Chapter V: Section IV (3)

In this long march, both the pursuers and the pursued suffered exceedingly from want of provisions; more especially the Pizarrians, as the viceroy used the precaution of removing the curacas and Indians from all the country through which he passed, that his enemy might find every part of the country deserted and unprovided with any means of subsistence. During this precipitate retreat, the viceroy carried along with him eight or ten of the best horses he had been able to procure, which were led by Indians for his own particular use; and when any of these became so tired as to be unable to proceed, he ordered them to be hamstrung, to prevent them from being useful to the enemy. While on this march in pursuit of the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro was joined by Captain Bachicao, who now returned from Tierra Firma with a reinforcement of three hundred and fifty men and a large quantity of artillery, having disembarked, from twenty vessels which he had procured, on a part of the coast as near as possible to Quito, and had made his way in such a manner across the mountains that he got to Quito rather before Gonzalo. On the junction of Bachicao, Gonzalo found himself at the head of more than eight hundred men, among whom were many of the principal people in South America, both townsmen or burgesses, planters, and soldiers. Owing to this large reinforcement, Gonzalo Pizarro found himself in such a state of tranquil security at Quito as hardly any usurper or tyrant had ever before enjoyed; as besides that this province abounded in provisions of every kind, several rich mines of gold had been recently discovered; and as most of the principal people of the province were either now along with the viceroy, or had attached themselves to him while at Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro appropriated all their Indians to himself, employing them in the collection of gold. From the Indians belonging to the treasurer, Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla, he procured about 800 marks [17] of gold in the course of eight months; besides that there were other repartimientos of greater value, and that he appropriated all the revenues and rights belonging to the crown, and even pillaged the tombs of the ancient sovereigns of Quito in search of treasure.

[Footnote 17: Eight hundred marks of gold, or 6400 ounces, at L.4 an ounce; are worth L.25,600: and at six for one, the value put upon bullion in those days by the Historian of America, are now worth at least L.153,600, perhaps a quarter of a million. As there were other repartimientos of more value than those of the treasurer, besides others not so valuable, it is not beyond bounds to suppose that Gonzalo may have acquired as much treasure at Quito as was equal to a million of our present money: A prodigious sum, considering that his army did not exceed 800 men; being equal to L.1250 for each soldier.--E.]

After a short stay at Quito, Gonzalo learnt that the viceroy had halted at the city of Parto, about forty leagues from thence, at the frontiers of the government of Benalcazar. Resolving to follow him, Gonzalo pushed on as he had done from San Miguel, and the light troops of the hostile parties had some interference at a place called Rio Caliente. When the viceroy was informed of the approach of Gonzalo, he hastily quitted Parto and retired to the city of Popayan at a greater distance from Quito, and was pursued by Gonzalo for twenty leagues beyond Parto. As Gonzalo found that he would have to march through a desert country, altogether destitute of provisions, he here discontinued the pursuit, and returned to Quito. Perhaps this was the longest and hottest pursuit ever made in war; as, counting from La Plata whence Gonzalo first set out, to Parto where the pursuit was discontinued, the distance is not less than 700 large Spanish leagues, or 2800 miles.

On his return to Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro was so puffed up with the success which had hitherto attended him, that he frequently spoke of his majesty with much disrespect; alleging that the king would be reduced to the necessity of granting him the government of Peru, and even went so far as to say, if this favour were denied him, he would throw off his allegiance. For the most part indeed, he concealed these ambitious sentiments, pretending that he was always ready to submit to the orders of his majesty; but all his officers were satisfied that he meant to assert an independent dominion, and publickly avowed these absurd and criminal pretensions. On returning from Parto, he remained a long while at Quito, continually feasting and rejoicing; he and his adherents abandoning themselves to every degree of licence and debauchery, particularly in regard to the sex. It is even asserted that Gonzalo caused a citizen of Quito to be assassinated, whose wife he publickly lived with, and that he hired a Hungarian soldier, named Vincente Pablo to execute this infamous deed. This man was afterwards hanged at Valladolid, in the year 1551, by a sentence of the royal council of the Indies.

As Pizarro found himself in the command of a strong body of excellent troops, which appeared entirely attached to his service, some of their own accord and others by constraint, he persuaded himself that no one could oppose him, or prevent him from enjoying his present elevation in peace and tranquillity. He was even convinced that the emperor would be obliged to treat him with cautious respect, and must find himself under the necessity of entering into a compromise. It was at this time, when Gonzalo considered himself as unresisted master of all Peru, that Centeno revolted from his tyrannical usurpation in the province of Las Charcas, and that he dispatched Carvajal for the reduction of that loyal officer, as has been already mentioned.

Having continued a long time at Quito without receiving any intelligence of the measures which were taken by the viceroy, Gonzalo became anxious to learn what was become of him. Some alleged that he would return to Spain by way of Carthagena, while others gave it as their opinion that he would retire to Tierra Firma, to keep possession of the isthmus, to assemble troops, arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to wait for orders from his majesty; and a third opinion was that he would wait for these orders in Popayan, where he now was. No one suspected that he would be able to collect a sufficient number of troops in that place to enable him to undertake any enterprise for recovering his authority in Peru; yet it seemed advisable to Gonzalo and his officers to take possession of the Tierra Firma, on purpose to occupy the only direct passage between Spain and Peru. For this purpose, Gonzalo Pizarro appointed Pedro Alfonzo De Hinojosa to command the fleet which Bachicao had collected, giving him a detachment of two hundred and fifty men to enable him to occupy the isthmus, and directed him while on his voyage to Panama to coast along the province of Buenaventura and the mouth of the river of San Juan.

Hinojosa set out immediately on this expedition, dispatching a single vessel, commanded by Captain Rodrigo de Carvajal direct for Panama, with letters from Gonzalo to some of the principal inhabitants of that city urging them to favour his designs. In these letters, he pretended that he was exceedingly displeased on hearing of the violence and rapacity with which Bachicao had conducted himself towards the inhabitants of Panama, in direct contradiction to his orders, which were to land the Doctor Texada without doing injury to any one. He informed them that Hinojosa was now on his way to their city, for the express purpose of indemnifying all those who had been injured by Bachicao; and desired them not to be under any apprehension of Hinojosa, although accompanied by a considerable force, as it was necessary for him to be on his guard against the viceroy and some of his officers, who were understood to be then in the Tierra Firma levying soldiers for their master. On the arrival of Rodrigo Carvajal at a place named Ancona about three leagues from Panama, he learnt that two officers belonging to the viceroy, Juan de Guzman and Juan Yllanez, were then in Panama, having been sent to that place to procure recruits and to purchase arms, with which they were to have gone to Popayan. They had already enrolled above an hundred soldiers, and had procured a considerable quantity of arms, among which were five or six small field-pieces; but, instead of going with these to join the viceroy, they remained to defend Panama against Gonzalo Pizarro, who they expected might send a force to occupy that important station.

As Rodrigo Carvajal had only fifteen men along with him, he did not think it prudent to land in person; but sent secretly by night one of his soldiers to deliver the letters with which he was entrusted. The soldier accordingly delivered them to the inhabitants for whom they were addressed, who immediately communicated them to the magistrates and the officers of the viceroy. The soldier was taken into custody, from whom they learnt the coming of Hinojosa, and the orders with which he was entrusted. Upon this intelligence, they armed the whole population of Panama, and fitted out two brigantines which were sent off on purpose to capture Rodrigo Carvajal; but, as his messenger did not return, Carvajal suspected what had actually taken place, and set sail for the Pearl Islands to wait the arrival of Hinojosa, by which means he escaped from the brigantines. Pedro de Casaos was then governor of the Tierra Firma; and to be in readiness to defend his province against Hinojosa, he went immediately to Nombre de Dios, where he collected all the musquets and other arms he could procure, arming all the inhabitants of that place who were fit for service, whom he carried along with him to Panama, making every preparation in his power for defence. The two captains belonging to the viceroy, Guzman and Yllanez, likewise put their troops in order for resistance, and at first there was some jealousy between them and Casaos as to the supreme command; but it was at length agreed that Casaos should command in chief, as governor of the province, while they retained the immediate authority over their own men, and bore their own standards. Differences had subsisted for some time between these officers and the governor, because he had repressed some disorderly conduct in which they had indulged, and had advised them to set off with their men to the assistance of the viceroy for whom they were employed to levy troops; while they were averse from that measure, and finding themselves at the head of a respectable force, they made light of the orders of Casaos, and refused to obey him: But the necessity they were now under of providing for their mutual defence, occasioned them to enter into an accommodation of their disputes.

After the dispatch of Carvajal to Panama, as already mentioned, Hinojosa set sail with ten vessels, and continued along the coast to the north till he arrived at Buenaventura, a small sea port at the mouth of the river San Juan which forms the southern boundary of Popayan, the government of Benalcazar. He proposed to learn at this place the situation and intentions of the viceroy, and to have seized any vessels that might be at this harbour, to prevent them from being employed by the viceroy for returning to Peru. On arriving at Buenaventura, Hinojosa sent some soldiers on shore, who brought off eight or ten of the inhabitants, from whom he learnt that the viceroy remained at Popayan, engaged in assembling troops and military stores for attempting to return into Peru; and that finding Yllanez and Guzman delayed their return from Panama, he had sent off his brother Vela Nunnez with several corporals on their way to Panama, to expedite the transmission of such reinforcements as could be procured, and had supplied him for that purpose with all the money belonging to the king at Popayan. Hinojosa was likewise informed that Vela Nunnez had the charge of a bastard son of Gonzalo Pizarro of twelve years old, who was found by the viceroy at Quito, and was now sent away to Panama, in the hope that the merchants of Panama might ransom him at a high price to acquire the good will of Gonzalo. The individual who communicated all this information added that the viceroy had employed a number of Indians to cut down a quantity of timber, which was to be conveyed to Buenaventura, on purpose to build a small vessel for the accommodation of Vela Nunnez; who must now be within a short distance of Buenaventura, and had sent this person before to inquire if he might come in safety to that place.

On receiving this intelligence, Hinojosa landed two confidential officers with a party of soldiers, giving them orders to take two several routes into the interior, as pointed out by the informant, on purpose to take Vela Nunnez. Accordingly, one of these officers came up with Vela Nunnez, and the other got hold of Rodrigo Mexia and Saavedra with the son of Gonzalo Pizarro [18]. Both of these parties carried considerable sums of money, which was pillaged by the soldiers of Hinojosa; and the prisoners were brought on board the vessels, where great rejoicings were made for the happy success of this enterprize, by which their acquisition of Panama must be facilitated, and because they had done especial good service to Gonzalo by the liberation of his son.

[Footnote 18: By Garcilasso de la Vega, this son of Gonzalo Pizarro is named Rodrigo Mexia; but Zarate could hardly be mistaken in giving that name to one of his conductors.--E.].

Hinojosa now resumed his voyage, in the course of which he fell in with Rodrigo de Carvajal, who gave him an account of the situation of affairs at Panama, and recommended the propriety of using judicious measures against that place, as it was provided for defence. Hinojosa accordingly appeared before Panama with eleven ships and two hundred and fifty soldiers. At this time there were more than five hundred men in Panama, all tolerably well armed, who were drawn, out under the command of Casaos to oppose the landing of the Pizarrians. But among these there were many merchants and tradesmen, little adapted for war, who hardly knew how to use their weapons, and many of whom were even unable to fire off a musquet. Many among them had no intention of fighting or of opposing the descent of the insurgents of Peru, whose arrival they were disposed to consider as more advantageous than prejudicial. The merchants expected to be able to sell their commodities, and the tradesmen were in hope of procuring profitable employment, each according to his occupation. Besides, the rich merchants had partners or factors who resided in Peru, and had charge of their most valuable effects; and were afraid, if they concurred in opposing Hinojosa, that Gonzalo Pizarro might revenge himself by seizing their goods and maltreating their partners and factors. Those who were principally inclined to oppose the landing of Hinojosa, were Pedro Casaos the governor, Guzman and Yllanez the captains belonging to the viceroy, Arias de Azevedo, Juan Fernandez de Rebollido, Andrew de Arayza, Juan de Zabala, Juan Vendrel, and some other considerable inhabitants of Panama; some from principles of loyalty, others from fear of future evils, lest Hinojosa might act with the same violence as had been done by Bachicao.

Finding himself resisted, Hinojosa landed with two hundred men about two leagues from Panama, towards which place he marched close along the shore, being, protected on one flank by a range of rocks from the attack of cavalry, and on the other by the boats of his squadron armed with some pieces of artillery. Fifty of his soldiers were left on board for the defence of the ships, and orders were given to hang up Vela Nunnez and the other prisoners whenever the enemy were seen to attack him. Casaos marched with all his troops from Panama to meet Hinojosa, with the determination of giving battle: But when the hostile parties were almost within musquet shot and ready to engage, the whole priests and monks of Panama interposed between in procession, having their crucifixes veiled and every other demonstration of mourning, and prevailed on both sides to agree to a truce for that day, that endeavours might be used to bring about an accommodation. For this purpose negotiators were appointed on both sides; Don Balthasar de Castilia, son of the Conde de Gomera, was named by Hinojosa, and Don Pedro de Cabrera on the part of Casaos, and hostages were mutually interchanged.

The deputy of Hinojosa affected to be astonished at the opposition of the governor and inhabitants of Panama, since he not only meant no harm to any one, but had come expressly to repair the injuries which had formerly been done by Bachicao, to purchase such provisions and clothing as they wanted, and to repair their ships; declaring that their only object was to oblige the deposed viceroy to return to Spain, pursuant to the orders of the royal audience, as his continuance in the country occasioned perpetual discord in Peru. But, as the viceroy was not there, Hinojosa intended to make only a short stay in the place, having orders from Gonzalo to offer no injury to any one unless attacked, in which case he must defend himself as he best could. The opposite party alleged that the presence of Hinojosa in warlike guise was sufficient to excite suspicion; since, even allowing the government of Gonzalo in Peru to be legitimate as they pretended, he had no jurisdiction in Panama, and had no right to direct the proceedings of any one at that place. That Bachicao had formerly come among them under pretence of peace, yet had committed all those violences and injuries, which Hinojosa now pretended he was come to repair. After a long conference, it was at length agreed that Hinojosa should be permitted to take up his residence in Panama for thirty days, accompanied by fifty soldiers to serve as a guard for his personal safety; but that the fleet and all the other soldiers of his party should repair to the Pearl Islands, where workmen and all necessaries for the reparation of the ships could be procured; and that at the expiry of these thirty days, Hinojosa and his armament were to return to Peru.

On the conclusion of this convention, which was confirmed by mutual oaths and the interchange of hostages, Hinojosa took up his residence in Panama with a guard of fifty picked men, and hired a house in which he kept open table for every one who pleased to visit him, all of whom he allowed to divert themselves in play or otherwise as they pleased. By this procedure, he gained over most of the soldiers of Yllanez in a few days, and many other idle fellows joined themselves secretly to his party. It was even said that all these men had previously engaged by letter to have gone over to him if he and the governor had come to a battle on the former occasion. Indeed the governor and other principal persons of Panama had been chiefly induced to agree to the present accommodation by distrust of their soldiers, who were all eager for an opportunity of getting to Peru. By the above-mentioned means, Hinojosa soon saw himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, while the captains Yllanez and Guzman were almost deserted by all their men. As they saw likewise that the convention was in other respects ill observed, they secretly withdrew with fifteen men who yet remained, and endeavoured to get to Carthagena. Yllanez was taken soon afterwards by one of Hinojosas officers; on which he entered into the service of Gonzalo Pizarro, and was afterwards engaged on that side in the engagement at Nombre de Dios against Verdugo, to be afterwards related. Hinojosa continued to reside in Panama, where no one dared to oppose him. He increased the number of his troops from day to day, and kept them under excellent discipline, without allowing them to do injury to any of the inhabitants; neither did he intermeddle in any thing whatever except what concerned his troops. At this time Don Pedro de Cabrera and his son-in-law Hernan Mexia de Guzman, who had been banished from Peru by the viceroy, resided in Panama; and these two gentlemen were sent by Hinojosa, with a party of soldiers, to keep possession of the port of Nombre de Dios, which was of great importance to his security, and whence he might receive early intelligence from Spain and other places.

Melchior Verdugo, an inhabitant of the city of Truxillo, was one of the richest men in Peru, being proprietor of the entire province of Caxamarca. On the arrival of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela, Verdugo, who was originally from the same city in Spain, engaged heartily in his service, and continued in his suite at Lima, till the time when the viceroy proposed to dismantle that city and retire to Truxillo. At that period he commanded Verdugo to go before, that he might secure possession of Truxillo, with orders to levy soldiers and provide arms; and Verdugo accordingly embarked all his baggage and effects, intending to have set sail on the very day when the viceroy was imprisoned. As all the vessels at the port of Lima were then detained, Verdugo was unable to proceed; and, as Verdugo was particularly obnoxious to Gonzalo and his partizans, on account of his known attachment to the viceroy, he was one of the twenty-five who were committed to prison by Carvajal on his arrival at Lima, when De Baro and several others were hanged, as formerly related. For a long while afterwards he was in continual danger of being put to death; but at length Gonzalo granted him a pardon, though he still entertained suspicions of his conduct, but had no convenient opportunity of getting rid of him, till the departure of Carvajal against Centeno, when it was proposed by the lieutenant-general to have surprised him while at Truxillo, as formerly mentioned: But having some suspicions of his intention, Verdugo saved himself by flight, and concealed himself among his Indians in the province of Caxamarca.

After Carvajal quitted Truxillo, Verdugo returned to that city; but as he expected Gonzalo might soon become master of that place, and would make him feel the effects of his displeasure, he resolved to abandon the country, yet wished to do it in such a manner as might distress Gonzalo as much as possible. While waiting a favourable opportunity for this, he made every preparation in his power for his intended enterprize, collecting as many men in his service as he possibly could, and employed workmen secretly to construct musquets, iron chains, fetters, and manacles. At this time a vessel arrived from Lima in the harbour of Truxillo, on which Verdugo sent for the master and pilot, under pretence of purchasing some of their commodities; and on their arrival at his house he confined them in a deep dungeon which he had previously prepared. After this, he returned to his chamber, causing his legs to be swathed with bandages, under pretence of certain malignant warts or ulcers to which he was subject, and sat down at one of his windows which looked towards the public square in which the magistrates and principal inhabitants used to assemble every day. When the magistrates came as usual to the square, he requested them to come into his house, as he wished to execute certain deeds in their presence, and the disorder in his legs rendered him unable to go out. Immediately on entering, he caused them to be carried into the dungeon, where they were deprived of their badges of office and put in chains. Leaving them under the guard of six musqueteers, he returned to the window of his chamber, whence he gradually enticed about twenty of the principal citizens into his house, all of whom he put in chains and fetters. He then went out into the city accompanied by a guard of soldiers, and proclaimed the king with much loyal solemnity, making prisoners of all who presumed to oppose him; which were very few, as Gonzalo had carried off most of the inhabitants on his expedition to Quito. Having thus made himself master of the city, and returned to his house, he addressed his prisoners, whom he reviled for having embraced the party of Gonzalo, and declared that he was resolved to withdraw from under the usurpation of the tyrant to join the viceroy, and meant to take along with him all the men and arms he was able to procure. For this purpose, he demanded that all his prisoners should contribute in proportion to their abilities, as it was quite reasonable they should give assistance to the royal cause, having frequently made large contributions to the usurper. He insisted therefore that every one of them should instantly subscribe for such sums as they were able to furnish, all of which were to be paid immediately, as he was otherwise resolved to carry them all along with him as prisoners. Every one of them accordingly agreed to advance such sums of money as they were able to procure, which were all instantly paid.

Having brought this contrivance to a favourable issue, Verdugo made an agreement with the master and pilot of the vessel, and had every thing that could be useful or necessary carried on board. He then carried all his prisoners in irons in carts or waggons to the shore, and embarked with about twenty soldiers, and a considerable sum of money, partly exacted from the inhabitant, partly from the royal funds belonging to the city, and partly, from his own extensive revenues. Leaving his prisoners still in fetters on the carriages, to be liberated as they best might, he set sail along the coast to the northwards. In the course of his voyage he fell in with and captured a vessel belonging to Bachicao, containing a great deal of valuable articles which that officer had acquired by plunder in Tierra Firma, all of which Verdugo divided among his soldiers. He at first inclined to have landed at Buenaventura, on purpose to join the viceroy; but considering the small amount of his force, and the danger of falling in with the fleet of Gonzalo Pizarro, he directed his course for the province of Nicaragua, where he landed and applied to the principal persons there for assistance against the usurper. Finding small encouragement in that quarter, he addressed himself to the royal audience, which was established on the frontiers of Nicaragua, who promised him protection and aid, and sent for that purpose one of their number, the oydor Ramirez de Alarcon to Nicaragua, with orders to the inhabitants of that city to hold themselves in readiness to march with their arms and horses.

Intelligence was soon received at Panama of the exploit of Verdugo at Truxillo, and his having gone to Nicaragua; and as Hinojosa suspected he might increase his force in that province so as to be enabled to disturb him in the possession of the Tierra Firma, he sent Alfonso Palamino with two ships and an hundred and eighty musqueteers to endeavour to dislodge Verdugo. Palamino easily took possession of the ship belonging to Verdugo; but as the inhabitants of Grenada and Leon, the two principal cities in the province of Nicaragua assembled in arms, under Verdugo and the licentiate Ramirez, to oppose his landing, and were much superior in number to his troops and provided with cavalry, he found himself unable to land with any prospect of success. After waiting some time in vain, he was obliged to sail back to Panama, taking several vessels along with him which he had captured on the coast, and burning several others which he could not carry away.

On the departure of Palomino, Verdugo levied about an hundred well armed men, with whom he resolved to give as much interruption as possible to the schemes of the insurgents in the Tierra Firma. With this view he determined to make an attempt on Nombre de Dios, which he learnt was occupied only by a small detachment, which had no suspicion of being attacked. For this purpose, he fitted out three or four small vessels, in which he embarked his troops on the lake of Nicaragua, whence he descended into the gulf of Mexico by the river Chagre, which discharges the waters of that lake into the Atlantic. Finding some trading vessels at the mouth of that river, he received accurate information from their commanders of the state of affairs in Nombre de Dios, the number of the soldiers which occupied that place, and the different quarters in which they were lodged. Taking some of these mariners along with him as guides, he contrived to arrive at Nombre de Dios undiscovered about midnight, and went immediately to the house of Juan de Zabala, in which the captains Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia were quartered with some soldiers; who, roused by the noise, put themselves in a state of defence. Verdugo and his people set the house on fire, so that Mexia and his soldiers, who defended the staircase, were constrained to rush from the house to save themselves from the flames; and as the night was exceedingly dark, they escaped unseen, and saved themselves in the woods near Nombre de Dios, whence they escaped across the isthmus to Panama.

Hinojosa was much chagrined at this exploit, and determined on revenge; but as he wished to give his conduct on the occasion some appearance of justice, he directed some of the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to enter a regular accusation before the Doctor Ribera, the governor of that place, giving an exaggerated account of the insolent invasion of his government by Verdugo, who without any just pretence, had levied contributions, imprisoned the magistrates, and invaded the town of Nombre de Dios on his own private authority. They were likewise instructed to request Ribera to march in person to chastise the insolence of Verdugo, and Hinojosa offered to accompany him on this expedition with his troops. Ribera, who appears to have been then resident in Panama, agreed to all that was desired, and, accepted the proffered military aid to drive Verdugo from his government; on which Hinojosa and his officers swore to obey his orders as their commander on this expedition, and the troops were put in motion to march across the isthmus. On receiving notice of the approach of Hinojosa, Verdugo disposed his troops to defend the place, and caused the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to take up arms, in addition to his own men. But as it was obvious that the inhabitants shewed no inclination for fighting, Verdugo suspected they might abandon him while engaged, and came therefore to the resolution of abandoning the town, and took post on the shore near his small barks. He waited for Hinojosa in that situation, having some boats in his rear, which he had seized to enable him to secure his retreat in case of necessity. Immediately on his arrival, Hinojosa attacked Verdugo, and several persons were killed at the first brunt. As the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios who were along with Verdugo, observed their governor acting as commander of the adverse party, they withdrew on one side from the engagement into an adjoining wood; by which the soldiers belonging to Verdugo were thrown into disorder, and they were forced to take to their boats and retreat on board their barks.

After this repulse, Verdugo took possession of several ships that lay at anchor near Nombre de Dios, the largest of which he armed with some pieces of artillery and endeavoured to cannonade the town. But finding that he could do very little injury to the place, which was situated in a bottom, and as he was in want of provisions, and most of his soldiers had been left on shore, he retired with his small vessels and the ship he had seized to Carthagena, to await a more favourable opportunity of annoying the insurgents. Having restored Nombre de Dios to order, Ribera and Hinojosa left a sufficient garrison in the place, under the command of Don Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia, and returned to Panama, where they proposed to wait for such orders as might be sent from Spain respecting the troubles in Peru.

On arriving at Popayan, as formerly related, the viceroy collected all the iron which could be procured in the province, erected forges, and procured workmen, so that in a short time he got two hundred musquets constructed, besides other arms both offensive and defensive, and provided every other species of warlike stores. Learning that the governor, Benalcazar, had detached a brave and experienced officer, named Juan Cabrera, to reduce some refractory Indians, with an hundred and fifty soldiers; the viceroy wrote a letter to Cabrera, in which he gave a detailed account of the insurrection and usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, and of his own determination to restore the kingdom of Peru to allegiance whenever he could collect a sufficient number of troops for that purpose. He earnestly intreated therefore, that Cabrera would immediately join him at Popayan with all his men, that they might commence their march together for Quito, to punish the rebellious usurper. To induce compliance, he represented in strong colours to Cabrera, the great and signal service which he had in his power to perform for the sovereign on this occasion; which likewise would be far more advantageous to his own personal interests, than any which could accrue from the expedition in which he was now engaged; as, on the defeat of Pizarro, he would be entitled to partake in the distribution of the lands belonging to Gonzalo and his partizans, and he might depend on being gratified with ample possessions for himself and his followers in the best districts of Peru. Farther to encourage Cabrera, the viceroy informed him of the events which had lately occurred in the south of Peru, where Centeno had erected the royal standard at the head of a respectable force; so that the present conjuncture was extremely favourable for an attack on Gonzalo, who could hardly resist when pressed from both extremities of the kingdom at once; and besides, that the inhabitants of Peru were now quite weary of the tyrannical violence and extortion of Gonzalo, and would doubtless revolt against him on the first favourable opportunity. As an additional inducement to Cabrera to join him, the viceroy sent him an order by which he was authorized to take from the royal coffers at Carthagena, Encelme, Cali, Antiochia, and other places, to the extent of 30,000 pesos for the pay and equipment of his troops; and as Cabrera acted under the orders of Benalcazar, he procured letters to him from that governor by which he was commanded immediately to obey the requisition of the viceroy. On receiving these dispatches, Cabrera immediately secured the funds which he was authorized to take, which he divided among his men, and set out with all possible expedition to join the viceroy at Popayan with an hundred well appointed soldiers. The viceroy had likewise sent orders for reinforcements from the new kingdom of Grenada, the province of Carthagena, and other places, so that his troops daily increased; and having learnt the capture of his brother Vela Nunnez, and the loss of Yllanez and his troops, he had no expectation of procuring any additional reinforcements.

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno, leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his march for the south after a general muster and review of his army. Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer. Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who, having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march, and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under pretence of falling sick.

On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito, satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully were all the passes guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary, Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by means of the Indians called _Cagnares_, a cunning and intelligent race. Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito, Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among which were many of the principal persons in Peru, his soldiers being inured to war, accustomed to hardships and fatigue, and full of confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained. Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy, particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience, and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives, to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause of the insurgents.

On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes, or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder[19]. Learning that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was now Saturday the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse, each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.

[Footnote 19: According to Garcilasso, the army of Gonzalo on this occasion amounted to 700 men, 200 of whom were armed with firelocks, 350 with pikes, and 150 were cavalry. In the History of America, II. 375, the force under the viceroy is only stated at 400; but both in Zarate and Garcilasso the royalists are mentioned as 800 strong.--E.]

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was accompanied by the licentiate Benedict Suarez de Carvajal brother to the commissary Yllan Suarez de Carvajal who had formerly been put to death at Lima in presence of the viceroy. At that former period Benedict was on his journey from Cuzco to Lima, intending to have joined the viceroy against Gonzalo, and had arrived within twenty leagues of Lima when he learnt the murder of his brother, after which he dared not to trust himself in that city until the viceroy had been deposed and sent on board ship. He was afterwards made prisoner by Gonzalo, who was even on the point of putting him to death; but on setting out for Quito, Gonzalo took him into favour. Carvajal now followed him with good will against the viceroy, upon whom he was eager to take signal vengeance for the unmerited death of his brother; and was even followed on this occasion by about thirty of his friends and relations, who formed a separate company under his immediate command.

The viceroy had arrived at a village called Tuza, about twenty leagues from Quito, when he learnt that Gonzalo Pizarro was returned to that city, and was now at the head of about seven hundred men. Believing himself however in sufficient force to attempt the recovery of his authority in Peru, the viceroy communicated this intelligence to his principal officers, whom he commanded to have every thing in readiness for battle. On his arrival at the river within two leagues of Quito, and in presence of the enemy who occupied the slope of a hill on the other side, he determined to endeavour to get into their rear, for which purpose he advanced with his troops by a road in a different direction from that on which the insurgents were posted, expecting to derive great advantages from this measure, as the whole infantry of Gonzalo, which formed his principal force, were posted on the slope of the hill directly in front, and his rear-guard of cavalry could have no suspicion of being liable to attack. The viceroy accordingly began his march on the night of the 15th January, leaving his camp standing with all his Indians and dogs, and with fires burning in many places, to deceive the enemy into a belief that he still remained in the camp. Marching therefore in perfect silence by the road which had been pointed out to him for gaining the rear of the insurgents, he expected to have attained his object before day: But as the road, had not been frequented for a long time, he encountered so many obstructions and difficulties, in consequence of the road being broken up in many places, that when day broke he was still a league from the enemy, by which all hope or opportunity of surprizing them was entirely lost. In this dilemma, he came to the resolution of marching straight upon Quito, in which there were very few to oppose him, and which was in no situation to give any resistance. He was in hopes of finding several loyal subjects in that place, who might have contrived to elude following the usurper to the field, and might now join his army, and he expected to find some arms and military stores left there by Gonzalo. On arriving at Quito, the soldiers of the viceroy learnt that Gonzalo was present with all his troops, which circumstance had hitherto been carefully concealed from their knowledge.

In the morning of the 16th, the scouts of Gonzalo were surprised to hear so little noise in the camp of the viceroy; and having cautiously advanced, they learnt from the Indian followers of the royalist army in what manner the viceroy had passed the insurgents during the night. The scouts therefore made haste to apprize Gonzalo of this event, who learnt soon afterwards by messengers from Quito that the viceroy had taken possession of that city. Gonzalo therefore immediately marched for Quito, determined to give battle to the viceroy without delay; and although the viceroy was perfectly aware of the advantages possessed by Pizarro in the superior discipline and equipment of his troops, he courageously resolved to run the risk of battle, and even to expose himself personally to all its dangers. In this determination, he boldly marched from the city of Quito directly towards the enemy, as if assured of gaining a victory. To Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, who commanded his first company with the royal standard, he assigned the office of lieutenant-general, commanding every one to obey him in that capacity. Cepeda and Bazan led the cavalry, and Ahumada carried the great standard. Sancho Sanchez de Avila, Hernandez Giron, Pedro Heredia, and Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla were captains of infantry, over which Juan de Cabrera commanded as major-general. The viceroy was earnestly requested by all his officers not to engage in the front of battle as he intended, but to take post in the rear with fifteen horsemen, whence he might send succours to wherever they might be required; yet, when the engagement was about to commence, the viceroy rode up to the vanguard, and took his place beside the lieutenant-general, Don Alfonzo, in front of the royal standard. On this occasion the viceroy was mounted on a grey horse, dressed in an upper garment of white muslin, with large slashes, shewing an under vest of crimson satin fringed with gold. Just before beginning the engagement, he addressed his troops to the following effect: "I do not pretend, my loyal friends, to encourage you by my words and example, as I rather look for an example of bravery from your courageous efforts, and am fully convinced you will do your duty as brave and faithful subjects of our gracious sovereign. Knowing therefore your inviolable fidelity to the king our common master, I have only to say that we are engaged in the cause of God." These last words he repeated several times, exclaiming, "It is the cause of God! It is the cause of God!"

After this short exhortation, the viceroy with Don Alfonzo and Bazan advanced to the charge, being opposed on the other side by the licentiate Carvajal. Gonzalo Pizarro had likewise intended to have taken post in the front of battle, but his officers insisted upon his remaining in the rear with eight or ten horsemen. In the first charge the cavalry shivered their lances, after which they continued to fight obstinately with swords, battle-axes and war-clubs or maces. In this part of the battle the cavalry of the viceroy were much galled by a line of musqueteers of the adverse army which plied them in flank. While fighting bravely, the viceroy beat down one of the insurgents named Montalva; but immediately afterwards received so severe a blow on the head with a battle-axe from Ferdinand de Torres, that he fell stunned from his horse. Indeed, both he and his horse had been so excessively fatigued by the difficult march of the preceding night, in which they had neither been able to take food or rest, that they were both easily overthrown. While this was passing with the cavalry of the van, the infantry on both sides advanced to engage, setting up such loud shouts, that one would have believed them much more numerous than they were in reality. Juan de Cabrera was slain at the very commencement of this part of the battle. Sancho de Avilla, advanced boldly at the head of his company to attack the enemy, brandishing a two-handed sword, which he employed with so much strength and address that he soon broke through and defeated half of the company by which he was opposed. But as the soldiers of Pizarro were more numerous in this part of the field than those who followed Avilla, he was surrounded on all sides, and he and most of his men slain. Until the death of the viceroy was known, the battle was very bravely contested by his infantry; but as soon as the knowledge of that unfortunate event had spread through their ranks, they lost heart and relaxed in their efforts, and were soon entirely defeated with considerable slaughter. At this time, the licentiate Carvajal observed Pedro de Puelles about to end the life of the unfortunate viceroy, already insensible and almost dead in consequence of the blow he had received from De Torres and a wound from a musquet ball: Carvajal immediately dismounted and cut off his head, saying, "That his only object in joining the party of Gonzalo was to take vengeance for the death of his brother."

When the victory was completely decided, Gonzalo Pizarro ordered a retreat to be sounded to recal his troops who were engaged in pursuit of the enemy. In this battle, the royalists lost about two hundred men, while only seven were slain on the side of the victors. Pizarro ordered the slain to be buried on the field of battle, and caused the bodies of the viceroy and Sancho de Avilla to be carried to Quito, where they were buried with much solemn pomp, attending himself at the funeral and in mourning[20]. He soon afterwards ordered ten or twelve of the principal royalists to be hanged, who had taken shelter in the churches of Quito, or had concealed themselves in other places. The oydor Alvarez, Benalcazar governor of Popayan, and Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, were wounded and made prisoners in the battle. Gonzalo intended to have ordered Don Alfonzo to be beheaded; but as he had many friends among the insurgents who interceded for his life, and who assured Gonzalo that he could not possibly recover from his wounds, he was spared. Some time afterwards, Gomez de Alvarado sent notice to Benalcazar that it was intended to administer poison to these three prisoners in the dressings applied to their wounds or in their food; and accordingly he and Don Alfonzo took great precautions to avoid this treachery. As the oydor Alvarez was lodged in the same house with his brother judge Cepeda, he had not in his power to use similar precautions, and died soon after; and every one believed that he was poisoned in some almond soup.

[Footnote 20: This authentic circumstance by no means agrees with the assertion in the History of America, II. 376, that the head of the viceroy was affixed on the public gibbet in Quito. From the text of Zarate, this battle appears to have been fought on the 16th January 1546. In the History of America, it is dated on the 18th; but the difference is quite immaterial.--E.]