Chapter V: Front Matter (5)

Between 1830 and 1848 Humboldt was frequently employed in diplomatic missions to the court of Louis Philippe, with whom he always maintained the most cordial personal relations. The death of his brother, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who expired in his arms, on the 8th of April 1836, saddened the later years of his life. In losing him, Alexander lamented that he had "lost half himself." The accession of the crown prince, as Frederick William IV., on the death of his father, in June 1840, added to rather than detracted from his court favour. Indeed, the new king's craving for his society became at times so importunate as to leave him only some hours snatched from sleep for the prosecution of his literary labours.

It is not often that a man postpones to his seventy-sixth year, and then successfully executes, the crowning task of his life. Yet this was Humboldt's case. The first two volumes of the _Kosmos_ were published, and in the main composed, between the years 1845 and 1847. The idea of a work which should convey, not only a graphic description, but an imaginative conception of the physical world--which should support generalization by details, and dignify details by generalization, had floated before his mind for upwards of half a century. It first took definite shape in a set of lectures delivered by him before the university of Berlin in the winter of 1827-1828. These lectures formed, as his latest biographer expresses it, "the cartoon for the great fresco of the _Kosmos_." The scope of this remarkable work may be briefly described as the representation of the unity amid the complexity of nature. In it the large and vague ideals of the 18th are sought to be combined with the exact scientific requirements of the 19th century. And, in spite of inevitable shortcomings, the attempt was in an eminent degree successful. Nevertheless, the general effect of the book is rendered to some extent unsatisfactory by its tendency to substitute the indefinite for the infinite, and thus to ignore, while it does not deny, the existence of a power outside and beyond nature. A certain heaviness of style, too, and laborious picturesqueness of treatment make it more imposing than attractive to the general reader. But its supreme and abiding value consists in its faithful reflection of the mind of a great man. No higher eulogium can be passed on Alexander von Humboldt than that, in attempting, and not unworthily attempting, to portray the universe, he succeeded still more perfectly in portraying his own comprehensive intelligence.

The last decade of his long life--his "improbable" years, as he was accustomed to call them--was devoted to the continuation of this work, of which the third and fourth volumes were published in 1850-1858, while a fragment of a fifth appeared posthumously in 1862. In these he sought to fill up what was wanting of detail as to individual branches of science in the sweeping survey contained in the first volume. Notwithstanding their high separate value, it must be admitted that, from an artistic point of view, these additions were deformities. The characteristic idea of the work, so far as such a gigantic idea admitted of literary incorporation, was completely developed in its opening portions, and the attempt to convert it into a scientific encyclopaedia was in truth to nullify its generating motive. Humboldt's remarkable industry and accuracy were never more conspicuous than in the erection of this latest trophy to his genius. Nor did he rely entirely on his own labours. He owed much of what he accomplished to his rare power of assimilating the thoughts and availing himself of the co-operation of others. He was not more ready to incur than to acknowledge obligations. The notes to _Kosmos_ overflow with laudatory citations, the current coin in which he discharged his intellectual debts.

On the 24th of February 1857 Humboldt was attacked with a slight apoplectic stroke, which passed away without leaving any perceptible trace. It was not until the winter of 1858-1859 that his strength began to decline, and on the ensuing 6th of May he tranquilly expired, wanting but six months of completing his ninetieth year. The honours which had been showered on him during life followed him after death. His remains, previously to being interred in the family resting-place at Tegel, were conveyed in state through the streets of Berlin, and received by the prince-regent with uncovered head at the door of the cathedral. The first centenary of his birth was celebrated on the 14th of September 1869, with equal enthusiasm in the New and Old Worlds; and the numerous monuments erected in his honour, and newly explored regions called by his name, bear witness to the universal diffusion of his fame and popularity.

Humboldt never married, and seems to have been at all times more social than domestic in his tastes. To his brother's family he was, however, much attached; and in his later years the somewhat arbitrary sway of an old and faithful servant held him in more than matrimonial bondage. By a singular example of weakness, he executed, four years before his death, a deed of gift transferring to this man Seifert the absolute possession of his entire property. It is right to add that no undue advantage appears to have been taken of this extraordinary concession. Of the qualities of his heart it is less easy to speak than of those of his head. The clue to his inner life might probably be found in a certain egotism of self-culture scarcely separable from the promptings of genius. Yet his attachments, once formed, were sincere and lasting. He made innumerable friends; and it does not stand on record that he ever lost one. His benevolence was throughout his life active and disinterested. His early zeal for the improvement of the condition of the miners in Galicia and Franconia, his consistent detestation of slavery, his earnest patronage of rising men of science, bear witness to the large humanity which formed the ground-work of his character. The faults of his old age have been brought into undue prominence by the injudicious publication of his letters to Varnhagen von Ense. The chief of these was his habit of smooth speaking, almost amounting to flattery, which formed a painful contrast with the caustic sarcasm of his confidential utterances. His vanity, at all times conspicuous, was tempered by his sense of humour, and was so frankly avowed as to invite sympathy rather than provoke ridicule. After every deduction has been made, he yet stands before us as a colossal figure, not unworthy to take his place beside Goethe as the representative of the scientific side of the culture of his country.

The best biography of Humboldt is that of Professor Karl Bruhns (3
vols., 8vo, Leipzig, 1872), translated into English by the Misses
Lassell in 1873. Brief accounts of his career are given by A. Dove in
_Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, and by S. Gunther in _Alexander von
Humboldt_ (Berlin, 1900). The _Voyage aux regions equinoxiales du
Nouveau Continent, fait en 1799-1804, par Alexandre de Humboldt et
Aime Bonpland_ (Paris, 1807, &c.), consisted of thirty folio and
quarto volumes, and comprised a considerable number of subordinate but
important works. Among these may be enumerated _Vue des Cordilleres et
monuments des peuples indigenes de l'Amerique_ (2 vols. folio, 1810);
_Examen critique de l'histoire de la geographie du Nouveau Continent_
(1814-1834); _Atlas geographique et physique du royaume de la Nouvelle
Espagne_ (1811); _Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle
Espagne_ (1811); _Essai sur la geographie des plantes_ (1805, now very
rare); and _Relation historique_ (1814-1825), an unfinished narrative
of his travels, including the _Essai politique sur l'ile de Cuba_. The
_Nova genera et species plantarum_ (7 vols. folio, 1815-1825),
containing descriptions of above 4500 species of plants collected by
Humboldt and Bonpland, was mainly compiled by C. S. Kunth; J. Oltmanns
assisted in preparing the _Recueil d'observations astronomiques_
(1808); Cuvier, Latreille, Valenciennes and Gay-Lussac cooperated in
the _Recueil d'observations de zoologie et d'anatomie comparee_
(1805-1833), Humboldt's _Ansichten der Natur_ (Stuttgart and Tubingen,
1808) went through three editions in his lifetime, and was translated
into nearly every European language. The results of his Asiatic
journey were published in _Fragments de geologie et de climatologie
asiatiques_ (2 vols. 8vo, 1831), and in _Asie centrale_ (3 vols. 8vo,
1843)--an enlargement of the earlier work. The memoirs and papers read
by him before scientific societies, or contributed by him to
scientific periodicals, are too numerous for specification.

Since his death considerable portions of his correspondence have been
made public. The first of these, in order both of time and of
importance, is his _Briefe an Varnhagen von Ense_ (Leipzig, 1860).
This was followed in rapid succession by _Briefwechsel mit einem
jungen Freunde_ (Friedrich Althaus, Berlin, 1861); _Briefwechsel mit
Heinrich Berghaus_ (3 vols., Jena, 1863); _Correspondance scientifique
et litteraire_ (2 vols., Paris, 1865-1869); "Lettres a Marc-Aug.
Pictet," published in _Le Globe_, tome vii. (Geneva, 1868); _Briefe an
Bunsen_ (Leipzig, 1869); _Briefe zwischen Humboldt und Gauss_ (1877);
_Briefe an seinen Bruder Wilhelm_ (Stuttgart, 1880); _Jugendbriefe an
W. G. Wegener_ (Leipzig, 1896); besides some other collections of less
note. An octavio edition of Humboldt's principal works was published
in Paris by Th. Morgand (1864-1866). See also Karl von Baer, _Bulletin
de l'acad. des sciences de St-Petersbourg_, xvii. 529 (1859); R.
Murchison, _Proceedings, Geog. Society of London_, vi. (1859); L.
Agassiz, _American Jour. of Science_, xxviii. 96 (1859); _Proc. Roy.
Society_, X. xxxix.; A. Quetelet, _Annuaire de l'acad. des sciences_
(Brussels, 1860), p. 97; J. Madler, _Geschichte der Himmelskunde_, ii.
113; J. C. Houzeau, _Bibl. astronomique_, ii. 168. (A. M. C.)

HUMBOLDT, KARL WILHELM VON (1767-1835), German philologist and man of letters, the elder brother of the more celebrated Alexander von Humboldt, was born at Potsdam, on the 22nd of June 1767. After being educated at Berlin, Gottingen and Jena, in the last of which places he formed a close and lifelong friendship with Schiller, he married Fraulein von Dacherode, a lady of birth and fortune, and in 1802 was appointed by the Prussian government first resident and then minister plenipotentiary at Rome. While there he published a poem entitled _Rom_, which was reprinted in 1824. This was not, however, the first of his literary productions; his critical essay on Goethe's _Hermann und Dorothea_, published in 1800, had already placed him in the first rank of authorities on aesthetics, and, together with his family connexions, had much to do with his appointment at Rome; while in the years 1795 and 1797 he had brought out translations of several of the odes of Pindar, which were held in high esteem. On quitting his post at Rome he was made councillor of state and minister of public instruction. He soon, however, retired to his estate at Tegel, near Berlin, but was recalled and sent as ambassador to Vienna in 1812 during the exciting period which witnessed the closing struggles of the French empire. In the following year, as Prussian plenipotentiary at the congress of Prague, he was mainly instrumental in inducing Austria to unite with Prussia and Russia against France; in 1815 he was one of the signatories of the capitulation of Paris, and the same year was occupied in drawing up the treaty between Prussia and Saxony, by which the territory of the former was largely increased at the expense of the latter. The next year he was at Frankfort settling the future condition of Germany, but was summoned to London in the midst of his work, and in 1818 had to attend the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. The reactionary policy of the Prussian government made him resign his office of privy councillor and give up political life in 1819; and from that time forward he devoted himself solely to literature and study.

During the busiest portion of his political career, however, he had found time for literary work. Thus in 1816 he had published a translation of the _Agamemnon_ of Aeschylus, and in 1817 corrections and additions to Adelung's _Mithridates_, that famous collection of specimens of the various languages and dialects of the world. Among these additions that on the Basque language is the longest and most important, Basque having for some time specially attracted his attention. In fact, Wilhelm von Humboldt may be said to have been the first who brought Basque before the notice of European philologists, and made a scientific study of it possible. In order to gain a practical knowledge of the language and complete his investigations into it, he visited the Basque country itself, the result of his visit being the valuable "Researches into the Early Inhabitants of Spain by the help of the Basque language" (_Prufung der Untersuchungen uber die Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache_), published in 1821. In this work he endeavoured to show, by an examination of geographical names, that a race or races speaking dialects allied to modern Basque once extended through the whole of Spain, the southern coast of France and the Balearic Islands, and suggested that these people, whom he identified with the Iberians of classical writers, had come from northern Africa, where the name of Berber still perhaps perpetuates their old designation. Another work on what has sometimes been termed the metaphysics of language appeared from his pen in 1828, under the title of _Uber den Dualis_; but the great work of his life, on the ancient Kawi language of Java, was unfortunately interrupted by his death on the 8th of April 1835. The imperfect fragment was edited by his brother and Dr Buschmann in 1836, and contains the remarkable introduction on "The Heterogeneity of Language and its Influence on the Intellectual Development of Mankind" (_Uber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts_), which was afterwards edited and defended against Steinthal's criticisms by Pott (2 vols., 1876). This essay, which has been called the text-book of the philosophy of speech, first clearly laid down that the character and structure of a language expresses the inner life and knowledge of its speakers, and that languages must differ from one another in the same way and to the same degree as those who use them. Sounds do not become words until a meaning has been put into them, and this meaning embodies the thought of a community. What Humboldt terms the inner form of a language is just that mode of denoting the relations between the parts of a sentence which reflects the manner in which a particular body of men regards the world about them. It is the task of the morphology of speech to distinguish the various ways in which languages differ from each other as regards their inner form, and to classify and arrange them accordingly. Other linguistic publications of Humboldt, which had appeared in the _Transactions_ of the Berlin Academy, the _Journal_ of the Royal Asiatic Society, or elsewhere, were republished by his brother in the seven volumes of Wilhelm von Humboldt's _Gesammelte Werke_ (1841-1852). These volumes also contain poems, essays on aesthetical subjects and other creations of his prolific mind. Perhaps, however, the most generally interesting of his works, outside those which deal with language, is his correspondence with Schiller, published in 1830. Both poet and philosopher come before us in it in their most genial mood. For, though Humboldt was primarily a philosopher, he was a philosopher rendered practical by his knowledge of statesmanship and wide experience of life, and endowed with keen sympathies, warm imagination and active interest in the method of scientific inquiry. (A. H. S.)

HUMBUG, an imposture, sham, fraud. The word seems to have been originally applied to a trick or hoax, and appears as a slang term about 1750. According to the _New English Dictionary_, Ferdinando Killigrew's _The Universal Jester_, which contains the word in its sub-title "a choice collection of many conceits ... bonmots and humbugs," was published in 1754, not, as is often stated, in 1735-1740. The principal passage in reference to the introduction of the word occurs in _The Student_, 1750-1751, ii. 41, where it is called "a word very much in vogue with the people of taste and fashion." The origin appears to have been unknown at that date. Skeat connects it (_Etym. Dict._ 1898) with "hum," to murmur applause, hence flatter, trick, cajole, and "bug," bogey, spectre, the word thus meaning a false alarm. Many fanciful conjectures have been made, e.g. from Irish _uim-bog_, soft copper, worthless as opposed to sterling money; from "Hamburg," as the centre from which false coins came into England during the Napoleonic wars; and from the Italian _uomo bugiardo_, lying man.

HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609), Scottish poet, second son of Patrick Hume of Polwarth, Berwickshire, was born, probably at Reidbrais, one of his family's houses, about 1557. It has been generally assumed that he is the Alexander Hume who matriculated at St Mary's college, St Andrews, in 1571, and graduated in 1574. In _Ane Epistle to Maister Gilbert Montcreif_ (Moncrieff), _mediciner to the Kings Majestie, wherein is set downe the Experience of the Authours youth_, he relates the course of his disillusionment. He says he spent four years in France before beginning to study law in the courts at Edinburgh (l. 136). After three years' experience there he abandoned law in disgust and sought a post at court (_ib._ l. 241). Still dissatisfied, he took orders, and became in 1597 minister of Logic, near Stirling, where he lived until his death on the 4th of December 1609. His best-known work is his _Hymns, or Sacred Songs_ (printed by Robert Waldegrave at Edinburgh in 1599, and dedicated to Elizabeth Melvill, Lady Comrie) containing an epistle to the Scottish youth, urging them to abandon vanity for religion. One poem of the collection, entitled "A description of the day Estivall," a sketch of a summer's day and its occupations, has found its way into several anthologies. "The Triumph of the Lord after the Manner of Men" is a song of victory of some merit, celebrating the defeat of the Armada in 1588. His prose works include _Ane Treatise of Conscience_ (Edinburgh, 1594), _A Treatise of the Felicitie of the Life to come_ (Edinburgh, 1594), and _Ane Afold Admonitioun to the Ministerie of Scotland_. The last is an argument against prelacy. Hume's elder brother, Lord Polwarth, was probably one of the combatants in the famous "Flyting betwixt Montgomerie and Polwart."

The editions of Hume's verse are: (a) by Robert Waldegrave (1599); (b)
a reprint of (a) by the Bannatyne Club (1832); and (c) by the Scottish
Text Society (ed. A. Lawson) (1902). The last includes the prose
tracts.

HUME, DAVID (1711-1776), English philosopher, historian and political economist, was born at Edinburgh, on the 26th of April (O.S.) 1711. His father, Joseph Hume or Home, a scion of the noble house of Home of Douglas (but see _Notes and Queries_, 4th ser. iv. 72), was owner of a small estate in Berwickshire, on the banks of the Whiteadder, called, from the spring rising in front of the dwelling-house, Ninewells. David was the youngest of a family of three, two sons and a daughter, who after the early death of the father were brought up with great care and devotion by their mother, the daughter of Sir David Falconer, president of the college of justice.

Of Hume's early education little is known beyond what he has himself stated in his _Life_. He appears to have entered the Greek classes of the university of Edinburgh in 1723, and, he tells us, "passed through the ordinary course of education with success." From a letter printed in Burton's _Life_ (i. 30-39), it appears that about 1726 Hume returned to Ninewells with a fair knowledge of Latin, slight acquaintance with Greek and literary tastes decidedly inclining to "books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors." We do not know, except by inference, to what studies he especially devoted himself. It is, however, clear that from his earliest years he began to speculate upon the nature of knowledge in the abstract, and its concrete applications, as in theology, and that with this object he studied largely the writings of Cicero and Seneca and recent English philosophers (especially Locke, Berkeley and Butler). His acquaintance with Cicero is clearly proved by the form in which he cast some of the most important of his speculations. From his boyhood he devoted himself to acquiring a literary reputation, and throughout his life, in spite of financial and other difficulties, he adhered to his original intention. A man of placid and even phlegmatic temperament, he lived moderately in all things, and sought worldly prosperity only so far as was necessary to give him leisure for his literary work. At first he tried law, but was unable to give his mind to a study which appeared to him to be merely a barren waste of technical jargon. At this time the intensity of his intellectual activity in the area opened up to him by Locke and Berkeley reduced him to a state of physical exhaustion. In these circumstances he determined to try the effect of complete change of scene and occupation, and in 1734 entered a business house in Bristol. In a few months he found "the scene wholly unsuitable" to him, and about the middle of 1734 set out for France, resolved to spend some years in quiet study. He visited Paris, resided for a time at Rheims and then settled at La Fleche, famous in the history of philosophy as the school of Descartes. His health seems to have been perfectly restored, and during the three years of his stay in France his speculations were worked into systematic form in the _Treatise of Human Nature_. In the autumn of 1737 he was in London arranging for its publication and polishing it in preparation for the judgments of the learned. In January 1739 appeared the first and second volumes of the _Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects_, containing book i., _Of the Understanding_, and book ii., _Of the Passions_. The third volume, containing book iii., _Of Morals_, was published in the following year. The publisher of the first two volumes, John Noone, gave him L50 and twelve bound copies for a first edition of one thousand copies. Hume's own words best describe its reception. "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate; it fell _dead-born from the press_, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." "But," he adds, "being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country." This brief notice, however, is not sufficient to explain the full significance of the event for Hume's own life. The work undoubtedly failed to do what its author expected from it; even the notice, otherwise not unsatisfactory, which it obtained in the _History of the Works of the Learned_, then the principal critical journal, did not in the least appreciate the true bearing of the _Treatise_ on current discussions. Hume naturally expected that the world would see as clearly as he did the connexion between the concrete problems agitating contemporary thought and the abstract principles on which their solution depended. Accordingly he looked for opposition, and expected that, if his principles were received, a change in general conceptions of things would ensue. His disappointment at its reception was great; and though he never entirely relinquished his metaphysical speculations, though all that is of value in his later writings depends on the acute analysis of human nature to which he was from the first attracted, one cannot but regret that his high powers were henceforth withdrawn for the most part from the consideration of the foundations of belief, and expended on its practical applications. In later years he attributed his want of success to the immature style of his early exposition, to the rashness of a young innovator in an old and well-established province of literature. But this has little foundation beyond the irritation of an author at his own failure to attract such attention as he deems his due. None of the principles of the _Treatise_ is given up in the later writings, and no addition is made to them. Nor can the superior polish of the more mature productions counterbalance the concentrated vigour of the more youthful work.

After the publication of the _Treatise_ Hume retired to his brother's house at Ninewells and carried on his studies, mainly in the direction of politics and political economy. In 1741 he published the first volume of his _Essays_, which had a considerable and immediate success. A second edition was called for in the following year, in which also a second volume was published. These essays Butler, to whom he had sent a copy of his _Treatise_, but with whom he had failed to make personal acquaintance, warmly commended. The philosophical relation between Butler and Hume is curious. So far as analysis of knowledge is concerned they are in harmony, and Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact are the foundations on which Butler's defence of religion rests. Butler, however, retained, in spite of his destructive theory of knowledge, confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God, and certainly maintains what may be vaguely described as an a priori view of conscience. Hume had the greatest respect for the author of the _Analogy_, ranks him with Locke and Berkeley as an originator of the experimental method in moral science, and in his specially theological essays, such as that on _Particular Providence and a Future State_, has Butler's views specifically in mind. (See BUTLER.)

The success of the _Essays_, though hardly great enough to satisfy his somewhat exorbitant cravings, was a great encouragement to him. He began to hope that his earlier work, if recast and lightened, might share the fortunes of its successor; and at intervals throughout the next four years he occupied himself in rewriting it in a more succinct form with all the literary grace at his command. Meantime he continued to look about for some post which might secure him the modest independence he desired. In 1744 we find him, in anticipation of a vacancy in the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh university, moving his friends to advance his cause with the electors; and though, as he tells us, "the accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism or theism, &c., &c., was started" against him, it had no effect, "being bore down by the contrary authority of all the good people in town." To his great mortification, however, he found out, as he thought, that Hutcheson and Leechman, with whom he had been on terms of friendly correspondence, were giving the weight of their opinion against his election. The after history of these negotiations is obscure. Failing in this attempt, he was induced to become tutor, or keeper, to the marquis of Annandale, a harmless literary lunatic. This position, financially advantageous, was absurdly false (see letters in Burton's _Life_, i. ch. v.), and when the matter ended Hume had to sue for arrears of salary.

In 1746 Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St Clair, and was a spectator of the ill-fated expedition to France in the autumn of that year. His admirable account of the transaction has been printed by Burton. After a brief sojourn at Ninewells, doubtless occupied in preparing for publication his _Philosophical Essays_ (afterwards entitled _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_), Hume was again associated with General St Clair as secretary in the embassy to Vienna and Turin (1748). The notes of this journey are written in a light and amusing style, showing Hume's usual keenness of sight in some directions and his almost equal blindness in others. During his absence from England, early in the year 1748, the _Philosophical Essays_ were published; but the first reception of the work was little more favourable than that accorded to the _Treatise_. To the later editions of the work Hume prepared an "Advertisement" referring to the _Treatise_, and desiring that the _Essays_ "may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Some modern critics have accepted this disclaimer as of real value, but in fact it has no significance; and Hume himself in a striking letter to Gilbert Elliott indicated the true relation of the two works. "I believe the _Philosophical Essays_ contain everything of consequence relating to the understanding which you would meet with in the _Treatise_, and I give you my advice against reading the latter. By shortening and simplifying the questions, I really render them much more complete. _Addo dum minuo_. The philosophical principles are the same in both." The Essays are undoubtedly written with more maturity and skill than the _Treatise_; they contain in more detail application of the principles to concrete problems, such as miracles, providence, immortality; but the entire omission of the discussion forming part ii. of the first book of the _Treatise_, and the great compression of part iv., are real defects which must always render the _Treatise_ the more important work.

In 1749 Hume returned to Ninewells, enriched with "near a thousand pounds." In 1751 he removed to Edinburgh, where for the most part he resided during the next twelve years of his life. These years are the richest so far as literary production is concerned. In 1751 he published his _Political Discourses_, which had a great and well-deserved success both in England and abroad. It was translated into French by Mauvillon (1753) and by the Abbe le Blanc (1754). In the same year appeared the recast of the third book of the _Treatise_, called _Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_, of which he says that "of all his writings, philosophical, literary or historical, it is incomparably the best." At this time also we hear of the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, a work which Hume was prevailed on not to publish, but which he revised with great care, and evidently regarded with the greatest favour. The work itself, left by Hume with instructions that it should be published, did not appear till 1779.

In 1751 Hume was again unsuccessful in the attempt to gain a professor's chair. In the following year he received, in spite of the usual accusations of heresy, the librarianship of the Advocates' Library in Edinburgh, small in emoluments (L40 a year) but rich in opportunity for literary work. In a playful letter to Dr Clephane, he describes his satisfaction at his appointment, and attributes it in some measure to the support of "the ladies."

In 1753 Hume was fairly settled in Edinburgh, preparing for his _History of England_. He had decided to begin the _History_, not with Henry VII., as Adam Smith recommended, but with James I., considering that the political differences of his time took their origin from that period. On the whole his attitude in respect to disputed political principles seems not to have been at first consciously unfair. As for the qualities necessary to secure success as a _writer_ on history, he felt that he possessed them in a high degree; and, though neither his ideal of an historian nor his equipment for the task of historical research would now appear adequate, in both he was much in advance of his time. "But," he writes in the well-known passage of his _Life_, "miserable was my disappointment. I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation; ... what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to sink into oblivion. Mr Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he sold only forty-five copies of it." This account must be accepted with reservations. It expresses Hume's feelings rather than the real facts. In Edinburgh, as we learn from one of his letters, the book succeeded well, no fewer than 450 copies being disposed of in five weeks. Nor is there anything in Hume's correspondence to show that the failure of the book was so complete as he declared. Within a very few years the sale of the _History_ was sufficient to gain for the author a larger revenue than had ever before been known in his country to flow from literature, and to place him in comparative affluence. He seems to have received L400 for the first edition of the first volume, L700 for the first edition of the second and L840 for the copyright of the two together. At the same time the bitterness of Hume's feelings and their effect are of importance in his life. It is from the publication of the _History_ that we date his virulent hatred of everything English, towards society in London, Whig principles, Whig ministers and the public generally (see Burton's _Life_, ii. 268, 417, 434). He was convinced that there was a conspiracy to suppress and destroy everything Scottish.[1] The remainder of the _History_ became little better than a party pamphlet. The second volume, published in 1756, carrying on the narrative to the Revolution, was better received than the first; but Hume then resolved to work backwards, and to show from a survey of the Tudor period that his Tory notions were grounded upon the history of the constitution. In 1759 this portion of the work appeared, and in 1761 the work was completed by the history of the pre-Tudor periods. The numerous editions of the various portions--for, despite Hume's wrath and grumblings, the book was a great literary success--gave him an opportunity of careful revision, which he employed to remove from it all the "villainous seditious Whig strokes," and "plaguy prejudices of Whiggism" that he could detect. In other words, he bent all his efforts toward making his _History_ more of a party work than it had been, and in his effort he was entirely successful. The early portion of his _History_ may be regarded as now of little or no value. The sources at Hume's command were few, and he did not use them all. None the less, the _History_ has a distinct place in the literature of England. It was the first attempt at a comprehensive treatment of historic facts, the first to introduce the social and literary aspects of a nation's life as only second in importance to its political fortunes, and the first historical writing in an animated yet refined and polished style.[2]

While the _History_ was in process of publication, Hume did not entirely neglect his other lines of activity. In 1757 appeared _Four Dissertations: The Natural History of Religion, Of the Passions, Of Tragedy, Of the Standard of Taste_. Of these the dissertation on the passions is a very subtle piece of psychology, containing the essence of the second book of the _Treatise_. It is remarkable that Hume does not appear to have been acquainted with Spinoza's analysis of the affections. The last two essays are contributions of no great importance to aesthetics, a department of philosophy in which Hume was not strong. The _Natural History of Religion_ is a powerful contribution to the deistic controversy; but, as in the case of Hume's earlier work, its significance was at the time overlooked. It is an attempt to carry the war into a province hitherto allowed to remain at peace, the theory of the general development of religious ideas. Deists, though raising doubts regarding the historic narratives of the Christian faith, had never disputed the general fact that belief in one God was natural and primitive. Hume endeavours to show that polytheism was the earliest as well as the most natural form of religious belief, and that theism or deism is the product of reflection upon experience, thus reducing the validity of the historical argument to that of the theoretical proofs.

In 1763 he accompanied Lord Hertford to Paris, doing the duties of secretary to the embassy, with the prospect of the appointment to that post. He was everywhere received "with the most extraordinary honours." The society of Paris was peculiarly ready to receive a great philosopher and historian, especially if he were known to be an avowed antagonist of religion, and Hume made valuable friendships, especially with D'Alembert and Turgot, the latter of whom profited much by Hume's economical essays. In 1766 he left Paris and returned to Edinburgh. In 1767 he accepted the post of under-secretary to General Conway and spent two years in London.

He settled finally in Edinburgh in 1769, having now through his pension and otherwise an income of L1000 a year. The solitary incident of note in this period of his life is the ridiculous quarrel with Rousseau, which throws much light upon the character of the great sentimentalist. Hume certainly did his utmost to secure for Rousseau a comfortable retreat in England, but his usually sound judgment seems at first to have been quite at fault with regard to his protege. The quarrel which all the acquaintances of the two philosophers had predicted soon came, and no language had expressions strong enough for Rousseau's anger. Hume came well out of the business, and had the sagacity to conclude that his admired friend was little better than a madman. In one of his most charming letters he describes his life in Edinburgh. The new house to which he alludes was built under his own directions at the corner of what is now called St David Street after him; it became the centre of the most cultivated society of Edinburgh. Hume's cheerful temper, his equanimity, his kindness to literary aspirants and to those whose views differed from his own won him universal respect and affection. He welcomed the work of his friends (e.g. Robertson and Adam Smith), and warmly recognized the worth of his opponents (e.g. George Campbell and Reid). He assisted Blackwell and Smollett in their difficulties and became the acknowledged patriarch of literature.

In the spring of 1775 Hume was struck with a tedious and harassing though not painful illness. A visit to Bath seemed at first to have produced good effects, but on the return journey more alarming symptoms developed themselves, his strength rapidly sank, and, little more than a month later, he died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August 1776.

No notice of Hume would be complete without the sketch of his
character drawn by his own hand:--"To conclude historically with my
own character, I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now
use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my
sentiments),--I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of
temper, of an open, social and cheerful humour, capable of attachment,
but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my
passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never
soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My
company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to
the studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the
company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the
reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men anywise
eminent have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched,
or even attacked, by her baleful tooth; and, though I wantonly exposed
myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions, they seem to
be disarmed on my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had
occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and
conduct; not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have
been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but
they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of
probability. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral
oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a
matter of fact which is easily cleansed and ascertained." The more his
life has become known, the more confidence we place in this admirable
estimate.

The results of Hume's speculations may be discussed under two
heads:--(1) philosophical, (2) economical.

Philosophy.

1. The philosophical writings, which mark a distinct epoch in the
development of modern thought, can here be considered in two only of
the many aspects in which they present themselves as of the highest
interest to the historian of philosophy. In the _Treatise of Human
Nature_, which is in every respect the most complete exposition of
Hume's philosophical conception, we have the first thorough-going
attempt to apply the fundamental principles of Locke's empirical
psychology to the construction of a theory of knowledge, and, as a
natural consequence, the first systematic criticism of the chief
metaphysical notions from this point of view. Hume, in that work,
holds the same relation to Locke and Berkeley as the late J. S. Mill
held with his _System of Logic_ to Hartley and James Mill. In certain
of the later writings, pre-eminently in the _Dialogues on Natural
Religion_, Hume brings the result of his speculative criticism to bear
upon the problems of current theological discussion, and gives in
their regard, as previously with respect to general philosophy, the
final word of the empirical theory in its earlier form. The
interesting parallel between Hume and J. S. Mill in this second
feature will not be overlooked.

In the first instance, then, Hume's philosophical work is to be
regarded as the attempt to supply for empiricism in psychology a
consistent, that is, a logically developed theory of knowledge. In
Locke, indeed, such theory is not wanting, but, of all the many
inconsistencies in the _Essay on the Human Understanding_, none is
more apparent or more significant than the complete want of harmony
between the view of knowledge developed in the fourth book and the
psychological principles laid down in the earlier part of the work.
Though Locke, doubtless, drew no distinction between the problems of
psychology and of theory of knowledge, yet the discussion of the
various forms of cognition given in the fourth book of the _Essay_
seems to be based on grounds quite distinct from and in many respects
inconsistent with the fundamental psychological principle of his work.
The perception of relations, which, according to him, is the essence
of cognition, the demonstrative character which he thinks attaches to
our inference of God's existence, the intuitive knowledge of self, are
doctrines incapable of being brought into harmony with the view of
mind and its development which is the keynote of his general theory.
To some extent Berkeley removed this radical inconsistency, but in his
philosophical work it may be said with safety there are two distinct
aspects, and while it holds of Locke on the one hand, it stretches
forward to Kantianism on the other. Nor in Berkeley are these
divergent features ever united into one harmonious whole. It was left
for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness
from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final
consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned. The terms
which he employs in describing the aim and scope of his work are not
those which we should now employ, but the declaration, in the
introduction to the _Treatise_, that the science of human nature must
be treated according to the experimental method, is in fact equivalent
to the statement of the principle implied in Locke's _Essay_, that the
problems of psychology and of theory of knowledge are identical. This
view is the characteristic of what we may call the English school of
philosophy.

Theory of knowledge.

In order to make perfectly clear the full significance of the
principle which Hume applied to the solution of the chief
philosophical questions, it is necessary to render somewhat more
precise and complete the statement of the psychological view which
lies at the foundation of the empirical theory, and to distinguish
from it the problem of the theory of knowledge upon which it was
brought to bear. Without entering into details, which it is the less
necessary to do because the subject has been recently discussed with
great fulness in works readily accessible, it may be said that for
Locke as for Hume the problem of psychology was the exact description
of the contents of the individual mind, and the determination of the
conditions of the origin and development of conscious experience in
the individual mind. And the answer to the problem which was furnished
by Locke is in effect that with which Hume started. The conscious
experience of the individual is the result of interaction between the
individual mind and the universe of things. This solution presupposes
a peculiar conception of the general relation between the mind and
things which in itself requires justification, and which, so far at
least as the empirical theory was developed by Locke and his
successors, could not be obtained from psychological analysis. Either
we have a right to the assumption contained in the conception of the
individual mind as standing in relation to things, in which case the
grounds of the assumption must be sought elsewhere than in the results
of this reciprocal relation, or we have no right to the assumption, in
which case reference to the reciprocal relation can hardly be accepted
as yielding any solution of the psychological problem. But in any
case,--and, as we shall see, Hume endeavours so to state his
psychological premises as to conceal the assumption made openly by
Locke,--it is apparent that this psychological solution does not
contain the answer to the wider and radically distinct problem of the
theory of knowledge. For here we have to consider how the individual
intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by
the cognition of a fact. With Locke, Hume professes to regard this
problem as virtually covered or answered by the fundamental
psychological theorem; but the superior clearness of his reply enables
us to mark with perfect precision the nature of the difficulty
inherent in the attempt to regard the two as identical. For purposes
of psychological analysis the conscious experience of the individual
mind is taken as given fact, to be known, i.e. observed,
discriminated, classified and explained in the same way in which any
one special portion of experience is treated. Now if this mode of
treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results
assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the
fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked. In all cognition,
strictly so-called, there is involved a certain synthesis or relation
of parts of a characteristic nature, and if we attempt to discuss this
synthesis as though it were in itself but one of the facts forming the
_matter_ of knowledge, we are driven to regard this relation as being
of the quite external kind discovered by observation among matters of
knowledge. The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which
gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory
of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the
synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental
result of external relations among the elements of conscious
experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote
of all his philosophical work. The final perplexity, concealed by
various forms of expression, comes forward at the close of the
_Treatise_ as absolutely unsolved, and leads Hume, as will be pointed
out, to a truly remarkable confession of the weakness of his own
system.

While, then, the general idea of a theory of knowledge as based upon
psychological analysis is the groundwork of the _Treatise_, it is a
particular consequence of this idea that furnishes to Hume the
characteristic criterion applied by him to all philosophical
questions. If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only
those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known
experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent. The
only necessary relation which can be discovered in a given fact of
experience is that of non-contradiction (i.e. purely formal); the
thing must be what it is, and cannot be conceived as having qualities
contradictory of its nature. The universal test, therefore, of any
supposed philosophical principle is the possibility or impossibility
of imagining its contradictory. All our knowledge is but the sum of
our conscious experience, and is consequently material for
imagination. "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as
possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens or to the utmost
limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond
ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those
perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the
universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there
produced." (_Works_, ed. of 1854, i. 93, cf. i. 107.)

The course of Hume's work follows immediately from his fundamental
principle, and the several divisions of the treatise, so far as the
theoretical portions are concerned, are but its logical consequences.
The first part of the first book contains a brief statement of the
contents of mind, a description of all that observation can discover
in conscious experience. The second part deals with those judgments
which rest upon the formal elements of experience, space and time. The
third part discusses the principle of real connexion among the
elements of experience, the relation of cause and effect. The fourth
part is virtually a consideration of the ultimate significance of this
conscious experience, of the place it is supposed to occupy in the
universe of existence, in other words, of the relations between the
conscious experience of an individual mind as disclosed to observation
and the supposed realities of self and external things.

Ideas and impressions.

In the first part Hume gives his own statement of the psychological
foundations of his theory. Viewing the contents of mind as matter of
experience, he can discover among them only one distinction, a
distinction expressed by the terms _impressions_ and _ideas_. Ideas
are secondary in nature, copies of data supplied we know not whence.
All that appears in conscious experience as primary, as arising from
some unknown cause, and therefore relatively as original, Hume
designates by the term _impression_, and claims to imply by such term
no theory whatsoever as to the origin of this portion of experience.
There is simply the fact of conscious experience, ultimate and
inexplicable. Moreover, if we remain faithful to the fundamental
conception that the contents of the mind are merely matters of
experience, it is evident in the first place that as impressions are
strictly individual, ideas also must be strictly particular, and in
the second place that the faculties of combining, discriminating,
abstracting and judging, which Locke had admitted, are merely
expressions for particular modes of having mental experience, i.e. are
modifications of _conceiving_ (cf. i. 128 n., 137, 192). By this
theory, Hume is freed from all the problems of abstraction and
judgment. A comparative judgment is simplified into an isolated
perception of a peculiar form, and a series of similar facts are
grouped under a single symbol, representing a particular perception,
and only by the accident of custom treated as universal (see i. 37,
38, 100).

Such, in substance, is Hume's restatement of Locke's empirical view.
Conscious experience consists of isolated states, each of which is to
be regarded as a fact and is related to others in a quite external
fashion. It remains to be seen how knowledge can be explained on such
a basis; but, before proceeding to sketch Hume's answer to this
question, it is necessary to draw attention, first, to the peculiar
device invariably resorted to by him when any exception to his general
principle that ideas are secondary copies of impressions presents
itself, and, secondly, to the nature of the substitute offered by him
for that perception of relations or synthesis which even in Locke's
confused statements had appeared as the essence of cognition. Whenever
Hume finds it impossible to recognize in an idea the mere copy of a
particular impression, he introduces the phrase "manner of
conceiving." Thus general or abstract ideas arc merely copies of a
particular impression conceived in a particular manner. The ideas of
space and time, as will presently be pointed out, are copies of
impressions conceived in a particular manner. The idea of necessary
connexion is merely the reproduction of an impression which the mind
_feels_ itself compelled to conceive in a particular manner. Such a
fashion of disguising difficulties points, not only to an
inconsistency in Hume's theory as stated by himself, but to the
initial error upon which it proceeds; for these perplexities are but
the consequences of the doctrine that cognition is to be explained on
the basis of particular perceptions. These external relations are, in
fact, what Hume describes as the natural bonds of connexion among
ideas, and, regarded subjectively as principles of association among
the facts of mental experience, they form the substitute he offers for
the synthesis implied in knowledge. These principles of association
determine the imagination to combine ideas in various modes, and by
this mechanical combination Hume, for a time, endeavoured to explain
what are otherwise called judgments of relation. It was impossible,
however, for him to carry out this view consistently. The only
combination which, even in appearance, could be explained
satisfactorily by its means was the formation of a complex idea out of
simpler parts, but the idea of a relation among facts is not
accurately described as a complex idea; and, as such relations have no
basis in impressions, Hume is finally driven to a confession of the
absolute impossibility of explaining them. Such confession, however,
is only reached after a vigorous effort had been made to render some
account of knowledge by the experimental method.

Association.