Chapter VI: Front Matter (6)

The psychological conception, then, on the basis of which Hume
proceeds to discuss the theory of knowledge, is that of conscious
experience as containing merely the succession of isolated impressions
and their fainter copies, ideas, and as bound together by merely
natural or external links of connexion, the principles of association
among ideas. The foundations of cognition must be discovered by
observation or analysis of experience so conceived. Hume wavers
somewhat in his division of the various kinds of cognition, laying
stress now upon one now upon another of the points in which mainly
they differ from one another. Nor is it of the first importance, save
with the view of criticizing his own consistency, that we should adopt
any of the divisions implied in his exposition. For practical purposes
we may regard the most important discussions in the _Treatise_ as
falling under two heads. In the first place there are certain
principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to express
relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz.
space and time. The propositions of mathematics seem to be independent
of this or that special fact of experience, and to remain unchanged
even when the concrete matter of experience varies. They are formal.
In the second place, cognition, in any real sense of that term,
implies connexion for the individual mind between the present fact of
experience and other facts, whether past or future. It appears to
involve, therefore, some real relation among the portions of
experience, on the basis of which relation judgments and inferences as
to matters of fact can be shown to rest. The theoretical question is
consequently that of the nature of the supposed relation, and of the
certainty of judgments and inferences resting on it.

Hume's well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters
of fact corresponds fairly to this separation of the formal and real
problems in the theory of cognition, although that distinction is in
itself inadequate and not fully representative of Hume's own
conclusions.

With regard, then, to the first problem, the formal element in
knowledge, Hume has to consider several questions, distinct in nature
and hardly discriminated by him with sufficient precision. For a
complete treatment of this portion of the theory of knowledge, there
require to be taken into consideration at least the following points:
(a) the exact nature and significance of the space and time relations
in our experience, (b) the mode in which the primary data, facts or
principles, of mathematical cognition are obtained, (c) the nature,
extent and certainty of such data, in themselves and with reference to
the concrete material of experience, (d) the principle of inference
from the data, however obtained. Not all of these points are discussed
by Hume with the same fulness, and with regard to some of them it is
difficult to state his conclusions. It will be of service, however, to
attempt a summary of his treatment under these several heads,--the
more so as almost all expositions of his philosophy are entirely
defective in the account given of this essential portion. The brief
statement in the _Inquiry_, S iv., is of no value, and indeed is
almost unintelligible unless taken in reference to the full discussion
contained in part ii. of the _Treatise_.

Space and time.

(a) The nature of space and time as elements in conscious experience
is considered by Hume in relation to a special problem, that of their
supposed infinite divisibility. Evidently upon his view of conscious
experience, of the world of imagination, such infinite divisibility
must be a fiction. The ultimate elements of experience must be real
units, capable of being represented or imagined in isolation. Whence
then do these units arise? or, if we put the problem as it was
necessary Hume should put it to himself, in what orders or classes of
impressions do we find the elements of space and time? Beyond all
question Hume, in endeavouring to answer this problem, is brought face
to face with one of the difficulties inherent in his conception of
conscious experience. For he has to give some explanation of the
nature of space and time which shall identify these with impressions,
and at the same time is compelled to recognize the fact that they are
not identical with any single impression or set of impressions.
Putting aside, then, the various obscurities of terminology, such as
the distinction between the objects known, viz. "points" or several
mental states, and the impressions themselves, which disguise the full
significance of his conclusion, we find Hume reduced to the following
as his theory of space and time. Certain impressions, the sensations
of sight and touch, have in themselves the element of space, for these
impressions (Hume skilfully transfers his statement to the _points_)
have a certain order or mode of arrangement. This mode of arrangement
or manner of disposition is common to coloured points and tangible
points, and, considered separately, is the impression from which our
idea of space is taken. All impressions and all ideas are received, or
form parts of a mental experience only when received, in a certain
order, the order of succession. This manner of presenting themselves
is the impression from which the idea of time takes its rise.

It is almost superfluous to remark, first, that Hume here deliberately
gives up his fundamental principle that ideas are but the fainter
copies of impressions, for it can never be maintained that order of
disposition is an impression, and, secondly, that he fails to offer
any explanation of the mode in which _coexistence_ and _succession_
are possible elements of cognition in a conscious experience made up
of isolated presentations and representations. For the consistency of
his theory, however, it was indispensable that he should insist upon
the real, i.e. presentative character of the ultimate units of space
and time.

Mathematics.

(b) How then are the primary data of mathematical cognition to be
derived from an experience containing space and time relations in the
manner just stated? It is important to notice that Hume, in regard to
this problem, distinctly separates geometry from algebra and
arithmetic, i.e. he views extensive quantity as being cognized
differently from number. With regard to geometry, he holds
emphatically that it is an empirical doctrine, a science founded on
observation of concrete facts. The rough appearances of physical
facts, their outlines, surfaces and so on, are the data of
observation, and only by a method of approximation do we gradually
come near to such propositions as are laid down in pure geometry. He
definitely repudiates a view often ascribed to him, and certainly
advanced by many later empiricists, that the data of geometry are
hypothetical. The ideas of perfect lines, figures and surfaces have
not, according to him, any existence. (See _Works_, i. 66, 69, 73, 97
and iv. 180.) It is impossible to give any consistent account of his
doctrine regarding number. He holds, apparently, that the foundation
of all the science of number is the fact that each element of
conscious experience is presented as a unit, and adds that we are
capable of considering any fact or collection of facts as a unit. This
_manner of conceiving_ is absolutely general and distinct, and
accordingly affords the possibility of an all-comprehensive and
perfect science, the science of discrete quantity. (See _Works_, i.
97.)

(c) In respect to the third point, the nature, extent and certainty
of the elementary propositions of mathematical science, Hume's
utterances are far from clear. The principle with which he starts and
from which follows his well-known distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact, a distinction which Kant appears to have
thought identical with his distinction between analytical and
synthetical judgments, is comparatively simple. The _ideas_ of the
quantitative aspects of phenomena are exact representations of these
aspects or quantitative impressions; consequently, whatever is found
true by consideration of the ideas may be asserted regarding the real
impressions. No question arises regarding the _existence_ of the fact
represented by the idea, and in so far, at least, mathematical
judgments may be described as hypothetical. For they simply assert
what will be found true in any conscious experience containing
coexisting impressions of sense (specifically, of sight and touch),
and in its nature successive. That the propositions are hypothetical
in this fashion does not imply any distinction between the abstract
truth of the ideal judgments and the imperfect correspondence of
concrete material with these abstract relations. Such distinction is
quite foreign to Hume, and can only be ascribed to him from an entire
misconception of his view regarding the ideas of space and time. (For
an example of such misconception, which is almost universal, see
Riehl, _Der philosophische Kriticismus_, i. 96, 97.)

(d) From this point onwards Hume's treatment becomes exceedingly
confused. The identical relation between the ideas of space and time
and the impressions corresponding to them apparently leads him to
regard judgments of continuous and discrete quantity as standing on
the same footing, while the ideal character of the data gives a
certain colour to his inexact statements regarding the extent and
truth of the judgments founded on them. The emphatic utterances in the
_Inquiry_ (iv. 30, 186), and even at the beginning of the relative
section in the _Treatise_ (i. 95) may be cited in illustration. But in
both works these utterances are qualified in such a manner as to
enable us to perceive the real bearings of his doctrine, and to
pronounce at once that it differs widely from that commonly ascribed
to him. "It is from the idea of a triangle that we discover the
relation of equality which its three angles bear to two right ones;
and this relation is invariable, so long as our idea remains the same"
(i. 95). If taken in isolation this passage might appear sufficient
justification for Kant's view that, according to Hume, geometrical
judgments are analytical and therefore perfect. But it is to be
recollected that, according to Hume, an idea is actually a
_representation_ or individual picture, not a notion or even a
_schema_, and that he never claims to be able to extract the predicate
of a geometrical judgment by analysis of the subject. The properties
of this individual subject, the idea of the triangle, are, according
to him, discovered by observation, and as observation, whether actual
or ideal, never presents us with more than the rough or general
appearances of geometrical quantities, the relations so discovered
have only approximate exactness. "Ask a mathematician what he means
when he pronounces two quantities to be equal, and he must say that
the idea of _equality_ is one of those which cannot be defined, and
that it is sufficient to place two equal quantities before any one in
order to suggest it. Now this is an appeal to the general appearances
of objects to the imagination or senses" (iv. 180). "Though it (i.e.
geometry) much excels, both in universality and exactness, the loose
judgments of the senses and imagination, yet [it] never attains a
perfect precision and exactness" (i. 97). Any exactitude attaching to
the conclusions of geometrical reasoning arises from the comparative
simplicity of the data for the primary judgments.

So far, then, as geometry is concerned, Hume's opinion is perfectly
definite. It is an experimental or observational science, founded on
primary or immediate judgments (in his phraseology, _perceptions_), of
relation between facts of intuition; its conclusions are hypothetical
only in so far as they do not imply the existence at the moment of
corresponding real experience; and its propositions have no exact
truth. With respect to arithmetic and algebra, the science of numbers,
he expresses an equally definite opinion, but unfortunately it is
quite impossible to state in any satisfactory fashion the grounds for
it or even its full bearing. He nowhere explains the origin of the
notions of unity and number, but merely asserts that through their
means we can have absolutely exact arithmetical propositions (_Works_,
i. 97, 98). Upon the nature of the reasoning by which in mathematical
science we pass from data to conclusions, Hume gives no explicit
statement. If we were to say that on his view the essential step must
be the establishment of identities or equivalences, we should probably
be doing justice to his doctrine of numerical reasoning, but should
have some difficulty in showing the application of the method to
geometrical reasoning. For in the latter case we possess, according to
Hume, no standard of equivalence other than that supplied by immediate
observation, and consequently transition from one premise to another
by way of reasoning must be, in geometrical matters, a purely verbal
process.

Hume's theory of mathematics--the only one, perhaps, which is
compatible with his fundamental principle of psychology--is a
practical condemnation of his empirical theory of perception. He has
not offered even a plausible explanation of the mode by which a
consciousness made up of isolated momentary impressions and ideas can
be aware of coexistence and number, or succession. The relations of
ideas are accepted as facts of immediate observation, as being
themselves perceptions or individual elements of conscious experience,
and to all appearance they are regarded by Hume as being in a sense
analytical, because the formal criterion of identity is applicable to
them. It is applicable, however, not because the predicate is
contained in the subject, but on the principle of contradiction. If
these judgments are admitted to be facts of immediate perception, the
supposition of their non-existence is impossible. The ambiguity in his
criterion, however, seems entirely to have escaped Hume's attention.

Real cognition and causation.

A somewhat detailed consideration of Hume's doctrine with regard to
mathematical science has been given for the reason that this portion
of his theory has been very generally overlooked or misinterpreted. It
does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination
of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness. It will
probably be sufficient to indicate the problem as conceived by Hume,
and the relation of the method he adopts for solving it to the
fundamental doctrine of his theory of knowledge.

Real cognition, as Hume points out, implies transition from the
present impression or feeling to something connected with it. As this
thing can only be an impression or perception, and is not itself
present, it is represented by its copy or idea. Now the supreme,
all-comprehensive link of connexion between present feeling or
impression and either past or future experience is that of causation.
The idea in question is, therefore, the idea of something connected
with the present impression as its cause or effect. But this is
explicitly the idea of the said thing as having had or as about to
have existence,--in other words, belief in the existence of some
matter of fact. What, for a conscious experience so constituted as
Hume will admit, is the precise significance of such belief in real
existence?

Clearly the real existence of a fact is not demonstrable. For whatever
is may be conceived not to be. "No negation of a fact can involve a
contradiction." Existence of any fact, not present as a perception,
can only be proved by arguments from cause or effect. But as each
perception is in consciousness only as a contingent fact, which might
not be or might be other than it is, we must admit that the mind can
conceive no necessary relations or connexions among the several
portions of its experience.

If, therefore, a present perception leads us to assert the existence
of some other, this can only be interpreted as meaning that in some
natural, i.e. psychological, manner the idea of this other perception
is excited, and that the idea is viewed by the mind in some peculiar
fashion. The natural link of connexion Hume finds in the similarities
presented by experience. One fact or perception is discovered by
experience to be uniformly or generally accompanied by another, and
its occurrence therefore naturally excites the idea of that other. But
when an idea is so roused up by a present impression, and when this
idea, being a consequence of memory, has in itself a certain vivacity
or liveliness, we regard it with a peculiar indefinable feeling, and
in this feeling consists the immense difference between mere
imagination and belief. The mind is led easily and rapidly from the
present impression to the ideas of impressions found by experience to
be the usual accompaniments of the present fact. The ease and rapidity
of the mental transition is the sole ground for the supposed necessity
of the causal connexion between portions of experience. The idea of
necessity is not intuitively obvious; the ideas of cause and effect
are correlative in our minds, but only as a result of experience.
Hobbes and Locke were wrong in saying that the mind must find in the
relation the idea of Power. We mistake the subjective transition
resting upon custom or past experience for an objective connexion
independent of special feelings. All reasoning about matters of fact
is therefore a species of feeling, and belongs to the sensitive rather
than to the cogitative side of our nature. It should be noted that
this theory of Causation entirely denies the doctrine of Uniformity in
Nature, so far as the human mind is concerned. All alleged uniformity
is reduced to observed similarity of process. The idea is a mere
convention, product of inaccurate thinking and custom.

While it is evident that some such conclusion must follow from the
attempt to regard the cognitive consciousness as made up of
disconnected feelings, it is equally clear, not only that the result
is self-contradictory, but that it involves certain assumptions not in
any way deducible from the fundamental view with which Hume starts.
For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with
the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from
matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects
or relations. Deferring his criticism of the significance of self and
object, Hume yet makes use of both to aid his explanation of the
belief attaching to reality. The reference of an idea to past
experience has no meaning, unless we assume an identity in the object
referred to. For a past impression is purely transitory, and, as Hume
occasionally points out, can have no connexion of fact with the
present consciousness. His exposition has thus a certain plausibility,
which would not belong to it had the final view of the permanent
object been already given.

The final problem of Hume's theory of knowledge, the discussion of the
real significance of the two factors of cognition, self and external
things, is handled in the _Treatise_ with great fulness and
dialectical subtlety.

The self in cognition.

As in the case of the previous problem, it is unnecessary to follow
the steps of his analysis, which are, for the most part, attempts to
substitute qualities of feeling for the relations of thought which
appear to be involved. The results follow with the utmost ease from
his original postulate. If there is nothing in conscious experience
save what observation can disclose, while each act of observation is
itself an isolated feeling (an impression or idea), it is manifest
that a permanent identical thing can never be an object of experience.
Whatever permanence or identity is ascribed to an impression or idea
is the result of association, is one of those "propensities to feign"
which are due to natural connexions among ideas. We regard as
successive presentations of one thing the resembling feelings which
are experienced in succession. Identity, then, whether of self or
object, there is none, and the supposition of _objects_, distinct from
impressions, is but a further consequence of our "propensity to
feign." Hume's explanation of the belief in external things by
reference to association is well deserving of careful study and of
comparison with the more recent analysis of the same problem by J. S.
Mill.

Negative result of Hume's treatise.

The weak points in Hume's empiricism are so admirably realized by the
author himself that it is only fair to quote his own summary in the
_Appendix_ to the _Treatise_. He confesses that, in confining all
cognition to single perceptions and supplying no purely intellectual
faculty for modifying, recording and classifying their results, he has
destroyed real knowledge altogether:

"If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by
being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences
are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only _feel_ a
connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to
another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal
identity, when, reflecting on the train of past perceptions that
compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together
and naturally introduce each other.

"However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise
us. Modern philosophers seem inclined to think that personal identity
_arises_ from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a
reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore,
has a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish when I come to
explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our
thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me
satisfaction on this head....

"In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent,
nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz. _that all our
distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never
perceives any real connexion among distinct existences_. Did our
perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did
the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no
difficulty in the case" (ii. 551).

The closing sentences of this passage may be regarded as pointing to
the very essence of the Kantian attempt at solution of the problem of
knowledge. Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken
as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of
cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further development
is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiving
experience. The work of the critical philosophy is the introduction of
this new mode of regarding experience, a mode which, in the technical
language of philosophers, has received the title of _transcendental_
as opposed to the psychological method followed by Locke and Hume. It
is because Kant alone perceived the full significance of the change
required in order to meet the difficulties of the empirical theory
that we regard his system as the only sequel to that of Hume. The
writers of the Scottish school, Reid in particular, did undoubtedly
indicate some of the weaknesses in Hume's fundamental conception, and
their attempts to show that the isolated feeling cannot be taken as
the ultimate and primary unit of cognitive experience are efforts in
the right direction. But the question of knowledge was never
generalized by them, and their reply to Hume, therefore, remains
partial and inadequate, while its effect is weakened by the uncritical
assumption of principles which is a characteristic feature of their
writings.

Theology and ethics.

The results of Hume's theoretical analysis are applied by him to the
problems of practical philosophy and religion. For the first of these
the reader is referred to the article Ethics, where Hume's views are
placed in relation to those of his predecessors in the same field of
inquiry. His position, as regards the second, is very noteworthy. As
before said, his metaphysic contains _in abstracto_ the principles
which were at that time being employed, uncritically, alike by the
deists and by their antagonists. There can be no doubt that Hume has
continually in mind the theological questions then current, and that
he was fully aware of the mode in which his analysis of knowledge
might be applied to them. A few of the less important of his
criticisms, such as the argument on miracles, became then and have
since remained public property and matter of general discussion. But
the full significance of his work on the theological side was not at
the time perceived, and justice has barely been done to the admirable
manner in which he reduced the theological disputes of the century to
their ultimate elements. The importance of the _Dialogues on Natural
Religion_, as a contribution to the criticism of theological ideas and
methods, can hardly be over-estimated. A brief survey of its contents
will be sufficient to show its general nature and its relations to
such works as Clarke's _Demonstration_ and Butler's _Analogy_. The
_Dialogues_ introduce three interlocutors, Demea, Cleanthes and Philo,
who represent three distinct orders of theological opinion. The first
is the type of a certain a priori view, then regarded as the safest
bulwark against infidelity, of which the main tenets were that the
being of God was capable of a priori proof, and that, owing to the
finitude of our faculties, the attributes and modes of operation of
deity were absolutely incomprehensible. The second is the typical
deist of Locke's school, improved as regards his philosophy, and
holding that the only possible proof of God's existence was a
posteriori, from design, and that such proof was, on the whole,
sufficient. The third is the type of completed empiricism or
scepticism, holding that no argument, either from reason or
experience, can transcend experience, and consequently that no proof
of God's existence is at all possible. The views of the first and
second are played off against one another, and criticized by the third
with great literary skill and effect. Cleanthes, who maintains that
the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is hardly
distinguishable from atheism, is compelled by the arguments of Philo
to reduce to a minimum the conclusion capable of being inferred from
experience as regards the existence of God. For Philo lays stress upon
the weakness of the analogical argument, points out that the demand
for an ultimate cause is no more satisfied by thought than by nature
itself, shows that the argument from design cannot warrant the
inference of a perfect or infinite or even of a single deity, and
finally, carrying out his principles to the full extent, maintains
that, as we have no experience of the origin of the world, no argument
from experience can carry us to its origin, and that the apparent
marks of design in the structure of animals are only results from the
conditions of their actual existence. So far as argument from nature
is concerned, a total suspension of judgment is our only reasonable
resource. Nor does the a priori argument in any of its forms fare
better, for reason can never demonstrate a matter of fact, and, unless
we know that the world had a beginning in time, we cannot insist that
it must have had a cause. Demea, who is willing to give up his
abstract proof, brings forward the ordinary theological topic, man's
consciousness of his own imperfection, misery and dependent condition.
Nature is throughout corrupt and polluted, but "the present evil
phenomena are rectified in other regions and in some future period of
existence." Such a view satisfies neither of his interlocutors.
Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can
never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent
Creator, hazards the conjecture that the deity, though all-benevolent,
is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their
full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand
that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited
deity, we certainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the
benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes's view is, therefore, an
hypothesis, and in no sense an inference.

The _Dialogues_ ought here to conclude. There is, however, appended
one of those perplexing statements of personal opinion (for Hume
declares Cleanthes to be his mouthpiece) not uncommon among writers of
this period. Cleanthes and Philo come to an agreement, in admitting a
certain illogical force in the a posteriori argument, or, at least, in
expressing a conviction as to God's existence, which may not perhaps
be altogether devoid of foundation. The precise value of such a
declaration must be matter of conjecture. Probably the true statement
of Hume's attitude regarding the problem is the somewhat melancholy
utterance with which the _Dialogues_ close.

It is apparent, even from the brief summary just given, that the
importance of Hume in the history of philosophy consists in the vigour
and logical exactness with which he develops a particular metaphysical
view. Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but
they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the
case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and
endeavour to unite with it others radically incompatible. In Hume's
theory of knowledge we have the final expression of what may be called
psychological individualism or atomism, while his ethics and doctrine
of religion are but the logical consequences of this theory. So far as
metaphysic is concerned, Hume has given the final word of the
empirical school, and all additions, whether from the specifically
psychological side or from the general history of human culture, are
subordinate in character, and affect in no way the nature of his
results. It is no exaggeration to say that the later English school of
philosophy represented by J. S. Mill made in theory no advance beyond
Hume. In the _logic_ of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special
character that has no counterpart in Hume, much that is introduced _ab
extra_, from general considerations of scientific procedure, but, so
far as the groundwork is concerned, the _System of Logic_ is a mere
reproduction of Hume's doctrine of knowledge. It is impossible for any
reader of Mill's remarkable posthumous essay on theism to avoid the
reflection that in substance the treatment is identical with that of
the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, while on the whole the
superiority in critical force must be assigned to the earlier work.

Economics.

2. Hume's eminence in the fields of philosophy and history must not be
allowed to obscure his importance as a political economist. Berkeley
had already, in the _Querist_, attacked the mercantile theory of the
nature of national wealth and the functions of money, and Locke had,
in a partial manner, shown that political economy could with advantage
be viewed in relation to the modern system of critical philosophy. But
Hume was the first to apply to economics the scientific methods of his
philosophy. His services to economics may be summed up in two heads:
(1) he established the relation between economic facts and the
fundamental phenomena of social life, and (2) he introduced into the
study of these facts the new historical method. Thus, though he gave
no special name to it, he yet describes the subject-matter, and
indicates the true method, of economic science. His economic essays
were published in the volumes entitled _Political Discourses_ (1752)
and _Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects_ (1753); the most
important are those on Commerce, on Money, on Interest and on the
Balance of Trade, but, notwithstanding the disconnected form of the
essays in general, the other less important essays combine to make a
complete economic system. We have said that Berkeley and Locke had
already begun the general work for which Hume is most important; in
details also Hume had been anticipated to some extent. Nicholas Barbon
and Sir Dudley North had already attacked the mercantile theory as to
the precious metals and the balance of trade; Joseph Massie and Barbon
had anticipated his theory of interest. Yet when we compare Hume with
Adam Smith, the advance which Hume had made on his predecessors in
lucidity of exposition and subtlety of intellect becomes clear, and
modern criticism is agreed that the main errors of Adam Smith are to
be found in those deductions which deviate from the results of the
_Political Discourses_. A very few examples must suffice to illustrate
his services to economics.

Money.

Interest.

Free trade.

Taxation and national debt.

In dealing with money, he refutes the Mercantile School, which had
tended to confound it with wealth. "Money," said Hume, "is none of the
wheels of trade; it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels
more smooth and easy." "Money and commodities are the real strength of
any community." From the internal, as distinct from the international,
aspect, the absolute quantity of money, supposed as of fixed amount,
in a country, is of no consequence, while a quantity larger than is
required for the interchange of commodities is injurious, as tending
to raise prices and to drive foreigners from the home markets. It is
only _during the period of acquisition_ of money, and before the rise
in prices, that the accumulation of precious metals is advantageous.
This principle is perhaps Hume's most important economic discovery
(cf. F. A. Walker's _Money in its Relations to Trade and Industry_,
London, 1880, p. 84 sqq.). He goes on to show that the variations of
prices are due solely to money and commodities in circulation.
Further, it is a misconception to regard as injurious the passage of
money into foreign countries. "A government," he says, "has great
reason to preserve with care its _people_ and its _manufactures_; its
_money_ it may safely trust to the course of human affairs without
fear or jealousy." Dealing with the phenomena of interest, he exposes
the old fallacy that the rate depends upon the amount of money in a
country; low interest does not follow on abundance of money. The
reduction in the rate of interest must, in general, result from "the
increase of industry and frugality, of arts and commerce." In
connexion with this he emphasizes a too generally neglected factor in
economic phenomena, "the constant and insatiable desire of the mind
for exercise and employment." "Interest," he says in general, "is the
barometer of the state, and its lowness an almost infallible sign of
prosperity," arising, as it does, from increased trade, frugality in
the merchant class, and the consequent rise of new lenders: low
interest and low profits mutually forward each other. In the matter of
free trade and protection he compromises. He says on the one hand,
"not only as a man, but as a British subject I pray for the
flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself,"
and condemns "the numerous bars, obstructions and imposts which all
nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade."
On the other hand, he approves of a protective tax on German linen in
favour of home manufactures, and of a tax on brandy as encouraging the
sale of rum and so supporting our southern colonies. Indeed it has
been fairly observed that Hume retains an attitude of refined
mercantilism. With regard to taxation he takes very definite views.
The best taxes, he says, are those levied on consumption, especially
on luxuries, for these are least heavily felt. He denies that all
taxes fall finally on the land. Superior frugality and industry on the
part of the artisan will enable him to pay taxes without mechanically
raising the price of labour. Here, as in other points, he differs
entirely from the physiocrats, and his criticism of contemporary
French views are, as a whole, in accordance with received modern
opinion. For the modern expedient of raising money for national
emergencies by way of loan he has a profound distrust. He was
convinced that what is bad for the individual credit must be bad for
the state also. A national debt, he maintains, enriches the capital at
the expense of the provinces; further, it creates a leisured class of
stockholders, and possesses all the disadvantages of paper credit.
"Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will
destroy the nation." To sum up, it may be said that Hume enunciated
the principle that "everything in the world is purchased by labour,
and our passions are the only causes of labour"; and further, that, in
analysing the complex phenomena of commerce, he is superior sometimes
to Adam Smith in that he never forgets that the ultimate causes of
economic change are the "customs and manners" of the people, and that
the solution of problems is to be sought in the elementary factors of
industry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--1. Life.--J. H. Burton's _Life and Correspondence of
David Hume_ (2 vols., 1846); Dr G. Birkbeck Hill, _Letters of Hume to
William Strahan_; C. J. W. Francke, _David Hume_ (Haarlem, 1907).

2. Works.--Until 1874 the standard edition was that of 1826 (reprinted
1854), in 4 vols. The best modern edition is that in 4 vols. by T. H.
Green and T. H. Grose (containing a valuable introduction and
excellent bibliographical matter); the _Enquiry_ and the _Treatise_
(1894 and 1896, Oxford), edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.

3. Philosophic (the more important only can be quoted).--Huxley's
_Hume_ (a popular reproduction of Hume's views in "English Men of
Letters" series); Sir L. Stephen's _English Thought in the XVIIIth
Century_ (1876, especially ch. vi.); J. Orr, _David Hume and his
Influence on Philosophy and Theology_ (1903, especially ch. ix. on
"Moral Theory of Hume"); H. Calderwood, _David Hume_ (1898, especially
ch. vii. on Hume's attitude to religion); A. Seth, _Scottish and
German Answers to Hume_; F. Jodl, _Leben und Philosophie D. Humes_
(1872); E. Pfleiderer, _Empirismus und Skepsis in D. Humes
Philosophie_ (1874); G. Spicker, _Kant, Hume und Berkeley_ (1875); G.
Compayre, _La Philosophie de D. Hume_ (1873); A. Meinong,
_Hume-Studien_ (1877, especially Hume's nominalism); G. von Gizycki (a
thorough exposition of Hume's utilitarianism), _Die Ethik D. Humes_
(1878); G. Lechartier, _D. Hume, moraliste et sociologue_ (1900); M.
Klemme, _Die volkswirtschaftlichen Anchauungen D. Humes_ (1900); E.
Marcus, _Kants Revolutionsprinzip. Eine exakte Losung des
Kant-Hume'schen Erkenntnisproblems_ (1902); C. Hedvall, _Humes
Erkenntnistheorie_ (1906); R. Honigswald, _Uber die Lehre Humes von
der Realitat der Aussendinge_ (1904); O. Quast, _Der Begriff des
Belief bei David Hume_ (1903). Hume's relation to the society of his
time is described in the Rev. H. G. Graham's _Social Life in Scotland_
and _Scottish Men of Letters_; "Jupiter" in Carlyle's _Autobiography_.
J. MacCosh published a short pamphlet (1884) containing interesting
but perhaps not conclusive arguments on the _Agnosticism of Hume and
Huxley_.

4. Economic.--J. Bonar, _Philosophy and Political Economy_ (London,
1893), chapter on Hume; notes to W. G. F. Roscher's _Principles of
Political Economy_ (J. Lalor's trans. of 13th ed., New York, 1878); F.
A. Walker's _Money_ (New York, 1877) gives an account of Hume's views
on interest and money; H. H. Gibbs (Lord Aldenham), _Colloquy on the
Currency_; for Hume's relation to Adam Smith, John Rae's _Life of Adam
Smith_ (London, 1895). See also M. Teisseire, _Les Essais economiques
de David Hume_ (1902; a critical study); A. Schatz, _L'Oeuvre
economique de David Hume_ (1902). (R. Ad.; J. M. M.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Burton, ii. 265, 148 and 238. Perhaps our knowledge of
Johnson's sentiments regarding the Scots in general, and of his
expressions regarding Hume and Smith in particular, may lessen our
surprise at this vehemence.

[2] Macaulay describes Hume's characteristic fault as an historian:
"Hume is an accomplished advocate. Without positively asserting much
more than he can prove, he gives prominence to all the circumstances
which support his case; he glides lightly over those which are
unfavourable to it; his own witnesses are applauded and encouraged;
the statements which seem to throw discredit on them are
controverted; the contradictions into which they fall are explained
away; a clear and connected abstract of their evidence is given.
Everything that is offered on the other side is scrutinized with the
utmost severity; every suspicious circumstance is a ground for
argument and invective; what cannot be denied is extenuated, or
passed by without notice; concessions even are sometimes made; but
this insidious candour only increases the effect of the vast mass of
sophistry."--_Miscell. Writings_, "History." With this may be
compared the more favourable verdict by J. S. Brewer, in the preface
to his edition of the _Student's Hume_.

HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855), British politician, was born on the 22nd of January 1777, of humble parents, at Montrose, Scotland. After completing his course of medical study at the university of Edinburgh he sailed in 1797 for India, where he was attached as surgeon to a regiment; and his knowledge of the native tongues and his capacity for business threw open to him the lucrative offices of interpreter and commissary-general. In 1802, on the eve of Lord Lake's Mahratta war, his chemical knowledge enabled him to render a signal service to the administration by making available a large quantity of gunpowder which damp had spoiled. In 1808, on the restoration of peace, he resigned all his civil appointments, and returned home in the possession of a fortune of L40,000. Between 1808 and 1811 he travelled much both in England and the south of Europe, and in 1812 published a blank verse translation of the _Inferno_. In 1812 he purchased a seat in parliament for Weymouth and voted as a Tory. When upon the dissolution of parliament the patron refused to return him he brought an action and recovered part of his money. Six years elapsed before he again entered the House, and during that interval he had made the acquaintance and imbibed the doctrines of James Mill and the philosophical reformers of the school of Bentham. He had joined his efforts to those of Francis Place, of Westminster, and other philanthropists, to relieve and improve the condition of the working classes, labouring especially to establish schools for them on the Lancasterian system, and promoting the formation of savings banks. In 1818, soon after his marriage with Miss Burnley, the daughter of an East India director, he was returned to parliament as member for the Border burghs. He was afterwards successively elected for Middlesex (1830), Kilkenny (1837) and for the Montrose burghs (1842), in the service of which constituency he died. From the date of his re-entering the House Hume became the self-elected guardian of the public purse, by challenging and bringing to a direct vote every single item of public expenditure. In 1820 he secured the appointment of a committee to report on the expense of collecting the revenue. He was incessantly on his legs in committee, and became a name for an opposition bandog who gave chancellors of the exchequer no peace. He undoubtedly exercised a check on extravagance, and he did real service by helping to abolish the sinking fund. It was he who caused the word "retrenchment" to be added to the Radical programme "peace and reform." He carried on a successful warfare against the old combination laws that hampered workmen and favoured masters; he brought about the repeal of the laws prohibiting the export of machinery and of the act preventing workmen from going abroad. He constantly protested against flogging in the army, the impressment of sailors and imprisonment for debt. He took up the question of lighthouses and harbours; in the former he secured greater efficiency, in the latter he prevented useless expenditure. Apart from his pertinacious fight for economy Hume was not always fortunate in his political activity. He was conspicuous in the agitation raised by the so-called Orange plot to set aside King William IV. in favour of the duke of Cumberland (1835 and 1836). His action as trustee for the notorious Greek Loan in 1824 was at least not delicate, and was the ground of charges of downright dishonesty. He died on the 20th of February 1855.

A _Memorial_ of Hume was published by his son Joseph Burnley Hume
(London, 1855).

HUMILIATI, the name of an Italian monastic order created in the 12th century. Its origin is obscure. According to some chroniclers, certain noblemen of Lombardy, who had offended the emperor (either Conrad III. or Frederick Barbarossa), were carried captive into Germany and after suffering the miseries of exile for some time, "humiliated" themselves before the emperor. Returning to their own country, they did penance and took the name of Humiliati. They do not seem to have had any fixed rule, nor did St Bernard succeed in inducing them to submit to one. The traditions relating to a reform of this order by St John of Meda are ill authenticated, his _Acta_ (_Acta sanctorum Boll._, Sept., vii. 320) being almost entirely unsupported by contemporary evidence. The "Chronicon anonymi Laudunensis canonici" (_Mon. Germ. hist. Scriptores_, xxvi. 449), at date 1178, states that a group of Lombards came to Rome with the intention of obtaining the pope's approval of the rule of life which they had spontaneously chosen; while continuing to live in their houses in the midst of their families, they wished to lead a more pious existence than of old, to abandon oaths and litigation, to content themselves with a modest dress, and all in a spirit of Catholic piety. The pope approved their resolve to live in humility and purity, but forbade them to hold assemblies and to preach in public; the chronicler adding that they infringed the pope's wish and thus drew upon themselves his excommunication. Their name, Humiliati ("Humiles" would have been more appropriate), arose from the fact that the clothes they wore were very simple and of one colour. This lay fraternity spread rapidly and soon put forth two new branches, a second order composed of women, and a third composed of priests. No sooner, however, had this order of priests been formed, than it claimed precedence of the others, and, though chronologically last, was called _primus ordo_ by hierarchical right--_propter tonsuram_ (see P. Sabatier, "Regula antiqua Fr. et Sor. de poenitentia" in _Opuscules de critique historique_, part i. p. 15). In 1201 Pope Innocent III. granted a rule to this third order. Sabatier has drawn attention to the resemblances between this rule and the _Regula de poenitentia_ granted to Franciscanism in the course of its development; on the other hand, it is incontestable that Innocent III. wished to reconcile the order with the Waldenses, and, indeed, its rule reproduces several of the Waldensian propositions, ingeniously modified in the orthodox sense, but still very easily recognizable. It forbade useless oaths and the taking of God's name in vain; allowed voluntary poverty and marriage; regulated pious exercises; and approved the solidarity which already existed among the members of the association. Finally, by a singular concession, it authorized them to meet on Sunday to listen to the words of a brother "of proved faith and prudent piety," on condition that the hearers should not discuss among themselves either the articles of faith or the sacraments of the church. The bishops were forbidden to oppose any of the utterances of the Humiliati brethren, "for the spirit must not be stifled." James of Vitry, without being unfavourable to their tendencies, represents their association as one of the peculiarities of the church of his time (_Historia orientalis_, Douai, 1597). So broad a discipline must of necessity have led back some waverers into the pale of the church, but the Waldenses of Lombardy, in their _congregationes laborantium_, preserved the tradition of the independent Humiliati. Indeed, this tradition is confounded throughout the later 12th century with the history of the Waldenses. The "Chronicon Urspergense" (_Mon. Germ. hist. Scriptores_, xxiii. 376-377) mentions the Humiliati as one of the two Waldensian sects. The celebrated decretal promulgated in 1184 by Pope Lucius III. at the council of Verona against all heretics condemns at the same time as the "Poor Men of Lyons" "those who attribute to themselves falsely the name of Humiliati," at the very time when this name denoted an order recognized by the papacy. This order, though orthodox, was always held in tacit and ever-increasing suspicion, and, in consequence of grave disorders, Pius V. suppressed the entire congregation in February 1570-71.

See Tiraboschi, _Vetera humiliatorum monumenta_ (Milan, 1766); K.
Muller, _Die Waldenser_ (Gotha, 1886); W. Preger, _Beitrage zur
Geschichte der Waldensier_ (Munich, 1875). (P. A.)

HUMITE, a group of minerals consisting of basic magnesium fluo-silicates, with the following formulae:--Chondrodite, Mg3[Mg(F, OH)]2[SiO4]2; Humite, Mg5[Mg(F, OH)]2[SiO4]3; Clinohumite, Mg7[Mg(F, OH)]2[SiO4]4. Humite crystallizes in the orthorhombic and the two others in the monoclinic system, but between them there is a close crystallographic relation: the lengths of the vertical axes are in the ratio 5:7:9, and this is also the ratio of the number of magnesium atoms present in each of the three minerals. These minerals are strikingly similar in appearance, and can only be distinguished by the goniometric measurement of the complex crystals. They are honey-yellow to brown or red in colour, and have a vitreous to resinous lustre; the hardness is 6-6(1/2), and the specific gravity 3.1-3.2. Further, they often occur associated together, and it is only comparatively recently that the three species have been properly discriminated. The name humite, after Sir Abraham Hume, Bart. (1749-1839), whose collection of diamond crystals is preserved at Cambridge in the University museum, was given by the comte de Bournon in 1813 to the small and brilliant honey-yellow crystals found in the blocks of crystalline limestone ejected from Monte Somma, Vesuvius; all three species have since been recognized at this locality. Chondrodite (from [Greek: chondros], "a grain") was a name early (1817) in use for granular forms of these minerals found embedded in crystalline limestones in Sweden, Finland and at several place in New York and New Jersey. Large hyacinth-red crystals of all three species are associated with magnetite in the Tilly Foster iron-mine at Brewster, New York; and at Kafveltorp in Orebro, Sweden, similar crystals (of chondrodite) occur embedded in galena and chalcopyrite.

The relation mentioned above between the crystallographic constants and the chemical composition is unique amongst minerals, and is known as a morphotropic relation. S. L. Penfield and W. T. H. Howe, who in 1894 noticed this relation, predicted the existence of another member of the series, the crystals of which would have a still shorter vertical axis and contain less magnesium, the formula being Mg[Mg(F, OH)]2SiO4; this has since been discovered and named prolectite (from [Greek: prolegein], "to foretell"). (L. J. S.)

HUMMEL, JOHANN NEPOMUK (1778-1837), German composer and pianist, was born on the 14th of November 1778, at Pressburg, in Hungary, and received his first artistic training from his father, himself a musician. In 1785 the latter received an appointment as conductor of the orchestra at the theatre of Schikaneder, the friend of Mozart and the librettist of the _Magic Flute_. It was in this way that Hummel became acquainted with the composer, who took a great fancy to him, and even invited him to his house for a considerable period. During two years, from the age of seven to nine, Hummel received the invaluable instruction of Mozart, after which he set out with his father on an artistic tour through Germany, England and other countries, his clever playing winning the admiration of amateurs. He began to compose in his eleventh year. After his return to Vienna he completed his studies under Albrechtsberger and Haydn, and for a number of years devoted himself exclusively to composition. At a later period he learned song-writing from Salieri. For some years he held the appointment of orchestral conductor to Prince Eszterhazy, probably entering upon this office in 1807. From 1811 to 1815 he lived in Vienna. On the 18th of May 1813 he married Elisabeth Rockl, a singer, and the sister of one of Beethoven's friends. It was not till 1816 that he again appeared in public as a pianist, his success being quite extraordinary. His gift of improvisation at the piano was especially admired, but his larger compositions also were highly appreciated, and for a time Hummel was considered one of the leading musicians of an age in which Beethoven was in the zenith of his power. In Prussia, which he visited in 1822, the ovations offered to him were unprecedented, and other countries--France in 1825 and 1829, Belgium in 1826 and England in 1830 and 1833--added further laurels to his crown. He died in 1837 at Weimar, where for a long time he had been the musical conductor of the court theatre. His compositions are very numerous, and comprise almost every branch of music. He wrote, amongst other things, several operas, both tragic and comic, and two grand masses (Op. 80 and 111). Infinitely more important are his compositions for the pianoforte (his two concerti in A minor and B minor, and the sonata in F sharp minor), and his chamber music (the celebrated septet, and several trios, &c.). His experience as a player and teacher of the pianoforte was embodied in his _Great Pianoforte School_ (Vienna), and the excellence of his method is further proved by such pupils as Henselt and Ferdinand Hiller. Both as a composer and as a pianist Hummel continued the traditions of the earlier Viennese school of Mozart and Haydn; his style in both capacities was marked by purity and correctness rather than by passion and imagination.