Chapter XVII: Part 17

The plainly paramount purpose of these rules was to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the samurai and the courtiers living in Kioto. The dancing, the couplet-composing, the sumptuous living and the fine costumes of the officials frequenting the imperial capital were strictly interdicted by the feudatories. Frugality, fealty and filial piety--these may be called the fundamental virtues of the samurai. Owing to the circumstances out of which his caste had grown, he regarded all bread-winning pursuits with contempt, and despised money. To be swayed in the smallest degree by mercenary motives was despicable in his eyes. Essentially a stoic, he made self-control the ideal of his existence, and practised the courageous endurance of suffering so thoroughly that he could without hesitation inflict on his own body pain of the most horrible description. Nor can the courage of the samurai justly be ascribed to bluntness of moral sensibility resulting from semi-savage conditions of life. From the 8th century onwards the current of existence in Japan set with general steadiness in the direction of artistic refinement and voluptuous luxury, amidst which men could scarcely fail to acquire habits and tastes inconsistent with acts of high courage and great endurance. The samurai's mood was not a product of semi-barbarism, but rather a protest against emasculating civilization. He schooled himself to regard death by his own hand as a normal eventuality. The story of other nations shows epochs when death was welcomed as a relief and deliberately invited as a refuge from the mere weariness of living. But wherever there has been liberty to choose, and leisure to employ, a painless mode of exit from the world, men have invariably selected it. The samurai, however, adopted in _harakiri_ (disembowelment) a mode of suicide so painful and so shocking that to school the mind to regard it with indifference and perform it without flinching was a feat not easy to conceive. Assistance was often rendered by a friend who stood ready to decapitate the victim immediately after the stomach had been gashed; but there were innumerable examples of men who consummated the tragedy without aid, especially when the sacrifice of life was by way of protest against the excesses of a feudal chief or the crimes of a ruler, or when some motive for secrecy existed. It must be observed that the suicide of the samurai was never inspired by any doctrine like that of Hegesias. Death did not present itself to him as a legitimate means of escaping from the cares and disappointments of life. Self-destruction had only one consolatory aspect, that it was the soldier's privilege to expiate a crime with his own sword, not under the hand of the executioner. It rested with his feudal chief to determine his guilt, and his peremptory duty was never to question the justice of an order to commit suicide, but to obey without murmur or protest. For the rest, the general motives for suicide were to escape falling into the hands of a victorious enemy, to remonstrate against some official abuse which no ordinary complaint could reach, or, by means of a dying protest, to turn a liege lord from pursuing courses injurious to his reputation and his fortune. This last was the noblest and by no means the most infrequent reason for suicide. Scores of examples are recorded of men who, with everything to make existence desirable, deliberately laid down their lives at the prompting of loyalty. Thus the samurai rose to a remarkable height of moral nobility. He had no assurance that his death might not be wholly fruitless, as indeed it often proved. If the sacrifice achieved its purpose, if it turned a liege lord from evil courses, the samurai could hope that his memory would be honoured. But if the lord resented such a violent and conspicuous mode of reproving his excesses, then the faithful vassal's retribution would be an execrated memory and, perhaps, suffering for his family and relatives. Yet the deed was performed again and again. It remains to be noted that the samurai entertained a high respect for the obligations of truth; "A bushi has no second word," was one of his favourite mottoes. However, a reservation is necessary here. The samurai's doctrine was not truth for truth's sake, but truth for the sake of the spirit of uncompromising manliness on which he based all his code of morality. A pledge or a promise must never be broken, but the duty of veracity did not override the interests or the welfare of others. Generosity to a defeated foe was also one of the tenets of the samurai's ethics. History contains many instances of the exercise of that quality.

Religious Influence.

Something more, however, than a profound conception of duty was needed to nerve the samurai for sacrifices such as he seems to have been always ready to make. It is true that Japanese parents of the military class took pains to familiarize their children of both sexes from very tender years with the idea of self-destruction at any time. But superadded to the force of education and the incentive of tradition there was a transcendental influence. Buddhism supplied it. The tenets of that creed divided themselves, broadly speaking, into two doctrines, salvation by faith and salvation by works, and the chief exponent of the latter principle is the sect which prescribes meditation as the vehicle of enlightenment. Whatever be the mental processes induced by this rite, those who have practised it insist that it leads finally to a state of absorption, in which the mind is flooded by an illumination revealing the universe in a new aspect, absolutely free from all traces of passion, interest or affection, and showing, written across everything in flaming letters, the truth that for him who has found Buddha there is neither birth nor death, growth nor decay. Lifted high above his surroundings, he is prepared to meet every fate with indifference. The attainment of that state seems to have been a fact in the case both of the samurai of the military epoch and of the Japanese soldier to-day.

Abolition of the Samurai.

The policy of seclusion adopted by the Tokugawa administration after the Shimabara insurrection included an order that no samurai should acquire foreign learning. Nevertheless some knowledge could not fail to filter in through the Dutch factory at Deshima, and thus, a few years before the advent of the American ships, Takashima Shuhan, governor of Nagasaki, becoming persuaded of the fate his country must invite if she remained oblivious of the world's progress, memorialized the Yedo government in the sense that, unless Japan improved her weapons of war and reformed her military system, she could not escape humiliation such as had just overtaken China. He obtained small arms and field-guns of modern type from Holland, and, repairing to Yedo with a company of men trained according to the new tactics, he offered an object lesson for the consideration of the conservative officials. They answered by throwing him into prison. But Egawa, one of his retainers, proved a still more zealous reformer, and his foresight being vindicated by the appearance of the American war-vessels in 1853, he won the government's confidence and was entrusted with the work of planning and building forts at Shinagawa and Shimoda. At Egawa's instance rifles and cannon were imported largely from Europe, and their manufacture was commenced in Japan, a powder-mill also being established with machinery obtained from Holland. Finally, in 1862, the shogun's government adopted the military system of the West, and organized three divisions of all arms, with a total strength of 13,600 officers and men. Disbanded at the fall of the shogunate in 1867, this force nevertheless served as a model for a similar organization under the imperial government, and in the meanwhile the principal fiefs had not been idle, some--as Satsuma--adopting English tactics, others following France or Germany, and a few choosing Dutch. There appeared upon the stage at this juncture a great figure in the person of Omura Masujiro, a samurai of the Choshu clan. He established Japan's first military school at Kioto in 1868; he attempted to substitute for the hereditary soldier conscripts taken from all classes of the people, and he conceived the plan of dividing the whole empire into six military districts. An assassin's dagger removed him on the threshold of these great reforms, but his statue now stands in Tokyo and his name is spoken with reverence by all his countrymen. In 1870 Yamagata Aritomo (afterwards Field-Marshal Prince Yamagata) and Saigo Tsugumichi (afterwards Field-Marshal Marquis Saigo) returned from a tour of military inspection in Europe, and in 1872 they organized a corps of Imperial guards, taken from the three clans which had been conspicuous in the work of restoring the administrative power to the sovereign, namely, the clans of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa. They also established garrisons in Tokyo, Sendai, Osaka and Kumamoto, thus placing the military authority in the hands of the central government. Reforms followed quickly. In 1872, the _hyobusho_, an office which controlled all matters relating to war, was replaced by two departments, one of war and one of the navy, and, in 1873, an imperial decree substituted universal conscription for the system of hereditary militarism. Many persons viewed this experiment with deep misgiving. They feared that it would not only alienate the samurai, but also entrust the duty of defending the country to men unfitted by tradition and custom for such a task, namely, the farmers, artisans and tradespeople, who, after centuries of exclusion from the military pale, might be expected to have lost all martial spirit. The government, however, was not deterred by these apprehensions. It argued that since the distinction of samurai and commoner had not originally existed, and since the former was a product simply of accidental conditions, there was no valid reason to doubt the military capacity of the people at large. The justice of this reasoning was put to a conclusive test a few years later. Originally the period of service with the colours was fixed at 3 years, that of service with the first and second reserves being 2 years each. One of the serious difficulties encountered at the outset was that samurai conscripts were too proud to stand in the ranks with common rustics or artisans, and above all to obey the commands of plebeian officers. But patriotism soon overcame this obstacle. The whole country--with the exception of the northern island, Yezo--was parcelled out into six military districts (headquarters Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sendai, Hiroshima and Kumamoto) each furnishing a division of all arms and services. There was also from 1876 a guards division in Tokyo. The total strength on a peace footing was 31,680 of all arms, and on a war footing, 46,350. The defence of Yezo was entrusted to a colonial militia. It may well be supposed that to find competent officers for this army greatly perplexed its organizers. The military school--now in Tokyo but originally founded by Omura in Kioto--had to turn out graduates at high pressure, and private soldiers who showed any special aptitude were rapidly promoted to positions of command. French military instructors were engaged, and the work of translating manuals was carried out with all celerity. In 1877, this new army of conscripts had to endure a crucial test: it had to take the field against the Satsuma samurai, the very flower of their class, who in that year openly rebelled against the Tokyo government. The campaign lasted eight months; as there had not yet been time to form the reserves, the Imperial forces were soon seriously reduced in number by casualties in the field and by disease, the latter claiming many victims owing to defective commissariat. It thus became necessary to have recourse to volunteers, but as these were for the most part samurai, the expectation was that their hereditary instinct of fighting would compensate for lack of training. That expectation was not fulfilled. Serving side by side in the field, the samurai volunteer and the heimin[15] regular were found to differ by precisely the degree of their respective training. The fact was thus finally established that the fighting qualities of the farmer and artisan reached as high a standard as those of the bushi.

Thenceforth the story of the Japanese army is one of steady progress
and development. In 1878, the military duties of the empire were
divided among three offices: namely, the army department, the general
staff and the inspection department, while the six divisions of troops
were organized into three army corps.

In 1879, the total period of colour and reserve service became 10
years. In 1883 the period was extended to 12 years, the list of
exemptions was abbreviated, and above all substitution was no longer
allowed. Great care was devoted to the training of officers; promotion
went by merit, and at least ten of the most promising officers were
sent abroad every year to study. A comprehensive system of education
for the rank and file was organized. Great difficulty was experienced
in procuring horses suitable for cavalry, and indeed the Japanese army
long remained weak in this arm. In 1886, the whole littoral of the
empire was divided into five districts, each with its admiralty and
its naval port, and the army being made responsible for coast defence,
a battery construction corps was formed. Moreover, an exhaustive
scheme was elaborated to secure full co-operation between the army and
navy. In 1888 the seven divisions of the army first found themselves
prepared to take the field, and, in 1893, a revised system of
mobilization was sanctioned, to be put into operation the following
year, for the Chino-Japanese War (q.v.). At this period the division,
mobilized for service in the field, consisted of 12 battalions of
infantry, 3 troops of cavalry, 4 batteries of field and 2 of mountain
artillery, 2 companies of sappers and train, totalling 18,492 of all
arms with 5633 horses. The guards had only 8 battalions and 4
batteries (field). The field army aggregated over 120,000, with 168
field and 72 mountain guns, and the total of all forces, field,
garrison and dépôt, was 220,580 of all arms, with 47,220 horses and
294 guns. Owing, however, to various modifications necessitated by
circumstances, the numbers actually on duty were over 240,000, with
6495 non-combatant employees and about 100,000 coolies who acted as
carriers. The infantry were armed with the Murata single-loader rifle,
but the field artillery was inferior, and the only two divisions
equipped with magazine rifles and smokeless powder never came into
action. The experiences gained in this war bore large fruit. The total
term of service with the colours and the reserves was slightly
increased; the colonial militia of Yezo (Hokkaido) was organized as a
seventh line division; 5 new divisions were added, bringing the whole
number of divisions to 13 (including the guards); a mixed brigade was
stationed in Formosa (then newly added to Japan's dominions); a high
military council composed of field-marshals was created; the cavalry
was brigaded; the garrison artillery was increased; strenuous efforts
were made to improve the education of officers and men; and lastly,
sanitary arrangements underwent much modification. An arsenal had been
established in Tokyo, in 1868, for the manufacture of small arms and
small-arm ammunition; this was followed by an arsenal in Osaka for the
manufacture of guns and gun-ammunition; four powder factories were
opened, and in later years big-gun factories at Kure and Mororan.
Japan was able to make 12-inch guns in 1902, and her capacity for this
kind of work was in 1909 second to none. She has her own patterns of
rifle and field gun, so that she is independent of foreign aid so far
as armaments are concerned. In 1900, she sent a force to North China
to assist in the campaign for the relief of the foreign legations in
Peking, and on that occasion her troops were able to observe at first
hand the qualities and methods of European soldiers. In 1904 took
place the great war with Russia (see RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR). After the
war important changes were made in the direction of augmenting and
improving the armed forces. The number of divisions was increased to
19 (including the guards), of which one division is for service in
Korea and one for service in Manchuria. Various technical corps were
organized, as well as horse artillery, heavy field artillery and
machine-gun units. The field-gun was replaced by a quick-firer
manufactured at Osaka, and much attention was given to the question of
remounts--for, both in the war with China and in that with Russia, the
horsing of the cavalry had been poor. Perhaps the most far-reaching
change in all armies of late years is the shortening of the term of
service with the colours to 2 years for the infantry, 3 years
remaining the rule for other arms. This was adopted by Japan after the
war, the infantry period of service with the reserves being extended
to 14{1/3} years, and of course has the effect of greatly augmenting
the potential war strength. As to this, figures are kept secret, nor
can any accurate approximation be attempted without danger of error.
Rough estimates of Japan's war strength have, however, been made,
giving 550,000 as the war strength of the first line army, plus 34,000
for garrisons overseas and 150,000 special reserves (_hoju_); 370,000
second line or _kobi_, and 110,000 for the fully trained portion of
the territorial forces, or _Kokumin-hei_. All these branches can
further draw upon half-trained elements to the number of about 800,000
to replace losses. Japan's available strength in the last resort for
home defence was recently (1909) stated by the Russian _Novoye Vremya_
at 3,000,000. In 20 years, when the present system has produced its
full effect, the first line should be 740,000 strong, the second line
780,000, and the third line about 3,850,000 (3,000,000 untrained and
850,000 partly trained). Details can be found in _Journal of the R.
United Service Institution_, Dec. 1909-Jan. 1910.

Recruiting.

At 20 years of age every Japanese subject, of whatever status, becomes
liable for military service. But the difficulty of making service
universal in the case of a growing population is felt here as in
Europe, and practically the system has elements of the old-fashioned
conscription. The minimum height is 5.2 ft. (artillery and engineers,
5.4 ft.). There are four principal kinds of service, namely, service
with the colours (_genyeki_), for two years; service with the first
reserves (_yobi_), for 7{1/3} years; service with the second reserves
(_kobi_), for 7 years; and service with the territorial troops (_ko
kumin-hei_) up to the age of 40. Special reserve (_hoju_) takes up men
who, though liable for conscription and medically qualified, have
escaped the lot for service with the colours. It consists of two
classes, one of men remaining in the category of _hoju_ for 7{1/3}
years, the other for 1{1/3} year, before passing into the territorial
army. Their purpose is similar to that of special or _ersatz_ reserves
elsewhere. The first class receives the usual short initial training.
Men of the second class, in ordinary circumstances, pass, after their
1{1/3} year's inability, to the territorial army untrained. As for the
first and second general reserves (_yobi_ and _kobi_), each is called
out twice during its full term for short "refresher" courses. After
reaching the territorial army a man is relieved from all further
training. The total number of youths eligible for conscription each
year is about 435,000, but the annual contingent for full service is
not much more than 100,000. Conscripts in the active army may be
discharged before the expiration of two years if their conduct and
aptitude are exceptional.

A youth is exempted if it be clearly established[16] that his family
is dependent upon his earnings. Except for permanent deformities men
are put back for one year before being finally rejected on medical
grounds. Men who have been convicted of crime are disqualified, but
those who have been temporarily deprived of civil rights must present
themselves for conscription at the termination of their sentence.
Educated men may enrol themselves as one-year volunteers instead of
drawing lots, this privilege of entry enduring up to the age of 28,
after which, service for the full term without drawing lots is
imposed. Residence in a foreign country secures exemption up to the
age of 32--provided that official permission to go abroad has been
obtained. A man returning after the age of 32 is drafted into the
territorial army, but if he returns before that age he must volunteer
to receive training, otherwise he is taken without lot for service
with the colours. The system of volunteering is largely resorted to by
persons of the better classes. Any youth who possesses certain
educational qualifications is entitled to volunteer for training. If
accepted after medical inspection, he serves with the colours for one
year, during three months of which time he must live in
barracks--unless a special permit be granted by his commanding
officer. A volunteer has to contribute to his maintenance and
equipment, although youths who cannot afford the full expense, if
otherwise qualified, are assisted by the state. At the conclusion of a
year's training the volunteer is drafted into the first reserve for 6¼
years, and then into the second reserve for 5 years, so that his total
period (12¼ years) of service before passing into the territorial army
is the same as that of an ordinary conscript. The main purpose of the
one-year voluntariat, as in Germany, is to provide officers for the
reserves to territorial troops. Qualified teachers in the public
service are only liable to a very short initial training, after which
they pass at once into the territorial army. But if a teacher abandons
that calling before the age of 28, he becomes liable, without lot,[17]
to two years with the colours, unless he adopts the alternative of
volunteering.

Officers.

Officers are obtained in two ways. There are six local preparatory
cadet schools (_yonen-gakko_) in various parts of the empire, for boys
of from 13 to 15. After 3 years at one of these schools[18] a graduate
spends 21 months at the central preparatory school
(_chuo-yonen-gakko_), Tokyo, and if he graduates with sufficient
credit at the latter institution, he becomes eligible for admission to
the officers' college (_shikan-gakko_) without further test of
proficiency. The second method of obtaining officers is by competitive
examination for direct admission to the officers' college. In either
case the cadet is sent to serve with the colours for 6 to 12 months as
a private and non-commissioned officer, before commencing his course
at the officers' college. The period of study at the officers' college
is one year, and after graduating successfully the cadet serves with
troops for 6 months on probation. If at the end of that time he is
favourably reported on, he is commissioned as a sub-lieutenant. Young
officers of engineers and artillery receive a year's further training
at a special college. Officers' ranks are the same as in the British
army, but the nomenclature is more simple. The terms, with their
English equivalents, are _shoi_ (second lieutenant), _chui_ (first
lieutenant), _tai_ (captain), _shosa_ (major), _chusa_
(lieut.-colonel), _taisa_ (colonel), _shosho_ (major-general), _chujo_
(lieut.-general), _taisho_ (general), _gensui_ (field-marshal). All
these except the last apply to the same relative ranks in the navy.
Promotion of officers in the junior grades is by seniority or merit,
but after the rank of captain all promotion is by merit, and thus many
officers never rise higher than captain, in which case retirement is
compulsory at the age of 48. Except in the highest ranks, a certain
minimum period has to be spent in each rank before promotion to the
next.

Soldiers.

There are three grades of privates: upper soldiers (_joto-hei_),
first-class soldiers (_itto-sotsu_), and second-class soldiers
(_nito-sotsu_). A private on joining is a second-class soldier. For
proficiency and good conduct he is raised to the rank of first-class
soldier, and ultimately to that of upper soldier. Non-commissioned
officers are obtained from the ranks, or from those who wish to make
soldiering a profession, as in European armies. The grades are
corporal (_gocho_), sergeant (_gunso_), sergeant-major (_socho_) and
special sergeant-major (_tokumu-socho_).

The pay of the conscript is, as it is everywhere, a trifle (1s.
10d.-3s. 0½d. per month). The professional non-commissioned officers
are better paid, the lowest grade receiving three times as much as an
upper soldier. Officers' pay is roughly at about three-quarters of the
rates prevailing in Germany, sub-lieutenants receiving about £34,
captains £71, colonels £238 per annum, &c. Pensions for officers and
non-commissioned officers, according to scale, can be claimed after 11
years' colour service.

The emperor is the commander-in-chief of the army, and theoretically
the sole source of military authority, which he exercises through a
general staff and a war department, with the assistance of a board of
field-marshals (_gensuifu_). The general staff has for chief a
field-marshal, and for vice-chief a general or lieutenant-general. It
includes besides the usual general staff departments, various survey
and topographical officers, and the military college is under its
direction. The war department is presided over by a general officer on
the active list, who is a member of the cabinet without being
necessarily affected by ministerial changes. There are, further,
artillery and engineer committees, and a remount bureau. The
headquarters of coast defences under general officers are Tokyo,
Yokohama, Shimonoseki and Yura. The whole empire is divided into three
military districts--eastern, central and western--each under the
command of a general or lieutenant-general. The divisional
headquarters are as follows:--Guard Tokyo, I. Tokyo, II. Sendai, III.
Nagoya, IV. Wakayama, V. Hiroshima, VI. Kumamoto, VII. Asahikawa,
VIII. Hirosaki, IX. Kasanava, X. Himeji, XI. Senzui, XII. Kokura,
XIII. Takata, XIV. Utsonomia, XV. Fushimi, XVI. Kioto, XVII. Okayama,
XVIII. Kurume. Some of these divisions are permanently on foreign
service, but their recruiting areas in Japan are maintained. There are
also four cavalry brigades, and a number of unassigned regiments of
field and mountain artillery, as well as garrison artillery and army
technical troops. The organization of the active army by regiments is
176 infantry regiments of 3 battalions; 27 cavalry regiments; 30 field
artillery regiments each of 6 and 3 mountain artillery regiments each
of 3 batteries; 6 regiments and 6 battalions of siege, heavy field and
fortress artillery; 20 battalions engineers; 19 supply and transport
battalions.

Medical Service.

The medical service is exceptionally well organized. It received
unstinted praise from European and American experts who observed it
closely during the wars of 1900 and 1904-5. The establishment of
surgeons to each division is approximately 100, and arrangements
complete in every detail are made for all lines of medical assistance.
Much help is rendered by the red cross society of Japan, which has an
income of 2,000,000 yen annually, a fine hospital in Tokyo, a large
nursing staff and two specially built and equipped hospital ships.
During the early part of the campaign in Pechili, in 1900, the French
column entrusted its wounded to the care of the Japanese.

Supply.

The staple article of commissariat for a Japanese army in the field is
_hoshii_ (dried rice), of which three days' supply can easily be
carried in a bag by the soldier. When required for use the rice, being
placed in water, swells to its original bulk, and is eaten with a
relish of salted fish, dried sea-weed or pickled plums. The task of
provisioning an army on these lines is comparatively simple. The
Japanese soldier, though low in stature, is well set up, muscular and
hardy. He has great powers of endurance, and manoeuvres with
remarkable celerity, doing everything at the run, if necessary, and
continuing to run without distress for a length of time astonishing to
European observers. He is greatly subject, however, to attacks of
_kakke_ (beri-beri), and if he has recourse to meat diet, which
appears to be the best preventive, he will probably lose something of
his capacity for prolonged rapid movement. He attacks with apparent
indifference to danger, preserves his cheerfulness amid hardships, is
splendidly patriotic and has always shown himself thoroughly amenable
to discipline.

Military Schools.

Of the many educational and training establishments, the most
important is the _rikugun daigakko_, or army college, where officers,
(generally subalterns), are prepared for service in the upper ranks
and for staff appointments, the course of study extending over three
years. The Toyama school stands next in importance. The courses
pursued there are attended chiefly by subaltern officers of dismounted
branches, non-commissioned officers also being allowed to take the
musketry course. The term of training is five months. Young officers
of the scientific branches are instructed at the _hokogakko_ (school
of artillery and engineers). There are, further, two special schools
of gunnery--one for field, the other for garrison artillery, attended
chiefly by captains and senior subalterns of the two branches. There
is an inspection department of military education, the
inspector-general being a lieutenant-general, under whom are fifteen
field and general officers, who act as inspectors of the various
schools and colleges and of military educational matters in general.

The Japanese officer's pay is small and his mode of life frugal. He
lives out of barracks, frequently with his own family. His uniform is
plain and inexpensive,[19] and he has no desire to exchange it for
mufti. He has no mess expenses, contribution to a band, or luxuries of
any kind, and as he is nearly always without private means to
supplement his pay, his habits are thoroughly economical. He devotes
himself absolutely to his profession, living for nothing else, and
since he is strongly imbued with an effective conception of the honour
of his cloth, instances of his incurring disgrace by debt or
dissipation are exceptional. The samurai may be said to have been
revived in the officers of the modern army, who preserve and act up to
all the old traditions. The system of promotion has evidently much to
do with this good result, for no Japanese officer can hope to rise
above the rank of captain unless, by showing himself really zealous
and capable, he obtains from his commanding officer the recommendation
without which all higher educational opportunities are closed to him.
Yet promotion by merit has not degenerated into promotion by favour,
and corruption appears to be virtually absent. In the stormiest days
of parliamentary warfare, when charges of dishonesty were freely
preferred by party politicians against all departments of officialdom,
no whisper ever impeached the integrity of army officers.

The training of the troops is thorough and strictly progressive, the
responsibility of the company, squadron and battery commanders for the
training of their commands, and the latitude granted them in choice of
means being, as in Germany, the keystone of the system.

Foreign Assistance.

Originally the government engaged French officers to assist in
organizing the army and elaborating its system of tactics and
strategy, and during several years a military mission of French
officers resided in Tokyo and rendered valuable aid to the Japanese.
Afterwards German officers were employed, with Jakob Meckel at their
head, and they left a perpetually grateful memory. But ultimately the
services of foreigners were dispensed with altogether, and Japan now
adopts the plan of sending picked men to complete their studies in
Europe. Up to 1904 she followed Germany in military matters almost
implicitly, but since then, having the experience of her own great war
to guide her, she has, instead of modelling herself on any one foreign
system, chosen from each whatever seemed most desirable, and also, in
many points, taken the initiative herself.

Military Finance.

When the power of the sword was nominally restored to the Imperial
government in 1868, the latter planned to devote one-fourth of the
state's ordinary revenue to the army and navy. Had the estimated
revenue accrued, this would have given a sum of about 3 millions
sterling for the two services. But not until 1871, when the troops of
the fiefs were finally disbanded, did the government find itself in a
position to include in the annual budgets an adequate appropriation on
account of armaments. Thenceforth, from 1872 to 1896, the ordinary
expenditures of the army varied from three-quarters of a million
sterling to 1½ millions, and the extraordinary outlays ranged from a
few thousands of pounds to a quarter of a million. Not once in the
whole period of 25 years--if 1877 (the year of the Satsuma rebellion)
be excepted--did the state's total expenditures on account of the army
exceed 1½ millions sterling, and it redounds to the credit of Japan's
financial management that she was able to organize, equip and maintain
such a force at such a small cost. In 1896, as shown above, she
virtually doubled her army, and a proportionate increase of
expenditure ensued, the outlays for maintenance jumping at once from
an average of about 1¼ millions sterling to 2¼ millions, and growing
thenceforth with the organization of the new army, until in the year
(1903) preceding the outbreak of war with Russia, they reached the
figure of 4 millions. Then again, in 1906, six divisions were added,
and additional expenses had to be incurred on account of the new
overseas garrisons, so that, in 1909, the ordinary outlays reached a
total of 7 millions, or about one-seventh of the ordinary revenue of
the state. This takes no account of extraordinary outlays incurred for
building forts and barracks, providing new patterns of equipment, &c.
In 1909 the latter, owing to the necessity of replacing the weapons
used in the Russian War, and in particular the field artillery gun
(which was in 1905 only a semi-quickfirer), involved a relatively
large outlay.

Early Japanese War-vessels.

_The Navy._--The traditions of Japan suggest that the art of navigation was not unfamiliar to the inhabitants of a country consisting of hundreds of islands and abounding in bays and inlets. Some interpreters of her cosmography discover a great ship in the "floating bridge of heaven" from which the divine procreators of the islands commenced their work, and construe in a similar sense other poetically named vehicles of that remote age. But though the seas were certainly traversed by the early invaders of Japan, and though there is plenty of proof that in medieval times the Japanese flag floated over merchantmen which voyaged as far as Siam and India, and over piratical craft which harassed the coasts of Korea and China, it is unquestionable that in the matter of naval architecture Japan fell behind even her next-door neighbours. Thus, when a Mongol fleet came to Kiushiu in the 13th century, Japan had no vessels capable of contending against the invaders, and when, at the close of the 16th century, a Japanese army was fighting in Korea, repeated defeats of Japan's squadrons by Korean war-junks decided the fate of the campaign on shore as well as on sea. It seems strange that an enterprising nation like the Japanese should not have taken for models the great galleons which visited the Far East in the second half of the 16th century under the flags of Spain, Portugal, Holland and England. With the exception, however, of two ships built by a castaway English pilot to order of Iyeyasu, no effort in that direction appears to have been made, and when an edict vetoing the construction of sea-going vessels was issued in 1636 as part of the Tokugawa policy of isolation, it can scarcely be said to have checked the growth of Japan's navy, for she possessed nothing worthy of the name. It was to the object lesson furnished by the American ships which visited Yedo bay in 1853 and to the urgent counsels of the Dutch that Japan owed the inception of a naval policy. A seamen's training station was opened under Dutch instructors in 1855 at Nagasaki, a building-slip was constructed and an iron factory established at the same place, and shortly afterwards a naval school was organized at Tsukiji in Yedo, a war-ship the "Kwanko Maru"[20]--presented by the Dutch to the shogun's government--being used for exercising the cadets. To this vessel two others, purchased from the Dutch, were added in 1857 and 1858, and these, with one given by Queen Victoria, formed the nucleus of Japan's navy. In 1860, we find the Pacific crossed for the first time by a Japanese war-ship--the "Kwanrin Maru"--and subsequently some young officers were sent to Holland for instruction in naval science. In fact the Tokugawa statesmen had now thoroughly appreciated the imperative need of a navy. Thus, in spite of domestic unrest which menaced the very existence of the Yedo government, a dockyard was established and fully equipped, the place chosen as its site being, by a strange coincidence, the village of Yokosuka where Japan's first foreign ship-builder, Will Adams, had lived and died 250 years previously. This dockyard was planned and its construction superintended by a Frenchman, M. Bertin. But although the Dutch had been the first to advise Japan's acquisition of a navy, and although French aid was sought in the case of the important and costly work at Yokosuka, the shogun's government turned to England for teachers of the art of maritime warfare. Captain Tracey, R.N., and other British officers and warrant-officers were engaged to organize and superintend the school at Tsukiji. They arrived, however, on the eve of the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate, and as the new administration was not prepared to utilize their services immediately, they returned to England. It is not to be inferred that the Imperial government underrated the importance of organizing a naval force. One of the earliest Imperial rescripts ranked a navy among "the country's most urgent needs" and ordered that it should be "at once placed on a firm foundation." But during the four years immediately subsequent to the restoration, a semi-interregnum existed in military affairs, the power of the sword being partly transferred to the hands of the sovereign and partly retained by the feudal chiefs. Ultimately, not only the vessels which had been in the possession of the shogunate but also several obtained from Europe by the great feudatories had to be taken over by the Imperial government, which, on reviewing the situation, found itself owner of a motley squadron of 17 war-ships aggregating 13,812 tons displacement, of which two were armoured, one was a composite ship, and the rest were of wood. Steps were now taken to establish and equip a suitable naval college in Tsukiji, and application having been made to the British government for instructors, a second naval mission was sent from England in 1873, consisting of 30 officers and warrant-officers under Commander (afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir) Archibald Douglas. At the very outset occasions for active service afloat presented themselves. In 1868, the year after the fall of the shogunate, such ships as could be assembled had to be sent to Yezo to attack the main part of the Tokugawa squadron which had raised the flag of revolt and retired to Hakodate under the command of the shogun's admiral, Enomoto. Then in 1874 the duty of convoying a fleet of transports to Formosa had to be undertaken; and in 1877 sea power played its part in crushing the formidable rebellion in Satsuma. Meanwhile the work of increasing and organizing the navy went on steadily. The first steam war-ship constructed in Japan had been a gunboat (138 tons) launched in 1866 from a building-yard established at Ishikawajima, an island near the mouth of the Sumida river on which Tokyo stands. At this yard and at Yokosuka two vessels of 897 tons and 1450 tons, respectively, were launched in 1875 and 1876, and Japan now found herself competent not only to execute all repairs but also to build ships of considerable size. An order was placed in England in 1875, which produced, three years later, the "Fuso," Japan's first ironclad (3717 tons) and the "Kongo" and "Hiei," steel-frame sister-cruisers of 2248 tons. Meanwhile training, practical and theoretical, in seamanship, gunnery, torpedo-practice and naval architecture went on vigorously, and in 1878 the Japanese flag was for the first time seen in European waters, floating over the cruiser "Seiki" (1897 tons) built in Japan and navigated solely by Japanese. The government, constantly solicitous of increasing the fleet, inaugurated, in 1882, a programme of 30 cruisers and 12 torpedo-boats, and in 1886 this was extended, funds being obtained by an issue of naval loan-bonds. But the fleet did not yet include a single battleship. When the diet opened for the first time in 1890, a plan for the construction of two battleships encountered stubborn opposition in the lower house, where the majority attached much less importance to voting money for war-ships than to reducing the land tax. Not until 1892 was this opposition overcome in deference to an order from the throne that thirty thousand pounds sterling should be contributed yearly from the privy purse and that a tithe of all official salaries should be devoted during the same interval to naval needs. Had the house been more prescient, Japan's position at the outbreak of war with China in 1894 would have been very different. She entered the contest with 28 fighting craft, aggregating 57,600 tons, and 24 torpedo-boats, but among them the most powerful was a belted cruiser of 4300 tons. Not one battleship was included, whereas China had two ironclads of nearly 8000 tons each. Under these conditions the result of the naval conflict was awaited with much anxiety in Japan. But the Chinese suffered signal defeats (see CHINO-JAPANESE WAR) off the Yalu and at Wei-hai-wei, and the victors took possession of 17 Chinese craft, including one battleship. The resulting addition to Japan's fighting force was, however, insignificant. But the naval strength of Japan did not depend on prizes. Battleships and cruisers were ordered and launched in Europe one after the other, and when the Russo-Japanese War (q.v.) came, the fleet promptly asserted its physical and moral superiority in the surprise of Port Arthur, the battle of the 10th of August 1904, and the crowning victory of Tsushima.

As to the development of the navy from 1903 onwards, it is not
possible to detail with absolute accuracy the plans laid down by the
admiralty in Tokyo, but the actual state of the fleet in the year 1909
will be apparent from the figures given below.

Japan's naval strength at the outbreak of the war with Russia in 1904
was:--

Number. Displacement.
Tons.

Battleships 6 84,652
Armoured cruisers 8 73,982
Other cruisers 44 111,470
Destroyers 19 6,519
Torpedo-boats 80 7,119
-- -------
Totals 157 283,742

Losses during the war were:--

Battleships 2 27,300
Cruisers (second
and smaller classes) 8 18,009
Destroyers 2 705
Torpedo-boats 7 557
-- ------
Totals 19 46,571

The captured vessels repaired and added to the fleet were:--

Battleships 5 62,524
Cruisers 11 71,276
Destroyers 5 1,740
-- -------
Totals 21 135,530

The vessels built or purchased after the war and up to the close of
1908 were:--

Battleships 4 71,500
Armoured cruisers 4 56,700
Other cruisers 5 7,000
Destroyers 33 12,573
Torpedo-boats 5 760
-- -------
Totals 51 148,533

Some of the above have been superannuated, and the serviceable fleet
in 1909 was:--

Battleships 13 191,380
Armoured cruisers 12 130,683
Other cruisers, coast-
defence ships and
gun-boats 47 165,253
Destroyers 55 20,508
Torpedo-boats 77 7,258
--- -------
Totals 204 515,082

To the foregoing must be added two armoured cruisers--the "Kurama"
(14,000) launched at Yokosuka in October 1907, and the "Ibuki"
(14,700) launched at Kure in November 1907, but no other battleships
or cruisers were laid down in Japan or ordered abroad up to the close
of 1908.

Naval Dockyards.

There are four naval dockyards, namely, at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo and
Maizuru. Twenty-one vessels built at Yokosuka since 1876 included a
battleship (19,000 tons) and an armoured cruiser (14,000 tons); seven
built at Kure since 1898 included a battleship (19,000 tons) and an
armoured cruiser (14,000 tons). The yards at Sasebo and Maizuru had
not yet been used in 1909 for constructing large vessels. Two private
yards--the Mitsubishi at Nagasaki and Kobe, and the Kawasaki at the
latter place--have built several cruisers, gun-boats and torpedo
craft, and are competent to undertake more important work.
Nevertheless in 1909 Japan did not yet possess complete independence
in this matter, for she was obliged to have recourse to foreign
countries for a part of the steel used in ship-building. Kure
manufactures practically all the steel it requires, and there is a
government steel-foundry at Wakamatsu on which more than 3 millions
sterling had been spent in 1909, but it did not yet keep pace with the
country's needs. When this independence has been attained, it is hoped
to effect an economy of about 18% on the outlay for naval
construction, owing to the cheapness of manual labour and the
disappearance both of the manufacturer's profit and of the expenses of
transfer from Europe to Japan.

There are five admiralties--Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and Port
Arthur; and four naval stations--Takeshiki (in Tsushima), Mekong (in
the Pescadores), Ominato and Chinhai (in southern Korea).

Personnel.

The navy is manned partly by conscripts and partly by volunteers.
About 5500 are taken every year, and the ratio is, approximately, 55%
of volunteers and 45% of conscripts. The period of active service is 4
years and that of service with the reserve 7 years. On the average 200
cadets are admitted yearly, of whom 50 are engineers, and in 1906 the
personnel of the navy consisted of the following:--

Admirals, combative and non-combative 77
Officers, combative and non-combative,
below the rank of admiral 2,867
Warrant officers 9,075
Bluejackets 29,667
Cadets 721
------
Total 42,407

Naval Education.

The highest educational institution for the navy is the naval staff
college, in which there are five courses for officers alone. The
gunnery and torpedo schools are attended by officers, and also by
selected warrant-officers and bluejackets, who consent to extend their
service. There is also a mechanical school for junior engineers,
warrant-officers and ordinary artificers.

At the naval cadet academy--originally situated in Tokyo but now at
Etajima near Kure--aspirants for service as naval officers receive a 3
years' academical course and 1 year's training at sea; and, finally,
there is a naval engineering college collateral to the naval cadet
academy.

Since 1882, foreign instruction has been wholly dispensed with in the
Japanese navy; since 1886 she has manufactured her own prismatic
powder; since 1891 she has been able to make quick-firing guns and
Schwartzkopf torpedoes, and in 1892 one of her officers invented a
particularly potent explosive, called (after its inventor) Shimose
powder.

The Feudal Period.

_Finance._--Under the feudal system of the Tokugawa (1603-1871), all land in Japan was regarded as state property, and parcelled out into 276 fiefs, great and small, which were assigned to as many feudatories. These were empowered to raise revenue for the support of their households, for administrative purposes, and for the maintenance of troops. The basis of taxation varied greatly in different districts, but, at the time of the Restoration in 1867, the general principle was that four-tenths of the gross produce should go to the feudatory, six-tenths to the farmer. In practice this rule was applied to the rice crop only, the assessments for other kinds of produce being levied partly in money and partly in manufactured goods. Forced labour also was exacted, and artisans and tradesmen were subjected to pecuniary levies. The yield of rice in 1867 was about 154 million bushels,[21] of which the market value at prices then ruling was £24,000,000, or 240,000,000 _yen_.[22] Hence the grain tax represented, at the lowest calculation, 96,000,000 _yen_. When the administration reverted to the emperor in 1867 the central treasury was empty, and the funds hitherto employed for governmental purposes in the fiefs continued to be devoted to the support of the feudatories, to the payment of the samurai, and to defraying the expenses of local administration, the central treasury receiving only whatever might remain after these various outlays.

The shogun himself, whose income amounted to about £3,500,000, did not, on abdicating, hand over to the sovereign either the contents of his treasury or the lands from which he derived his revenues. He contended that funds for the government of the nation as a whole should be levied from the people at large. Not until 1871 did the feudal system cease to exist. The fiefs being then converted into prefectures, their revenues became an asset of the central treasury, less 10% allotted for the support of the former feudatories.[23]

Paper Money.

But during the interval between 1867 and 1871, the men on whom had devolved the direction of national affairs saw no relief from crippling impecuniosity except an issue of paper money. This was not a novelty in Japan. Paper money had been known to the people since the middle of the 17th century, and in the era of which we are now writing no less than 1694 varieties of notes were in circulation. There were gold notes, silver notes, cash-notes, rice-notes, umbrella-notes, ribbon-notes, lathe-article-notes, and so on through an interminable list, the circulation of each kind being limited to the issuing fief. Many of these notes had almost ceased to have any purchasing power, and nearly all were regarded by the people as evidences of official greed. The first duty of a centralized progressive administration should have been to reform the currency. The political leaders of the time appreciated that duty, but saw themselves compelled by stress of circumstances to adopt the very device which in the hands of the feudal chiefs had produced such deplorable results. The ordinary revenue amounted to only 3,000,000 _yen_, while the extraordinary aggregated 29,000,000, and was derived wholly from issues of paper money or other equally unsound sources.

Land Tax.

Even on the abolition of feudalism in 1871 the situation was not immediately relieved. The land tax, which constituted nine-tenths of the feudal revenues, had been assessed by varying methods and at various rates by the different feudatories, and re-assessment of all the land became a preliminary essential to establishing a uniform system. Such a task, on the basis of accurate surveys, would have involved years of work, whereas the financial needs of the state had to be met immediately. Under the pressure of this imperative necessity a re-assessment was roughly made in two years, and being continued thereafter with greater accuracy, was completed in 1881. This survey, eminently liberal to the agriculturists, assigned a value of 1,200,000,000 _yen_ to the whole of the arable land, and the treasury fixed the tax at 3% of the assessed value of the land, which was about one-half of the real market value. Moreover, the government contemplated a gradual reduction of this already low impost until it should ultimately fall to 1%. Circumstances prevented the consummation of that purpose. The rate underwent only one reduction of ½%, and thereafter had to be raised on account of war expenditures. On the whole, however, no class benefited more conspicuously from the change of administration than the peasants, since not only was their burden of taxation light, but also they were converted from mere tenants into actual proprietors. In brief, they acquired the fee-simple of their farms in consideration of paying an annual rent equal to about one sixty-sixth of the market value of the land.

State Revenue.

In 1873, when these changes were effected, the ordinary revenue of the state rose from 24,500,000 _yen_ to 70,500,000 _yen_. But seven millions sterling is a small income for a country confronted by such problems as Japan had to solve. She had to build railways; to create an army and a navy; to organize posts, telegraphs, prisons, police and education; to construct roads, improve harbours, light and buoy the coasts; to create a mercantile marine; to start under official auspices numerous industrial enterprises which should serve as object lessons to the people, as well as to lend to private persons large sums in aid of similar projects. Thus, living of necessity beyond its income, the government had recourse to further issues of fiduciary notes, and in proportion as the volume of the latter exceeded actual currency requirements their specie value depreciated.

Banks.