Chapter XXIV: Book I (21)

On the 15th of April, 1769, the house decided that by the previous action Wilkes had become ineligible, and that the votes given for him were void and could not be counted, and gave the seat to Luttrell. Subsequently, in 1783, the House of Commons declared the resolution of February 17, 1769, which had asserted the incapacity of an expelled member to be re-elected to the same Parliament, to be subversive of the rights of the electors, and expunged it from the journal. It will be seen from this concise statement of Wilkes’s case that the question was not raised as to the power of the house to expel a member for offenses committed prior to his election; the point decided, and afterward most properly expunged, was that expulsion _per se_ rendered the expelled member legally ineligible, and that votes cast for him could not be counted. Wilkes’s offense was of purely a political character, not involving moral turpitude; he had attacked the ministry in the press, and the proceedings against him in Parliament were then claimed to be a partisan political persecution, subversive of the rights of the people and of the liberty of the press. These proceedings in Wilkes’s case took place during the appearance of the famous Junius letters, and several of them are devoted to the discussion of them. The doctrine that expulsion creates ineligibility was attacked and exposed by him with great force. But he concedes that if the cause of expulsion be one that renders a man unfit and unworthy to be a member, he may be expelled for that cause as often as he shall be elected.

The case of Matteson, in the House of Representatives, has also often been quoted as a precedent for this limitation of jurisdiction. In the proceedings and debates of the House upon that case it will be seen that this was one among many grounds taken in the debate; but as the whole subject was ended by being laid on the table, it is quite impossible to say what was decided by the House. It appeared, however, in that case that the charge against Matteson had become public, and his letter upon which the whole charge rested had been published and circulated through his district during the canvass preceding his election. This fact, we judge, had a most important influence in determining the action of the House in his case.

The committee have no occasion in this report to discuss the question as to the power or duty of the House in a case where a constituency, with a full knowledge of the objectionable character of a man, have selected him to be their Representative. It is hardly a case to be supposed that any constituency, with a full knowledge that a man had been guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude, would elect him. The majority of the committee are not prepared to concede such a man could be forced upon the House, and would not consider the expulsion of such a man any violation of the rights of the electors, for while the electors have rights that should be respected, the House as a body has rights also that should be protected and preserved. But that in such case the judgment of the constituency would be entitled to the greatest consideration, and that this should form an important element in its determination, is readily admitted.

It is universally conceded, as we believe, that the House has ample jurisdiction to punish or expel a member for an offense committed during his term as a member, though committed during a vacation of Congress and in no way connected with his duties as a member. Upon what principle is it that such a jurisdiction can be maintained? It must be upon one or both of the following: that the offense shows him to be an unworthy and improper man to be a member, or that his conduct brings odium and reproach upon the body. But suppose the offense has been committed prior to his election, but comes to light afterward, is the effect upon his own character, or the reproach and disgrace upon the body, if they allow him to remain a member, any the less? We can see no difference in principle in the two cases, and to attempt any would be to create a purely technical and arbitrary distinction, having no just foundation. In our judgment, the time is not at all material, except it be coupled with the further fact that he was re-elected with a knowledge on the part of his constituents of what he had been guilty, and in such event we have given our views of the effect.

It seems to us absurd to say that an election has given a man political absolution for an offense which was unknown to his constituents. If it be urged again, as it has sometimes been, that this view of the power of the House, and the true ground of its proper exercise, may be laid hold of and used improperly, it may be answered that no rule, however narrow and limited, that may be adopted can prevent it. If two-thirds of the House shall see fit to expel a man because they do not like his political or religious principles, or without any reason at all, they have the power, and there is no remedy except by appeal to the people. Such exercise of the power would be wrongful, and violative of the principles of the Constitution, but we see no encouragement of such wrong in the views we hold.

It is the duty of each House to exercise its rightful functions upon appropriate occasions, and to trust that those who come after them will be no less faithful to duty, and no less jealous for the rights of free popular representation than themselves. It will be quite time enough to square other cases with right reason and principle when they arise. Perhaps the best way to prevent them will be to maintain strictly public integrity and public honor in all cases as they present themselves. Nor do we imagine that the people of the United States will charge their servants with invading their privileges when they confine themselves to the preservation of a standard of official integrity which the common instincts of humanity recognize as essential to all social order and good government.

The foregoing are the views which we deem proper to submit upon the general question of the jurisdiction of the House over its members. But apart from these general views, the committee are of opinion that the facts found in the present case amply justify the taking jurisdiction over them, for the following reasons:

The subject-matter upon which the action of members was intended to be influenced was of a continuous character, and was as likely to be a subject of congressional action in future Congresses as in the Fortieth. The influences, brought to bear on members were as likely to be operative upon them in the future as in the present, and were so intended. Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks have both continued members of the House to the present time, and so have most of the members upon whom these influences were sought to be exerted. The committee are, therefore, of opinion that the acts of these men may properly be treated as offenses against the present House, and so within its jurisdiction upon the most limited rule.

Two members of the committee, Messrs. Niblack and McCrary, prefer to express no opinion on the general jurisdictional questions discussed in the report, and rest their judgment wholly on the ground last stated.

In relation to Mr. Ames, he sold to several members of Congress stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth double that amount or more, with, the purpose and intent thereby to influence their votes and decisions upon matters to come before Congress.

The facts found in the report as to Mr. Brooks, show that he used the influence of his official positions as member of Congress and Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to get fifty shires of the stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth three or four times that sum, knowing that it was given to him with intent to influence his votes and decisions in Congress, and his action as a Government director.

The sixth section of the act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. United States, 171, is in the following words:

“If any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise, offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any other valuable thing whatever, to any member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after his election as such member, and either before or after he shall have qualified and taken his seat, or to any officer of the United States, or person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under or in connection with any Department of the Government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after the passage of this act, with intent to influence his vote or decision on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of the United States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit, and shall thereof be convicted, such person or persons so offering, promising, or giving, or causing or procuring to be promised, offered, or given, any such money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or other valuable thing whatever, and the member, officer, or person who shall in anywise accept or receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as for a high crime and misdemeanor in any of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding three times the amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding three years; and the person so convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or any part thereof, if an officer or person holding any such place of trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or place; and any person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”

In the judgment of the committee, the facts reported in regard to Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks would have justified their conviction under the above-recited statute and subjected them to the penalties therein provided.

The committee need not enlarge upon the dangerous character of these offenses. The sense of Congress is shown by the severe penalty denounced by the statute itself. The offenses were not violations of private rights, but were against the very life of a constitutional Government by poisoning the fountain of legislation.

The duty devolved upon the committee has been of a most painful and delicate character. They have performed it to the best of their ability. They have proceeded with the greatest care and deliberation, for while they desired to do their full duty to the House and the country, they were most anxious not to do injustice to any man. In forming their conclusions they have intended to be entirely cool and dispassionate, not to allow themselves to be swerved by any popular fervor on the one hand, or any feeling of personal favor and sympathy on the other.

The committee submit to the House and recommend the adoption of the following resolutions.

“1. Whereas Mr. Oakes Ames, a Representative in this House from the State of Massachusetts, has been guilty of selling to members of Congress shares of stock in the Credit Mobilier of America, for prices much below the true value of such stock, with intent thereby to influence the votes and decisions of such members in matters to be brought before Congress for action: Therefore,

_Resolved_, That Mr. Oakes Ames be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

2. Whereas Mr. James Brooks, a Representative in this House from the State of New York, did procure the Credit Mobilier Company to issue and deliver to Charles H. Neilson, for the use and benefit of said Brooks, fifty shares of the stock of said company, at a price much below its real value, well knowing that the same was so issued and delivered with intent to influence the votes and decisions of said Brooks, as a member of the House, in matters to be brought before Congress for action, and also to influence the action of said Brooks as a Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company: Therefore,

_Resolved_, That Mr. James Brooks be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

The House, after much discussion, modified the propositions of the committee of investigation, and subjected Oakes Ames and James Brooks to the “absolute condemnation of the House.” Both members died within three months thereafter.

The session was full of investigations, but all the others failed to develop any tangible scandals. The Democrats demanded and secured the investigation of the New York custom-house; the United States Treasury; the use of Seneca sandstone; the Chorpenning claim, and the Navy Department, etc. They were, as stated, fruitless.

The “Salary Grab.”

At the same session—1871–’73, acts were passed to abolish the franking privilege, to increase the President’s salary from $25,000 to $50,000, and that of Senators and Representatives from $5,000 to $7,500. The last proved quite unpopular, and was generally denounced as “The Salary Grab,” because of the feature which made it apply to the Congressmen who passed the bill, and of course to go backward to the beginning of the term. This was not new, as earlier precedents were found to excuse it, but the people were nevertheless dissatisfied, and it was made an issue by both parties in the nomination and election of Representatives. Many were defeated, but probably more survived the issue, and are still enjoying public life. Yet the agitation was kept up until the obnoxious feature of the bill and the Congressional increase of salary were repealed, leaving it as now at the rate of $5,000 a year and mileage.

A House committee, headed by B. F. Butler, on Feb. 7th, 1873, made a report which gave a fair idea of the expenses under given circumstances—the increase to be preserved, but the franking privilege and mileage to be repealed. We quote the figures:

Increase of President’s salary $25,000 00

Increase of Cabinet ministers’ salary 14,000 00

Increase of salary of judges United States Supreme Court 18,500 00

Increase of salary of Senators, Members, and Delegates 972,000 00

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Total increase $1,029,500 00

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Saving to the Government, according to the official
statement of the Postmaster-General, per annum, by the
abolition of the franking privilege $2,543,327 72

Saving to the Government by abolition of
mileage, stationery, postage, and newspaper accounts
(estimated) 200,000 00

—————————————

$2,753,327 72

1,029,500 00

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Total net saving $1,713,827 72

The House passed a bill for the abolition of mileage, but in the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment, and not again heard from. So that the increased pay no longer obtains, the franking privilege only to the extent of mailing actual Congressional documents, and mileage remains.

The following curious facts relating to these questions we take from Hon. Edward McPherson’s admirable compilation in his “Hand-Book of Politics” for 1874.

Statement of Compensation and Mileage.

_Drawn by U. S. Senators under the various Compensation Acts._

Mr. Gorham, Secretary of the Senate, prepared, under date of January 3, 1874, a statement, in answer to a resolution of the Senate, covering these points:

I.—_The several rates of compensation fixed by various laws, and the
cases in which the same were retroactive, and for what length of
time._

1. By the act of September 22, 1789, the compensation of Senators and Representatives in Congress was fixed at six dollars a day, and thirty cents a mile for traveling to and from the seat of Government. This rate was to continue until March 4, 1795. The same act fixed the compensation from March 4, 1795, to March 4, 1796, (at which last named date, by its terms, it expired,) at seven dollars a day, and thirty-five cents a mile for travel. This act was retroactive, extending back six months and eighteen days, namely, to March 4, 1789.

2. The act of March 10, 1796, fixed the compensation at six dollars a day, and thirty cents a mile for travel. (This act extended back over six days only.)

3. The act of March 19, 1816, fixed the compensation at $1,500 a year, “instead of the daily compensation,” and left the mileage unchanged. This act was retroactive, extending back one year and fifteen days, namely to March 4, 1815. (This act was repealed by the act of February 6, 1817, but it was expressly declared that no former act was thereby revived.)

4. The act of January 22, 1818, fixed the compensation at eight dollars a day, and forty cents a mile for travel. This act was retroactive, extending back fifty-three days, namely, to the assembling of Congress, December 1, 1817.

5. The act of August 16, 1856, fixed the compensation at $3,000 a year, and left the mileage unchanged. This act was retroactive, extending back one year, five months, and twelve days, namely, to March 4, 1855.

6. The act of July 28, 1866, fixed the compensation at $5,000 a year, and twenty cents a mile for travel, (not to affect mileage accounts already accrued.) This act was retroactive, extending back one year, four months, and twenty-four days, namely, to March 4, 1865.

7. The act of March 3, 1873, fixed the compensation at $7,500 a year, and actual traveling expenses; the mileage already paid for the Forty-Second Congress to be deducted from the pay of those who had received it. This act was retroactive, extending back two years, namely, to March 4, 1871.

NOTE.—Stationery was allowed to Senators and Representatives without any special limit until March 3, 1868, when the amount for stationery and newspapers for each Senator and Member was limited to $125 a session. This was changed by a subsequent act, taking effect July 1, 1869, to $125 a year. The act of 1873 abolished all allowance for stationery and newspapers.

II.—_Names of Senators who drew pay under the retroactive provisions
of the several laws, amounts drawn, and dates of same._

ACT OF 1789.—The records of my office do not furnish the exact information desired under this head concerning the First Congress, the compensation of which was fixed by act of September 22, 1789. It appears, however, that the account of each Senator was made up, and that each received the amount allowed by law. The following is a copy from the record:

_January 19, 1790._—That there is due to the Senators of the United States for attendance in Congress the present session, to the 31st of March inclusive, and expenses of travel to Congress, as allowed by law, as follows, to wit:

Messrs. Richard Bassett, $496.50; Pierce Butler, $796; Charles Carroll, $186; Tristram Dalton, $612; Oliver Ellsworth, $546.50; Jonathan Elmer, $414; William Few, $833.50; John Henry, $596.50; Benjamin Hawkins, $615; William S. Johnson, $544; Samuel Johnson, $534; Rufus King, $522; John Langdon, $618; William Maclay, $585; Robert Morris, $430.50; William Paterson, $514.50; George Read, $195; Caleb Strong, $575.50; Philip Schuyler, $571.50; Paine Wingate, $616.50.

ACT OF 1816.—The record contains no showing as to the amount paid to Senators under the retroactive provision of the act of March 19, 1816. The following, taken from the books, shows the amount of compensation paid to each Senator for the entire Congress, exclusive of mileage:

Messrs. Eli P. Ashmun, $920; James Barbour, $2,850; William T. Barry, $2,080; William W. Bibb, $2,070; James Brown, $2,980; George W. Campbell, $2,950; Dudley Chace, $3,000; John Condit, $2,980; David Daggett, $3,000; Samuel W. Dana, $2,640; Elegius Fromentin, $3,000; John Gaillard, President, $6,000; Robert H. Goldsborough, $2,840; Christopher Gore, $1,940; Alexander Contee Hanson, $530; Martin D. Hardin, $900; Robert G. Harper, $1,450; Outerbridge Horsey, $3,000; Jeremiah B. Howell, $3,000; William Hunter, $2,930; Rufus King, $2,660; Abner Lacock, $3,000; Nathaniel Macon, $2,946; Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire, $2,680; Armistead T. Mason of Virginia, $2,360; Jeremiah Morrow, $3,000; James Noble, $920; Jonathan Roberts, $3,000; Benjamin Ruggles, $3,000; Nathan Sanford, $2,720; William Smith, $540; Montfort Stokes, $810; Charles Tait, $3,000; Isham Talbot, $2,730; John Taylor of South Carolina, $1,990; Waller Taylor of Indiana, $920; Thomas W. Thompson, $2,850; Isaac Tichenor, $3,000; George M. Troup, $830; James Turner, $2,060; Joseph B. Varnum, $3,000; William H. Wells, $2,610; John Williams, $3,000; James J. Wilson, $3,000.

ACT OF 1818.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of January 22, 1818, the following named Senators drew the amounts for compensation and mileage opposite their respective names:

Messrs. Eli P. Ashmun, $668; James Barbour, $520; James Burril, $762; George W. Campbell, $1,008; John J. Crittenden, $1,007.20; David Daggett, $690.40; Samuel W. Dana, $283.20; Mahlon Dickerson, $628.80; John W. Eppes, $584; James Fisk, $848; Elegius Fromentin, $1,393.60; John Gaillard, $880; Robert H. Goldsborough, $483.20; Outerbridge Horsey, $485.60; William Hunter, $543.20; Henry Johnson, $1,273.60; Rufus King, $627.20; Abner Lacock, $649.60; Walter Leake, $1,384; Nathaniel Macon, $600; David L. Morril, $876; Jeremiah Morrow, $776; James Noble, $918.40; Harrison Gray Otis, $792.80; Jonathan Roberts, $564.80; Benjamin Ruggles, $688; Nathan Sanford, $616; William Smith, $774.40; Montfort Stokes, $745.60; Clement Storer, $875.20; Charles Tait, $952; Isham Talbot, $872; Waller Taylor, $1,080; Isaac Tichenor, $784; George M. Troup, $952; —— Van Dyke, $380.80; Thomas H. Williams of Mississippi, $1,433.60; John Williams of Tennessee, $861.60; James J. Wilson, $568.

ACT OF 1856.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of August 16, 1856, the following named Senators drew the amounts opposite their respective names:

Messrs. Stephen Adams, $2,243.77; Philip Allen, $2,202.79; James A. Bayard, $2,088.03; James Bell, $1,083.93; John Bell, $2,268.36; J. P. Benjamin, $2,210.99; Asa Biggs, $2,161.81; William Bigler, $1,594.24; Jesse D. Bright, president _pro tempore_, $6,772.40; R. Brodhead, $2,251.97; A. G. Brown, $2,251.97; A. P. Butler, $2,202.70; Lewis Cass, $2,251.97; C. C. Clay, jr., $2,251.97; J. M. Clayton, $2,292.95; J. Collamer, $2,219.18; J. J. Crittenden, $2,243.79; H. Dodge, $2,292.95; S. A. Douglas, $2,268.36; C. Durkee, $2,235.56; J. J. Evans, $2,121.70; W. S. Fessenden, $2,276.56; H. Fish, $2,237.28; B. Fitzpatrick, $2,194.59; S. Foot, $2,292.94; L. F. S. Foster, $2,112.62; H. S. Geyer, $2,276.56; J. P. Hale, $887.10; H. Hamlin, $1,989.68; J. Harlan, $2,268.36; S. Houston, $2,292.95; R. M. T. Hunter, $2,210.99; A. Iverson, $2,210.99; C. T. James, $2,210.99; R. W. Johnson, $632.21; G. W. Jones, $2,235.58; J. C. Jones, $2,047.05; S. R. Mallory, $2,276.56; J. M. Mason, $2,170; J. A. Pearce, $2,194.59; T. G. Pratt, $2,129.02; G. E. Pugh, $2,096.21; D. S. Reid, $2,235.58; T. J. Rusk, $2,292.95; W. K. Sebastian, $2,137.22; W. H. Seward, $2,292.95; John Slidell, $2,276.56; C. E. Stuart, $2,292.95; C. Sumner, $2,292.95; J. B. Thompson, $2,235.57; John R. Thomson, $2,022.46; Robert Toombs, $2,006.07; Isaac Toucey, $2,292.65; L. Trumbull, $2,251.97; B. F. Wade, $2,202.79; J. B. Weller, $2,251.97; H. Wilson, $2,178.20; W. Wright, $2,120.82; D. L. Yulee, $2,194.59.

ACT OF 1866.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of July 28, 1866, the following named Senators received the amounts opposite their respective names:

Messrs. H. B. Anthony, $2,805.56; B. Gratz Brown, $2,805.56; C. R. Buckalew, $2,805.56; Z. Chandler, $2,805.56; D. Clark, $2,805.56; J. Collamer, $1,366.15; J. Conness, $2,805.56; E. Cowan, $2,805.56; A. H. Cragin, $2,805.56; J. A. J. Creswell, $2,805.56; G. Davis, $2,805.56; J. Dixon, $2,805.56; J. R. Doolittle, $2,805.56; W. P. Fessenden, $2,805.56; S. Foot, $2,136.76; L. F. S. Foster, President _pro tempore_, $261.93; J. W. Grimes, $2,805.56; J. Guthrie, $2,805.56; I. Harris, $2,805.56; J. B. Henderson, $2,805.56; T. A. Hendricks, $2,805.56; J. M. Howard, $2,805.56; T. O. Howe, $2,805.56; R. Johnson, $2,805.56; H. S. Lane, $2,805.56; J. H. Lane, $2,710.49; James A. McDougall, $2,805.56; E. D. Morgan, $2,805.56; L. M. Morrill, $2,805.56; J. W. Nesmith, $2,805.56; D. S. Norton, $2,805.56; J. W. Nye, $2,805.56; S. C. Pomeroy, $2,805.56; A. Ramsey, $2,805.56; G. R. Riddle, $2,805.56; W. Saulsbury, $2,805.56; J. Sherman, $2,805.56; W. M. Stewart, $2,805.56; C. Sumner, $2,805.56; L. Trumbull, $2,805.56; P. G. Van Winkle, $2,805.56; B. Wade, $2,805.56; W. T. Willey, $2,805.56; G. H. Williams, $2,805.56; H. Wilson, $2,805.56; W. Wright, $2,805.56; R. Yates, $2,805.56; J. Harlan, $350; L. P. Poland, $1,361; John P. Stockton, $2,131.20; S. J. Kirkwood, $2,361.10; G. F. Edmunds, $666.66; E. G. Ross, $180 40.

ACT OF 1873.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of March 3, 1873, the following named Senators received the sums set opposite their respective names:

Messrs. A. Ames, $2,840; J. L. Alcorn, $2,312.39; J. T. Bayard, $4,865.60; F. P. Blair, $3,761.60; A. I. Boreman, $4,514; W. G. Brownlow, $4,588; A. Caldwell, $2,647.60; S. Cameron, $4,856; M. H. Carpenter, $3,887.60; E. Casserly, $970.40; Z. Chandler, $3,906.80; P. Clayton, $2,600; C. Cole, $970.40; H. Cooper, $3,760; H. G. Davis, $4,635.20; O. S. Ferry, $4,652; T. W. Ferry, $3,920; J. W. Flanagan, $2,000; A. Gilbert, $3,680; George Goldthwaite, $3,924.80; M. C. Hamilton, $2,480; Joshua Hill, $4,083.20; P. W. Hitchcock, $2,852.80; T. O. Howe, $3,689 60, J. W. Johnston, $4,705.60; John T. Lewis, $4,804.40; John A. Logan, $3,800; W. B. Machen, $552.98; L. M. Morrill, $4,190; J. S. Morrill, (draft in favor of the treasurer of the State of Vermont,) $4,386.80; T. M. Norwood, $4,169.60; J. W. Nye, $2,076.80; T. W. Osborn, $3,440; J. W. Patterson, $4,280; S. C. Pomeroy, $3,320; John Pool, $4,620.80; M. W. Ransom, $4,817.60; B. F. Rice, $3,200; T. J. Robertson, $4,374.80; F. A. Sawyer, $4,294.40; George E. Spencer, $4,106; W. Sprague, $4,508; W. M. Stewart, $1,486.40; J. P. Stockton, $4,790; T. W. Tipton, $3,358; Lyman Trumbull, $3,980; G. Vickers, $4,880; J. R. West, $2,468 80.

III.—_Names of Senators who covered into the Treasury amounts due them
under retroactive provisions of law, with date of such action._

There is no record in my office showing that any Senator covered into the Treasury any money to which he was entitled by the retroactive provisions of either of the acts of September 22, 1789, March 19, 1816, January 22, 1818, August 16, 1856, or July 28, 1866.

The following Senators covered into the Treasury the amounts due them under the retroactive provision of the act of March 3, 1873, namely:

1873.—May 26, H. B. Anthony, $4,497.20; June 23, W. A. Buckingham, $4,553.60; May 21, R. E. Fenton, $4,184; June 2, F. T. Frelinghuysen, $4,644.80; May 19, H. Hamlin, $4,136; August 14, O. P. Morton, $3,922.40; April 9, D. D. Pratt, $4,121.60; August 25, A. Ramsey, $3,041.40; March 28, C. Schurz, $3,761.60; May 9, John Scott, $4,733.06; July 11, John Sherman, $4,336.40; May 2, C. Sumner, $4,445.60; May 22, A. G. Thurman, $4,359.20; March 28, Henry Wilson, $4,448; September 6, George G. Wright, $3,140 80.

NOTE.—Several of these Senators, as well as others who have not either drawn or covered into the Treasury the amounts due them under the retroactive provision of the act of 1873, expressed to me their intention to allow the money to lapse into the Treasury by the ordinary operation of law, which they supposed would occur July 3, 1873. After learning that it could not be covered in, except by their order, before July 3, 1875, some gave me written instructions to anticipate the latter date. I am unable to furnish from any information in my office the names of Senators who themselves paid into the Treasury salary drawn under the act of 1873 or previous acts. I have not furnished the names of Senators who have left increased salary undrawn, as this information was not called for in the resolution.

IV.—_A Comparative Statement._

Total compensation and allowance of Senators, under act of July 28, 1866, from March 4, 1871, to March 3, 1872: Compensation, $370,000; mileage, $37,041.20; stationery and newspapers, $9,250; total, $416,291.20; average per Senator, $5,625.55–²³⁄₃₇.

Under same act, from March 4, 1872, to March 3, 1873, during which year members of the Senate received mileage for attending the special session of the Senate, held in May, 1872, the following amounts were paid: Compensation, $370,000; mileage, $59,002.80; newspapers and stationery, $9,250; total, $438,252.80; average per Senator, $5,922 23–¹⁹⁄₃₇.

Total compensation and allowance of Senators under act of March 3, 1873: Compensation, $555,000; traveling expenses, based upon the certificates of forty-six Senators, (twenty-eight having presented none,) amounting to $4,607 95, giving an average of $100 17×74=$7,412.58; total, $562,412.58; average per Senator, $7,600 17.

In connection with this were statements, prepared by the Secretary of the Senate, and laid before that body by Senator CAMERON, January 9, 1874, of the amounts of mileage paid in dollars (cents omitted) at particular dates under the acts of 1856 and 1866, are given. The act of 1856 fixed mileage at forty cents per mile each way, and the act of 1866 fixed it at twenty cents per mile each way.

Returning Boards.

At the second session of the 42d Congress that body, and the President as well, were compelled to consider a new question in connection with politics—an actual conflict of State Governments. There had always been, in well regulated State governments, returning boards, but with a view the better to guard the newly enfranchised citizens of the South from intimidation, the Louisiana Republicans, under very bold and radical leaders, had greatly strengthened the powers of her returning boards. It could canvass the votes, reject the returns in part or as a whole of parishes where force or fraud had been used, and could declare results after such revision. The Governor of Louisiana had made several removals and appointments of State officers for the purpose mainly of making a friendly majority in the returning board, and this led to the appointment of two bodies, both claiming to be the legitimate returning board. There soon followed two State governments and legislatures, the Democratic headed by Governor John McEnery, the Republican by Governor Wm. Pitt Kellogg, later in the U. S. Senate. Kellogg brought suit against the Democratic officers before Judge Durell, of the Federal District Court, and obtained an order that the U. S. Marshal (S. B. Packard, afterwards Governor), should seize the State House and prevent the meetings of the McEnery legislature. Then both governments were hastily inaugurated, and claimed the recognition of Congress. The Senate Committee reported that Judge Durell’s decision was not warranted, but the report refused a decisive recognition of either government. A bill was introduced declaring the election of Nov. 4, 1872, on which this condition of affairs was based, null and void, and providing for a new election, but this bill was defeated by a close vote. Later on, Louisiana claimed a large share in National politics. Somewhat similar troubles occurred in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas, but they were settled with far greater ease than those of Louisiana. The correspondence in all of these cases was too voluminous to reproduce here, and we shall dismiss the subject until the period of actual hostilities were reached in Louisiana.

The Grangers.

So early as 1867 a secret society had been formed first in Washington, known as the Patrons of Husbandry, and it soon succeeded in forming subordinate lodges or granges in Illinois, Wisconsin, and other States. It was declared not to be political; that its object was co-operation among farmers in purchasing supplies from first hands, so as to do away with middle-men, but, like many other secret organizations, it was soon perverted to political purposes, and for a time greatly disturbed the political parties of the Western States. This was especially true of the years 1873–74, when the Grangers announced a contemplated war on railroad corporations, and succeeded in carrying the legislatures of Illinois and Wisconsin, and inducing them subsequently to pass acts, the validity of which the Supreme Courts of the State, under a temporary popular pressure which was apparently irresistible, could not sustain. The effect of these laws was to almost bankrupt the Illinois Central, theretofore wealthy, to cripple all railroads, to interfere largely with foreign exports, and to react against the interests of the people of the States passing them, that the demand for repeal was soon very much greater than the original demand for passage. As these laws, though repealed, are still often referred to in the discussion of political and corporate questions, we give the text of one of them:

Illinois Railroad Act of 1873.

An Act to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in the rates
charged for the transportation of passengers and freights on
railroads in this State, and to punish the same, and prescribe a
mode of procedure and rules of evidence in relation thereto, and to
repeal an act entitled “An act to prevent unjust discrimination and
extortions in the rates to be charged by the different railroads in
this State for the transportation of freights on said roads,”
approved April 7, A. D. 1871.