Chapter XVII: Part II: of this case (3)

I submit, as Document Number USSR-294, the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, a former Generaloberst of the Hungarian Army.

Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September 1942 he commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy War Minister of Hungary.

Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should like to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4 of the Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the document book:

“The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a
decision which was of little profit to Hungary. The district of
Megyes-Kissármés, where natural oil could be obtained, was
reserved for Romania. In Hungarian political and military
circles this was interpreted in such a way that in the Second
Vienna Arbitration Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance
with Romania in the war against Soviet Russia. The fact that
Hitler considered Romania a more important ally than Hungary was
explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet
Union, Germany would undoubtedly need Romania’s southern wing
which extends to the Black Sea.

“In an official conversation which took place towards November
1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General
Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following:

“‘The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy
of Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages
from Hitler.’”

I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented to the Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:

“In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not
been spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me
to understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of
the decision previously adopted on the question of
Transylvania.”

However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant Ribbentrop expressed an entirely opposite point of view.

I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Göring under these circumstances. I submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235 (Document Number USSR-235), containing the minutes of one of the subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler, which took place on 3 April 1942. This document will be found on Pages 113-116 of the document book. I shall read some excerpts from this document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which corresponds to Page 113 in the document book. I quote:

“I”—Antonescu—“reminded him”—Hitler—“that the Hungarian
statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and
in the press after Ribbentrop’s visit to Budapest that should
they intervene”—that is, should they send their
troops—“Transylvania is to remain Hungarian; such rumors
circulate, and they greatly demoralize the Romanians. Hitler
gave me his word of honor that such promises had not been made
and could not have been made, and that this does not correspond
to actual facts.”

In this way Hitler juggled with promises to encourage his satellites.

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

GEN. ZORYA: The next document, which I am submitting to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-183 (Document Number USSR-183), concerns the Transylvanian question and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of a conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which took place at the frontier on 10 February 1942. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. This document, taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu, was captured by the advancing Red Army. I do not consider it necessary to read the entire document into the record, and I shall merely confine myself to a few excerpts. Will you please open your document book on Page 116, where there is a record of the conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg of 10 February 1942. I quote:

“He openly introduced the subject of the Order of Charles the
First which Herr Von Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through
various German official channels in our country, as well as
through the Romanian officials accredited to the German
Government.”

I pass to the next page, Page 117 of the document book. I quote:

“I told Herr Von Dörnberg that I would not be able to grant this
award until Herr Von Ribbentrop, at the very first opportunity,
made a public declaration also to Romania, a declaration which
would bolster up the faith of the Romanian people in their
struggle for the cause of justice and for their legitimate
claims in the Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant
him this award on condition that it be made public only after he
had made this declaration.

“Herr Von Dörnberg asked for time to reflect on the matter.

“Next day, before entering the railway coach, he asked me to
hand him the decoration, telling me that Von Ribbentrop wanted
it and requesting me not to divulge our conversation to
Ribbentrop, since he now promised to make the award public only
upon the fulfillment of my conditions. On this condition I gave
him the decoration, without the appropriate certificate.”

Thus Ribbentrop was prepared to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Romanian order.

I have also at my disposal a record of a conference between Antonescu and Göring. Will you kindly turn to Page 118 of the document book. Unfortunately, this document, discovered together with other documents in Antonescu’s personal files, previously mentioned by me, is undated. We submit this document as found. I present it as Exhibit Number USSR-238 (Document USSR-238), and I am reading one excerpt only. I quote:

“During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Göring was very
reticent on the problem of Transylvania. On the way, in the car,
he said to the Marshal”—that is to Antonescu:

“‘After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania,
which is actually more German than Romanian or Hungarian.’”

We may, presumably, agree that on this occasion Göring had expressed the viewpoint of the fascist conspirators on the problem of Transylvania with a sufficient degree of truthfulness.

With a view to concluding the clarification of Germany’s mutual relations with her vassal, Romania, I should like to emphasize the subject of crude oil. In this field, Romania was one of Germany’s principal suppliers.

Both before and during the war the Hitlerites extracted oil from Romania by all possible means. Antonescu, by the way, refers to this in one of his letters which has already been read into the record. I shall now submit two documents which sufficiently prove how important this question was to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves. As Exhibit Number USSR-244 (Document Number USSR-244), I present an urgent telegram from the Defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonescu and received by the latter on 31 October 1942. I shall not explain in detail how this document was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu, in the same way as the previous one. I now read this telegram into the record and would ask you to accept it as evidence—to be found on Page 119 of the document book:

“Telegram to the German Mission for direct transmission to
Marshal Antonescu.

“Herr Marshal! In the name of the Führer I approach Your
Excellency with a request for your personal intervention in the
matter of accelerating, as far as possible, the delivery of the
maximum possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is
absolutely essential to the latter for the continuance of
military operations in the Mediterranean.

“The absence and lack of all means of transport for further
operations have resulted in a critical situation in North
Africa, and the transport of supplies depends entirely on the
delivery of adequate quantities of fuel.

“I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree those
deliveries of fuel to Italy, which are exclusively reserved for
supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions
in the Mediterranean for the purpose of the joint warfare.

“I have chosen this method of direct appeal to you because I am
sure that your personal intervention will result in the
assistance required.

“Yours in comradely esteem, signed Keitel, Field Marshal.”

Allow me now to submit the telegram which Antonescu sent in reply to Keitel. Please turn to Page 120 of the document book, Exhibit Number USSR-244(a), (Document Number USSR-244(a)).

THE PRESIDENT: Could you summarize the contents of this document.

GEN. ZORYA: I can summarize the contents of that telegram in two sentences. In reply to the Defendant Keitel’s tearful appeal to increase to the maximum degree the fuel supplies, Antonescu replied, in a wire addressed to Keitel, that he would meet his engagements in full, but that the supplies previously requested by the German officials had already been delivered and that it was impossible to send any more. If something could eventually be saved from the quantities used inside Romania then perhaps, somehow or other, Romania might be able to help her allies. On the whole, Antonescu begged General Keitel to accept his expressions of regard and high esteem, but would not give him any more oil.

Allow me to remind you, Your Honors, that in October and November 1942 Rommel’s fate was being decided in North Africa, and that at the same time the Red Army was barring Germany’s advance on the Grozny and Baku oil fields on the borders of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans lacked sufficient quantities of crude oil.

I shall read one extract from the minutes of a conversation which took place on 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop, which has not, as yet, been read into the record. I have previously submitted to the Tribunal the record of this conversation as Exhibit Number USSR-233. I ask you to turn to the end of Page 51 and to Page 52 of the document book, which corresponds to Page 4 of the Russian text. There you will find the following lines. In reply to Ribbentrop’s question on the subject of crude oil, Antonescu stated:

“As for crude oil, Romania has contributed the maximum which it
was in her power to contribute; she can give no more. The only
way out of the situation would be to seize territories rich in
oil.”

We should note here that Antonescu was not at all original in his idea of seizing other people’s territories, rich in oil.

I am asking Your Honors to refer to Pages 121-129 of the document book. There is one document taken from the private office of the Defendant Rosenberg, which is entitled, “About the Organization of the Caucasus.” I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), and I would ask you to accept it as evidence. In July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg formulated the German opinion on this question—Page 122 of the document book as follows:

“Germany is interested in creating a stable position in the
entire Caucasus in order to secure the safety of continental
Europe, that is, to safeguard for herself the link with the Near
East. It is only this link with the oil fields that can make
Germany and the rest of Europe independent, in the future, of
any coalition of maritime powers. The aim of German policy is to
control the Caucasus and the adjoining lands to the south, both
politically and militarily.”

Will you please turn to Page 124 of the document book as well as to Page 4 of the Russian text of the document from which I am quoting. The same idea is formulated there by the Defendant Rosenberg with extreme clarity. I quote, “Economically, the German Reich must take all oil into its hands.”

Your Honors, I shall not dwell in detail on the relations between the fascist conspirators and their other satellite, Finland, inasmuch as the witness, Buschenhagen, offered sufficiently conclusive evidence on this question; and the Tribunal has probably already got some definite ideas on the subject. I just want to remind the Tribunal that according to Paragraph 3, Section 2, of Plan Barbarossa, Finland was to cover the advance of the German landing of Group North, consisting of units of the 21st Group, which was due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. According to Plan Barbarossa, the liquidation of the Russian forces at Hangö was also assigned to Finland.

I would also like to remind the Tribunal that Section 2 of the temporary Plan Barbarossa, which has been presented to the Tribunal by the American Prosecution as Document Number C-39, mentions Finland’s participation in the war; as I have already reported to the Tribunal, the following sentence is to be found in this section, which corresponds to Page 52 of the document book. “The preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.”

I should also like to invite your attention to the following paragraph of the same document, Page 58 of the document book:

“Provision has been made for transportation from the Reich to
Norway of one security division and 18 artillery battalions, and
for transportation to Finland of one reinforced infantry
division complete with army corps units. Of the units, one
infantry division, two mountain divisions and the SS Group North
are designated for Case Silver Fox.

“It has been planned, on the outbreak of military operations, to
bring by rail, through Sweden, a further division for the attack
on Hangö.”

I consider that I am now justified in stating that the date of 25 May 1941, indicated in the temporary Plan Barbarossa as the date on which the negotiations with the Finnish General Staff were opened, was incorrect. The indication of this date, which did not correspond to reality, was an attempt to disguise the preparations for aggression, presenting them to the outside world as preparations for a so-called preventive war.

In addition to the testimony of the witness, Buschenhagen, already given to the Tribunal, I shall now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-229 (Document Number USSR-229), the depositions of a former colonel of the German Army, Kitchmann, which I beg you to accept as evidence.

Kitchmann held the office of military attaché in the German Embassy at Helsinki since 1 October 1941. You will find this testimony on Page 130 of the document book. I shall read a very short extract therefrom into the record:

“A long time before 22 June 1941, the German Government and the
High Command of the German Armed Forces jointly carried out
secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General
Staff of the Finnish Army and prepared the attack on the Soviet
Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the
Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the
following circumstances: On my arrival at Helsinki in October
1941, as acting German military attaché, I had numerous
conversations with Major Von Albedill, the aide of the German
military attaché who formerly served in the Military Attaché’s
Department in the OKH, General Staff of the Army.

“Albedill acquainted me with the situation in Finland and its
military and political background, since Major General Rössing,
the military attaché, was seriously ill and receiving treatment
at the health resort of Merano in the Tyrol. In the course of
these conversations Albedill told me that already in September
1940, Major General Rössing, acting on an order of Hitler and of
the German General Staff, had organized the visit of Major
General Taloela, Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the
Führer’s headquarters in Berlin. During this visit an agreement
was reached between the German and Finnish General Staffs for
joint preparations for the attack and for warfare against the
Soviet Union.

“In this connection General Taloela told me, during a conference
at his staff headquarters in Aunus in November 1941, that he,
acting on Marshal Mannerheim’s personal orders, had—as far back
as September 1940—been one of the first to contact the German
High Command with a view to joint preparation for a German and
Finnish attack on the Soviet Union.”

I ask your permission to conclude herewith the presentation of the documents concerning the relations between fascist Germany and her satellite, Finland, since—I repeat—Buschenhagen’s testimony has relieved me of this necessity.

I should like to make one brief résumé:

Buschenhagen’s testimony disposes of all attempts to assert that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was disassociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Finland’s entry into the war had been envisaged in the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers. The Finns, like the other satellites of Germany, waged war in the hope of gaining whole regions and republics of the Soviet Union.

At the conference of 16 July 1941 Hitler spoke of the Finnish claims to Eastern Karelia, the Leningrad region, and the city of Leningrad. In proof of this fact I refer to Document Number L-221 presented by the United States Prosecution. The extracts quoted from this document will be found on the corresponding page of the document book, Page 141.

Romania and Finland were two German satellites discussed in full detail in Plan Barbarossa. The part these countries played in the plans of German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their war potential—which without doubt was of some importance—but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union.

The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for attack against the U.S.S.R. had been carefully plotted by the fascist conspirators, in the same way as were all the preparations connected with Plan Barbarossa.

The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in Plan Barbarossa. However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators.

I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus—although he has already testified before the Tribunal—which formulates very clearly. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You aren’t going to give us Paulus’ affidavit over again, are you? We have already had Paulus’ evidence in full.

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this is on Page 182. It is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on Page 143 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we don’t want his interrogation.

GEN. ZORYA: But I really need one particular paragraph of his testimony in order to show the connection between the subsequent documents relating to Hungary and the contents of my statement. It is just a few lines.

THE PRESIDENT: It must surely be cumulative, is it not?

GEN. ZORYA: That which was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in my own words, in two sentences.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has already said?

GEN. ZORYA: Yes. Do forgive me! I have just been told that Colonel Pokrovsky has already read that extract into the record. I shall therefore merely give a very brief summary of the extract and then pass on to a further subject and shall not repeat myself.

I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus’ affidavit which state that the leading factor of Hungary’s policy was the full recognition of Germany’s leading rule and that it was determined by two basic factors, that is, the aspiration to territorial conquests with the help of Germany and the fear of the growing power of Romania as Germany’s ally; and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage where Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing his plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because he considered the Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that Paulus immediately adds, on Page 2 of his affidavit, that:

“The essential reason was Hitler’s unwillingness to give Hungary
a chance of seizing the oil fields in the Russian oil district
of Dragovitch.”

Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet Union, the Supreme Command of the Army, the OKH, issued an order to the 17th Army to seize Dragovitch prior to the arrival of the Hungarians.

Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his negotiations with the Hungarians regarding armament supplies. This—all this—has already been mentioned by Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that this testimony of Paulus’ has undoubtedly lifted a corner of the veil of mystery shrouding the mutual relations between the German and Hungarian aggressors.

In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to the depositions by Ruszkiczay-Ruediger which are already at the disposal of the Tribunal. This document has been presented as Exhibit Number USSR-294.

Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1939, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger testified—see Page 2, Paragraph 3 of the Russian text of the depositions which can be found on Page 101 of the document book. I quote the following—the quotation is underlined:

“This took place not long before the outbreak of the
German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic advantages
and a new liberation from the Trianon Treaty were, for Hungary,
the primary objectives.

“But from the time when the region of the Transcarpathian
Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia, we began
to attach a perfectly different significance to this region by
military preparations concerning this area. It was clear to us,
the high-ranking officers, that the political leadership both of
Germany and Hungary also considered this region strategically
important for future military operations against Soviet Russia.”

On Page 9, Paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Bartha, outlined the objectives of the war with Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Bartha pointed directly to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally of the Soviet Union.

However, a more complete picture of Germano-Hungarian relations, which were determined by the preparation of an attack against the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major General, Esteban Ujszaszy. From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years, he had inside information on the secrets which shrouded this preparation. Some of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in the document which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-155 (Document Number USSR-155). I ask you to accept this document as evidence.

I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy’s statement which may clarify the question at issue. Beginning from Page 2 of the Russian text—this corresponds to Page 149 of the document book—we find Section 2 entitled, “Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet Russia.” Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to “Halder’s letters.” I quote:

“In November 1940 the German military attaché in Budapest,
Colonel Günther Krappe of the German General Staff, was received
in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff,
Henry Werth. Krappe brought a letter from the Chief of the
General Staff of the German Army, Generaloberst Halder.

“In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring of
1941, ‘Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by
force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude,
at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear.
In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and
definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to
participate if only in her own interests.’”

Werth replied that he agreed with Halder’s concept but drew attention to the lack of equipment in the Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was not ready for war against Soviet Russia. His request, on the whole, was for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary’s armaments. He was informed of Halder’s letter and Werth’s reply thereto, by General Werth in person. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin. It consisted of officer-specialists from the Main Ordinance Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense, and in December 1940 the commission left for Berlin. The Hungarian requests were as follows. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: General, couldn’t you pass on to December 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to come to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph:

“In December 1940, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
forces (OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the
Hungarian Minister of Home Defense, General Carl Bartha, to come
to Berlin in order to: a) discuss personally the problem of
armaments; b) elaborate a plan of military and political
collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of
1941.

“This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal
Hungarian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel in the General
Staff Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a similar
invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign and
Defense Sections of the OKW.”

I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who accompanied Bartha on his trip, and I read further from Page 151 of the document book:

“The information which we received follows:

“In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will be
clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in the rear
eliminated. . . . For this purpose the Hungarian Honved Army,
reinforced by the delivery of 10-centimeter field howitzers and
with up-to-date tanks for a ‘Mobile Brigade’ will be ready for
action. For the war against Russia, Hungary must make available
15 operational units (including 3 mobilized, cavalry, and Panzer
units); she must also complete, by 1 June 1941, the erection of
fortifications in Transcarpathian Russia, assist the advance of
the German troops in the area adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav
and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers and facilitate the deployment
and the passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The
details for the operational preparation will be determined later
by representatives of the German General Staff about to be sent
to Hungary. As a political compensation for her participation,
Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Soviet
Russia (the ancient Principality of Halicz) and the land at the
foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to the River Dniester.”

In March 1941 Eberhard Kienzl, a colonel of the German General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements about the question of attack on Yugoslavia.

This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter—Page 5 of the Russian text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152 of the document book:

“The Colonel of the German General Staff, Eberhard Kienzl,
detachment Foreign Armies East in the OKH (High Command of the
Army), arrived in Budapest in March 1941 bringing with him a
letter from Generaloberst Halder to Generaloberst Werth. This
letter contained an insistent request on the part of Germany
that Hungary should participate in the possible war against
Yugoslavia by mobilizing the following army corps: I. Budapest,
II. Szekesfeherwar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pecs, V. Szeged, and
in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15 operational
units, including 1 cavalry division, 2 mechanized brigades, and
1 mountain (rifle) brigade.

“The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of a
German delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Paulus, for
discussing combined operations and the deployment of German
troops against Yugoslavia through Hungarian territory.

“In reply to this letter General Werth issued an invitation to
the German commission, held out prospects of Hungary’s
participation in the war against Yugoslavia and of producing,
for this purpose, 3 army corps, that is, the 1st, 4th, and 5th.

“Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in
principle, promising at least to mobilize the 8th Army Corps
(Kressikosice) as well as the mechanized operation units
demanded by Halder.

“I was informed personally about this exchange of correspondence
by Colonel of the German General Staff, Kienzl.”

THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to put one army corps, or two army corps, or three army corps against the Russians. It was absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we are to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany’s disposal, for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units?

It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely cumulative. It doesn’t add anything in the least to what you have already given us, and you could go on to the next document, which is Number USSR-150 (Exhibit Number USSR-150). Everything up to there is simply the negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.

GEN. ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the presentation of the documents on this question should be restricted.

THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?

GEN. ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain information pertaining not only to the number of units pledged by Hungary to Germany in case of war with the Soviet Union; but there is, for example, an indication as to what methods in the preparation for war were being used by the fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these methods, and that is why I request your permission to quote certain passages in this document.

What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification of the information regarding the number of Soviet units concentrated on the Hungarian-Russian border.

THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.

GEN. ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as follows:

“My immediate superior, General Laszlo, as chief of the
operational group ordered the second section of the General
Staff to prepare a situation report according to which 14 Soviet
Russian operational units were concentrated on the Hungarian
border, including 8 motorized units. This situation report was
prepared by Colonel Cornel Hidai, of Intelligence.

“I should like to point out that according to subsequent
explanations supplied by the second section of the Royal
Hungarian General Staff, there were only four Soviet operational
units actually concentrated on the Hungarian border. This
circumstance I truthfully reported to Generaloberst Werth and
General Laszlo, but the latter altered my truthful, objective
report in accordance with his wishes.”

Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up by the militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of creating incidents abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet Union. Ujszaszy states—Page 10, Line 4 from the top of the document, Page 157 of the document book:

“These plans emanated from Lieutenant General Fütterer, from his
assistant Lieutenant Colonel Frimond, and from General Laszlo.
They proposed that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged
as Russian planes, should bomb the eastern border districts of
Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian origin.”

And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days preceding the attack on the Soviet Union—this is Page 11 of the document, Page 158 of the document book:

“On 24 June 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30 noon, I was
informed that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Raho in
Carpathian Russia and firing on trains in the vicinity with
machine gun fire. On the same afternoon news reached us that
Soviet Russian planes were bombing Kassá (Košice). The Crown
Council, with the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening
and, on the strength of Soviet Russia’s provocation, decided to
declare war on that country. I am convinced that the bombarding
was carried out by German planes with Russian markings. My
conclusion was based on the following facts:

“a) Lieutenant General Fütterer and the German propaganda
machine publicized this bombing on a very vast scale.

“b) Lieutenant General Laszlo immediately gave me orders,
through the Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal
Hungarian General Staff, to obtain photographs of such fragments
of the ‘Soviet Russian bombs’ as could still be found and to
publish these photographs in the press of the fascist countries.

“c) Lieutenant General Fütterer, General Laszlo, and Lieutenant
General Frimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that
Slovakian pilots in Russian service had bombed Kassá (Košice).
The excellence of the hits was explained by the fact that these
pilots were well acquainted with the terrain.”

This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24 June 1941, at 12:30 p.m. We have a document that establishes the fact that long before this date the participation of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union had been decided. The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger explains the reasons for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that Ruszkiczay-Ruediger’s viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still, as it is the testimony of the Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this statement can, of course, not be devoid of interest.

On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger states that towards the end of May 1941 he received an order to supply, first of all, the troops concentrated in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; 2 days afterwards a secret meeting of the army corps commanders took place at the headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, at which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was announced.

I quote from the testimony of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger—Page 108 of the document book and Page 9 of the document itself. I am only quoting the passages underlined, in order to save time. I quote:

“. . . General of the Infantry Werth gave us an account of the
military and political situation.

“It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by Germany
is forthcoming, in which Romania and Hungary will take an active
part on the side of Germany.”

Ruszkiczay-Ruediger further points out that:

“The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of
Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Bartha had made
their reports, and was ratified by the Crown Council. The
question was not submitted to Parliament. “These decisions of
the Council of Ministers and the Crown Council caused no
surprise at all, and were the result of the voluntary military
collaboration with Germany which had actually existed for many
years past.

“The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders of
Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their mainstay in their
plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation of
Transcarpathian Ukraine and the strategic organization of this
region as a military base in preparation for an attack on Soviet
Russia.”

Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German military attaché in Budapest, Krappe. The former Lieutenant General of the German Army, Günther Krappe, was the German military attaché in Budapest from November 1939 to 30 April 1941. After that, Krappe commanded the 10th Corps of SS troops of the Army Group “Vistula,” and was captured by Red Army units.

I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement made by Krappe in January of this year and presented as Exhibit Number USSR-150 (Document Number USSR-150). It should be noted that the main circumstances mentioned in Krappe’s statement coincide with those on Ujszaszy’s report. I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page 4 of Krappe’s document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document book:

“In October 1940 I was ordered by the OKH to report on the
conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia,
that is, in the Carpathian Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations
Section, Colonel Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were
only simple antitank obstacles in existence, varying in depth
from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction of barracks for
quartering troops had just begun. The necessary surveys for
building concrete pillboxes along the border and the highways
would be made during the winter and in the spring of 1941 it
would be possible to proceed with the actual construction. It
appeared to be a question of raising some 6 million pengö.

“General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile trip
through Munkac to Urzok Pass. . . .

“I communicated the results of the inspection trip and of the
information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin. Some time
later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the
building of these fortifications had already been allotted.”

In order to save time, Your Honors, I shall briefly expose the remaining part of Krappe’s testimony. An agreement was reached with the War Minister, Von Bartha, to organize war communications and war transports of the German Army in Hungary. In connection with this a special organization therefore arrived which was entrusted with these transports. At the same time, Your Honors, permission was received to establish jointly with the postal services, a special communication system for military needs, and, furthermore, a number of German officers were attached to the Hungarian Army for the interchange of experiences and instruction of the troops. Krappe states that as from December 1940, Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the increase of the German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of the Armament Department, was in charge.

In concluding the presentation of documents concerning the setting up of an aggressive bloc against the Soviet Union by the fascist war criminals, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general nature as derived from these documents.

The fascist conspirators began to adopt immediate measures for securing the participation of Romania, Finland, and Hungary in the preparation for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union at least as early as September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Romania.

The negotiations concerning the military preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union, in each of these countries, were mainly concluded during the period September-December 1940. The negotiations were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite armies. The subject of the negotiations in each case was of a purely military character, such as the retraining of the troops, the transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans, the deciding on the number of divisions needed to attack the Soviet Union, _et cetera_.

Such character of negotiations testifies to the fact that there existed between the fascist Government of Germany and the Governments of Romania, Finland, and Hungary, a preliminary agreement with regard to aggression against the Soviet Union even before the negotiations began.

And, finally, the documents submitted reveal that to each of these countries, one way or the other, the fascist conspirators had promised some territory belonging to the Soviet Union.

I should like to point out one more circumstance.

In order fully to grasp the consequences of the predatory fascist attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to confine ourselves to Plan Barbarossa. This is a strategic plan, a plan for military attack, a plan for the beginning of aggression.

And close on the heels of the attack followed, as it is well known, the so-called “assimilation” and “organization” of the occupied territories. The plans for the “assimilation” and “organization,” which were plans for the extermination of the peaceful civilian population and the plundering of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, were also prepared in advance, in the same way as Plan Barbarossa.

The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents at the disposal of the Tribunal, and especially such documents as the directive of 13 March 1941 (Document Number 447-PS), signed by the Defendant Keitel; the order for the application of military jurisdiction, dated 15 May 1941 (Document Number C-50), also signed by Keitel; the propaganda directive for Plan Barbarossa (Document Number C-26); and others, testify to the destruction not only of legal but of all moral standards of behavior by the hordes of the fascist usurpers on the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, this destruction having been premeditated and planned long before the attack on the Soviet Union.

Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites had decided and outlined in appropriate paragraphs of these instructions, directions, and orders, the terroristic methods for dealing with the civilian population and the measures and means for plundering the land of the Soviet Union and reducing it to a colony of the Third Reich. And when war did break out and the whole secret was laid bare, the fascists did not hesitate to publish all these plans in their press.

I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-59 (Document Number USSR-59), an article, published on 20 August 1942, in _Das Schwarze Korps_, an SS paper and organ of the Reich Führer of the SS. This article, entitled, “Should We Germanize?”—Page 180 of the document book—states openly:

“The Reich Führer of the SS chose the following slogan for one
of the editions of the newspaper _Deutsche Arbeit_, devoted to
the problems of resettlement in the East:

“Our duty in the East is not Germanization in the former sense
of the term, that is, imposing the German language and the
German laws upon the population, but to ensure that only people
of pure German blood should inhabit the East.”

This negation of Germanization is not new. However, falling from the lips of the Reich Führer of the SS, acting as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of the Volkstum, it becomes an order. Such is the exact meaning of these words.

The rejection of the idea of germanizing the population of the occupied territories, and the assertion that the East should be inhabited only by people of pure German blood, signified, in practice, the mass extermination of Soviet citizens, their spoliation and their deportation to slave labor, the annihilation of centuries of Russian culture, and the destruction of our cities and villages. I shall confine myself to what I have just said, as the same theme, or rather themes, have already been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues.

On 22 June 1941, after prolonged preparations, the German fascist hordes hurled themselves on the Soviet Union. One hundred and seventy divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, started the invasion.

The military problems connected with the attack were formulated in Plan Barbarossa:

“The German Army should be ready, even prior to the end of the
war with England, to defeat Soviet Russia by operating with
lightning speed.

“To this end the Army will have to utilize all units at its
disposal, with the sole reservation that the territories
occupied must be adequately protected against all unexpected
eventualities.”

Plan Barbarossa foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of cutting off the possible retreat towards the interior of all Red Army units still fit for battle and of permitting the German fascist invaders speedily to reach a line of combat which would place the land of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force.

As an ultimate aim, Plan Barbarossa provided for the strengthening of the Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction by bombardment of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and finally, the capture of Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1946 at 1000 hours._]

FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 13 February 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.

GEN. ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that Plan Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid action, a combat line for the German-fascist invaders which would place the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The final aim, according to Plan Barbarossa, was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.

The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at the meeting in Hitler’s headquarters on 16 July 1941. This document was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number L-221. You will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler, Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.

The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Bialystok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were declared as “annexed” to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Romania, while Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad region.

As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at general headquarters, on 16 July 1941, Hitler, for instance, said that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to tactical intentions.

The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20 June 1941, at a conference on the Eastern question—a record of which was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number 1058-PS—that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt from Rosenberg’s declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document book.

Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga. The specter of a “Greater Germany” ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear that the opportunity had arrived about which Defendant Rosenberg spoke when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that “certain political slogans could be made public.”

I presented to the Tribunal, under Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), a document from the archives of the Defendant Rosenberg’s office relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask you to refer to this document. I turn to Page 203 in the document book and Page 9 of the Russian text, which is the translation of this document.

Rosenberg, on 27 July 1942, solved the Eastern problem in this fashion, and I quote:

“The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples
under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely
conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukrainian problem
consists in securing food supplies for Germany and Europe and
supplies of raw materials for the Continent.

“The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political task, and
its solution means the expansion of continental Europe, under
German leadership, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East.”

On 27 November 1941 the Defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in Number 329-A of the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_. I present this report as Exhibit Number USSR-347 (Document Number USSR-347).

Ribbentrop said in this report:

“I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of
Soviet Russia and of the occupation of the far greater part of
European Russia in 1941, as follows:

“First, from a military point of view, England’s last ally on
the Continent has thereby ceased to exist as a significant
factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become
unassailable in Europe. And powerful forces will be released.

“Second, in the economic field the Axis powers, together with
their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved
independence from countries overseas. Europe has once and for
all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw
materials of European Russia can fully cover the needs of
Europe. Its war production will serve Germany’s war economy and
that of her allies, as a result of which Europe’s war potential
will increase, and increase more powerfully. The organization of
this gigantic area is already in full swing.

“Thus, the last two decisive prerequisites for the victory of
the Axis and its allies over England have been created.”

I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject. It is Goebbels’ speech in Munich, published on 19 October 1942 in the main organ of the Nazi Party, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, South German edition. The text of this speech is presented to the Military Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-250 (Document Number USSR-250). That is on Page 205 in the document book. In his address Goebbels said:

“Over and above that, we have captured the most important grain,
coal, and iron ore producing regions of the Soviet Union. What
the enemy has lost we now possess. And since what the enemy
lacks has come to us, it is, according to Adam Riese, of double
value. While in the past we were a people without space, this is
today no longer the case. Today we have only to give a shape to
this space conquered by our soldiers, to organize it, and render
it useful to us; and this requires a certain period of time. But
if the English were to contend that we have lost the war because
we have lost time, then this contention will only prove how
completely they have misunderstood the entire situation. Time
only works against those who have no space and no raw materials.
If we make use of our time to organize the space we have
conquered, then time will work not against us, but for us.”

Your Honors, that which Goebbels, the Defendants Ribbentrop, and Rosenberg said about exploiting the space captured by the soldiers, took on, at the OKW, the shape of plans for further aggression.

In this respect the following document—which I now submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336 (Document Number USSR-336)—is of interest and I ask you to accept this as evidence. This document is a letter from the Staff of the German Navy to the commanding generals of Groups West, North, and South. This document was discovered in German archives by the Allied troops. The letter, which you will find on Page 209 in the document book, is entitled, “Objectives for the Further Conduct of War upon the Termination of the Campaign in the East.” It is numbered 1385/41 and is dated 8 August 1941.

In those days the fascist conspirators considered that victory over the Soviet Union was really only a question of time; and they, therefore, planned for further aggression. This letter which I am about to quote begins with the following words:

“The Naval Operations Staff has just received the draft about
further intentions on termination of the campaign in the East.

“The following declarations describe these intentions in broad
lines and are only intended for the personal information of the
commanding generals and the Chiefs of Staff.”

There follows Part 2, Paragraph P, the eight subparagraphs of which detail the plans to be carried out on the termination of the campaign in the East.

I omit, Your Honors, the first two subparagraphs dealing with the tasks of the so-called pacification of the Occupied Eastern Territories and with the assignment to other fronts of troops which had become available.

Subparagraph 3 details the intentions of the fascist conspirators in North Africa. I quote:

“Strengthening of the Armed Forces in North Africa with a view
to rendering possible the capture of Tobruk. In order to
guarantee the passage of necessary transports according to plan,
attacks by the German Air Force on Malta should be resumed.

“Provided that weather conditions cause no delay and the service
of transports is assured as planned, it can be assumed that the
campaign against Tobruk will begin in mid-September.”

In August 1941 the Hitlerites intended, with the aid of fascist Spain, to seize Gibraltar during the same year. Subparagraph 4 of Part 2 of the letter just submitted to you envisaged that:

“Plan Felix, that is, the seizure of Gibraltar with the active
participation of Spain, must be executed in 1941.”

The Hitlerites planned the execution of an attack against Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt. Subparagraph 5 of the above-mentioned letter states as follows: