Chapter XXI: Part 21

The immense responsibilities involved were most imperfectly understood by the British government. Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan dates from 1820, when Mehemet Ali sent a large force into the country, and ultimately established his authority over Sennar and Kordofan. In 1865 Suakin and Massawa were assigned to Egyptian rule by the sultan, and in 1870 Sir Samuel Baker proceeded up the Nile to the conquest of the Equatorial provinces, of which General Gordon was appointed governor-general in 1874. In the same year Darfur and Harrar were annexed, and in 1877 Gordon became governor-general of the Sudan, where, with the valuable assistance of Gessi Pasha, he laboured to destroy the slave trade and to establish just government. In August 1879 he returned to Cairo, and was succeeded by Raouf Pasha. Misrule and oppression in every form now again prevailed throughout the Sudan, while the slave traders, exasperated by Gordon's stern measures, were ready to revolt. The authority of Egypt was represented by scattered garrisons of armed men, badly officered, undisciplined and largely demoralized. In such conditions a leader only was required to ensure widespread and dangerous rebellion. A leader appeared in the person of Mahommed Ahmed, born in 1848, who had taken up his abode on Abba Island, and, acquiring great reputation for sanctity, had actively fomented insurrection. In August 1881 a small force sent by Raouf Pasha to arrest Mahommed Ahmed was destroyed, and the latter, proclaiming himself the mahdi, stood forth as the champion of revolt. Thus, at the time when the Egyptian army was broken up at Tell-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. On the 7th of June 1882, 6000 men under Yusef Pasha, advancing from Fashoda, were nearly annihilated by the mahdists. Payara and Birket in Kordofan quickly fell, and a few days before the battle of Tell-el-Kebir was fought, the mahdi, with a large force, was besieging El Obeid. That town was captured, after an obstinate defence, on the 17th of January 1883, by which time almost the whole of the Sudan south of Khartum was in open rebellion, except the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Equatorial provinces, where for a time Lupton Bey and Emin Pasha were able to hold their own. Abd-el-Kader, who had succeeded Raouf, telegraphed to Cairo for 10,000 additional troops, and pointed out that if they were not sent at once four times this number would be required to re-establish the authority of the government in the Sudan. After gaining some small successes, Abd-el-Kader was superseded by Suliman Niagi on the 20th of February 1883, and on the 26th of March Ala-ed-din Pasha was appointed governor-general. Meanwhile 5000 men, who had served in the Egyptian army, were collected and forcibly despatched to Khartum via Suakin. In March 1883 Colonel William Hicks, late of the Bombay army, who in January had been appointed by the khedive chief of the staff of the army of the Sudan, found himself at Khartum with nine European officers and about 10,000 troops of little military value. The reconquest of the Sudan having been determined upon, although Sir E. Malet reported that the Egyptian government could not supply the necessary funds, and that there was great risk of failure, Colonel Hicks, who had resigned his post on the 23rd of July, and had been appointed commander-in-chief, started from Khartum on 9th September, with a total force of about 10,000 men, including non-combatants, for Kordofan. On the 22nd of May Sir E. Malet had informed Sherif Pasha that,

"although Colonel Hicks finds it convenient to communicate with Lord
Dufferin or with me, it must not be supposed that we endorse in any
way the contents of his telegrams.... Her Majesty's government are in
no way responsible for his operations in the Sudan, which have been
undertaken under the authority of His Highness's government."

Colonel Hicks was fully aware of the unfitness of his rabble forces for the contemplated task, and on the 5th of August he telegraphed: "I am convinced it would be best to keep the two rivers and province of Sennar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself." Early in November the force from Khartum was caught by the mahdists short of water at Kashgil, near El Obeid, and was almost totally destroyed, Colonel Hicks, with all his European officers, perishing. Sinister rumours having reached Cairo, Sir E. Baring (Lord Cromer), who had succeeded Sir E. Malet, telegraphed that "if Colonel Hicks's army is destroyed, the Egyptian government will lose the whole of the Sudan, unless some assistance from the outside is given," and advised the withdrawal to some post on the Nile. On the following day Lord Granville replied: "We cannot lend English or Indian troops; if consulted, recommend abandonment of the Sudan within certain limits"; and on the 25th he added that "Her Majesty's government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibilities for operations in the Sudan." In a despatch of the 3rd of December Sir E. Baring forcibly argued against British intervention in the affairs of the Sudan, and on the 13th of December Lord Granville telegraphed that "Her Majesty's government recommend the ministers of khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of Assuan, or, at least, of Wadi Halfa." On the 4th of January 1884 Sir E. Baring was directed to insist upon the policy of evacuation, and on the 18th General Gordon left London to assist in its execution.

Defeat of General Baker.

The year 1883 brought a great accession of power to the mahdi, who had captured about 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and large stores of ammunition. On the Red Sea littoral Osman Digna, a slave dealer of Suakin, appointed amir of the Eastern Sudan, raised the local tribes and invested Sinkat and Tokar. On the 16th of October and the 4th of November Egyptian reinforcements intended for the former place were destroyed, and on the 2nd of December a force of 700 men was annihilated near Tamanieb. On the 23rd of December General Valentine Baker, followed by about 2500 men, gendarmerie, blacks, Sudanese and Turks, with 10 British officers, arrived at Suakin to prepare for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. The khedive appears to have been aware of the risks to be incurred, and in a private letter he informed the general that "I rely upon your prudence and ability not to engage the enemy except under the most favourable circumstances." The tragedy of Kashgil was repeated on the 4th of February 1884, when General Baker's heterogeneous force, on the march from Trinkitat to Tokar, was routed at El Teb by an inferior body of tribesmen. Of 3715 men, 2375, with 11 European officers, were killed. Suakin was now in danger, and on the 6th of February British bluejackets and marines were landed for the defence of the town.

British expedition under Sir G. Graham: battles of El Teb and Tamanieb.

Two expeditions in the Sudan led by British officers having thus ended in disaster, and General Gordon with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart having reached Khartum on the 18th of February, the policy of British non-intervention in regard to Sudan affairs could no longer be maintained. Public opinion in England was strongly impressed by the fact that the Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were perishing within striking distance of the Red Sea littoral. A British force about 4400 strong, with 22 guns, made up of troops from Egypt and from units detained on passage from India, was rapidly concentrated at Suakin and placed under the orders of Major-General Sir G. Graham, with Major-Generals Sir R. Buller and J. Davis as brigadiers. News of the fall of Sinkat, where the starving garrison, under Tewfik Bey, made a gallant sortie and was cut to pieces, reached Suakin on the 12th of February. On the 24th General Graham's force disembarked at Trinkitat and received information of the surrender of Tokar. At 8 A.M. on the 29th the force advanced towards Tokar in square, and came under fire at 11.20 A.M. from the enemy entrenched at El Teb. The tribesmen made desperate efforts to rush the square, but were repulsed, and the position was taken by 2 P.M. The cavalry, 10th and 19th Hussars, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, became involved in a charge against an unbroken enemy, and suffered somewhat severely. The total British loss was 34 killed and 155 wounded; that of the tribesmen was estimated at 1500 killed. On the following day Tokar was reached, and on the 2nd of March the force began its return to Suakin, bringing away about 700 people belonging to the late garrison and the civil population, and destroying 1250 rifles and a quantity of ammunition found in a neighbouring village. On the 9th of March the whole force was back at Suakin, and on the evening of the 11th an advance to Tamai began, and the force bivouacked and formed a zeriba in the evening. Information was brought by a native that the enemy had assembled in the Khor Ghob, a deep ravine not far from the zeriba. At about 8.30 A.M. on the 13th the advance began in echelon of brigade squares from the left. The left and leading square (2nd Brigade) moved towards the khor, approaching at a point where a little ravine joined it. The enemy showing in front, the leading face of the square was ordered to charge up to the edge of the khor. This opened the square, and a mass of tribesmen rushed in from the small ravine. The brigade was forced back in disorder, and the naval guns, which had been left behind, were temporarily captured. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, in which the troops behaved with great gallantry, order was restored and the enemy repulsed, with the aid of the fire from the 1st Brigade square and from dismounted cavalry. The 1st Brigade square, having a sufficient field of fire, easily repelled all attempts to attack, and advancing as soon as the situation had been restored, occupied the village of Tamai. The British loss was 109 killed and 104 wounded; of the enemy nearly 2000 were killed. On the following day the force returned to Suakin.

Two heavy blows had now been inflicted on the followers of Osman Digna, and the road to Berber could have been opened, as General Graham and Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart suggested. General Gordon, questioned on the point, telegraphed from Khartum, on the 7th of March, that he might be cut off by a rising at Shendi, adding, "I think it, therefore, most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small force to Berber." He had previously, on the 29th of February, urged that the Suakin-Berber road should be opened up by Indian troops. This, and General Gordon's proposal to send 200 British troops to Wadi Halfa, was opposed by Sir E. Baring, who, realizing soon afterwards the gravity of the situation, telegraphed on the 16th of March:--

"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road
between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes
between Berber and Khartum."

The government refused to take this action, and Major-General Graham's force was employed in reconnaissances and small skirmishes, ending in the destruction of the villages in the Tamanieb valley on 27th March. On the 28th the whole force was reassembled at Suakin, and was then broken up, leaving one battalion to garrison the town.

Entanglement of General Gordon at Khartum.

The abrupt disappearance of the British troops encouraged the tribesmen led by Osman Digna, and effectually prevented the formation of a native movement, which might have been of great value. The first attempt at intervention in the affairs of the Sudan was made too late to save Sinkat and Tokar. It resulted only in heavy slaughter of the tribesmen, which afforded no direct or indirect aid to General Gordon or to the policy of evacuation. The public announcement of the latter was a grave mistake, which increased General Gordon's difficulties, and the situation at Khartum grew steadily worse. On the 24th of March Sir E. Baring telegraphed:--

"The question now is, how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart
away from Khartum.... Under present circumstances, I think an effort
should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a
possible military operation.... We all consider that, however
difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable
than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile."

A telegram from General Gordon, received at Cairo on the 19th of April, stated that

"We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in.... Our position
will be much strengthened when the Nile rises.... Sennar, Kassala and
Dongola are quite safe for the present."

At the same time he suggested "an appeal to the millionaires of America and England" to subscribe money for the cost of "2000 or 3000 nizams" (Turkish regulars) to be sent to Berber. A cloud now settled down upon Khartum, and subsequent communications were few and irregular. The foreign office and General Gordon appeared to be somewhat at cross purposes. The former hoped that the garrisons of the Sudan could be extricated without fighting. The latter, judging from the tenor of some of his telegrams, believed that to accomplish this work entailed the suppression of the mahdi's revolt, the strength of which he at first greatly underestimated. He had pressed strongly for the employment of Zobeir as "an absolute necessity for success" (3rd of March); but this was refused, since Sir H. Gordon advised at this time that it would be dangerous. On the 9th of March General Gordon proposed, "if the immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined upon irrespective of outlying towns," to send down the "Cairo _employes_" and the garrison to Berber with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart, to resign his commission, and to proceed with the stores and the steamers to the equatorial provinces, which he would consider as placed under the king of the Belgians. On the 13th of March Lord Granville gave full power to General Gordon to "evacuate Khartum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay," and expressed a hope that he would not resign his commission.

Relief expedition: question of route.

By the end of March 1884 Sir E. Baring and the British officers in Egypt were convinced that force would have to be employed, and the growing danger of General Gordon, with the grave national responsibility involved, began to be realized in Great Britain. Sir Henry Gordon, however, who was in personal communication with Mr Gladstone, considered that his brother was in no peril, and for some time disbelieved in the need for a relief expedition. Meanwhile it was at least necessary to evolve some plan of action, and on the 8th of April the adjutant-general addressed a memorandum to the secretary of state for war detailing the measures required for placing 6500 British troops "in the neighbourhood of Shendi." The battle of the routes began much earlier, and was continued for some months. Practically the choice lay between the Nile and the Suakin-Berber road. The first involved a distance of 1650 m. from Cairo along a river strewn with cataracts, which obstructed navigation to all but small boats, except during the period of high water. So great was this obstruction that the Nile had never been a regular trade route to the Sudan. The second entailed a desert march of about 250 m., of which one section, Obak-Bir Mahoba (52 m.), was waterless, and the rest had an indifferent water supply (except at Ariab, about half-way to Berber), capable, however, of considerable development. From Berber the Nile is followed (210 m.) to Khartum. This was an ancient trade route with the Sudan, and had been used without difficulty by the reinforcements sent to Hicks Pasha in 1883, which were accompanied by guns on wheels. The authorities in Egypt, headed by General Stephenson, subsequently supported by the Admiral Lord John Hay, who sent a naval officer to examine the river as far as Dongola, were unanimous in favour of the Suakin-Berber route. From the first Major-General Sir A. Clarke, then inspector-general of fortifications, strongly urged this plan, and proposed to begin at once a metre gauge railway from Suakin, to be constructed by Indian labour under officers skilled in laying desert lines. Some preliminary arrangements were made, and on the 14th of June the government sanctioned certain measures of preparation at Suakin. On the other side were the adjutant-general (Lord Wolseley) and a small number of officers who had taken part in the Red River expedition of 1870. The memorandum of the adjutant-general above referred to was based on the hypothesis that Khartum could not hold out beyond the 15th of November, and that the expedition should reach Berber by the 20th of October. Steamers were to be employed in such reaches as proved practicable, but the force was to be conveyed in special whale-boats, by which "the difficulty of transport is reduced to very narrow limits." The mounted force was to consist of 400 men on native horses and 450 men on horses or camels. The question of routes continued to be the subject of animated discussion, and on the 29th of July a committee of three officers who had served in the Red River expedition reported:--

"We believe that a brigade can easily be conveyed in small boats from
Cairo to Dongola in the time stated by Lord Wolseley; and, further,
that should it be necessary to send a still larger force by water to
Khartum, that operation will present no insuperable difficulties."

Lord Wolseley sent out; Nile route adopted.

This most inconclusive report, and the baseless idea that the adoption of the Nile route would involve no chance of bloodshed, which the government was anxious to avoid, seem to have decided the question. On the 8th of August the secretary of state for war informed General Stephenson that "the time had arrived when some further measures for obtaining accurate information as to his (General Gordon's) position, and, if necessary, for tendering him assistance, should be adopted." General Stephenson still urged the Suakin-Berber route, and was informed on the 26th of August that Lord Wolseley would be appointed to take over the command in Egypt for the purposes of the expedition, for which a vote of credit had been taken in the House of Commons on the 5th of August. On the 9th of September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, and the plan of operations was somewhat modified. A camel corps of 1100 men selected from twenty-eight regiments at home was added, and the "fighting force to be placed in line somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shendi" was fixed at 5400. The construction of whale-boats began on the 12th of August, and the first batch arrived at Wadi Halfa on the 14th of October, and on the 25th the first boat was hauled through the second cataract. The mounted forces proceeded up the banks, and the first half-battalion embarked at Gemai, 870 m. from Khartum, on the 5th of November, ten days before the date to which it had been assumed General Gordon could hold out. In a straggling procession the boats worked their way up to Korti, piloted by Canadian _voyageurs_. The labour was very great, and the troops, most of whom were having their first lesson in rowing, bore the privations of their unaccustomed conditions with admirable cheerfulness. By the 25th of December 2220 men had reached Korti, of whom about 800 only had been conveyed by the whale-boats, the last of which did not arrive till the 27th of January. Beyond Korti lay the very difficult section of the river to Abu Hamed, which was quite unknown. Meanwhile news of the loss of the "Abbas" and of the murder of Colonel J. D. Stewart and his party on the 18th of September had been received. A letter from Gordon, dated the 4th of November and received on the 17th of November, stated that his steamers would await the expedition at Metemma, and added, "We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." In his diary, on the 13th of December, when his difficulties had become extreme, he noted that "if the expeditionary force does not come in ten days, the town may fall."

Stewart's Desert Column; battle of Abu Klea wells.

Failure of relief expedition.

It was clear at Korti that something must be done at once; and on the 13th of December 1100 men, with 2200 camels, under General Sir H. Stewart, were despatched to occupy Jakdul wells, 96 m. on the desert route to Metemma. Stewart returned on the 5th of January, and started again on the 8th, with orders to establish a fort at Abu Klea and to occupy Metemma. The Desert Column, 1800 men, with 2880 camels in poor condition and 153 horses, found the enemy in possession of Abu Klea wells on the 16th, and was desperately attacked on the 17th. The want of homogeneity of the force, and the unaccustomed tactics imposed upon the cavalry, somewhat hampered the defence, and the square was broken at the left rear corner. Driven back upon the camels in the centre, the troops fought hand to hand with the greatest gallantry. Order was quickly restored, and the attack was repulsed, with a loss of 74 killed and 94 wounded. At least 1100 of the enemy were killed. The wells being occupied and a zeriba formed, the column started on the evening of the 18th. The wrong road was taken, and great confusion occurred, during the night, but at dawn this was rectified; and after forming a rough fort under fire, by which General Sir H. Stewart was fatally wounded, an advance was made at 3 P.M. The square was again heavily attacked, but the Arabs could not get to close quarters and in the evening a bivouac was formed on the Nile. The British losses on this day were 23 killed and 98 wounded. The Desert Column was now greatly exhausted. On the 20th the village of Gubat was occupied; and on the following day Sir C. Wilson, on whom the command had devolved, advanced against Metemma, which was found too strong to assault. On this day General Gordon's four steamers arrived; and on the morning of the 24th Sir C. Wilson, with 20 British soldiers in red coats and about 280 Sudanese, started in the "Bordein" and "Telahawiyeh" for Khartum. The "Bordein" grounded on the following day, and again on the 26th, by which twenty-four hours were lost. At 11 A.M. on the 28th Khartum was sighted, and it soon became clear that the town was in the hands of the enemy. After reconnoitring farther, the steamers turned and proceeded down stream under a heavy fire, the Sudanese crews showing signs of disaffection. The "Telahawiyeh" was wrecked on the 29th of January and the "Bordein" on the 31st, Sir C. Wilson's party being rescued on the 4th of February by Lord C. Beresford in the "Safieh," which had come up from Gubat on receipt of news carried there by Lieutenant Stuart Wortley in a row-boat. Khartum had been taken and General Gordon killed on the morning of the 26th of January 1885, having thus held out thirty-four days beyond the date when he had expected the end. The garrison had been reduced to starvation; and the arrival of twenty British soldiers, with orders to return at once, could not have affected the situation. The situation of the Desert Column and of its transport was most imperfectly understood at Korti, where impossible plans were formed. Fortunately Major-General Sir R. Buller, who arrived at Gubat on the 11th of February, decided upon withdrawal, thus averting impending disaster, and by the 16th of March the Desert Column had returned to Korti.

The advance from Korti of the River Column, under Major-General Earle, began on the 28th of December, and great difficulties of navigation were encountered. On the 10th of February an action was fought at Kirbekan with about 800 of the enemy, entailing a loss of 10 killed, including Major-General Earle, and 47 wounded. The column, now commanded by Brigadier-General Brackenbury, continued its slow advance, and on the morning of the 24th of February it was about 26 m. below Abu Hamed, a point where the Korosko desert route strikes the Nile, 350 m. from Khartum. Here it received orders to retire, and it reached Korti on the 8th of March.

Suakin operations.

The verbal message received from General Gordon on the 30th of December 1884 rendered the extreme danger of the position at Khartum painfully apparent, and the secretary of state for war, acting on Sir E. Baring's advice, offered to make an active demonstration from Suakin. To this proposal Lord Wolseley demurred, but asked that ships of war should be sent to Suakin, and that "marines in red coats should be frequently landed and exercised." Lord Hartington replied that the government did not consider that a demonstration of this kind could be effective, and again suggested stronger measures. On the 8th of January 1885 Lord Wolseley repeated that "the measures you propose will not assist my operations against Khartum," adding:--

"I have from first endeavoured to impress on government that I am
strong enough to relieve Khartum, and believe in being able to send a
force, when returning by way of Berber, to Suakin, to open road and
crush Osman Digna."

On this very day the small Desert Column started from Korti on its hazardous mission to the relief of a town fully 270 m. distant, held by a starving garrison, and invested by 30,000 fighting men, mostly armed with good rifles. Before reaching the Nile the Desert Column had lost 300 men and was unable to take Metemma, while its transport had completely broken down. On the 8th of February Lord Wolseley telegraphed, "The sooner you can now deal with Osman Digna the better," and recommended the despatch of Indian troops to Suakin, to "co-operate with me in keeping road to Berber open." On the 11th of February, the day on which Sir R. Buller most wisely decided to withdraw the Desert Column from a position of extreme danger, it was determined at Korti that the River Column should proceed to attack Berber, and Lord Wolseley accepted the proposal of the government to make a railway from Suakin, telegraphing to Lord Harrington:--

"By all means make railway by contract to Berber, or as far as you
can, during summer. It will be invaluable as a means of supply, and I
recommend it being begun immediately. Contract to be, if possible, for
so much per ton military stores and supplies and men carried, per
mile."

Battle of Hashin.

Every effort was now concentrated upon sending an expeditionary force to Suakin, and before the end of March about 13,000 men, including a brigade from India and a field battery from New South Wales, with nearly 7000 camels and 1000 mules, were there assembled. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Graham was placed in command of this force, with orders to break down the power of Osman Digna and to press the construction of the railway towards Berber. The troops at Suakin, on arrival, were much harassed by small night attacks, which ceased as soon as the scattered camps were drawn together. On the 19th of March Sir G. Graham, with the cavalry brigade and the infantry of the Indian contingent, reconnoitred as far as Hashin, finding the country difficult on account of the dense mimosa scrub. The enemy occupied the hills and fired upon the cavalry. On the 20th Sir G. Graham, with about 9000 men, again advanced to Hashin, and Dehilbat hill was taken by the Berkshire regiment and the Royal Marines. A squadron of the 9th Royal Lancers, which was dismounted in the thick bush, was driven back with the loss of 9 men; but elsewhere the Arabs never succeeded in closing, and the troops returned to Suakin in the afternoon, leaving the East Surrey regiment in a zeriba covering some low hills near Hashin village. The total British loss was 9 killed and 39 wounded.

McNeill's zeriba.

On the 22nd of March a force, consisting of two British and three Indian battalions, with a naval brigade, a squadron of lancers, two companies of engineers, and a large convoy of camels carrying water and supplies, under Major-General Sir J. McNeill, started from Suakin for Tamai, with orders to form a half-way zeriba. The advance was much impeded by the dense bush, and the force halted at Tofrik, about 6 m. out, at 10.30 A.M. A native had brought information that the enemy intended to attack while the zeriba was being formed, and this actually occurred. The force was caught partly unprepared soon after 2.30 P.M., and severe fighting took place. The enemy were repulsed in about twenty minutes, the naval brigade, the Berkshire regiment, the Royal Marines, and the 15th Sikhs showing the greatest gallantry. The casualties, including those among non-combatants, were 150 killed, 148 missing, and 174 wounded. More than 500 camels were killed. The tribesmen lost more than 1000 killed. As soon as firing was heard at Suakin, Sir G. Graham, with two battalions of Guards and a battery of horse artillery, started for Tofrik, but returned on being assured that reinforcements were not required. On the 24th and 26th convoys proceeding in square to Tofrik were attacked, the enemy being repulsed without difficulty. On the 2nd of April a force exceeding 7000 men, with 14 guns and 1600 transport animals, started from Suakin at 4.30 A.M., and bivouacked twelve hours later at Tesela Hill. Next morning an advance was made towards Tamai, and a number of huts in the Khor Ghob were burned. The force then returned to Suakin. The railway was now pushed on without interruption, reaching Otao on the 30th. On the night of the 6th of May a combined movement was made from Suakin and Otao, which resulted in the surprise and break-up of a force of the enemy under Mahommed Sardun, and the capture of a large number of sheep and goats. The moral effect of this operation was marked, and large numbers of tribesmen placed themselves unconditionally at the disposal of Sir G. Graham. A great native movement could now have been organized, which would have kept the route to Berber and enabled the railway to be rapidly pushed forward.

Political and military situation at end of operations.

Meanwhile many communications had passed between the war office and Lord Wolseley, who at first believed that Berber could be taken before the summer. In a long despatch of the 6th of March he discussed the general situation, and pointed out that although the force at his disposal "was amply sufficient" for raising the siege of Khartum and defeating the mahdi, the conditions were changed by the fall of the town. It was now "impossible ... to undertake any offensive operations until about the end of the summer," when twelve additional British battalions, four strong squadrons of British cavalry, and two R.H.A. batteries, together with a large extension of the Wadi Halfa railway, eleven steamers, and three hundred more whale-boats, would be required. He considered it necessary to hold Dongola, and he reported that he was "distributing this army along the left bank of the Nile, on the open reach of water" between the Hannek cataract and Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. On the 30th of March Lord Wolseley quitted the army and proceeded to Cairo. A cloud having arisen on the frontiers of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of the troops from the Sudan was ordered on the 11th of May. On the formation of Lord Salisbury's cabinet, the new secretary of state for war, Mr W. H. Smith, inquired whether the retirement could be arrested, but Major-General Sir R. Buller reported that the difficulties of reoccupation would be great, and that if Dongola was to be held, a fresh expedition would be required. On the 22nd of June, before the British rearguard had left Dongola, the mahdi died. The withdrawal of the Suakin force began on the 17th of May, and the friendly tribes, deprived of support, were compelled to make terms with Osman Digna, who was soon able to turn his attention to Kassala, which capitulated in August, nearly at the same time as Sennar.

The failure of the operations in the Sudan had been absolute and complete, and the reason is to be sought in a total misconception of the situation, which caused vacillation and delay, and in the choice of a route by which, having regard to the date of the decision, the relief of General Gordon and Khartum was impossible. (G. S. C.)

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1885 TO 1896

The operations against Mahdism during the eleven years from the end of the Nile expedition and the withdrawal from the Sudan to the commencement of the Dongola campaign will be more easily understood if, instead of narrating them in one chronological sequence, the operations in each province are considered separately. The mahdi, Mahommed Ahmed, died at Omdurman on the 22nd of June 1885. He was succeeded by the principal khalifa, Abdullah el Taaisha, a Baggara Arab, who for the next thirteen years ruled the Sudan with despotic power. Cruel, vicious, unscrupulous and strong, the country groaned beneath his oppression. He removed all possible rivals, concentrated at Omdurman a strong military force composed of men of his own tribe, and maintained the ascendancy of that tribe over all others. As the British troops retired to Upper Egypt, his followers seized the evacuated country, and the khalifa cherished the idea, already formulated by the mahdi, of the conquest of Egypt, but for some years he was too much occupied in quelling risings, massacring the Egyptians in the Sudan, and fighting Abyssinia, to move seriously in the matter.

_Upper Egypt._--Mahommed el Kheir, dervish amir of Dongola, however, advanced towards the frontier in the autumn of 1885, and at the end of November came in touch with the frontier field force, a body of some 3000 men composed in nearly equal parts of British and Egyptian troops. A month of harassing skirmishes ensued, during which the Egyptian troops showed their mettle at Mograka, where 200 of them held the fort against a superior number of dervishes, and in combats at Ambigol, Kosha and Firket. Sir Frederick Stephenson, commanding the British army of occupation in Egypt, then concentrated the frontier field force at Firket, and attacked the main body of the enemy at Ginnis on the 30th of December 1885, completely defeating it and capturing two guns and twenty banners. It was here the new Egyptian army received its baptism of fire and acquitted itself very creditably. Although checked, the dervishes were not discouraged, and continued to press upon the frontier in frequent raids, and thus in many bloody skirmishes the fighting qualities of the Egyptian troops were developed. In April 1886 the frontier was drawn back to Wadi Halfa, a fortified camp at the northern end of the desolate defile, Batn-el-Hagar, through which the Nile tumbles amid black, rocky hills in a succession of rapids, and debouches on a wide plain. The protection of the frontier was now left in the hands of the Egyptian army, a British force remaining at Assuan, 200 m. to the north, as a reserve in case of emergency, and two years later even this precaution was deemed unnecessary.

In October 1886 Wad en Nejumi, the amir who had defeated Hicks Pasha in Kordofan three years before, and led the assault at Khartum when General Gordon was slain in January 1885, replaced Mahommed el Kheir as "commander of the force for the conquest of Egypt," and brought large reinforcements to Dongola. An advanced column under Nur-el-Kanzi occupied Sarras in April 1887, was attacked by the Egyptian force under Colonel H. Chermside on the 28th of that month, and after a stubborn resistance was defeated with great loss. Nur-el-Kanzi was killed and ten standards taken.

Battle of Toski.

The troubles in Darfur and with Abyssinia (q.v.) induced the khalifa to reduce the garrisons of the north; nevertheless, the dervishes reoccupied Sarras, continued active in raids and skirmishes, and destroyed the railway south of Sarras, which during the Nile expedition of 1884 and 1885 had been carried as far as Akasha. It was not until May 1889 that an invasion of the frontier on a large scale was attempted. At this time the power and prestige of the khalifa were at their height: the rebellions in Darfur and Kordofan had been stamped out, the anti-mahdi was dead, and even the dervish defeat by the Abyssinians had been converted by the death of King John and the capture of his body into a success. It was therefore an opportune time to try to sweep the Turks and the British into the sea. On the 22nd of June Nejumi was at Sarras with over 6000 fighting men and 8000 followers. On the 2nd of July Colonel J. Wodehouse headed off a part of this force from the river at Argin, and, after a sharp action, completely defeated it, killing 900, among whom were many important amirs, and taking 500 prisoners and 12 banners, with very small loss to his own troops. A British brigade was on its way up stream, but the sirdar, who had already arrived to take the command in person, decided not to wait for it. The Egyptian troops, with a squadron of the 20th Hussars, concentrated at Toski, and thence, on the 3rd of August, General Grenfell, with slight loss, gained a decisive victory. Wad en Nejumi, most of his amirs, and more than 1200 Arabs were killed; 4000 prisoners and 147 standards were taken, and the dervish army practically destroyed. No further serious attempts were made to disturb the frontier, of which the most southerly outpost was at once advanced to Sarras.

The escape from Omdurman of Father Ohrwalder and of two of the captive nuns in December 1891, of Father Rossignoli in October 1894, and of Slatin Bey in February 1895, revealed the condition of the Sudan to the outside world, threw a vivid light on the rule of the khalifa, and corroborated information already received of the discontent which existed among the tribes with the oppression and despotism under which they lived.

_The Eastern Sudan._--In 1884 Colonel Chermside, governor of the Red Sea littoral, entered into arrangements with King John of Abyssinia for the relief of the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons. Gera, Amadib, Senhit and Gallabat were, in consequence, duly succoured, and their garrisons and Egyptian populations brought away to the coast by the Abyssinians in 1885. Unfortunately famine compelled the garrison of Kassala to capitulate on the 30th of July of that year, and Osman Digna hurried there from Tamai to raise a force with which to meet the Abyssinian general, Ras Alula, who was preparing for its relief. By the end of August Osman Digna had occupied Kufit, in the Barea country, with 10,000 men and entrenched himself. On the 23rd of September Ras Alula attacked him there with an equal number of men and routed him with great slaughter. Over 3000 dervishes with their principal amirs, except Osman Digna, lay dead on the field, and many more were killed in the pursuit. The Abyssinians lost 40 officers and 1500 men killed, besides many more wounded. Instead of marching on to Kassala, Ras Alula, who at this time was much offended by the transfer of Massawa by the Egyptians to Italy, made a triumphant entry into Asmara, and absolutely refused to make any further efforts to extricate Egyptian garrisons from the grip of the khalifa. Meanwhile Osman Digna, who had fled from Kufit to Kassala, wreaked his vengeance upon the unhappy captives at Kassala.

Handub.

Battle of Afafit.

In the neighbourhood of Suakin there were many tribes disaffected to the khalifa's cause, and in the autumn of 1886 Colonel H. Kitchener, who was at the time governor of the Red Sea littoral, judiciously arranged a combination of them to overthrow Osman Digna, with the result that his stronghold at Tamai was captured on the 7th of October, 200 of his men killed, and 50 prisoners, 17 guns and a vast store of rifles and ammunition captured. For about a year there was comparative quiet. Then at the end of 1887 Osman Digna again advanced towards Suakin, but his force at Taroi was routed by the "Friendlies," and he fell back on Handub. Kitchener unsuccessfully endeavoured to capture Osman Digna on the 17th of January 1888, but in the attack was himself severely wounded, and was shortly after invalided. Later in the year Osman Digna collected a large force and besieged Suakin. In December the sirdar arrived with reinforcements from Cairo, and on the 20th sallied out and attacked the dervishes in their trenches at Gemaiza, clearing the whole line and inflicting considerable loss on the enemy, who retired towards Handub, and the country was again fairly quiet for a time. During 1889 and 1890 Tokar became the centre of dervish authority, while Handub continued to be occupied for the khalifa. In January 1891 Osman Digna showed signs of increased activity, and Colonel (afterwards Sir Charles) Holled Smith, then governor of the Red Sea littoral, attacked Handub successfully on the 27th and occupied it, then seized Trinkitat and Teb, and on the 19th of February fought the decisive action of Afafit, occupied Tokar, and drove Osman Digna back to Temrin with a loss of 700 men, including all his chief amirs. This action proved the final blow to the dervish power in the neighbourhood of Suakin, for although raiding continued on a small scale, the tribes were growing tired of the khalifa's rule and refused to support Osman Digna.

In the spring of 1891 an agreement was made between England and Italy by which the Italian forces in Eritrea were at liberty, if they were able, to capture and occupy Kassala, which lay close to the western boundary of their new colony, on condition that they restored it to Egypt at a future day when required to do so. Three years passed before they availed themselves of this agreement. In 1893 the dervishes, 12,000 strong, under Ahmed Ali, invaded Eritrea, and were met on the 29th of December at Agordat by Colonel Arimondi with 2000 men of a native force. Ahmed Ali's force was completely routed and himself killed, and in the following July Colonel Baratieri, with 2500 men, made a fine forced march from Agordat, surprised and captured Kassala on the 17th of that month, and continued to hold it for three years and a half.

_The Abyssinian Frontier._--On the Abyssinian frontier Ras Adal was in
command of a considerable force of Abyssinians early in 1886, and in
June of that year he invaded Gallabat and defeated the dervishes on
the plain of Madana; the dervish amir Mahommed Wad Ardal was killed
and his camp captured. In the following year the amir Yunis ed Dekeim
made two successful raids into Abyssinian territory, upon which Ras
Adal collected an enormous army, said to number 200,000 men, for the
invasion of the Sudan. The khalifa sent the amir Hamdan Abu Angar, a
very skilful leader, with an army of over 80,000 men against him. Abu
Angar entered Abyssinia and, in August 1887, attacked Ras Adal in the
plain of Debra Sin and, after a prolonged battle, defeated the
Abyssinians, captured their camp, and marched on Gondar, the ancient
capital of Abyssinia, which he sacked, and then returned into
Gallabat. King John, the negus of Abyssinia, burning to avenge this
defeat, marched, in February 1889, with an enormous army to Gallabat,
where the amir Zeki Tumal commanded the khalifa's forces, some 60,000
strong, and had strongly fortified the town and the camp. On the 9th
of March 1889 the Abyssinians made a terrific onslaught, stormed and
burnt the town, and took thousands of prisoners. A small party of
dervishes still held a zeriba when King John was struck by a stray
bullet. The Abyssinians decided to retire, fighting ceased, and they
moved off with their prisoners and the wounded negus. That night the
king died, and the greater part of the army having gone ahead with the
prisoners, a party of Arabs pursued the rearguard, which consisted of
the king's bodyguard, routed them, and captured the king's body, which
was sent to Omdurman to confirm the report of a brilliant victory sent
by Zeki Tumal to the khalifa. Internal strife prevented the new negus
of Abyssinia from prosecuting the war, which thus, in spite of the
Abyssinian success, resulted in the increased prestige of the khalifa.
From this time, however, the dervishes ceased to trouble the
Abyssinians.

_Darfur and Kordofan._--On the outbreak of the mahdi's rebellion
Slatin Bey was governor of the province, and when Madibbo, the
insurgent sheikh of Rizighat, attacked and occupied Shakka and was
following up his success, Slatin twice severely defeated him, and,
having concentrated his forces at El Fasher, repulsed the enemy again
at Om Shanga. Mahdism, however, spread over Darfur in spite of
Slatin's efforts to stay it. He fought no fewer than twenty-seven
actions in various parts of his province, but his own troops, in
course of time, became infected with the new faith and deserted him.
He was obliged to surrender at Dara in December 1883, and was a
prisoner, first at Obeid and then at Omdurman, until he escaped in
1895. In January 1884 Zogal, the new dervish amir of the province,
attacked El Fasher, where Said Bey Guma and an Egyptian garrison 1000
strong with 10 guns was still holding out, and captured it. He also
reduced the Jebel Marra district, where the loyal hill-people gave him
some trouble.

After the death of the mahdi in 1885, Madibbo revolted against the
khalifa, but was defeated by Karamalla, the dervish amir of the
Bahr-el-Ghazal, and was caught and executed. A war then sprang up
between Karamalla and Sultan Yusef, who had succeeded Zogal as amir of
Darfur. Yusef was joined in 1887 by Sultan Zayid, the black ruler of
Jebel Marra, and Karamalla's trusted general, Ketenbur, was defeated
with great slaughter at El Towaish on the 29th of June 1887. Osman wad
Adam (Ganu), amir of Kordofan, was sent by the khalifa to Karamalla's
assistance. He forced back the Darfurians near Dara on the 26th of
December, routed Zayid in a second battle, entered El Fasher, and, in
1888, became complete master of the situation, the two sultans being
killed. The Darfurian chiefs then allied themselves with Abu Gemaiza,
sheikh of the Masalit Arabs, who had proclaimed himself "Khalifa
Osman," and was known as the anti-mahdi. The revolt assumed large
proportions, and became the more dangerous to Abdullah, the khalifa,
by reason of its religious character, wild rumours spreading over the
country and reaching to Egypt and Suakin of the advent to power of an
opposition mahdi. Abu Gemaiza attacked a portion of Osman Adam's
force, under Abd-el-Kader, at Kebkebia, 30 m. from El Fasher, and
almost annihilated it on the 16th of October 1888; and a week later
another large force of Osman Adam met with the same fate at the same
place. Instead of following up his victories, Abu Gemaiza retired to
Dar Tama to augment his army, to which thousands flocked as the news
of his achievements spread far and wide. He again advanced to El
Fasher in February 1889, but was seized with smallpox. His army,
however, under Fiki Adam, fought a fierce battle close to El Fasher on
the 22nd, which resulted in its defeat and dispersion, and Abu Gemaiza
himself dying the following day, the movement collapsed.

In 1891 Darfur and Kordofan were again disturbed, and Sultan Abbas
succeeded in turning the dervishes out of the Jebel Marra district.
Two years later a saint of Sokoto, Abu Naal Muzil el Muhan, collected
many followers and for a time threatened the khalifa's power, but the
revolt gradually died out.

_The Bahr-el-Ghazal._--The first outbreak in favour of Mahdism in the
Bahr-el-Ghazal took place at Liffi in August 1882, when the Dinka
tribe, under Jango, revolted and was defeated by Lupton Bey with
considerable slaughter at Tel Gauna, and again in 1883 near Liffi. In
September of that year Lupton's captain, Rufai Aga, was massacred with
all his men at Dembo, and Lupton, short of ammunition, was forced to
retire to Dem Suliman, where he was completely cut off from Khartum.
After gallantly fighting for eighteen months he was compelled by the
defection of his troops to surrender on the 21st of April 1884 to
Karamalla, the dervish amir of the province. He died at Omdurman in
1888.

In 1890 the Shilluks in the neighbourhood of Fashoda rose against the
khalifa, and the dervish amir of Gallabat, Zeki Tumal, was engaged for
two years in suppressing the rebellion. He got the upper hand in 1892,
and was recalled to oppose an Italian force said to be advancing from
Massawa; but on reporting that it was impossible to invade Eritrea, as
the khalifa wished him to do, he was summoned to Omdurman and put to
death. The country then relapsed into its original barbarous
condition, and dervish influence was nominal only. In 1892 the Congo
State expedition established posts up to the seventh parallel of north
latitude. In 1893 the dervish amir, Abu Mariam, fought with the Dinka
tribe and was killed and his force destroyed, the fugitives taking
refuge in Shakka. In the following year the Congo expedition
established further posts, and in consequence the khalifa sent 3000
men, under the amir Khatem Musa, from Shakka to reoccupy the
Bahr-el-Ghazal. The Belgians at Liffi retired before him, and he
entered Faroga. Famine and disease broke out in Khatem Musa's camp in
1895, and a retreat was made towards Kordofan.

_Equatoria._--In the Equatorial Province, which extended from the
Albert Nyanza to Lado, Emin Bey, who had a force of 1300 Egyptian
troops and 3000 irregulars, distributed among many stations, held out,
hoping for reinforcements. In March 1885, however, Amadi fell to the
dervishes, and on the 18th of April Karamalla arrived near Lado, the
capital, and sent to inform Emin of the fall of Khartum. Emin and
Captain Casati, an Italian, moved south to Wadelai, giving up the
northern posts, and opened friendly relations with Kabarega, king of
Unyoro. On the 26th of February 1886 Emin received despatches from
Cairo via Zanzibar, from which he learned all that had occurred during
the previous three years, and that "he might take any step he liked,
should he decide to leave the country." He determined to remain where
he was and "hold together, as long as possible, the remnant of the
last ten years." His troops were in a mutinous state, wishing to go
north rather than south, as Emin had ordered them to do, and
unsuccessfully endeavoured to carry him with them by force.

His communications to Europe through Zanzibar led to the relief
expedition under H. M. Stanley, which went to his rescue by way of the
Congo in 1887, and after encountering incredible dangers and
experiencing innumerable sufferings, met with Emin and Casati at
Nsabe, on the Albert Nyanza, on the 29th of April 1888. Stanley went
back in May to pick up his belated rearguard, leaving Mounteney
Jephson and a small escort to accompany Emin round his province. The
southern garrisons decided to go with Emin, but the troops at Labore
mutinied, and a general revolt broke out, headed by Fadl-el-Maula,
governor of Fabbo. On arriving at Dufile in August 1888, Emin and
Jephson were made prisoners by the Egyptian mutineers. In the meantime
the arrival of Stanley at Lake Albert had caused rumours, which
quickly spread to Omdurman, of a great invading white pasha, with the
result that in July the khalifa sent up the river three steamers and
six barges, containing 4000 troops, to oppose this new-comer. In
October Omar-Saleh, the Mahdist commander, took Rejaf and sent
messengers to Dufile to summon Emin to surrender; but on the 15th of
November the mutineers released both Emin and Jephson, who returned to
Lake Albert with some 600 refugees, and joined Stanley in February
1889. The expedition arrived at Zanzibar at the end of the year.

Emin's mutinous troops kept the dervishes at bay between Wadelai and
Rejaf, and eventually severely defeated them, driving them back to
Rejaf. They did not, however, follow up their victory, and under the
leadership of Fadl-el-Maula Bey remained about Wadelai, while the
dervishes strengthened their post at Rejaf. In 1893 Fadl-el-Maula Bey
and many of his men took service with Baert of the Congo State
expedition. The bey was killed fighting the dervishes at Wandi in
January 1894, and the remnant of his men eventually were found by
Captain Thruston from Uganda on the 23rd of March 1894 at Mahagi, on
the Albert Nyanza, whither they had drifted from Wadelai in search of
supplies. They were enlisted by Thruston and brought back under the
British flag to Uganda.

In consequence of the Franco-Congolese Treaty of 1894, Major
Cunningham and Lieutenant Vandeleur were sent from Uganda to Dufile,
where they planted the British flag on the 15th of January 1895.

SUDAN OPERATIONS, 1896-1900

Dongola campaign, 1896.