Chapter VII: Section V

_Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order._

At this period, some of Gonzalo's adherents advised him to send his fleet to scour the coasts of Nicaragua and New Spain, on purpose to take or burn all the vessels which might be found in these parts, by which he would effectually secure himself from any attack by sea. By this means, they alleged, when the dispatches and orders from his majesty should arrive in the Tierra Firma, finding no means of sending these into Peru, the ministers of the crown would be under the necessity of granting him favourable terms of accommodation almost equal to his wishes. Pizarro however had great confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Hinojosa and those who were with him, believing that he might trust implicitly to their vigilance, and refused to follow the measures proposed, as tending to evince too much weakness and want of confidence in the goodness of the cause in which he was engaged. He was besides so puffed up by the victory which he had gained over the viceroy, that he believed himself able to resist any power which could now be brought against him.

Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that judge and his brother Blas Soto[21]. Still however this judge retained every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some measure reconciled to the usurper.

[Footnote 21: Of this brother of the Pizarro family, no other notice occurs in Zarate.--E.]

While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms, marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno retired a short space to the other side of the city, taking post on the side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took possession of the _tambo_ of Paria, about a league from the camp of Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal, to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.

Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched battle, and meaning rather to harass the enemy by means of skirmishes and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon. Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty horsemen to assault the camp of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles; and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.

Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march, towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo[22] Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners. Finding his force daily diminishing, Centeno complained loudly of his officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to endeavour to procure a ship somewhere on the coast, which he was to bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival[23]. Ribadeneyra fell in with a ship on the coast which was ready to sail for Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for his purpose.

[Footnote 22: The Callao is a district at the north end of the great lake of Titicaca. Paria and Hayohayo are two towns on the east side of the Rio Desaguadero, which flows from the south into the lake of Titicaca.--E.]

[Footnote 23: Arequipa is not less than twenty-five miles from the nearest coast, at which place there is a bay or port named La Guata.--E.]

"In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to pass a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pass, he was confident of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with directions to assail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled, to get beyond the pass in safety. The ambush accordingly remained concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past; after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed multitude of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this unexpected assault, Carvajal continued his march for some time, believing it only a false alarm. The six horsemen therefore continued their assault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the assault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno, and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six horsemen belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal, they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape across the dangerous pass, and even gained considerably in the retreat, as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats, accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno[24]."

[Footnote 24: This paragraph, marked by inverted commas, is inserted from Garcilasso de la Vega in the text, as too long for a note.--E.]

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at Arequipa, and in less than two days Carvajal arrived there in pursuit. As the vessel procured by Ribadeneyra was not come to that part of the coast, and Centeno had not even received notice of its capture, he determined to dismiss his followers, now reduced to eighty men, that they might endeavour to escape separately, being utterly unable to make head against the enemy who was fast approaching. Centeno, accompanied only by two friends, withdrew, into the mountains, where he remained concealed in a cave till the arrival of the licentiate Gasca, being all the time supplied with provisions by a friendly cacique. On arriving at the coast of Arequipa, Carvajal was informed that Centeno and his people were dispersed; and hearing that Lope de Mendoza was at no great distance with eight or ten of the royalists, he detached one of his officers with twenty mounted musqueteers in pursuit. Mendoza however fled with so much diligence, that although followed for more than eighty leagues, his pursuers were unable to overtake him, and were at last obliged to return. Mendoza continued his retreat beyond the ridge of the Andes, into the eastern plain of the Rio Plata, where we must leave him for the present to continue the narrative of events in Peru.

Soon after the arrival of Carvajal in Arequipa, the ship which, had been seized by Ribadeneyra appeared on the coast, and Carvajal was informed by some of the soldiers of Centeno who remained at Arequipa of the intention of this vessel, and of the signal which had been agreed, upon between Centeno and Ribadeneyra. Wishing to gain possession of the vessel, Carvajal concealed twenty musqueteers near the coast, and made the appointed signal. Ribadeneyra at first believed that the signal was made by order of Centeno and sent the boat on shore; but having some suspicions of the actual state of affairs, he directed the people in the boat to be extremely cautious against surprize before venturing on shore. They accordingly, refused to land, unless Centeno himself made his appearance; and as this of course could not be complied with, they returned to the ship, with which Ribadeneyra immediately set sail for Nicaragua. As no part of the late force under Centeno remained in the field, Carvajal resolved to take up his residence for some time in the city of La Plata, as he was informed that Centeno and his friends had concealed a large quantity of treasure at that place, and that he might both endeavour to discover that deposit, and might draw as large a sum as possible from the rich mines in that neighbourhood. Carvajal was willing to communicate to Gonzalo a portion of the wealth he expected to acquire in that district, for defraying the expences of the war; but he proposed especially to enrich himself on this occasion, being exceedingly covetous, as has been already remarked. He accordingly went to La Plata, which submitted without resistance, and remained there for a considerable time amassing wealth, till obliged to take the field against Mendoza.

Lope de Mendoza, as already mentioned, made his escape from Arequipa with a small number of followers, and was pursued for a long way. He for some time followed the line of the coast, and after he had eluded the pursuit of the party sent after him by Carvajal, he and his companions resolved so endeavour to penetrate into the government of Diego de Roias on the Rio Plata, as all the country of Peru had universally submitted to the domination of Gonzalo. For this purpose Mendoza followed the same route which Centeno had formerly taken when retreating from Alfonso de Toro; both because he thought his enemies would not pursue him by that road and because the Indians belonging to Centeno and himself dwelt in that part of the country, and he expected to procure provisions and other assistance from them. While travelling across these deserts, Mendoza met with Gabriel Bermudez, who had accompanied Diego de Roias on his expedition into the country on the Rio Plata. From this person Mendoza was informed of the events which had occurred to the expedition under De Roias, of which the following is an abstract:

Diego de Roias, Philip Gutierrez and Pedro de Heredia, who went upon this expedition, had to fight their way among hostile Indians, in the course of which De Roias was slain. After his death, violent disputes arose between Francisco de Mendoza who succeeded in the command and the other officers engaged in the expedition, in the course of which Gutierrez was cashiered and banished. They continued after this to prosecute their discoveries all the way to the Rio Plata, receiving information that great riches were to be found in some districts in the neighbourhood, in which there were certain Spaniards who had penetrated into the country by ascending the Rio Plata from the Atlantic, and had formed establishments in the interior. In prosecuting the exploration, of that great river, they had fallen in with some forts which were built by Sebastian Gabota; and reported many other surprizing and wonderful things which they had seen in that country. In the course of their proceedings, Francisco de Mendoza was assassinated by Pedro Heredia, owing to which violent disputes had taken place among them, by which and the smallness of their force they had been rendered unable to proceed in conquering the country, so that at length they had come to the resolution of returning into Peru, that his majesty or the viceroy of that kingdom might nominate a new commander. They were likewise persuaded, when the riches of the country in which they had been came to be known, that they would be able to procure a considerable accession of new adventurers, so as to enable them to atchieve the conquest.

In the course of their expedition they asserted that they had penetrated six hundred leagues to the eastwards of La Plata, through a champaign country of very easy access, and tolerably abounding in provisions and water. Bermudez added, that within a very few days they had learnt, from some Indians who occasionally traded into the province of Las Charcas, of the revolt which had taken place in Peru, but had been unable to procure information respecting the causes of this insurrection or as to who were chiefly engaged in it; for which reason he had been sent on before to inquire into these circumstances, and had received orders from the captains and other principal persons in the expedition, to offer their services to the party that acted for the royal interests, in which cause they might be of material importance, as they had a considerable number of excellent horses and plenty of arms. After the conclusion of this narrative, Mendoza gave Bermudez an account of all the late events in Peru; on which, in, virtue of the commission with which he had been entrusted, Bermudez promised in the name of all his companions to march against the lieutenant-general.

Lope Mendoza and Bermudez went after this to meet the troops which were returning from the Rio Plata, which were at no great distance. When they were informed of the situation of affairs in Peru, they received Lope with every demonstration of respect, and confirmed the offers of assistance which Bermudez had already made in their name, declaring their resolution to devote themselves heartily to the service of the king. Lope de Mendoza gave them hearty commendations for their loyalty, and represented to them how honourable and praiseworthy it was to exert their utmost endeavours in the cause of their lawful sovereign; assuring them that they might all depend upon being amply provided for, when the country was restored to obedience. Lope de Mendoza was unanimously received as their chief, and conducted them to the village of Pocona, about forty leagues to the north-east of La Plata; whence he sent some confidential persons to certain secret places where he and Centeno had hidden above a thousand marks of silver under ground. On recovering this treasure, he proposed to divide it among those persons who had so nobly offered to follow his orders; but most of them refused his preferred bounty, either because they were already sufficiently rich, or because hitherto the soldiers who had been engaged in the wars of Peru had been unused to any regular pay, and only accepted money to answer their immediate wants, and to provide themselves with horses and arms. Even the lowest soldier, in those days expected, when the enterprizes of their leaders succeeded, to be rewarded for his services in repartitions or advantageous establishments in the country, by which they flattered themselves to acquire riches, so great was the reputation of the richness of Peru. By means of these men from the Rio Plata, Lope Mendoza found himself unexpectedly at the head of an hundred and fifty well mounted cavalry; all excellently armed and equipped for service. It was a great misfortune to the royal cause, that Centeno was now concealed, instead of having retreated into the interior along with Mendoza as he had done formerly; as if he had now been at the head of the royalists, with this important reinforcement, affairs might have taken a better turn than they actually did.

While Carvajal was on his way from Arequipa for the city of La Plata, he received intelligence of the success of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, and that all Peru was entirely reduced under his command. He resolved therefore to repair to La Plata, as formerly mentioned, intending to regulate the affairs of the province of Las Charcas, and to collect treasure. On his arrival however at Paria on his way to La Plata he received intelligence of the arrival of the troops from the Rio Plata and of their junction with Lope Mendoza. Being informed at the same time that these unexpected opponents were by no means united among themselves, and that they marched very carelessly in separate and unconnected detachments, most of which refused to acknowledge any one as their commander, he determined to set out against them with the utmost diligence, that he might fall upon them in their present divided state. Being rejoined by the detachment which had pursued Lope Mendoza, and having put his men in order for a fresh expedition, Carvajal set out from La Plata and marched towards the enemy with the utmost possible speed, encouraging his troops by the assurance of an easy and bloodless victory, even asserting that he had received letters from the principal officers among the enemy in which they offered their services to him, so that they would only have the trouble of marching, without any danger of fighting.

During this march Carvajal was joined by thirty men in addition to his former force, so that he was now at the head of two hundred and fifty men. At length he came in sight of Pocona, which is eighty leagues from Paria, about four o'clock of an afternoon, and made his appearance in good order, on the top of a rising ground within view of Lope de Mendoza, who was then making a distribution of money among such of his new companions as were willing to accept his bounty: Mendoza had already got some intimation of the approach of Carvajal; and as his own force consisted entirely of cavalry, most of whom were persons of some consideration, remarkably well mounted and armed, he drew up his men in good order in a plain at some distance from the village, in which he left the baggage and his money; saying, that he trusted through their bravery to be soon able to recover both, and even to increase their store by that belonging to their enemies. Carvajal immediately descended from the hill he had first taken possession of, and took post in the place which Mendoza had just quitted, which was an inclosare of considerable extent surrounded with walls, in which there were openings in several places. Carvajal chose this as a convenient post for the night, in which the enemy would not be able to attack with their cavalry. On learning that Lope de Mendoza and his men had left their baggage in the town of Pocona, the troops of Carvajal immediately quitted their ranks to go in search of plunder, insomuch that Carvajal was left in his camp with hardly eight men. If Mendoza had availed himself of this opportunity to attack Carvajal, he might have gained an easy victory, and might have boasted of having left his baggage exposed to plunder as a stratagem of war, which on similar occasions had often been the cause of signal victories. On purpose to recall his troops to their duty, Carvajal ordered a false alarm to be sounded, which occasioned the return of the greater part of his men; but so strong was their avidity for spoil that most part of the night was spent before they all returned to the camp.

At this time there was a secret conspiracy entered into by many of Carvajal's followers, with the intention of putting him to death out of revenge for his harsh and tyrannical conduct towards them, and one Pedro de Avendano, his secretary, in whom he reposed entire confidence was the principal ringleader of the conspirators. To facilitate the execution of this enterprize, Avendano, sent a message by a clever fellow of an Indian to give Mendoza notice of the intentions of the conspirators, and to request he would make an attack upon Carvajal's camp in the course of the night, in the confusion attendant upon which he and the other conspirators might have an opportunity of executing their intended plot. Mendoza had previously determined upon withdrawing about four or five leagues from Pocona, to a level plain in which his cavalry would be able to act with much advantage. But on receiving the message of Avendano, he ordered his men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the camp of Carvajal at the going down of the moon, preferring the obscurity of night in order to avoid the danger of the more numerous firearms of the enemy. At that time he advanced in good order towards the enemy, sending some scouts in advance, who made prisoner of one of Carvajal's soldiers. After interrogating this man, they advanced to the openings of the wall which surrounded the camp, which they found guarded by some musqueteers and pikemen. Mendoza made a brisk attack, but was bravely resisted by the enemy, and so great was the confusion and noise that it was impossible to enter upon any parley, as no one could be heard by reason of the continual firing and the shouts of the combatants.

Immediately on the alarm, Carvajal used his utmost efforts to get his troops into order and to animate and encourage them to exert themselves against the enemy. At this period, Avendano pointed out Carvajal to a musqueteer who was one of the conspirators, and encouraged him to take a steady aim at the lieutenant-general; but owing to the darkness, the shot missed of its intended effect; and only wounded him in one of his thighs. Finding himself wounded, and being satisfied it had been done by one of his own people, Carvajal deemed it prudent to conceal the circumstance for the present; and retired along with Avendano, of whose fidelity he had no suspicion, on purpose to disguise himself in an old brown coat-and a shabby hat, that he might not be conspicuous, after which he returned to animate his men to defend the camp. Avendano again pointed him out to another conspirator, who fired a second time at Carvajal, but entirely missed his aim. In the meantime the assailants frequently called out to know if Carvajal were dead; but receiving no answer, and finding that all the avenues to the camp were bravely defended, Lope de Mendoza drew off his men. In this night engagement about fourteen were slain on both sides, and several wounded. Carvajal got his wound secretly dressed, so that none of his people knew that such a thing had happened.

After the cessation of the engagement, one Placentia deserted from Carvajal's camp, and informed Mendoza that all the baggage belonging to Carvajal and his troops had been left at a place which he described about five or six leagues from Pocona, among which was a large quantity of gold and silver, several horses, and some musquets and powder. On this information, Meodoza set off immediately with his troops for that place, guided by the deserter; and marching diligently all the remainder of the night, he arrived quite unexpectedly at the place where Carvajal had secured his baggage; but as the night was exceedingly dark, above seventy of his men lost their way and fell behind. Yet, with such of his people as had kept up with him, Mendoza took possession of the whole without any resistance. After this, being sensible that he was not in sufficient force to cope with Carvajal, Mendoza resolved to retreat by way of the desert in which Centeno had formerly taken shelter, which he did accordingly with about fifty men, all the rest of his troops having fallen behind during the night, as already mentioned. In the prosecution of this plan of retreat, Mendoza and his people reached a certain river about two leagues and a half from Pocona, where they halted to take some rest and refreshment after the excessive fatigues of the past night. Carvajal was soon apprised of the capture of his baggage and the route which Mendoza had taken, and immediately set off in pursuit with about fifty of his best mounted troops; and, using every possible diligence, he came to the place where Mendoza had halted, about noon of the next day, and immediately attacked the royalists, some of whom were asleep, while others were taking food. Thus unexpectedly assailed, and believing that Carvajal was followed by his whole force, the royalists made a feeble resistance, and very soon took to flight, dispersing themselves in every direction. Lope de Mendoza and Pedro de Heredia, with a good many others, were made prisoners and Carvajal immediately ordered these two chiefs, and six or seven other principal persons among the royalists to be beheaded.

On this occasion Carvajal recovered the whole of his own baggage, and got possession of all that had belonged to the enemy, with all of which and the prisoners he had made, he returned to Pocona, engaging to do no injury to those who had escaped from the soldiers in the late attack, and even restored their horses arms and baggage to his prisoners, most of whom he sent off to join Gonzalo Pizarro. On leaving Pocona, he took Alfonso de Camargo and Luis Pardamo along with him, who had formerly fled along with Mendoza, and whose lives he now spared, as they gave him information respecting a considerable treasure which Centeno had concealed under ground near Paria, and where in fact he discovered above 50,000 crowns. After this, he went with his troops to the city of La Plata, where he proposed to reside for some time. At this place he appointed persons in whom he could confide to the offices of judges and magistrates, and dispatched intelligence of the success of his arms over the whole kingdom of Peru. He remained for some time at La Plata, where he collected treasure from all the surrounding country, under pretence of supplying Gonzalo Pizarro, but in reality he retained much the larger share for himself.

Having thus succeeded, in all his enterprizes and established his authority in the south of Peru on such firm foundations that no opposition remained in the whole country, fortune seemed to determine to exalt him to the summit of his desires by the discovery of the richest mines which had ever been known. Some Indians who belonged to Juan de Villareal, an inhabitant of La Plata, happening to pass over a very high isolated mountain in the middle of a plain, about eighteen leagues from that city, named Potosi, noticed by some indications that it contained mines of silver. They accordingly took away some specimens of the ore for trial, from which they found that the mineral was exceedingly rich in pure silver; insomuch that the poorest of the ore produced eighty marks of pure silver from the quintal of native mineral[25], being a more abundant production than any that ever had been heard of before. When this discovery became known in the city of La Plata, the magistrates went to the mountain of Potosi, which they divided among the inhabitants of their city, setting up boundary marks to distinguish the allotments or each person in those places which appeared eligible for workings. So great was the resort to these new mines, that in a short time there were above seven thousand _Yanaconas_, or Indian labourers, established in the neighbourhood, who were employed by their Christian masters in the various operations of these mines. These men laboured with so much industry, that each Indian, by agreement, furnished two marks or sixteen ounces of silver weekly to their respective masters; and so rich was the mine, that they were able to do this and to retain an equal quantity to themselves[26]. Such is the nature of the ore extracted from the mineral veins of this mountain, that it cannot be reduced in the ordinary manner by means of bellows, as is customary in other places. It is here smelted in certain small furnaces, called _guairas_ by the Indians, which are supplied with a mixed fuel of charcoal and sheeps dung, and are blown up by the wind only, without the use of any mechanical contrivance.

[Footnote 25: This produce is most extraordinarily large, being equal to _four_ parts of pure silver from _ten_ of ore, or 640 ounces of silver from the quintal or 1600 ounces of ore. At the present time, the silver mines in Mexico, which are the most productive of any that have ever been known, are remarkable for the poverty of the mineral they contain. A quintal or 1600 ounces of ore affording only at an average 3 or 4 ounces of pure silver. The profit therefore of these must depend upon the abundance of ore, and the facility with which it is procured and smelted.--E.]

[Footnote 26: The gross amount of this production of silver, on the data in the text, is 11,648,000 ounces yearly; worth, at 5s. 6d. per ounce, L. 3,203,200 sterling; and, estimating silver in those days, at six times its present efficacy, worth L. 19,219,200 of modern value. In the present day before the revolutionary troubles, Humboldt estimates the entire production of gold and silver from Spanish and Portuguese America at L. 9,787,500; only about three times the quantity said to have been at first extracted from Potosi alone, and only about half the effective value.--E.]

These rich mines are known by the name of Potosi, which is that of the district, or province in which the mountain is situated. Owing to the easy labour and great profit experienced by the Indians at these mines, when any of the Yanaconas was once established at this place it was found almost impossible to induce them to leave it or to work elsewhere; and indeed, they were here so entirely concealed from all dangers, and so much exempted from their usual severe drudgery and the unwholesome vapours they had been subjected to in other mines, that they preferred working at Potosi to any other situation. So great was the concourse of inhabitants to Potosi, and the consequent demand for provisions, _that the sack of maize was sold for twenty crowns, the sack of wheat for forty, and a small bag of _coca_ for thirty dollars; and these articles rose afterwards to a higher price. Owing to the astonishing productiveness of these new mines, all the others in that part of Peru were speedily abandoned. Even those of Porco, whence Ferdinand Pizarro had formerly procured great riches, were left unwrought. All the Yanaconas who had been employed in searching for gold in the province of Carabaya, and in the auriferous rivers in different parts of southern Peru, flocked to Potosi, where they were able to make vastly more profit by their labour than in any other place. From various indications, those who are most experienced in mining believe that Potosi will always continue productive and cannot be easily exhausted[27].

[Footnote 27: It has however become very much exhausted, and has been in a great measure abandoned. The mines of Lauricocha, in a different part of Peru, are now in greater estimation. But those of Guanaxuato and Zacatecas in Mexico, notwithstanding the poverty of their ore, have been long the most productive of the American mines.--E.]

Carvajal did not fail to take advantage of this favourable discovery, and immediately set about the acquisition of treasure for himself by every means which his present uncontroulable power afforded. In the first place, he appropriated to his own use all the Yanaconas, or Indian labourers in the mines, which had belonged, to such of the inhabitants as had opposed him, or to those who had died or fled from the province. He likewise appropriated to his own use above 10,000 Peruvian sheep, belonging to the Yanaconas of the crown or to individuals, which were employed in transporting provisions for the miners. By these means, he amassed in a short time near 200,000 crowns, all of which he retained to his own use. His soldiers were so much dissatisfied with his conduct, as he gave them no share of his exactions, that they plotted together against him. Luis Pardamo, Alfonso de Comargo, Diego de Balsameda, and Diego de Luxan, with thirty others, who had entered into this conspiracy, had determined to put him to death about a month after his arrival in La Plata from his expedition against Mendoza; but, owing to some obstacles, they had been induced to deter the execution of their enterprize to a future period. By some unknown means the circumstances of this plot came to the knowledge of Carvajal, who put to death the before-mentioned leaders of the conspiracy, and ten or twelve others, and banished all the rest. By these merciless executions, in which he indulged on all occasions, Carvajal inspired so much terror that no one dared in future to make any similar attempt; as he not only punished in the severest manner all who evinced any intention of revolt, but put people to death on the slightest suspicion. Owing to this the loyal servants of his majesty may assuredly be exculpated from the blame which has been imputed to them, for not putting Carvajal to death: In reality, there were many persons sufficiently anxious to have done so, on purpose to escape from the cruel tyranny under which they groaned in secret; and four or five conspiracies were entered into for the purpose, which were all discovered, and occasioned the destruction of at least fifty individuals. By these means every one was terrified from attempting any thing against him, more especially as he gave high rewards to all who communicated any intelligence of the kind, so that all were forced to temporize and to wait in anxious hope of some favourable opportunity to deliver them from his cruel tyranny. Carvajal continued to remain at La Plata, frequently publishing accounts of the successes of Gonzalo Pizarro, to whom he often sent large remittances; derived from his own resources, from the royal fifths which he appropriated, and from the confiscated estates of those whom he put to death, all of which he seized upon, under pretence of supplying funds for prosecuting the war.

From the 18th of January 1546, the day on which he defeated the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro continued to reside at Quito till the middle of July of that year, accompanied by a force of about five hundred men, occupied in almost continual feastings and revelry. Various reasons were assigned for his long residence in that place; some alleging that it was on purpose to be more at hand for receiving early intelligence from Spain; while others attribute it to the great profits he derived from the gold mines which had been recently discovered in that neighbourhood; and others again alleged that he was detained by attachment to the lady formerly mentioned, whose husband he had procured to be assassinated by Vincente Pablo. That woman was delivered, after the death of her husband, of a child which was put to death by her father; for which inhuman action he was ordered to be hanged by Pedro de Puelles.

During his residence in Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro sent off several detachments of soldiers to different places, giving commissions and instructions to their commanders in his own name as governor of Peru. Among these, the lieutenant Benalcazar was sent back to his former government; having been pardoned and even taken into favour by Gonzalo. A reinforcement was also sent to Pedro de Valdivia who commanded in Chili, under the command of Captain Ulloa, whom he had sent to ask assistance to enable him to continue and maintain his conquests in that country. Other officers and soldiers were sent to other parts, which are unnecessary to be particularized. At length Gonzalo determined to leave Quito, and to establish his residence in Lima; and it has been alleged that he was principally induced to take this step from suspicion of the fidelity of Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant at Lima, who was so much beloved by all the inhabitants of that city as to be almost in condition to have revolted to the royal cause. Gonzalo is said likewise to have been somewhat suspicious of his lieutenant-general Carvajal, being afraid lest he might be so puffed up by the many victories he had gained, and by his immense distance, as to be induced to set up for himself. He accordingly left Quito under the command of Pedro de Puelles, whom he appointed his lieutenant and captain-general in that province, with a force of three hundred men, having great confidence in his attachment ever since he had succoured him when in straits on his march from Cuzco to Lima, and when his army was on the point of abandoning him. He reposed so entirely on Puelles, that he believed, if the king were to send any force against him by the route of the province in which Benalcazar commanded, that Puelles would prevent them from being able to penetrate into Peru.

While on his progress from Quito towards Lima, Gonzalo assumed in everything the deportment and authority of governor of Peru, and was treated in every respect as such by all the inhabitants of the country. He seemed to believe that his authority was so well and firmly established that he had nothing to fear from the attempts of his enemies, and that even the king would be obliged to grant him any terms he might require. All his officers soldiers and dependents obeyed and respected him entirely, as if satisfied that they were always to be subject to his authority, and to depend upon him alone for advancement and reward. In the exercise of his usurped authority, he made many grants or repartitions of lands and Indians, all of them for long periods, which every one considered as secure of being continued. He and his principal officers pretended that they frequently received letters from some of the highest of the nobles in Spain, praising his conduct and approving of every thing he had done, which these pretended letters justified on account of the infringements which had been made on the rights and privileges of the colonists. In these letters likewise, the pretended Spanish grandees were made to engage their favour and credit at court to support his interest and authority with the sovereign. The well informed among the followers of Gonzalo Pizarro saw clearly that these letters were mere fabrications to impose upon the vulgar, and had no foundation whatever in truth.

On his arrival at the city of San Miguel, Gonzalo learned that there were a considerable number of Indians in that neighbourhood who had not been reduced under subjection; for which reason he gave orders to establish a military post in the province of _Garrochamba[28]_, the command of which he conferred on Captain Mercadillo, with a force of an hundred and thirty men, and gave him instructions for completing the conquest of that district, and for dividing the lands and Indians into repartitions like the rest of the country. At this time likewise, he detached Captain Porcel with sixty soldiers to complete the conquest of the Bracamoros. In these proceedings, he wished it to be believed that his sole object was for the advantage of the colony; but his real purpose was to keep his troops on foot and in employ, in case of needing them at a future period for his own defence in support of his usurpation. Before leaving Quito, Gonzalo sent off the licentiate Carvajal by sea with a party of soldiers, in the ships which Juan Alonzo Palomino had brought from Nicaragua after his pursuit of Verdugo. Carvajal was ordered to proceed along the coast towards Lima, and to settle all the maritime towns in his way in good order.

[Footnote 28: No such province or district is now found in the maps of Peru; but it appears to have been on the confines between the northern part of Peru Proper and the southern extremity of Quito, where Valladolid now stands.--E.]

The licentiate Carvajal after executing the before-mentioned orders, came to Truxillo to meet Gonzalo Pizarro, whence they went together to Lima, accompanied by a force of two hundred men. On approaching Lima, there was a diversity of opinions among the followers of Pizarro, respecting the ceremonies with which he should be received into the capital of Peru. Some of his officers were desirous that the magistracy should come out to meet him with a canopy, under which he should make his entry after the manner usually practised with kings. Some even proposed that a breach should be made in the walls, and some of the houses of the city thrown down, so as to make a new entrance on purpose in memory of his victory over the viceroy, as used to be done anciently in Rome for the reception of triumphant generals. In this, as in all other important affairs, Gonzalo was guided by the advice of the licentiate Carvajal, and entered the city on horseback, preceded by all his captains on foot leading their horses by the bridles. On this occasion he was accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, and the bishop of Bogota, who had come into Peru by way of Carthagena on purpose to receive consecration. He was likewise accompanied by Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant-governor of Lima, and by all the magistrates and inhabitants of the city; no one daring to remain at home lest they might be suspected of disaffection. The streets were all ornamented with green herbs and flowers; all the bells of the churches and monasteries were kept ringing; and the cavalcade was preceded by a numerous band of trumpets kettle-drums and other warlike instruments of music. In this pompous manner, Pizarro was conducted in the first place to the great church, and thence to his own residence.

From this time, Gonzalo Pizarro conducted himself with much more pride and haughtiness than formerly, conceiving high ideas of his own importance from these public ceremonials of respect, as usually happens to men of feeble minds on any sudden elevation. He had a guard for his person of eighty halberdiers, besides several horsemen, who acompanied him wherever he went. No person whatever was permitted to be seated in his presence; and there were very few persons whom he designed to honour so far as to return their salute. By these haughty manners, and still more by his frequent disobliging and even abusive manner of speaking, he displeased every one and became universally disliked. It must likewise be mentioned, that the soldiery, to whom he owed everything, became exceedingly discontented with him, as he gave them no pay. All this had a powerful influence on his downfall in the sequel; though for the present every one concealed their real sentiments, waiting for a more favourable opportunity.

* * * * *

"Following Garcilasso de la Vega and other authors, the Historian of America[29] alleges that Gonzalo Pizarro was urged by several of his adherents, and in particular by Carvajal, to assume the sovereignty of Peru; to attach the Spaniards to his interest by liberal grants of lands and Indians, and by the creation of titles of nobility similar to those in Europe; to establish military orders of knighthood, with privileges distinctions and pensions, resembling those in Spain, as gratifications to the officers in his service; and to gain the whole body of natives to his service, by marrying the Coya, or Peruvian princess next in relation to the reigning Inca. Thus at the head of the ancient inhabitants of the country and of the colonists, he might set the power of Spain at defiance, and could easily repel any force that might be sent from Spain to such a distance. These counsellors who urged Pizarro to adopt this plan, insisted that he had already gone too far to expect pardon from the emperor; and endeavoured to convince him that all the founders of great monarchies had risen by their personal merit and their own valour, without any pretensions to ancient lineage or valid rights of sovereignty; and that, besides, his family had a strong title to the dominion of Peru, founded on the rights of discovery and conquest. But the inferior talents of Gonzalo circumscribed his ambition within more narrow bounds, and confined his views to the obtaining a confirmation of the authority which he now possessed from the emperor; for which purpose he sent an officer of distinction to Spain, to give such a representation of his conduct and the state of the country, as might induce the court, from inclination or necessity, to continue him as governor of Peru for life. Although Garcilasso de la Vega gives full warrant for this account of the proposals of the insurgents, Zarate, who was then resident in a public character in Peru, makes no mention of any such plan having been agitated, which could hardly have happened without his knowledge: It is probable therefore that these additional circumstances were invented by the enemies of Gonzalo after his fall, on purpose to blacken his memory by the imputation of even deeper crimes than those he was actually guilty of."--E.

[Footnote 29: History of America, II. 378.]