Chapter V: Book I (2)

Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural. He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal, and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson, who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions. Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations; realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.

After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him, and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams, sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.

Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th, speaking of this contest, he says:

“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”

It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions, and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed from office on the ground of their public character, nor without complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered _his_ assurance that these things would prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson replied that the points given corresponded with his views and intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.

This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe, March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In this he says:

“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed _ā talons_, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our plan.”

A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:

“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me.”

Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says:

“I am satisfied that the heaping of abuse on me personally, has been with the design and the hope of provoking me to make a general sweep of all Federalists out of office. But as I have carried no passion into the execution of this disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be excited. The clamor which has been raised will not provoke me to remove one more, nor deter me from removing one less, than if not a word had been said on the subject. In the course of the summer, all which is necessary will be done; and we may hope that, this cause of offence being at an end, the measures we shall pursue and propose for the amelioration of the public affairs, will be so confessedly salutary as to unite all men not monarchists in principle.” In the same letter he warmly berates the monarchical federalists, saying, “they are incurables, to be taken care of in a madhouse if necessary, and on motives of charity.”

The seventh Congress assembled. Political parties were at first nearly equally divided in the Senate, but eventually there was a majority for the administration. Jefferson then discontinued the custom established by Washington of delivering in person his message to Congress. The change was greatly for the better, as it afforded relief from the requirement of immediate answers on the subjects contained in the message. It has ever since been followed.

The seventh session of Congress, pursuant to the recommendation of President Jefferson, established a uniform system of naturalization, and so modified the law as to make the required residence of aliens five years, instead of fourteen, as in the act of 1798, and to permit a declaration of intention to become a citizen at the expiration of three years. By his recommendation also was established the first sinking fund for the redemption of the public debt. It required the setting apart annually for this purpose the sum of seven millions and three hundred thousand dollars. Other measures, more partisan in their character, were proposed, but Congress showed an aversion to undoing what had been wisely done. A favorite law of the Federalists establishing circuit courts alone was repealed, and this only after a sharp debate, and a close vote. The provisional army had been disbanded by a law of the previous Congress. A proposition to abolish the naval department was defeated, as was that to discontinue the mint establishment.

At this session the first law in relation to the slave trade was passed. It was to prevent the importation of negroes, mulattoes and other persons of color into any port of the United States within a state which had prohibited by law the admission of any such person. The penalty was one thousand dollars and the forfeiture of the vessel. The slave trade was not then prohibited by the constitution, nor was the subject then generally agitated, though it had been as early as 1793, when, as previously stated, an exciting sectional debate followed the presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania to abolish the slave trade.

Probably the most important occurrence under the first administration of Jefferson was that relating to the purchase and admission of Louisiana. There had been apprehensions of a war with Spain, and with a view to be ready Congress had passed an act authorizing the President to call upon the executives of such of the states as he might deem expedient, for detachments of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, or to accept the services of volunteers for a term of twelve months. The disagreement arose over the southwestern boundary line and the right of navigating the Mississippi. Our government learned in the spring of 1802, that Spain had by a secret treaty made in October, 1800, actually ceded Louisiana to France. Our government had in 1795 made a treaty with Spain which gave us the right of deposit at New Orleans for three years, but in October, 1802, the Spanish authorities gave notice by proclamation that this right was withdrawn. Excitement followed all along the valley of the Mississippi, and it was increased by the belief that the withdrawal of the privilege was made at the suggestion of France, though Spain still retained the territory, as the formalities of ceding it had not been gone through with. Jefferson promptly took the ground that if France took possession of New Orleans, the United States would immediately become allies of England, but suggested to Minister Livingston at Paris that France might be induced to cede the island of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. It was his belief, though a mistaken one, that France had also acquired the Floridas. Louisiana then comprised much of the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the Missouri.

The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood in with his friends in the political battle which followed.

The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory, and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans, English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves. There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed preparations for war with England, and while he had previously expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English navy.

Little chance was afforded the Federalists for adverse criticism in Congress, for the purchase proved so popular that the people greatly increased the majority in both branches of the eighth Congress, and Jefferson called it together earlier for the purpose of ratification. The Senate ratified the treaty on the 20th of October, 1803, by a vote of 24 to 7, while the House adopted a resolution for carrying the treaty into effect by a vote of 90 to 25. Eleven million dollars of the purchase money was appropriated, the remaining four millions being reserved for the indemnity of American citizens who had sustained losses by French assaults upon our commerce—from which fact subsequently came what is known as the French Spoliation Bill.

Impeachment trials were first attempted before the eighth Congress in 1803. Judge Pickering, of the district court of the United States for New Hampshire, was impeached for occasional drunkenness, and dismissed from office. Judge Chase of the U. S. Supreme Court, and Judge Peters of the district court of Pennsylvania, both Federalists, were charged by articles proposed in the House with illegal and arbitrary conduct in the trial of parties charged with political offenses. The Federalists took alarm at these proceedings, and so vehement were their charges against the Republicans of a desire to destroy the judiciary that their impeachments were finally abandoned.

The Republicans closed their first national administration with high prestige. They had met several congressional reverses on questions where defeat proved good fortune, for the Federalists kept a watchful defence, and were not always wrong. The latter suffered numerically, and many of their best leaders had fallen in the congressional contest of 1800 and 1802, while the Republicans maintained their own additions in talent and number.

In 1804, the candidates of both parties were nominated by congressional caucuses. Jefferson and Clinton were the Republican nominees; Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, the nominees of the Federalists, but they only received 14 out of 176 electoral votes.

The struggle of Napoleon in Europe with the allied powers now gave Jefferson an opportunity to inaugurate a foreign policy. England had forbidden all trade with the French and their allies, and France had in return forbidden all commerce with England and her colonies. Both of these decrees violated our neutral rights, and were calculated to destroy our commerce, which by this time had become quite imposing.

Congress acted promptly, and on the 21st of December passed what is known as the Embargo Act, under the inspiration of the Republican party, which claimed that the only choice of the people lay between the embargo and war, and that there was no other way to obtain redress from England and France. But the promised effects of the measure were not realized, and so soon as any dissatisfaction was manifested by the people, the Federalists made the question a political issue. They declared it unconstitutional because it was not limited as to time; that it helped England as against France (a cunning assertion in view of the early love of the Republicans for the cause of the French), and that it laid violent hands on our home commerce and industries. Political agitation increased the discontent, and public opinion at one time turned so strongly against the law that it was openly resisted on the eastern coast, and treated with almost as open contempt on the Canadian border. The bill had passed the House by 87 to 35, the Senate by 19 to 9. In January, 1809, the then closing administration of Jefferson had to change front on the question, and the law was repealed on the 18th of March. The Republicans when they changed, went all the way over, and advocated full protection by the use of a navy, of all our rights on the high seas. If the Federals could have recalled their old leaders, or retained even a considerable portion of their power, the opportunity presented by the embargo issue could have brought them back to full political power, but lacking these leaders, the opportunity passed.

Democrats and Federals.

During the ninth Congress, which assembled on the second of December, 1805, the Republicans dropped their name and accepted that of “Democrats.” In all their earlier strifes they had been charged by their opponents with desiring to run to the extremes of the democratic or “mob rule,” and fear of too general a belief in the truth of the charge led them to denials and rejection of a name which the father of their party had ever shown a fondness for. The earlier dangers which had threatened their organization, and the recollection of defeats suffered in their attempts to establish a government anti-federal and confederate in their composition, had been greatly modified by later successes, and with a characteristic cuteness peculiar to Americans they accepted an epithet and sought to turn it to the best account. In this they imitated the patriots who accepted the epithets in the British satirical song of “Yankee Doodle,” and called themselves Yankees. From the ninth Congress the Jeffersonian Republicans called themselves Democrats, and the word Republican passed into disuse until later on in the history of our political parties, the opponents of the Democracy accepted it as a name which well filled the meaning of their attitude in the politics of the country.

Mr. Randolph of Roanoke, made the first schism in the Republican party under Jefferson, when he and three of his friends voted against the embargo act. He resisted its passage with his usual earnestness, and all attempts at reconciling him to the measure were unavailing. Self-willed, strong in argument and sarcasm, it is believed that his cause made it even more desirable for the Republicans to change name in the hope of recalling some of the more wayward “Democrats” who had advocated Jacobin democracy in the years gone by. The politicians of that day were never short of expedients, and no man so abounded in them as Jefferson himself.

Randolph improved his opportunities by getting most of the Virginia members to act with him against the foreign policy of the administration, but he was careful not to join the Federalists, and quickly denied any leaning that way. The first fruit of this faction was to bring forth Monroe as a candidate for President against Madison—a movement which proved to be quite popular in Virginia, but which Jefferson flanked by bringing about a reconciliation between Monroe and Madison. The now usual Congressional caucus followed at Washington, and although the Virginia Legislature in its caucus previously held had been unable to decide between Madison and Monroe, the Congressional body chose Madison by 83 to 11, the minority being divided between Clinton and Monroe, though the latter could by that time hardly be considered as a candidate. This action broke up Randolph’s faction in Virginia, but left so much bitterness behind it that a large portion attached themselves to the Federalists. In the election which followed Madison received 122 electoral votes against 47 for C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and 6 for Geo. Clinton of New York.

Before Jefferson’s administration closed he recommended the passage of an act to prohibit the African slave trade after January 1st, 1808, and it was passed accordingly. He had also rejected the form of a treaty received from the British minister Erskine, and did this without the formality of submitting it to the Senate—first, because it contained no provision on the objectionable practice of impressing our seamen; second,[2] “because it was accompanied by a note from the British ministers, by which the British government reserved to itself the right of releasing itself from the stipulations in favor of neutral rights, if the United States submitted to the British decree, or other invasion of those rights by France.” This rejection of the treaty by Jefferson caused public excitement, and the Federalists sought to arouse the commercial community against his action, and cited the fact that his own trusted friends, Monroe and Pinckney had negotiated it. The President’s party stood by him, and they agreed that submission to the Senate was immaterial, as its advice could not bind him. This refusal to consider the treaty was the first step leading to the war of 1812, for embargoes followed, and Britain openly claimed the right to search American vessels for her deserting seamen. In 1807 this question was brought to issue by the desertion of five British seamen from the _Halifax_, and their enlistment on the U. S. frigate _Chesapeake_. Four separate demands were made for these men, but all of the commanders, knowing the firm attitude of Jefferson’s administration against the practice, refused, as did the Secretary of State refuse a fifth demand on the part of the British minister. On the 23d of June following, while the _Chesapeake_ was near the capes of Virginia, Capt. Humphreys of the British ship _Leopard_ attempted to search her for deserters. Capt. Barron denied the right of search, but on being fired into, lowered his flag, Humphreys then took four men from the _Chesapeake_, three of whom had previously entered the British service, but were Americans by birth, and had been formally demanded by Washington. The act was a direct violation of the international law, for a nation’s ship at sea like its territory is inviolable. The British government disavowed the act of its officer and offered apology and reparation, which were accepted. This event, however, strengthened Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinckney treaty, and quickly stopped adverse political criticism at home, Foreign affairs remained, however, in a complicated state, owing to the wars between England and the then successful Napoleon, but they in no wise shook the firm hold which Jefferson had upon the people, nor the prestige of his party. He stands in history as one of the best politicians our land has ever seen, and then as now no one could successfully draw the line between the really able politician and the statesman. He was accepted as both. His administration closed on the 3d of March, 1809, when he expressed great gratification at being able to retire to private life.

Mr. Madison succeeded at a time when the country, through fears of foreign aggression and violence, was exceedingly gloomy and despondent—a feeling not encouraged in the least by the statements of the Federalists, some of whom then thought political criticism in hours of danger not unpatriotic. They described our agriculture as discouraged, our fisheries abandoned, our commerce restrained, our navy dismantled, our revenues destroyed at a time when war was at any moment probable with either France, England or Spain.

Madison, representing as he did the same party, from the first resolved to follow the policy of Jefferson, a fact about which there was no misunderstanding. He desired to avert war as long as possible with England, and sought by skilful diplomacy to avert the dangers presented by both France and England in their attitude with neutrals. England had declared that a man who was once a subject always remained a subject, and on this plea based her determination to impress again into her service all deserters from her navy. France, because of refusal to accede to claims equally at war with our rights, had authorized the seizure of all American vessels entering the ports of France. In May, 1810, when the non-intercourse act had expired, Madison caused proposals to be made to both belligerents, that if either would revoke its hostile edict, the non-intercourse act should be revived and enforced against the other nation. This act had been passed by the tenth Congress as a substitute for the embargo. France quickly accepted Madison’s proposal, and received the benefits of the act, and the direct result was to increase the growing hostility of England. From this time forward the negotiations had more the character of a diplomatic contest than an attempt to maintain peace. Both countries were upon their mettle, and early in 1811, Mr. Pinckney, the American minister to Great Britain, was recalled, and a year later a formal declaration of war was made by the United States.

Just prior to this the old issue, made by the Republicans against Hamilton’s scheme for a National Bank, was revived by the fact that the charter of the bank ceased on the 4th of March, 1811, and an attempt was made to re-charter it. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress, but on the 11th of January, 1811, it was indefinitely postponed in the House, by a vote of 65 to 64, while in the Senate it was rejected by the casting vote of the Vice-President, Geo. Clinton, on the 5th of February, 1811—this notwithstanding its provisions had been framed or approved by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. The Federalists were all strong advocates of the measure, and it was so strong that it divided some of the Democrats who enjoyed a loose rein in the contest so far as the administration was concerned, the President not specially caring for political quarrels at a time when war was threatened with a powerful foreign nation. The views of the Federalists on this question descended to the Whigs some years later, and this fact led to the charges that the Whigs were but Federalists in disguise.

The eleventh Congress continued the large Democratic majority, as did the twelfth, which met on the 4th of November, 1811, Henry Clay, then an ardent supporter of the policy of Madison, succeeding to the House speakership. He had previously served two short sessions in the U. S. Senate, and had already acquired a high reputation as an able and fluent debater. He preferred the House, at that period of life, believing his powers better calculated to win fame in the more popular representative hall. Calhoun was also in the House at this time, and already noted for the boldness of his views and their assertion.

In this Congress jealousies arose against the political power of Virginia, which had already named three of the four Presidents, each for two terms, and De Witt Clinton, the well-known Governor of New York, sought through these jealousies to create a division which would carry him into the Presidency. His efforts were for a time warmly seconded by several northern and southern states. A few months later the Legislature of New York formally opened the ball by nominating DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency. An address was issued by his friends, August 17th, 1812, which has since become known as the Clintonian platform, and his followers were known as Clintonian Democrats. The address contained the first public protest against the nomination of Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. There was likewise declared opposition to that “official regency which prescribed tenets of political faith.” The efforts of particular states to monopolize the principal offices was denounced, as was the continuance of public men for long periods in office.

Madison was nominated for a second term by a Congressional caucus held at Washington, in May, 1812. John Langdon was nominated for Vice-President, but as he declined on account of age, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, took his place. In September of the same year a _convention_ of the opposition, representing eleven states, was held in the city of New York, which nominated De Witt Clinton, with Jared Ingersoll for Vice-President. This was the first national convention, partisan in character, and the Federalists have the credit of originating and carrying out the idea. The election resulted in the success of Madison, who received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton.

Though factious strife had been somewhat rife, less attention was paid to politics than to the approaching war. There were new Democratic leaders in the lower House, and none were more prominent than Clay of Kentucky, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, all of South Carolina. The policy of Jefferson in reducing the army and navy was now greatly deplored, and the defenceless condition in which it left the country was the partial cause, at least a stated cause of the factious feuds which followed. Madison sought to change this policy, and he did it at the earnest solicitation of Clay, Calhoun and Lowndes, who were the recognized leaders of the war party. They had early determined that Madison should be directly identified with them, and before his second nomination had won him over to their more decided views in favor of war with England. He had held back, hoping that diplomacy might avert a contest, but when once convinced that war was inevitable and even desirable under the circumstances, his official utterances were bold and free. In the June following the caucus which renominated him, he declared in a message that our flag was continually insulted on the high seas; that the right of searching American vessels for British seamen was still in practice, and that thousands of American citizens had in this way been impressed in service on foreign ships; that peaceful efforts at adjustment of the difficulties had proved abortive, and that the British ministry and British emissaries had actually been intriguing for the dismemberment of the Union.

The act declaring war was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812, and is remarkably short and comprehensive. It was drawn by the attorney-general of the United States, William Pinckney, and is in the words following:—

“_An act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of
America and their territories._

“_Be it enacted, &c._ That war be, and the same is hereby declared to
exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the
dependencies thereof, and the United States of America, and their
territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby
authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States
to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels
of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general
reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of
the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the
government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
subjects thereof.”

This was a soul-stirring message, but it did not rally all the people as it should have done. Political jealousies were very great, and the frequent defeats of the Federalists, while they tended to greatly reduce their numbers and weaken their power, seemed to strengthen their animosity, and they could see nothing good in any act of the administration. They held, especially in the New England states, that the war had been declared by a political party simply, and not by the nation, though nearly all of the Middle, and all of the Southern and Western States, warmly supported it. Clay estimated that nine-tenths of the people were in favor of the war, and under the inspiration of his eloquence and the strong state papers of Madison, they doubtless were at first. Throughout they felt their political strength, and they just as heartily returned the bitterness manifested by those of the Federalists who opposed the war, branding them as enemies of the republic, and monarchists who preferred the reign of Britain.

Four Federalist representatives in Congress went so far as to issue an address, opposing the war, the way in which it had been declared, and denouncing it as unjust. Some of the New England states refused the order of the President to support it with their militia, and Massachusetts sent peace memorials to Congress.

A peace party was formed with a view to array the religious sentiment of the country against the war, and societies with similar objects were organized by the more radical of the Federalists. To such an extreme was this opposition carried, that some of the citizens of New London, Conn., made a practice of giving information to the enemy, by means of blue lights, of the departure of American vessels.

The Hartford Convention.

This opposition finally culminated in the assembling of a convention at Hartford, at which delegates were present from all of the New England states. They sat for three weeks with closed doors, and issued an address which will be found in this volume in the book devoted to political platforms. It was charged by the Democrats that the real object of the convention was to negotiate a separate treaty of peace, on behalf of New England, with Great Britain, but this charge was as warmly denied. The exact truth has not since been discovered, the fears of the participants of threatened trials for treason, closing their mouths, if their professions were false. The treaty of Ghent, which was concluded on December 14th, 1814, prevented other action by the Hartford convention than that stated. It had assembled nine days before the treaty, which is as follows:

Treaty of Ghent.

This treaty was negotiated by the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and William Adams, Esq., on the part of Great Britain, and John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, on behalf of the United States.

The treaty can be found on p. 218, vol. 8, of Little & Brown’s Statutes at Large. The first article provided for the restoration of all archives, records, or property taken by either party from the other during the war. This article expressly provides for the restoration of “slaves or other private property.” The second article provided for the cessation of hostilities and limitation of time of capture. The third article provided for the restoration of prisoners of war.

The fourth article defined the boundary established by the treaty of 1783, and provided for commissioners to mark the same.

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles established rules to govern the proceedings of the commissioners.

The ninth article bound the United States and His Britannic Majesty to end all hostilities with Indian tribes, with whom they were then respectively at war.

The tenth article reads as follows:—

“Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles
of humanity and justice; and, whereas, both His Majesty and the United
States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire
abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall
use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.”

The eleventh and last article provides for binding effect of the treaty, upon the exchange of ratifications.

The position of New England in the war is explained somewhat by her exposed position. Such of the militia as served endured great hardships, and they were almost constantly called from their homes to meet new dangers. Distrusting their loyalty, the general government had withheld all supplies from the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the year 1814, and these States were forced to bear the burden of supporting them, at the same time contributing their quota of taxes to the general government—hardships, by the way, not greater than those borne by Pennsylvania and Ohio in the late war for the Union, nor half as hard as those borne by the border States at the same time. True, the coast towns of Massachusetts were subjected to constant assault from the British navy, and the people of these felt that they were defenceless. It was on their petition that the legislature of Massachusetts finally, by a vote of 226 to 67, adopted the report favoring the calling of the Hartford Convention. A circular was then addressed to the Governors of the other States, with a request that it be laid before their legislatures, inviting them to appoint delegates, and stating that the object was to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section was exposed, “and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defence which might be consistent with the preservation of their resources from total ruin, _and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union_.” The italicized portion shows that there was at least then no design of forming a separate treaty, or of promoting disunion. The legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island endorsed the call and sent delegates. Those of New Hampshire and Vermont did not, but delegates were sent by local conventions. These delegates, it is hardly necessary to remark, were all members of the Federal party, and their suspected designs and action made the “Hartford Convention” a bye-word and reproach in the mouths of Democratic orators for years thereafter. It gave to the Democrats, as did the entire history of the war, the prestige of superior patriotism, and they profited by it as long as the memory of the war of 1812 was fresh. Indeed, directly after the war, all men seemed to keep in constant view the reluctance of the Federalists to support the war, and their almost open hostility to it in New England. Peace brought prosperity and plenty, but not oblivion of the old political issues, and this was the beginning of the end of the Federal party. Its decay thereafter was rapid and constant.

The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth Congresses had continued Democratic. The fourteenth began Dec. 4, 1815, with the Democratic majority in the House increased to 30. Clay had taken part in negotiating the treaty, and on his return was again elected to the House, and was for the third time elected speaker. Though 65 Federalists had been elected, but 10 were given to Federal candidates for speaker, this party now showing a strong, and under the circumstances, a very natural desire to rub out party lines. The internal taxes and the postage rates were reduced.

The Protective Tariff.

President Madison, in his message, had urged upon Congress a revision of the tariff, and pursuant to his recommendation what was at the time called a protective tariff was passed. Even Calhoun then supported it, while Clay proclaimed that protection must no longer be secondary to revenue, but of primary importance. The rates fixed, however, were insufficient, and many American manufactures were soon frustrated by excessive importations of foreign manufactures. The position of Calhoun and Lowndes, well known leaders from South Carolina, is explained by the fact that just then the proposal of a protective tariff was popular in the south, in view of the heavy duties upon raw cotton which England then imposed. The Federalists in weakness changed their old position when they found the Democrats advocating a tariff, and the latter quoted and published quite extensively Alexander Hamilton’s early report in favor of it. Webster, in the House at the time and a leading Federalist, was against the bill. The parties had exchanged positions on the question.

Peace brought with it another exchange of positions. President Madison, although he had vetoed a bill to establish a National Bank in 1815, was now (in 1816) anxious for the establishment of such an institution. Clay had also changed his views, and claimed that the experiences of the war showed the necessity for a national currency. The bill met with strong opposition from a few Democrats and nearly all of the Federalists (the latter having changed position on the question since 1811), but it passed and was signed by the President.

A bill to promote internal improvements, advocated by Clay, was at first favored by Madison, but his mind changed and he vetoed the measure—the first of its kind passed by Congress.

The Democratic members of Congress, before the adjournment of the first session, held a caucus for the nomination of candidates to succeed Madison and Gerry. It was understood that the retiring officers and their confidential friends favored James Monroe of Virginia. Their wishes were carried out, but not without a struggle, Wm. H. Crawford of Georgia receiving 54 votes against 65 for Monroe. The Democrats opposed to Virginia’s domination in the politics of the country, made a second effort, and directed it against Monroe in the caucus. Aaron Burr denounced him as an improper and incompetent candidate, and joined in the protest then made against any nomination by a Congressional caucus; he succeeding in getting nineteen Democrats to stay out of the caucus. Later he advised renewed attempts to break down the Congressional caucus system, and before the nomination favored Andrew Jackson as a means to that end. Daniel B. Tompkins was nominated by the Democrats for Vice-President. The Federalists named Rufus King of New York, but in the election which followed he received but 24 out of 217 electoral votes. The Federalists divided their votes for Vice-President.

Monroe was inaugurated on the 14th of March, 1817, the oath being administered by Chief Justice Marshall. The inaugural address was so liberal in its tone that it seemed to give satisfaction to men of all shades of political opinion. The questions which had arisen during the war no longer had any practical significance, while the people were anxious to give the disturbing ones which ante-dated at least a season of rest. Two great and opposing policies had previously obtained, and singularly enough each seemed exactly adapted to the times when they were triumphant. The Federal power had been asserted in a government which had gathered renewed strength during what was under the circumstances a great and perilous war, and the exigencies of that war in many instances compelled the Republicans or Democrats, or the Democratic-Republicans as some still called them, to concede points which had theretofore been in sharp dispute, and they did it with that facility which only Americans can command in emergencies: yet as a party they kept firm hold of the desire to enlarge the scope of liberty in its application to the citizens, and just here kept their original landmark.

It is not singular then that the administration of Monroe opened what has ever since been known in politics as the “Era of Good Feeling.” Party differences rapidly subsided, and political serenity was the order of the day. Monroe made a tour of the States, with the direct object of inspecting fortifications and means of defence, and in this way spread the good feeling, without seeming to have any such object. He was everywhere favorably greeted by the people, and received by delegations which in many instances were specially made up of all shades of opinion.

The Cabinet was composed of men of rare political distinction, even in that day of great men. It was probably easier to be great then than now, just as it is easier to be a big political hero in the little State of Delaware than it is in the big States of New York or Pennsylvania. Yet these men were universally accepted as great without regard to their localities. All were Republicans or Democrats, with John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State, Wm. H. Crawford (Monroe’s competitor for the nomination) as Secretary of the Treasury, John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, William Wirt as Attorney-General. All of these united with the President in the general desire to call a halt upon the political asperities which were then recognized as a public evil. On one occasion, during his tour, the citizens of Kennebunk and its vicinity, in Maine, having in their address alluded to the prospects of a political union among the people in support of the administration, the President said in reply:

“You are pleased to express a confident hope that a spirit of mutual conciliation may be one of the blessings which may result from my administration. This indeed would be an eminent blessing, and I pray it may be realized. Nothing but union is waiting to make us a great people. The present time affords the happiest presage that this union is fast consummating. It cannot be otherwise; I daily see greater proofs of it. The further I advance in my progress in the country, the more I perceive that we are all Americans—that we compose but one family—that our republican institutions will be supported and perpetuated by the united zeal and patriotism of all. Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to behold a perfect union among ourselves—a union which is necessary to restore to social intercourse its former charms, and to render our happiness, as a nation, unmixed and complete. To promote this desirable result requires no compromise of principle, and I promise to give it my continued attention, and my best endeavors.”

Even General Jackson, since held up to public view by historians as the most austere and “stalwart” of all politicians, caught the sweet infection of peace, and thus advised President Monroe:—

“Now is the time to exterminate that monster, called party spirit. By selecting [for cabinet officers] characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate those feelings, which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of government. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested; always bearing in mind, that he acts for the whole and not a part of the community.”

This advice had been given with a view to influence the appointment of a mixed political Cabinet, but while Monroe professed to believe that a free government could exist without political parties, he nevertheless sought to bring all of the people into one political fold, and that the Democratic. Yet he certainly and plainly sought to allay factions in his own party, and with this view selected Crawford for the Treasury—the gentleman who had been so warmly supported in the nominating struggle by the Clintonians and by all who objected to the predominating influence of Virginia in national politics.

Monroe, like his immediate predecessor, accepted and acted upon the doctrines of the new school of Republicans as represented by Clay and Calhoun, both of whom still favored a tariff, while Clay had become a warm advocate of a national system of internal improvements. These two statesmen thus early differed on some questions, but they were justly regarded as the leading friends and advisers of the administration, for to both still clung the patriotic recollections of the war which they had so warmly advocated and supported, and the issue of which attested their wisdom. Clay preferred to be called a Republican; Calhoun preferred to be called a Democrat, and just then the terms were so often exchanged and mingled that history is at fault in the exact designation, while tradition is colored by the bias of subsequent events and lives.

Monroe’s first inaugural leaned toward Clay’s scheme of internal improvements, but questioned its constitutionality. Clay was next to Jefferson the most original of all our statesmen and politicians. He was prolific in measures, and almost resistless in their advocacy. From a political standpoint he was the most direct author of the war of 1812, for his advocacy mainly brought it to the issue of arms, which through him and Calhoun were substituted for diplomacy. And Calhoun then stood in broader view before the country than since. His sectional pride and bias had been rarely aroused, and like Clay he seemed to act for the country as an entirety. Subsequent sectional issues changed the views held of him by the people of both the North and South.

We have said that Monroe leaned toward internal improvements, but he thought Congress was not clothed by the Constitution with the power to authorize measures supporting it, and when the opportunity was presented (May 4, 1822) he vetoed the bill “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road,” and accompanied the veto with a most elaborate message in which he discussed the constitutional aspects of the question. A plain majority of the friends of the administration, under the leadership of Clay, supported the theory of internal improvements from the time the administration began, but were reluctant to permit a division of the party on the question.

Mississippi and Illinois were admitted to the Union during the “Era of Good Feeling,” without serious political disturbance, while Alabama was authorized to form a state constitution and government, and Arkansas was authorized as a separate territorial government from part of Missouri. In 1819 President Monroe made a tour through the Southern States to examine their defenses and see and get acquainted with the people. From the first inauguration of Monroe up to 1819 party lines can hardly be said to have existed, but in the sixteenth session of Congress, which continued until May, 1820, new questions of national interest arose, prominent among which were additional protective duties for our manufactures; internal improvements by the government; acknowledgments of the independence of the South American States.

The Monroe Doctrine.

Upon the question of recognizing the independence of the South American States, the President made a record which has ever since been quoted and denominated “The Monroe Doctrine.” It is embodied in the following abstract of his seventh annual message, under date of Dec. 2d, 1823: