Chapter IV: Section IV (2)

Gonzalo used every effort to collect provisions and all kinds of necessaries for his army, more especially as he had to pass through a desert country which intervened between the province of Motupe[15] and the city of San Miguel, a distance of twenty-two leagues without any inhabitants, and entirely destitute of water or other means of refreshment, consisting every where of burning sands without shelter from the heat of the sun and almost under the equinoctial line. As this march was necessarily attended with much inconvenience and difficulty, Gonzalo used every proper precaution that his troops might be supplied abundantly with water and other necessaries. For this purpose all the neighbouring Indians were ordered to bring a prodigious quantity of jars and other vessels calculated to contain water. The soldiers were ordered to leave at Motupe all their clothes and baggage of which they were not in immediate want, which were to be brought forward by the Indians. Above all things, it was taken care that a sufficiency of water should accompany the army, both for the troops, and for the horses and other animals. Every thing being in readiness, Gonzalo sent forwards a party of twenty-five horsemen by the ordinary road through the desert, that they might be observed by the scouts belonging to the viceroy, and that he might be led to believe the army came in that direction. He then took a different route through the same desert with the army, marching as expeditiously as possible, every soldier being ordered to carry his provisions along with him on his horse. By these precautions, and the rapidity of the march, the viceroy was not informed of the approach of Gonzalo and his army, till they were very near San Miguel. Immediately on learning their approach, he sounded the alarm, giving out that he intended to meet and give battle to the insurgents; but as soon as his army was drawn out from the city, he took a quite opposite course, directing his march with all possible expedition towards the mountain of Caxas.

[Footnote 15: Named Morrope in modern maps. The desert in the text is of great extent, reaching from the river Leche to the Piura, a distance of above eighty English miles.]

Gonzalo Pizarro got notice of the retreat of the viceroy about four hours afterwards, in consequence of which he made no halt at San Miguel, except to procure guides to direct him in the road which the viceroy had taken. In the first night of this pursuit, the army of Gonzalo marched eight Spanish leagues, or near thirty English miles, and several of the royalists who had lagged behind the rest, together with the whole baggage belonging to the retreating army fell into his hands. Gonzalo hanged such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and continued the pursuit of the flying royalists with the utmost diligence, through difficult and almost impracticable roads, where no provisions could be procured, always coming up with some of the hindmost of the enemy. Gonzalo likewise sent on several Indians with letters to the principal officers who served under the viceroy, urging them to put him to death, and offering them their pardons for the past and to give them high rewards. He continued the pursuit above fifty leagues or two hundred miles, till at length the horses were no longer able to carry their riders, and the men were incapable of proceeding, both from excessive fatigue and by the failure of provisions. The insurgent army at length arrived at Ayabaca[16], where the hot pursuit of the viceroy was discontinued, and the troops of Gonzalo halted for rest and refreshment. Besides the difficulty of overtaking the royalists, Gonzalo had received assurances from some of the principal followers of the viceroy that they would either put him to death, or deliver him up as a prisoner; and, as this came afterwards to the knowledge of the viceroy, he put several of these officers and gentlemen of his army to death. After Gonzalo had supplied his army with such provisions as could be furnished at Ayabaca, he resumed the pursuit, but with less rapidity than before, and keeping his army always in compact order; yet at this time some of his troops remained behind, partly owing to extreme fatigue, and partly from discontent. Leaving the viceroy to continue his retreat to Quito, and Gonzalo in pursuit, it is proper to mention some events that occurred at this time in other parts of Peru.

[Footnote 16: Notwithstanding the distance mentioned in the text, Ayabaca is only about 60 miles, or fifteen Spanish leagues in a straight line N.N.E. from San Miguel.--E.]

In this march, Gonzalo did not think proper to carry along with his army any of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy whom he had taken during the pursuit, both because he could not confide in them, because he had already a sufficient force in proportion to the enemy, and because provisions were very difficult to be procured, as the viceroy had stripped every place through which he passed as much as possible. For this reason, Gonzalo Pizarro sent back all his prisoners to Truxillo, Lima, or such other places as they thought proper, having in the first place put to death such of their chiefs as he considered most strongly attached to the viceroy. As these soldiers were dispersed over several parts of the country, they began to declaim in favour of the viceroy and against the tyrannical conduct of Gonzalo, and found many persons abundantly disposed to listen to their harangues; both because what they alleged was true in itself, and because most of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru were much inclined to revolution and change of party, especially the soldiery and those who were lazy and unoccupied. The real settlers and principal inhabitants of the cities were quite of an opposite description, being friends of peace and order, as most conducive to their interest and happiness, and necessary to the preservation of their properties, and being more exposed in time of civil war than even the soldiers to be harassed and tormented in many ways, as the ruling party was apt on the slightest pretexts to put them to death on purpose to seize their effects, with which to gratify and reward the partizans of their tyranny and injustice. These seditious discourses were so openly indulged in, that they reached the knowledge of the lieutenants of Gonzalo; who, each in his peculiar jurisdiction, punished the authors as they deemed right. At Lima, to which most of these prisoners had gone, Pedro Martin de Cecilia the provost marshal was a violent partizan of Gonzalo, and caused several of these malecontents to be hanged. Lorenzo de Aldana, who had been left by Gonzalo as lieutenant-governor of Lima, was a prudent man, and conducted himself in a quite different manner, being disinclined from acting with such violence as might occasion displeasure to either party in the sequel; for which reason he used all his influence to prevent putting any one to death, or from injuring any person in any manner. Although he held his office from Gonzalo, he never exerted himself zealously in his service, so that the partizans of that usurper considered him as secretly gained by the other party, more especially as he always behaved well to the known friends of the viceroy. On this account, all these men flocked to Lima, where they believed themselves in greater security than anywhere else. The partizans of Gonzalo, on the other hand, made loud complaints against the favourable behaviour of Aldana to the royalists; and in particular one of the alcaldes of Lima, named Christopher de Burgos, spoke of it so openly that Aldana thought it necessary to give him a public reprimand, and even committed him to prison for some time. Several even went so far as to communicate their suspicions of the fidelity of Aldana to Gonzalo Pizarro by letters, and even persuaded him of the truth of their allegations: But he refrained from manifesting his want of confidence in the lieutenant-governor, considering it dangerous to deprive him of his office while the army was at so great a distance, more especially as Aldana had a respectable military force, and was much esteemed by the citizens of Lima.

We have formerly mentioned that several inhabitants of the city of La Plata in the province of Las Charcas, on receiving orders to that effect from the viceroy, had set out from that city on purpose to offer him their services against Gonzalo; but having learnt his imprisonment while on their way to Lima, they returned to their habitations. Gonzalo Pizarro was particularly displeased with these men, as he expected to have been especially favoured by the inhabitants of his own peculiar district, and sent therefore a person named Francisco de Almendras as lieutenant-governor to La Plata, a coarse brutal fellow without feeling or humanity, and one of the most cruel satellites of his tyrannical usurpation; whom he instructed to be peculiarly watchful of the behaviour of those who had shewn an intention of joining the viceroy, and to make them feel on every opportunity how much he was dissatisfied with their conduct on that occasion. In pursuance of his instructions, Almendras deprived the principal persons among these loyalists of their lands and Indians, and exacted heavy contributions from them towards defraying the expences of the war. He likewise affronted and used them ill on all occasions, and even on very frivolous pretences. One Don Gomez de Luna, a principal person among the loyalists of La Plata, happened one day to observe in conversation at his own house, that the emperor Don Carlos must assuredly at length recover the command over Peru. This loyal sentiment was reported to Almendras, who immediately ordered De Luna to be arrested and thrown into the common prison. The magistrates of the city went in a body to supplicate Almendras either to liberate De Luna, or at least to confine him in a place more conformable to his rank; and as Almendras refused to give a satisfactory answer to their representation, one of the magistrates declared publicly, that, if he would not liberate de Luna, they would do so in spite of him. Almendras dissembled his sentiments at the time, but went next night to the prison, whence he caused De Luna to be taken out to the public square and beheaded.

The inhabitants of the city were exceedingly disgusted by this cruel act of tyranny, which they considered as an outrage against the whole community; and particularly one Diego Centeno was most sensibly affected, as he and De Luna had been extremely intimate. At the commencement of the troubles respecting the obnoxious regulations, Centeno had attached himself to Gonzalo Pizarro, whom he had accompanied to Cuzco, in the capacity of procurator from the province of Las Charcas, being one of the principal persons of his party. Having noticed the bad intentions of Pizarro, and that he did not limit his designs to those objects which he at first proposed, Centeno abandoned the party of Gonzalo and returned to his own house. He now determined to use his utmost endeavours to revenge the cruel death of his friend De Luna, that he might save himself and others from the tyrannous rule of Almendras, and on purpose to restore the country to obedience to its legitimate sovereign. With this view, he communicated his sentiments to some of the principal settlers, among whom were Lopez de Mendoza, Alfonso Perez de Esquivel, Alfonzo de Camargo, Fernando Nunnez de Segura, Lopez de Mendiera, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and several others whom he believed to have loyal intentions, all of whom he found disposed to second him in executing the enterprize which he had in view. In the prosecution of this purpose, they all assembled one Sunday morning, according to custom, at the house of Almendras, under pretence of accompanying him to church. When all were assembled, although Almendras had a considerable guard, Ceuteno went up to him as if to converse on some affair of moment, and stabbed him repeatedly with his dagger. The conspirators then dragged him out to the public square and cut off his head, declaring him a traitor, and proclaiming that they had done so for the service of the king.

Considering that Almendras was universally detested, the conspirators had not thought it necessary to use any precautions for conciliating the people; yet all the inhabitants declared for the king, and took immediate measures to support his authority and to defend themselves against the resentment of Gonzalo and the insurgents. For this purpose, they elected Centeno as commander in chief of the province; in which capacity he appointed proper persons to be captains of cavalry and infantry under his authority, and used every effort to inlist a body of troops, which he paid out of his own funds, being one of the richest men in the country; but in this he was assisted by the other inhabitants of the province, who contributed towards the expence. Centeno was of an honourable family, being descended from Hernan Centeno who had made himself illustrious in the wars of Castillo. He was about thirty-five years of age, of very agreeable manners, of a liberal disposition, personally brave, of an excellent character and universally respected. At this time he enjoyed a revenue exceeding 80,000 crowns; but about two years afterwards, on the discovery of the famous mines of Potosi, he became possessed of above 100,000 crowns of annual rent by means of his Indians, as his estate lay very near these mines.

Having assembled a body of troops, Centeno used every effort to provide them with arms and all other necessary equipments. He placed guards at all the passes, to prevent any intelligence from being conveyed to the enemy till his affairs were in proper order. He sent likewise Lopez de Mendoza one of his captains, first to Porco and thence to Arequipa to collect as many men as possible, and to endeavour to arrest Pedro do Puentes the lieutenant of Gonzalo at Arequipa. But Puentes fled immediately from Arequipa on receiving intelligence of the events which had occurred at Las Charcas. Mendoza therefore took possession of Arequipa without resistance; whence he reinforced himself with all the men, arms, and horses, he could procure, and carried off all the money he could find, with which and his reinforcement he returned to Centeno at La Plata.

On the return of Mendoza, Centeno found himself at the head of two hundred and fifty men well equipped for war, to whom he explained his sentiments and views, and gave an account of the criminal usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, in the following terms. "You know that Gonzalo, on leaving Cuzco, pretended merely to present the humble remonstrances of the colonists respecting the obnoxious regulations; and you have been informed that, even at the outset, he put to death Gaspard de Roias, Philip Gutierrez, and Arias Maldonado. You have learnt how he conspired with the judges of the royal audience and other inhabitants of Lima, to arrest and depose the viceroy, both of which were done accordingly. After this, while at the very gates of Lima, and before his public entry into that city, he sent in his lieutenant-general, who arrested many of the most considerable and richest inhabitants of the country, under the eyes of the judges, merely because these men had joined the viceroy, and even hanged three of them without any form of trial, Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, and Juan Saavedra. He in the next place has broken up the royal court of audience, sending off its judges to different places, having in the first place obliged them to appoint him to the government. He has since, as you well know, caused many others to be put to death, merely on suspicion that they were favourable to the viceroy, and intended to join his party. Not satisfied with all this, he has seized all the treasure belonging to his majesty in the different receipts of the colony, and has imposed excessive contributions on the inhabitants, from whom he has exacted above 150,000 ducats by means of taxes imposed at his own pleasure. Adding crime to crime, he has again levied forces against the authority of his majesty, with which he has marched against the viceroy, and has carried insubordination and confusion into every part of the country; permitting and encouraging many to hold public discourse contrary to the respect and obedience which is due to his majesty. They were likewise aware, that Gonzalo had token away the repartimientos, or allotments of lands and Indians from many persons, and had converted them to his own emolument. Finally, he laid before them the strong obligations by which they were all bound, as faithful subjects, to exert their utmost endeavours in the service of their sovereign, lest they should draw upon themselves the imputation of being rebels and traitors." By these representations, and others which it were tedious to repeat, he disposed his auditors to concur in his loyal sentiments, and willingly to obey his orders. After this, Centeno sent one of his captains with a detachment to Chicuito, a place belonging particularly to the king, between Orcaza and Las Charcas, with orders to guard the passes with the utmost vigilance, till he and the royalists were in full readiness to execute their principal enterprize, as will be related in the sequel.

Notwithstanding every precaution employed by Centeno to conceal his operations and intentions, it was impossible to prevent intelligence from spreading in various directions, more especially after the expedition of Mendoza to Arequipa. Every thing he had already done, even the number of his troops, and of the musquets and horses he had collected, was fully known, by means of Indians and Spaniards who had escaped from La Plata, in spite of the guards which had been set, to watch the passes of the mountains. Alfonso de Toro, who acted as lieutenant governor of Cuzco under Gonzalo Pizarro, happened at this time to be a hundred leagues to the northward of that city, keeping guard in one of the passes of the mountains, as by letters from Gonzalo the viceroy was reported to have gone into the mountainous country, and was supposed to have directed his march by that road toward the south of Peru. On receiving notice of the late revolution at La Plata, De Toro returned in all diligence to Cuzco, where he levied forces to oppose Centeno; and, having assembled the magistrates and principal inhabitants of Cuzco, he informed them of what had occurred at Las Charcas, and as there was a sufficient force in Cuzco to suppress the royalists, he thought it incumbent on him to march to La Plata for that purpose. To gain them over to his purpose, he represented that Centeno had revolted without any just cause, and had usurped authority in Las Charcas for his own private ends, under pretence of serving the king; whereas Gonzalo Pizarro, being actual governor of the kingdom of Peru, ought to be obeyed as such till his majesty sent orders to the contrary. That the revolt of Centeno, being both criminal in itself and contrary to the law, every one was bound to resist him, and to punish his temerity. He recalled to their remembrance, that Gonzalo Pizarro was engaged in serving the general interest of the colonists, to procure the revocation of the obnoxious ordinances, in which common cause he had exposed his fortune and personal safety to every hazard, as it was well known that every inhabitant of Peru would be stripped of his property if the regulations were put in force. That besides the general advantage procured by Gonzalo in setting aside the obnoxious regulations, for which all were infinitely indebted to him, it was obvious that he had not in any respect conducted himself contrary to the royal orders, and had not in any manner set himself against the authority of the sovereign; since, on his arrival at Lima for the purpose of presenting their remonstrances, the judges of the royal audience had already arrested the viceroy and sent him out of the kingdom, of which these judges had appointed Gonzalo interim governor; and that in marching in a warlike manner against the viceroy, he had acted at the request and by the orders of the royal audience; as was manifest by his being accompanied by Cepeda, one of the royal judges and chairman of the audience. He asserted that no person in Peru could take upon him to determine whether the audience had acted right or otherwise in conferring the government on Gonzalo; and that it was the duty of all to support him in that office, till they received the ulterior orders of the sovereign.

At the close of this discourse, every one acknowledged the justice of what he had represented, and voluntarily offered to support Gonzalo with their lives and fortunes; although in reality most of them did so more from fear than good will, as they stood in great awe of De Toro, who had hanged several persons in a summary manner, and had made himself universally dreaded by his cruel and ferocious disposition and conduct, so that no one dared to oppose or contradict him in any thing. After a short deliberation, a set of resolutions were entered into, in which the transactions of Centeno in Las Charcas were recited as seditious and unlawful, and he was declared to have assassinated Francisco de Almendras, the lieutenant governor, to have levied forces in rebellion against the legitimate government, and to have passed the boundaries of the province of Las Charcas in hostile manner; for all which reasons it was just and proper to make war upon him, and to reduce him to obedience. All this was done principally to satisfy or to amuse the people, and to make them believe that the partizans of Gonzalo acted reasonably and lawfully, as all those who signed these resolutions were perfectly aware of the real state of affairs. In reality, although matters were thus represented in the popular assemblages, in justification of the measures of the insurgent party, or at least to excuse their actions under specious pretences, those who took an active part on the present occasion, used often to declare, both in the presence and absence of Gonzalo, that the king would certainly give, or ought to give him the government of Peru, as they were resolved not to receive any other person in that capacity, such being the resolution of Gonzalo in which they all concurred.

Alfonso de Toro now proceeded to levy an army, of which he declared himself captain general and commander in chief, and appointed captains and other officers to command under his authority. In all his proceedings he carried himself with a high hand, employing force and violence, instead of persuasion and good treatment. He protested publickly and with many oaths, that he would hang up every one who did not assist and contribute to the cause; and even had several persons carried to the foot of the gallows, whose lives he was induced to spare by dint of solicitations. He abused and maltreated others, using everyone in the most outrageous manner who did not give way to him in all things. By this violent procedure he completed his warlike preparations at very small expence; insomuch that it appeared afterwards by his accounts, that he had not expended above twenty thousand crowns in this expedition, as he took away gratuitously all the horses that were to be found in Cuzco, and constrained all the inhabitants who were able to carry arms to accompany him in the expedition against Centeno. By these means De Toro collected three hundred men, tolerably armed and equipped, with which he marched from Cuzco to a place named Urcos, about six leagues from that city, where he remained three weeks in anxious expectation of intelligence from Las Charcas: But all the roads and passes between and La Plata, were so well guarded by the Indians, who were entirely disposed to favour Centeno, that he was unable to learn any thing of the movements or intentions of the royalists in Las Charcas, so that he was constrained to remain continually on the alert lest he might have been surprized. Besides these military precautions, he rigorously punished all who presumed to show the slightest disinclination towards the interest of the Pizarrian faction, or to express their sentiments in any respect in disapprobation of his own designs; insomuch that all were constrained from dread of punishment to appear heartily attached to the cause in which he was engaged.

After remaining three weeks encamped at Urcos, he determined to march in search of Centeno, and advanced for that purpose to the village named Del Rey. As the troops of Centeno happened to be a good deal scattered at this time, he was under the necessity of retreating on the approach of De Toro. These hostile chiefs being encamped at the distance of about twelve leagues, entered into a negotiation to endeavour to form an accommodation; but, as they were unable to agree upon any terms, De Toro advanced for the purpose of attacking Centeno; who, on the other hand, was unwilling to risk the chance of an engagement, owing to the inferiority of his force, and because a defeat might have dispirited his own party and have been of great advantage to the cause of the insurgents. On this account he retired in proportion as De Toro advanced, accompanied by a great number of large Peruvian sheep loaded with provisions and ammunition, and carrying along with him all the principal _curacas_ or native chiefs, to prevent De Toro from being able to avail himself of the assistance of the Indians. In this manner Centeno continued to retreat across a desert and uninhabited country of forty leagues extent, till he arrived at a place named _Casabindo_, through which Diego de Roias had formerly descended from the elevated region of Peru into the eastern plain of the Rio de la Plata. Alfonso de Toro continued the pursuit as far as the city of La Plata, which is an hundred and eighty leagues to the south of Cuzca. Finding that place abandoned and entirely stript of every thing which might contribute to the subsistence of his troops, and being unable to procure provisions on account of the absence of all the curacas or caciques, he was under the necessity to discontinue his pursuit of Centeno, and even found himself compelled to return towards Cuzco. In this retreat, De Toro took the command of the advanced guard of fifty men, ordering the main body to march at leisure, and left a rear-guard of thirty of his best mounted cavalry under Alfonso de Mendoza, with orders to use every possible means of procuring intelligence of the motions of Centeno; that, in case of his following, the troops might be collected together in good order to rejoin the van.

The departure of De Toro from La-Plata on his return to Cuzco was soon communicated to Centeno by means of the Indians. He was astonished at this sudden alteration of affairs; and, as he understood that De Toro marched in great hast, without keeping his troops in close array, he supposed that circumstance to have been occasioned by De Toro entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of his followers, and that he had found them ill-disposed towards the party of the Pizarrians. On these considerations, Centeno resolved to pursue in his turn, in hope of drawing some advantage to the cause in which he was engaged from this measure, and even expecting that several of the followers of Toro might come over to his side. He sent off therefore the captain Lope de Mendoza with fifty light armed cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. Mendoza got in a short time to Collao; and, although de Toro and most of his troops had already passed beyond that place, he made prisoners of about fifty who remained behind, whom at first he deprived of their horses and arms. Soon afterwards, however, he returned these to his prisoners, and even distributed some money among them, receiving their engagements upon oath to join him when required; but he hanged a few of them who were suspected of being particulary attached to De Toro. After this successful exploit, Lope returned in great haste to La Plata, in hope of being able to cut off Alfonzo de Mendoza and his small party, who still occupied that place. But Alfonzo had received intelligence of what had happened at Collao, and had already quitted La Plata in great haste, taking a different road from that pursued by Lope, by which means he got safe to Cuzco.

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at La Plata with the remainder of his troops, where he assembled all the force under his command, and where he made every possible preparation for continuing the war to advantage, and in particular caused a number of musquets to be made. De Toro continued his retreat to Cuzco, dreading much to be pursued, and lest Centeno might have acquired possession of Cuzco, which he might easily have accomplished in the present situation of affairs; but Centeno thought it more prudent to remain at La Plata, where he augmented the number of his troops and collected treasure which was found in great plenty in the province of Las Charcas.

The events which had taken place in Las Charcas were soon known at Lima; and as several of the soldiers in that city were attached to the party of the viceroy, they spoke almost openly of going away to join Centeno; and, from the small attention paid by Lorenzo de Aldana to repress these men, he was even suspected of favouring the same cause. Antonio de Ribera likewise, although the brother-in-law of Pizarro, was strongly suspected of being secretly devoted to the royal interest, as indeed his conduct in the sequel evinced; and several other persons of consideration lay under suspicions of the same nature. All this gave much uneasiness to the friends of Pizarro: Yet those persons at Lima who wished well to the interests of his majesty, did not think it prudent at this time to make any open attempt, being satisfied that it was better to wait a more favourable opportunity, and that De Aldana would prepare matters for that purpose, as he seemed clearly favourable to the same cause. His abilities were universally acknowledged, and his good intentions were not doubted, so that all were satisfied that he would conduct matters with much prudence to a favourable issue.

At this time it became known at Lima that the viceroy had retreated with a small body of troops into the province of Popayan; and that during his retreat he had put to death several of the officers and other persons of consideration in his army; among whom were Rodrigo de Ocampo, Jerom de la Cerna, Gaspard Gil Olivarez and Gomez Estacio; some of these because they were inclined to abandon him, and others for corresponding with Gonzalo Pizarro, and conspiring to put the viceroy to death. On the communication of this intelligence at Lima, it produced different effects according to the different inclinations and views of the inhabitants. It occasioned more reserve among those who were of loyal dispositions; whereas the partizans of the Pizarrian tyranny considered themselves more at liberty to avow their sentiments to Aldana. They went therefore to him in a body, and represented that there were many persons in Lima who were strongly suspected of being hostile to Gonzalo Pizarro, and only waited a favourable opportunity to take up arms against him; and that it was incumbent therefore on the lieutenant governor to punish these men for the scandalous freedoms in which they had indulged, or at least to banish them from the city. They offered to furnish sufficient proof of these facts, and urged him to exert his authority on the occasion. Aldana assured them that none of these things had ever come to his knowledge; and that if he knew who those were against whom they complained, he would take such measures as were necessary on the occasion.

The partizans of Pizarro became at length so bold that they arrested fifteen of those whom they most strongly suspected of attachment to the deposed viceroy, among whom was Diego Lopez de Zuniga. Having thrown these men into prison, the Pizarrians were inclined to have given them the torture to extort confession, and afterwards to have procured their condemnation by Pedro Martin the provost marshal of the city; so that they were in imminent danger of being put to death, if Lorenzo de Aldana had not exerted himself promptly and effectually to take them out of the hands of the Pizarrians. For this purpose, he caused them all to be brought to his own residence, on pretence that they would be there in more safe custody, and provided them with every thing of which they stood in need, even secretly furnishing them with a vessel in which they embarked and saved themselves from their enemies. This transaction gave much dissatisfaction to the friends of Pizarro, both on account of the escape of the prisoners, and because Aldana refused to allow of any formal investigation into the circumstances of their escape; on which account the Pizarrians firmly believed that Aldana was in secret league with the opposite party. They wrote therefore to Gonzalo Pizarro, giving him an account of all these events, and urging him to give proper orders on the occasion. But Gonzalo did not think it prudent at this time to make any change in affairs at Lima, or to attempt any thing against Aldana; because, as it has been reported, he was afraid of matters taking an unfavourable issue while he was at so great a distance.

When Gonzalo Pizarro was informed of what had been done by Centeno in the province of Las Charcas against his interest and authority, he believed it necessary to use prompt measures for reducing that country to subjection, and not to give his enemies time and opportunity for strengthening themselves and increasing the number of their partizans; as he flattered himself that he would become absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru, if he were able to get rid of Centeno. After several consultations with the principal officers of his army, on the measures necessary to be pursued on this emergency, in which Gonzalo could not act in person as he had still to oppose the viceroy in the north, it was determined to confide the care of an expedition against Centeno to the lieutenant-general Carvajal. For this purpose all the necessary orders and commissions were made out immediately in the name of Gonzalo Pizarro, by which Carvajal was authorized to levy what men and money he might deem necessary. This employment was very acceptable to Carvajal, as he believed he might derive considerable profit to himself in its execution; and he set out from Quito accompanied only by twenty persons, in whom he had great confidence. The council of Gonzalo Pizarro had other and secret motives for recommending the employment of Carvajal on this occasion, besides those which they publickly avowed. Some were desirous of acquiring by his absence a greater share in the management of affairs; while others were anxious to send him to a distance, from the terror inspired by his cruel and ferocious conduct, and his passionate temper, owing to which he used often to put people to death on the most trifling offences or the slightest suspicions. But all the leaders in the army disguised their real sentiments on this occasion, pretending that the importance of the affair required the talents and experience of Carvajal to bring it to a successful issue.

Leaving Quito, Carvajal went, directly to San Miguel, where the principal inhabitants went out to meet him, and conducted him with much respect to the house which was prepared for his reception. On arriving there, he desired six of the most considerable persons belonging to the city to dismount and accompany him into the house, under pretence that he had something of importance to communicate to them from the governor. Having caused the doors to be shut, and posted centinels to prevent any communication with the rest of the inhabitants, he represented to these men, that Gonzalo was much incensed against them for having always taken part with his enemies, and more especially on account of having received and favoured the deposed viceroy, and of having readily supplied his army with every thing of which they stood in need. On this account it had been his first intention to have destroyed the city with fire and sword, without sparing a single inhabitant. But, on reflecting that the magistrates and principal inhabitants only were to blame, the people at large having been constrained by force or fear, he was now determined to punish only the most guilty and to pardon the rest. Yet, having certain private reasons for dissembling for the present with some of the principal persons of the place, he had selected the six who were now present, as principal inhabitants, to punish them as they richly deserved, that they might serve as a warning to all Peru. For this reason, therefore, he desired them to confess their sins in preparation for death, as he was resolved to have them all executed immediately.

They used every argument to exculpate themselves from the crimes kid to their charge, but all they could say was without avail; and Carvajal even caused one of them to be strangled, against whom he was particularly incensed, as he had been principally instrumental in constructing the royal seal which the viceroy employed in his dispatches. In the mean time, a rumour of what was going forward at the residence of Carvajal spread over the city, and came to the knowledge of the wives of the prisoners. These ladies immediately implored the priests and monks who dwelt in San Miguel to accompany them to the place where their husbands were in so great danger. They all went there accordingly, and got in by a private door which had not been noticed by the people belonging to Carvajal, and which had consequently been omitted to be guarded. Coming into the presence of Carvajal, the wives of the prisoners threw themselves at his feet, and implored mercy for their husbands. He pretended to be softened, and granted pardon to the prisoners, so far as their lives; yet reserving to himself to punish them in such other manner as he might see fit. Accordingly, he banished them from the province, depriving them of their lands and Indians, and condemned them in the payment of heavy fines towards defraying the expences of the war.

From San Miguel Carvajal went to Truxillo, collecting every where on his route all the soldiers, horses, arms, and money he could find. Carvajal had resolved to have put one Melchior Verdugo to death, who dwelt in Truxillo; but as Verdugo got intimation of this intention, he fled to the province of Caxamarca, where his repartimiento of Indians was situated. The bussiness on which Carvajal was engaged was of too great importance to admit of pursuing Verdugo; wherefore, after having got possession of as much money as possible under pretence of a loan, he went on to Lima, always collecting all the soldiers he could procure. He gave no money to his recruits, only supplying them with horses and arms, which he took wherever they could be found. He kept all the money he could find for his own use, every where pillaging the royal coffers and public funds, and even searching for treasure among the ancient tombs. After arriving at Lima, he completed his military preparations, and departed for Cuzco by way of the mountain and the city of Guamanga, at the head of two hundred men well equipped, and carrying with him a great sum of money which he had collected during his march; and at Guamanga he conducted himself in the same rapacious manner as in other places.

Seven or eight days after the departure of Carvajal from Lima, a conspiracy was detected among those who were well affected to the royal cause, in consequence of which fifteen of the principal persons of that city were committed to prison. Among these were, Juan Velasquez, Vela Nunnez nephew to the viceroy, Francisco Giron another gentlemen of his household, and Francisco Rodriguez. By means of the torture, these unhappy persons were made to confess that they had concerted with Pedro Manxarres, an inhabitant of Las Charcas, to kill the lieutenant-governor Aldana, the provost marshall Pedro Martin, and other friends and partizans of Gonzalo Pizarro, after which they proposed to induce the citizens of Lima to declare for his majesty, confidently expecting that all those who now followed Carvajal by constraint would join their party; and they intended finally to have gone off with all the strength they could muster to join Centeno. Upon this forced confession, Giron and one other of these prisoners were strangled. By the intercession of several respectable persons the life of Juan Velasquez was spared, but his right hand was cut off. All the rest of these prisoners were so severely tortured that they continued lame for the rest of their lives. Manxarres saved himself by flight, and continued to conceal himself among the mountains for more than a year; but fell at last into the hands of one of the officers in the interest of Gonzalo, who caused him to be hanged.

As Pedro Martin, the provost-marshal, strongly suspected that some of those who accompanied Carvajal had participated in this plot; he endeavoured to discover this by torturing Francisco de Guzman, one of the prisoners. Finding that Guzman made no confession on this head, he interrogated him particularly respecting a soldier along with Carvajal named Perucho de Aguira, and some of his friends, demanding to know whether these men were in the secret. On purpose to free himself from the torture, Guzman said they were. After this confession, Guzman was formally condemned to become a monk in the convent belonging to the order of mercy, in which he accordingly assumed the habit. After this, Martin demanded from the registrar a certificate of the confession of Guzman, by which Aguira and others were implicated in the plot, and Martin immediately sent off this writing by an Indian messenger to Carvajal who was then at Guamanga. On the receipt of this paper, Carvajal ordered Aguira and five others to be hanged, without any further proof or examination. A short time afterwards, the registrar being sensible of the error he had committed in supplying the certificate, sent off a full copy of the confession made by Guzman, in which was an ample revocation of all he had said under torture, declaring that he had falsely charged Aguira and the others, merely to get free from torture. This was however of no avail, as it arrived too late, Aguira and the others having been already executed, although they asserted their innocence to the last moment of their lives, as was certified by the confessors who attended them at their execution; but Carvajal was inexorable.

Learning while at Guamanga, that Centeno had retired through the desert to Casabindo as he was unable to cope with Toro, Carvajal was satisfied that the affaire of the insurgent party were in a fair train in Las Charcas, where his presence was not now needed, and determined therefore to return to Lima. He was besides induced to take this step in consequence of a difference which subsisted between Toro and himself, occasioned by the charge of lieutenant general under Gonzalo having originally belonged to Toro, of which he had been deprived in favour of Carvajal. He feared therefore, lest Toro, on his victorious return from Las Charcas, being at the head of a much stronger force, might renew their former quarrel. Carvajal had likewise received letters from some inhabitants of Lima, remarking the lukewarmness of Aldana to the cause of Gonzalo Pizarro, and requesting his presence to place affairs at that city on a more secure footing. He returned therefore to Lima; but learning shortly afterwards the successful return of Centeno against De Toro, he again collected his troops and prepared to march against Centeno. With this view, he had his standards solemnly consecrated, not forgetting to impose fresh exactions on the inhabitants of Lima. On this occasion, he designated his army, _The happy army of Liberty, against the Tyrant Centeno._

Before leaving Lima, he sent off messengers to Cuzco by way of the mountain, but chose to march by the route of the plain or low country of Peru to Arequipa, exacting money from the inhabitants wherever he passed. At Arequipa he received letters from the magistrates of Cuzco and De Toro, earnestly requesting his immediate presence in that city; whence, as being the capital of the kingdom, it was proper that the army should march against the rebels. They assured him of being there provided with considerable reinforcements of men arms and horses, and that all the principal persons of the city were ready to accompany him on the expedition: adding, that being himself a citizen of Cuzco it seemed reasonable he should honour that city by his presence. By these and other considerations he was induced to march for Cuzco, though still entertaining some distrust and even fear of Toro, who he was informed had often spoken against him in his absence. When De Toro was informed of the approach of Carvajal to Cuzco, he made every necessary preparation for reinforcing the army, and providing for the intended expedition against Centeno; yet could not conceal his dissatisfaction, that he who had begun the war, and had already suffered great fatigues, and even had gained material advantages, should be superseded by another commander whom he must now obey, and more especially that it should be Carvajal who was put over him, with whom he had been already engaged in disputes. He dissembled however as much as possible, and concealed his resentment, saying publickly that his only wish was for the fortunate management of affairs, whoever might command. Yet with all his caution, he could not so carefully conceal his sentiments, but that he occasionally dropped expressions of resentment.

The discontent of De Toro was well known to the inhabitants of Cuzco, yet they were in hopes that Carvajal would set every thing to rights on his arrival. Carvajal having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, which he was to enter next day at the head of two hundred men, part cavalry and part musqueteers, De Toro was very anxious to muster all that were able to carry arms; and from this measure, and the precautions he took that every one should be in the most perfect equipment, and the troops steady in their ranks, it was suspected that he entertained some evil design. De Toro was thus posted with his troops, as if in ambush, in the way by which Carvajal had to march into the city. As these circumstances were made known to Carvajal, he ordered his troops to march in close array, and even ordered their arms to be loaded with ball, prepared for whatever might happen. On entering the city, De Toro and his troops were seen on one side, as if ready to dispute the passage. Carvajal halted his men, and the two parties remained for some time observing each other with mutual distrust. At length, as neither side seemed inclined to commence hostilities, both parties broke their ranks, and intermingled as friends.

Carvajal was exceedingly irritated against De Toro for his conduct on this occasion, but dissembled till he had entered into Cuzco, where he was received in the most honourable manner. A few days afterwards, he caused four of the principal inhabitants to be arrested, and ordered them to instant execution, without consulting De Toro, or even assigning any reason for this cruel and arbitrary proceeding. Some of those whom he put to death were among the most intimate friends of De Toro, who deemed it prudent and necessary to be silent on the occasion. The unexpected cruelty of Carvajal occasioned much astonishment and consternation among the inhabitants of Cuzco, insomuch that none of them dared to refuse accompanying him on the expedition, and he was enabled to leave Cuzco at the head of three hundred well appointed soldiers with which he marched by Collao in the way towards the province of Las Charcas in search of Centeno. As the latter had a considerably stronger force, it was believed by many that Carvajal would be unsuccessful in this expedition, more especially as most of his followers acted more from force than good will, because he allowed them no pay and treated them with much severity. In his whole conduct and deportment Carvajal acted in a brutal and passionate manner, evincing himself on all occasions the enemy of good men; for he was a bad Christian, constantly addicted to blasphemy, and of a cruel and tyrannical disposition, insomuch that it was generally expected his own people would put him to death to rid themselves of his tyrannous and oppressive conduct. Besides all this, it was obvious to many, that right and justice were on the side of Centeno, who was a man of honour and probity, and, being exceedingly rich, had both the power and inclination to reward his followers. It is necessary to quit Carvajal and his expedition for the present, that we may relate the events which took place at Quito.

We have already mentioned that Gonzalo Pizarro pursued the viceroy from San Miguel to Quito, a distance of 150 leagues or 600 miles, with much perseverance and rapidity, insomuch that almost every day the light armed men belonging to the two armies had opportunities of speaking with each other. During the whole of that long march, neither party had an opportunity to unsaddle their horses. Those belonging to the viceroy, owing to the necessity they were under of escaping from a force so much superior, were even more alert than their pursuers. When at any time they stopped to take a short rest during the night, they slept on the ground in their clothes, holding their horses by the halters, without wasting time in fixing up piquets, or making any of the usual preparations for accommodating themselves and horses during the night. It is true that piquets are seldom used in the sands of Peru for the horses, as it would be necessary to drive these very deep to take sufficient hold; and as there are no trees to be met with in many parts of that country for making piquets, necessity has introduced a substitute in some measure equivalent: For this purpose each horseman has a small bag, which he fills with sand and burries in a hole of sufficient depth, having one end of the halter fixed to the bag, the hole being afterwards filled up and pressed well down to prevent the bag from being drawn up by the efforts of the horse. But on this urgent occasion, the troops of the viceroy did not take time for this measure, but held the halters in their hands, that they might be ready to mount and set out the moment it was necessary by the approach of their pursuers.