Chapter LXIV: Appendix: B (2)

Leibniz supports this doctrine by his theory of sense-experience as originating spontaneously from within the individual mind. Thereby he is only repeating that pure thought generates its whole content from within itself. Sense-experience, in its intrinsic nature, is nothing but pure thought. Such thought, owing to the inexhaustible wealth of its conceptual significance, so confuses the mind which thus generates it, that only by prolonged analysis can larger and larger portions of it be construed into the conceptual judgments which have all along constituted its sole content. And in the process, space, time, and motion lose all sensuous character, appearing in their true nature as orders of relation which can be adequately apprehended only in conceptual terms. They remain absolutely real as objects of thought, though as sensible existences they are reduced to the level of mere appearance. Such is the view of thought which is unfolded in Leibniz’s writings, in startling contrast to the naturalistic teaching of his Scotch antagonist.

As already indicated, Kant’s first-hand knowledge of Leibniz’s teaching was very limited. He was acquainted with it chiefly through the inadequate channel of Wolff’s somewhat commonplace exposition of its principles. But even from such a source he could derive what was most essential, namely, Leibniz’s view of thought as absolute in its powers and unlimited in its claims. How closely Wolff holds to the main tenet of Leibniz’s system appears from his definition of philosophy as “the science of possible things, so far as they are possible.” He thus retains, though without the deeper suggestiveness of Leibniz’s speculative insight, the view that thought precedes reality and legislates for it. By the possible is not meant the existentially or psychologically possible, but the conceptually necessary, that which, prior to all existence, has objective validity, sharing in the universal and necessary character of thought itself.

As Riehl has very justly pointed out,[1789] Wolff’s philosophy had, prior even to the period of Kant’s earliest writings, been displaced by empirical, psychological enquiries and by eclectic, popular philosophy. Owing to the prevailing lack of thoroughness in philosophical thinking, “Problemlosigkeit” characterised the whole period. The two exclusively alternative views of the function of thought stood alongside one another within each of the competing systems, quite unreconciled and in their mutual conflict absolutely destructive of all real consistency and thoroughness of thought. It was Kant who restored rationalism to its rightful place. He reinvigorated the flaccid tone of his day by adopting in his writings, both early and late, the strict method of rational science, and by insisting that the really crucial issues be boldly faced. In essentials Kant holds to Wolff’s definition of philosophy as “the science of possible things, so far as they are possible.” As I have just remarked, the possible is taken in an objective sense, and the definition consequently gives expression to the view of philosophy upon which Kant so frequently insists, as lying wholly in the sphere of pure _a priori_ thought. Its function is to determine prior to specific experience what experience must be; and obviously that is only possible by means of an _a priori_, purely conceptual method. His _Critique_, as its title indicates, is a criticism of pure reason by pure reason. Nothing which escapes definition through pure _a priori_ thinking can come within its sphere. The problem of the “possibility of experience” is the problem of discovering the conditions which _necessarily_ determine experience to be what it is. Kant, of course, radically transforms the whole problem, in method of treatment as well as in results, when in defining the subject-matter of enquiry he substitutes experience for things absolutely existent. This modification is primarily due to the influence of Hume. But the constant occurrence in Kant’s philosophy of the term “possibility” marks his continued belief in the Idealist view of thought. Though pure thought never by itself amounts to knowledge--therein Kant departs from the extreme rationalist position--only through it is any knowledge, empirical or _a priori_, possible at all. Philosophy, in order to exist, must be a system of _a priori_ rational principles. Nothing empirical or hypothetical can find any place in it.[1790] Yet at the same time it is the system of the _a priori_ conditions only of experience, not of ultimate reality. Such is the twofold relation of agreement and difference in which Kant stands to his rationalist predecessors.

INDEX

Absolute. _See_ Unconditioned

Absolutist aspect of human consciousness, xxx-xxxiii, liii, liv-lv, lvi-lvii,
270-1, 274, 282, 285-7, 331 _n._, 423 _n._

Actuality, 391 ff.

Adamson, R., 38, 311, 314

Addison, 156

Adickes, E., xx-xxi, 76, 166, 200, 215 _n._, 233 _n._, 234, 304, 363,
376, 397, 406 _n._, 423, 439-40, 441, 464 _n._, 466, 479,
579 _n._, 601 _n._

Affinity, objective, 224, 253-7, 266-7

“_Als ob_” doctrine, 524, 553 ff.

Analogy, Kant’s use of the term, 356-8

Analytic and synthetic judgment, xxv ff., xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii,
28 ff., 37 ff., 59-60, 65;
existential judgment, 530-1;
distinction perhaps suggested by examination of ontological argument, 531.
_See_ Judgment

Analytic and synthetic methods, 44 ff., 111, 117 _n._
_See_ Transcendental method

_Analytic_, distinguished from the _Dialectic_, 172-4, 438-42

_Anthropologie_, Kant’s, 81 _n._, 100 _n._

Antinomies, lii, liii, 432, 478 ff., 519-20

Appearance, Kant’s views regarding, xxxvii, xlvi-xlvii, liii-liv, 18-22, 83-5, 120-2, 147 ff., 205 ff., 215 ff., 279-284, 293 ff., 301 ff., 312 ff., 321 ff., 330-1, 372-3, 404 ff., 427 ff.; criticism of Leibnizian view of, 143-6; criticism of Locke’s view of, 146-7; ideality of, 147 ff.; outer and inner appearances reduce to relations, 147-8; appearance and illusion, 148 ff.; causal efficacy of appearances, 216, 217-18, 351, 373-4; distinction between appearance and reality based not on categories of understanding but on Ideas of Reason, liii-liv, 217-18, 326 _n._, 331, 390-1, 414-17, 426-31, 473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61

Apperception, and memory, 251;
in what sense original, xxxiv, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 260-3, 461-2, 472-7;
transcendental unity of, l-lii, 207 ff., 212, 250-3, 260-3, 270, 277-9, 322
ff., 455 ff., 473-7;
absent from the animal mind, xlvii-l;
objective unity of, 270-1, 274, 282, 285-7;
and inner sense, 295-8, 321 ff., 512 _n._
_See_ Self

_A priori_, Kant’s views regarding the, xxvi-xxviii, xxxiii-xxxvi,
lii-lv, 1-2, 39-40, 42, 54 ff.;
problem of _a priori_ synthetic judgment, 26 ff., 39-40, 43 ff.;
its validity merely _de facto_, xxxv-xxxvi, xliv, 30, 57, 118, 142, 185-6,
257-9, 291, 391-2, 393, 400-1, 411;
the faculties in which it originates, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 1-2, 50-1, 237-8,
263 ff., 391-2, 393, 398, 563-5;
semi-Critical view of the, 188-9, 232, 263-4.
_See_ Understanding, Reason

Aquinas, 73

Architectonic, xxii, 100, 184, 332-6, 340-1, 342, 343, 345, 347, 390, 392, 394,
419 ff., 434, 437, 440, 439-40, 454, 463, 464, 474, 479-80, 496, 498, 542,
563, 579

Aristotle, xlv, 196, 198, 390. _See_ Logic

Arithmetic, 32, 40-1, 65-6, 128 ff., 337-8, 347, 566

Association, and judgment, xxxiv-xxxv, xlviii-l;
and consciousness, xli-xlii; rests on objective affinity, 253-7, 266-7

Attributive judgment, Kant’s exclusive emphasis upon, 37-8, 180-1, 197

Augustine, St., 73, 110, 565

Avenarius, 587 _n._

Axioms, Kant’s view of, 50, 127, 348, 565-7

Bacon, Francis, 4-5, 74

Bain, A., 86 _n._

Balfour, A. J., 314

Baumgarten, 192-3, 441, 522

_Beantwortung der Frage: Was heisst Aufklärung?_ Kant’s, 15

Beattie, James, xxviii-xxix, xxxi _n._, 207, 582, 595, 600 _n._

Beck, 80

Belief, Kant’s view of, lv ff., 576-7

Beloselsky, Fürst von, xlix

Bergson, 86, 142, 359-60 _n._, 587 _n._

Berkeley, xxxii, xl, xlvi, 112, 153-4, 155 ff., 272, 298 ff., 587-8, 592, 595,
596

Borowski, 63, 156

Bosanquet, B., 36, 181, 197

Bradley, F. G., 36, 181, 197

Bruno, Giordano, 74

Bülffinger, 155

Caird, E., xx, 1 _n._, 23, 51, 102 _n._, 114, 117, 183, 194,
195, 262, 296, 314, 328, 340, 357 _n._, 359 _n._, 373, 378, 399, 462, 468

Campanella, 74

Canon, 72, 169-70, 174, 332-3, 438, 569 ff.

Cassirer, E., 132

Categorical imperative, xxxvi, lvi-lviii, 571 ff.

Categories, distinction from generic concept, 178 ff.;
_de facto_ nature of the, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii, xliv, 30, 57, 185-6, 257-8,
291, 391-2, 398, 400-1, 411;
definition of the, 195-6, 198, 339-42, 404-5;
semi-Critical view of the, 188-9, 217-18, 232, 263-4;
merely logical forms, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii, 30 _n._, 32, 39, 108, 176 ff.,
185-6, 191, 195-196, 257-8, 290-1, 325 ff., 339-40, 398, 404-5, 409-10,
413-14, 467;
valid only for appearances, 259-60;
and schemata, 195-6, 311, 333, 339-342, 467 _n._;
metaphysical deduction of the, 183 ff., 192 ff., 287-8;
transcendental deduction of the, 234 ff., 287-8;
all categories involved in every act of consciousness, xli-xlv, liii-liv
199-200, 356, 368, 370, 377, 387-91;
have wider scope than the forms of sense, lv-lvi, 20, 25, 290-1,
331, 404 ff.;
restricted by time and space, 342, 357;
in relation to outer and inner experience, 311-12;
how far predicable of the ‘I think,’ 325 ff.;
how far applicable to sensations, desires, etc., xlvi _n._, 275-6, 279 ff.,
312 ff., 384-5, 476;
proof of specific, 242-3, 252-3, 258-9, 287-8, 333, 343-4;
determinate and indeterminate application of the, 325 ff., 405 ff.;
may be intrinsically inapplicable to things in themselves, 290,
409-10, 413-14;
category of existence, 322, 415 _n._;
category of totality and Idea of the unconditioned, 199-200, 433, 451, 480,
529;
mathematical and dynamical, 198, 345-7, 510-11.
See _A priori_, Understanding

Catharticon, 169, 174

Causality, Kant influenced by Hume’s teaching regarding, xxv ff.,
61-4, 364 ff., 593-600;
Kant’s treatment of the principle of, 363 ff.;
Kant’s subjectivist and phenomenalist views of, 216, 217-18,
318-21, 351, 373-4;
sensations, feelings, etc. subject to principle of, xlvi _n._, 275, 279-82,
312, 384-5;
category of, involved in consciousness of time, liii-liv, 365 ff., 377 ff.,
387;
and freedom, 492 ff.
_See_ Hume

Clarke, 140, 539, 594

Cohen, H., 51, 102 _n._, 195, 262, 340

Coherence theory of truth, xxxvi-xxxix, 36 ff., 173 _n._;
criterion of truth bound up with the Ideas of Reason, 217-18, 326 _n._, 331,
390-1, 414-17, 426-31, 473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61

Concept, Kant’s generic or class view of the, 99-100, 105-7, 118-19, 126, 132-3
, 177-84, 338-9, 370-1, 377-84, 390-1;
intuition and conception, 38-42, 93-4, 105-9, 118-20, 126, 128-134, 165-6,
167-8, 194, 370, 390-1, 564-6;
construction of concepts, 41, 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff., 564-6;
concepts and images, 337-9;
Kant’s doctrine of the pure concept, xxxix, 394-400, 418 ff.
_See_ Understanding

_Concerning the Advances, made, etc._
See _Fortschritte_

Consciousness, Kant’s views regarding, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxix-xlv,
xliii-xlvii, l-lii;
and the animal mind, xlvii-l;
may be a resultant, xxxiv, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 261-3, 277-9, 327,
459-62, 473-7;
no immediate consciousness of mind’s own activities, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 263
ff., 273 ff., 293, 295 ff., 322 ff.;
consciousness of time Kant’s datum, xxxiv, 120, 241 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.;
absolutist aspect of, xxx-xxxiii, liii, lvi-lvii, 270-1, 274,
282, 285-7, 331 _n._
See Apperception, Judgment

Contingency, assertion of, 39 ff., 55, 286-9

Continuity, Kant’s views regarding, 352-355, 488 ff., 509;
principle of, 380-1;
transcendental principle of, 551

Copernicus, 18-19, 22-5

Cosmological Argument, 531 ff.

Criterion of truth. _See_ Coherence theory of truth

Criticism, Kant’s use of term, 1, 9, 13-14, 21;
Age of, 15

_Critique of Practical Reason_, lvi, lvii, lx, 77-8, 569 ff., 572

_Critique of Judgment_, lxi, 77, 83, 97-8, 191, 265, 537, 539, 561, 569 _n._,
574, 575 _n._, 576, 577 _n._

Crusius, xxviii, xxxii, 47

Curtius, E., 336

Deduction of categories, distinction between subjective and objective,
xliv _n._, 235 ff.;
subjective, 245 ff., 263 ff.; objective, 248 ff.;
metaphysical, 175 ff., 192 ff.;
stages in Kant’s development of metaphysical, 186 ff.
_See_ Transcendental method of proof

Deduction of Ideas, metaphysical, 426, 433 ff., 450-4, 478-80, 522-3;
transcendental, 426, 430, 436, 454, 552-4, 572 ff.
_See_ Ideas of Reason

Definition, Kant’s view of, 564-5

Deist, as contrasted with Theist, 541;
Kant’s deistic interpretation of the Ideas of Reason, 418, 436, 439-40, 454,
473-7, 520-1, 537, 542, 575.
_See_ Idealist view of Reason.

Democritus, 354 _n._

Demonstration, Kant’s view of, 566-7

Descartes, xxxi, xxxix-xliii, xlvi, 155, 157, 272-3, 279 ff., 298 ff.,
354 _n._, 421, 449, 583-7, 589-90, 597

Desires, Kant’s view of the, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Dewey, J., 36

_Dialectic_, distinguished from the _Analytic_, 172-4, 438-42;
the problems of the, 425 ff.;
development of Kant’s views regarding the, 431 ff.

_Dilucidatio Principiorum primorum_, etc., Kant’s, 155, 299

Discipline, 170, 174, 438, 563 ff.

_Dissertation_, Kant’s Inaugural, xx, 26, 40, 46, 81, 86, 87, 89 ff., 96, 99,
101, 117, 123, 128, 131, 135, 137, 140-1, 144-5, 147, 159-60, 163-5, 185,
186-9, 208, 260, 263, 299, 382, 419, 427, 432, 482, 486, 489 _n._, 548

Divine Existence, in relation to space and time, 159-61;
and intuitive understanding, 160;
Idea of, 434-7;
how far can be concretely pictured, 536-7, 541-2, 556 ff.
_See_ God

Dogmatism, as distinguished from Criticism, 9, 13-14, 21

_Dreams of a Visionseer_, Kant’s, 155 _n._, 299

Duns Scotus, 73-4

Eberhard, Kant’s reply to, 90 ff., 143 _n._

Ego, transcendental. _See_ Apperception

Eleatics, the, 159

Emotions, Kant’s view of the, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Empirical, relation to the _a priori_, 36 ff.;
problem of empirical knowledge, 39-40, 53;
empirical object intermediate between subjective representations and thing
in itself, 206 ff., 223, 270 ff., 308 ff.
_See_ Experience

_Enquiry into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals_,
Kant’s, 15, 40, 563 ff.

_Ens realissimum_, 522 ff., 529-30, 532, 534, 541-2, 556

Epicurus, lix, 436, 499, 582

Erdmann, B., xx, xxviii _n._, 46, 142 _n._, 158, 161, 163, 200-1,
208 _n._, 294 _n._, 314, 373, 382 _n._, 412, 431-2, 471, 601 _n._

Erhardt, F., 484 _n._, 494

Error, _See_ Appearance, Illusion

Euler, 162

Existence, and the “I think,” 322 ff.;
judgment of, always synthetic, 527 ff.;
necessary existence, 533-7

Experience, proof by reference to the possibility of, xxxvi, xxxvii-xxxviii,
45, 238-9, 241-3, 259-60, 344, 426, 430, 454, 552-4, 572 ff.;
meaning of term, 52; problem of, 57-8;
as datum is equivalent to consciousness of time, xxxiv, 120,
241 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.

Exposition, Kant’s use of term, 109-10

Faith, Kant’s view of, lv-lvi, lxi, 571 ff., 575-6

Feeling, Kant’s use of term, 82-3;
Kant’s view of, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Fichte, l

Fischer, K., 46, 75, 113-14, 140, 601 _n._

Form and matter, importance of distinction between, xxxiii-xxxiv, xxxvi, 85 ff.

Forms of the understanding. _See_ Categories

_Fortschritte, Welches sind die wirklichen_, etc., Kant’s, li _n._, 59, 60, 84,
578 _n._, 580 _n._

_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_, Kant’s, lviii, lix, 569, 572

_Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse_, Kant’s, lvii, 578

Freedom of the will, problem of, 20-1, 435, 512 ff., 569-70;
and causality, 492 ff.;
transcendental and practical freedom, 497, 512-13, 517-18, 569-70, 573-4

Galileo, 18, 583-4, 586

Garve, xix, 150; Garve-Feder review, 158

_Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_, Kant’s, 117, 161-2

Geometry, the fundamental mathematical science, 96 _n._;
pure and applied, 111-12, 147, 349, 565-6;
Kant’s attitude to modern, 117 ff.

Geulincx, 596, 598

God, ontological proof of existence of, 527 ff.;
cosmological proof, 531 ff.;
physico-theological proof, 538 ff.;
problem of God’s existence, 569 ff.;
how far an indispensable Idea of Reason, 439-40, 536-7, 541-2, 556 ff.

Green, T. H., l _n._, 23, 36

Groos, K., xxviii _n._

Hamann, 157, 539-40 _n._;
describes Kant as “a Prussian Hume,” 305

Hegel, xxxvii, xlv, l, 36, 190, 194, 274, 554 _n._

Herbart, 86 _n._, 124

Herz, Marcus, xxii-xxiii, xxix, xlix, 6, 26, 28, 46, 51, 114 _n._, 138, 187,
189, 198, 206-7, 219-22, 432

Hicks, G. Dawes, 415 _n._

Hobbes, 593

Höffding, H., 23

Home, Henry, 1

Homogeneity, transcendental principle of, 550-1

Hume, date of first influence on Kant, xx, xxviii;
Kant’s relation to, xxv-xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvii, xlvi;
his view of consciousness, xl-xliii;
anticipates Kant’s phenomenalism, 21-2;
maintains that experience cannot prove universality or necessity, 27, 57-8;
shows causal axiom to be synthetic, 30-1;
Hume’s problem a deepening of Kant’s earlier problem, 46;
Kant’s relation to, 61-4;
on the self, 207 _n._;
his subjectivism, 272-3, 284, 300;
Kant “a Prussian Hume,” 305;
much of Hume’s teaching in regard to causality accepted by Kant, 364;
Kant’s reply to Hume, 369-71;
Hume’s philosophy the perfected expression of the empirical
and sceptical position, 421;
influence on Kant, 432;
on existential judgment, 528;
influence on Kant of Hume’s _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, 539-540, 557,
567 _n._;
influence on Kant, 583;
the philosophical teaching of, 588-601;
influence on Kant, 606

Humility, lvi, lviii-lix, 554 _n._

Hypotheses, and postulates, xxxvii-xxxviii, 541, 543 ff., 571 ff.;
how far valid in metaphysics, lxi, 9-12, 543 ff.

Hypothetical employment of Reason, 549-50

Idealism, objective or Critical, 274;
Kant’s refutations of subjective idealism. 298 ff., 462-3;
transcendental idealism as key to solution of the antinomies, 503 ff.
_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism

Ideal of Reason, 522 ff., 536-7, 541-2, 554 _n._, 556-61

Idealist view of Reason, xxxviii-xxxix, xliv, liii, 97-8, 102, 331-2, 390-1,
414-17, 426 ff., 433 ff., 447 ff., 473-7, 478 ff., 500-6, 511-12,
519-21, 547 ff., 552 ff., 558-61

Ideality, of space and time, 76, 111, 116-17, 138, 147, 154, 308

Ideas of Reason, Kant’s sceptical and Idealist views of the, xxxviii-xxxix,
xliii, xliv, lii-lv, lvi ff., 330-1, 390-1, 414-17. 426 ff., 433 ff.,
446 ff., 473-7, 478 ff., 500-6, 511-12, 520-1, 547 ff., 558-61;
involved in consciousness of space and time, liii-liv, 96-8, 102 _n._, 165-6,
390-1;
Kant’s deistic interpretation of the, 418, 436, 439-40, 454, 473-477, 520-1,
537, 575;
as limiting concepts, 408, 413-17, 426 ff.;
as regulative, xxxviii-xxxix, xliii, liii, 473-7, 500 ff., 547 ff.;
and categories of relation, 451-2;
distinction between mathematical and dynamical, 510-11;
Kant’s criticism of Idea of unconditioned necessity, 527 ff., 533-7, 541-2;
metaphysical and practical validity of the Ideas, 570-6;
concluding comments on Kant’s views of the, 558-61;
condition distinction between appearance and reality, liii-liv, 217-18, 326
_n._, 331, 391, 414-17, 426-31, 473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61.
_See_ Deduction of Ideas

Illusion, and appearance, 148 ff.;
Berkeley regards objects of outer sense as, 157, 307-8;
inner experience not illusory, 323-4;
transcendental, 13, 427-9, 437, 456 ff., 480, 552, 555

Imagination, may be the common root of sensibility and understanding, 77, 225,
265;
productive, 224 ff., 264 ff., 337, 348, 375-6

Immanent and transcendent metaphysics. _See_ Metaphysics

Immortality, problem of, 569 ff.

Incongruous counterparts, 161 ff.

Infinitude, of space, 105 ff.;
of time, 124 ff.;
Kant’s view of, 483 ff.;
distinction between _in infinitum_ and _in indefinitum_, 507 ff.

Inner Sense, xliii _n._, 148, 291 ff., 360, 464, 468-9;
and apperception, 321 ff.

Intuition, Kant’s doctrine of pure, 40 ff., 79-80, 118-20, 128 ff.,
167-8, 468-9;
intuition and conception, 38-42, 93-98, 105-9, 118-20, 126, 128-34, 165-166,
167-8, 194, 390-1, 564-6;
formal intuition and form of intuition, 109, 114-16

Intuitive understanding, Kant’s view of, 160, 291, 408 ff., 468 _n._ 542

Jacobi, 300

Jakob, xxviii _n._

James, W., 86, 277-8, 459 _n._, 461 _n._

Janitsch, 155, 156

Jones, Sir Henry, 36

Judgment, Kant’s doctrine of the, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xliv, xlviii-l, 177
ff., 192 ff., 286 ff.;
the fundamental activity of the understanding, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xlii,
133, 181-2, 288, 332, 370;
_a priori_ and empirical, 27-8;
analytic and synthetic, xxv ff., 28 ff., 37 ff., 59-60;
judgment 7 + 5 = 12, 65;
relational types ignored by Kant, 37 ff.;
Kant’s attributive view of, 37-38, 180-1, 197;
as assertion of contingency, 39 ff., 55, 286-9;
Kant’s distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience, 288-9;
existential, 527-31

Knowing and thinking, distinction between, lv-lvi, 20, 25, 290-1, 331, 404 ff.
_See_ Categories

Knowledge, the narrow meaning assigned to term by Kant, lv-lvi, lxi, 25

Knützen, 161

Lambert, xx, xxviii, xxxii, 74, 138, 150, 193

Lange, F., 23

_Lectures on Metaphysics_, Kant’s, 261, 275 _n._, 299, 448-9, 475 _n._

_Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion_ Kant’s, 261

Leibniz, Kant’s relation to, xxx-xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvii, xlvi, l, lvii;
his absolutist view of thought, xxx-xxxii;
anticipates Kant’s phenomenalism, 21-2;
his rejection of empiricism, 27, 58;
his pre-established harmony, 28;
regards synthetic judgments as always empirical, 30;
his conceptual atomism, 38;
Kant probably influenced by the _Nouveaux Essais_ of, 92, 186;
referred to by Kant, 112;
Kant’s relation to, 140-1;
Kant’s criticism of his interpretation of sensibility and appearance, 143-6;
his view of space, 161 ff.;
Kant influenced by the spiritualism of, 208-9, 243, 260-1, 263;
his subjectivism and doctrine of _petites perceptions_, 272-3, 298-9, 306;
his alternative views of the reality of the material world, 298-9;
continuing influence of his rationalism on Kant, 394-5, 398-9, 418 ff.;
his view of the possible as wider than the actual, 401-2;
antinomies formulated by Kant from the standpoint of the Leibnizian
rationalism, 481 ff.;
Kant’s formulation of the ontological argument Leibnizian, 522 ff., 556;
contrast between Locke and, 146-7, 421, 582;
on mathematical method, 592;
the philosophical teaching of, 601-6;
on the nature of sense-experience, 604-5;
influence on Kant, 605-6

Limiting concepts, Ideas as, 408, 413-17, 426 ff.
_See_ Ideas of Reason

Locke, xxxii, xl, xlvi, 15;
Kant’s criticism of his view of appearance, 146-7;
Kant’s restatement of his distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, 120-2, 146, 149 ff., 306;
subjectivism of, 272, 306;
on inner sense, 148, 292-3;
contrast between Leibniz and, 146-7, 421, 582;
his use of term idea rejected by Kant, 449;
on primary and secondary qualities, 586 _n._;
rationalism of, 591-2;
his proof of causal axiom, 594;
on the causal relation, 596, 598

Logic, Kant’s contribution to the science of, xxxvi-xxxix;
Kant’s view of the traditional, 10, 21, 33-6, 100, 181, 183, 184-6,
259, 332;
the various kinds of, 167 ff.;
distinction between general and transcendental, xxxix, 170 ff.,
176 ff., 178
_n._, 181, 183, 184-5, 194-5, 196, 335

_Logic_, Kant’s, 1, 110, 170 ff., 180-1, 576 _n._, 577 _n._,
580 _n._, 581 _n._, 582

_Lose Blätter aus Kant’s Nachlass_, xx-xxi, 112 _n._, 202-3,
209, 211 _n._, 232-4, 261

Lotze, 1 _n._, 36, 181

Mach, E., 596

Mairan, J. J. Dortous de, 496

Malebranche, xxxi, xxxii, xliii _n._, 15, 28, 47;
Kant’s phenomenalism anticipated by, 21-2;
rationalism of, 590-1;
on the causal relation, 596-8

Manifolds, of appearance, 84-5;
empirical, 267, 274 ff.;
pure _a priori_, 88-90, 92 ff., 95, 96-7, 134, 142 _n._, 148 _n._,
171, 194-5, 226, 228-9, 267, 269-70, 289, 337, 344, 375, 385 _n._

Mathematics, methods of, 17-18;
judgments in, not all synthetic, 64;
principle of contradiction in mathematical reasoning, 60, 64-5, 344;
Kant’s intuitional view of, 40-1, 65-6;
distinction between mathematical and philosophical knowledge, 15, 563 ff.;
pure and applied, 68, 111-12, 114-15, 140, 166, 566;
use of schemata in, 337-9.
_See_ Arithmetic, Geometry

Matter, Kant’s dynamical theory of, 354-5;
principle of conservation of, 361-2

Meier, 441

Mendelssohn, Moses, xix, xxxii, 6, 11, 58, 138 _n._, 139 _n._,
150, 153, 160-1,
458-9 _n._, 467, 470-1

_Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_, Kant’s, 56 _n._, 66, 97,
127-8, 164-5 _n._, 312 _n._, 354 _n._, 361 _n._, 380-1,
384 _n._, 491, 579 _n._

Metaphysics, distinction between immanent and transcendent,
liv-lv, 15, 19, 22,
26-7, 33, 50, 52, 53, 55-6, 58-9, 66-70, 244-5, 257-8,
545, 580-1; in disrepute, 8-9;
Kant professes to establish a quite final, 10, 35, 543 ff.;
“Copernican hypothesis” and, 18 ff.;
as natural disposition, 12-13, 68 ff.;
as science, 68 ff.;
hypotheses not valid in, 543 ff.;
the problems of, 569-76, 579-81

Method, the sceptical, 545-6;
mathematical, 563-7.
_See_ Analytic and Synthetic Methods

Mill, J. S., 86, 364-5, 377, 596

Mind, Kant’s use of term, 81

_Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_, Kant’s, 181-2

Modality, 391 ff.

_Monadologia physica_, Kant’s, 354

Moral attitude, the, xxxvi, xlv, lv ff., 515-16, 571 ff.

Moral belief, lvi ff., 577

Moral law, consciousness of the, _de facto_, xxxvi, xlv, 572-3

Motion, doctrine of, 127-9, 133;
Galileo’s revolutionary doctrine of, 583-4

Müller, Max, 75

Natural Science, pure, 66-8;
and immanent metaphysics, 70. _See_ Metaphysics

Nature, means “all that is,” 16

Necessity, and universality, 56-7;
definition of, 391 ff.;
of thought and of existence, 402-3, 527, 533, 536;
limited being may exist by unconditioned, 527, 533, 536;
absolute necessity not purely logical, 528;
unconditioned, Idea of, 527 ff., 533-7, 541-2, 555, 558-61;
and contingency, concepts of, not applicable to things in themselves, 535;
relative, 541, 555, 571 ff.

_Negative Quantity_, Kant’s essay on, 381, 403 _n._

_New Doctrine of Motion and Rest_, Kant’s, 354, 381 _n._

Newton, his influence on Kant, lv-lvi, 96 _n._, 140-2, 161 ff., 354 _n._;
Kant modifies Newton’s cosmology, 539

Noumenon, positive and negative conception of, 408 ff., 413.
_See_ Appearance

Number, schema of, 347-8. _See_ Arithmetic

Object, Kant’s use of term, 79-81, 167 _n._, 174;
transcendental, 203 ff.;
empirical, 206 ff., 223, 270 ff., 308 ff.

Objective, not the opposite of the subjective, 279 ff., 313-14;
validity of Ideas, 558-61

Occasionalism, 465, 596-7, 598

_On the Radical Evil in Human Nature_, Kant’s treatise, lviii, lix

Ontological argument, 527 ff.

Opinion, Kant’s use of term, 543, 576-7

Organon, 71-2, 169-70, 174

Oswald, xxviii _n._

Outer Sense, 147, 276, 293 ff., 360

Paralogisms, 455 ff.;
nature of fallacy of the, 466, 470

Paulsen, 46-7, 64, 373, 601 _n._

Pearson, K., 596

_Perpetual Peace_, Kant’s treatise on, lvii _n._

Phenomenalism and subjectivism, xxxix ff.,
xlv-xlvii, 82-4, 120-2, 136-8, 138-9, 140, 150-4,
155-9, 223, 227, 270 ff., 312 ff., 349-51,
357-8, 373-4, 407 _n._, 414-17

Phenomenon, distinction between appearance and, 83.
_See_ Appearance

Philosophy, causes of failure of, 59;
Kant reinterprets its function and aims, lvi, 571-6, 577-8;
the domains of, 579-81;
Kant’s view of history of, 582

Physico-theological argument, 538 ff.

Physics, method of, 17-18;
Kant’s views regarding, 354-5, 361-2, 379-81

Pistorius, 305, 307-8, 323, 467

Plato, xlv, 47, 158, 301, 390, 436, 496, 582

Pope, 156

Possibility, Kant’s definition of, 391 ff.

Postulates. _See_ Hypotheses

Practical employment of Reason, lvi-lix, 569 ff.

Pragmatic belief, lvi, 577

Prantl, 73

Pre-established harmony, 28, 47, 114, 141-2, 267-8, 290, 465, 590

Priestley, J., xxviii _n._, 11, 567 _n._

Primary and secondary qualities, 82, 120-2, 146, 149 ff., 306

Principles never self-evident, xxvi-xxviii,
xxxv-xxxviii, 36 ff., 53, 185-6, 340.
See _A priori_

Probabilities, inference from. _See_ Hypotheses

_Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics_, Kant’s, xxv,
xxviii _n._, xxix _n._,
12, 13, 46, 47, 49, 59-60, 61-4, 65, 66-7, 68 ff.,
80, 84, 91, 106, 109-11, 116, 121, 129, 146, 149,
152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 178-9,
184, 188, 234, 288-9, 299, 300-1, 305-8, 346,
361 _n._, 376-7

Psychology, Kant’s views regarding, xliii-xlvii, 50-1,
235 ff., 263 ff., 269-270, 311 _n._, 312 _n._, 384-5,
455 ff., 473-7, 580-1

Pure, Kant’s use of term, 1-2, 54-6, 64

Quality, and intensive magnitude, 352.
_See_ Primary and secondary qualities

Rationalism, Kant’s type of, xxxv-xxxvi, 257-8;
relation to the rationalism of Leibniz, 418 ff.
See _A priori_

Reason, meanings of the term, liii-lv, lvi, 2-3, 71, 426 ff., 520-1, 558-61;
ineradicably metaphysical, liii-lv, lvi, 8;
condition of free actions, 515-16;
as practical, lvi ff., 515-17;
as causing antinomy, liii, 519 ff.;
hypothetical employment of, 549-50;
Ideal of, 556 ff.
_See_ Idealist and sceptical views of Reason, Ideas of Reason

_Rechtslehre_, Kant’s, 190

Reciprocity, category of, 197, 381 ff., 434-5, 439-40, 451-4

_Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, xx,
xxiii, xlix, lv, 85,
86, 106, 127, 182, 188 ff., 196, 197, 198, 200-1, 202-3
, 208, 231-2, 261, 334 _n._, 399, 433-40, 448-9, 543

Regulative. _See_ Ideas of Reason

Reicke, xx. See _Lose Blätter_

Reimarus, 193

Representation, Kant’s use of term, 81, 104;
distinction between representation and its object, 135,
136-7, 272 ff., 308
ff., 317-18, 365.
_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism

Representative perception, doctrine of, xxxix-xliii, xlvi, 272 ff., 298 ff.,
585-8

Riehl, A., xliv _n._, 46, 51, 88, 102 _n._, 195, 303-4,
317-18, 340-1, 342, 357-8, 372 _n._, 373, 601 _n._, 605

Rousseau, lvii, lviii-lix, 436, 567 _n._, 578

Rule, two kinds of, 372

Russell, B., 491-2, 568 _n._

Sceptical method, Kant’s, 481, 545-6

Sceptical view of Reason, 481, 500-3, 511-12, 519-21, 528-9, 533-7, 541-2, 547
ff., 558-61

Scepticism, 9, 13-15, 545-6, 567

Schematism, 195-6, 265-7, 289, 311, 333, 334 ff., 467 _n._;
and images, 337-9

Schopenhauer, 75, 197, 315-16, 365-7, 377-9, 387-9, 407 _n._, 482-3 _n._, 493
_n._, 495 _n._

Schulze, Johann, 129-31, 138, 198-9, 480 _n._

Schütz, 153

Segner, 66

Self, Kant’s semi-Critical, spiritualist view of the, l,
207-9, 212, 243, 260-3, 327-8, 473-7, 515;
may not be an ultimate form of existence, l-lii, 260-3,
277-9, 327, 459-62,
473-7;
Idea of the, 439-40, 455-62, 471, 472-7, 554;
Kant’s view of nature and destiny of, 472-7.
_See_ Apperception, Soul

Self-consciousness. _See_ Apperception, Consciousness

Self-evidence, Kant’s rejection of, xxvi-xxviii, xxxv-xxxviii,
36, 53, 118, 142, 185-6, 563-4, 565-6.
See _A priori_

Sensation, Kant’s views of, 81-2, 84-8, 274-7, 349-52;
non-spatial, 85-8, 100-1, 105;
required for determining actuality, 391 ff.;
sensations, feelings, etc., subject to law of causality,
xlvi _n._, 275, 279-82, 311-12, 313-14, 384-5

Sensibility, may have a common root with understanding, 77;
definition of, 81, 167-8;
as a limitation, 116;
criticism of Leibniz’s view of, 143-6;
Kant’s view of, 274-7

_Seven Small Papers_, Kant’s, 298

Sidgwick, H., 314

Sigsbee, R. A., 11

Sigwart, 36, 181, 197

Simultaneity. _See_ Time

Soul, and body, Kant’s view of their relation, 275-6,
279-84, 312 ff., 384-5,
464-6, 467, 471, 476.
_See_ Apperception, Self

Space, Kant’s views of, xxxv-xxxvi, lii, 85 ff., 188;
involves an Idea of Reason, liii-liv, 96-8, 102 _n._, 165-6, 390-1;
metaphysical exposition of, 99 ff., 109-10, 112 ff., 134 ff.;
transcendental exposition of, 109 ff., 344-5;
not a property of things in themselves, 112 ff.;
is the form of outer sense, 114-16;
transcendental ideality of, 76, 116-17;
uniform for all human beings, 116-18, 120, 241-2, 257;
possibility of other spaces, 117 ff.;
criticism of Newtonian and Leibnizian views of, 140-2;
merely _de facto_ character of, 57, 118, 142, 185-6, 257;
as _Unding_, 154;
in relation to Divine Existence, 159-61;
and incongruous counterparts, 161 ff.;
involved in consciousness of time, 309 ff., 384-6, 390-1;
ignored by Kant in doctrine of schematism, 341, 348, 360;
involves category of reciprocity, liii-liv, 385-7, 390-1;
and antinomy, 480 ff.
_See_ Geometry

Specification, transcendental principle of, 501-2

Spencer, Herbert, 87, 584 _n._, 596

Spinoza, 74, 273 _n._, 440, 587, 601-2

Stadler, 197, 378-9, 389 _n._

Stirling, J. Hutchison, 23, 75, 366 _n._, 377

Stout, G. F., 87, 367 _n._, 387

Subconscious, the, Kant’s view of, 263 ff., 273-4

Subjectivism, in Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental
object, xxxix ff., xlv-xlvii, 206 ff., 217-18.
_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism, Idealism

Substance and attribute, category of, 362-3

Sulzer, xxviii _n._

Summum Bonum, 575, 577

Swedenborg, 155 _n._, 158 _n._, 299

Swift, Benjamin, 74

Synthetic, problem of knowledge _a priori_ and, xxv ff.,
xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii,
28 ff., 37 ff., 59 ff.;
knowledge from mere concepts, 64;
decomposing synthesis, 95;
ambiguities in Kant’s formulation of problem of _a priori_
synthetic judgments, 43 ff.;
processes, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 245-8, 261-2, 263 ff.,
277-8, 293, 295 ff., 322,
327 ff.
_See_ Analytic and synthetic judgments, and methods

System of pure reason, 71-3, 579-80

Teleological argument, 536-7, 538-42, 556-8

Terrasson, Jean, 15

Tetens, 82, 148, 294 _n._, 475

Thales, 18

Theist, as contrasted with deist, 541

Things in themselves, Kant’s first use of phrase, 112 _n._;
transcendental object equivalent to thing in itself, 204 ff.
_See_ Appearance

Thinking, discursive and creative. _See_ Understanding

Thomasius, 193

Time, consciousness of, Kant’s datum, xxxiv, 120, 241-2;
metaphysical exposition of, 123 ff.;
as infinite, 125;
transcendental exposition of, 126 ff., 344-5;
as form of inner sense, 134-5, 293 ff.; axioms of, 127;
not a determination of outer appearance, 134 ff.;
merely _de facto_ character of, xxxv-xxxvi, lii, 142, 565-7;
simultaneity not a mode of, 135 ff., 356, 358-9;
and simultaneous apprehension, 135-6, 348, 358-9, 367-8, 371-2, 381-2;
and reality of inner changes, 138-40;
transcendental ideality of, 76, 138;
Kant’s view of, not a mere hypothesis, 147;
space involved in consciousness of, 134-6, 309 ff., 341, 347-8;
subjective and objective order of, 358 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.;
time relations determined by the given, 34-5, 267-8, 367, 370, 371-2, 377;
does not itself change, 142, 359-60;
category of causality involved in consciousness of, liii-liv, 365 ff., 377
ff., 387;
cannot be experienced in and by itself, 375-6;
category of reciprocity involved in consciousness of, 381-91;
Idea of Reason involved in consciousness of, liii-liv, 96-8, 390-1;
infinitude and infinite divisibility of, 390-1, 481, 483 ff.

Totality. _See_ Unconditioned

Transcendent. _See_ Transcendental and Metaphysics

Transcendental, meaning of term, 73-6, 116-17, 302; illusion, 13, 427-9, 552,
555;
method of proof, xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii, 45, 238-9, 241-3, 259-60, 344, 568,
572 ff.;
ideality of space and time, 76, 116-17, 138;
exposition of space and time, 109 ff., 126 ff., 344-5;
object, Kant’s doctrine of, xlvi _n._, 203, 204 ff., 322, 328, 371-3, 406-7,
412, 414, 415, 513-14, 518;
unity of apperception, Kant’s pre-Critical view of, 207 ff., 212;
unity of apperception, Kant’s doctrine of, l-lii, 250-3, 260-3, 270, 277-9,
322 ff., 455 ff., 473-7;
psychology, xliii-xlvii, l-lii, 50-1, 235 ff., 253, 263 ff.; Ideal, 522 ff.;
principles of Reason, 550-1;
illusion, 13, 427-9, 437, 456 ff., 480, 552, 555.
_See_ Deduction of Categories and of Ideas

_Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural
Science to Physics_, Kant’s treatise, 275 _n._, 283 _n._,
482 _n._, 514 _n._

Trendelenburg, 113-14, 140

Truth. _See_ Coherence theory of truth

_Ueber das Organ der Seele_, Kant’s, 81 _n._, 275 _n._

_Ueber eine Entdeckung_, etc., Kant’s reply to Eberhard, 90 ff., 143 _n._

_Ueber Philosophie überhaupt_, Kant’s, 83 _n._, 128

Ulrichs, 467, 471

Unconditioned, Idea of the, its relation to category of totality,
199-200, 433-4, 451, 480, 529, 559-60;
our awareness of the conditioned presupposes the, 416-17, 429 ff.;
in connection with Kant’s view of the self, 473-7;
Kant’s criticism of the Idea of the, 498, 527 ff., 533-7,
541-2, 555, 558-61.
_See_ Idealist and Sceptical views of Reason

Understanding, and Reason, lii-lv, 2, 52;
defined, 81;
may have common root with sensibility, 77;
distinction between its discursive and its originative
activities, 172, 176
ff., 182-3, 263 ff., 277-8, 334-5, 370, 377;
viewed by Kant as a unity, 174 ff., 185-6;
its primary function, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xlii, 93-94,
133, 181-2, 288-9, 332, 370, 377;
as intuitive, 160, 291, 408 ff., 468 _n._, 542.
_See_ Concept

_Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens_, Kant’s, 539

_Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze_, Kant’s, 110 _n._, 131

Vaihinger, Hans, xx, xxv, xxviii _n._, xliv _n._, 2, 13, 23, 43,
45 ff., 52,
53, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 81, 87, 104, 105, 109, 112, 113, 117,
127, 130, 139, 140, 143, 147, 148, 156, 161, 162, 202 ff.,
261, 268-9, 298-9, 301, 314-315, 579 _n._, 601 _n._

Value, problems of, lvi, lx-lxi

Void, Kant’s doctrine of the, 354-5

Voltaire, xxxi, 436, 539

_Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume_, Kant’s, 40,
86 _n._, 140, 162

Watson, J., 1 _n._, 23 _n._, 75, 102 _n._, 117, 183, 195, 196, 198, 262, 328,
462, 468 _n._, 564

Windelband, 46

Wolff, 192-3, 272, 436, 440, 522, 579, 587, 601-6

Zedlitz, Freiherr von, 6-7

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Headings not in Kant’s Table of Contents are printed in italics.

[2] _W._ x. p. 323.

[3] _W._ x. p. 316.

[4] Cf. Kant’s letter to Lambert, September 2, 1770: _W._ x. p. 93.

[5] Embodied in his edition of the _Kritik_ (1889).

[6] From letter to Marcus Herz, June 7, 1777: _W._ x. pp. 116-17.

[7] From letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772: _W._ x. p. 127.

[8] _Reflexionen_ ii. 5.

[9] These passages are by no means unambiguous, and are commented upon below, p. 61 ff.

[10] For justification of this interpretation of Hume I must refer the reader to my articles on “The Naturalism of Hume” in _Mind_, vol. xiv. N.S. pp. 149-73, 335-47.

[11] To this fact Kant himself draws attention: “But the perpetual hard fate of metaphysics would not allow Hume to be understood. We cannot without a certain sense of pain consider how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and even Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing, they so overlooked his inclination towards a better state of things, that everything remained undisturbed in its old condition.”--_Prolegomena_, p. 6; Mahaffy and Bernard’s trans. p. 5.

[12] Sulzer’s translation of Hume’s _Essays_ (including the _Enquiries_) appeared in 1754-56.

[13] The word which Kant uses is _Erinnerung_ (cf. below, p. xxix, _n._ 4). There are two main reasons for believing that Kant had not himself read the _Treatise_. He was imperfectly acquainted with the English language, and there was no existing German translation. (Jakob’s translation did not appear till 1790-91. On Kant’s knowledge of English, cf. Erdmann: _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, Bd. i. (1888) pp. 62 ff., 216 ff.; and K. Groos: _Kant-Studien_, Bd. v. (1900) p. 177 ff.: and below, p. 156.) And, secondly, Kant’s statements reveal his entire ignorance of Hume’s view of mathematical science as given in the _Treatise_.

[14] Cf. Vaihinger, _Commentary_, i. p. 344 ff. Beattie does, indeed, refer to Hume’s view of mathematical science as given in the _Treatise_, but in so indirect and casual a manner that Kant could not possibly gather from the reference any notion of what that treatment was. Cf. Beattie’s _Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth_ (sixth edition), pp. 138, 142, 269.

[15] These Hume had himself pointed out both in the _Treatise_ and in the _Enquiry_; and because of them he rejects scepticism as a feasible philosophy of life. Kant’s statement above quoted that Hume’s critics (among whom Beattie is cited) “were ever assuming what Hume doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and _often with arrogance_ what he never thought of disputing,” undoubtedly refer in a quite especial degree to Beattie.

[16] _Werke_, x. p. 123 ff. It is dated February 21, 1772. Cf. below, pp. 219-20.

[17] In _Prolegomena_, p. 6 (above quoted, p. xxviii, _n._ 1), and p. 8 (trans. p. 6): “I should think Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to sound sense as Beattie, and besides to a critical understanding (such as the latter did not possess).”

[18] Cf. _Prolegomena_, p. 8: “I honestly confess that my recollection of David Hume’s teaching (_die Erinnerung des David Hume_) was the very thing which many years ago [Kant is writing in 1783] first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction.” Kant’s employment of the term _Erinnerung_ may perhaps be interpreted in view of the indirect source of his knowledge of Hume’s main position. He would bring to his reading of Beattie’s quotations the memory of Hume’s other sceptical doctrines as expounded in the _Enquiry_.

[19] Kant, it should be noted, classifies philosophies as either dogmatic (= rationalistic) or sceptical. Empiricism he regards as a form of scepticism.

[20] Quoted by Beattie (_op. cit._, sixth edition, p. 295), who, however incapable of appreciating the force of Hume’s arguments, was at least awake to certain of their ultimate consequences.

[21] For a more detailed statement of Kant’s relation to his philosophical predecessors, cf. below, Appendix B, p. 583 ff.

[22] The term “recognition” is employed by Kant in its widest sense, as covering, for instance, recognition of the past as past, or of an object as being a certain kind of object.

[23] Consciousness of time, consciousness of objects in space, consciousness of self, are the three modes of experience which Kant seeks to analyse. They are found to be inseparable from one another and in their union to constitute a form of conscious experience that is equivalent to an act of judgment--_i.e._ to be a form of awareness that involves relational categories and universal concepts.

[24] As we have noted (above, pp. xxvi-xxvii), it was Hume’s insistence upon the synthetic, non-self-evident character of the causal axiom that awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Cf. below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.

[25] Cf. below, pp. lvi ff., 571 ff.

[26] Cf. below, pp. 36-7.

[27] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.

[28] Cf. below, pp. liii-iv.

[29] Cf. below, pp. 45, 238-43.

[30] Cf. below, pp. 33-6, 181, 183-6.

[31] Cf. below, pp. 33-42, 394-5, 398.

[32] With the sole exception of Malebranche, who on this point anticipated Kant.

[33] This is the position that Kant endeavours to expound in the very unsatisfactory form of a doctrine of “inner sense.” Cf. below, pp. l-ii, 291 ff.

[34] This was Kant’s chief reason for omitting the so-called “subjective deduction of the categories” from the second edition. The teaching of the subjective deduction is, however, preserved in almost unmodified form throughout the _Critique_ as a whole, and its “transcendental psychology” forms, as I shall try to show, an essential part of Kant’s central teaching. In this matter I find myself in agreement with Vaihinger, and in complete disagreement with Riehl and the majority of the neo-Kantians. The neo-Kantian attempt to treat epistemology in independence of all psychological considerations is bound to lead to very different conclusions from those which Kant himself reached. Cf. below, pp. 237 ff., 263-70.

[35] This subjectivism finds expression in Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” which, as I shall try to prove, is a doctrine of early date and only semi-Critical. That doctrine is especially prominent in the section on the Antinomies. See below p. 204 ff.

[36] Cf. pp. 270 ff., 298 ff., 308-21, 373-4, 414-17.

[37] That this statement holds of feelings and desires, and therefore of all the emotions, as well as of our sense-contents, is emphasised by Kant in the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Cf. below, pp. 276, 279-80, 312, 384-5.

[38] The connection of this teaching with Kant’s theory of consciousness may be noted. If consciousness in all its forms, however primitive, is _already_ awareness of meaning, its only possible task is to define, modify, reconstruct, and develop such meaning, never to obtain for bare contents or existences objective or other significance. Cf. above, pp. xli-ii, xliv.

[39] _Reflexionen zur Anthropologie_, 207.

[40] In sketch of a letter (summer 1792) to Fürst von Beloselsky (_W._ xi. p. 331).

[41] May 26, 1789 (_W._ xi. p. 52).

[42] That Kant has not developed a terminology really adequate to the statement of his meaning, is shown by a parenthesis which I have omitted from the above quotation.

[43] This interpretation of Kant appears in a very crude form in James’s references to Kant in his _Principles of Psychology_. It appears in a more subtle form in Lotze and Green. Caird and Watson, on the other hand, have carefully guarded themselves against this view of Kant’s teaching, and as I have maintained (pp. xliii-v), lie open to criticism only in so far as they tend to ignore those aspects of Kant’s teaching which cannot be stated in terms of logical implication.

[44] It may be objected that this is virtually what Kant is doing when he postulates synthetic activities as the source of the categories. Kant would probably have replied that he has not attempted to define these activities save to the extent that is absolutely demanded by the known character of their products, and that he is willing to admit that many different explanations of their nature are possible. They _may_ be due to some kind of personal or spiritual agency, but also they may not. On the whole question of the legitimacy of Kant’s general method of procedure, cf. below, pp. 235-9, 263 ff., 273-4, 277 ff., 461-2, 473-7.

[45] Cf. _Concerning the Advances made by Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff_ (_Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. 530-1): “I am conscious to myself of myself--this is a thought which contains a twofold I, the I as subject and the I as object. How it should be possible that I, the I that thinks, should be an object ... to myself, and so should be able to distinguish myself from myself, it is altogether beyond our powers to explain. It is, however, an undoubted fact ... and has as a consequence the complete distinguishing of us off from the whole animal kingdom, since we have no ground for ascribing to animals the power to say I to themselves.”

[46] Cf. above, p. xxxiv; below, pp. 250-3, 260-3, 285-6.

[47] Cf. A 651 = B 679: “The law of Reason, which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, as without it we should have no Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth.” Cf. also below, pp. 390-1, 414-17, 429-31, 519-21, 558-61.

[48] Regarding a further complication, due to the fact that the _Dialectic_ was written before the teaching of the _Analytic_ was properly matured, cf. above, p. xxiv.

[49] Cf. below, pp. 331, 390-1, 414-17.

[50] Cf. below, pp. 22, 33, 56, 66 ff.

[51] _Reflexionen_ (B. Erdmann’s edition) ii. 204.

[52] For an alternative and perhaps more adequate method of describing Kant’s general position, cf. below, p. 571 ff.

[53] Above, pp. xxxviii-ix, xlii, xliv.

[54] Cf. below, p. 577.

[55] _Critique of Practical Reason_, W. v. p. 32; Abbott’s trans. pp. 120-1.

[56] _Op. cit._ p. 86; Abbott’s trans. p. 180.

[57] _Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse (Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624). Cf. below, pp. 577-8. Kant claims for all men equality of political rights, and in his treatise on _Perpetual Peace_ maintains that wars are not likely to cease until the republican form of government is universally adopted. He distinguishes, however, between republicanism and democracy. By the former he means a genuinely representative system; the latter he interprets as being the (in principle) unlimited despotism of majority rule. Kant accordingly contends that the smaller the staff of the executive, and the more effective the representation of minorities, the more complete will be the approximation to the ideal constitution. In other words, the less government we can get along with, the better.

[58] _On the Radical Evil in Human Nature, W._ vi. p. 20; Abbott’s trans. p. 326. “This opinion [that the world is constantly advancing from worse to better] is certainly not founded on experience if what is meant is _moral_ good or evil (not civilisation), for the history of all times speaks too powerfully against it. Probably it is merely a good-natured hypothesis ... designed to encourage us in the unwearied cultivation of the germ of good that perhaps lies in us....”

[59] _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, W._ iv. p. 407; Abbott’s trans. p. 24.

[60] _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 84-5; Abbott’s trans. pp. 178-9.

[61] Cf. _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, W._ iv. p. 463; Abbott’s trans. p. 84: “While we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its _incomprehensibility_, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limit of human reason.”

[62] _On the Radical Evil in Human Nature, W._ vi. pp. 49-50; Abbott’s trans. pp. 357-8.

[63] Cf. Pringle-Pattison: _The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy_, p. 25 ff.

[64] _Einleitung_, i.

[65] Henry Home, Lord Kames, published his _Elements of Criticism_ in 1762.

[66] _W._ ii. p. 311. In referring to his course in logic, Kant states that he will consider the training of the power of sound judgment in ordinary life, and adds that “in the _Kritik der Vernunft_ the close kinship of subject-matter gives occasion for casting some glances upon the _Kritik des Geschmacks, i.e._ upon _Aesthetics_.” This passage serves to confirm the conjecture that the term _Kritik_ was borrowed from the title of Home’s work.

[67] For Kant’s other uses of the term _pure_, cf. below, p. 55.

[68] _Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, i. pp. 117-20.

[69] For a definition, less exclusively titular, and more adequate to the actual scope of the _Critique_, cf. below, p. 56. Reason, when distinguished from understanding, I shall hereafter print with a capital letter, to mark the very special sense in which it is being employed.

[70] _Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon_ (edited by J. M. Robertson, 1905), p. 247.

[71] For Zedlitz’s severe strictures (Dec. 1775) upon the teaching in Königsberg University, and his incidental appreciative reference to Kant, cf. Schubert’s edition of Kant’s _Werke_, xi. pt. ii. pp. 59-61.

[72] Cf. _W._ x. p. 207.

[73] _Op. cit._ pp. 212-13.

[74] Cf. _op. cit._ pp. 208-9.

[75] _Op. cit._ p. 219.

[76] A v.-vi.

[77] A v. _n._

[78] Cf. above on title, pp. 2-3.

[79] Cf. below, pp. 543, 576-7.

[80] A vii.-viii.

[81] A xiv.

[82] Cf. below, pp. 543 ff.

[83] Cf. A 86 = B 118-19.

[84] Morgenstunden; _Gesammelte Schriften_, 1863 edition, ii. pp. 246, 288. Cf. below, pp. 160-1.

[85] Cited by R. A. Sigsbee, _Philosophisches System Joseph Priestleys_ (1912), p. 33.

[86] A v. _n._

[87] A viii.

[88] _Prolegomena_, _Anhang_, Trans. of Mahaffy and Bernard, p. 147.

[89] A 1.

[90] B 21. Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 60 ff., and below, pp. 427-9, 552.

[91] A 297-8 = B 353-5. Cf. below, pp. 427-9.

[92] A iii.

[93] i. p. 50.

[94] P. 9.

[95] This statement, as we shall find, calls for modification. Kant’s Critical position is more correctly described as phenomenalism than as subjectivism. Cf. above, pp. xlv-vii; below, p. 270 ff.

[96] A 769 = B 797.

[97] A 761 = B 789-90. Cf. Sections I.-III. in the _Methodology_.

[98] A iii.

[99] A v. _n._

[100] A v. _n._

[101] Cf. Kant’s _Beantwortung der Frage: Was heist Aufklärung?_ 1784.

[102] A v.

[103] Cf. above, pp. 2-3.

[104] Cf. above, pp. xliv-v; below, pp. 19, 33, 56, 66 ff.

[105] A ix.

[106] A x.-xi.

[107] A xii.-xiii.

[108] A xv.

[109] A xv. Cf. below, pp. 66-7.

[110] B xiv.

[111] B ix.

[112] B xi.

[113] Cf. below, pp. 22-5.

[114] Cf. above, p. lvi; below, p. 571 ff.

[115] _Dissertation_, § 7.

[116] All these assertions call for later modification and restatement.

[117] B xxx.

[118] B xxxii.

[119] B xxxvii.

[120] B xxxviii.

[121] B vii.

[122] B viii.

[123] B xvi.

[124] Cf. above, pp. xxvi-vii; below, pp. 594-5.

[125] Cf. “Malebranche’s Theory of the Perception of Distance and Magnitude,” in _British Journal of Psychology_ (1905), i. pp. 191-204.

[126] Cf. below, pp. 143 ff., 604.

[127] B xviii.-xix.

[128] Cf. below, pp. 33, 56, 66 ff.

[129] B xx.

[130] B xxii.

[131] B xvi.; B xxii. _n._

[132] Watson’s _The Philosophy of Kant Explained_ (p. 37) is the only work in which I have found correct and unambiguous indication of the true interpretation of Kant’s analogy.

[133] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, bk i. ch. i. § 11.

[134] _Text-Book to Kant_ (1881), p. 29.

[135] _History of Materialism_, Eng. transl., ii. pp. 156, 158, 237.

[136] _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (1896), ii. p. 64.

[137] _Hibbert Journal_, October 1910, p. 49.

[138] _De Revolutionibus_, I. v.

[139] _Ibid._ I. x.

[140] B xxii. _n._

[141] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.

[142] B xxvi. Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, 20; below, pp. 290-1, 331, 342, 404 ff.

[143] This restatement will continue up to p. 33. In pp. 33-43 I shall then give general comment on the _Introduction_ as a whole. In p. 43 ff. I add the necessary detailed treatment of special points.

[144] Cf. below, p. 219 ff.

[145] Cf. above, p. xxv ff.; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.

[146] This statement is first made in the _Introduction_ to the second edition. It is really out of keeping with the argument of the _Introduction_ in either edition. Cf. below, pp. 39-40, 57, 85, 168, 222, 245 ff. (especially pp. 278, 288).

[147] This is the argument of the _Introduction_ to the second edition. In the first edition Kant assumes without question the existence of the _a priori_. He enquires only whether it is also valid in its metaphysical employment beyond the field of possible experience.

[148] The argument of the first edition, though briefer, is substantially the same.

[149] Quoted below, pp. 219-20.

[150] Cf. below, pp. 114, 290, 590.

[151] A 6 = B 10. I here follow the wording of the second edition.

[152] Kant’s view of the _a priori_ differs from that of Leibniz in _two_ respects. For Kant _a priori_ concepts are merely logical functions, _i.e._ empty; and secondly, are always synthetic. Cf. above, pp. xxxiii-vi, 186, 195-6, 257-8, 290-1, 404 ff.

[153] Cf. above, pp. xxv-vii; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.

[154] B 24.

[155] Cf. above, pp. xliv-xlv, 22; below, pp. 52-3, 55-6, 66 ff.

[156] Needless to say, this “Aristotelian” logic, in the traditional form in which alone Kant was acquainted with it, diverges very widely from Aristotle’s actual teaching.

[157] Cf. above, pp. xxxvi-ix; below, pp. 36, 181, 184-6.

[158] A vii.

[159] B xxiii-iv.

[160] Above, pp. xxv-vii, 26; below, p. 593 ff.

[161] Cf. above, p. xxxvi ff.

[162] Cf. above, pp. xxxvii-viii; below, pp. 238-42.

[163] Cf. below, pp. 176 ff., 181, 191, 257.

[164] A 6 = B 10.

[165] Leibniz’s interpretation of the judgment seems to result in an atomism which is the conceptual counterpart of his metaphysical monadism (cf. Adamson, _Development of Modern Philosophy_, i. p. 77 ff.; and my _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, p. 160 ff.; also below, p. 603). Each concept is regarded as having exclusive jurisdiction, so to speak, over a content wholly internal to itself. The various concepts are like sovereign states with no mediating tribunals capable of prescribing to them their mutual dealings. Cf. below, pp. 394-400, 418 ff.

[166] A 9 = B 13.

[167] _Erste Betrachtung_, §§ 2, 3; _dritte Betrachtung_, § 1.

[168] Cf. below, p. 162.

[169] § 12, 15 C.

[170] Cf. B 15-16.

[171] Cf. below, p. 128 ff., on Kant’s views regarding arithmetical science.

[172] Cf. below, p. 117 ff., on Kant and modern geometry, and p. 128 ff., on Kant’s views regarding arithmetical science.

[173] Cf. below, pp. 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff.