Chapter LXV: Appendix: B (3)

[174] That certain parts of the _Introduction_ were written at different dates is shown below, pp. 71-2. That other parts may be of similarly composite origin is always possible. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to establish this conclusion. Adickes’ attempt to do so (_K._ pp. 35-7 _n._) is not convincing.

[175] Cf. above, pp. xxxiii ff., 1-2, 26 ff.

[176] i. pp. 317 and 450 ff.

[177] i. p. 412 ff.; cf. p. 388 ff.

[178] Cf. below, pp. 219-20.

[179] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 394. Cf. above, p. 28.

[180] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 415-17.

[181] Paulsen objects that if synthetic _a priori_ judgments are valid without explanation, they do not need it. For two reasons the objection does not hold. (_a_) Without this explanation it would be impossible to repel the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics (cf. A 209 = B 254-5; A 283 = B 285). (_b_) This solution of the theoretical problem has also, as above stated, its own intrinsic interest and value. Without such explanation the validity of these judgments might be granted, but could not be understood. (Cf. _Prolegomena_, §§ 4-5 and § 12 at the end. Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 394.)

[182] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 336. The argument of the _Analytic_, which is still more complicated, will be considered later.

[183] Cf. A 46-9 = B 64-6. The corresponding sections of the _Prolegomena_, Vaihinger contends, were developed from this first edition passage, and the transcendental exposition of space in the second edition from the argument of the _Prolegomena_.

[184] The synthetic method of argument is, as we shall see later, further extended in the _Analytic_ by being connected with the problem of the validity of ordinary experience. But as the mathematical sciences are proved to have the same conditions as--neither more nor less than--the consciousness of time, this also allows of a corresponding extension of the analytic method. The mathematical sciences can be substituted for the _de facto_ premiss by which these conditions are proved.

[185] Cf. above, p. 43.

[186] What follows should be read along with p. 235 ff. below, in which this distinction between the “subjective” and “objective” deductions is discussed in greater detail.

[187] A x-xi.

[188] This is a criticism to which Cohen, Caird, and Riehl lay themselves open.

[189] Cf. below, pp. 219-20.

[190] Cf. above, pp. 49-50.

[191] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 405. The existing sciences can, as Vaihinger says, be treated _en bloc_, whereas each of the principles of the new philosophy must be separately established.

[192] A 1.

[193] A 1-2.

[194] B 6 = A 2.

[195] A 2.

[196] Cf. above, pp. xxxv, 36 ff.; below, pp. 565-7.

[197] A 2.

[198] A 2.

[199] B 1.

[200] Cf. below, p. 55.

[201] B 1.

[202] Cf. below, p. 54.

[203] B 2-3.

[204] Cf. below, p. 55.

[205] B 1.

[206] B 1.

[207] B 1.

[208] Cf. below, p. 88 ff.

[209] Cf. below, p. 237 ff.

[210] B 1.

[211] Cf. below, pp. 55-6.

[212] B 2.

[213] Cf. above, p. 27 _n._

[214] B 2.

[215] Cf. above, pp. 39 ff., 53; below, pp. 57-8, 222 ff., 241, 286-9.

[216] B 2-3.

[217] Cf. above, p. 53.

[218] A 9-10 = B 13.

[219] Cf. above, p. 39 ff., and below, pp. 286-9.

[220] P. 53; cf. also pp. 1-2.

[221] Cf. also above, pp. 2-3.

[222] B 3.

[223] Cf. _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe_, Hauptstück ii. Lehrs. 8, Zus. 2, in which elasticity and gravity are spoken of as the only universal properties of matter which can be apprehended _a priori_.

[224] B 3-4.

[225] Cf. above, p. 27 ff.

[226] B 4.

[227] Cf. above, pp. xxxiii-iv, 27, 599 ff.

[228] Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, 30; below, pp. 185-6, 257-9.

[229] _Loc. cit._

[230] B 5.

[231] Cf. above, pp. xxx, 599 ff.

[232] Cf. above, pp. 39, 54.

[233] A 2 = B 6.

[234] B 7.

[235] Cf. _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, § 91, _W._ v. p. 473. _Fortschritte_, _Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. pp. 572-3.

[236] Cf. above, pp. 22, 49-50, 52.

[237] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 40; _Fortschritte_, pp. 577-8.

[238] i. p. 238.

[239] P. 579.

[240] A 712 ff. = B 740 ff.; cf. also _Fortschritte_, p. 522.

[241] A 4 = B 8; cf. below, p. 563 ff.

[242] A 4 = B 8.

[243] A 5 = B 9.

[244] Cf. B 18.

[245] Cf. above, p. 29.

[246] A 6 ff. = B 10 ff.

[247] _Prolegomena_, § 2, _b_, _c_; Eng. trans, pp. 15-16. On the connection of mathematical reasoning with the principle of contradiction, cf. below, pp. 64-5.

[248] P. 582; cf. _Logik_, § 37.

[249] ii. p. 257.

[250] _Prolegomena_, § 4.

[251] Cf. B 290.

[252] § 2, _c_.

[253] B 161.

[254] B 218.

[255] A 9 = B 13.

[256] Cf. above, pp. xxv ff., 26; below, p. 593 ff.; cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 340 ff.

[257] A 9 = B 13, B 11, B 19.

[258] In A 9 = B 13, B 11, B 19.

[259] Cf. Borowski’s _Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Im. Kants_ (Hoffmann’s edition, 1902), p. 252. The German translation of Hume’s _Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding_ appeared in 1755, and Kant probably made his first acquaintance with Hume through it. Cf. above, p. xxviii; below, p. 156.

[260] Cf. below, _Appendix B_, p. 593 ff.

[261] A 9 = B 13.

[262] A 733 = B 761.

[263] A 737 = B 764.

[264] i. p. 291.

[265] B 14.

[266] B 14. Cf. above, pp. 59-60.

[267] i. p. 294.

[268] B 15.

[269] B 15. Cf. above, p. 41.

[270] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 296.

[271] A 164.

[272] A 164.

[273] In _Prolegomena_ and in second edition.

[274] B 15.

[275] § 2 _c_.

[276] Cf. below, p. 128 ff.

[277] Cf. A 713 = B 741.

[278] A 140 = B 179. Cf. below, p. 337 ff.

[279] B 15.

[280] B 17.

[281] i. p. 304 ff.

[282] § 15.

[283] This latter Kant developed in his _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe_ (1786).

[284] Cf. A 840 = B 869. “Nature” means, in the Kantian terminology, “all that is.”

[285] Cf. above, pp. xliv-v, 19, 22, 33, 52-3, 55-6.

[286] § 4.

[287] The propositions of pure natural science are not separately treated in § 4 of the _Prolegomena_, though the subsequent argument implies that this has been done. Vaihinger’s inference (i. p. 310) that a paragraph, present in Kant’s manuscript, has been dropped out in the process of printing the fourth section (the section which contains the paragraphs transposed from the end of § 2) seems unavoidable. The missing paragraph was very probably that which is here given in B 17.

[288] B 18.

[289] In § 4 (at end of paragraphs transposed from § 2).

[290] B 19.

[291] B 19.

[292] B 20.

[293] B 20.

[294] Cf. B 17.

[295] B 20.

[296] B 21.

[297] B 22.

[298] Vaihinger’s analysis (i. p. 371 ff.) is invaluable. I follow it throughout.

[299] When corrected as above, pp. 51-2, 66-7.

[300] Cf. above, p. 38 ff.

[301] By J. Erdmann (cited by Vaihinger, i. p. 371).

[302] By B. Erdmann, _Kriticismus_, p. 183.

[303] As above noted, pp. 66-7.

[304] Above, p. 66.

[305] A 11.

[306] A 11 = B 24.

[307] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 23: _usus logicus_--_usus realis_.

[308] Cf. above, p. 2.

[309] A 11 = B 24.

[310] i. p. 459 ff.

[311] _Entwickelungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie_, p. 113.

[312] Cf. A 795 = B 823. Cf. below, pp. 170, 174.

[313] Cf. A 796 = B 824.

[314] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 461-2 for the very varied meanings in which Kant “capriciously” employs the terms _Organon_, _Canon_, _Doctrine_, and _Discipline_.

[315] A 11 = B 25.

[316] _Erklärung in Beziehung auf Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre_ (1799), _Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 600.

[317] B 25.

[318] Cf. A xv.

[319] Cf. B xxiv.

[320] A 11 = B 25.

[321] _De vera religione_, 72; _De civitate Dei_, viii. 6. Cited by Eisler, _Wörterbuch_, p. 1521.

[322] Cf. Prantl, _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande_, iii. pp. 114, 244-5.

[323] _Ethica_ (Vloten and Land), ii. prop. xl. schol. 1.

[324] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, cxviii. The above citations are from Eisler, _loc. cit._ pp. 1524-5. I have also myself come upon the term in Swift’s _Gulliver’s Travels_ (Dent, 1897, p. 166): “And as to ‘ideas, entities, abstractions, and transcendentals,’ I could never drive the least conception into their heads.”

[325] _Organon_, i. 484, cited by Eucken in _Geschichte der philosophischer Terminologie_, p. 205.

[326] A 11 = B 25, A 56 = B 80.

[327] Cited by Vaihinger, i. p. 468.

[328] Cf. _Text-Book to Kant_, p. 13.

[329] Cf. _Kant Explained_, p. 89.

[330] Cf. below, p. 238.

[331] Cf. below, pp. 116-17, 302.

[332] Adickes has taken the liberty in his edition of the _Critique_ of substituting in A 297 = B 354 transcendental for transcendent. The Berlin edition very rightly retains the original reading.

[333] B 27.

[334] A vi.

[335] A 14-15 = B 28. Cf. below, p. 570_n._

[336] This alteration is not given in Max Müller’s translation.

[337] Cf. the corresponding alteration made in the second edition at end of note to A 21 = B 35.

[338] A 15 = B 29.

[339] _Loc. cit._

[340] _Loc. cit._ Cf. A 835 = B 863.

[341] Cf. A 124, B 151-2, and below, pp. 225, 265.

[342] Cf. A 141 = B 180-1. Cf. _Critique of Judgment_, § 57: “Thus here [in the _Critique of Aesthetic Judgment_], as also in the _Critique of Practical Reason_, the antinomies force us against our will to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point of union for all our _a priori_ faculties; because no other expedient is left to make our Reason harmonious with itself.” Cf. also below, p. 473 ff., in comment on A 649 = B 677.

[343] A 16 = B 30.

[344] Introduction (_W._ v. p. 16). Cf. below, p. 438.

[345] Cf. also above, p. 25.

[346] Cf. A 51 = B 75.

[347] That thought finds in intuition its sole possible content is, of course, a conclusion first established in the _Analytic_. Kant is here defining his terms in the light of his later results.

[348] A 51 = B 75.

[349] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 12, Remark ii. at the beginning.

[350] Cf. below, p. 88 ff.; B 146-7.

[351] _Prolegomena_, § 8 (Eng. trans. p. 33).

[352] Quoted by Vaihinger, ii. p. 4.

[353] Cf. _Ueber das Organ der Seele_ (1796) and _Anthropologie_, § 22.

[354] § 3.

[355] A 27 = B 43, A 34 = B 51, A 42 = B 59, A 51 = B 75.

[356] Cf. B 72.

[357] In the second paragraph, A 20 = B 34.

[358] _Dissertation_, § 4.

[359] A 320 = B 376.

[360] _Dissertation_, § 4.

[361] A 50 = B 74.

[362] This view, as I shall endeavour to show, is only semi-Critical, and is profoundly modified by the more revolutionary conclusions to which Kant finally worked his way. Cf. below, p. 274 ff.

[363] In this he was anticipated by Tetens, _Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur_, Bd. i. (1777), _Versuch_ X. v. Cf. below, p. 294.

[364] _Critique of Judgment_, § 3 (Eng. trans, p. 49). Kant was the first to adopt the threefold division of mental powers--“the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire.” This threefold division is first given in his _Ueber Philosophie überhaupt_ (Hartenstein, vi. p. 379), which was written some time between 1780 and 1790, being originally designed as an Introduction to the _Critique of Judgment_.

[365] A 248 (occurs in a lengthy section omitted in B).

[366] This distinction between intuition and appearance practically coincides with that above noted between intuition and its object.

[367] For statement of the precise meaning in which these terms are here employed, cf. above, pp. xlv-vii; below, pp. 270 ff., 312 ff.

[368] This would harmonise with the view developed in A 166 (in its formulation of the principle of the _Anticipations_), A 374 ff., B 274 ff., A 723 = B 751.

[369] Cf. A 50 = B 74: “We may name sensation the matter of sensuous knowledge.” Similarly in A 42 = B 59; _Prolegomena_, § 11; _Fortschritte_, (Hartenstein, viii. p. 527).

[370] Cf. below, p. 274 ff.

[371] Cf. below, pp. 366-7, 370-2, 377.

[372] ii. p. 59.

[373] A 42 = B 60.

[374] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. note to 469; also note to 357.

[375] Cf. above, p. xxxiii ff.

[376] A 266 = B 322.

[377] In discussing _a_ and _b_ we may for the present identify form with space. The problem has special complications in reference to time.

[378] Cf. B 207.

[379] Herbart’s doctrine of space, Lotze’s local sign theory, also the empiricist theories of the Mills and Bain, all rest upon this same assumption. It was first effectively called in question by William James. Cf. Bergson: _Les Données immédiates_, pp. 70-71, Eng. trans. pp. 92-3: “The solution given by Kant does not seem to have been seriously disputed since his time: indeed, it has forced itself, sometimes without their knowledge, on the majority of those who have approached the problem anew, whether nativists or empiricists. Psychologists agree in assigning a Kantian origin to the nativistic explanation of Johann Müller; but Lotze’s hypothesis of local signs, Bain’s theory, and the more comprehensive explanation suggested by Wundt, may seem at first sight quite independent of the _Transcendental Aesthetic_. The authors of these theories seem indeed to have put aside the problem of the nature of space, in order to investigate simply by what process our sensations come to be situated in space and to be set, so to speak, alongside one another: but this very question shows that they regard sensations as inextensive, and make a radical distinction, just as Kant did, between the matter of representation and its form. The conclusion to be drawn from the theories of Lotze and Bain, and from Wundt’s attempt to reconcile them, is that the sensations by means of which we come to form the notion of space are themselves unextended and simply qualitative: extensity is supposed to result from their synthesis, as water from the combination of two gases. The empirical or genetic explanations have thus taken up the problem of space at the very point where Kant left it: Kant separated space from its contents: the empiricists ask how these contents, which are taken out of space by our thought, manage to get back again.” Bergson proceeds to argue that the analogy of chemical combination is quite inapplicable, and that some “unique act very like what Kant calls an _a priori_ form” must still be appealed to. With the Kantian standpoint in this matter Bergson does not, of course, agree. He is merely pointing out what the consequences must be of this initial assumption of inextensive sensations.

[380] Cf. _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume_, in its penultimate paragraph.

[381] Cf. _Dissertation_, last sentence of § 4, quoted below, p. 87.

[382] A 291 = B 347; A 429 = B 457.

[383] _Reflexionen_, ii. 334.

[384] ii. p. 73.

[385] Cf. Stout: _Manual of Psychology_ (3rd edition), pp. 465-6. “We find that the definite apprehension of an order of coexistence, as such, arises and develops only in connection with that peculiar aspect of sense-experience which we have called _extensity_, and more especially the extensity of sight and touch. Two sounds or a sound and a smell may be presented as coexistent in the sense of being simultaneous; but taken by themselves apart from association with experiences of touch and sight, they are not apprehended as spatially juxtaposed or separated by a perceived spatial interval or as having perceived spatial direction and distance relatively to each other. Such relations can only be perceived or imagined, except perhaps in a very rudimentary way, when the external object is determined for us as an extensive whole by the extensity of the same presentation through which we apprehend it.”

[386] _Principles of Psychology_, § 399, cited by Vaihinger.

[387] § 4.

[388] _Sich ordnen_ has here, in line with common German usage, the force of a passive verb.

[389] Riehl: _Kriticismus_ (1876-1879) ii. _Erster Theil_, p. 104. As already noted, Kant tacitly admits this in regard to time relations of coexistence and sequence. He continues, however, to deny it in regard to space relations.

[390] Cf. below, pp. 101-2, 105.

[391] A 20 = B 34.

[392] A 20 = B 34.

[393] A 42 = B 60. Cf. _Dissertation_, § 12: [“Space and time, the objects of pure mathematics,] are not only formal principles of all intuition, but themselves original intuitions.”

[394] A 196 = B 241; A 293 = B 349.

[395] That is to say, in his published writings. It finds expression in one, and only one, of the _Reflexionen_ (ii. 410: “Both space and time are nothing but combinations of sensuous impressions”).

[396] § 15, Coroll. at the end.

[397] Cf. § 12, quoted above, p. 89 _n._ 2.

[398] There also Kant teaches that the representation of space is gained from the space-endowed objects of experience.

[399] Cf. B 1.

[400] § 43.

[401] _Ueber eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Kritik durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll._

[402] _Op. cit. W._ viii. pp. 221-2.

[403] _Loc. cit._ p. 222.

[404] Especially those which he had offered in support of the contention that pure mathematical science is intuitive, not merely conceptual.

[405] Cf. below, p. 291 ff., on Kant’s reasons for developing his doctrine of inner sense.

[406] As no one passage can be regarded as quite decisively proving Kant’s belief in a pure manifold of intuition, the question can only be decided by a collation of all the relevant statements in the light of the general tendencies of Kant’s thinking.

[407] This at least would seem to be implied in the wording of his later positions; it is not explicitly avowed.

[408] Cf. A 76-7 = B 102.

[409] Cf. above, pp. xlii, 38-42; below, pp. 118-20, 128-34.

[410] The last statement may be more freely translated: “Only in this way can I get the intuition before me in visible form.” Cf. below, pp. 135-6, 347-8, 359.

[411] B 202-3.

[412] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 393, 409, 465, 630, 649.

[413] This, indeed, is Kant’s reason for describing space as an Idea of reason. Cf. below, pp. 97-8.

[414] Geometry is for Kant the fundamental and chief mathematical science (cf. A 39 = B 56 and _Dissertation_, § 15 _c_). In this respect he is a disciple of Newton, not a follower of Leibniz. His neglect to take adequate account of arithmetic and algebra is due to this cause. Just as in speaking of the manifold of sense he almost invariably has sight alone in view, so in speaking of mathematical science he usually refers only to geometry and the kindred discipline of pure mechanics.

[415] A 76-7 = B 102. Cf. B 160-1 _n._

[416] Cf. above, pp. 90, 92 ff.; below, pp. 171, 226-9, 267-70, 337.

[417] Cf. B 160.

[418] _Metaphysical First Principles_, _W._ iv. p. 559, cf. p. 481.

[419] _Op. cit._ p. 560.

[420] _Critique of Judgment_, §§ 26-7, Eng. trans. pp. 115-16 and 121.

[421] Cf. below, pp. 102 _n._, 165-6, 390-1.

[422] The title of this section, and the points raised in the opening paragraph, are commented upon below. Cf. pp. 110, 114-15, 134 ff. I pass at once to the first space argument.

[423] Added in second edition.

[424] This argument is an almost verbal repetition of the first argument on space in the _Dissertation_, § 15.

[425] Cf. below, pp. 106-7, 126, 132-3, 177-84, 338-9.

[426] Cf. above, p. 37 ff.; below, p. 178 ff.

[427] That is particularly obvious in Kant’s formulation of his problem in the _Introduction_. For that is the assumption which underlies his mode of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic judgments. Cf. above, p. 37.

[428] Cf. above, p. xxii.

[429] Cf. especially, pp. 184, 332-6, 419, 474, 479.

[430] I here use the more modern terms. Kant, in _Anthropologie_, § 14, distinguishes between them as _Organenempfindungen_ and _Vitalempfindungen_.

[431] ii. p. 165.

[432] Cf. above, pp. 85-8.

[433] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “Space is not anything objective and real. It is neither substance, nor accident, nor relation, but is subjective and ideal, proceeding by a fixed law from the nature of the mind, and being, as it were, a schema for co-ordinating, in the manner which it prescribes, all external sensations whatsoever.” And § 15, corollary at end: “Action of the mind co-ordinating its sensations in accordance with abiding laws.”

[434] Especially in view of the third and fourth arguments on space, and of Kant’s teaching in the transcendental exposition.

[435] _E.g._ Cohen, Riehl, Caird, Watson.

[436] Cf. Watson, _The Philosophy of Kant explained_, p. 83: “Kant, therefore, concludes from the logical priority of space that it is _a priori_.”

[437] Upon it Kant bases the assertion that space is an Idea of reason; cf. above, pp. 96-8, and below, pp. 165-6, 390-1.

[438] This second argument is not in the _Dissertation_.

[439] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 196-7. The corresponding argument on time, in the form in which it is given in the second edition, is, as we shall find, seriously misleading. It has caused Herbart and others to misinterpret the connection in which this corollary stands to the main thesis. Herbart’s interpretation is considered below, p. 124.

[440] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 220.

[441] _Reflexionen_, ii. 403.

[442] “That in space there are no more than three dimensions, that between two points there can be but one straight line, that in a plane surface from a given point with a given straight line a circle is describable, cannot be inferred from any universal notion of space, but can only be discerned in space as in the concrete.” Cf. also _Prolegomena_, § 12.

[443] In the second edition, the third.

[444] For a different view cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 233.

[445] Cf. above, pp. 99-100; below, pp. 126, 180-1, 184, 338-9.

[446] Cf. below, p. 180.

[447] Cf. above, p. xxxvi; below, pp. 176 ff., 191, 195-6, 257, 290-1, 404 ff., 413.

[448] This statement occurs in a parenthesis; it has already been dwelt upon in the fourth (third) argument.

[449] It has led Kant to substitute _erörtern_ for _betrachten_ in A 23 = B 38.

[450] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 151.

[451] § 1 (Eng. trans, p. 13). Cf. above, p. 64.

[452] This is, no doubt, one reason why Kant employs, in reference to space, the unfortunate and confusing term concept (_Begriff_) in place of the wider term representation (_Vorstellung_). Cf. B 37, and above, p. 64.

[453] Cf. A 729 = B 757: “In place of the term _definition_ I should prefer to employ the term exposition. For that is a more guarded expression, the claims of which the critic may allow as being in a certain degree valid even though he entertain doubts as to the completeness of the analysis.” Cf. _Logic_, §§ 99 ff., 105. Cf. also _Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze, W._ ii. pp. 183-4: “Augustine has said, ‘I know well what time is, but if any one asks me, I cannot tell.’”

[454] For explanation of the phrase “construction of concepts” cf. below, pp. 132-3.

[455] Cf. below, p. 117. ff.

[456] Cf. conclusion of fourth argument on space.

[457] _A priori_ is here employed in its ambiguous double sense, as _a priori_ in so far as it precedes experience (as a _representation_), and in so far as it is valid independently of experience (as a _proposition_). Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 268.

[458] Cf. below, p. 114 ff.

[459] Cf. below, pp. 115-16.

[460] Cf. _Lose Blätter_, i. p. 18: “This is a proof (_Beweis_) that space is a subjective condition. For its propositions are synthetic and through them objects can be known _a priori_. This would be impossible if space were not a subjective condition of the representation of these objects.” Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. p. 396, in which this _direct_ proof of the ideality of space is distinguished from the _indirect_ proof by means of the antinomies.

[461] By “concepts” Kant seems to mean the five arguments, though as a matter of fact other conclusions and presuppositions are taken into account, and quite new points are raised.

[462] This, according to Vaihinger (ii. p. 287), is the first occurrence of the phrase _Dinge an sich_ in Kant’s writings.

[463] Cf. Vaihinger’s analysis of this discussion, ii. pp. 290-313.

[464] ii. pp. 289-90.

[465] Cf. below, pp. 415 ff., 515 ff., 558 ff.

[466] In B 166 ff.

[467] This is likewise true of the references in the letter to Herz, 21st Feb. 1772. Cf. below, pp. 219-20.

[468] _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, i. pp. 306-9.

[469] Cf. letter to Herz, _W._ x. p. 126. It is, Kant there says, the most absurd explanation which can be offered of the origin and validity of our knowledge, involving an illegitimate _circulus in probando_, and also throwing open the door to the wildest speculations. Cf. above, p. 28; below, pp. 141-2, 290, 590.

[470] Cf. B 167-8.

[471] That is, in the first edition. Cf. above, p. 85 ff.; and below, p. 116.

[472] Above, pp. 111-12.

[473] ii. p. 335.

[474] §§ 6-11.

[475] This identification of the two is especially clear in A 39 = B 56.

[476] A 27 = B 43.

[477] Cf. above, p. xxxv; below, pp. 117-20, 142, 185-6, 241-2, 257, 290-1.

[478] A 28 = B 44, cf. A 35 = B 52.

[479] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 351-4; and above, p. 76; below, p. 302. Cf. Caird, _The Critical Philosophy_, i. pp. 298-9, 301; and Watson, _Kant Explained_, p. 91.

[480] _Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_ (1747), § 10.

[481] This important and far-reaching assertion we cannot at this point discuss. Kant’s reasoning is really circular in the bad sense. Kant may legitimately argue from the _a priori_ character of space to the apodictic character of _pure_ mathematical science; but when he proceeds similarly to infer the apodictic character of _applied_ mathematics, he is constrained to make the further assumption that space is a fixed and absolutely uniform mode in which alone members of the human species can intuit objects. That, as we point out below (p. 120), is an assumption which Kant does not really succeed in proving. In any case the requirements of the strict synthetic method preclude him from arguing, as he does both in the _Dissertation_ (§ 15) and in the third space argument of the first edition, that the _a priori_ certitude of applied mathematics affords proof of the necessary uniformity of all space.

[482] § 15 D.

[483] Cf. above, p. 111.

[484] Cf. above, pp. 40-2, 93-4; below, pp. 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff.

[485] A 99-100.

[486] A 78 = B 104. Cf. A 159 = B 198, B 147.

[487] § 38, Eng. trans, p. 81.

[488] Cf. p. 241 ff.

[489] A 28-9. Cf. B 1; _Prolegomena_, § 13, Remark II. at the end: “Cinnabar excites the sensation of red in me.” Cf. above, pp. 80-8; below, pp. 146 ff., 274 ff.

[490] Kant continues the discussion of this general problem in A 45 ff. = B 62 ff.

[491] Kant himself again uses the confusing term conception.

[492] § 14, 1.

[493] Herbart, _Werke_, ii. 30. Quoted by Vaihinger, iii. p. 198.

[494] The third argument on time will be considered below in its connection with the transcendental exposition.

[495] The chief omission goes, as we shall see, to form the concluding argument on time.

[496] In the second edition, the third.

[497] In the second edition, the third.

[498] In the second edition, the fourth.

[499] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 380-1.

[500] Cf. second part of fourth (third) argument on space.

[501] Kant’s _Logik, Einleitung_, § 8, Eng. trans, p. 49.

[502] Cf. above, pp. 99-100.

[503] These axioms are: (1) time has only one dimension; (2) different times are not simultaneous but successive. In the fourth argument the synthetic character of these axioms is taken as further evidence of the intuitive nature of time. This passage also is really part of the transcendental exposition. That exposition has to account for the synthetic character of the axioms as well as for their apodictic character; and as a matter of fact the intuitive and consequent synthetic character of the _a priori_ knowledge which arises from time is much more emphasised in the transcendental exposition than its apodictic nature.

[504] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 374 ff.

[505] Vaihinger, ii. p. 387.

[506] Cf. A 41 = B 58: “Motion which combines both [space and time] presupposes something empirical.”

[507] _W._ iv. p. 471.

[508] _Ueber Philosophie überhaupt_ (Hartenstein, vi. p. 395).

[509] § 12.

[510] _Loc. cit._

[511] A 78 = B 104.

[512] A 142-3 = B 182. It should be observed that in Kant’s view schemata “exist nowhere but in thought” (A 141 = B 180). It may also be noted that time is taken as conditioning the schemata of _all_ the categories.

[513] A 717 ff. = B 745 ff.

[514] § 10.

[515] _Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der reinen Vernunft_ (Königsberg, 1784), p. 24. Johann Schulze (or Schultz) was professor of mathematics in Königsberg. He was also _Hofprediger_, and is frequently referred to as Pastor Schulze. Kant has eulogised him (_W._ x. p. 128) as “the best philosophical head that I am acquainted with in our part of the world.” In preparing the _Erläuterungen_, which is a paraphrase or simplified statement of the argument of the _Critique_, with appended comment, Schulze had the advantage of Kant’s advice in all difficulties. Kant also read his manuscript, and suggested a few modifications (_op. cit._ pp. 329, 343).

[516] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 388-9.

[517] _Werke_ (Frauenstädt’s ed., 1873), i. p. 133.

[518] P. 129.

[519] _W._ x. p. 530. Italics not in Kant.

[520] _Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze: Erste Betrachtung_, §§ 2, 3; _dritte Betrachtung_, § 1; _Dissertation_, §§ 12, 15 C.

[521] P. 128.

[522] _Dissertation_, § 15 C.

[523] Cf. above, pp. 40-2, 118-20; below, pp. 338-9.

[524] _Kant und die moderne Mathematik in Kant-Studien_, xii. (1907) p. 34 _n._

[525] Cf. A 713 ff. = B 741 ff.; A 4 = B 8; B 15-16; A 24; A 47-8 = B 64-5.

[526] Cf. below, pp. 337-8.

[527] Cf. above, pp. 112 n. 4.

[528] The content of the second _Conclusion_ in regard to space.

[529] This expresses the matter a little more clearly than Kant himself does. The term representation is ambiguous. In the first paragraph it is made to cover the appearances as well as their representation.

[530] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 Coroll.: “Space properly concerns the intuition of the _object_; time the _state_, especially the _representative_ state.”

[531] Cf. below, pp. 309 ff., 347-8, 359.

[532] Cf. _Reflexionem_, ii. 365 ff.

[533] § 14, 5 and note to 5.

[534] The opposite is, however, asserted in B 67.

[535] Cf. A 427-8 _n._ = B 456 _n._

[536] A 99. Cf. A 162 = B 203: “I cannot represent to myself a line, however small, without drawing it in thought, _i.e._ generating from a point all its parts one after another.” Cf. pp. 94, 347-8.

[537] Cf. _Lose Blätter_, i. 54: “Without space time itself would not be represented as quantity (_Grösse_), and in general this conception would have no object.” Cf. _Dissertation_, § 14. 5.

[538] Cf. below, p. 365 ff.

[539] In the _Dissertation_ time is treated before space.

[540] Cf. above, pp. xxxiv, 120; below, pp. 241-2, 365, 367-70, 390-1.

[541] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 C.

[542] Cf. below, pp. 272 ff., 294-5, 308 ff., 365 ff.

[543] A 23 = B 37.

[544] They correspond to the third paragraph dealing with space. Cf. above, p. 116.

[545] Cf. above, pp. 116-17.

[546] Cf. _W._ x. p. 102. Mendelssohn had also protested; cf. _op. cit._ x. p. 110.

[547] _W._ x. pp. 128-9. Italics not in Kant. Kant is entirely justified in protesting against the view that in denying things in themselves to be in time he is asserting that they remain eternally the same with themselves. To make a dancer preserve one and the same posture is not to take him out of time, but to bring home to him the reality of time in an extremely unpleasant manner. Duration is one of the modes of time.

[548] This is Kant’s reply to Mendelssohn’s objection (December 1770, _W._ x. p. 110): “Succession is at least a necessary condition of the representations of finite spirits. Now the finite spirits are not only subjects but also objects of representations, both for God and for our fellow-men. The succession must therefore be regarded as something objective.”

[549] Cf. A 277 = B 333: “It is not given to us to observe even our own mind with any intuition but that of our inner sense.”

[550] Quoted by Vaihinger, ii. p. 406.

[551] In the fourth _Paralogism_, A 366, and in the _Refutation of Idealism_, B 274.

[552] Cf. A 42 = B 59.

[553] Above, pp. 113-14.

[554] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 114.

[555] The date of Kant’s _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume_.

[556] Cf. below, p. 161 ff.

[557] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “Those who defend the reality of space conceive it either as an absolute and immense _receptacle_ of possible things--a view which appeals not only to the English [thinkers] but to most geometricians--or they contend that it is _nothing but a relation_ holding between existing things, which must vanish when the things are removed, and which is thinkable only in actual things. This latter is the teaching of Leibniz and of most of our countrymen.” That the account of Leibniz’s teaching given in the paragraphs under consideration is not altogether accurate, need hardly be pointed out. Kant, following his usual method in the discussion of opposing systems, is stating what he regards as being the logical consequences of certain of Leibniz’s tenets, rather than his avowed positions.

[558] Cf. A 275-6 = B 331-2: “Leibniz conceived space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. But that which both seem to possess as proper to themselves, in independence of things, he ascribed to the confused character of their concepts, asserting this confusion to be the reason why what is a mere form of dynamical relations has come to be regarded as a special intuition, self-subsistent and antecedent to the things themselves. Thus space and time were [for Leibniz] the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) in themselves.” Cf. also _Prolegomena_, § 13, _Anm._ i.

[559] Kant has stated that both views conflict with “the principles of experience.” But his criticisms are not altogether on that line. The statement strictly applies only to his criticism of the Leibnizian view. Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “That first inane invention of reason, assuming as it does the existence of true infinite relations in the absence of all interrelated entities, belongs to the realm of fable. But those who adopt the other view fall into a much worse error. For whereas the former place an obstacle in the way only of certain rational concepts, _i.e._ concepts that concern noumena, and which also in themselves are extremely obscure bearing upon questions as to the spiritual world, omnipresence, etc., the latter set themselves in direct antagonism to the phenomena themselves and to geometry, the most faithful interpreter of all phenomena. For--not to dwell upon the obvious circle in which they necessarily become involved in defining space--they cast geometry down from its position at the highest point of certitude, and throw it back into the class of those sciences the principles of which are empirical. For if all modifications of space are derived only through experience from external relations, geometrical axioms can have only comparative universality, like that acquired through induction, in other words, such as extends only as far as observation has gone. They cannot lay claim to any necessity save that of being in accordance with the established laws of nature, nor to any precision except of the artificial sort, resting upon assumptions. And as happens in matters empirical, the possibility is not excluded that a space endowed with other original modifications, and perhaps even a rectilineal figure enclosed by two lines, may sometime be discovered.” Cf. above, p. 114; below, p. 290.

[560] In B 155 _n._ Kant distinguishes between motion of an object in space, and motion as generation of a geometrical figure. The former alone involves experience; the latter is a pure act of the productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but also to transcendental philosophy. This note, as Erdmann has pointed out (_Kriticismus_, pp. 115, 168), was introduced by Kant into the second edition as a reply to a criticism of Schütz. The distinction as thus drawn is only tenable on the assumption of a pure manifold distinct from the manifold of sense.

[561] A 230 = B 283. Cf. above, pp. 57, 118; below, pp. 185-6, 257.

[562] A 41 = B 58.

[563] Cf. below, pp. 359-60.

[564] _Les Données Immédiates_, p. 75.

[565] ii. p. 446.

[566] §§ 4 and 27.

[567] Cf. _Ueber eine Entdeckung_, etc.: _W._ viii. p. 220.

[568] A 44 = B 61.

[569] A 277 = B 334. Cf. A 278-9 = B 335-6.

[570] When Kant says that the distinction is not logical (that of relative clearness and obscurity) but transcendental, the latter term is taken as practically equivalent to epistemological. It does not mean ‘relating to the _a priori_,’ but relating to transcendental philosophy, just as logical here means relating to logic. Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 452.

[571] Cf. A 270 ff. = B 326 ff.

[572] § 7 (I read _autem_ for _autor_). Cf. below, p. 187.

[573] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 13, Remark II.

[574] Cf. above, pp. 120-1.

[575] Cf. A 257 = B 313.

[576] A 46 = B 63. This is the first occurrence in the _Critique_ of the phrase transcendental object. Transcendental is employed as synonymous with transcendent. Cf. below, p. 204 ff.

[577] Cf. above, pp. 120-2.

[578] A 271 = B 327.

[579] A 46-9 = B 63-6.

[580] A 48 = B 65-6. Vaihinger (ii. pp. 470-2) gives what appears to be a sufficient explanation of what Kant had in mind in its employment.

[581] A 46 = B 64. Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 C. In the concluding sentence of the first edition’s _Aesthetic_, Kant for the first time uses the singular _Ding an sich_ in place of the more usual _Dinge an sich_ and also refers to it in problematic terms as what _may_ underlie appearances.

[582] B 66-73.

[583] _a_ does not contain anything not to be found elsewhere in the first edition. It is a restatement of A 265 ff. = B 321 ff., A 274 = B 330, A 277 ff. = B 333 ff., A 283-5 = B 339-41.

[584] An assertion, it may be noted, which conflicts with Kant’s view of it as a pure manifold.

[585] Kant was probably influenced by Tetens. Cp. below, p. 294.

[586] Cf. below, p. 291 ff. _b_ together with B 152-8 is a more explicit statement of the doctrine of inner sense than Kant had given in the first edition.

[587] Vaihinger (ii. p. 486 ff.), who has done more than any other commentator to clear up the ambiguities of this passage, distinguishes only two views.

[588] A 38 = B 55.

[589] Cf. _Prolegomena_, _W._ iv. p. 376 _n._, Eng. trans. p. 149: “The reviewer often fights his own shadow. When I oppose the truth of experience to dreaming, he never suspects that I am only concerned with the _somnium objective sumtum_ of Wolff’s philosophy, which is merely formal, and has nothing to do with the distinction of dreaming and waking, which indeed has no place in any transcendental philosophy.”

[590] Cf. below, p. 270 ff.

[591] B 69. For explanation of the references to time and self-consciousness, cf. below, pp. 308, 323.

[592] This view of illusion likewise appears in A 293 = B 349, A 377-8, A 396, and _Prolegomena_, § 13, III., at the beginning.

[593] _Prolegomena_, _loc. cit._

[594] Cf. in the 1863 edition, Bd. ii. 267 ff. The examples of illusion employed by Mendelssohn are reflection in a mirror and the rainbow.

[595] _W._ x. p. 405.

[596] _Schein_ is so used by Kant himself (_W._ x. p. 105) in a letter to Lambert in 1770.

[597] A 38.

[598] Cf. above, A 39 = B 57. This is, however, merely asserted by implication; it is not proved. As already noted, Kant does not really show that space and time, viewed as absolute realities, are “inconsistent with the principles of experience.” Nor does Kant here supply sufficient grounds for his description of space and time as _Undinge_. Kant, it must be observed, does not regard the conception of the actual infinite as in itself self-contradictory. Cf. below, p. 486.

[599] B 275.

[600] Cf. below, p. 298 ff., on Kant’s _Refutations of Idealism_. This is also the meaning in which Kant employs the term in his pre-Critical writings. Cf. _Dilucidatio_ (1755), prop. xii. _usus_; _Träume eines Geistersehers_ (1766), ii. 2, _W._ ii. p. 364. These citations are given by Janitsch (_Kant’s Urtheile über Berkeley_, 1879, p. 20), who also points out that the term is already used in this sense by Bülffinger as early as 1725, _Dilucidationes philos._ This is also the meaning in which the term is employed in B xxxiv. Cf. A 28 = B 44.

[601] _Prolegomena_; _Anhang. W._ iv. pp. 374-5.

[602] In his _Kleine Aufsätze_ (3. _Refutation of Problematic Idealism_, Hartenstein, v. p. 502) Kant would seem very inconsistently to accuse Berkeley of maintaining a solipsistic position. “Berkeley denies the existence of all things save that of the being who asserts them.” This is probably, however, merely a careless formulation of the statement that thinking beings alone exist. Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 13, Anm. ii.

[603] _Prolegomena_, _W._ iv. p. 375; Eng. trans. p. 148.

[604] Borowski (_Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kant_, in Hoffman’s ed. 1902, p. 248 ff.) gives a list of English writers with whom Kant was acquainted. They were, according to Janitsch (_loc. cit._ p. 35), accessible in translation. Cf. above, pp. xxviii _n._ 3, 63 _n._ 1.

[605] Cf. _W._ i. pp. 318, 322. When Kant cites Hume in the _Prolegomena_ (Introduction), the reference is to the German translation.

[606] This was the first of Berkeley’s writings to appear in German. The translation was published in Leipzig in 1781.

[607] Cf. below, pp. 307-8. The opposite view has, however, been defended by Vaihinger: _Philos. Monatshefte_, 1883, p. 501 ff.

[608] _Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding_ (sec. xii. pt. ii. at the end).

[609] Sixth edition, pp. 132, 214, 243 ff.

[610] A 38.

[611] A 377.

[612] A 377-8. Though Kant here distinguishes between perceptions and their “outer objects,” the latter are none the less identified with mental representations.

[613] Cf. below, p. 305 ff.

[614] _Prolegomena_, § 13, _Remark_ III.; and _Anhang_ (_W._ iv. p. 374).

[615] Kant’s description of Berkeley’s idealism as visionary and mystical is doubtless partly due to the old-time association of idealism in Kant’s mind with the spiritualistic teaching of Swedenborg (_W._ ii. p. 372). This association of ideas was further reinforced owing to his having classed Berkeley along with Plato.

[616] _Prolegomena_, _Anhang_, _W._ iv. p. 374; Eng. trans. p. 147.

[617] Cf. above, pp. 140-1.

[618] § 27. In translating Kant’s somewhat difficult Latin I have found helpful the English translation of the _Dissertation_ by W. J. Eckoff (New York, 1894).

[619] Besides the internal evidence of the passage before us, we also have Kant’s own mention of Mendelssohn in this connection in notes (to A 43 and A 66) in his private copy of the first edition of the _Critique_. Cf. Erdmann’s _Nachträge zu Kant’s Kritik_, xx. and xxxii.; and above, p. 11.

[620] Cf. _Morgenstunden_, Bd. ii. of _Gesammelte Schriften_ (1863), pp. 246, 288.

[621] Cf. above, p. 116.

[622] B 72.

[623] Upon this subject cf. Vaihinger’s exhaustive discussion in ii. p. 518 ff.

[624] _Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_ (1747).

[625] _Op. cit._ § 10. Cf. above, p. 117 ff.

[626] _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume._

[627] Euler, _Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps_ (1748). Vaihinger (ii. p. 530) points out that Kant may also have been here influenced by certain passages in the controversy between Leibniz and Clarke.

[628] _Loc. cit._, at the end.

[629] In the Dorpater manuscript, quoted by Erdmann in his edition of the _Prolegomena_, p. xcvii _n._

[630] § 15 C.

[631] So also in the _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_ (1786), _Erstes Hauptstück_, _Erklärung 2_, _Anmerkung 3_.

[632] Cf. above, p. 105.

[633] A 289 = B 345.

[634] More exactly between the writing of the _Metaphysical First Principles_ (in which as above noted the argument of the _Prolegomena_ is endorsed) and 1787.

[635] Cf. A 260 ff. = B 316 ff. on the _Amphiboly of Reflective Concepts_.

[636] The _Dissertation_ cites the argument only with this purpose in view. And yet it is only from the _Dissertation_ standpoint that the wider argument of the _Prolegomena_ can be legitimately propounded.

[637] Above, pp. 96-8, 102 _n._ 4; below, pp. 390-1.

[638] B 73.

[639] A 50 = B 74.

[640] Cf. below, p. 176 _n._ 1.

[641] K. p. 99 _n._

[642] A 64 = B 89.

[643] The definition of intuition given in A 19 = B 33 also applies only to empirical intuition.

[644] For discussion of Kant’s view of sensation as the matter of sensuous intuition, cf. above, p. 80 ff.

[645] Second paragraph, A 51 = B 75.

[646] Object (_Gegenstand_) is here used in the strict sense and no longer as merely equivalent to content (_Inhalt_).

[647] Cf. above, p. 79 ff.

[648] P. 85.

[649] Third paragraph, A 52 = B 77.

[650] K. p. 100.

[651] Kant’s _Logik: Einleitung_, i. (Abbott’s trans. p. 4).

[652] Cf. A 796 = B 824; A 130 = B 169; also above, pp. 71-2.

[653] A 709 = B 737.

[654] Logik: _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 3).

[655] Cf. below, p. 194.

[656] _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 4).

[657] Cf. A 796 = B 824.

[658] _Logik_: _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 5).

[659] A 57 = B 81.

[660] _Einleitung_, vii. (Eng. trans. p. 40 ff.).

[661] Kant might have added that transcendental logic defines further conditions, those of possible experience, and that by implication it refers us to coherence as the ultimate test even of material truth.

[662] A 60-2 = B 84-6.

[663] _Einleitung_, ii. (Eng. trans. pp. 6-7).

[664] Cf. above, pp. 71-2, 170; below, pp. 438, 563.

[665] Cf. below, p. 425 ff.

[666] Kant employs _Gegenstand_ and _Object_ as synonymous terms.

[667] Cf. below, p. 426.

[668] A 64 = B 89.

[669] A 65 = B 90.

[670] The opening statement, A 67 = B 92, that hitherto understanding has been defined only negatively, is not correct, and would seem to prove that this section was written prior to the introduction to the _Analytic_, cf. above, p. 167.

[671] See above, pp. 170-1.

[672] A 79 = B 105. ‘Element’ translates the misleading term ‘Inhalt.’

[673] Kant’s definition of transcendental logic as differing from general logic in that it does not abstract from _a priori_ content must not be taken as implying that the categories of understanding are contents, though of _a priori_ nature. As we shall find, though that is Kant’s view of the forms of sense, it is by no means his view of the categories. They are, he repeatedly insists, merely functions, and are quite indeterminate in meaning save in so far as a content is yielded to them by sense. In A 76-7 = B 102, in distinguishing between the two logics, Kant is careful to make clear that the _a priori_ content of transcendental logic consists exclusively of the _a priori_ manifolds of sense.

[674] § 20, Eng. trans. p. 58.

[675] The view of the two as co-ordinate reappears in the _Prolegomena_ (§ 20) in a section the general tendency of which runs directly counter to any such standpoint.

[676] A 78 = B 103.

[677] Cf. below, pp. 196, 204, 226.

[678] _Einleitung_, viii., Eng. trans. p. 48.

[679] Cf. above, pp. 37-8.

[680] _The Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_ (1762). _W._ ii. p. 47, Eng. trans. p. 79.

[681] Cf. above, pp. 99-100, 106-7.

[682] _W._ ii. pp. 58-9, Eng. trans. pp. 92-3.

[683] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 599.

[684] Below, pp. 185-6.

[685] The same indefiniteness of statement is discernible in Caird’s (i. p. 322 ff.) and Watson’s (_Kant Explained_, pp. 121-2) discussions of the principle supposed to be involved.

[686] Cf. A 80 = B 106.

[687] § 39.

[688] P. 176 ff.

[689] B 145-6. Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, xliv, 57, 142; below, pp. 257, 291.

[690] §§ 5-6.

[691] §§ 7-8. Cf. above, pp. 144-5.

[692] W. x. p. 126. Italics not in Kant.

[693] The relevant _Reflexionen_ have been carefully discussed by Adickes (_Kant’s Systematik_, p. 21 ff.). In what follows I have made extensive use of his results, though not always arriving at quite the same conclusions.

[694] § 15, Coroll.

[695] In his later writings Kant recognises that the representations of space and time involve an Idea of Reason. Cf. above, pp. 97-8; below, pp. 390-1.

[696] § 39.

[697] _Reflexionen_, ii. 513, cf. 502, 525-7.

[698] _Op. cit._ ii. 513.

[699] Cf. _op. cit._ ii. 537.

[700] Cf. above, p. 90 ff.

[701] Only in one passage, _Rechtslehre_, i., Anhang 3, 2, cited by Adickes, _op. cit._ p. 13, does Kant so far depart from his own orthodoxy as to speak of the possibility of an _a priori_ tetrachotomy. But he never wavers in the view that the completeness of a division cannot be guaranteed on empirical grounds.

[702] Introduction, § 9 _n._ Eng. trans. p. 41.

[703] §§ 4-6, 9.

[704] A 70-6 = B 95-101.

[705] Cf. Adickes, Kant’s _Systematik_, p. 36 ff.

[706] Cf. Adickes, _op. cit._ p. 89 ff.

[707] _Organon_, § 137. Cited by Adickes.

[708] i. p. 343 ff.

[709] Cf. below, p. 391 ff.

[710] A 76-79 = B 102-5.

[711] Cf. above, p. 171.

[712] A 55.

[713] Cf. also B 160.

[714] _Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung_, 2nd ed. p. 257 ff.

[715] _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, i. p. 327 ff.

[716] _Philosophischer Kriticismus_, 2nd ed. i. p. 484 ff.

[717] _Kant explained_, p. 124 ff.

[718] Cf. below, p. 198.

[719] P. 226.

[720] A 79 = B 105.

[721] Cf. above, p. 177 ff.

[722] A 79-80.

[723] Cf. above, p. 192.

[724] Cf. B 111.

[725] Cf. Adickes, _Systematik_, pp. 42-3.

[726] _Kant Explained_, p. 128.

[727] Cf. above, p. 37.

[728] Cf. _Dissertation_, §§ 16 to 28, and below, p. 381 ff.

[729] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 795.

[730] B 111-13.

[731] _World as Will and Idea, Werke_ (Frauenstädt), ii. p. 544; Eng. trans. ii. p. 61.

[732] Cf. Stadler, _Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie_(1876), p. 122. Cf. also below, pp. 387-9.

[733] Cf. below, p. 391 ff.

[734] A 81.

[735] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 39.

[736] Cf. above, p. 186 ff.

[737] _Kant Explained_, p. 120.

[738] A 81.

[739] A 82.

[740] A 82.

[741] B 110.

[742] B 110-11.

[743] Cf. below, pp. 199-200.

[744] _W._ x. p. 344-5.

[745] Cf. below, p. 382 ff.

[746] Cf. below, pp. 433-4, 451, 480, 529, 559-60.

[747] B 114.

[748] Cf. 904-5.

[749] Cf. 907-10.

[750] Cf. B. Erdmann, _Mittheilungen_ in _Phil. Monatshefte_, 1884, p. 80, and Adickes, _Systematik_, pp. 55-9.

[751] _Reflexionen_, ii. p. 252 _n._

[752] “Die transcendentale Deduktion der Kategorien” in the _Gedenkschrift für Rudolf Haym_. Published separately in 1902.

[753] Readers who are not immediately interested in the analysis of the text or in the history of Kant’s earlier semi-Critical views may omit pp. 203-34, with exception of pp. 204-19, on Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental object, which should be read.

[754] The reader is recommended to mark off the passages in a copy of the _Critique_.

[755] Its first occurrence in the _Critique_ is in the _Aesthetic_ A 46 = B 63. It there signifies the thing in itself.

[756] A 104.

[757] A 109.

[758] A 109.

[759] A 104.

[760] Cf. above, p. 28; below, pp. 219-20.

[761] _W._ x. pp. 124-5.

[762] Cf. below, pp. 209-10.

[763] Hume’s view of the self is not developed in the _Enquiry_, and is not mentioned by Beattie.

[764] A 107.

[765] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 952 (belonging, as Erdmann notes, to the earliest Critical period): “Appearances are representations whereby we are affected. The representation of our free self-activity (_Selbsttätigkeit_) does not involve affection, and accordingly is not appearance, but apperception.” Cf. below, p. 296.