Chapter XII: Introduction (3)

The key to the whole problem of the four questions is not to be found in the _Critique_. This section is transcribed from §§ 4-5 of the _Prolegomena_, and is consequently influenced by the general arrangement of the latter work. This fourfold division was indeed devised for the purposes of the argument of the _Prolegomena_, which is developed on the analytic method, and for that reason it cannot be reconciled with the very different structure of the _Critique_. Yet even the _Prolegomena_ suffers from confusion, due[303] to Kant’s failure to distinguish between universal and relative natural science on the one hand, and between immanent and transcendent metaphysics on the other. The four questions do not coincide with those of the _Critique_. Instead of the third--how is metaphysics as natural disposition possible?--we find: _how is metaphysics in general possible?_ In §§ 4, 5, Kant’s argument is clear and straightforward. Pure mathematical science and mathematical physics are actually existing sciences. The synthetic _a priori_ judgments which they contain must be recognised as valid. Metaphysics makes similar claims. But, as is sufficiently proved by the absence of agreement among philosophers, its professions are without ground. It transgresses the limits of possible experience, and contains only pretended knowledge. This false transcendent metaphysics is refuted in the _Dialectic_. Kant was, however, equally convinced that an _immanent_ metaphysics is possible, and that its grounds and justification had been successfully given in the _Analytic_. His problem as formulated in the _Prolegomena_ is accordingly threefold: (1) how are the existing rational sciences, mathematical and physical, possible? (2) _in the light of the insight acquired by this investigation_, what is the origin and explanation of the existing pretended sciences of transcendent metaphysics? and (3) in what manner can we establish a positive metaphysics that will harmonise with reason’s true vocation? So far all is clear and definite. But the unresolved difficulty, as to the relation in which natural science and immanent metaphysics stand to one another, brings confusion in its train. As already noted,[304] in § 15 natural science is displaced by immanent metaphysics (though not under that name); and as a result the fourth question reduces to the second, and the above threefold problem has to be completely restated. The _Prolegomena_ has, however, already been divided into four parts; and in the last division Kant still continues to treat the fourth question as distinct from that which has been dealt with in the second division, though, as his answer shows, they are essentially the same. The answer given is that metaphysics as a science is possible only in and through the _Critique_, and that though the whole _Critique_ is required for this purpose, the _content_ of the new science is embodied in the _Analytic_.

In the second edition of the _Critique_ the confusion between natural science and immanent metaphysics still persists, and a new source of ambiguity is added through the reformulation of the third question. It is now limited to the problem of the _subjective_ origin of metaphysics as a natural disposition. The fourth question has therefore to be widened, so as to include transcendent as well as immanent, the old as well as the new, metaphysics. But save for this one alteration the entire section is inspired by considerations foreign to the _Critique_; this section, like B 17, must be recast before it will harmonise with the subsequent argument.

=Every kind of knowledge is called pure, etc.=[305]--These sentences are omitted in the second edition. They have been rendered unnecessary by the further and more adequate definition of “pure” given in B 3 ff.

=Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge a priori.=[306]--This statement should, as Vaihinger points out, be interpreted in the light of A 299 = B 355.

“Reason, like understanding, can be employed in a merely formal,
_i.e._ logical manner, wherein it abstracts from all content of
knowledge. But it is also capable of a real use,[307] since it
contains within itself the source of certain concepts and
principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or from
the understanding.”

Reason is taken in the first of the above meanings. Reason in its real use, when extended so as to include pure sensibility and understanding,[308] is the pure reason referred to in the next sentence of the _Critique. A priori_ is here used to signify the relatively _a priori_; in the next sentence it denotes the absolutely _a priori_.

=An Organon of pure reason.=[309]--What follows, from this point to the middle of the next section, is a good example of Kant’s patchwork method of piecing together old manuscript in the composition of the _Critique_. There seems to be no way of explaining its bewildering contradictions save by accepting Vaihinger’s[310] conclusion that it consists of three separate accounts, written at different times, and representing different phases in the development of Kant’s views.

I. The first account, beginning with the above words and ending with “already a considerable gain” (_schon sehr viel gewonnen ist_), is evidently the oldest. It reveals the influence of the _Dissertation_. It distinguishes:

1. =Critique= of pure reason ( = _Propaedeutic_).
2. =Organon= of pure reason.
3. =System= of pure reason.

1. =Critique= is a critical examination (_Beurtheilung_) of pure reason, its sources and limits. The implication (obscured by the direct relating of _Critique_ to _System_) is that it prepares the way for the _Organon_.

2. =Organon= comprehends all the principles by which pure knowledge can be acquired and actually established.

3. =System= is the complete application of such an _Organon_.

This classification is, as Paulsen[311] was the first to remark, an adaptation of the _Dissertation_ standpoint.

II. The second account begins: “I entitle all knowledge transcendental,” but is broken by the third account--from “Such a _Critique_” to the end of the paragraph--which has been inserted into the middle of it. It is then continued in the next section. It distinguishes:

1. =Critique= of pure reason.

2. =Transcendental philosophy.=

1. =Critique= contains the principles of all _a priori synthetical_ knowledge, tracing an architectonic plan which guarantees the completeness and certainty of all the parts.

2. =Transcendental philosophy= contains their complete analytic development, and is therefore the system of such knowledge.

III. The third account (“Such a _Critique_” to end of paragraph) in its main divisions follows the first account: 1. _Critique_, 2. _Organon_ or _Canon_, 3. _System_. But they are now defined in a different manner. _Critique_ is a propaedeutic for the _Organon_. But _Organon_, which signifies the totality of the principles through which pure knowledge is attained and extended,[312] may not be possible. In that case the _Critique_ is a preparation only for a _Canon_, _i.e._ the totality of the principles of the _proper_ employment of reason.[313] The _Organon_ or _Canon_, in turn, will render possible a _System_ of the philosophy of pure reason, the former yielding a system in extension of _a priori_ knowledge, the latter a system which defines the limits of _a priori_ knowledge.

It is impossible to reduce these divergencies to a single consistent view. They illustrate the varying sense in which Kant uses the term “metaphysics.” In the first account, even though that account is based on a distinction drawn in the _Dissertation_, the _system_ of metaphysics is immanent; in the second it is also transcendent; in the third it is neutral.[314]

=Propaedeutic.=[315]--That the _Critique_ is only propaedeutic to a _System_ of pure reason was later denied by Kant in the following emphatic terms:

“I must here observe that I cannot understand the attempt to
ascribe to me the view that I have sought to supply only a
Propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy, not the System of this
philosophy. Such a view could never have entered my thoughts, for I
have myself praised the systematic completeness (_das vollendete
Ganze_) of the pure philosophy in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ as
the best mark of its truth.”[316]

Kant thus finally, after much vacillation in his use of the terms, came to the conclusion that _Critique_, _Transcendental Philosophy_, and _System_ all coincide. Meantime he has forgotten his own previous and conflicting utterances on this point.

=As regards speculation negative only.=[317]--“Speculation” here signifies the theoretical, as opposed to the practical.[318] The qualifying phrase is in line with other passages of the second edition, in which it is emphasised that the conclusions of the _Critique_ are positive in their practical (moral) bearing.[319]

=Transcendental=--=transcendent.=[320]--Kant was the first to distinguish between these two terms. In the scholastic period, in which they first appear, they were exactly synonymous, the term transcendent being the more usual. The verb, to transcend, appears in Augustine in its widest metaphysical sense. “Transcende et te ipsum.” “Cuncta corpora transcenderunt [Platonici] quaerentes Deum; omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt quaerentes summum Deum.”[321] The first employment of the term in a more specific or technical sense occurs in a treatise, _De natura generis_, falsely ascribed to Thomas Aquinas. In this treatise _ens_, _res_, _aliquid_, _unum_, _bonum_, _verum_ are entitled _transcendentia_. To understand the meaning in which the word is here used, we have, it would seem,[322] to take account of the influence exercised upon Aquinas by a mystical work of Arabian origin, entitled _De causis_. It contained reference to the Neo-Platonic distinction between the Aristotelian categories, which the Neo-Platonists regarded as being derivative, and the more universal concepts, _ens_, _unum_, _verum_, _bonum_. To these latter concepts Aquinas gave a theological application. _Ens_ pertains to essence, _unum_ to the person of the Father, _verum_ to the person of the Son, _bonum_ to the person of the Holy Ghost. In the _De natura generis_ the number of these supreme concepts is increased to six by the addition of _res_ and _aliquid_, and as just stated the title _transcendentia_ is also now applied for the first time. In this meaning the term transcendent and its synonym transcendental are of frequent occurrence in Scholastic writings. The _transcendentia_ or _transcendentalia_ are those concepts which so transcend the categories as to be themselves predicable of the categories. They are the “_termini vel proprietates rebus omnibus cuiusque generis convenientes_.” Thus Duns Scotus speaks of _ens_ as the highest of the “_transcendental_” concepts. The term also occurs in a more or less similar sense in the writings of Campanella, Giordano Bruno, Francis Bacon, and Spinoza. The last named gives a psychological explanation of the “termini _Transcendentales_ ... ut Ens, Res, Aliquid” as standing for ideas that are in the highest degree confused owing to the multiplicity of the images which have neutralised one another in the process of their generation.[323] Berkeley also speaks of the “transcendental maxims” which lie outside the field of mathematical enquiry, but which influence all the particular sciences.[324] Evidently the term has become generalised beyond its stricter scholastic meaning. Lambert employs transcendent in an even looser sense to signify concepts which represent what is common to both the corporeal and the intellectual world.[325] We may, indeed, assert that in Kant’s time the terms transcendent and transcendental, while still remaining synonymous, and though used on the lines of their original Scholastic connotation, had lost all definiteness of meaning and all usefulness of application. Kant took advantage of this situation to distinguish sharply between them, and to impose upon each a meaning suitable to his new Critical teaching.

“Transcendental” is primarily employed by Kant as a name for a certain kind of knowledge. Transcendental knowledge is knowledge not of objects, but of the nature and conditions of our _a priori_ cognition of them. In other words, _a priori_ knowledge must not be asserted, simply because it is _a priori_, to be transcendental; this title applies only to such knowledge as constitutes a _theory_ or _science_ of the _a priori_.[326] Transcendental knowledge and transcendental philosophy must therefore be taken as coinciding; and as thus coincident, they signify the science of the possibility, nature, and limits of _a priori_ knowledge. The term similarly applies to the subdivisions of the _Critique_. The _Aesthetic_ is transcendental in that it establishes the _a priori_ character of the forms of sensibility; the _Analytic_ in that it determines the _a priori_ principles of understanding, and the part which they play in the constitution of knowledge; the _Dialectic_ in that it defines and limits the _a priori_ Ideas of Reason, to the perverting power of which all false metaphysics is due. That this is the primary and fundamental meaning common to the various uses of the term is constantly overlooked by Max Müller. Thus in A 15 = B 30 he translates _transcendentale Sinnenlehre_ “doctrine of transcendental sense” instead of as “transcendental doctrine of sense.” In transforming _transcendentale Elementarlehre_ into “elements of transcendentalism” he avoids the above error, but only by inventing a word which has no place in Kant’s own terminology.

But later in the _Critique_ Kant employs the term transcendental in a second sense, namely, to denote the _a priori_ factors in knowledge. All representations which are _a priori_ and yet are applicable to objects are transcendental. The term is then defined through its distinction from the empirical on the one hand, and from the transcendent on the other. An intuition or conception is transcendental when it originates in pure reason, and yet at the same time goes to constitute an _a priori_ knowledge of objects. The contrast between the transcendental and the transcendent, as similarly determined upon by Kant, is equally fundamental, but is of quite different character. That is transcendent which lies entirely beyond experience; whereas the transcendental signifies those _a priori_ elements which underlie experience as its necessary conditions. The transcendent is always unknowable. The transcendental is that which by conditioning experience renders all knowledge, whether _a priori_ or empirical, possible. The direct opposite of the transcendent is the immanent, which as such includes both the transcendental and the empirical. Thus while Kant employs the term transcendental in a very special sense which he has himself arbitrarily determined, he returns to the original etymological meaning of the term transcendent. It gains a specifically Critical meaning only through being used to expound the doctrine that all knowledge is limited to sense-experience. The attempt to find some similar etymological justification for Kant’s use of the term transcendental has led Schopenhauer and Kuno Fischer to assert that Kant entitles his philosophy transcendental because it transcends both the dogmatism and the scepticism of all previous systems![327] Another attempt has been made by Stirling[328] and Watson,[329] who assert, at least by implication, that the transcendental is a species of the transcendent, in that while the latter transcends the scope of experience, the former transcends its sense-content. Kant himself, however, nowhere attempts to justify his use of the term by any such argument.

A third meaning of the term transcendental arises through its extension from the _a priori_ intuitions and concepts to the processes and faculties to which they are supposed to be due. Thus Kant speaks of the transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, and of the transcendental faculties of imagination and understanding. In this sense the transcendental becomes a title for the conditions which render experience possible. And inasmuch as processes and faculties can hardly be entitled _a priori_, Kant has in this third application of the term departed still further from his first definition of it.[330]

The distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent may be illustrated by reference to the Ideas of reason. Regarded as regulative only, _i.e._ merely as ideals which inspire the understanding in the pursuit of knowledge, they are transcendental. Interpreted as constitutive, _i.e._ as representing absolute realities, they are transcendent. Yet, despite the fundamental character of this distinction, so careless is Kant in the use of his technical terms that he also employs transcendental as exactly equivalent in meaning to transcendent. This is of constant occurrence, but only two instances need here be cited. In the important phrase “transcendental ideality of space and time” the term transcendental is used in place of the term transcendent. For what Kant is asserting is that judged from a _transcendent_ point of view, _i.e._ from the point of view of the thing in itself, space is only subjectively real.[331] The phrase is indeed easily capable of the orthodox interpretation, but, as the context clearly shows, that is not the way in which it is actually being used by Kant. Another equally surprising example is to be found in the title “transcendental dialectic.” Though it is defined in A 63-4 = B 88 in correct fashion, in A 297 = B 354 and A 308-9 = B 365-6 it is interpreted as treating of the illusion involved in transcendent judgments, and so virtually as meaning _transcendent_ dialectic.[332]

=Not a Critique of books and systems.=[333]--Kant here inserts a statement from the omitted _Preface_ to the first edition.[334] He now adds that the _Critique_ will supply a criterion for the valuation of all other systems.

=A 13 = B 27.=--Kant’s reason for omitting the title of Section II in the second edition was no doubt its inconsistency with the assertion of its opening sentence, viz. that the _Critique_ is _not_ transcendental philosophy, but only a preparation for it. Instead of it, Kant has introduced the more appropriate heading placed over the preceding paragraph.

=The highest principles of morals do not belong to transcendental philosophy.=[335]--Cf. A 801 = B 829. The alteration made in this passage in the second edition[336] indicates a transition towards the opposite view which Kant developed in the _Critique of Practical Reason_.[337]

=The division of this science.=[338]--Kant in this paragraph alternates in the most bewildering fashion between the _Critique_ and _Transcendental Philosophy_. In this first sentence the _Critique_ seems to be referred to. Later it is _Transcendental Philosophy_ that is spoken of.

=Doctrine of Elements and Doctrine of Methods.=[339]--Cf. A 707 ff. = B 735 ff., and below, pp. 438, 563.

=Two stems, sensibility and understanding, which may perhaps spring from a common root.=[340]--Kant sometimes seems to suggest[341] that imagination is this common root. It belongs both to sensibility and to understanding, and is passive as well as spontaneous. But when so viewed, imagination is virtually regarded as an unknown supersensuous power, “concealed in the depths of the soul.”[342] The supersensuous is the point of union of our disparate human faculties, as well as of nature and freedom, mechanism and teleology.

=The transcendental doctrine of sense would necessarily constitute the first part of the Science of Elements.=[343]--“Necessarily constitute the first part” translates _zum ersten Theile gehören müssen_. This Vaihinger explains as an archaic mode of expression, equivalent to _ausmachen_. The point is important because, if translated quite literally, it might seem to conflict with the division actually followed, and to support the alternative division given in the _Critique of Practical Reason_. The first _Critique_ is divided thus:

I. Doctrine of Elements.
1. Aesthetic.
2. Logic.
(_a_) Analytic.
(_b_) Dialectic.

II. Doctrine of Methods.

In the _Critique of Practical Reason_[344] a much more satisfactory division is suggested:

I. Doctrine of Elements.
1. Analytic.
(_a_) Aesthetic (Sense).
(_b_) Logic (Understanding).
2. Dialectic.

II. Doctrine of Methods.

The first division rests on somewhat irrelevant distinctions derived from the traditional logic; the other is more directly inspired by the distinctions which naturally belong to Kant’s own philosophical system.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS