Chapter XIV: Section L: , (IV/QU), Number 00630/41; top secret, commanders (2)

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.

Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question rather differently.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Göring, in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.

GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shall make a summary. Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in the well-known Green File.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The British?

BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The United States?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants’ counsel?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff, I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants’ counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning’s session.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.

GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don’t know whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants’ counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case.

[_The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: General, you won’t, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement, will you?

GEN. ZORYA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.

GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case.

Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.

I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-228, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.

For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock’s testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book.

“I must say”—said Pieckenbrock—“that already since August and
September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of
the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence
assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These
assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation
of war against Russia.

“The more precise dates for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union
I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what
sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the
Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May.”

The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I present those documents under Document Number USSR-230.

I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of Bentivegni’s testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal:

“I learned first of Germany’s preparation for a military attack
on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris.
In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris’
office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for
an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938
in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin.

“Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler’s had now begun
to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that
divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large
numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in
accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up
positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia.”

These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni’s testimony.

And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of fascist Germany’s military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Müller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-149.

All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.

THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Müller, does it appear where that document was made and where General Müller is now?

GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Müller’s hand. This date is 8 January 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Where?

GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the date is written.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want to know which one and where it is.

GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn’t it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy.

Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?

GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general’s whereabouts.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision.

I think it would be better if, when defendants’ counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak.

I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.

This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook—as he had already undertaken—to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.

If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.

DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.

DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19—provided it is an authentic document.

We are affording the defendants’ counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.

DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants’ counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.

DR. NELTE: Thank you.

GEN. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Müller. General Müller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region.

May I continue my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself, General Müller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany’s preparations against the Soviet Union.

I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Müller’s statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it:

“The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as
early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff
officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General
Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group
consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation
armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose
task was to prepare ‘Case Sea Lion’ (the invasion of England by
Army Group B—Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army
Group B was transferred to the East (Posen) during July and was
given the following forces, transferred from France—part of the
armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army
Command (Von Kluge), and 18th Army Command (Von Küchler), plus
several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater
part of this number was taken from Army Group C (Von Leeb).

“Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order
for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was
cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of
this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and
thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.

“Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men
to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order
disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already
in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.

“The next order which gives evidence of Germany’s preparations
for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued
in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new
army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about
forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units
was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of
the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but
mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH
called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the
General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards
Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the
order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to
Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II
(Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff,
should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was
the leading of training of the above-mentioned 40 divisions
which were to be newly created.

“In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by
the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these
units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into
action in the invasion of the Soviet Union.”

Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry.

I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two military exercises under the direction of Paulus.

THE PRESIDENT: General, I don’t think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence in the witness box.

GEN. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Müller’s statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of these games which, _per se_, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents:

“Insofar”—General Müller states—“as in the future the Army was
to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers
and general staff officers.

“Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders
from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the
military exercises of Rundstedt’s army group at St. Germain,
near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack
and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of
Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of
the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military
exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order
concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will
refer later.

“The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the
General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present:
Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th
Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wöhler, and of
Kleist’s tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of
the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place
occupied by Rundstedt’s army group, approximately between the
31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the
necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces.”

The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.

I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.

Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.

This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany’s Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind was brewing against the Balkans.

The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.

The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.

I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East.

I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.

On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni’s deposition, it is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:

“In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received
from Canaris orders to intensify the work for
counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the
German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”

On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues:

“In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a
corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig,
Königsberg, Posen, Kraków, Breslau, and Vienna.”

And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read:

“In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives
for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.

“a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out
active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for
instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence
groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended
for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and
paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and
counterintelligence organs.

“b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence
agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in
relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow
against Great Britain.

“c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations
being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the
transfer of troops to the East be kept secret.”

The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army, Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock’s testimony. Pieckenbrock states:

“In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris
and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel
Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During
this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this
subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I,
beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than
once had official talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV,
Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the
detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These
conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various
tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and
in particular with the verification of old intelligence data
about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of
the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack
on the Soviet Union.”

I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement and read further:

“All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against
Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of
agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task—the intensification of
espionage work against Russia—was given to all intelligence
organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more
successful direction of all these field Abwehr organs, a special
intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name
of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the
village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work
against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I.
Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had
also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ
became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire
intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against
the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line.
At the head of staff ‘Wally’ was Lieutenant Colonel
Schmalschläger.”

I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement on Page 36 of the document book:

“From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at
which I was also present, I know that a great amount of
preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried
out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941
many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the
quarters of Jodl’s deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in
a cavalry school in Krampnitz. One particular question settled
at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war
with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units,
Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units
among the individual army groups.”

In Pieckenbrock’s testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen’s department had been entrusted, and to special task units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800.

Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen’s deputy in Department II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze’s testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashnikov, of the Counterintelligence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:

“I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a
special group under code name ‘A,’ which had to engage in the
preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of
disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the
intended attack on the U.S.S.R.

“At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with
it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came
from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which
contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive
activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field
Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General
Warlimont on Keitel’s instructions—I do not quite remember
which.)”

I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on:

“It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of
delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II,
in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a
net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national
antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union.”

I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the following passages in his testimony:

“In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and
Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the
German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist
fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set
out above.

“In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the
leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name ‘Consul
I’) and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany’s attack
on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the
Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet
armies, and also to convince international public opinion of
alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.

“We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for
subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet
Union.”

I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze’s testimony:

“Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for
subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty
training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the
immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen. Among the
objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure
of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and
important military installations, and holding them till the
arrival of the advance units of the German Army.

“Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of
war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans
from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and
equipment in order to camouflage their operations.

“During the course of preparations for Germany’s attack on the
U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected
supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and
organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the
Russian language.”

Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa.

I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature.

The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the hands of advance units of the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s letter to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52. I read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter:

“28 June 1943; top secret.

“To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object:
Elections to the Iranian Parliament.

“Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact
with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of
exercising German influence on the course of the imminent
Iranian parliamentary elections.”

And a few lines further on it is stated:

“In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the
elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and
for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are
necessary. . . . It should also be noted that nationally
oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany.

“I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one
million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent
by the people whom we are sending there by airplane.

“Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS
Obergruppenführer.”

This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.

In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Führer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.

I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:

“By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Führer has entrusted
the Reich Führer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret
Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its
purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get
information in the political, military, economic, and technical
spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Führer has established
that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as
foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement
with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following
agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich
Führer SS had been reached:

“1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Führer SS
represents an important instrument for obtaining information in
the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at
the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for
this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the
Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security
Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by
the diplomatic service is not affected by this.

“2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office
of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation
in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of
the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German
foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich
Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere
of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of
the Secret Intelligence Service.

“3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics,
obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service? The details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.

GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler’s Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.

I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read—I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad—also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.

If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, “The Satellites of Germany.”

When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of “Presumed Allies and Their Tasks.” I should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out