Chapter XVI: British Freethought in the Eighteenth Century (3)

An interesting instance of liberalizing orthodoxy is furnished
by the Rev. Arthur Ashley Sykes, who contributed many volumes to
the general deistic discussion, some of them anonymously. In the
preface to his Essay on the Truth of the Christian Religion (1732;
2nd ed. enlarged, 1755) Sykes remarks that "since ... systematical
opinions have been received and embraced in such a manner that it
has not been safe to contradict them, the burden of vindicating
Christianity has been very much increased. Its friends have been
much embarrassed through fear of speaking against local truths; and
its adversaries have so successfully attacked those weaknesses that
Christianity itself has been deemed indefensible, when in reality
the follies of Christians alone have been so." Were Christians left
to the simple doctrines of Christ and the Apostles, he contends,
Infidelity could make no converts. And at the close of the book
he writes: "Would to God that Christians would be content with the
plainness and simplicity of the gospel.... That they would not vend
under the name of evangelical truth the absurd and contradictory
schemes of ignorant or wicked men! That they would part with that
load of rubbish which makes thinking men almost sink under the
weight, and gives too great a handle for Infidelity!" Such writing
could not give satisfaction to the ecclesiastical authorities;
and as little could Sykes's remarkable admission (The Principles
and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion, 1740, p. 242):
"When the advantages of revelation are to be specified, I cannot
conceive that it should be maintained as necessary to fix a rule
of morality. For what one principle of morality is there which
the heathen moralists had not asserted or maintained? Before ever
any revelation is offered to mankind they are supposed to be so
well acquainted with moral truths as from them to judge of the
truth of the revelation itself." Again he writes:--

"Nor can revelation be necessary to ascertain religion. For
religion consisting in nothing but doing our duties from a sense
of the being of God, revelation is not necessary to this end,
unless it be said that we cannot know that there is a God, and what
our duties are, without it. Reason will teach us that there is a
God ... that we are to be just and charitable to our neighbours;
that we are to be temperate and sober in ourselves" (id. p. 244).

This is simple Shaftesburyan deism, and all that the apologist
goes on to contend for is that revelation "contains motives and
reasons for the practice of what is right, more and different
from what natural reason without this help can suggest." He seems,
however, to have believed in miracles, though an anonymous Essay
on the Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices (1748) which
is ascribed to him quietly undermines the whole evangelical
doctrine. Throughout, he is remarkable for the amenity of his
tone towards "infidels."

Balguy, a man of less ability, is notably latitudinarian in
his theology. In the very act of criticizing the deists, he
complains of Locke's arbitrariness in deriving morality from the
will of God. Religion, he argues, is so derived, but morality is
inherent in the whole nature of things, and is the same for God
and men. This position, common to the school of Clarke, is at
bottom that of Shaftesbury and the Naturalists. All that Balguy
says for religion is that a doctrine of rewards and punishments
is necessary to stimulate the average moral sense; and that the
Christian story of the condescension of Omnipotence in coming to
earth and suffering misery for man's sake ought to overwhelm the
imagination! (See A Letter to a Deist, 2nd ed. 1730, pp. 5, 14,
15, 31; Foundation of Moral Goodness, pt. ii, 1729, p. 41 sq.)

The next intellectual step in natural course would have been a revision of the deistic assumptions, insofar, that is, as certain positive assumptions were common to the deists. But, as we have seen, certain fresh issues were raised as among the deists themselves. In addition to those above noted, there was the profoundly important one as to ethics. Shaftesbury, who rejected the religious basis, held a creed of optimism; and this optimism was assailed by Mandeville, who in consequence was opposed as warmly by the deist Hutcheson and others as by Law and Berkeley. To grapple with this problem, and with the underlying cosmic problem, there was needed at least as much general mental activity as went to the antecedent discussion; and the main activity of the nation was now being otherwise directed. The negative process, the impeachment of Christian supernaturalism, had been accomplished so far as the current arguments went. Toland and Collins had fought the battle of free discussion, forcing ratiocination on the Church; Collins had shaken the creed of prophecy; Shaftesbury had impugned the religious conception of morals; and Mandeville had done so more profoundly, laying the foundations of scientific utilitarianism. [869] So effective had been the utilitarian propaganda in general that the orthodox Brown (author of the once famous Estimate of the life of his countrymen), in his criticism of Shaftesbury (1751), wrote as a pure utilitarian against an inconsistent one, and defended Christianity on strictly utilitarian lines. Woolston, following up Collins, had shaken the faith in New Testament miracles; Middleton had done it afresh with all the decorum that Woolston lacked; and Hume had laid down with masterly clearness the philosophic principle which rebuts all attempts to prove miracles as such. [870] Tindal had clinched the case for "natural" theism as against revelationism; and the later deists, notably Morgan, had to some extent combined these results. [871] This literature was generally distributed; and so far the case had been thrashed out.

§ 13

To carry intellectual progress much further there was needed a general movement of scientific study and a reform in education. The translation of La Mettrie's Man a Machine (1749) [872] found a public no better prepared for the problems he raised than that addressed by Strutt eighteen years before; and the reply of Luzac, Man More than a Machine, in the preface to which the translator (1752) declared that "irreligion and infidelity overspread the land," probably satisfied what appetite there was for such a discussion. There had begun a change in the prevailing mental life, a diversion of interest from ideas as such to political and mercantile interests. The middle and latter part of the eighteenth century is the period of the rise of (1) the new machine industries, and (2) the new imperialistic policy of Chatham. [873] Both alike withdrew men from problems of mere belief, whether theological or scientific. [874] That the reaction was not one of mere fatigue over deism we have already seen. It was a general diversion of energy, analogous to what had previously taken place in France in the reign of Louis XIV. As the poet Gray, himself orthodox, put the case in 1754, "the mode of freethinking has given place to the mode of not thinking at all." [875] In Hume's opinion the general pitch of national intelligence south of the Tweed was lowered. [876] This state of things of course was favourable to religious revival; but what took place was rather a new growth of emotional pietism in the new industrial masses (the population being now on a rapid increase), under the ministry of the Wesleys and Whitefield, and a further growth of similar religion in the new provincial middle-class that grew up on the industrial basis. The universities all the while were at the lowest ebb of culture, but officially rabid against philosophic freethinking. [877]

It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that all this meant a dying out of deism among the educated classes. The statement of Goldsmith, about 1760, that deists in general "have been driven into a confession of the necessity of revelation, or an open avowal of atheism," [878] is not to be taken seriously. Goldsmith, whose own orthodoxy is very doubtful, had a whimsical theory that skepticism, though it might not injure morals, has a "manifest tendency to subvert the literary merits" of any country; [879] and argued accordingly. Deism, remaining fashionable, did but fall partly into the background of living interests, the more concrete issues of politics and the new imaginative literature occupying the foreground. It was early in the reign of George III that Sir William Blackstone, having had the curiosity to listen in succession to the preaching of every clergyman in London, "did not hear a single discourse which had more Christianity in it than the writings of Cicero," and declared that it would have been impossible for him to discover from what he heard whether the preacher were a follower of Confucius, of Mahomet, or of Christ. [880] When the Church was thus deistic, the educated laity can have been no less so. The literary status of deism after 1750 was really higher than ever. It was now represented by Hume; by Adam Smith (Moral Sentiments, 1759); by the scholarship of Conyers Middleton; and by the posthumous works (1752-54) of Lord Bolingbroke, who, albeit more of a debater than a thinker, debated often with masterly skill, in a style unmatched for harmony and energetic grace, which had already won him a great literary prestige, though the visible insincerity of his character, and the habit of browbeating, always countervailed his charm. His influence, commonly belittled, was much greater than writers like Johnson would admit; and it went deep. Voltaire, who had been his intimate, tells [881] that he had known some young pupils of Bolingbroke who altogether denied the historic actuality of the Gospel Jesus--a stretch of criticism beyond the assimilative power of that age.

His motive to write for posthumous publication, however, seems rather to have been the venting of his tumultuous feelings than any philosophic purpose. An overweening deist, he is yet at much pains to disparage the à priori argument for deism, bestowing some of his most violent epithets on Dr. Samuel Clarke, who seems to have exasperated him in politics. But his castigation of "divines" is tolerably impartial on that side; and he is largely concerned to deprive them of grounds for their functions, though he finally insists that churches are necessary for purposes of public moral teaching. His own teachings represent an effort to rationalize deism. The God whom he affirms is to be conceived or described only as omnipotent and omniscient (or all-wise), not as good or benevolent any more than as vindictive. Thus he had assimilated part of the Spinozistic and the atheistic case against anthropomorphism, while still using anthropomorphic language on the score that "we must speak of God after the manner of men." Beyond this point he compromises to the extent of denying special while admitting collective or social providences; though he is positive in his denial of the actuality or the moral need of a future state. As to morals he takes the ordinary deistic line, putting the innate "law of nature" as the sufficient and only revelation by the deity to his creatures. On the basis of that inner testimony he rejects the Old Testament as utterly unworthy of deity, but endorses the universal morality found in the gospels, while rejecting their theology. It was very much the deism of Voltaire, save that it made more concessions to anti-theistic logic.

The weak side of Bolingbroke's polemic was its inconsistency--a flaw deriving from his character. In the spirit of a partisan debater he threw out at any point any criticism that appeared for the moment plausible; and, having no scientific basis or saving rectitude, would elsewhere take up another and a contradictory position. Careful antagonists could thus discredit him by mere collation of his own utterances. [882] But, the enemy being no more consistent than he, his influence was not seriously affected in the world of ordinary readers; and much of his attack on "divines," on dogmas, and on Old Testament morality must have appealed to many, thus carrying on the discredit of orthodoxy in general. Leland devoted to him an entire volume of his View of the Principal Deistical Writers, and in all bestows more space upon him than on all the others together--a sufficient indication of his vogue.

In his lifetime, however, Bolingbroke had been extremely careful
to avoid compromising himself. Mr. Arthur Hassall, in his
generally excellent monograph on Bolingbroke (Statesmen Series,
1889, p. 226), writes, in answer to the attack of Johnson,
that "Bolingbroke, during his lifetime, had never scrupled to
publish criticisms, remarkable for their freedom, on religious
subjects." I cannot gather to what he refers; and Mr. Walter
Sichel, in his copious biography (2 vols. 1901-1902), indicates no
such publications. The Letters on the Study and Use of History,
which contain (Lett. iii, sect. 2) a skeptical discussion of
the Pentateuch as history, though written in 1735-36, were only
posthumously published, in 1752. The Examen Important de Milord
Bolingbroke, produced by Voltaire in 1767, but dated 1736,
is Voltaire's own work, based on Bolingbroke. In his letter to
Swift of September 12, 1724 (Swift's Works, Scott's ed. 1824,
xvi, 448-49), Bolingbroke angrily repudiates the title of esprit
fort, declaring, in the very temper in which pious posterity has
aspersed himself, that "such are the pests of society, because
they endeavour to loosen the bands of it.... I therefore not
only disown, but I detest, this character." In this letter he
even affects to believe in "the truth of the divine revelation
of Christianity." He began to write his essays, it is true,
before his withdrawal to France in 1735, but with no intention
of speedily publishing them. In his Letter to Mr. Pope (published
with the Letter to Wyndham, 1753), p. 481, he writes: "I have been
a martyr of faction in politics, and have no vocation to be so
in philosophy." Cp. pp. 485-86. It is thus a complete blunder on
the part of Bagehot to say (Literary Studies, Hutton's ed. iii,
137) that Butler's Analogy, published in 1736, was "designed as
a confutation of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke." It is even said
(Warton, Essay on Pope, 4th ed. ii, 294-95) that Pope did not
know Bolingbroke's real opinions; but Pope's untruthfulness was
such as to discredit such a statement. Cp. Bolingbroke's Letter
as cited, p. 521, and his Philosophical Works, 8vo-ed. 1754, ii,
405. It is noteworthy that a volume of controversial sermons
entitled A Preservative against unsettled notions and Want of
Principles in Religion, so entirely stupid in its apologetics as
to be at times positively entertaining, was published in 1715
by Joseph Trapp, M.A., "Chaplain to the Right Honble. The Lord
Viscount Bolingbroke."

In seeking to estimate Bolingbroke's posthumous influence we have
to remember that after the publication of his works the orthodox
members of his own party, who otherwise would have forgiven him
all his vices and insincerities, have held him up to hatred. Scott,
for instance, founding on Bolingbroke's own dishonest denunciation
of freethinkers as men seeking to loosen the bands of society,
pronounced his arrangement for the posthumous issue of his works
"an act of wickedness more purely diabolical than any hitherto upon
record in the history of any age or nation" (Note to Bolingbroke's
letter above cited in Swift's Works, xvi, 450). It would be an
error, on the other hand, to class him among either the great
sociologists or the great philosophers. Mr. Sichel undertakes to
show (vol. ii, ch. x) that Bolingbroke had stimulated Gibbon to a
considerable extent in his treatment of early Christianity. This
is in itself quite probable, and some of the parallels cited are
noteworthy; but Mr. Sichel, who always writes as a panegyrist,
makes no attempt to trace the common French sources for both. He
does show that Voltaire manipulated Bolingbroke's opinions
in reproducing them. But he does not critically recognize the
incoherence of Bolingbroke's eloquent treatises. Mr. Hassall's
summary is nearer the truth; but that in turn does not note how
well fitted was Bolingbroke's swift and graceful declamation to
do its work with the general public, which (if it accepted him
at all) would make small account of self-contradiction.

§ 14

In view of such a reinforcement of its propaganda, deism could not be regarded as in the least degree written down. In 1765, in fact, we find Diderot recounting, on the authority of d'Holbach, who had just returned from a visit to this country, that "the Christian religion is nearly extinct in England. The deists are innumerable; there are almost no atheists; those who are so conceal it. An atheist and a scoundrel are almost synonymous terms for them." [883] Nor did the output of deistic literature end with the posthumous works of Bolingbroke. These were followed by translations of the new writings of Voltaire, [884] who had assimilated the whole propaganda of English deism, and gave it out anew with a wit and brilliancy hitherto unknown in argumentative and critical literature. The freethinking of the third quarter of the century, though kept secondary to more pressing questions, was thus at least as deeply rooted and as convinced as that of the first quarter; and it was probably not much less common among educated men, though new social influences caused it to be more decried.

The hapless Chatterton, fatally precocious, a boy in years and experience of life, a man in understanding at seventeen, incurred posthumous obloquy more for his "infidelity" than for the harmless literary forgeries which reveal his poetic affinity to a less prosaic age. It is a memorable fact that this first recovery of the lost note of imaginative poetry in that "age of prose and reason" is the exploit of a boy whose mind was as independently "freethinking" on current religion as it was original even in its imitative reversion to the poetics of the past. Turning away from the impossible mythicism and mysticism of the Tudor and Stuart literatures, as from the fanaticism of the Puritans, the changing English world after the Restoration had let fall the artistic possession of imaginative feeling and style which was the true glory of the time of Renascence. The ill-strung genius of Chatterton seems to have been the first to reunite the sense of romantic beauty with the spirit of critical reason. He was a convinced deist, avowing in his verse, in his pathetic will (1770), in a late letter, and at times in his talk, that he was "no Christian," and contemning the ethic of Scripture history and the absurdity of literal inspiration. [885] Many there must have been who went as far, with less courage of avowal.

What was lacking to the age, once more, was a social foundation on which it could not only endure but develop. In a nation of which the majority had no intellectual culture, such a foundation could not exist. Green exaggerates [886] when he writes that "schools there were none, save the grammar schools of Edward and Elizabeth"; [887] but by another account only twelve public schools were founded in the long reign of George III; [888] and, as a result of the indifference of two generations, masses of the people "were ignorant and brutal to a degree which it is hard to conceive." [889] A great increase of population had followed on the growth of towns and the development of commerce and manufactures even between 1700 and 1760; [890] and thereafter the multiplication was still more rapid. There was thus a positive fall in the culture standards of the majority of the people. According to Massey, "hardly any tradesman in 1760 had more instruction than qualified him to add up a bill"; and "a labourer, mechanic, or domestic servant who could read or write possessed a rare accomplishment." [891] As for the Charity Schools established between 1700 and 1750, their express object was to rear humble tradesmen and domestics, not to educate in the proper sense of the term.

In the view of life which accepted this state of things the educated deists seem to have shared; at least, there is no record of any agitation by them for betterment. The state of political thought was typified in the struggle over "Wilkes and Liberty," from which cool temperaments like Hume's turned away in contempt; and it is significant that poor men were persecuted for freethinking while the better-placed went free. Jacob Ilive, for denying in a pamphlet (1753) the truth of revelation, was pilloried thrice, and sent to hard labour for three years. In 1754 the Grand Jury of Middlesex "presented" the editor and publisher of Bolingbroke's posthumous works [892]--a distinction that in the previous generation had been bestowed on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees; and in 1761, as before noted, Peter Annet, aged seventy, was pilloried twice and sent to prison for discrediting the Pentateuch; as if that were a more serious offence than his former attacks on the gospels and on St. Paul. The personal influence of George III, further, told everywhere against freethinking; and the revival of penalties would have checked publishing even if there had been no withdrawal of interest to politics.

Yet more or less freethinking treatises did appear at intervals
in addition to the works of the better-known writers, such as
Bolingbroke and Hume, after the period commonly marked as that
of the "decline of deism." In the list may be included a few by
Unitarians, who at this stage were doing critical work. Like
a number of the earlier works above mentioned, the following
(save Evanson) are overlooked in Sir Leslie Stephen's survey:--

1746. Essay on Natural Religion. Falsely attributed to Dryden.
1746. Deism fairly stated and fully vindicated, etc. Anon.
1749. J. G. Cooper, Life of Socrates.
1750. John Dove, A Creed founded on Truth and Common Sense.
1750. The British Oracle. (Two numbers only.)
1752. The Pillars of Priestcraft and Orthodoxy Shaken. Four vols.
of freethinking pamphlets, collected (and some written) by
Thomas Gordon, formerly secretary to Trenchard. Edited by
R. Barron. (Rep. 1768.)
1765. W. Dudgeon, Philosophical Works (reprints of those of 1732,
-4, -7, -9, above mentioned). Privately printed--at
Glasgow?
1772. E. Evanson, The Doctrines of a Trinity and the
Incarnation, etc.
1773. ---- Three Discourses (1. Upon the Man after God's own
Heart; 2. Upon the Faith of Abraham; 3. Upon the Seal of
the Foundation of God).
1777. ---- Letter to Bishop Hurd.
1781. W. Nicholson, The Doubts of the Infidels. (Rep. by R.
Carlile.)
1782. W. Turner, Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a
Philosophical Unbeliever.
1785. Dr. G. Hoggart Toulmin, The Antiquity and Duration of the
World.
1789. ---- The Eternity of the Universe. [893] (Rep. 1825.)
1789. Dr. T. Cooper, Tracts, Ethical, Theological, and Political.
1792. E. Evanson, The Dissonance of the Four Evangelists.
(Rep. 1805.)
1795. Dr. J. A. O'Keefe, On the Progress of the Human
Understanding.
1797. John C. Davies, The Scripturian's Creed. Prosecuted and
imprisoned. (Book rep. 1822 and 1839.)

Of the work here noted a considerable amount was done by Unitarians, Evanson being of that persuasion, though at the time of writing his earlier Unitarian works he was an Anglican vicar. [894] During the first half of the eighteenth century, despite the movement at the end of the seventeenth, specific anti-Trinitarianism was not much in evidence, the deistic controversy holding the foreground. But gradually Unitarianism made fresh headway. One dissenting clergyman, Martin Tomkyns, who had been dismissed by his congregation at Stoke Newington for his "Arian or Unitarian opinions," published in 1722 A Sober Appeal to a Turk or an Indian, concerning the plain sense of the Trinity, in reply to the treatise of Dr. Isaac Watts on The Christian Doctrine of the Trinity. A second edition of Tomkyns's book appeared in 1748, with a further reply to Watts's Dissertations of 1724. The result seems to have been an unsettlement of the orthodoxy of the hymn-writer. There is express testimony from Dr. Lardner, a very trustworthy witness, that Watts in his latter years, "before he was seized with an imbecility of his faculties," was substantially a Unitarian. His special papers on the subject were suppressed by his executors; but the full text of his Solemn Address to the Great and Blessed God goes far to bear out Lardner's express assertion. [895] Other prominent religionists were more outspoken. The most distinguished names associated with the position were those of Lardner and Priestley, of whom the former, trained as a simple "dissenter," avowedly reached his conclusions without much reference to Socinian literature; [896] and the second, who was similarly educated, no less independently gave up the doctrines of the Atonement and the Trinity, passing later from the Arian to the Socinian position after reading Lardner's Letter on the Logos. [897] As Priestley derived his determinism from Collins, [898] it would appear that the deistical movement had set up a general habit of reasoning which thus wrought even on Christians who, like Lardner and Priestley, undertook to rebut the objections of unbelievers to their faith. A generally rationalistic influence is to be noted in the works of the Unitarian Antipædobaptist Dr. Joshua Toulmin, author of lives of Socinus (1777) and Biddle (1789), and many other solid works, including a sermon on "The Injustice of classing Unitarians with Deists and Infidels" (1797). In his case the "classing" was certainly inconvenient. In 1791 the effigy of Paine was burned before his door, and his windows broken. His house was saved by being closely guarded; but his businesses of schoolkeeping and bookselling had to be given up. It thus becomes intelligible how, after a period in which Dissent, contemned by the State Church, learned to criticize that Church's creed, there emerged in England towards the close of the eighteenth century a fresh movement of specific Unitarianism.

Evanson and Toulmin were scholarly writers, though without the large learning of Lardner and the propagandist energy and reputation of Priestley; and the Unitarian movement, in a quiet fashion, made a numerical progress out of all proportion to that of orthodoxy. It owed much of its immunity at this stage, doubtless, to the large element of tacit deism in the Church; and apart from the scholarly work of Lardner both Priestley and Evanson did something for New Testament criticism, as well as towards the clearing-up of Christian origins. Evanson was actually prosecuted in 1773, on local initiative, for a sermon of Unitarian character delivered by him in the parish church of Tewkesbury on Easter-Day of 1771; and, what is much more remarkable, members of his congregation, at a single defence-meeting in an inn, collected £150 to meet his costs. [899] Five years later he had given up the belief in eternal punishment, though continuing to believe in "long protracted" misery for sinners. [900] Still later, after producing his Dissonance, he became uncommonly drastic in his handling of the Canon. He lived well into the nineteenth century, and published in 1805 a vigorous tractate, Second Thoughts on the Trinity, recommended to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Gloucester. In that he treats the First Gospel as a forgery of the second century. The method is indiscriminating, and the author lays much uncritical stress upon prophecy. On the whole, the Unitarian contribution to rational thought, then as later, was secondary or ancillary, though on the side of historical investigation it was important. Lardner's candour is as uncommon as his learning; and Priestley [901] and Evanson have a solvent virtue. [902] In all three the limitation lies in the fixed adherence to the concept of revelation, which withheld them from radical rationalism even as it did from Arianism. Evanson's ultra-orthodox acceptance of the Apocalypse is significant of his limitations; and Priestley's calibre is indicated by his life-long refusal to accept the true scientific inference from his own discovery of oxygen. A more pronounced evolution was that of the Welsh deist David Williams, who, after publishing two volumes of Sermons on Religious Hypocrisy (1774), gave up his post as a dissenting preacher, and, in conjunction with Franklin and other freethinkers, opened a short-lived deistic chapel in Margaret Street, London (1776), where there was used a "Liturgy on the Universal Principles of Religion and Morality." [903]

§ 15

On the other hand, apart from the revival of popular religion under Whitefield and Wesley, which won multitudes of the people whom no higher culture could reach, there was no recovery of educated belief upon intellectual lines; though there was a steady detachment of energy to the new activities of conquest and commerce which mark the second half of the eighteenth century in England. On this state of things supervened the massive performance of the greatest historical writer England had yet produced. Gibbon, educated not by Oxford but by the recent scholarly literature of France, had as a mere boy seen, on reading Bossuet, the theoretic weakness of Protestantism, and had straightway professed Romanism. Shaken as to that by a skilled Swiss Protestant, he speedily became a rationalist pure and simple, with as little of the dregs of deism in him as any writer of his age; and his great work begins, or rather signalizes (since Hume and Robertson preceded him), a new era of historical writing, not merely by its sociological treatment of the rise of Christianity, but by its absolutely anti-theological handling of all things.

The importance of the new approach may be at once measured by the zeal of the opposition. In no case, perhaps, has the essentially passional character of religious resistance to new thought been more vividly shown than in that of the contemporary attacks upon Gibbon's History. There is not to be found in controversial literature such another annihilating rejoinder as was made by Gibbon to the clerical zealots who undertook to confound him on points of scholarship, history, and ratiocination. The contrast between the mostly spiteful incompetence of the attack and the finished mastery of the reply put the faith at a disadvantage from which it never intellectually recovered, though other forces reinstated it socially. By the admission of Macaulay, who thought Gibbon "most unfair" to religion, the whole troup of his assailants are now "utterly forgotten"; and those orthodox commentators who later sought to improve on their criticism have in turn, with a notable uniformity, been rebutted by their successors; till Gibbon's critical section ranks as the first systematically scientific handling of the problem of the rise of Christianity. He can be seen to have profited by all the relevant deistic work done before him, learning alike from Toland, from Middleton, and from Bolingbroke; though his acknowledgments are mostly paid to respectable Protestants and Catholics, as Basnage, Beausobre, Lardner, Mosheim, and Tillemont; and the sheer solidity of the work has sustained it against a hundred years of hostile comment. [904] While Gibbon was thus earning for his country a new literary distinction, the orthodox interest was concerned above all things to convict him of ignorance, incompetence, and dishonesty; and Davis, the one of his assailants who most fully manifested all of these qualities, and who will long be remembered solely from Gibbon's deadly exposure, was rewarded with a royal pension. Another, Apthorp, received an archiepiscopal living; while Chelsum, the one who almost alone wrote against him like a gentleman, got nothing. But no cabal could avail to prevent the instant recognition, at home and abroad, of the advent of a new master in history; and in the worst times of reaction which followed, the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire impassively defied the claims of the ruling creed.

In a literary world which was eagerly reading Gibbon [905] and Voltaire, [906] there was a peculiar absurdity in Burke's famous question (1790) as to "Who now reads Bolingbroke" and the rest of the older deists. [907] The fashionable public was actually reading Bolingbroke even then; [908] and the work of the older deists was being done with new incisiveness and thoroughness by their successors. [909] In the unstudious world of politics, if the readers were few the indifferentists were many. Evanson could truthfully write to Bishop Hurd in 1777 that "That general unbelief of revealed religion among the higher orders of our countrymen, which, however your Lordship and I might differ in our manner of accounting for it, is too notorious for either of us to doubt of, hath, by a necessary consequence, produced in the majority of our present legislators an absolute indifference towards religious questions of every kind." [910] Beside Burke in Parliament, all the while, was the Prime Minister, William Pitt the younger, an agnostic deist.

Whether or not the elder Pitt was a deist, the younger gave
very plain signs of being at least no more. Gladstone (Studies
subsidiary to the Works of Bishop Butler, ed. 1896, pp. 30-33) has
sought to discredit the recorded testimony of Wilberforce (Life of
Wilberforce, 1838, i, 98) that Pitt told him "Bishop Butler's work
raised in his mind more doubts than it had answered." Gladstone
points to another passage in Wilberforce's diary which states that
Pitt "commended Butler's Analogy" (Life, i, 90). But the context
shows that Pitt had commended the book for the express purpose of
turning Wilberforce's mind from its evangelical bias. Wilberforce
was never a deist, and the purpose accordingly could not have
been to make him orthodox. The two testimonies are thus perfectly
consistent; especially when we note the further statement credibly
reported to have been made by Wilberforce (Life, i, 95), that
Pitt later "tried to reason me out of my convictions." We have
yet further the emphatic declaration of Pitt's niece, Lady Hester
Stanhope, that he "never went to church in his life ... never even
talked about religion" (Memoirs of Lady Hester Stanhope, 1845, iii,
166-67). This was said in emphatic denial of the genuineness of
the unctuous death-bed speech put in Pitt's mouth by Gifford. Lady
Hester's high veracity is accredited by her physician (Travels
of Lady Hester Stanhope, 1846, i, pref. p. 11). No such character
can be given to the conventional English biography of the period.

We have further to note the circumstantial account by Wilberforce
in his letter to the Rev. S. Gisborne immediately after Pitt's
death (Correspondence, 1840, ii, 69-70), giving the details he
had had in confidence from the Bishop of Lincoln. They are to
the effect that, after some demur on Pitt's part ("that he was
not worthy to offer up any prayer, or was too weak,") the Bishop
prayed with him once. Wilberforce adds his "fear" that "no further
religious intercourse took place before or after, and I own I
thought what was inserted in the papers impossible to be true."

There is clear testimony that Charles James Fox, Pitt's illustrious rival, was no more of a believer than he, [911] though equally careful to make no profession of unbelief. And it was Fox who, above all the English statesmen of his day, fought the battle of religious toleration [912]--a service which finally puts him above Burke, and atones for many levities of political action.

Among thinking men too the nascent science of geology was setting up a new criticism of "revelation"--this twenty years before the issue of the epoch-making works of Hutton. [913] In England the impulse seems to have come from the writings of the Abbé Langlet du Fresnoy, De Maillet, and Mirabaud, challenging the Biblical account of the antiquity of the earth. The new phase of "infidelity" was of course furiously denounced, one of the most angry and most absurd of its opponents being the poet Cowper. [914] Still rationalism persisted. Paley, writing in 1786, protests that "Infidelity is now served up in every shape that is likely to allure, surprise, or beguile the imagination, in a fable, a tale, a novel, or a poem, in interspersed or broken hints, remote and oblique surmises, in books of travel, of philosophy, of natural history--in a word, in any form rather than that of a professed and regular disquisition." [915] The orthodox Dr. J. Ogilvie, in the introduction to his Inquiry into the Causes of the Infidelity and Skepticism of the Times (1783), begins: "That the opinions of the deists and skeptics have spread more universally during a part of the last century and in the present than at any former æra since the resurrection of letters, is a truth to which the friends and the enemies of religion will give their suffrage without hesitation." In short, until the general reversal of all progress which followed on the French Revolution, there had been no such change of opinion as Burke alleged.

One of the most popular poets and writers of the day was the celebrated Erasmus Darwin, a deist, whose Zoonomia (1794) brought on him the charge of atheism, as it well might. However he might poetize about the Creator, Dr. Darwin in his verse and prose alike laid the foundations of the doctrines of the transmutation of species and the aqueous origin of simple forms of life which evolved into higher forms; though the idea of the descent of man from a simian species had been broached before him by Buffon and Helvétius in France, and Lords Kames and Monboddo in Scotland. The idea of a Natura naturans was indeed ancient; but it has been authoritatively said of Erasmus Darwin that "he was the first who proposed and consistently carried out a well-rounded theory with regard to the development of the living world--a merit which shines forth more brilliantly when we compare it with the vacillating and confused attempts of Buffon, Linnæus, and Goethe. It is the idea of a power working from within the organisms to improve their natural position" [916]--the idea which, developed by Lamarck, was modified by the great Darwin of the nineteenth century into the doctrine of natural selection.

And in the closing years of the century there arose a new promise of higher life in the apparition of Mary Wollstonecraft, ill-starred but noble, whose Letters on Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796) show her to have been a freethinking deist of remarkable original faculty, [917] and whose Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) was the first great plea for the emancipation of her sex.

§ 16

Even in rural Scotland, the vogue of the poetry of Burns told of germinal doubt. To say nothing of his mordant satires on pietistic types--notably Holy Willie's Prayer, his masterpiece in that line--Burns even in his avowed poems [918] shows small regard for orthodox beliefs; and his letters reveal him as substantially a deist, shading into a Unitarian. Such pieces as A Prayer in the prospect of Death, and A Prayer under the pressure of Violent Anguish, are plainly unevangelical; [919] and the allusions to Jesus in his letters, even when writing to Mrs. Maclehose, who desired to bring him to confession, exclude orthodox belief, [920] though they suggest Unitarianism. He frequently refers to religion in his letters, yet so constantly restricts himself to the affirmation of a belief in a benevolent God and in a future state that he cannot be supposed to have held the further beliefs which his orthodox correspondents would wish him to express. A rationalistic habit is shown even in his professions of belief, as here: "Still I am a very sincere believer in the Bible; but I am drawn by the conviction of a man, not the halter of an ass"; [921] and in the passage: "Though I have no objection to what the Christian system tells us of another world, yet I own I am partial to those proofs and ideas of it which we have wrought out of our own heads and hearts." [922] Withal, Burns always claimed to be "religious," and was so even in a somewhat conventional sense. The lines:

An atheist-laugh's a poor exchange
For Deity offended [923]

exhibit a sufficiently commonplace conception of Omnipotence; and there is no sign that the poet ever did any hard thinking on the problem. But, emotionalist of genius as he was, his influence as a satirist and mitigator of the crudities and barbarities of Scots religion has been incalculably great, and underlies all popular culture progress in Scotland since his time. Constantly aspersed in his own day and world as an "infidel," he yet from the first conquered the devotion of the mass of his countrymen; though he would have been more potent for intellectual liberation if he had been by them more intelligently read. Few of them now, probably, realize that their adored poet was either a deist or a Unitarian--presumably the former.

§ 17

With the infelicity in prediction which is so much commoner with him than the "prescience" for which he is praised, Burke had announced that the whole deist school "repose in lasting oblivion." The proposition would be much more true of 999 out of every thousand writers on behalf of Christianity. It is characteristic of Burke, however, that he does not name Shaftesbury, a Whig nobleman of the sacred period. [924] A seeming justice was given to Burke's phrase by the undoubted reaction which took place immediately afterwards. In the vast panic which followed on the French Revolution, the multitude of mediocre minds in the middle and upper classes, formerly deistic or indifferent, took fright at unbelief as something now visibly connected with democracy and regicide; new money endowments were rapidly bestowed on the Church; and orthodoxy became fashionable on political grounds just as skepticism had become fashionable at the Restoration. Class interest and political prejudice wrought much in both cases; only in opposite directions. Democracy was no longer Bibliolatrous, therefore aristocracy was fain to became so, or at least to grow respectful towards the Church as a means of social control. Gibbon, in his closing years, went with the stream. And as religious wars have always tended to discredit religion, so a war partly associated with the freethinking of the French revolutionists tended to discredit freethought. The brutish wrecking of Priestley's house and library and chapel by a mob at Birmingham in 1791 was but an extreme manifestation of a reaction which affected every form of mental life. But while Priestley went to die in the United States, another English exile, temporarily returned thence to his native land, was opening a new era of popular rationalism. Even in the height of the revolutionary tumult, and while Burke was blustering about the disappearance of unbelief, Thomas Paine was laying deep and wide the English foundations of a new democratic freethought; and the upper-class reaction in the nature of the case was doomed to impermanency, though it was to arrest English intellectual progress for over a generation. The French Revolution had re-introduced freethought as a vital issue, even in causing it to be banned as a danger.

That freethought at the end of the century was rather driven
inwards and downwards than expelled is made clear by the multitude
of fresh treatises on Christian evidences. Growing numerous
after 1790, they positively swarm for a generation after Paley
(1794). Cp. Essays on the Evidence and Influence of Christianity,
Bath, 1790, pref.; Andrew Fuller, The Gospel its own Witness,
1799, pref. and concluding address to deists; Watson's sermon
of 1795, in Two Apologies, ed. 1806, p. 399; Priestley's Memoirs
(written in 1795), 1806, pp. 127-28; Wilberforce's Practical View,
1797, passim (e.g., pp. 366-69, 8th ed. 1841); Rev. D. Simpson,
A Plea for Religion ... addressed to the Disciples of Thomas Paine,
1797. The latter writer states (2nd ed. p. 126) that "infidelity is
at this moment running like wildfire among the common people"; and
Fuller (2nd ed. p. 128) speaks of the Monthly Magazine as "pretty
evidently devoted to the cause of infidelity." A pamphlet on The
Rise and Dissolution of the Infidel Societies in this Metropolis
(London, 1800), by W. Hamilton Reid, describes the period as the
first "in which the doctrines of infidelity have been extensively
circulated among the lower orders"; and a Summary of Christian
Evidences, by Bishop Porteous (1800; 16th ed. 1826), affirms,
in agreement with the 1799 Report of the Lords' Committee on
Treasonable Societies, that "new compendiums of infidelity,
and new libels on Christianity, are dispersed continually,
with indefatigable industry, through every part of the kingdom,
and every class of the community." Freethought, in short, was
becoming democratized.

As regards England, Paine is the great popular factor; and it is the bare truth to say that he brought into the old debate a new earnestness and a new moral impetus. The first part of the Age of Reason, hastily put together in expectation of speedy death in 1793, and including some astronomic matter that apparently antedates 1781, [925] is a swift outline of the position of the rationalizing deist, newly conscious of firm standing-ground in astronomic science. That is the special note of Paine's gospel. He was no scholar; and the champions of the "religion of Galilee" have always been prompt to disparage any unlearned person who meddles with religion as an antagonist; but in the second part of his book Paine put hard criticism enough to keep a world of popular readers interested for well over a hundred years. The many replies are forgotten: the Biblical criticism of Paine will continue to do its work till popular orthodoxy follows the lead of professional scholarship and gives up at once the acceptance and the circulation of things incredible and indefensible as sacrosanct.

Mr. Benn (Hist. of Eng. Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, i,
217) remarks that Paine's New Testament criticisms are "such as at
all times would naturally occur to a reader of independent mind and
strong common sense." If so, these had been up to Paine's time,
and remained long afterwards, rare characteristics. And there
is some mistake about Mr. Benn's criticism that "the repeated
charges of fraud and imposture brought against the Apostles and
Evangelists ... jar painfully on a modern ear. But they are
largely due to the mistaken notion, shared by Paine with his
orthodox contemporaries, that the Gospels and Acts were written
by contemporaries and eye-witnesses of the events related." Many
times over, Paine argues that the documents could not have been
so written. E.g. in Conway's ed. of Works, pp. 157, 158, 159,
160, 164, 167, 168, etc. The reiterated proposition is "that the
writers cannot have been eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of what
they relate; ... and consequently that the books have not been
written by the persons called apostles" (p. 168). And there is some
exaggeration even in Mr. Benn's remark that, "strangely enough, he
accepts the Book of Daniel as genuine." Paine (ed. p. 144) merely
puts a balance of probability in favour of the genuineness. It may
be sometimes--it is certainly not always--true that Paine "cannot
distinguish between legendary or [? and] mythical narratives"
(Benn, p. 216); but it is to be feared that the disability subsists
to-day in more scholarly quarters.

Despite his deadly directness, Paine, in virtue of his strong
sincerity, probably jars much less on the modern ear than
he did on that of his own, which was so ready to make felony
of any opinion hostile to reigning prejudices. But if it be
otherwise, it is to be feared that no less offence will be given
by Mr. Benn's own account of the Hexateuch as "the records kept
by a lying and bloodthirsty priesthood"; even if that estimate be
followed by the very challengeable admission that "priesthoods
are generally distinguished for their superior humanity" (Benn,
p. 350, and note).

Henceforth there is a vital difference in the fortunes of freethought and religion alike. Always in the past the institutional strength of religion and the social weakness of freethought had lain in the credulity of the ignorant mass, which had turned to naught an infinity of rational effort. After the French Revolution, when over a large area the critical spirit began simultaneously to play on faith and life, politics and religion, its doubled activity gave it a new breadth of outlook as of energy, and the slow enlightenment of the mass opened up a new promise for the ultimate reign of reason.