Chapter XVI: Part II: of this case (2)

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): A statement made by you yesterday has already been discussed once more today, namely, how much knowledge did individual members of the German Government have regarding important decisions? I gathered from your reply that you did not consider the Reich Government, regarding its personalities, one homogeneous body. In this Trial the difficulty repeatedly arises that normal conditions are assumed. One is especially prone to the conception that most important political and military decisions, as is otherwise customary, are made within a government body of important persons or within the military supreme command; in other words, that questions are discussed and decided within a group to which belongs a larger number of personalities. Witness, from the knowledge you have gained in your high military rank, could one assume this to be true of Adolf Hitler’s Government? Has Adolf Hitler, in his personality and methods, to speak politely, as a man of an unusual type, chiefly employed a completely different procedure here? Did he not always make his decisions independently or, at most, in closest consultation with a very few assistants, and can we not derive from that that leading personalities in political and military fields had no knowledge of impending events?

PAULUS: I must say to that that my military service in the General Staff of the Army did not give me an insight into the methods of the leadership of the State and of the Reich Government. My concept of a governing body of a nation is that of a united group who, regardless of the methods the state intends to use, have such a sense of responsibility toward the people for the deeds of the government, that they will not allow just anything to be done by even the head of the state—in this case Hitler with his usual brutal and autocratic ways—but, even if not required to do so, would themselves intervene in time with the necessary measures, at the very latest as soon as it was clear to the whole world that this government was being led by an insane criminal.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you belong to the second circle of people which you mentioned. It is an established fact that you have not intervened, and, surely, you would have had important reasons for that. I believe that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned, you would not pass judgment, but would answer my questions as far as actual facts are concerned.

My question was whether, according to your knowledge gained not only in your military position but also in your particular and leading position—whether they were right or wrong is unnecessary for establishing the fact—you knew what the methods in military and political matters were and what they were not. According to your knowledge, were resolutions made by a large body of military and political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were decisions generally made and resolutions passed in a very much smaller circle of people, probably sometimes only by Hitler alone?

PAULUS: How decisions of the Reich Government were made is not known to me. Therefore, in my previous answer, I have merely given you my general conception of this question and I believe that I have answered it therewith. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done everything that was done. In order to exert his influence in a small circle he finally needed the co-operation of his immediate assistants. In other words, it was quite impossible for him to achieve his aims otherwise.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: As to the co-operation of his closest assistants, do you believe that some trained minister, a minister of labor or some other minister who was specially trained, was ever consulted by Hitler about his plans for aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said that he does not know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at. What he may think about it is really not relevant. He does not know.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, is it your impression that plans for aggression were made by Hitler many years in advance, or are you of the opinion that they were made to meet certain circumstances, on the basis of the intuition which you say he always had?

PAULUS: That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on 3 September 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942. What I observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. About the time prior to that I am not informed.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, you said just now that you were a member of a body which had the aim of saving Germany from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the other members of that group?

PAULUS: We had the possibility of making ourselves heard and understood by the German people, and believed it our duty to make known to the German people our view, not only of military events but also of the events of 20 July, and to tell them of the convictions we had since gained. In this regard the initiative came chiefly from the ranks of the army I had led to Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through the orders of those military and political leaders against whom we were now taking a stand, more than 100,000 soldiers died of hunger, cold, and snow. There we experienced in concentrated form the horrors and terrors of a war of conquest.

DR. HORN: Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda?

PAULUS: Apart from the possibility of making propaganda through radio and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to the German people, we had no other facilities.

THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?

DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on the credibility of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot see that it has any bearing on his credibility.

DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other possibilities which were available, which the witness has not mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got nothing to do with his credibility, at least as far as the questions that you have asked are concerned, and they will not allow the questions to be put.

DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. HORN: Did you, during the time you were a prisoner, have an opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the disposal of anybody else?

PAULUS: In no way, in no case.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I understand that that concludes the cross-examination. Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any more questions?

GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. We consider that the questions have been comprehensively explained.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army on 3 September 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against the Soviet Union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation before you saw it?

PAULUS: I cannot say exactly how long the period of preparation lasted, but I would estimate that it lasted 2 to 3 weeks.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who had given the orders for the preparation of the plan?

PAULUS: I assume that they originated from the same source, namely, the OKW via the High Command of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army had given to Major General Marx the same documents that he had given me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were usually present?

PAULUS: The departments concerned, the Operational Department, the Department for Foreign Armies, the General Quartermaster for Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief departments which were involved.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): How many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were familiar with the orders and directives as they were being signed?

PAULUS: In the course of time, that is, up to December, while the actual marching orders were being prepared, more or less, all General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many had been informed previously, in the individual periods, is something which I can no longer say exactly.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I.T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): What exactly did the General Staff of the German Army represent? Did it deal exclusively with the elaboration of technical questions, was it the apparatus elaborating technical problems according to instructions of the Supreme Command, or, again, was the General Staff an organization which prepared, elaborated, and submitted its findings to the Supreme Command independently?

PAULUS: It was a technical executive body which had the task of carrying out existing instructions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Therefore the General Staff was merely a technical apparatus?

PAULUS: That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army, and not an executive body.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Gen. Nikitchenko): To what extent did the General Staff conscientiously carry out the instructions received from the Supreme Command?

PAULUS: They carried out these instructions absolutely.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did any conflict exist between the General Staff and the Supreme Command?

PAULUS: It is a known fact that certain differences of opinion did exist, although I am unable to explain that in detail. At any rate, I know through my immediate superior that he had frequently had differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Could such officers remain? Did they, in fact, remain in the service of the General Staff if they disagreed with the policy of the Supreme Command?

PAULUS: Political questions did not arise in that connection. Generally speaking, political questions were not discussed in the circle of the Army Supreme Command.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not speaking of political questions in the narrow sense of the word. I am speaking of the policy of planning for war, of the policy of preparations and aggression. That is what I had in mind. Was it intended, in case you know about it, to transform that part of the Soviet Union, occupied by the German Forces?

PAULUS: I never did know what the itemized plans were. My knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by exploitation?

PAULUS: The economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing its resources one could bring the war in the West to a close and also to guarantee future supremacy in Europe.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did the nature of the exploitation differ from the economic exploitation applied inside Germany?

PAULUS: In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I only led that army in Russia for three-quarters of a year; and I was captured early, in January 1943.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did you know of the directives issued by Government organizations in Germany and by the Supreme Command, concerning the treatment of the Soviet population by the Army?

PAULUS: I remember that instructions did appear, but I cannot recollect the date at the moment. In those instructions definite rules were given for the manner of conducting the war in the East. I believe that this principal decree was included in that so-called Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders to the effect that no particular consideration should be shown the population.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by “not to show particular consideration”—or perhaps the translation is not quite correct?

PAULUS: That meant that only military necessities should be considered a basis for all measures that were taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Were there any divisions under your command consisting entirely of SS troops?

PAULUS: During the time I led the Army I had no SS troops at all under my command, as I remember. Even in the cauldron at Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry, armored, and motorized divisions, and two Romanian divisions, there were no SS units.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the SA did not form units, did they? The SA?

PAULUS: I have never heard of SA units, but the existence of SS units is a known fact.

THE PRESIDENT: And did you have any branches of the Gestapo attached to your army?

PAULUS: No, I did not have those either.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any questions to ask, and you said no, I take it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand, and Gen. Zorya approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on, General.

GEN. ZORYA: Yesterday, I stopped at the questions connected with the relations between the fascist conspirators and the Romanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to read into the Record the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal.

The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the laws of the Soviet Union and I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-153 (Document Number USSR-153) the record of his deposition, which is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites. I consider it necessary to read the greater part of these depositions, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I quote:

“Throughout the entire period during which I held office in
Romania”—testifies Ion Antonescu—“I followed the policy of
strengthening the alliance with Germany and resorted to her help
for retraining and rearming the Romanian army. For this purpose
I had several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with
Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head
of the Romanian State. This meeting took place on my initiative,
in Berlin, at Hitler’s official residence, in the presence of
the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, and Hitler’s personal
interpreter, Schmidt. The conversation with Hitler lasted over 4
hours.

“I assured Hitler that Romania remained true to the previously
concluded agreement regarding Romania’s adherence to the
Tripartite Pact.

“In reply to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany,
Hitler declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the
frontiers of Romania.

“At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration
should not be considered as final and thus gave me to understand
that Romania could count on a revision of the decision
previously taken in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania.

“Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Romania
should continue its work of reconstructing the Romanian Army on
German lines.

“In the same way I also concluded an economic agreement, in
accordance with which the Germans would at a later date supply
Romania with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, antiaircraft
and antitank guns, automatic rifles, and other armaments, while
they, in return, would receive from Romania wheat and oil for
the needs of the German armies.

“To the question put to me as to whether this, my first
conversation with Hitler, could be regarded as the beginning of
my agreement with the Germans concerning the preparations for
war against the Soviet Union—I replied in the affirmative.
There is no doubt that Hitler had this fact in mind, when he
elaborated his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union.

“In January 1941, through the offices of the German Minister in
Romania, Fabricius, I was invited to Germany and had my second
meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The following persons were
present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German
Minister to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these, Field Marshal
Keitel and General Jodl were also present as representing the
German Armed Forces.

“At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced
Killinger to me, emphasizing that the latter was one of his
closest friends. After this, Hitler described the military
situation in the Balkans and declared that Mussolini had
appealed to him for help in connection with the Italian failures
in the war against Greece, and that he, Hitler, intended to give
this help to Italy.

“While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the German
troops concentrated on Hungarian territory to pass through
Romania, so that they could render speedy assistance to the
Italians.

“Knowing that the passage of German troops through Romania to
the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly act towards the
Soviet Union, I asked Hitler what, in his opinion, would be the
subsequent reaction of the Soviet Government.

“Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in November 1940,
he had already given appropriate guarantees to Romania and had
taken upon himself the obligation of protecting Romania by force
of arms.

“I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through
Romania might serve as a pretext for military operations on the
part of the Soviet Union, and that Romania would then be in a
difficult position since the Romanian Army had not been
mobilized.

“Hitler announced that he would give orders for some of the
German troops intended for participation in the operations
against Greece to be left in Romania. Hitler also stressed that,
according to the information at his disposal, the Soviet Union
did not intend to fight either Germany or Romania.

“Satisfied with Hitler’s declaration, I agreed to the passage of
German troops through Romanian territory.

“General Jodl, who was present at this conference, described to
me the strategic situation of the German Army and stressed the
necessity for an attack against Greece launched from Bulgaria.

“My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.

“At this meeting at which, in addition to ourselves, there were
present Ribbentrop and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt,
we reached a final agreement with regard to a joint attack on
the Soviet Union.

“Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed attack on
the Soviet Union. ‘Once we have prepared this attack,’ said
Hitler, ‘we must carry it out without warning, along the entire
extent of the Soviet frontier, from the Black to the Baltic
Seas.’

“The unexpectedness of the military attack—Hitler went on to
say—would in a short time give Germany and Romania a chance to
liquidate one of our most dangerous adversaries.

“As a result of his military plans, Hitler suggested the use of
Romanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and, at
the same time, he requested me to participate directly in the
attack on the Soviet Union.

“Hitler stressed the point that Romania must not remain outside
this war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia and North
Bukovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to
fight on Germany’s side. At the same time he pointed out that,
in return for our assistance in the war, Romania would be
allowed to occupy and administer other Soviet territories, right
up to the River Dnieper.

“Since Hitler’s offer to initiate a joint campaign against the
U.S.S.R. corresponded to my own aggressive intentions, I
announced my agreement to participate in the attack on the
Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number
of Romanian troops and, at the same time, to increase deliveries
of the oil and food required by the German armies.

“Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia, I asked
Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding
her participation in the war.

“Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their
consent to participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. in
alliance with Germany. When, exactly, the Germans had agreed on
this joint attack with the Hungarians, Hitler did not specify.

“On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active
preparations for the coming campaign.”

Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following manner—I refer to Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of the testimony.

“After the Romanian troops under my supreme command had invaded
the Soviet territory Hitler sent me a letter in which he
expressed his gratitude to me and to the Romanian army for the
assistance given.

“Signed, Marshal Antonescu.”

The date of the beginning of Romanian preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions furnished by the former Vice Minister, Mihai Antonescu, who was also interrogated by the Soviet authorities upon the request of the Soviet Prosecution: I now submit his testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-152 (Document Number USSR-152). I shall not quote these depositions in detail since their greater part is a repetition of some of the facts described already in the testimony of Ion Antonescu. I shall only refer to a few paragraphs. I would refer you to Page 1 of the testimony which is translated into Russian, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the document book:

“In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by the then
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Studza, left for Germany,
where he had a meeting with Hitler.

“During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed
the agreement for Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and
received Hitler’s promise for the later revision, in favor of
Romania, of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Treaty.

“The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial step of
a policy which subsequently led to a joint German and Romanian
attack on the Soviet Union.”

Your Honors, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well as the testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, which have just been submitted to the Tribunal, justify the Soviet Prosecution in making the following statement:

1. The decision to send to Romania a military mission of the German General Staff for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, in order to prepare for and subsequently to attack the U.S.S.R., was taken no later than September 1940, that is, no less than 9 months prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R. 2. In November of the same year, Romanian war preparations had been fully developed.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had intended presenting to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen, general of the former German Army. I do not, however, intend to do so now, since the Soviet Prosecution has the possibility of examining this witness in court during the session. I, on my part, request your permission to have this witness brought to the court for examination.

THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, that would be convenient, in view of several technical reasons, and would facilitate the task of the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

[_The witness, Buschenhagen, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ERICH BUSCHENHAGEN (Witness): Erich Buschenhagen.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

GEN. ZORYA: Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when and where you were born?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I was born on 8 December 1895 in Strasbourg, in Alsace.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you name your last military rank, please.

BUSCHENHAGEN: I was general in the infantry in the German Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52d Army Corps.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you tell us please, did you on 26 December 1945 appeal to us with a statement in connection with the Helsinki trials?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

GEN. ZORYA: Do you confirm this statement now?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I do.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you please tell us what you know about the preparations made by fascist Germany for attacking the Soviet Union?

BUSCHENHAGEN: At the end of December 1940, in my position as Chief of the General Staff of the German forces in Norway, I was called to the OKH, where the then Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, had a conference with the chiefs of general staffs of the army groups and of the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference we were informed of the OKW’s Directive Number 21, the Plan Barbarossa, which was issued on 18 December 1940. We were given in lectures the basic reasons for the intended operations against Soviet Russia.

From this directive I learned that troops of my army also would take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one speech made by the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who was then also with the OKH. He spoke at that time about the military actions in the winter war between Finland and the Soviet Union. He drew a picture of the methods of warfare and the fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops.

General Heinrichs also had conferences with Generaloberst Halder at that time, in which I did not take part myself, but I assume that they were concerned with possible co-operation between the Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There existed since the fall of 1940 a military co-operation between Germany and Finland, and the German Air Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for through traffic from northern Norway to the Finnish harbors in the transport of men and material. As the result of conferences, which the German military attaché had held in Helsinki by order of the OKW, this through traffic was extended in the winter of 1940 to a general through traffic of the German Wehrmacht from northern Norway to the Finnish Baltic seaports. In order to carry out this traffic, a German Army administration center was set up in the main city of Lapland, Rovanjemi, and a German army transport unit was transferred to the Arctic Strait of Rovanjemi and Petsamo-Rovanjemi. Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this Arctic Sea route and along the railroad which led from Rovanjemi to ports on the Finnish south coast.

In December to January 1940-41, I had, with the OKW, discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.

GEN. ZORYA: Didn’t you also have conferences with the Finnish General Staff about joint operations against the Soviet Union?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I did.

GEN. ZORYA: Tell us, who instructed you to negotiate with the Finnish Government and what course did these negotiations follow?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I had orders and authorizations from the OKW, which was the immediate superior of myself and my army. In February 1941 I received—after the basic facts had been cleared in regard to the participation of the troops from Norway based in Finland—I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss with them these operations from middle and northern Finland.

On 18 February 1941 I reached Helsinki and on the 2 following days, I had conferences with the Finnish Chief of General Staff, General Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of the Operations Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area around Kuusamo and Rovanjemi; also from the area of Petsamo. These conferences led to an agreement of the different opinions.

After these conferences I travelled, together with the Chief of the Operation Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to middle and northern Finland in order to study the area of Urinsalmo-Kuusamo, the area east of Rovanjemi-Petsamo, the terrain, the possibilities for deployment and billeting, and for operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on 28 February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border. In a final conference it was determined that an operation from the area of Kuusamo and Helsinki and an operation from the area east of Rovanjemi in the direction of Basikamo would prove successful; that, on the other hand, the operations from Petsamo towards Rovanjemi would have considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.

As a result of these discussions there was worked out by the German High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from the Finnish areas. The operational study was presented to the OKW and found its approval. It then received through the High Command of Norway the name of “Blaufuchs.”

In May, that is, on 24 May, I met the Finnish Chief of Staff Heinrichs, who had been invited to the Führer’s headquarters at Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of the Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, a discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg.

On the 25th there was at Salzburg a conference between the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl on the one side, and on the other, Lieutenant General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic plans for co-operation between German and Finnish troops were laid down.

After this conference I travelled, together with General Heinrichs, to Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force concerning joint questions of the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force with matériel. General Heinrichs, after these discussions, also had a meeting with Generaloberst Halder, in which I did not participate.

For the third time I met the Finnish General Staff on 2 June. In my statement of 26 December I said that this conference took place at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of fact, it took place on 2 June.

At these conferences, which again took place between General Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization; there it was decided that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the border patrols, and then the form of further enlistments for the military training of reservists and reserve officers; a decision was also reached about the deployment and formation of German-Finnish forces in such a way that the main Finnish forces, under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south, should operate together with the German Army Group North, coming from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and also towards the east of Lake Ladoga.

The other Finnish forces were to be under the command of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst north of the Rivers Ulo and Ulojoki. For this army of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo through Kerskienski against the Murmansk railroad; the middle group east of Rovanjemi through Salla Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk. There was complete agreement on all these questions and also there were details discussed about exchange of information, about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air Force about joint questions of air warfare and about the use of Finnish airports by the German Air Force.

After these discussions I returned to Germany in order to work out their results and put them into action on behalf of Germany. Then again, on 12 or 13 July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with Lieutenant General Erfurt, who was the German liaison officer with the Finnish Armed Forces. We met General Heinrichs at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum on the points which we had agreed upon in previous conferences. He agreed to these points, except for a minor detail. Then I turned over my duties as liaison officer with the Finnish General Staff to Lieutenant General Erfurt, to take up my activities as Chief of General Staff of the German Army in Lapland.

GEN. ZORYA: I should like to ask you a last question. If it is not too difficult for you, will you please indicate what was the exact character of these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff? More especially, at the planning of these operations was the necessity of defense taken into consideration?

BUSCHENHAGEN: All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff, to the outside world, always pointed out that all these measures had only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was—from the very beginning—no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union, for all the preparations that we made pointed in that same direction, namely, the plans for mobilization; above all, the objectives for the attack. Nobody ever reckoned with the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland.

Since, for cogent military reasons, the operations for attack from Finnish territory could start only 8 to 10 days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken during and after the attack, but the whole formation and lining-up of the troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe you can see sufficiently from that the aggressive character of all these preparations.

GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do defendants’ counsel wish to cross-examine?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in this Trial a group of people are under indictment with the purpose of declaring them criminals. Included in this group, to state it shortly, are all the commanders-in-chief of the several parts of the Armed Forces.

Have you ever had any knowledge before the beginning of the attack against the Soviet Union that an order came out, according to which the captured commissars had to be executed?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you at any time speak to your commanding general, Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, concerning this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: What opinion did Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and yourself hold concerning this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: That this was a criminal order.

DR. LATERNSER: Since you had that opinion, I would like to ask you whether, within your army, this order was carried out?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Actually it was not carried out.

DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because the commander and his chief and you, Witness, were of the opinion that this order should not be carried out or because it would not have been practicable, for, as it is known, the Soviet commissars fought until the last and fell and, in cases where they were captured, their papers, which showed them to be commissars, had already been destroyed?

For what reason was this order not actually carried out?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Firstly, in view of the line taken by Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and myself, comments were added to it before it was passed on, in other words, we let the troops know that inwardly we were not in agreement with it—and we found our commanding generals to show a full understanding. Secondly, because of the reason given by you, because, as a matter of fact, not a single commissar fell into our hands, as far as I can remember.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know any other commanders who had the same attitude as you had with regard to this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you answer “no” because you did not speak to others?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I did not speak to others because in Norway I was so isolated from other armies that I had no opportunity of speaking to others.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, aren’t you of the opinion that the great majority of the commanding generals had the same attitude concerning this order as you and your commanding general?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I cannot answer that because I cannot speak the minds of the others.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?

GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

GEN. ZORYA: This morning I had to stop before reading the testimony of Pantazi, Romania’s former Minister of War, which I intend to present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-154 (Document Number USSR-154). Pantazi describes in detail the preparations of Romania for war. I would ask you to accept this testimony as evidence. You will find it on Page 71 of the document book. I shall now read such extracts of this document as are of interest to us:

“Romania’s preparations for war against the Soviet Union began
in November 1940 when, in accordance with the agreement signed
by Marshal Antonescu in Bucharest, regarding Romania’s adherence
to the Tripartite Pact, there arrived in Bucharest German
military missions, consisting of groups of German
officer-instructors; those for the army were headed by General
Hansen, those for the Air Force by Major General Speidel.

“With the arrival of the German military missions in Romania,
the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General
Joanitiu, acting on the orders of Antonescu, issued an order to
the army, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors
into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganizing and
re-educating the Romanian forces in accordance with the code of
regulations of the German Army.

“At the same time, and still acting on Marshal Antonescu’s
orders, all reserve officers of the Romanian Army were called up
for a course of 2 months of retraining and underwent instruction
under German direction.

“During the period of the retraining of officers, the General
Staff of the Romanian Army drafted a plan for calling up into
the Army 12 age groups due for mobilization in case of war, the
training of all these groups to be carried out in accordance
with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army,
to be completed by 1 July 1941.

“The higher Romanian officers underwent similar retraining in
their respective branches of the service.

“In this way, under German leadership and prior to the beginning
of the war by Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union, the
whole of the Romanian Army and Air Force were reorganized and
retrained along German lines.”

I shall omit two paragraphs which are of no importance and I pass to the second paragraph, which you will find on Page 72 in the document book. These are also depositions of Pantazi.

THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could omit these details of the preparations made in Romania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on the Romanian frontier.

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, this question is of importance. I hesitate at present to point out the exact passage which deals with it—it must be on Page 74 in the document book:

“In this connection the following units which were already
mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union were, in
February 1941, on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, directed to the
frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia: The 4th Alpine Rifle
Division, the 7th, 8th, and 21st Infantry Divisions, the
Infantry Division of the Guards, a cavalry corps and another
infantry division whose name I do not recall at present. In
addition, 3 German divisions, selected from the 21 German
divisions moving to Greece across Romania, were sent to the
U.S.S.R. frontier.”

I omit several paragraphs. On Page 73 of your book of documents we find the following extract from Pantazi’s testimony, marked in pencil:

“In accordance with instructions from Marshal Antonescu in May
1941, the following divisions were likewise sent to the
frontier: The Frontier Division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine Rifle
Divisions, the 13th Infantry Division, and a Panzer division.
Concurrently with these divisions the Germans transferred to the
U.S.S.R. frontier seven German divisions.

“Consequently, prior to the beginning of the Romanian and German
attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the
frontier between Romania and the U.S.S.R. 12 Romanian and 10
German divisions, totalling up to 600,000 men.”

Thus the documents which have just been submitted to the Tribunal justify the assertion that Romania’s preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union on the directions received from the staff of the fascist conspirators had begun long before they found expression on paper in Plan Barbarossa. Having attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler’s lackeys expected gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On 27 July 1941 Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing gratitude to him and to his army.

I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler, addressed to Antonescu as Exhibit Number USSR-237 (Document Number USSR-237). Hitler writes in this letter—Page 1 of the Russian translation of the letter, Paragraph 3, Page 74 in the document book presented to the Tribunal:

“To congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success is for
me personally as great a happiness as it is a satisfaction easy
to understand. The winning back of Bessarabia will be the most
natural reward for your effort and those of your gallant
troops.”

The promises of the fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia alone.

I beg for permission to return to the conversation of 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop. This conversation is set forth in a document which I presented as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document USSR-233). I am now referring to Paragraph 3 of the Russian translation of this document—3rd paragraph from the top of this page—which you will find on Page 61 of the document book. It consists of the following entry made by Antonescu:

“I reminded Herr Von Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by
him, he raised his glass to the happiness of a great Romania, to
which I replied that we have entered into an alliance with the
Axis in order to create a ‘Great Romania.’”

What, then, was this “Great Romania” to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop had raised his glass?

This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-242 (Document USSR-242). This document is one of Antonescu’s letters—a copy of a letter—to Hitler, dated 17 August 1941. I request you to read this document into the record, and I consider it necessary to read Paragraphs 2 and 4 from it, which correspond to Page 2 of the Russian translation in the document book in your possession. The corresponding text is on Page 78. I quote Paragraph 2. Antonescu writes:

“In compliance with the wish of Your Excellency, I take upon
myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the
Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there, and
for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary
to delineate a boundary to this territory on the north.”

Paragraph 4 of this letter:

“In order to maintain order and to control the economic
exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the
continuation of the war, I consider it absolutely necessary that
unity of command should be established.

“I therefore beg Your Excellency to give precise instructions
defining my rights and responsibilities for the administration
and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers
Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding, the maintenance
of order and the security of the whole territory between the
Rivers Dniester and Dnieper.

“I beg you, Your Excellency, to accept the best assurances from
your devoted Marshal Antonescu.”

Two days after this letter was written Antonescu appointed a governor of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of the “Transnistrian” regions.

I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-295 (Document Number USSR-295), the testimony of this “governor,” George Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army, and beg you to accept it as evidence.

Alexianu, giving details of his nomination, testifies as follows—Page 2, Paragraph 2, of the Russian text, Page 79 in the document book which is in your possession. I quote:

“Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance
of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which
he offered to annex to Romania the Soviet territories extending
from the Dniester to the Dnieper which had been captured by the
German troops and to establish there their own occupational
authorities.”

On Page 80 of the document book at the top of Page 3 of the Russian text of the testimony, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was present at the Council of Romanian Ministers at which Marshal Antonescu, referring to the successes of the German and the Romanian armies on the Eastern Front, stated:

“It is now evident for us all that I acted rightly when, as
early as November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the
joint attack against the Soviet Union.”

However, the generosity of the fascist Führer, who gave Soviet territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.

I have here before me one of Hitler’s letters to Ion Antonescu, dated 25 October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240). Something like 2 years and 3 months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Romanian satrap on the seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been worrying over the question of organizing a “unified” administration in Transnistria. Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now writes—I quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you will find on Pages 82-83 of your document book:

“My further request concerns the essential exploitation of
Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army
Groups A and South it should not be hampered by any formal
juridical or economic considerations and difficulties. I must
further request you to put at the disposal of the German
authorities the entire network of the Transnistrian
railways. . . .”

As a poor consolation Hitler adds—Page 82 of the document book:

“All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the
preservation of Transnistria for Romania.”

Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently assured Hitler of his submissiveness, reached the end of his endurance. On 15 November 1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler. In this letter Antonescu wrote unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the will of his master at the expense of his people.

I present Antonescu’s letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239 (Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15 November 1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter, towards the end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of the document book:

“As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency
that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit
of a banker the problem of this territory as a military zone, a
zone of supply, _et cetera_.

“I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety.

“I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian
participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has
always been told you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000
million lei; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8
million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks,
as well as the deposits themselves; that we are bearing heavy
expenses incurred in supporting the families of 250,000 men who
lost their lives in battle.”

Here I omit four paragraphs which have no bearing in the gist of the matter and continue to read on Page 89 of the document book.

“Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transnistrian territory
is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Romania. Our only
desire is that all be in good order and utilized in the most
advantageous manner possible. . . .

“As regards the transfer of the Transnistrian railways into
German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg
Your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this
transfer is not necessary.

“Transnistrian railways, from 1941 to the present day,
functioned well under Romanian administration. They always
satisfied German demands and their management was always highly
appreciated.”

I request you to turn one page of the document book. I now read an extract from Page 90 of the book:

“If the traffic capacity of the Transnistrian railways cannot
still be further increased in pursuance to the generally
established joint plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for
that fact. Here too we kept our obligations.”

And two paragraphs further on, the same page, the following statement is made:

“I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the
measures necessary in order to increase the traffic capacity and
to improve the organization.

“As I personally was in charge of the organization of the
administration and economics of this region, it would be a great
mortification to me if the administration of the railways were
to pass to German hands, since one would justly say that our
incapacity in this respect was the reason for such measure.”

There came a moment in the relations between the two aggressors when the former harmony, based on the seizure of foreign lands and wealth, gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the great financial responsibility for the losses suffered as a result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners.

This is revealed by the following document, captured from the personal archives of Antonescu and which I intend to present to the honorable Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-245 (Document Number USSR-245). I should like to read a quotation from this document, which is lengthy but which is very important in enabling us to realize the relationship between fascist Germany and her satellites. This document is entitled, “General Hansen’s Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on 7 July 1943.”

As Your Honors will no doubt remember, General Hansen was the head of the German Military Mission of the German General Staff in Romania. I shall read into the record excerpts from this document, underlined in red pencil, on Pages 92 and 93 of the document book. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible for you to summarize these documents with reference to Romania? Because you have already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to Romania’s participation, General Antonescu’s statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation—in Document Number USSR-294. What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the Romanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.

GEN. ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the case at all.

GEN. ZORYA: I shall summarize this document in a few sentences, and I shall then pass on to the next document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

GEN. ZORYA: The sense of this conversation is interesting insofar as it reveals the shameless bargaining which went on between Hansen and Antonescu. The objects of this bargaining were money, war supplies, and human lives. Antonescu, who was beginning to feel the disadvantage of the absence of any kind of proper agreement with Germany, insisted that all subsequent dealings, whether of a material or any other nature, be subjected to appropriate official agreements. He demanded from Germany the delivery of various war supplies either of a technical or, in last analysis, of a monetary nature. And when General Hansen said that Germany had no lei, Antonescu replied, “If you have no lei, give us at least arms and equipment.” That is how the document describes the policy pursued by fascist Germany for extracting the most varied resources from her vassals.

Now, I should like to touch briefly upon certain methods of foreign policy which the Hitlerites used in dealing with their vassals. I should like to dwell on the policy pursued by the Hitlerite conspirators in regard to the question of Transylvania. Holding out the question of Transylvania as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators forced their Hungarian and Romanian vassals to work out their own promotion.