.”

I will now read into the record the first paragraph of Appendix 3, entitled the “Occupation of Danzig.”

“The surprise occupation of the Free City of Danzig may come
into question—independently of Fall Weiss—in utilization of a
favorable political condition.”

I think that we can dispense with the reading of the remaining text of the document.

If it please the Tribunal, it is worthy of note that, according to German plans the occupation of Danzig was regarded either as an integral part of the aggression against Poland or, in case of a different political situation, as a completely independent operation, but in both cases it was planned well in advance.

The same set of documents, listed as Number C-120, includes a top-secret directive intended exclusively for commanding officers and was to be transmitted through officers only. It is important to note that the subject of this document, which I submit to the Tribunal, is indicated as follows: Instructions concerning the uniform preparation for war of the Armed Forces for the years 1939-1940. Just as the previous ones, this document was not intended for a wide circle of readers. It was typed in seven originals only. The fascist conspirators were not very anxious to popularize their planned preparation for war.

And again, in the appendix to directive OKW 37/39, which I have already submitted to the Tribunal and which is entitled, “Special Orders for Fall Weiss,” there is one very significant sentence. I shall read into the Record the penultimate subparagraph of Paragraph 2:

“In case of a public announcement of general mobilization
(Mobplan) for the Armed Forces, the mobilization will
automatically cover the entire civilian network, including war
production. A public announcement, however, of mobilization
should not be counted on, should military events be confined to
Fall Weiss.”

It seems highly significant to me that the fascist conspirators, though fully conscious of the fact that war was to begin, had planned the execution of their criminal intent without announcing any mobilization.

And finally, I should like to point out that in Keitel’s order to the Armed Forces, Number 37/39, of 3 April 1939, issued in connection with Fall Weiss, the following directives by Hitler were made public:

“I. Operational plan Fall Weiss must be elaborated with a view
to the fact that its execution must be possible at any time, as
from 1 September 1939.”

We know that the invasion of Poland was, in fact, started on 1 September 1939—in short, on the very first day on which the German Armed Forces had to be fully ready for action.

Operational Order Number 1, 25039, of 21 August 1939, issued to the Command of Naval Group OST, on board the battleship _Schleswig Holstein_, stated as follows—this document has already been submitted to the Tribunal as a German photostatic copy:

“I. General situation. a) Political: All the armed forces must
be defeated by means of a lightning thrust, to enable the
creation in the East of a situation favorable for the defense of
the Reich. The Free City of Danzig will be declared a Reich
city.”

It is worth while to bear this sentence in mind when speaking of the “free expression of will by the Danzig population,” which allegedly aspired to become part of the Reich. It must not be forgotten that this free expression of will had been foreseen by the above operational Order Number 1, to the very day.

To conclude, I consider it essential to read into the record, almost in full, a rather long but exceptionally important document. I have in mind a note by the Defendant Bormann of 2 October 1940, referring to a conversation about Poland. This conversation was held after a dinner which took place in Hitler’s apartment. You will find this note on Page 311, Volume I, Part 2 of the document book:

“Secret; Berlin, 2 October 1940; note.

“On 2 October 1940, after dinner at the Führer’s apartment, a
conversation arose on the nature of the Government General, the
treatment of the Poles and the incorporation, already approved
by the Führer, of the Districts of Piotrokow and Tomassov into
the Warthegau.

“The conversation began when the Reich Minister, Dr. Frank,
informed the Führer that the activities in the Government
General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw and
other cities had been locked up in the ghetto; Kraków would very
shortly be cleared of them.”

I now consider it possible to omit a few paragraphs.

“The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct
contrast to our German workmen, are specially born for low
labor; we must give every possibility of advancement to our
German workers; as to the Poles—there can be no question of
improvement for them. On the contrary, it is necessary to keep
the standard of life low in Poland and it must not be permitted
to rise.

“The Government General must, under no condition whatsoever, be
an isolated and uniform economic region; it must not produce
independently, even in part, any manufactured goods necessary
for its subsistence; the Government General should be used by us
merely as a source of unskilled labor (in industries such as
brick manufacturing, road construction, _et cetera_). One cannot
change the nature of a Slav, as the Führer has already
emphasized. While as a rule our German workers are by nature
assiduous and diligent, the Poles are lazy and it is necessary
to use compulsion to make them work.

“However, there is no reason to expect that the Government
General will become an independent economic region, as there are
no mineral resources, and even should such be available the
Poles are not capable of utilizing them.

“The Führer has explained that the Reich needs large estates to
provide food for our large cities; these large estates, as well
as other agricultural enterprises, are in need of labor, and
cheap labor in particular, for the cultivation of the soil and
for harvesting. As soon as the harvest time is over, the
laborers can go back to Poland because should they be employed
in agriculture the whole year round they themselves would use up
an important part of the crops. The best solution would thus be
to import from Poland temporary laborers for the duration of the
sowing and for the harvesting. Our industrial districts are
overpopulated, while at the same time there is a lack of
manpower in agriculture. That is where we can make use of the
Polish laborers. For this reason, it would be quite right to
have a surplus of manpower in the Government General, so that
every year the laborers needed by the Reich could be procured
from there. It is indispensable to bear in mind that the Polish
gentry must cease to exist; however cruel this may sound,
wherever they are, they must be exterminated.

“There must, of course, be no sexual intercourse with Poles. It
would consequently be a correct procedure if Polish harvesters,
both men and women, came together to the Reich. Whatever the
mutual relationships were in their camps would not be a matter
of our concern—no zealous Protestant should poke his nose into
these affairs.

“The Führer stressed once more that there should be one master
only for the Poles—the German; two masters, side by side,
cannot and must not exist; therefore, all representatives of the
Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds cruel,
but such is the law of life.