Chapter VII: Part 7

To return to the provisions of the London Convention. The convention left the permanent rate of interest on the debt, as fixed by the Law of Liquidation, unchanged, but to afford temporary relief to the Egyptian exchequer a reduction of 5% on the interest of the debt was granted for two years, on condition that if at the end of that period payment, including the arrears of the two years, was not resumed in full, another international commission was to be appointed to examine into the whole financial situation. Lastly, the convention empowered Egypt to raise a loan of nine millions, guaranteed by all the powers, at a rate of interest of 3%. For the service of this loan--known as the Guaranteed loan--an annuity of L315,000 was provided in the Egyptian budget for interest and sinking fund. The L9,000,000 was sufficient to pay the Alexandria indemnities, to wipe out the deficits of the preceding years, to give the Egyptian treasury a working balance of LE.500,000 and thereby avoid the creation of a fresh floating debt, and to provide a million for new irrigation works. To the wise foresight which, at a moment when the country was sinking beneath a weight of debt, did not hesitate to add this million for expenditure on productive works, the present prosperity of Egypt is largely due.

The provisions of the London Convention did not exhaust the restrictions placed upon the Egyptian government in respect of financial autonomy. These restrictions were of two categories, (1) those independent of the London Convention, (2) those dependent upon that instrument. In the first category came (a) the prohibition to raise a loan without the consent of the Porte. The right to raise loans had been granted to the khedive Ismail in 1873, but was taken away in 1879 by the firman appointing Tewfik khedive. (b) Next came the inability to levy taxes on foreigners without the consent of their respective governments. This last obligation was, in virtue of the Capitulations, applicable to Egypt as part of the Ottoman empire. The only exception, resulting from the Ottoman law under which foreigners are allowed to acquire and hold real property, is the land tax. (All taxes formerly paid by natives and not by foreigners have been abolished in Egypt, but the immunity described constitutes a most serious obstacle to the redistribution of the burden of taxation in a more equitable manner.)

From the purely Egyptian point of view the most powerful restriction in this first category remains to be named. In 1883 the supervision exercised over the finances by French and British controllers was replaced by that of a British official called the financial adviser. The British government has declared that "no financial decision shall be taken without his consent," a declaration never questioned by the Egyptian government. This restriction, therefore, is at the same time the chief safeguard for the purity of Egypt's finances.

In the second category of restrictions, namely, those dependent on the London Convention, were the various commissions or boards known as Mixed Administrations and having relations of a quasi-independent character with the ministry of finance. Of these boards by far the most important was the Caisse. As first constituted it consisted of a French, an Austrian, and an Italian member; a British member was added in 1877 and a German and a Russian member in 1885. The revenue assigned to the debt charges was paid direct to the Caisse without passing through the ministry of finance. The assent of the Caisse (as well as that of the sultan) was necessary before any new loan could be issued, and in the course of a few years from its creation this body acquired very extensive powers. Besides the Caisse there was the Railway Board, which administered the railways, telegraphs and port of Alexandria for the benefit of the bondholders, and the Daira and Domains commissions, which administered the estates mortgaged to the holders of those loans. Each of the three boards last named consisted of an Englishman, a Frenchman and an Egyptian.

The race against bankruptcy.

During the two years that followed the signing of the London Convention, the financial policy of the Egyptian government was directed to placing the country in a position to resume full payment of the interest on the debt in 1887, and thereby to avoid the appointment of an international commission. By the exercise of the most rigid economy in all branches this end was attained, though budgetary equilibrium was only secured by a variety of financial expedients, justified by the vital importance of saving Egypt from further international interference. By such means this additional complication was averted, but the struggle to put Egypt in a genuinely solvent position was by no means over. It was not until his report on the financial results of 1888 that Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) was able to inform the British government that the situation was such that "it would take a series of untoward events seriously to endanger the stability of Egyptian finance and the solvency of the Egyptian government." From this moment the corner was turned, and the era of financial prosperity commenced. The results of the labours of the preceding six years began to manifest themselves with a rapidity which surprised the most sanguine observers. The principal feature of the successive Egyptian budgets of 1890-1894 was the fiscal relief afforded to the population. From 1894 onward more attention was paid than had hitherto been possible to the legitimate demands of the spending departments and to the prosecution of public works. Of these the most notable was the construction (1898-1902) of the Assuan dam, which by bringing more land under cultivation permanently increased the resources of the country and widened the area of taxation.

Reserve funds.

With the accumulating proofs of the financial stability of the country various changes were made in connexion with the debt charges. With the consent of the powers a General Reserve Fund was created by decree of the 12th of July 1888, into which was paid the Caisse's half-share in the eventual surplus of revenue. This fund, primarily intended as a security for the bondholders, might be drawn upon for extraordinary expenditure with the consent of the commissioners of the Caisse. Large sums were so advanced for the purposes of drainage and irrigation and other public works, and in relief of taxation. The defect of this arrangement consisted in the necessity of obtaining the consent of the commissioners--a consent sometimes withheld on purely political grounds. At the same time it is believed that but for the faculty given by the decree of 1888 to spend the General Reserve Fund on public works, the financial system elaborated by the London Convention would have broken down altogether. Between 1888 and 1904 about L10,000,000 was devoted from this fund to public works.

In June 1890 the assent of the powers was obtained to the conversion of the Preference (Privileged), Domains and Daira loans on the following conditions, imposed at the initiative of the French government:--

1. The employment of the economies resulting from the conversion was
to be the subject of future agreement with the powers.

2. The Daira loan was to be reimbursed at 85%, instead of 80%, as
provided by the Law of Liquidation.

3. The sales of Domains and Daira lands were to be restricted to
LE.300,000 a year each, thus prolonging the period of liquidation of
those estates.

The interest on the Preference stock was reduced from 5 to 3-1/2%, and on the Domains from 5 to 4-1/4%. As regards the Daira loan, there was no apparent reduction in the rate of interest, which remained at 4%, but the bondholders received L85 of the new stock for every L100 of the old. The capital of the debt was increased by L1,945,000 by these conversions, while the annual economy to the Egyptian government amounted at the time of the conversion to LE.348,000. Further, an engagement was entered into that there should be no reimbursement of the loans till 1905 for the Preference and Daira, and 1908 for the Domains. By an arrangement concluded in June 1898, between the Egyptian government and a syndicate, the unsold balance of the Daira estates was taken over by the syndicate in October 1905, for the amount of the debt remaining, when the Daira loan ceased to exist. The fund formed by the accumulation of the economies resulting from the conversion of the Privileged, Daira and Domains loan was known as the Conversion Economies Fund. The fund could not be used for any purpose without the consent of the powers, and the money paid into it was invested by the Caisse in Egyptian stock. The fund therefore acted as a very expensive sinking fund, the market price of the stock purchased being above par. Up to 1904 the consent of the powers to the employment of this fund for any purpose of public utility was withheld. On the 31st of December of that year the fund amounted to LE.6,031,000. It may be added that besides the General Reserve Fund and the Conversion Economies Fund, there existed another fund called the Special Reserve Fund. This was constituted in 1886 and was chiefly made up of the net savings of the Egyptian government on its share of the annual surpluses from revenue. Of the three funds this last-named was the only one at the absolute disposal of the government. The whole of the extraordinary expenditure of the Sudan campaigns of 1896-1898, with the exception of L800,000 granted by the British government, was paid out of this fund--a sum amounting in round figures to L1,500,000.

An era of prosperity.

Notwithstanding all the hampering conditions stated, the prosperity of the country became more manifest each succeeding year. During the four years 1883-1886, both inclusive, the aggregate deficit amounted to LE.2,606,000. In 1887 there was practical equilibrium in the budget, in 1888 there was a deficit of LE.53,000. In 1889 there was a surplus of LE.218,000, and from that date onward every year has shown a surplus. In 1895 the surplus exceeded, for the first time, LE.1,000,000. The growth of revenue was no less marked. "In 1883--the first complete year after the British occupation--the revenue was slightly under 9 millions. This sum was collected with difficulty. The revenue steadily rose until, in 1890, the figure of 10 millions was exceeded. In 1897 a figure of over 11 millions was attained. Continuing to rise with ever-increasing rapidity, a revenue of close on 12 millions was collected in 1901 and 1902, in spite of the fact that during the latter of these two years the Nile flood was one of the lowest on record. In 1903 the revenue amounted to 12-1/2 millions, and in 1904 the unprecedented figure of LE.13,906,000 was reached."[7] Yet during this period the amount of direct taxation remitted reached LE.1,900,000 a year. Arrears of land tax to the extent of LE.1,245,000 were cancelled. In indirect taxation the salt tax had been reduced by 40%, the postal, railway and telegraph rates lowered, octroi duties and bridge and lock dues abolished. The only increase of taxation had been on tobacco, on which the duty was raised from P.T. 14 to P.T. 20 per kilogramme. At the same time the house duty, with the consent of the powers, had been imposed on European residents. The fact that during the period under review Egypt suffered very severely from the general fall in the price of commodities makes the prosperity of the country the more remarkable. Had it not been for the great increase of production as the result of improved irrigation and the fiscal relief afforded to landowners, the agricultural depression would have impaired the financial situation. In this connexion it should be stated that during 1899 the reassessment of the land tax, a much-needed reform, was seriously taken in hand. The existing assessment, made before the British occupation, had long been condemned by all competent authorities, but the inherent intricacies and difficulties of the problem had hitherto postponed a solution. After careful study and a preliminary examination of the land, a scheme was passed which has given satisfaction to the landowning community, and which distributes the tax equitably in proportion to the fertility of the soil. The reassessment was completed in 1907.

The cost of internationalism.

While the country thus prospered it also suffered greatly from the restrictions imposed by the system of international control. This system produced a great disproportion between the sums available for capital and those available for administrative expenditure. Although the money for public works could be obtained out of grants from the General Reserve Fund, there was no fund from which to provide a sufficient sum to keep those works in order. Moreover, to avoid having to pay half the amount received into the General Reserve Fund the government was compelled to keep certain items of revenue and expenditure out of the accounts altogether--a violation of the principles of sound finance. Then there was the glaring anomaly of allowing the Conversion Economies to accumulate at compound interest in the hands of the commissioners of the Caisse, instead of using the money for remunerative purposes. The net result of internationalism was to impose an extra charge of about L1,750,000 a year on the Egyptian treasury.

Egypt gains financial liberty.

All these cumbersome restrictions were swept away by the khedivial decree of the 28th of November 1904, a decree which received the assent of the powers and was the result of the Anglo-French agreement of April 1904 (see S HISTORY). The decree did not affect the inability of Egypt to tax foreigners without their consent nor remove the right of Turkey to veto the issue of new loans, but in other respects the financial changes made by it were of a radical character. The main effect was to give to the Egyptian government a free hand in the disposal of its own resources so long as the punctual payment of interest on the debt was assured. The plan devised by the London Convention of fixing a limit to administrative expenditure was abolished. The consent of the Caisse to the raising of a new loan was no longer required. The Caisse itself remained, but shorn of all political and administrative powers, its functions being strictly limited to receiving the assigned revenues and to ensuring the due payment of the coupon. The nature of the assigned revenue was altered, the land tax being substituted for those previously assigned, that tax being chosen as it had a greater character of stability than any other source of revenue. By this means Egypt gained complete control of its railways, telegraphs, the port of Alexandria and the customs, and as a consequence the mixed administration known as the Railway Board ceased to exist. Moreover, it was provided that when the Caisse had received from the land tax the amount needed for the service of the debt, the balance of the tax was to be paid direct to the Egyptian treasury. The Conversion Economies Fund was also placed at the free disposal of the Egyptian government. The General Reserve Fund ceased to exist, but for the better security of the bondholders a reserve fund of L1,800,000 was constituted and left in the hands of the Caisse to be used in the highly improbable event of the land tax being insufficient to meet the debt charges. Moreover, the Caisse started under the new arrangement with a cash balance of L1,250,000. The interest of the money lying in the hands of the Caisse goes towards meeting the debt charges and thus reduces the amount needed from the land tax. The bondholders gained a further material advantage by the consent of the Egyptian government to delay the conversion of the loans, which under previous arrangements they would have been free to do in 1905. It was agreed that there should be no conversion of the Guaranteed or Privileged debts before 1910 and no conversion of the Unified debt until 1912. Such were the chief provisions of the khedivial decree, and in 1905, for the first time, it was possible to draw up the Egyptian budget in accordance with the needs of the country and on perfectly sound principles.

In the system adopted in 1905 and since maintained, recurring and
non-recurring expenditure were shown separately, the non-recurring
expenditure being termed "special." At the same time a new General
Reserve Fund was created, made up chiefly of the surpluses of the old
General Reserve, Special Reserve, and Conversion Economies funds. This
new fund started with a capital of L13,376,000 and was replenished by
the surpluses of subsequent years, by the interest earned by its
temporary investment, and by the sums accruing by the liquidation of
the Daira and Domains loans. During 1905 and 1906 about L3,000,000 was
paid into the fund through the liquidation of the Daira loan. From
this fund, which had a balance of over L12,000,000 in 1906, is taken
capital expenditure on remunerative public works in Egypt and the
Sudan, and while the fund lasts the necessity for any new loan is
avoided. The greater freedom of action attained as the result of the
Anglo-French declaration of 1904 enabled the Egyptian government to
advance simultaneously along the lines of fiscal reform and increased
administrative expenditure. Thus in 1906 the salt monopoly was
abolished at a cost to the revenue of L175,000, while the reduction of
import duties on coal and other fuels, live-stock, &c., involved a
further loss of L118,000, and an increase of over L1,000,000 in
expenditure was budgeted for. The accounts for 1907 showed a total
revenue of LE.16,368,000 and a total expenditure of LE.14,280,000, a
surplus of LE.2,088,000. The annual growth of revenue for the previous
five years averaged over LE.500,000. About one-third of the annual
revenue is derived from the land tax; customs and tobacco duties yield
about L3,000,000, and an equal or larger amount is received from
railways and other revenue-earning departments. The chief items of
ordinary expenditure are tribute and debt charges, the expenses of the
civil administration, of the Egyptian army (between L500,000 and
L600,000 yearly), of the revenue-earning departments and of pensions.

It will be convenient here to summarize the position of the Egyptian
debt at the close of 1905, that is at the period immediately following
the liquidation of the Daira loan. In a previous table it has been
shown that under the Law of Liquidation of 1880 the total debt was
L98,640,000. In 1883, the first complete year after the British
occupation, the capital of the debt--then exclusively held by the
public--was L96,457,000. In 1885 the Guaranteed loan, the nominal
capital of which was L9,424,000, was issued, and in 1891 the debt
reached its maximum figure of L106,802,000. At that period the charge
for interest and sinking fund was L4,127,000. On the 31st of December
1905 the total capital of the debt was as follows:--

Guaranteed 3% L7,849,000
Preference 3-1/2% 31,128,000
Unified 4% 55,972,000
Domains 4-1/4% 1,535,000
----------
Total L96,484,000

The charge on account of interest and sinking fund was L3,709,000.
Thus the capital of the debt in 1905 stood at almost the exact figure
it did in 1883, although by borrowing and conversion operations nearly
L17,000,000 had in the meantime been added to the capital. This
reduction was brought about by surplus revenue, and by the operation
of the sinking fund in the case of the Guaranteed loan, while
L15,729,000 had been wiped out by the sale of Daira and Domains
property. These figures do not, however, indicate fully the prosperity
of the country, for although the nominal amount of the capital was
practically identical in 1883 and 1905, in the latter year the
Egyptian government or the Caisse held stock (bought with surplus
revenue) to the value of L8,770,000. The amount of debt in the hands
of the public was therefore only L87,714,000, that is to say
L8,743,000 less than in 1883, while the interest charge to be borne by
the taxpayer of Egypt was L3,378,000, being L890,000 less than in
1883. The charge amounts to about 40% of the national expenditure. On
the other hand, Egypt is not now weighed down with a huge warlike
expenditure. There is no navy to support, and the army costs but 7% of
the total expenditure.

AUTHORITIES.--A concise view of the financial situation in 1877 will
be found in J. C. McCoan's _Egypt as it is_ (London n.d.). Mr Cave's
report is printed in an appendix. The subsequent history of Egyptian
finance is told in the following blue-books, &c.:--_Correspondence
respecting the State Domains of Egypt_ (1883); _Statement of the
Revenue and Expenditure of Egypt, together with a List of the Egyptian
Bonds and the Charges for their Services_ (1885); _Reports on the
Finances of Egypt_, by the British agent, yearly from 1888;
_Convention ... relative to the Finance of Egypt, signed at London,
March 18, 1885; Khedivial decree of the 28th November 1904; Compte
general de l'administration des finances_, issued yearly at Cairo.
Consult also the works of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, and Sir A. Colvin
cited under S History, last section. (E. Go.; F. R. C.)

_The Egyptian Army._

Early history.

The fellah soldier has been aptly likened to a bicycle, which although incapable of standing up alone, is very useful while under the control of a skilful master. It is generally believed that the successes gained in the time of the Pharaohs were due to foreign legions; and from Cambyses to Alexander, from the Ptolemies to Antony (Cleopatra), from Augustus to the 7th century, throughout the Arab period, and from Saladin's dynasty down to the middle of the 13th century, the military power of Egypt was dependent on mercenaries. The Mamelukes (slaves), imported from the eastern borders of the Black Sea and then trained as soldiers, usurped the government of Egypt, and held it till 1517, when the Ottomans began to rule. This form of government, speaking generally, endured till the French invasion at the end of the 18th century. British and Turkish troops drove the French out after an occupation of two years, the British troops remaining till 1803. Then Mehemet Ali, a small tobacconist of Kavala, Macedonia, coming with Albanian mercenaries, made himself governor, and later (1811), by massacring the Mamelukes, became the actual master of the country, and after seven years' war brought Arabia under Egypt's rule. He subdued Nubia and Sennar in 1820-22; and then, requiring a larger army, he obtained instructors from France. To them were handed over 1000 Turks and Circassians to be trained as officers, who later took command of 30,000 Sudanese. These died so rapidly in Egypt from pneumonia[8] that Mehemet Ali conscripted over 250,000 fellahin, and in so arbitrary a fashion that many peasants mutilated themselves to avoid the much-dreaded service. The common practice was to place a small piece of nitrate of silver into the eye, which was then kept tightly bandaged till the sight was destroyed. Battalions were then formed of one-eyed men, and of soldiers who, having cut off their right-hand fingers, were made to shoot from the left shoulder. Every man who could not purchase exemption, with the exception of those living in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, on becoming 19 years old was liable nominally to 12 years' service; but many men were kept for 30 or 40 years, in spite of constant appeals. Nevertheless the experiment succeeded. The docile, yet robust and hardy peasants, under their foreign leaders, gained an unbroken series of successes in the first Syrian War; and after the bloody battle of Konia (1832), where the raw Turkish army was routed and the grand vizier taken prisoner, it was only European intervention which prevented the Egyptian general, Ibrahim Pasha, from marching unopposed to the Bosphorus. The defeat of the Turkish army at Nizib (Nezeeb or Nisib), in the second Syrian War (1839), showed that it was possible to obtain favourable military results with Egyptians when stiffened by foreigners and well commanded. Ibrahim, the hero of Konia, declared, however, that no native Egyptian ought to rise higher than the rank of sergeant; and in the Syrian campaigns nearly all the officers were Turks or Circassians, as were several non-commissioned officers. In the cavalry and artillery many of the privates were foreigners, numbers of the janissaries who escaped the massacre at Stamboul (1832) having joined Mehemet Ali's army.

In the reign of Abbas, who succeeded Mehemet Ali, the Egyptian troops were driven from Nejd, and the Wahhabi state recovered its independence. The next viceroy, Said, began as an ardent soldier, but took to agriculture, and at his death (1863) 3000 men only were retained under arms. Ismail, on succeeding, immediately added 27,000 men, and in seven years was able to put 100,000 men, well equipped, in the field. He sent 10,000 men to help to suppress a rebellion in Crete, and conquered the greater part of the (Nile) Sudan; but an expedition of 11,000 men, sent to Abyssinia under Prince Hasan and Rateb Pasha, well equipped with guns and all essentials, was, in two successive disasters (1875 and 1876), practically destroyed. The education of Egyptians in continental cities had not produced the class of leaders who led the fellahin to victory at Konia.

Ismail's exactions from the Egyptian peasantry reacted on the army, causing discontent; and when he was tottering on the throne he instigated military demonstrations against his own government, and, by thus sapping the foundations of discipline, assisted Arabi's revolution; the result was the battle of Tell el-Kebir, the British occupation, and the disbandment of the army, which at that time in Egypt proper consisted of 18,000 men. Ismail had collected 500 field-guns, 200 Armstrong cannon, and had created factories of warlike and other stores. These latter were conducted extravagantly, and badly administered.

Reorganization.

In January 1883, Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., was given L200,000, and directed to spend it in raising a fellahin force of 6000 men for the defence of Egypt. He was assisted at first by 26 officers, amongst whom were two who later became successively sirdars--Colonel F. Grenfell, commanding a brigade, and Lieutenant H. Kitchener, R.E., second in command of the cavalry regiment. There were four batteries, eight battalions, and a camel company. Each battalion of the 1st infantry brigade had three British mounted officers, Turks and Egyptians holding the corresponding positions in the battalions of the 2nd Brigade. The sirdar selected these native officers from those of Arabi's followers who had been the least prominent in the recent mutiny; non-commissioned officers who had been drill-instructors in the old army were recalled temporarily, but all the privates were conscripted from their villages. The earlier merciless practice had been in theory abolished by a decree based on the German system, published in 1880; but owing to defective organization, and internal disturbances induced by Khedive Ismail's follies, the law had not been applied, and the 6000 recruits collected at Cairo in January 1883 represented the biggest and strongest peasants who could not purchase exemption by bribing the officials concerned. The difficulties experienced in applying the 1880 decree were great, but the perseverance of British officers gave the oppressed peasants, in 1885, an equitable law, which has been since improved by the decree of 1900. General considerations later caused the sirdar to allow exemption by payment of (Badalia) L20 before ballot. This tax, which is popular amongst the peasantry, produced in 1906 LE.150,000, and over L250,000 in 1908. This is a marked indication of the increasing prosperity of the fellahin. A portion of the badalia is expended in the betterment of the soldier's position. He is no longer drafted into the police on completing his army service, but goes free at the end of five years with a gift of LE.20. The sirdar is allowed, moreover, to use L20,000 per annum of the badalia for the improvement of the education of the rank and file. As an experiment the police is now a voluntary service, except in Alexandria and Cairo, for which cities peasants are conscripted for the police under army conditions. The recruiting superintending committee, travelling through districts, supervise every ballot, and work under stringent rules which render systematic bribery difficult. The recruits who draw unlucky numbers at 19 years of age are seldom called up till they are 23, when they are summoned by name and escorted by a policeman to Cairo. To prevent substitution on the journey each recruit wears a string girdle sealed in lead. The periods of service are: with the colours, 5 years; in the reserve, 5 years, during which time they may be called up for police service, manoeuvres, &c. The pay is LE.3, 14s. per annum for all services, and the liberal scale of rations of meat, bread and rice remains as before in theory, but in practice the value of pay and food received is greatly enhanced. So also with the pension and promotion regulations. They were in 1882 sufficiently liberal on paper, but had never been carried into effect.

The efforts of 48 American officers, who under Gen. C. P. Stone zealously served Ismail, had entirely failed to overcome Egyptian venality and intrigue; and in spite of the military schools, with a comprehensive syllabus, the only perceptible difference between the Egyptian officer and private in 1879 consisted, according to one of the Americans, in the fact that the first was the product of the harem, and the second of the field. Marshal Marmont, writing in 1839, mentions the capacity of the Egyptians for endurance; and it was tested in 1883, especially in the 2nd Brigade, since its officers (Turks and Egyptians), anxious to excel as drill-masters, worked their men not only from morn till eve, but also by lamplight in the corridors of the barracks. On the 31st March 1883, ten weeks after the arrival of the first draft of recruits, about 5600 men went through the ceremonial parade movements as practised by the British guards in Hyde Park, with unusual precision. The British officers had acquired the words of command in Turkish, as used in the old army, an attempt to substitute Egyptian words having failed owing to lack of crisp, sharp-sounding words. As the Egyptian brigadier, who had spent some years in Berlin, spoke German fluently, and it was also understood by the senior British officers, that language was used for all commands given by the sirdar on that special parade. The British drill-book, minus about one-third of the least serviceable movements, was translated by an English officer, and by 1900 every necessary British official book had been published in English and Arabic, except the new Recruiting Law (1885) and a manufacturing manual, for which French and Arabic editions are in use. The discipline of the old army had been regulated by a translation of part of the Code Napoleon, which was inadequate for an Eastern army, and the sirdar replaced it by the British Army Act of 1881, slightly modified, and printed in Arabic.

The task undertaken by the small body of British officers was difficult. There was not one point in the former administration of the army acceptable to English gentlemen. That there had been no adequate auxiliary departments, without which an army cannot move or be efficient, was comparatively a minor difficulty. To succeed, it was essential that the fellah should be taught that discipline might be strict without being oppressive, that pay and rations would be fairly distributed, that brutal usage by superiors would be checked, that complaints would be thoroughly investigated, and impartial justice meted out to soldiers of all ranks. An epidemic of cholera in the summer of 1883 gave the British officers their first chance of acquiring the esteem and confidence of their men, and the opportunity was nobly utilized. While the patient fellah, resigned to the decrees of the Almighty, saw the ruling Egyptian class hurry away from Cairo, he saw also those of his comrades who were stricken tenderly nursed, soothed in death's struggles, and in many cases actually washed, laid out and interred by their new self-sacrificing and determined masters. The regeneration of the fellahin army dates from that epidemic.

When the Egyptian Army of the Delta was dispersed at Tell el-Kebir, the khedive had 40,000 troops in the Sudan, scattered from Massawa on the Red Sea to 1200 m. towards the west, and from Wadi Halfa, 1500 m. southward to Wadelai, near Albert Nyanza. These were composed of Turks, Albanians, Circassians and some Sudanese. Ten thousand fellahin, collected in March 1883, mainly from Arabi's former forces, set out from Duem, 100 m. south of Khartum, in September 1883, under Hicks Pasha, a dauntless retired Indian Army officer, to vanquish the Mahdi. They disappeared in the deserts of Kordofan, where they were destroyed by the Mahdists about 50 m. south of El Obeid. In the wave of successful rebellion, except at Khartum, few of the Egyptian garrisons were killed when the posts fell, long residence and local family ties rendering easy their assimilation in the ranks of the Mahdists.

Baker Pasha, with about 4000 constabulary, who were old soldiers, attempted to relieve Tokar in February 1884. He was attacked by 1200 tribesmen and utterly routed, losing 4 Krupp guns, 2 machine guns and 3000 rifles. Only 1400 Egyptians escaped the slaughter.

The sirdar made an attempt to raise a battalion of Albanians, but the few men obtained mutinied when ordered to proceed to the Sudan, and it was deemed advisable, after the ringleaders had been executed, to abandon the idea, and rely on blacks to stiffen the fellahin. Then the 9th (Sudanese) Battalion was created for service at Suakin, and four others having been successively added, these (with one exception--at Gedaref) have since borne the brunt of all the fighting which has been done by the khedivial troops. The Egyptian troops in the operations near Suakin behaved well; and there were many instances of personal gallantry by individual soldiers. In the autumn of 1884, when a British expedition went up the Nile to endeavour to relieve the heroic Gordon, besieged in Khartum, the Egyptians did remarkably good work on the line of communication from Assiut to Korti, a distance of 800 m., and the training and experience thus gained were of great value in all subsequent operations. The honesty and discipline of the fellah were shown to be undoubtedly of a high order. When the crews of the whale-boats were conveying stores, the forwarding officers tried to keep brandy and such like medical comforts from the European crews, coffee and tea from Canadian voyageurs and sugar from Kroo boys. The only immaculate carrier was the Egyptian. A large sum of specie having failed under British escort to reach Dongola, an equivalent sum was handed to an Egyptian lieutenant of six months' service, with 10 men, and duly reached its destination.

Twelve years later the standard of honesty was unimpaired, and the British officers had imparted energy and activity into Egyptians of all ranks. The intelligent professional knowledge of the native officers, taught under British gentlemen, and the constant hard work cheerfully rendered by the fellah soldiers, were the main factors of the success achieved at Omdurman on the 2nd of September 1898. The large depots of stores at Assuan, Halfa and Dongola could only be cursorily supervised by British officers, and yet when the stores were received at the advance depot the losses were infinitesimal.

Character of Egyptian soldier.

By nature the fellah is unwarlike. Born in the valley of a great river, he resembles in many respects the Bengali, who exists under similar conditions; but the Egyptian has proved capable of greater improvement. He is stronger in frame, and can undergo greater exertion. Singularly unemotional, he stood steady at Tell el-Kebir after Arabi Pasha and all his officers, from general to subaltern, had fled, and gave way only when decimated by the British field artillery firing case shot. At El Teb, however, in 1884 he allowed himself to be slaughtered by tribesmen formerly despised, and only about one-fourth of the force under General Valentine Baker escaped. Baker Pasha's force was termed constabulary, yet his men were all old soldiers, though new to their gallant leader and to the small band of their brave but strange British officers. Since that fatal day, however, many of the fellahin have shown they are capable of devoted conduct, and much has been done to raise in the soldiers a sense of self-respect, and, in spite of centuries of oppression, of veracity. The barrack-square drill was smart under the old system, but there was no fire discipline, and all individuality was crushed. Now both are encouraged, and the men, receiving their full rations, are unsurpassable in endurance at work and in marching. All the troops present in the surprise fight when the Dervish force was destroyed at Firket in June 1896 had covered long distances, and one battalion (the 10th Sudanese) accomplished 90 m. within 72 hours, including the march back to railhead immediately after the action. The troops under Colonel Parsons, Royal Artillery, who beat the Dervishes at Gedaref, were so short of British officers that all orders were necessarily given in Arabic and carried to commanders of units by Arabs. While an Egyptian battalion was attacking in line, it was halted to repel a rush from the rear, and front and rear ranks were simultaneously engaged, firing in opposite directions--yet the fellahin were absolutely steady; they shot well and showed no signs of trepidation. On the other hand, neither was there any exultation after their victory. It has been aptly said "the fellah would make an admirable soldier if he only wished to kill some one!" The fellahin furnish three squadrons, five batteries, three garrison artillery companies and nine battalions.

The well-educated Egyptian officer, with his natural aptitude for figures, does subordinate regimental routine carefully, and works well when supervised by men of stronger character. The ordinary Egyptian is not self-reliant or energetic by nature, and, like most Eastern people, finds it difficult to be impartial where duty and family or other personal relations are in the balance. The black soldier has, on the other hand, many of the finest fighting qualities. This was observed by British officers, from the time of the preliminary operations about Kosha and at the action near Ginnis in December 1885 down to the brilliant operations in the pursuit of the Mahdists on the Blue Nile after the action of Gedaref (subsequent to the battle of Omdurman), and the fighting in Kordofan in 1899, which resulted in the death of the khalifa and his amirs.

Black soldiers served in the army of Mehemet Ali, but their fighting value was not then duly appreciated. Prior to the death of the khalifa, many of his soldiers deserted to join their brethren who had been captured by the sirdar's troops, during the gradual advance up the Nile. After 1899 many more enlisted: the greater number were Shilluks and Dinkas coming from the country between Fashoda and the equatorial provinces, but a proportion came from the western borders of the Sudan, and some from Wadai and Bornu. Many were absolute savages, difficult to control, wayward and thoughtless like children. Sudanese are very excitable and apt to get out of hand; unlike the fellahs they are not fond of drill, and are slow to acquire it; but their dash, pugnacious instincts and desire to close with an enemy, are valuable military qualities. The Sudanese, moreover, shoot better than the fellahin, whose eyesight is often defective. The Sudanese captain can seldom read or write, and is therefore in the hands of the Egyptian-born company quartermaster-sergeant as regards pay and clothing accounts. He is slow, and as a rule has little knowledge of drill. Nevertheless he is self-reliant, much respected by his men, and can be trusted in the field to carry out any orders received from his British officer. The most efficient companies in the Sudanese battalions are apparently those in which the captain is a black and the lieutenants are Egyptians.

In 1908 the Egyptian army, with a total establishment of 18,000,
consisted of three squadrons of cavalry (one composed of Sudanese)
each numbering 116 men; four batteries of field artillery and a Maxim
battery, horses and mules being used, with a total strength of 1257 of
all ranks; the camel corps, 626 of all ranks (fellahin and Sudanese);
and nine fellahin and six Sudanese infantry battalions, 10,631 of all
ranks. Every battalion receives two additional companies on
mobilization and takes the field with six companies.

The armament of the infantry is Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet; of
the cavalry, lance, sword and carbine.

There are seven gunboats on the Nile.

The medical department (reorganized in 1883 by Surgeon-Major J. G.
Rogers at the time of the cholera epidemic) controls in peace fourteen
station hospitals, and in war furnishes a mobile field hospital to
each brigade. There are also veterinary station hospitals. The supply
department controls mills at Tura, Halfa and Khartum.

The stringent system of selecting British officers, originated by the
first sirdar in 1883, is shown by the fact that of the 24 employed in
creating the army, 14 rose to be generals. The competition for
employment in the army is still severe. In 1908 there were 140 British
warrant and non-commissioned officers. Four of the fellahin battalions
were officered by Orientals; in the other five, British officers
commanded. Seven officers were employed with the artillery, six with
the camel corps. Each of the Sudanese battalions had four British
officers, and each squadron of cavalry one. Twelve medical and two
veterinary officers are also employed departmentally, as well as
officers acting as directors of supply, &c. Since the assumption of
command by the third sirdar, Colonel (afterwards Lord) Kitchener, the
ordnance, supply and engineer services have been separately
administered, and a financial secretary is charged with the duty of
preparing the budget, making contracts, &c. The total annual
expenditure is L500,000.

The reorganized military school system under British control, for
supplying officers, dates from 1887. The course lasts for about two
years, and two hundred students can be accommodated. After the
reconquest of the Sudan one-fourth of the cadets in the military
school of Cairo were Sudanese. Later, however, the Sudanese cadets
were transferred to a branch school at Khartum.

The army raised by the first sirdar in January 1883 was highly
commended for its work on the line of communication in 1884-1885, and
its artillery and camelry distinguished themselves in the action at
Kirbekan in February 1885. Colonel Sir Francis Grenfell succeeded
General Sir Evelyn Wood in March 1885, and while under his command the
army continued to improve, and fought successful actions at Gemaiza,
Argin, Toski and Tokar. At Toski the Dervish force was nearly
annihilated. In March 1892 Colonel Kitchener succeeded General Sir
Francis Grenfell, and four years later began his successful reconquest
of the Sudan. In June 1896, owing to the indefatigable exertions of
Major Wingate, a perfected system of secret intelligence enabled the
sirdar to bring an overwhelming force of 6 to 1 against the Dervish
outpost at Firket and destroy it. In September 1896 a skirmish at
Hafir, with similarly successful tactics, gave the British commander
the possession of Dongola. On the 7th of August 1897 Colonel Hunter
surprised and annihilated a weak Dervish garrison at Abu Hamed, to
which place, by the 31st of October 1897, a railway had been laid
across the Nubian desert from Wadi Halfa, a distance of 230 m., the
"record" construction of 5300 yds surveyed, embanked and laid in one
day having been attained. On the 26th of December 1897 the Italian
troops handed over Kassala to Colonel Parsons, R.A. On the 8th of
April 1898 a British division, with the Egyptian army, destroyed the
Dervish force under the amir Mahmud Ahmed, on the Atbara river. On the
2nd of September the khalifa attacked the British-Egyptian troops at
Kerreri (near Omdurman), and being routed, his men dispersed; Khartum
was occupied, and on the 19th of September the Egyptian flag was
rehoisted at Fashoda. On the 22nd of September 1898 Gedaref was taken
from the amir Ahmed Fedil by Colonel Parsons, and on the 26th of
December the army of Ahmed Fedil was finally defeated and dispersed
near Roseires. The khalifa's army, reduced to an insignificant number,
after several unsuccessful engagements withdrew to the west of the
Nile, where it was attacked, on the 24th of November 1899, after a
forced march by Colonel Wingate, and annihilated. The khalifa himself
was killed; while the victor, who had joined the Egyptian army in 1883
as aide-de-camp to the first sirdar, in December 1899 became the
fourth sirdar, as Major-General Sir F. R. Wingate, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., &c. (E. Wo.)

II. ANCIENT EGYPT

A. _Exploration and Research._--Owing to its early development of a high civilization with written records, its wealth, and its preservative climate, Egypt is the country which most amply repays archaeological research. It is especially those long ages during which Egypt was an independent centre of culture and government, before its absorption in the Persian empire in the 6th century B.C., that make the most powerful appeal to the imagination and can often justify this appeal by the splendour of the monuments representing them. Later, however, the history of Hellenism, the provincial history of the Roman empire, the rise of Christianity and the triumph of Islam successively receive brilliant illustration in Egypt.

As early as the 17th century travellers began to bring home specimens of ancient Egyptian handiwork: a valuable stele from Sakkara of the beginning of the Old Kingdom was presented to the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford in 1683. In the following century the Englishman R. Pococke (1704-1765), the Dane F. L. Norden (1708-1742), both travelling in 1737, and others later, planned, described or figured Egyptian ruins in a primitive way and identified many of the sites with cities named in classical authors. Napoleon's great military expedition in 1798 was accompanied by a scientific commission including artists and archaeologists, the results of whose labours fill several of the magnificent volumes of the _Description de l'Egypte_. The antiquities collected by the expedition, including the famous Rosetta stone, were ceded to the British government at the capitulation of Alexandria, in 1801. Thereafter Mehemet Ali threw Egypt freely open to Europeans, and a busy traffic in antiquities began, chiefly through the agency of the consuls of different powers. From the year 1820 onwards the growth of the European collections was rapid, and Champollion's decipherments (see below, S "Language and Writing") of the hieroglyphic inscriptions, dating from 1821, added fresh impetus to the fashion of collecting, in spite of doubts as to their trustworthiness. In 1827 a combined expedition led by Champollion and Rosellini was despatched by the governments of France and Tuscany, and accomplished a great deal of valuable work in copying scenes and inscriptions. But the greatest of such expeditions was that of Lepsius, under the auspices of the Prussian government, in 1842-1845. Its labours embraced not only Egypt and Nubia (as far as Khartum) but also the Egyptian monuments in Sinai and Syria; its immense harvest of material is of the highest value, the new device of taking paper impressions or "squeezes" giving Lepsius a great advantage over his predecessors, similar to that which was later conferred by the photographic camera.

A new period was opened in Egyptian exploration in 1858 when Mariette was appointed director of archaeological works in Egypt, his duties being to safeguard the monuments and prevent their exploitation by dealers. As early as 1835 Mehemet Ali had given orders for a museum to be formed; little however, was accomplished before the whole of the resulting collection was given away to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria in 1855. Mariette, who was appointed by the viceroy Said Pasha at the instance of the French government, succeeded in making his office effective and permanent, in spite of political intrigues and the whims of an Oriental ruler; he also secured a building on the island of Bulak (Bulaq) for a viceregal museum in which the results of his explorations could be permanently housed. Supported by the French interest, the established character of this work as a department of the Egyptian government (which also claims the ancient sites) has been fully recognized since the British occupation. The "Service of Antiquities" now boasts a large annual budget and employs a number of European and native officials--a director, curators of the museum, European inspectors and native sub-inspectors of provinces (at Luxor for Upper Egypt and Nubia, at Assiut for Middle Egypt and the Fayum, at Mansura for Lower Egypt, besides a European official in charge of the government excavations at Memphis). The museum, no longer the property of an individual, was removed in 1889 from the small building at Bulak to a disused palace at Giza, and since 1902 has been established at Kasr-en-Nil, Cairo, in a special building, of ample size and safe from fire and flood. In the year 1881 the directorship of the museum was temporarily undertaken by Prof. Maspero, who resumed it in 1899. The admirably conducted Archaeological Survey of the portion of Nubia threatened by the raising of the Assuan dam is in the charge of another department--the Survey department, directed for many years up to 1909 by Captain H. G. Lyons. Non-official agencies (supported by voluntary contributions) for exploration in Egypt comprise the Egypt Exploration Fund, started in London in 1881, with its two branches, viz. the Archaeological Survey (1890) for copying and publishing the monuments above ground, and the Graeco-Roman Branch (1897), well known through the brilliant work in Greek papyri of B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt; and the separate Research Account founded by Professor W. M. Flinders Petrie in London (University College) in 1896, and since 1905 called the British School of Archaeology in Egypt (see especially MEMPHIS). The _Mission archeologique francaise au Caire_, established as a school by the French government in 1881, was re-organized in 1901 on a lavish scale under the title _Institut francais d'archeologie orientale du Caire_, and domiciled with printing-press and library in a fine building near the museum. As the result of an excellent bargain, it was afterwards removed to the Munira palace in the south-east part of the city. An archaeologist is attached to the German general consulate to look after the interests of German museums, and is director of the German Institute of Archaeology. The Orient-Gesellschaft (German Orient-Society) has worked in Egypt since 1901 with brilliant results. Excavations and explorations are also conducted annually by the agents of universities and museums in England, America and Germany, and by private explorers, concessions being granted generally on the terms that the Egyptian government shall retain half of the antiquities discovered, while the other half remains for the finders.

The era of scientific excavation began with Flinders Petrie's work at Tanis in 1883. Previous explorers kept scientific aims in view, but the idea of scientific archaeology was not realized by them. The procedure in scientific excavation is directed to collecting and interpreting all the information that can be obtained from the excavation as to the history and nature of the site explored, be it town, temple, house, cemetery or individual grave, wasting no evidence that results from it touching the endless problems which scientific archaeology affords--whether in regard to arts and crafts, manners and customs, language, history or beliefs. This is a totally different thing from mere hunting for inscriptions, statues or other portable objects which will present a greater or less value in themselves even when torn from their context. Such may, of course, form the greater part of the harvest and working material of a scientific excavator; their presence is most welcome to him, but their complete absence need be no bar to his attainment of important historical results. The absence of scientific excavation in Egypt was deplored by the Scottish archaeologist Alexander Henry Rhind (1833-1863), as early as 1862. Since Flinders Petrie began, the general level of research has gradually risen, and, while much is shamefully bad and destructive, there is a certain proportion that fully realizes the requirements of scientific archaeology.

_Antiquities, Sites, &c._--The remains for archaeological investigation in Egypt may be roughly classified as material and literary: to the latter belong the texts on papyri and the inscriptions, to the former the sites of ancient towns with the temples, fortifications and houses; remains of roads, canals, quarries and other matters falling within the domain of ancient topography; the larger monuments, as obelisks, statues, stelae, &c.; and finally the small antiquities--utensils, clothes, weapons, amulets, &c. Where moisture can reach the antiquities their preservation is no better in Egypt than it would have been in other countries; for this reason all the papyri in the Delta have perished unless they happen to have been charred by fire. A terrible pest is a kind of termite which is locally abundant and has probably visited most parts of Egypt at one time or another, destroying all dead vegetable or animal material in the soil that was not specially protected.