Chapter XV: Part II: of this case (1)

“1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active
participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet
Russia.

“The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the
appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed
forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German
command on their entry into the war.

“2. Romania’s task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the
group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces
facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary
services in the rear area.

“3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German
northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from
Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will
be up to Finland to eliminate Hangö.

“4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal
being available for the movements of the German northern group
not later than the beginning of the operation.”

In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:

“On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active
participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet
Russia.”

This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.

There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States Prosecution and which mentioned Germany’s presumed allies in her aggression against the U.S.S.R.

This document, numbered C-39, is entitled “Provisional Case Barbarossa.” It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a timetable for the preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57 of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled “Negotiations with Friendly Powers,” we read:

“a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any
large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the
Turkish frontier.

“b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the
Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial,
camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their
frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.

“c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army
Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for
introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian
forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on
this subject will be made to Hungary.

“d) Two German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part
of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of
Prosov.

“e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take
place as from 25 May.”

Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.

The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW.

The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs.

The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high-ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.

I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book.

In connection with Ribbentrop’s speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech—last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book:

“Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6
September, when I took over the government of the country,
supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without
asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of
adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only
example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make
an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a
policy which no doubt could only appear odious. . . .”

When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity.

Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February 1946 at 1000 hours._]

FIFTY-SEVENTH DAY
Tuesday, 12 February 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you were going to recall the witness who was being called yesterday, Field Marshal Paulus, were you not, so that the defendants’ counsel may have the opportunity of questioning him? Will you do that now?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, according to the wish of the Tribunal the witness is in the Palace of Justice.

[_The witness, Paulus, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Field Marshal Paulus, I want to remind you that you should pause after the question that has been asked you before you answer it, in order that the translation shall get through. Do you follow what I mean?

PAULUS: I have understood.

DR. NELTE: Witness, I should like to ask several questions. On 3 September 1940, you came as Chief Quartermaster I to the High Command of the Army; is that correct?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time?

PAULUS: It will be very well known to you that at that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

DR. NELTE: I believe that the phraseology that you have used is not correct because I did not put this question for any other reason than just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It is known to us but may not be known to the Tribunal. Who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Army?

PAULUS: It was Generaloberst Halder.

DR. NELTE: Were you, as Chief Quartermaster I, the permanent representative of the Chief of Staff?

PAULUS: I was the deputy of the Chief of Staff for those cases which he told me to supervise, and as for the rest I had to execute the tasks with which he charged me.

DR. NELTE: In this case were you especially charged with the adaptation of the plan which we later learned to know as Plan Barbarossa?

PAULUS: Yes, to the extent of which I told you yesterday.

DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Brauchitsch, your former Commander-in-Chief and superior, in an affidavit presented by the Prosecution has made a statement about the treatment of military plans. With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to ask you to tell me whether this statement by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch is also your opinion. I quote:

“When Hitler decided to use military pressure or force to
achieve his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
if he was involved, first received orally a sort of orientation
or a corresponding order.”

Is that your opinion also?

PAULUS: I have no knowledge of that.

DR. NELTE: Generaloberst Halder, your immediate superior, in an affidavit which also has been submitted by the Prosecution, has said the following about the handling of such military operational things:

“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts
of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were
immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is
to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time
the Chief of the Reich.”

Is that your opinion likewise?

PAULUS: I ask you please to repeat this once more because I could not understand exactly what you meant.

DR. NELTE: It is about the question: Who were the military persons responsible to Hitler in the forming of important plans? In respect to that, Von Brauchitsch said what you have just heard, and Halder said the following:

“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts
of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were
immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is
to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time
the Chief of the Reich.”

Is that so?

PAULUS: We received the orders about military measures from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Such was the Directive Number 21. I thought that those people held responsibility who were the first military advisers of Hitler in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

DR. NELTE: If you have seen Directive Number 21, then you must also know who signed it. Who was that?

PAULUS: As far as I can remember, that was signed by Hitler; and Keitel and Jodl initialed it.

DR. NELTE: But, at any rate, signed by Hitler, like all directives—is that correct?

PAULUS: At any rate, most of the directives, unless they were signed by other people in his name.

DR. NELTE: In other words, I may conclude that the man who gave the orders was the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, Hitler?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: From the statements of Von Brauchitsch and Halder we can see, in my opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in detail. Do you not believe that?

PAULUS: That is correct. It had to relegate the orders which were given it by the Supreme Command to the proper departments.

DR. NELTE: It is clear that these orders were given to the High Command, that is, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. There was in all planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of such aggressive plans a close collaboration between Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army. Is that correct?

PAULUS: This co-operation exists between the Supreme Command and all persons who are charged to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.

DR. NELTE: From your explanation I believe I can conclude that the incomplete plan which you found on 3 September 1940—that you have developed that, and that then, after you had achieved a certain measure of completeness, you presented it to the Supreme Commander, Hitler, personally, or through General Halder?

PAULUS: The detailed completion of the plan was presented by the Chief of the General Staff or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; then it was either accepted or rejected.

DR. NELTE: That is, it had to be accepted by Hitler or refused?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly yesterday to say that you had already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: I said yesterday that the preparation of that plan of operations was the theoretical preparation for an attack.

DR. NELTE: But already at that time you thought that that was Hitler’s intention, didn’t you?

PAULUS: From the way in which this task was started one could see that, after the theoretical preparation, a practical application would follow.

DR. NELTE: Furthermore, you said yesterday that no news of the Abwehr had been received which would prove that there were any intentions of the Soviet Union to attack.

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did anybody in the circle of the General Staff of the Army ever speak about these matters?

PAULUS: Yes, these matters were discussed. They had serious misgivings about them, but no reports about any visible preparations for war on the side of the Soviet Union were ever made known to me.

DR. NELTE: So you were firmly convinced that it was a straight attack on the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: At any rate, the indications did not exclude that.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness must speak more slowly.

DR. NELTE: The witness has said, if I understood correctly, that there were signs which did not exclude these inferences.

PAULUS: The order for the execution of this theoretical study of the conditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by other informed experts as the first step for the preparation for an attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.

DR. NELTE: In realizing these facts, did you or the General Staff of the Army or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army make any protests to Hitler about it?

PAULUS: Personally, I do not know in what form or whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Army made any protests.

DR. NELTE: Did you, yourself, speak about having any doubts to Generaloberst Halder or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch?

PAULUS: If I judge correctly, then I believe that I am supposed to be here as a witness for the events with which the defendants are charged. I ask the Tribunal, therefore, to relieve me of the responsibility of answering these questions which are directed against myself.

DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Paulus, you do not seem to know that you also belong to the circle of the defendants, because you belonged to the organization of the High Command which is indicted here as criminal.

PAULUS: And, therefore, since I believe that I am here as witness for the events which have led to the indictment of these defendants here, I have asked to be relieved of answering this question which concerns myself.

DR. NELTE: I ask the Tribunal to decide.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you must answer the questions that have been put up to date.

PAULUS: Then may I ask for a repetition of the question, please?

DR. NELTE: I have asked you whether, since you realized that there were serious doubts, you talked to your chief, Halder, or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch, about these things?

PAULUS: I cannot remember having talked to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about it, but I did so with the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, who was my superior.

DR. NELTE: Was he of the same opinion?

PAULUS: Yes, he was of the same opinion, that is to say, of the opinion of great anxiety for such a plan.

DR. NELTE: For military or moral reasons?

PAULUS: For many reasons, both military and moral.

DR. NELTE: It is certain, then, that you and the Chief of Staff, Von Halder, realized these facts which would have stamped the war against Russia as a criminal attack and that you nevertheless did nothing against it? In your statement you have said that later you became Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army; is that right?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: With knowledge of all these facts just stated you accepted the command of an army which was to push against Stalingrad. Did you have any scruples about being made a tool of that attack which in your opinion was a criminal one?

PAULUS: As the situation at that time presented itself for the soldier, in connection also with the extraordinary propaganda which was put into play, I had at that time, as so many others believed, to do my duty toward my fatherland.

DR. NELTE: But you knew about the facts which were against that opinion?

PAULUS: The facts which became clear to me afterwards, due to my experiences as Commander of the 6th Army which found their climax at Stalingrad, those facts I did not know at that time. Also, about that criminal attack—that knowledge came later, when I thought about all the circumstances, because before I could only see part of the whole.

DR. NELTE: Then I have to consider your expression “criminal attack” or any other expressions for the war mongers—I have to consider that as something that you found out later?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And I may say then that in spite of your having serious doubts and knowledge about the facts which marked the war against Russia as a criminal action of aggression, that in spite of your knowledge, you considered it your duty to take the command of the 6th Army and to hold Stalingrad until the last moment?

PAULUS: I have just explained that at that time, when I took over the command, I did not see the extent of the crime which was considered in the beginning and execution of this war of aggression; that I did not see the entire extent of it and could not see it, as my experiences as Commander of the 6th Army which I was able to gather at Stalingrad have shown to me later.

DR. NELTE: You speak of the extent, but the fact is that you knew the causes. Maybe you were one of the few who knew them. You have not mentioned that.

PAULUS: I did not know then. I knew the instigation of this war to be aggression, from the attitude of the greater part of the officers’ corps. In keeping with the prevailing concept I saw nothing unusual in the basing of the fate of a people and a nation upon power politics.

DR. NELTE: So you agreed to these ideologies?

PAULUS: Not to the tendency which appeared later, but I did not conclude therefrom that the fate of a country could be built upon power politics. It was a mistake that at this time, and in the 20th Century, only the democracies and the concept of the nationality principle were the decisive factors.

DR. NELTE: Would you grant to others also, who were not so near to the sources, the good faith that they only wanted what was best for their fatherland?

PAULUS: Yes, I do, of course.

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Von Schirach and Funk): Witness, yesterday you mentioned that you consider the Hitler Government as the guilty ones. Is that correct?

PAULUS: Yes, I have done so. . . .

DR. SAUTER: In your written deposition which you made on 9 January 1946—in a prisoner-of-war camp it is said—there is nothing about that; at least, I have not found anything about it so far.

PAULUS: This letter has nothing to do with that. This is a letter to the Soviet Government, in which I explained several questions which came up within the 6th Army in Russia, and several of my own experiences.

DR. SAUTER: In this letter of 9 January 1946, you said explicitly—and I quote:

“Today, when the crimes of Hitler and his helpers are being
judged, I find myself obliged to tell the Soviet Government
everything which I have known and which may serve as proof of
the guilt of the war criminals in the Nuremberg Trials.”

In spite of that, in this written declaration, which is very detailed, there is nothing about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, if you cross-examine the witness on this letter, you must put the letter in evidence, the whole letter.

DR. SAUTER: That is the statement which the witness has given, on the. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I have no doubt it is; all I say is, if you cross-examine him on the letter and put the letter to him, you must put the letter in evidence. You have a copy of the letter?

DR. SAUTER: Yes. It is in the statement which the Soviet Prosecutor yesterday put up to the witness and in regard to which the witness made the statement that he considers it correct and will repeat it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I follow it. I was not sure whether it was actually put in or not or whether it was withdrawn upon the promise to produce the witness. Is the letter actually in?

DR. SAUTER: But the witness has said, after the Prosecutor asked him, that he will repeat that statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Willey, has the letter been put in?

MR. HAROLD B. WILLEY (American Secretary): It has not been put in, no.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on cross-examining about it, but the document has got to be put in, that is all.

DR. SAUTER: [_Turning to the witness._] Now I would like to know, Witness, what you mean by “Hitler Government”? Do you mean the leaders of the Party or do you mean the Reich Cabinet, or what exactly do you mean?

PAULUS: I mean everyone who is responsible.

DR. SAUTER: I would like you to answer the question more precisely.

PAULUS: In my statement yesterday I have only explained what I have seen myself, what I have experienced myself. I did not intend to make any statements about individual personalities in the Government because that would not be within my knowledge.

DR. SAUTER: Yes, but you spoke about the Hitler Government, did you not?

PAULUS: I just meant the concept of the Hitlerite leadership of the State.

DR. SAUTER: Of the Hitlerite leadership of State? That means, first, the Reich Cabinet, does it not?

PAULUS: Yes, inasmuch as it is responsible for the directives given by the Government.

DR. SAUTER: For this reason I would like to know the following:

The Defendant Funk, who is sitting over there, was also a member of the Reich Cabinet and the Defendant Von Schirach is also counted as a member of the Reich Cabinet by the Prosecution. Do you know anything as to whether the Defendant Funk and the Defendant Von Schirach, like you, for instance, knew anything about these plans of Hitler?

PAULUS: I do not know.

DR. SAUTER: Do you know whether, during the war, since you were at the OKW, there were any meetings of the Cabinet at all?

PAULUS: I do not know that either.

DR. SAUTER: Do you know that Hitler, in the interests of secrecy of his war plans, even ordered that at conferences between himself and his military advisers the members of the Reich Cabinet, as for instance Funk, could not be admitted?

PAULUS: I do not know about that.

DR. SAUTER: Did it not come to your knowledge, perhaps through Herr Jodl or through Herr Keitel, that Hitler even forbade that civilian members of the Reich Cabinet should be present at such military conferences?

PAULUS: I do not know anything about that at all.

DR. SAUTER: Another question. After Stalingrad was encircled and the situation had become hopeless, there were several telegrams of devotion sent to Hitler from inside the fortress. Do you know anything about that?

PAULUS: If you speak of telegrams of devotion, I only know about the end, when efforts were made to find a meaning for the catastrophe that had happened there, to find a meaning for all the suffering and dying of so many soldiers. Therefore these things had been depicted as heroism in the telegram, to be forever remembered. I am sorry, but at that time, due to the prevailing situation, I let that pass and did not stop it.

DR. SAUTER: These telegrams were yours, were they not?

PAULUS: I do not know to which telegrams you are referring, with the exception of the last one.

DR. SAUTER: Several telegrams of devotion, in which there was a promise to hold out to the last man; those telegrams about which the German people were horrified. They are said to have your signature.

PAULUS: I request to have them presented to me, because there is nothing known to me about them.

DR. SAUTER: Do you have any idea what was in the last telegram?

PAULUS: In the last telegram there was a short description of what the army had done, of the achievement of the army, and it was pointed out that it did not intend to capitulate, and that that should be an example for the future.

DR. SAUTER: The answer was, I think, your promotion to General Field Marshal?

PAULUS: I do not know that this was the answer.

DR. SAUTER: But you were promoted to General Field Marshal, and you still have that title because the statement which I have submitted to the Court is signed “Paulus, General Field Marshal.”

PAULUS: Well, I have to say. . . . Do you mean this statement?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, this statement.

PAULUS: Yes, I had to take that title which was conferred upon me.

DR. SAUTER: In this statement which I have submitted to the Court as proof, there is the last sentence:

“I bear the responsibility for the fact that I did not give due
attention to the execution of the order of 14 January 1943 about
the surrender of the prisoners”—namely, all Russian
prisoners. . . .

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: “. . . to the Russians, and, furthermore, that I. . . .”

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: “. . . did not devote myself sufficiently to taking care of the prisoners.”—That is to say, the Russian prisoners.

I would like to hear your statement about the following: In that detailed letter why did you forget the several hundred thousands of German soldiers who were under your command and who lost under your command their freedom, their health, and their lives? There is no word about that.

PAULUS: No.

DR. SAUTER: No?

PAULUS: That is not the question in this letter. This letter to the Soviet Government was concerned with what happened to the Russian civilian population in the area of Stalingrad and the Russian prisoners of war. At this time I could not say anything about my soldiers, of course not.

DR. SAUTER: Not one word?

PAULUS: No, I could not speak here, because that had to be done at a different time. Of course, it is so that all the operational orders which led to the terrible conditions of Stalingrad, in spite of my objections. . . . About 20 January, as I said, I had made a report that conditions had reached such a measure of misery and of suffering through cold, hunger, and epidemics as to be unbearable, and that to continue the fighting would be beyond human possibility. The answer given to me by the Supreme Command was:

“Capitulation is impossible. The 6th Army will do its historic
duty by fighting to the utmost, in order to make the
reconstruction of the Eastern front possible.”

DR. SAUTER: And that is why you continued your efforts in the crime you have described until the very end?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. SAUTER: Because, according to your own statements, everything from the very beginning was a crime, which clearly and for a long time had come to your mind?

PAULUS: I did not say that it was clear to me as a crime from the very beginning, but that later I had this impression, as a result of retrospective considerations. My knowledge comes actually from my experience at Stalingrad.

DR. SAUTER: Then I would like to know, in closing: Was it not clear to you from the very beginning, when you were charged with the development of plans for the attack on Russia, as a specialist for such task—was it not clear to you from the very beginning that this attack on Russia could be made only under violations of international treaties, to which Germany was bound?

PAULUS: Yes, under violation of international law, but not under those conditions which developed later.

DR. SAUTER: No, I asked whether it was clear to you that this plan could only be executed by violation of international treaties?

PAULUS: It was clear to me that an attack of that kind could only be made under violation of the treaty which had existed with Russia since the fall of ’39.

DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions. Thank you.

[_Dr. Exner approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I have already told the witness, and defendants’ counsel have been told over and over again, that it is of the utmost importance that they should ask their questions slowly, that they ask one question at a time, and that they should pause between the question and the answer and between the answer and the next question. Will you try to observe that rule, please?

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, in September of 1940 at the OKW you were charged with the execution of an operational study against Russia, that is, to continue work on a plan which existed already. Do you know about how strong the German forces in the East were at that time?

PAULUS: I can only clarify, in the OKH I have. . . .

DR. EXNER: Yes, we have the OKH in mind.

PAULUS: I do not know any longer how strong the forces in the East were at that time. It was at a time shortly after the end of the campaign against France.

DR. EXNER: You do not know about how many divisions were in the East at that time for the protection of the German border?

PAULUS: No, I cannot remember that.

DR. EXNER: In February of 1941 our transports to the East began. Can you say how strong at that time the Russian forces were, along the German-Russian demarcation line and the Romanian-Russian border?

PAULUS: No, I cannot say that. The information which reached us about the Soviet Union and their forces was so extraordinarily scarce and incomplete that for a long time we had no clear picture at all.

DR. EXNER: But did not Halder at that time talk to the Führer frequently about the strength and deployment of the Russian forces?

PAULUS: That is possible, but I cannot remember it, because I had nothing to do with these questions after that time—with the theoretical development of our ideas. In December the operations department of the Army took the work over.

DR. EXNER: At this time you had theoretical war exercises?

PAULUS: That was in the beginning of December.

DR. EXNER: Then you probably used, as a basis of these exercises, information you had about the actual strength of the enemy?

PAULUS: That was just what we assumed about the strength of the enemy.

DR. EXNER: Well, you have collaborated intensively with that operational plan. You have tried it out by theoretical war exercises. Tell me, what was the difference between your work and Jodl’s at that time?

PAULUS: I do not think I am able to judge that.

DR. EXNER: I do not understand. That was General Staff work, was it not?

PAULUS: Yes, it was General Staff work, with which I was charged by the Chief of Staff.

DR. EXNER: Yes, and the activity of Jodl as Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab. . . .

PAULUS: The difference is that he had a view of the entire situation from the point where he was, whereas I could only see a small section, only that which I needed for my work, and that is all the information I received.

DR. EXNER: But the activity in both cases was one of General Staff preparation for the war?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. EXNER: I would also be interested to know something about Stalingrad. In your written statement, or written declaration, you have said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty with regard to the prohibition of capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that?

PAULUS: I just wanted to say it was the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht who was responsible for that order. It had the responsibility, and it makes no difference whether it was one person or another. At any rate, the responsibility was with the office as such.

DR. EXNER: At any rate, you do not know anything about the personal participation of any one of these two gentlemen? You only thought of. . . .

PAULUS: The OKW, which is represented by these persons.

DR. EXNER: Why, when the situation at Stalingrad was so hopeless and terrible—as you have indicated today—did you not, in spite of the order by the Führer to the contrary, try to break out?

PAULUS: Because at that time it was represented to me that by holding out with the army which I led, the fate of the German people would be decided.

DR. EXNER: Do you know that you enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in a special measure?

PAULUS: I do not know about that.

DR. EXNER: Do you know that he had already decided that you would become the successor to Jodl if the Stalingrad operation would be successful, because he did not like to work with Jodl any more?

PAULUS: I do not know about that in this form, but there was a rumor that late in the summer or early in the fall of 1942 a change was planned in the leadership. That was a rumor which the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe told me at that time, but I did not get any official information about that. There was other information, that I should be relieved of the command of that army and should be used to lead a new army group which was to be formed.

DR. EXNER: Do you remember the telegram which you sent to the Führer when you were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?

PAULUS: I did not send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not send a telegram.

DR. EXNER: Have you not thanked the Führer in any way?

PAULUS: No.

DR. EXNER: That is quite contrary to statements which other people have made. Witness, you are said to be or to have been a teacher at the Military Academy at Moscow. Is that correct?

PAULUS: That is not right, either.

DR. EXNER: Did you have another position in Moscow?

PAULUS: I was never in Russia before the war.

DR. EXNER: But now, since you became a prisoner of war?

PAULUS: I have been in a prisoner-of-war camp, like my other comrades.

DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the German Freedom Committee?

PAULUS: I was a member of a movement of German men, soldiers of all ranks and men of all classes, who had made it their aim to warn the German people at the last moment from the abyss, and to arouse them to overthrow this Hitler regime which had brought all this misery to many nations and especially to our German people. I have done that with the proclamation of 8 August 1944.

DR. EXNER: Did you do anything about that before?

PAULUS: No, I did not.

DR. EXNER: Thank you.

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.

[_Turning to the witness_] Witness, did you not know when you took over your office as Chief Quartermaster I that these preparations which Major General Marx already had begun, and which you then continued, were intended only for an eventual case?

PAULUS: One could think so, of course, but very soon in the course of the work things appeared which made it seem very probable that these theoretical preparations were to be put to practical use. In connection with the formulation of this plan of operations for an attack in which, from the very beginning, we were thinking in terms of using the Romanian area—during that very time we saw the dispatching of the first military mission with training groups and an entire Panzer division, just into that area for which the first theoretical preparations for an attack were being made. Thus, gradually, the impression became intensified that this was a plan which eventually would be executed.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the reason for my question is this: I believe the date which you mentioned, since which the plan was to have already been in existence, the fall of 1940, is a little early, isn’t it?

PAULUS: The documents which I was given for that plan of offense I explained in detail yesterday. They were submitted on 3 September, for upon the basis of these documents everything was developed, and everything was actually executed like that later.

DR. LATERNSER: I mean this: That first this plan was considered or conceived for an eventual case, and then at a later date, after a decision had been taken, it was used.

PAULUS: In retrospect, they fit together in perfect sequence, first the theoretical preparation, and then the practical preparation and execution.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know Directive Number 18 of 12 November 1940, issued by the former Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht?

PAULUS: I cannot remember it.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I refer now to a document which has already been submitted by the United States Prosecution, Number 444-PS. [_Handing the document to the witness_] I submit it to you, Witness. Page 8 is the one to which I am referring.

PAULUS: I cannot remember that I have ever seen this.

DR. LATERNSER: To inform the Court I am going to quote the passage—it is very short—which I have just shown to the witness. It is Page 8 of the Document 444-PS, this paragraph I quote: “5. Russia: Political conferences with the aim of clarifying the attitude of Russia for the near future have been started.”

Witness, after you have seen that passage you will have to admit that I am right in saying that the time at which the decision was taken to attack the Soviet Union must have been later than the time you told us yesterday.

PAULUS: I can only say from my personal experience and my own opinion as I look back now, following the entire development, that there was a clear plan from the beginning, the conception of that plan on 3 September 1940, then the directive of 21 December, and then its execution. Just at which precisely measurable date the decision was taken, I do not know, of course.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you know that in 1939 the Soviet Union marched into Poland with very strong forces which bore no relationship—according to opinions of German military experts—with the military problem to be solved at that time?

PAULUS: I only know of the fact that Soviet forces marched into Poland, but I have never heard anything about the size of the forces, nor have I ever heard anyone marvel at the strength of the forces that had taken part in the invasion.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know that before the German deployment on the Eastern border many strong Soviet forces had been deployed along that border, especially very strong Panzer forces in the area of Bialystok?

PAULUS: No, in that form I have never known of this.

DR. LATERNSER: Were not the first divisions from West to East transferred only after very strong Soviet forces already were standing along the Eastern border?

PAULUS: About the relationship of troop movements from West to East—the practical execution of the plan—I do not know anything, because I had nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months of April and May, because of other duties, I was present in the High Command of the Army for only a very short time.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said yesterday that at the end of March 1940 there was a conference at the Reich Chancellery, and there Generaloberst Halder gave you several points as a reason for the intended attack on Yugoslavia. You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank; second, the taking possession of the rail line to Nish, and you stressed the fact that in case of an attack against Russia the right flank would be free to move.

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Were not there reasons which were more important than those you mentioned?

PAULUS: I do not know of any others.

DR. LATERNSER: As to this attack upon Yugoslavia, was not that also to be done to relieve the Italians?

PAULUS: Yes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation against Greece was considered, and why that menace to the flank had to be eliminated if we were to push forward into Greece from Bulgaria.

DR. LATERNSER: Was not there at that time some concern about co-operation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England into the position of being able to land on the Greek coast and thereby gain a way to reach the Romanian oil fields?

PAULUS: Yes, but it would also have been impossible to carry out the Plan Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and unprotected.

DR. LATERNSER: I have received different information. In the decision to attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role which you said yesterday it did.

PAULUS: The Plan Barbarossa could not have been carried out if the area of Greece and Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we can adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the interpreters, using the words “question” and “answer” before the question and answer, assist the shorthand writers and the press, and therefore the interpreters may continue to say “question” and “answer” before the question and answer is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the difficulties which arise is for the counsel and witnesses to pause after the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the witness can then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further question. Is it clear what I mean?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were just speaking of the attack on Yugoslavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had to be carried out before the Plan Barbarossa could be undertaken, as otherwise there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I understand you correctly?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: You said yesterday that the overthrow of the government in Yugoslavia was the cause for Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia. Do you know whether any plans for such an attack existed even before the revolution in Yugoslavia?

PAULUS: That is not known to me.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you happen to know that particularly the plan of attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient time, and that it caused a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement of the attack on Russia, which had originally been planned for the middle of May, the weather permitting.

DR. LATERNSER: But then there is a sort of contradiction here, if you say that the attack against Yugoslavia took place at that time although it was inconvenient, as the attack against Russia was to be made.

PAULUS: I do not see any contradiction in that. As I saw the situation then, the Yugoslavian Government had made an agreement with us which placed the railway line from Belgrade to Nish at our disposal, and that after that agreement was concluded, a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which created a different policy. Therefore, this plan of attack was believed necessary to eliminate a danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia and to delay Barbarossa form a contradiction. I merely see that one is a prerequisite for the execution of the other.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you present at a conference of the General Staff on the Obersalzberg on 3 February 1941?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Are you aware of the fact that at that time the strength of the Soviet Russian deployment was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions, and that this was reported by Generaloberst Halder?

PAULUS: I cannot remember that. Nor am I sure whether Generaloberst Halder was actually present during that conference.

DR. LATERNSER: But, witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: And I believe that that conference must at least have given the impression that a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern Front was in question.

PAULUS: I myself have at least no recollection of any such impression.

DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of that attack against the Soviet Union, were you still Chief Quartermaster I?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: As far as I have in the meantime been informed, it is part of the tasks of that service department to make positive suggestions regarding military operations on land, is that correct?

PAULUS: That was once the case during a different division of tasks. At the time when I was Chief Quartermaster I did not get that task as part of my job. The operational department was not under my control but immediately under the personal control of the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of running the training department and then the organization department, and that was in autumn 1941. Therefore, it was not part of my sphere of activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff regarding operations which were in progress, or any other operations. I merely had to carry out the special tasks which were given to me.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you give information on the subject of how German prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That question, about which such an incredible amount of propaganda has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German officers and enlisted personnel in the cauldron of Stalingrad, I have obligated myself to consider in the interest of truth. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Cross-examination is questioning on questions which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or questions relevant to the credibility of the witness. Questions which relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have got nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try, and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that question? May I make a short statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I could ascertain how, actually, prisoners of war were treated, so that a large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so that their worries would cease.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with which the Tribunal is concerned.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Witness, do you know the Defendant Fritzsche?

PAULUS: Yes, I do.

DR. FRITZ: Are you aware of the fact that during the summer and autumn of 1942 he was with your army?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. FRITZ: Witness, in the course of this Trial there was a discussion about the command of the OKW which, as I hear, was also sharply criticized by you, according to which all the captured commissars of the Russian Army were to be shot. Are you aware of that order?

PAULUS: Yes. It came to my knowledge.

DR. FRITZ: Do you recollect that the Defendant Fritzsche, after he had become aware of that order in the course of his duties in the East, made a proposal to you and your I.C. officers, according to which that order should be cancelled as far as your army zone was concerned?

PAULUS: I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly possible that Herr Fritzsche did discuss that question with my staff, but when I took over that army on 20 January 1942, that order was not carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice did not become operative, was in fact cancelled later on.

DR. FRITZ: Perhaps, so as to refresh your memory, I might ask another question: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritzsche suggested to you or your I.C. officers the scattering of pamphlets with a corresponding content over the Russian front?

PAULUS: I personally cannot recollect that, but I consider it perfectly possible that such a discussion with the I.C. officer who was responsible for that sort of thing took place.

DR. FRITZ: Then one last question: As far as you know the character of the Defendant Fritzsche, would you consider it entirely possible and probable that he made this proposal?

PAULUS: Yes, indeed I do.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, in your position you supported Hitler right to the very end, despite the fact that you knew that an aggressive war was being waged. How much could the political leaders know of this?

PAULUS: I cannot answer that question, because it is out of my knowledge.

DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by political leaders?

PAULUS: May I ask another question in return? What does the defendant’s counsel understand by political leaders, concerning whom he asks the question?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the organization of the Party does not seem to be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is indicted in this Trial. They are to be declared criminal to this extent that, from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter, they may be punished because of their participation in the conspiracy to commit all the acts which are being tried here. This organization of political leaders is composed in such a way that 93 percent are local group leaders with their staffs and all their subordinates.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you can ask this witness about this. He does not know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge against the political leadership. I do not think that is proper cross-examination at all.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him to what extent these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going to ask a second question, whether he was aware that he, as a witness, has contributed materially to the fact that these people, the political leaders, supported Hitler because they believed in the facade which the witness himself had assisted in setting up.

THE PRESIDENT: I have already answered you that he did not know to what extent the political leaders had been informed.

DR. SERVATIUS: I am also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was responsible for the labor supply.

[_Turning to the witness_] Have you any knowledge as to whether German prisoners of war were used in Russian armament industries?

PAULUS: I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The prisoners of war whom I myself have seen, in the camps where I have been, worked for the immediate requirements of the camp or in the near vicinity of the camp. They worked at agriculture or forestry, and I know from the papers that some German units of workers, who had voluntarily formed groups and were working in industry, were proud of the results of their work. But I do not know in what branches of industry these people worked.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to this witness.