Chapter LXVII: Appendix: B (5)

[1293] In large part it represents the Critical position as understood by Schopenhauer, who never succeeded in acquiring any genuine understanding of Kant’s more mature teaching (cf. above, p. 366 _n._). Schopenhauer is correct in maintaining that one chief ground of Kant’s belief in the existence of things in themselves lies in his initial assumption that they must be postulated in order to account for the given manifold. Schopenhauer is also justified in stating that Kant, though starting from the dualistic Cartesian standpoint, so far modified it as to conclude that the origin of this manifold must be “_objective, since there is no ground for regarding it as subjective_” (_Parerga und Paralipomena_, 1851 ed., p. 74 ff.). But for two reasons this is a very incomplete, and therefore extremely misleading, account of Kant’s final teaching. In the first place, Schopenhauer fails to take account of Kant’s implied distinction between the sensations of the special senses and the manifold of outer sense. When Kant recognises that the sensations of the special senses are empirically conditioned, he is constrained in consistency to distinguish between them and the manifold which constitutes the matter of all experiences (cf. above, p. 275 ff.). Things in themselves, in accounting for the latter, account also, but in quite indirect fashion, for the former. Though sensations are empirically conditioned, the _entire_ natural world is noumenally grounded. Secondly, Kant’s subjectivism undergoes a similar transformation on its inner or mental side. The analysis of self-consciousness, which is given both in the _Deductions_ and in the _Paralogisms_, indicates with sufficient clearness Kant’s recognition that the form of experience is as little self-explanatory as its content, and that it must not, without such proof as, owing to the limitations of our experience, we are debarred from giving, be regarded as more ultimate in nature. The realities which constitute and condition our mental processes are not apprehended in any more direct manner than the thing in itself. When, therefore, Schopenhauer asserts in the _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke, Frauenstädt_, ii. p. 494, Eng. trans, ii. p. 6) that Kant proves the world to be merely phenomenal by demonstrating that it is conditioned by the intellect, he is emphasising what is least characteristic in Kant’s teaching. Schopenhauer’s occasional identification of the intellect with the brain--the nearest approximation in his writings to what may be described as phenomenalism--itself suffices to show how entirely he is lacking in any firm grasp of Critical principles.

[1294] As we have noted (above, p. 204 ff.), the doctrine of the transcendental object was entirely eliminated from those main sections that were rewritten or substantially altered in the second edition, namely, the chapters on the _Transcendental Deduction_, on _Phenomena and Noumena_, and on the _Paralogisms_. That it remained in the section on _Amphiboly_, in the _Second Analogy_, and in the _Antinomies_ is sufficiently explained by Kant’s unwillingness to make the very extensive alterations which such further rewriting would have involved.

[1295] A 251.

[1296] Not even, as Kant teaches in his doctrine of inner sense, in the inner world of apperception, cf. above, p. 295 ff.

[1297] Kant claims in the _Dialectic_ that this process is also unavoidable, constituting what he calls “transcendental illusion.”

[1298] A 254-7 = B 310-12.

[1299] A 255 = B 310-11.

[1300] Cf. below, p. 412 ff.

[1301] A 256 = B 312. For A 257 = B 312 on the empirical manner of distinguishing between the sensuous and the intelligible, cf. above, pp. 143 ff., 149 ff.

[1302] Cf. above, pp. 143-4, 147, 214-15, 291 ff.

[1303] Kant here (A 286 = B 342) speaks of this concept of the noumenon _as an object of non-sensuous intuition_ as being “merely negative.” This is apt to confuse the reader, as he usually comes to it after having read the passage introduced into the chapter on _Phenomena and Noumena_ in the second edition, in which, as above noted (p. 409), Kant describes this meaning of the term as positive, in distinction from its more negative meaning as signifying a thing merely so far as it is not an object of _our_ sense-intuition. Cf. below, p. 413.

[1304] Kant’s meaning here is not quite clear. He may mean either that the categories as such are inapplicable to things in themselves, or that, as this form of intuition is altogether different from our own, it will not help in giving meaning to the categories. What follows would seem to point to the former view.

[1305] A 286 = B 343.

[1306] A 287-8 = B 344.

[1307] A 288 = B 345.

[1308] A 288 = B 344. Kant allowed the section within which this passage occurs to remain, without the least modification, in the second edition.

[1309] Benno Erdmann’s explanation (_Kriticismus_, p. 194) of Kant’s omission of all references to the transcendental object, namely, because of their being likely to conduce to a mistaken idealistic interpretation of his teaching, we cannot accept. As already argued (above, p. 204 ff.), they represent a view which he had quite definitely and consciously outgrown.

[1310] B 306. Cf. above, pp. 290-1.

[1311] B 308. This, it may be noted, is in keeping with the passages above quoted from the section on _Amphiboly_.

[1312] A 255 = B 311.

[1313] Cf. above, p. 404 ff., especially pp. 409-10; also above, p. 331.

[1314] In order to form an adequate judgment upon Kant’s justification for distinguishing between appearance and reality the reader must bear in mind (1) the results obtained in the _Transcendental Deduction_ (above, p. 270 ff.); (2) the discussions developed in the _Paralogisms_ (below, p. 457 ff.); (3) the treatment of noumenal causality, that is of freedom, in the _Third_ and _Fourth Antinomies_; (4) the many connected issues raised in the _Ideal_ (below, pp. 534-7, 541-2), and in the _Appendix to the Dialectic_ (below, p. 543 ff.). Professor Dawes Hicks is justified in maintaining in his book, _die Begriffe Phänomenon und Noumenon in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander bei Kant_ (Leipzig, 1897, p. 167)--a work which unfortunately is not accessible to the English reader--that “the thing in itself is by no means a mere excrescence or addendum of the Kantian system, but forms a thoroughly necessary completion to the doctrine of appearances. At every turn in Kant’s thought the doctrine of the noumenon, in one form or another, plays an essential part.” Indeed it may be said that to state Kant’s reasons for asserting the existence of things in themselves, is to expound his philosophy as a whole. Upon this question there appears in Kant the same alternation of view as in regard to his other main tenets. On Kant’s discussion of the applicability of the category of existence to things in themselves, cf. above, p. 322 ff. Also, on Kant’s extension of the concepts possibility and actuality to noumena, cf. above, pp. 391 ff., 401-3.

[1315] ‘Ideal’ and ‘Idealist’ are printed with capitals, to mark the very special sense in which these terms are being used. As already noted (above, p. 3), the same remark applies to the term ‘Reason.’

[1316] Cf. above, pp. xli-ii, xliv, liii-v, 331.

[1317] A 260 ff. = B 316 ff.

[1318] Cf. above, pp. 38-9, 119, 131-3, 338-9, 394-400.

[1319] Above, p. xxx ff., and below, p. 601 ff.

[1320] Cf. A 267 = B 323.

[1321] Cf. Adickes’ _Systematik_, pp. 60, 70, 72, and 111-12.

[1322] A 270 = B 326.

[1323] Cf. A 264 = B 319, and A 266 = B 322.

[1324] Cf. below, pp. 563-5, 589 ff., 601 ff.

[1325] I have dwelt upon this at length in my _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_.

[1326] A 271 = B 327.

[1327] The un-Critical character of Kant’s doctrine of the pure concept has already been noted (above, pp. 418-19), and need not be further discussed.

[1328] A 272 = B 328.

[1329] A 273 = B 329.

[1330] This is Leibniz’s mode of stating the absolutist view of thought (cf. above, p. xxx ff.) to which, as we shall find, Kant gives much more adequate and incomparably deeper formulation in the _Dialectic_. Cf. pp. 430, 547 ff., 558 ff.

[1331] Adickes, _K._ p. 272 _n._, allows that the passage may be of earlier origin than the passages which precede and follow it.

[1332] Pp. 214-15.

[1333] As such it is commented on above, p. 410 ff.

[1334] _Loc. cit._

[1335] A 290 = B 347.

[1336] Cf. above, p. 409 ff.

[1337] Kant’s commentators have frequently misrepresented this aspect of his teaching. Cf. below, pp. 498, 520-1, 527-37, 541-2, 543 ff., 555, 558-61.

[1338] A 490 = B 518.

[1339] Cf. above, pp. 416-17.

[1340] Those readers who are not already well acquainted with the argument of the _Dialectic_ may be recommended to pass at once to p. 441. What here follows presupposes acquaintance with the nature and purposes of the main divisions of the _Dialectic_.

[1341] Introd. to _Reflexionen_, Bd. ii.

[1342] _W._ x. p. 123 ff. Cf. above, pp. 219-20.

[1343] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 27 _n._

[1344] _Op. cit._ Cf. § 24 with § 27.

[1345] _Op. cit._ § 27.

[1346] Cf. ii. 567, 571, 584, 585.

[1347] Cf. ii. 1251 and 586.

[1348] Cf. below, pp. 458, 488 ff.

[1349] In _Reflexionen_ ii. 573, 576, and 582 we find Kant in the very act of so doing. _Compositio_, _co-ordinatio_, and _commercium_ are treated as synonymous terms.

[1350] The problem of freedom is first met with in Kant’s _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, edition of 1821, pp. 89, 330), but is not there given as an antinomy, and is treated as falling within the field of theology. In _Reflexion_ ii. 585, also, it is equated in terms of the category of ground and consequence, with the concept of Divine Existence, the “_absolute_ or _primum contingens_ (_libertas_).” Upon elimination of theology, and therefore of the cosmological argument, from the sphere of antinomy, Kant raised freedom to the rank of an independent problem.

[1351] A 462 = B 490.

[1352] Cf. below, pp. 498-9, 571 ff.

[1353] Cf. below, p. 454, with references in _n._ 1.

[1354] A 507 = B 535. Cf. below, pp. 481, 545-6.

[1355] Cf. ii. 93, 94, 95, 1233, 1247.

[1356] This is the view represented in _Reflexionen_ ii. 94, 95.

[1357] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 124.

[1358] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 95.

[1359] Cf. below, p. 457.

[1360] Cf. ii. 86 ff.

[1361] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 114-15.

[1362] B 394 _n._ Immortality is here taken as representing the Idea of the soul as unconditioned substance.

[1363] Cf. below, p. 454, with further references in _n._ 1.

[1364] _Systematik_, pp. 115-16.

[1365] Above, p. 334.

[1366] This conclusion is supported by the evidence of the _Reflexionen_: they contain not a single reference to schematism.

[1367] A 293 = B 349.

[1368] Pp. 173-4.

[1369] Cf. A 61 = B 85.

[1370] Adickes, _Systematik_, p. 77 ff.

[1371] Cf. Kant’s _caveat_ in A 293 = B 349 against identifying dialectic with the doctrine of probable reasoning.

[1372] Pp. 427-8.

[1373] A 298 = B 355.

[1374] Cf. above, p. 332.

[1375] Reicke, i. p. 105.

[1376] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 109-10.

[1377] A 301-2 = B 358.

[1378] A 303 = B 359.

[1379] A 305 = B 362.

[1380] The wording of the concluding sentence of the third paragraph (A 307 = B 363-4) is so condensed as to be misleading. “It [viz. the principle of causality] makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from the Reason. The latter, if it were not for this [its indirect] reference [through mediation of the understanding] to possible experience, could never [of itself], from mere concepts, have imposed a synthetic unity of that kind.”

[1381] A 310 = B 366.

[1382] _Schein des Schliessens_ would seem to be here used in that sense.

[1383] Cf. above, p. 424.

[1384] Cf. also A 669 = B 697; A 680 = B 709.

[1385] Cf. Vaihinger, “Kant--ein Metaphysiker?” in _Philosophische Abhandlungen_ (Sigwart _Gedenkschrift_), p. 144.

[1386] A 312 = B 368.

[1387] A 313 = B 370.

[1388] A 316-17 = B 373. The context of this passage is a defence of Plato’s _Republic_ against the charge that it is Utopian, because unrealisable.

[1389] A 317-18 = B 374-5.

[1390] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1240. Cf. Schopenhauer: _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke_, ii. p. 277: Eng. trans. i. p. 303): “The _Idea_ is the unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension; the _concept_, on the contrary, is the unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason; the latter may be defined as _unitas post rem_, the former as _unitas ante rem_.”

[1391] _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, 1821), p. 79.

[1392] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1243.

[1393] _Lectures on Metaphysics_, pp. 308-9.

[1394] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1244.

[1395] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1254.

[1396] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1258.

[1397] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1259.

[1398] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1260.

[1399] A 320 = B 376-7.

[1400] A 321 = B 377.

[1401] A 323-4 = B 380-1. Cf. below, pp. 480, 529, 559-60.

[1402] Regarding the _progressive series_ from the conditioned to its consequences, cf. A 336-7 = B 393-4, A 410-11 = B 437-8, A 511 = B 539.

[1403] A 333 = B 390.

[1404] Cf. above, pp. 418, 436, 439-40; below, pp. 473-7, 520-1, 537, 543 ff., 575.

[1405] Cf. A 335.

[1406] Cf. A 337-8 = B 394-6 and note appended to B 394.

[1407] A 336 = B 393.

[1408] Cf. A 671 = B 699; above, pp. 426, 430, 436; below, pp. 552-4, 572 ff.

[1409] On the difference between the ascending and the descending series, cf. A 331-2 = B 338 and A 410-11 = B 437-8.

[1410] The questions raised in the two introductory paragraphs (A 336-40 = B 396-8) as to the content of the Ideas, their problematic character, and their possibility as concepts, are first adequately discussed in later chapters. The three new terms here introduced, Paralogism, Antinomy, and Ideal, can also best be commented upon in their own special context.

[1411] A 341 = B 399.

[1412] Cf. below, pp. 466, 470.

[1413] A 347.

[1414] A 345-6 = B 403-4.

[1415] Cf. A 354-5.

[1416] Cf. above, p. 437.

[1417] A 348.

[1418] A 351.

[1419] A 363-4.

[1420] A 351.

[1421] _K._ 688 _n._

[1422] A similar criticism holds true of the conception of identity employed in the third _Paralogism_, and arbitrarily equated with the categories of quantity.

[1423] Cf. A 355-6.

[1424] It is very forcibly developed in Mendelssohn’s “Phädon” (1767) (_Gesammelte Schriften_, 1843, ii. p. 151 ff.). This is a work with which Kant was familiar. Cf. below, p. 470.

[1425] This is the argument which William James has expounded in his characteristically picturesque style. “Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence” (_Principles of Psychology_, i. p. 160).

[1426] A 363 _n._ Cf. below, pp. 461-2.

[1427] A 356. Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 688 _n._

[1428] The argument is here in harmony with Kant’s definition of transcendental illusion.

[1429] A 358.

[1430] A 361.

[1431] A 364.

[1432] William James’s psychological description of self-consciousness is simply an extension of this illustration. Cf. _Principles of Psychology_, i. p. 339; quoted above, p. 278 _n._

[1433] A 363 _n._

[1434] A 362-3 and A 364. We must also, however, bear in mind that in this chapter Kant occasionally argues in _ad hominem_ fashion from the point of view of the position criticised.

[1435] Cf. A 353-4.

[1436] Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 695 _n._

[1437] A 366.

[1438] P. 301 ff.

[1439] The note to A 344 has evidently got displaced; it must, as Adickes points out, belong to A 404.

[1440] Cf. above, pp. 320, 455.

[1441] A 371-2.

[1442] A 380-1.

[1443] Cf. A 383.

[1444] A 383.

[1445] A 383.

[1446] A 381.

[1447] The first four paragraphs are probably a later intercalation (Adickes, _K._ p. 708 _n._), since they connect both with the introductory sections of the _Dialectic_ and with the _Introduction_ to the _Critique_. Also, the opening words of the fifth paragraph seem to refer us not to anything antecedent in this section, but directly to the concluding passages of the fourth _Paralogism_.

[1448] A 385.

[1449] A 393.

[1450] A 387.

[1451] Cf. above, pp. 215-16.

[1452] A 393-4.

[1453] A 394.

[1454] Pp. 326-7.

[1455] Pp. 327-8.

[1456] A 402. Cf. B 407.

[1457] _K._ p. 717 _n._

[1458] Cf. below, p. 470.

[1459] B 406 ff.

[1460] _Kriticismus_, p. 227, cf. p. 106 ff.

[1461] A. H. Ulrichs, _Institutiones logicae et metaphysicae_ (1785).

[1462] In his review of Kant’s _Prolegomena_ in the _Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek_ (1784).

[1463] Obviously by categories Kant here really means schemata. Cf. A 348, where Kant states that “pure categories ... have in themselves no objective meaning.... Apart from intuition they are merely functions of a judgment, without content.”

[1464] Above, pp. 404 ff., 413 ff.

[1465] B 408.

[1466] _Critical Philosophy_, ii. p. 34. So also in Watson’s _Kant Explained_, p. 244.

[1467] Caird (_op. cit._ p. 35) takes account of Kant’s conception of a possible intuitive understanding, but illegitimately assumes that by it he must mean a _creative_ understanding.

[1468] Cf. above, p. 295 ff.

[1469] Cf. B 415 _n._ In B xxxix. _n._ (at the end), quoted above pp. 309-10, Kant is careful to point out that the representation of something permanent is by no means identical with permanent representation.

[1470] P. 463.

[1471] Namely, as _Refutation of Idealism_, B 274 ff. Cf. above, p. 308 ff.

[1472] Cf. above, pp. 457, 462-3.

[1473] A 402.

[1474] Cf. above, p. 466.

[1475] B 413-15.

[1476] _Gesammelte Schriften_, ii. p. 151 ff.

[1477] _Op. cit._ p. 121 ff.

[1478] _Op. cit._ pp. 128 ff., 168.

[1479] _Op. cit._ p. 125 ff.

[1480] Regarding the value of the hypotheses propounded by Kant in his note to B 415, cf. below, p. 543 ff.

[1481] P. 321 ff.

[1482] Cf. above, p. 467.

[1483] Pp. 473-7.

[1484] _Kriticismus_, p. 226.

[1485] B 424.

[1486] B 421.

[1487] B 424-5.

[1488] B 425-6. Cf. above, pp. lvi-lxi; below, p. 570 ff.

[1489] The only approach to such a reference is in B 426-7, noted above, p. 471.

[1490] A 672 = B 700. Cf. below, p. 554.

[1491] A 649 = B 677-8. Tetens in his _Philosophische Versuche_ (1777) had devoted an entire chapter to this question. His term _Grundkraft_ is that which Kant here employs. Cf. _Philosophische Versuche_, Bd. i., _Elfter Versuch_: “Concerning the fundamental power of the human soul.” Incidentally Tetens discusses Rousseau’s suggestion that this fundamental power consists in man’s capacity for perfecting himself. Cf. Kant’s _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, 1821, p. 192 ff.).

[1492] A 682-4 = B 710-12. A 771-2 = B 799 in the _Methodology_ is similarly ambiguous, though tending to the spiritualist mode of formulation.

[1493] Cf. above, pp. 275-6, 279 ff., 312 ff., 384-5, 464-5.

[1494] Cf. end of B xxxix. _n._, quoted above, pp. 309-10.

[1495] A 405 = B 432.

[1496] A 408 = B 435.

[1497] Cf. A 414 = B 441, where it is stated that there is no transcendental Idea of the substantial.

[1498] Cf. above, p. 434 ff.

[1499] A 419 = B 447.

[1500] A 420 = B 447.

[1501] A very curious sentence in Kant’s letter to Schulze (_W._ x. pp. 344-5, quoted above, p. 199) seems to be traceable to this source.

[1502] Cf. below, pp. 529, 559-60, and above, pp. 199-200, 433-4, 451. For A 410-11 = B 439-40 on the difference between the ascending and descending series, cf. A 331-2 = B 387-8 and A 336-7 = B 393-4.

[1503] A 420 = B 448.

[1504] Cf. _per contra_ A 486 = B 514.

[1505] The limitation of Kant’s discussion to space, time, and causality is, of course, due to his acceptance of the current view that the concepts of infinity and continuity are derived from our intuitions of space and time. As we have already noted in discussing his intuitional theory of mathematical reasoning (above, pp. 40-1, 117 ff., 128 ff.), he fails to extend to mathematical concepts his own “transcendental” view of the categories, namely, as _conditioning_ the possibility of intuitional experience. Such concepts as order, plurality, whole and part, continuity, infinity, are prior to time and space in the logical order of thought; and to be adequately treated must be considered in their widest application.

[1506] Cf. A 507 = B 535, and above, p. 431 ff.; below, pp. 501, 545-6.

[1507] Cf. Kant’s posthumously published _Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to Physics_ (_Altpreussische Monatsschrift_, 1882), pp. 279-80: “If we take in regard to space, not its definition, but only an _a priori_ proposition, _e.g._ that space is a whole which must be thought only as part of a still greater whole, it is clear ... that it is an irrational magnitude, measurable indeed, but in its comparison with unity transcending all number.” “If space is something objectively existent, it is a magnitude which can exist only as part of another given magnitude.”

[1508] Cf. Schopenhauer, _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke, Frauenstädt_, ii. pp. 585-6; Eng. trans, ii. pp. 107-8). “I find and assert that the whole antinomy is a mere delusion, a sham fight. Only the assertions of the antitheses really rest upon the forms of our faculty of knowledge, _i.e._ if we express it objectively, on the necessary, _a priori_ certain, most universal laws of nature. Their proofs alone are t herefore drawn from objective grounds. On the other hand, the assertions and proofs of the theses have no other than a subjective ground, rest solely on the weakness of the reasoning individual; for his imagination becomes tired with an endless regression, and therefore he puts an end to it by arbitrary assumptions, which he tries to smooth over as well as he can; and his judgment, moreover, is in this case paralysed by early and deeply imprinted prejudices. On this account the proof of the thesis in all the four conflicts is throughout a mere sophism, while that of the antithesis is a necessary inference of the reason from the laws of the world as idea known to us _a priori_. It is, moreover, only with great pains and skill that Kant is able to sustain the thesis, and make it appear to attack its opponent, which is endowed with native power.... I shall show that the proofs which Kant adduces of the individual theses are sophisms, while those of the antitheses are quite fairly and correctly drawn from objective grounds.”]

[1509] Cf. F. Erhardt’s _Kritik der Kantischen Antinomienlehre_ (1888), a brief but excellent analysis of this section of the _Critique_.

[1510] § 1 _n._

[1511] Cf. A 431-2 = B 460-1: “...the concept [of the infinite] is not the concept of a maximum; by it we think only its relation to any assignable unit, in respect to which it is greater than all number.”

[1512] Cf. Kant’s statement in the _Observation_ to this antithesis, A 431-3 = B 459-61.

[1513] Kant regarded the point as a limit, _i.e._ as a boundary (_Dissertation_, § 14, 4; § 15, C: “The simple in space is not a part but a limit”; A 169-70 = B 211); whereas certain modern mathematicians take the point as one of the undefined elements. When the point is regarded in this latter manner, space may perhaps be satisfactorily defined as a set of points. In arguing for the antithesis, and in the passages just cited, Kant also assumes that, in the case of space, the properties of the class are determined by the properties of its elements. This questionable assumption is involved in his assertion that space can consist only of spaces.

[1514] A 438 = B 466.

[1515] A 439-41 = B 467-9.

[1516] A 441 = B 469.

[1517] Developed in the _Dissertation_ (1770).

[1518] Zweites Hauptstück, Lehrsatz 4, Anmerkung 1. Cf. also Anmerkung 2.

[1519] _Principles of Mathematics_, i. p. 460.

[1520] Cf. above, p. 481 _n._ 2.

[1521] P. 489 _n._

[1522] Cf. Schopenhauer, _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke_, _Frauenstädt_, ii. p. 590; Eng. trans. ii. pp. 111-12). “The argument for the third thesis is a very fine sophism, and is really Kant’s pretended principle of pure reason itself entirely unadulterated and unchanged. It tries to prove the finiteness of the series of causes by saying that, in order to be _sufficient_, a cause must contain the complete sum of the conditions from which the succeeding state, the effect, proceeds. For the completeness of the determinations present _together_ in the state which is the cause, the argument now substitutes the completeness of the series of causes by which that state itself was brought to actuality; and because completeness presupposes the condition of being rounded off or closed in, and this again presupposes finiteness, the argument infers from this a first cause, closing the series and therefore unconditioned. But the juggling is obvious. In order to conceive the state A as the sufficient cause of the state B, I assume that it contains the sum of the necessary determinations from the coexistence of which the state B inevitably follows. Now by this my demand upon it as a _sufficient_ cause is entirely satisfied, and has no direct connection with the question how the state A itself came to be; this rather belongs to an entirely different consideration, in which I regard the said state A no more as cause, but as itself an effect; in which case another state again must be related to it, just as it was related to B. The assumption of the finiteness of the series of causes and effects, and accordingly of a first beginning, appears nowhere in this as necessary, any more than the presentness of the present moment requires us to assume a beginning of time itself.”

[1523] _Op. cit._ p. 24.

[1524] For comment upon Kant’s defence of his procedure cf. below, p. 496.

[1525] Cf. Kant’s _Observation_ on the thesis.

[1526] A 451 = B 479.

[1527] Cf. also A 451 = B 479.

[1528] Cf. Schopenhauer, _op. cit._ p. 591; Eng. trans. p. 113. “The fourth conflict is ... really tautological with the third; and the proof of the thesis is also essentially the same as that of the preceding one. Kant’s assertion that every conditioned presupposes a complete series of conditions, and therefore a series which ends with an unconditioned, is a _petitio principii_ which must simply be denied. Everything conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition; that this is again conditioned raises a new consideration which is not directly contained in the first.”

[1529] Above, p. 494.

[1530] A 459 = B 487.

[1531] Jean Jacques Dortous de Mairan (1678-1771), physicist and mathematician. In 1740 he succeeded Fontenelle as perpetual Secretary of the French Academy of Sciences.

[1532] Cf. above, pp. 435, 495 _n._ 4.

[1533] A 448-50 = B 476-8.

[1534] Cf. above, p. 427 ff.; below, pp. 520-1, 527-37, 541 ff.

[1535] A 462 = B 490.

[1536] Cf. above, pp. 434 ff., 479.

[1537] A 476 = B 504.

[1538] A 484 = B 512.

[1539] _Ibid._

[1540] A 483 = B 511.

[1541] A 485 = B 513.

[1542] Cf. above, p. 481; below, pp. 545-6.

[1543] Kant is here playing on the double meaning of the German “sinnleeres”--“empty of sense” and “non-sense.”

[1544] A 489 = B 517.

[1545] A 490 = B 518.

[1546] Above, p. 426 ff.

[1547] A 490 = B 518.

[1548] Cf. above p. 204 ff.

[1549] A 494 = B 522-3.

[1550] A 495 = B 523.

[1551] Cf. A 494 = B 522-3: “...we can say of the transcendental object that it is given in itself prior to all experience.”

[1552] A 496 = B 524.

[1553] A 491 = B 519.

[1554] Pp. 306-7.

[1555] A 497 = B 525.

[1556] A 501-2 = B 529-30.

[1557] A 506 = B 534.

[1558] Cf. end of passage: “There can be no lack of conditions that are given through this regress.”

[1559] Cf. below, pp. 507-8.

[1560] Cf. below, pp. 507-9.

[1561] _K._ p. 414 _n._ The two last paragraphs of Section VII., which correct its argument, that of the Transcendental Aesthetic, are probably later additions.

[1562] A 508 = B 536.

[1563] _Loc. cit._

[1564] As to the distinction between the ascending and the descending series, cf. above, pp. 453 _n._, 484.

[1565] Cf. A 522 = B 549-50.

[1566] A 514 = B 542.

[1567] Above, p. 506.

[1568] Cf. A 522 = B 550.

[1569] A 515 = B 543.

[1570] A 519-20 = B 547-8.

[1571] When Kant adds (A 521 = B 549), “and therefore absolutely also,” he inconsistently reverts to the position ambiguously suggested in A 499 = B 527. Cf. above, p. 506.

[1572] A 523-6 = B 551-4.

[1573] The assertion of infinite divisibility is not applicable, Kant states (A 526-7 = B 554-5), to bodies as organised, but only to bodies as mere occupants of space. Organisation involves distinction of parts, and therefore discreteness. How far organisation can go in organised bodies, experience alone can show us.

[1574] P. 508.

[1575] A 528 = B 556.

[1576] Cf. above, pp. 345-7.

[1577] A 535-6 = B 563-4.

[1578] Cf. A 537 = B 564-5; also A 546 = B 574-5, in which Kant asserts that man knows himself not only through the senses but “also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which cannot be reckoned as impressions of the senses.” Such statements would seem to show that, at the time of writing, Kant had not yet developed his doctrine of inner sense.

[1579] A 532 = B 560.

[1580] A 536-7 = B 564-5.

[1581] A 533 = B 561.

[1582] A 536 = B 564.

[1583] A 538 = B 566.

[1584] Cf. Kant’s _Uebergang von der metaph. Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik (Altpreussische Monatsschrift_ (1882), pp. 272-3).

[1585] A 549 = B 577. Italics not in Kant.

[1586] In A 540 = B 568 a different and less satisfactory view finds expression.

[1587] A 542 = B 570.

[1588] A 544 = B 572.

[1589] A 546-7 = B 574-5.

[1590] A 548 = B 576.

[1591] A 552 = B 580.

[1592] A 553 = B 581.

[1593] A 557 = B 585.

[1594] A 553-4 = B 581-2.

[1595] Cf. A 537-41 = B 565-9 and A 544 = B 572.

[1596] Cf. A 566 = B 594.

[1597] Cf. above, p. 204 ff.

[1598] A 559 = B 587.

[1599] A 561 = B 589.

[1600] A 565 = B 593.

[1601] A 567 = B 593.

[1602] For Kant’s comparison of his Ideas with those of Plato, cf. above, pp. 447-9.

[1603] §§ 803 ff. in 5th edition (Halle, 1763).

[1604] A 578 = B 606.

[1605] A 580 = B 608.

[1606] Cf. above, p. 418 ff.

[1607] A 272-4 = B 328-30.

[1608] Cf. Kant’s distinction between distributive and collective unity in A 582-3 = B 610 with A 644 = B 672.

[1609] A 583 = B 611.

[1610] A 603 = B 631.

[1611] A 603-4 = B 631-2.

[1612] Cf. below, pp. 533, 536.

[1613] A 592 = B 620.

[1614] A 593 = B 621.

[1615] Cf. A 4-5 = B 8-9; A 735-8 = B 763-6.

[1616] Cf. above, pp. 427-8, and references there given.

[1617] Cf. above, p. 424.

[1618] Cf. above, p. 392 ff.

[1619] _K._ p. 475 _n._

[1620] A 603 = B 631.

[1621] Cf. above, p. 527. The concluding paragraphs A 613-14 = B 641-2 can best be treated later in another connection. Cf. below, p. 536.

[1622] A 614 = B 642.

[1623] A 613 = B 641.

[1624] A 616 = B 644.

[1625] A 619-20 = B 647-8.

[1626] Cf. below, pp. 541-2, 552 ff.

[1627] A 620 = B 648.

[1628] A 624 = B 652.

[1629] _Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens_ (1755).

[1630] _Critique of Judgment_, §§ 64, 65.

[1631] Hamann completed his translation of Hume’s _Dialogues on Natural Religion_ on August 7, 1780 (cf. Hamann’s _Werke_, vi. 154 ff.): and Kant, notwithstanding his being occupied in finishing the _Critique_, read through the manuscript. It is highly likely that this first perusal of Hume’s _Dialogues_ not only confirmed Kant in his negative attitude towards natural theology, but also enabled him to define more clearly than he otherwise would have done, the negative consequences of his own Critical principles. The chapter on the _Ideal_, as we have already observed (above, pp. 434-5, 527-9, 531), was probably one of the last parts of the _Critique_ to be brought into final form. It does not seem possible, however, to establish in any specific manner the exact influence which Hume’s _Dialogues_ may thus have exercised upon the argument of this portion of the _Critique_. When Schreiter’s translation of the _Dialogues_ appeared in 1781, Hamann, not unwilling to escape the notoriety of seeming to father so sceptical a work, withdrew his own translation.

[1632] This is the main point of Hume’s argument in Section XI. of his _Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding_.

[1633] A 631 = B 659.

[1634] A 641 = B 669.

[1635] Cf. above, p. 407 ff., and below, p. 552 ff.

[1636] Cf. above, p. 454, with further references in _n._ 1.

[1637] Cf. above, pp. 536-7.

[1638] A 642 = B 670.

[1639] A 769-82 = B 797-810.

[1640] A xiv, B xxiii-iv, and _Reflexionen_ ii. 1451: “In metaphysics there can be no such thing as uncertainty.” Cf. above, pp. 10, 35.

[1641] A 770-1 = B 798-9.

[1642] A 772 = B 800.

[1643] A 775 = B 803.

[1644] Cf. A 781-2 = B 809-10.

[1645] Cf. above, pp. 481, 501.

[1646] A 777-8 = B 805-6.

[1647] A 782 = B 810.

[1648] Cf. above, pp. 97-8, 102, 390-1, 426 ff., 447 ff.

[1649] A 651 = B 679.

[1650] _Loc. cit._

[1651] A 653 = B 681.

[1652] _Dissertation_, § 30.

[1653] The extremely un-Critical reason which Kant here (A 647 = B 675) gives for its necessarily remaining hypothetical is the “impossibility of knowing all possible consequences.” This use of the term hypothetical is also confusing in view of Kant’s criticism of the hypothetical employment of Reason in A 769 ff. = B 797 ff.

[1654] A 647 = B 675.

[1655] _Loc. cit._ and A 649 = B 677.

[1656] A 648 = B 676.

[1657] A 652 = B 680.

[1658] A 660-1 = B 688-9.

[1659] A 656 = B 684.

[1660] A 656 = B 684.

[1661] A 658 = B 686.

[1662] A 660 = B 688.

[1663] The opening paragraphs of the section, A 642-5 = B 670-3, may be of the same date as the concluding paragraphs.

[1664] Cf. _per contra_ A 669-70 = B 697-8.

[1665] A 666 = B 694.

[1666] A 669 = B 697.

[1667] Cf. above, pp. 446-7.

[1668] Cf. A 681 = B 709.

[1669] Cf. _per contra_ A 663-4 = B 691-2.

[1670] A 670 = B 698.

[1671] I may here guard against misunderstanding. Though the Ideas of Reason condition the experience which they regulate, this must not be taken as nullifying Kant’s fundamental distinction between the regulative and the constitutive. Even when he is developing his less sceptical view, he adopts, in metaphysics as in ethics, a position which is radically distinct from that of Hegel. Though the moral ideal represents reality of the highest order, it transcends all possible realisation of itself in human life. Though it conditions all our morality, it at the same time condemns it. The Christian virtue of humility defines the only attitude proper to the human soul. In an exactly similar manner, the fact that the Ideas of Reason have to be regarded as conditioning the possibility of sense-experience need not prevent us from also recognising that they likewise make possible our consciousness of its limitations.

[1672] Cf. above, pp. 473-7.

[1673] A 679 = B 707.

[1674] A 678 = B 706.

[1675] A 674 = B 702. Cf. A 678-9 = B 706-7.

[1676] A 680 = B 708.

[1677] As above noted (pp. 499 ff.), when we find Kant thus insisting upon the completely soluble character of all problems of pure Reason, the sceptical, subjectivist tendency is dominant.

[1678] A 669 = B 697.

[1679] Cf. above, pp. 536-7, 541-2.

[1680] A 686-7 = B 714-15.

[1681] A 693 = B 721.

[1682] A 699-700 = B 727-8.

[1683] A 701 = B 729.

[1684] Nearly all the important points raised in the _Methodology_, and several of its chief sections, I have commented upon in their connection with the earlier parts of the _Critique_. Also, the _Methodology_ is extremely diffuse. For these reasons I have found it advisable to give such additional comment as seems necessary in the form of this Appendix.

[1685] On Kant’s use of the terms ‘discipline’ and ‘canon,’ cf. above, pp. 71-2, 170, 174, 438.

[1686] Cf. above, p. 438.

[1687] A 4-5 = B 8-9.

[1688] _Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung, W._ ii. p. 283.

[1689] Kant here disavows the position of the _Untersuchung_ in which (_Erste Betrachtung_, § 4) he had asserted that mathematics deals with quantity and philosophy with qualities.

[1690] For comment upon this distinction, cf. above, pp. 131-3, 338-9.

[1691] _Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung_, § 2.

[1692] A 728 = B 756.

[1693] _Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung, W._ ii. p. 283.

[1694] _Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung_, § 1, _W._ ii. p. 276: “Mathematics proceeds to all its definitions by a _synthetic_ procedure, philosophy by an analytic procedure.”

[1695] In the _Untersuchung_ Kant’s statements are more cautious, and also more adequate. Cf. _Erste Betrachtung_, § 3, _W._ ii. p. 279: “In mathematics there are only a few but in philosophy there are innumerable irresolvable concepts....”

[1696] A 731 _n._ = B 759 _n._

[1697] The phrases which Kant employs (A 732-3 = B 760-1) are: “_unmittelbargewiss_,” “_evident_,” “_augenscheinlich_.” Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, 36 ff., 53.

[1698] Cf. above, pp. 118, 142, 185-6.

[1699] Cf. above, p. 117 ff.

[1700] Cf. above, pp. 38-42, 93-4, 118-20, 133.

[1701] Cf. above, pp. 111-12, 114-15.

[1702] Cf. above, p. 131 ff.

[1703] A 737 = B 765.

[1704] Cf. above, pp. 36 ff., 117 ff., 128 ff., 565-6.

[1705] A 743-4 = B 771-2.

[1706] A 753 = B 781. In A 745 = B 773 Kant’s mention of Hume can hardly refer to Hume’s _Dialogues_ (cf. above, pp. 539-40 n.). Kant probably has in mind Section XI. of the _Enquiry_. The important discussion of Hume’s position in A 760 ff. = B 788 ff. has been commented upon above, p. 61 ff. With Priestley’s teaching (A 745-6 = B 773-4) Kant probably became acquainted through some indirect source. The first of Priestley’s philosophical writings to appear in German was his _History of the Corruptions of Christianity_. The translation was published in 1782. In A 747-8 = B 775-6 Kant quite obviously has Rousseau in mind.

[1707] Section III., on _The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Hypotheses_, has been commented on above, pp. 543-6.

[1708] A 782 = B 810.

[1709] Even in mathematics the indirect method is not always available. Cf. Russell, _Principles of Mathematics_, i. p. 15.

[1710] A 794 = B 822.

[1711] Cf. above, p. 563 _n._ 2.

[1712] A 797 = B 825.

[1713] Cf. _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. p. 473; Bernard’s trans. p. 411: “_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_ are the problems at the solution of which all the preparations of Metaphysics aim, as their ultimate and unique purpose.”

[1714] A 800-1 = B 829.

[1715] The statement in A 801 = B 829 that morals is a subject foreign to transcendental philosophy is in line with that of A 14-15 = B 28, and conflicts with the position later adopted in the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Cf. above, p. 77.

[1716] A 803 = B 831-2.

[1717] Cf. below, pp. 571-5.

[1718] A 804 = B 832.

[1719] Cf. above, p. lvi.

[1720] These statements are subject to modification, if the distinction (not clearly recognised by Kant, but really essential to his position) between immanent and transcendent metaphysics is insisted upon. Cf. above, pp. liv-v, 22, 56, 66-70.

[1721] Cf. above, p. 541.

[1722] _W._ v. pp. 47-8; Abbott’s trans. (3rd edition) p. 136.

[1723] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 31-7; Abbott’s trans. p. 120.

[1724] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. p. 43; Abbott’s trans. p. 132: “The moral law, although it gives no _view_, yet gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, or from the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it _positively_, and enables us to know something of it, namely, a law.”

[1725] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason_, in note to Preface.

[1726] _Op. cit._, Preface, at the beginning, Abbott’s trans. pp. 87-8. Cf. also the concluding pages of Book I., _W._ v. pp. 103-6, Abbott, pp. 197-200.

[1727] _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. p. 468; Bernard’s trans. p. 406.

[1728] _Op. cit._ p. 474; Bernard’s trans. p. 413.

[1729] A 815 = B 843.

[1730] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 143-4 _n._; Abbott’s trans. p. 242: “It is a duty to realise the _Summum Bonum_ to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connexion with which alone it is valid.”

[1731] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. p. 142 ff.; Abbott’s trans. p. 240 ff.; _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. pp. 469-70; Bernard’s trans. pp. 406-8.

[1732] _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. pp. 369-72; Bernard’s trans. pp. 407-10. Cf. note in same section: “It is a trust in the promise of the moral law; not, however, such as is contained in it, but such as I put into it, and that on morally adequate grounds.”

[1733] A 819 = B 847.

[1734] A 820 = B 848.

[1735] The distinction is less harshly drawn in Kant’s _Logic, Einleitung_, ix. (Hartenstein), viii. p. 73; Eng. trans, p. 63: “Conviction is opposed to persuasion. Persuasion is an assent from inadequate reasons, in respect to which we do not know whether they are only subjective or are also objective. Persuasion often precedes conviction.”

[1736] Cf. above, pp. 10, 543. Cf. _Fortschritte; Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 561.

[1737] Cf. _Logic, loc. cit._ Cf. _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, W._ iv. pp. 416-17: Abbott’s trans. pp. 33-34.

[1738] Regarding Kant’s distinction in A 827 = B 855 between Ideas and hypotheses cf. above, p. 543 ff. Cf. also _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. pp. 392 ff., 461 ff.; Bernard’s trans. pp. 302 ff., 395 ff.

[1739] A 829 = B 857.

[1740] Cf. Kant’s Preface to the _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. p. 8 _n._; Abbott’s trans. p. 93 n. “A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work--[the _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_]--has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a _new formula_. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first inventor of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was, or had been in thorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be done to work out a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general.” Cf. _Fortschritte_, _Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 563.

[1741] _Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse, Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624, already quoted above, p. lvii. Cf. also _op. cit._ p. 630.

[1742] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason_, Conclusion, _W._ v. pp. 161-2; Abbott’s trans. p. 260.

[1743] A 832 = B 860.

[1744] _K._ p. 633 _n._ Cf. above, p. xxii.

[1745] Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 635 _n._, and Vaihinger, i. p. 306. In this table _Critique_ is distinguished from the _System_ of pure Reason (cf. above, pp. 71-2). The transcendental philosophy of pure Reason of this table corresponds to the _Analytic_ of the _Critique_, and to “pure natural science” in the absolute sense (cf. above, pp. 66-7). The rational physics of this table corresponds to the _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_.

[1746] When Kant in A 840 = B 868 takes philosophy as including empirical knowledge he contradicts the spirit, though not the letter of his own preceding statements. In his _Introduction to Logic_ (Hartenstein, viii. p. 22, Abbott’s trans. p. 12) the empirical is identified with the historical.

[1747] _Fortschritte, Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 554.

[1748] _Op. cit_. p. 520.

[1749] _I.e._ between the conception of philosophy as _Schulbegriff_ and as _Weltbegriff_ (_conceptus cosmicus_). He explains in a note to A 839 = B 868 that he employs these latter terms as indicating that philosophy in the traditional or humanistic sense is concerned with “that which must necessarily interest every one.” I have translated _Weltbegriff_ as ‘_universal concept_.’ By _conceptus cosmicus_ Kant means ‘concept shared by the whole world,’ or ‘common to all mankind.’

[1750] Cf. Kant’s _Logic, Introduction_, § iii.: Abbott’s trans. pp. 14-15: “In this scholastic signification of the word, philosophy aims only _at skill_; in reference to the higher concept common to all mankind, on the contrary, it aims at _utility_. In the former aspect, therefore, it is a doctrine of skill; in the latter a doctrine of wisdom; it is the lawgiver of reason; and hence the philosopher is _not_ a _master of the art of reason_, but a _lawgiver_. The master of the art of reason, or as Socrates calls him, the _philodoxus_, strives merely for speculative knowledge, without concerning himself how much this knowledge contributes to the ultimate end of human reason: he gives rules for the use of reason for all kinds of ends. The practical philosopher, the teacher of wisdom by doctrine and example, is the true philosopher. For philosophy is the Ideal of a perfect wisdom, which shows us the ultimate ends of all human reason.”

[1751] A 839 = B 867.

[1752] A 851 = B 879.

[1753] A 850 = B 878.

[1754] A 848-9 = B 876-7. Cf. above, pp. 237, 311 _n._, 312 _n._, 384-5, 473-7, 554.

[1755] A 852 = B 880.

[1756] Cf. A 313 ff. = B 370 ff., above, pp. 498-9.

[1757] Cf. above, pp. xxviii-xxix.

[1758] _Einleitung_, § iv.: Abbott’s trans, pp. 17-23.

[1759] Supplementary to pp. xxv-xxxiii. Throughout I shall make use of my _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, and may refer the reader to them for further justification of the positions adopted.

[1760] For recognition of this distinction, cf. Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_, vol. i., 3rd ed., pp. 620-3.

[1761] Cf. _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, pp. 80-2, 106-7.

[1762] This distinction is due to Galileo, though the terms “primary” and “secondary” were first employed by Locke.

[1763] I have dealt with Avenarius’ criticism in “Avenarius’ Philosophy of Pure Experience” (_Mind_, vol. xv. N.S., pp. 13-31, 149-160); with Bergson’s criticism in “Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy” (_Philosophical Review_, vol. xvii. pp. 138-148); and with the general issue as a whole in “The Problem of Knowledge” (_Journal of Philosophy_, vol. ix. pp. 113-128).

[1764] On Descartes’ failure to distinguish between the mathematical and the dynamical aspects of motion, cf. above, p. 584.

[1765] _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, IV. vi. 16.

[1766] _Op. cit._ IV. xii. 7.

[1767] _Op. cit._ IV. vi. 11.

[1768] Cf. above, pp. 27-8.

[1769] Though the concept of substance is also discussed by Hume, his treatment of it is quite perfunctory.

[1770] Cf. above, pp. xxv ff., 61 ff.

[1771] _Treatise on Human Nature_ (Green and Grose), i. p. 380.

[1772] _Op. cit._ p. 383.

[1773] _Loc. cit._

[1774] For justification of the phrase “synthetic reason,” I must refer to my articles in _Mind_, vol. xiv. N.S. pp. 149-73, 335-47, on “The Naturalism of Hume.”

[1775] _Treatise_ (Green and Grose), i. pp. 474-5.

[1776] _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_ (Green and Grose), p. 40.

[1777] _Treatise_, p. 471.

[1778] _Enquiry_ (Green and Grose), pp. 25-6.

[1779] _Éclaircissement_ sur chap. iii. pt. ii. liv. vi. _de la Recherche_: tome iv. (1712) p. 381.

[1780] _Enquiry_, p. 57.

[1781] _Enquiry_, p. 32.

[1782] This is the objection upon which Beattie chiefly insists.

[1783] _Op. cit._ pp. 33-4.

[1784] Cf. above, pp. 39 ff., 54, 222 ff., 241, 286-9.

[1785] How far Hume’s criticism of empiricism really influenced Kant in his appreciation of this deeper problem, it seems impossible to decide. Very probably Kant proceeded to it by independent development of his own standpoint, after the initial impulse received on the more strictly logical issue.

[1786] The assertion, by Kuno Fischer and Paulsen, of an empirical period in Kant’s development, has been challenged by Adickes, B. Erdmann, Riehl, and Vaihinger.

[1787] Cf. B. Erdmann’s _Kriticismus_, p. 147; _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. p. 391 (Bernard’s trans, p. 301).

[1788] Above, pp. xxx-iii.

[1789] _Philosophischer Kriticismus_, 2nd ed. p. 209.

[1790] Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, lxi, 543 ff.

* * * * *

Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber:

The transcenedntal doctrine=> The transcendental doctrine {pg 77}

non-commital=> non-committal {pg 122}

widersinnisches=> Widersinnisches {pg 444}

Erkenntniss=> Erkenntnis {pg 449}

themelves=> themselves {pg 505}

which contain the the material=> which contain the material {pg 523}

it as valid=> it is valid {pg 575}