Chapter XXII: Part 22

Russia, Holland and England speedily secured for themselves treaties similar to that concluded by Commodore Perry in 1854. But Japan's doors still remained closed to foreign commerce, and it was reserved for another citizen of the great republic to open them. This was Townsend Harris (1803-1878), the first U.S. consul-general in Japan. Arriving in August 1856, he concluded, in June of the following year, a treaty securing to American citizens the privilege of permanent residence at Shimoda and Hakodate, the opening of Nagasaki, the right of consular jurisdiction and certain minor concessions. Still, however, permission for commercial intercourse was withheld, and Harris, convinced that this great goal could not be reached unless he made his way to Yedo and conferred direct with the shogun's ministers, pressed persistently for leave to do so. Ten months elapsed before he succeeded, and such a display of reluctance on the Japanese side was very unfavourably criticized in the years immediately subsequent. Ignorance of the country's domestic politics inspired the critics. The Yedo administration, already weakened by the growth of a strong public sentiment in favour of abolishing the dual system of government--that of the mikado in Kioto and that of the shogun in Yedo--had been still further discredited by its own timid policy as compared with the stalwart mien of the throne towards the question of foreign intercourse. Openly to sanction commercial relations at such a time would have been little short of reckless. The Perry convention and the first Harris convention could be construed, and were purposely construed, as mere acts of benevolence towards strangers; but a commercial treaty would not have lent itself to any such construction, and naturally the shogun's ministers hesitated to agree to an apparently suicidal step. Harris carried his point, however. He was received by the shogun in Yedo in November 1857, and on the 29th of July 1858 a treaty was signed in Yedo, engaging that Yokohama should be opened on the 4th of July 1859 and that commerce between the United States and Japan should thereafter be freely carried on there. This treaty was actually concluded by the shogun's Ministers in defiance of their failure to obtain the sanction of the sovereign in Kioto. Foreign historians have found much to say about Japanese duplicity in concealing the subordinate position occupied by the Yedo administration towards the Kioto court. Such condemnation is not consistent with fuller knowledge. The Yedo authorities had power to solve all problems of foreign intercourse without reference to Kioto. Iyeyasu had not seen any occasion to seek imperial assent when he granted unrestricted liberty of trade to the representatives of the East India Company, nor had Iyemitsu asked for Kioto's sanction when he issued his decree for the expulsion of all foreigners. If, in the 19th century, Yedo shrank from a responsibility which it had unhesitatingly assumed in the 17th, the cause was to be found, not in the shogun's simulation of autonomy, but in his desire to associate the throne with a policy which, while recognizing it to be unavoidable, he distrusted his own ability to make the nation accept. But his ministers had promised Harris that the treaty should be signed, and they kept their word, at a risk of which the United States' consul-general had no conception. Throughout these negotiations Harris spared no pains to create in the minds of the Japanese an intelligent conviction that the world could no longer be kept at arm's length, and though it is extremely problematical whether he would have succeeded had not the Japanese themselves already arrived at that very conviction, his patient and lucid expositions coupled with a winning personality undoubtedly produced much impression. He was largely assisted, too, by recent events in China, where the Peiho forts had been captured and the Chinese forced to sign a treaty at Tientsin. Harris warned the Japanese that the British fleet might be expected at any moment in Yedo Bay, and that the best way to avert irksome demands at the hands of the English was to establish a comparatively moderate precedent by yielding to America's proposals.

Effects of the Treaty.

This treaty could not be represented, as previous conventions had been, in the light of a purely benevolent concession. It definitely provided for the trade and residence of foreign merchants, and thus finally terminated Japan's traditional isolation. Moreover, it had been concluded in defiance of the Throne's refusal to sanction anything of the kind. Much excitement resulted. The nation ranged itself into three parties. One comprised the advocates of free intercourse and progressive liberality; another, while insisting that only the most limited privileges should be accorded to aliens, was of two minds as to the advisability of offering armed resistance at once or temporizing so as to gain time for preparation; the third advocated uncompromising seclusion. Once again the shogun convoked a meeting of the feudal barons, hoping to secure their co-operation. But with hardly an exception they pronounced against yielding. Thus the shogunate saw itself compelled to adopt a resolutely liberal policy: it issued a decree in that sense, and thenceforth the administrative court at Yedo and the Imperial court in Kioto stood in unequivocal opposition to each other, the Conservatives ranging themselves on the side of the latter, the Liberals on that of the former. It was a situation full of perplexity to outsiders, and the foreign representatives misinterpreted it. They imagined that the shogun's ministers sought only to evade their treaty obligations and to render the situation intolerable for foreign residents, whereas in truth the situation threatened to become intolerable for the shogunate itself. Nevertheless the Yedo officials cannot be entirely acquitted of duplicity. Under pressure of the necessity of self-preservation they effected with Kioto a compromise which assigned to foreign intercourse a temporary character. The threatened political crisis was thus averted, but the enemies of the dual system of government gained strength daily. One of their devices was to assassinate foreigners in the hope of embroiling the shogunate with Western powers and thus either forcing its hand or precipitating its downfall. It is not wonderful, perhaps, that foreigners were deceived, especially as they approached the solution of Japanese problems with all the Occidental's habitual suspicion of everything Oriental. Thus when the Yedo government, cognisant that serious dangers menaced the Yokohama settlement, took precautions to guard it, the foreign ministers convinced themselves that a deliberate piece of chicanery was being practised at their expense; that statecraft rather than truth had dictated the representations made to them by the Japanese authorities; and that the alarm of the latter was simulated for the purpose of finding a pretext to curtail the liberty enjoyed by foreigners. Therefore a suggestion that the inmates of the legations should show themselves as little as possible in the streets of the capital, where at any moment a desperado might cut them down, was treated almost as an insult. Then the Japanese authorities saw no recourse except to attach an armed escort to the person of every foreigner when he moved about the city. But even this precaution, which certainly was not adopted out of mere caprice or with any sinister design, excited fresh suspicions. The British representative, in reporting the event to his government, said that the Japanese had taken the opportunity to graft upon the establishment of spies, watchmen and police-officers at the several legations, a mounted escort to accompany the members whenever they moved about.

Attacks upon Foreigners and their Consequences.

Just at this time (1861) the Yedo statesmen, in order to reconcile the divergent views of the two courts, negotiated a marriage between the emperor's sister and the shogun. But in order to bring the union about, they had to placate the Kioto Conservatives by a promise to expel foreigners from the country within ten years. When this became known, it strengthened the hands of the reactionaries, and furnished a new weapon to Yedo's enemies, who interpreted the marriage as the beginning of a plot to dethrone the mikado. Murderous attacks upon foreigners became more frequent. Two of these assaults had momentous consequences. Three British subjects attempted to force their way through the _cortège_ of the Satsuma feudal chief on the highway between Yokohama and Yedo. One of them was killed and the other two wounded. This outrage was not inspired by the "barbarian-expelling" sentiment: to any Japanese subject violating the rules of etiquette as these Englishmen had violated them, the same fate would have been meted out. Nevertheless, as the Satsuma daimyo refused to surrender his implicated vassals, and as the shogun's arm was not long enough to reach the most powerful feudatory in Japan, the British government sent a squadron to bombard his capital, Kagoshima. It was not a brilliant exploit in any sense, but its results were invaluable; for the operations of the British ships finally convinced the Satsuma men of their impotence in the face of Western armaments, and converted them into advocates of liberal progress. Three months previously to this bombardment of Kagoshima another puissant feudatory had thrown down the gauntlet. The Choshu chief, whose batteries commanded the entrance to the inland sea at Shimonoseki, opened fire upon ships flying the flags of the United States, of France and of Holland. In thus acting he obeyed an edict obtained by the extremists from the mikado without the knowledge of the shogun, which edict fixed the 11th of May 1863 as the date for practically inaugurating the foreigners-expulsion policy. Again the shogun's administrative competence proved inadequate to exact reparation, and a squadron, composed chiefly of British men-of-war, proceeding to Shimonoseki, demolished Choshu's forts, destroyed his ships and scattered his samurai. In the face of the Kagoshima bombardment and the Shimonoseki expedition, no Japanese subject could retain any faith in his country's ability to oppose Occidentals by force. Thus the year 1863 was memorable in Japan's history. It saw the "barbarian-expelling" agitation deprived of the emperor's sanction; it saw the two principal clans, Satsuma and Choshu, convinced of their country's impotence to defy the Occident; it saw the nation almost fully roused to the disintegrating and weakening effects of the feudal system; and it saw the traditional antipathy to foreigners beginning to be exchanged for a desire to study their civilization and to adopt its best features.

Ratification of the Treaties.

The treaty concluded between the shogun's government and the United States in 1858 was of course followed by similar compacts with the principal European powers. From the outset these states agreed to co-operate for the assertion of their conventional privileges, and they naturally took Great Britain for leader, though such a relation was never openly announced. The treaties, however, continued during several years to lack imperial ratification, and, as time went by, that defect obtruded itself more and more upon the attention of their foreign signatories. The year 1865 saw British interests entrusted to the charge of Sir Harry Parkes, a man of keen insight, indomitable courage and somewhat peremptory methods, learned during a long period of service in China. It happened that the post of Japanese secretary at the British legation in Yedo was then held by a remarkably gifted young Englishman, who, in a comparatively brief interval, had acquired a good working knowledge of the Japanese language, and it happened also that the British legation in Yedo was already--as it has always been ever since--the best equipped institution of its class in Japan. Aided by these facilities and by the researches of Mr Satow (afterwards Sir Ernest Satow) Parkes arrived at the conclusions that the Yedo government was tottering to its fall; that the resumption of administrative authority by the Kioto court would make for the interests not only of the West but also of Japan; and that the ratification of the treaties by the mikado would elucidate the situation for foreigners while being, at the same time, essential to the validity of the documents. Two other objects also presented themselves, namely, that the import duties fixed by the conventions should be reduced from 15 to 5% _ad valorem_, and that the ports of Hiogo and Osaka should be opened at once, instead of at the expiration of two years as originally fixed. It was not proposed that these concessions should be entirely gratuitous. When the four-power flotilla destroyed the Shimonoseki batteries and sank the vessels lying there, a fine of three million dollars (some £750,000) had been imposed upon the daimyo of Choshu by way of ransom for his capital, which lay at the mercy of the invaders. The daimyo of Choshu, however, was in open rebellion against the shogun, and as the latter could not collect the debt from the recalcitrant clansmen, while the four powers insisted on being paid by some one, the Yedo treasury was finally compelled to shoulder the obligation. Two out of the three millions were still due, and Parkes conceived the idea of remitting this debt in exchange for the ratification of the treaties, the reduction of the customs tariff from 15 to 5% _ad valorem_ and the immediate opening of Hiogo and Osaka. He took with him to the place of negotiation (Hiogo) a fleet of British, French and Dutch war-ships, for, while announcing peaceful intentions, he had accustomed himself to think that a display of force should occupy the foreground in all negotiations with Oriental states. This coup may be said to have sealed the fate of the shogunate. For here again was produced in a highly aggravated form the drama which had so greatly startled the nation eight years previously. Perry had come with his war-ships to the portals of Yedo, and now a foreign fleet, twice as strong as Perry's, had anchored at the vestibule of the Imperial city itself. No rational Japanese could suppose that this parade of force was for purely peaceful purposes, or that rejection of the amicable bargain proposed by Great Britain's representative would be followed by the quiet withdrawal of the menacing fleet, whose terrible potentialities had been demonstrated at Kagoshima and Shimonoseki. The seclusionists, whose voices had been nearly silenced, raised them in renewed denunciation of the shogun's incompetence to guarantee the sacred city of Kioto against such trespasses, and the emperor, brought once more under the influence of the anti-foreign party, inflicted a heavy disgrace on the shogun by dismissing and punishing the officials to whom the latter had entrusted the conduct of negotiations at Hiogo. Such procedure on the part of the throne amounted to withdrawing the administrative commission held by the Tokugawa family since the days of Iyeyasu. The shogun resigned. But his adversaries not being yet ready to replace him, he was induced to resume office, with, however, fatally damaged prestige. As for the three-power squadron, it steamed away successful. Parkes had come prepared to write off the indemnity in exchange for three concessions. He obtained two of the concessions without remitting a dollar of the debt.

Final Adoption of Western Civilization.

The shogun did not long survive the humiliation thus inflicted on him. He died in the following year (1866), and was succeeded by Keiki, destined to be the last of the Tokugawa rulers. Nine years previously this same Keiki had been put forward by the seclusionists as candidate for the shogunate. Yet no sooner did he attain that distinction in 1866 than he remodelled the army on French lines, engaged English officers to organize a navy, sent his brother to the Paris Exhibition, and altered many of the forms and ceremonies of his court so as to bring them into accord with Occidental fashions. The contrast between the politics he represented when a candidate for office in 1857 and the practice he adopted on succeeding to power in 1866 furnished an apt illustration of the change that had come over the spirit of the time. The most bigoted of the exclusionists were now beginning to abandon all idea of expelling foreigners and to think mainly of acquiring the best elements of their civilization. The Japanese are slow to reach a decision but very quick to act upon it when reached. From 1866 onwards the new spirit rapidly permeated the whole nation; progress became the aim of all classes, and the country entered upon a career of intelligent assimilation which, in forty years, won for Japan a universally accorded place in the ranks of the great Occidental powers.

[Continued in volume XV slice III.]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The highest rate of subscription to a daily journal is twelve
shillings per annum, and the usual charge for advertisement is from
7d. to one shilling per line of 22 ideographs (about nine words).

[2] It is first boiled in a lye obtained by lixiviating wood ashes;
it is next polished with charcoal powder; then immersed in plum
vinegar and salt; then washed with weak lye and placed in a tub of
water to remove all traces of alkali, the final step being to digest
in a boiling solution of copper sulphate, verdigris and water.

[3] This method is some 300 years old. It is by no means a modern
invention, as some writers have asserted.

[4] Obtained from the shell of the _Halictis_.

[5] In 1877 there were 120 English engineers, drivers and foremen in
the service of the railway bureau. Three years later only three
advisers remained.

[6] The largest is the mitsubishi at Nagasaki. It has a length of 722
ft. Next stands the kawasaki at Kobe, and in the third place is the
uraga.

[7] They were called _fuda-sashi_ (ticket-holders), a term derived
from the fact that rice-vouchers were usually held in a split bamboo
which was thrust into a pile of rice-bags to indicate their buyer.

[8] In 1725, when the population of Yedo was about three-quarters of
a million, the merchandise that entered the city was 861,893 bags of
rice; 795,856 casks of sake; 132,892 casks of soy (fish-sauce);
18,209,987 bundles of fire-wood; 809,790 bags of charcoal; 90,811
tubs of oil; 1,670,850 bags of salt and 3,613,500 pieces of cotton
cloth.

[9] Some derive this term from _mika_, an ancient Japanese term for
"great," and _to_, "place."

[10] The names given in italics are those more commonly used. Those
in the first column are generally of pure native derivation; those in
the second column are composed of the Chinese word _shu_, a
"province," added to the Chinese pronunciation of one of the
characters with which the native name is written. In a few cases both
names are used.

[11] The mayor of a town (_shicho_) is nominated by the minister for
home affairs from three men chosen by the town assembly.

[12] The term _hyaku-sho_, here translated "working man," means
literally "one engaged in any of the various callings" apart from
military service. In a later age a further distinction was
established between the agriculturist, the artisan, and the trader,
and the word _hyaku-sho_ then came to carry the signification of
"husbandman" only.

[13] A tent was simply a space enclosed with strips of cloth or silk,
on which was emblazoned the crest of the commander. It had no
covering.

[14] The Japanese never at any time of their history used poisoned
arrows; they despised them as depraved and inhuman weapons.

[15] The general term for commoners as distinguished from samurai.

[16] The privilege at first led to great abuses. It became a common
thing to employ some aged and indigent person, set him up as the head
of a "branch family," and give him for adopted son a youth liable to
conscription.

[17] Conscription without lot is thus the punishment for all failures
to comply with and attempts to evade the military laws.

[18] Sons of officers' widows, or of officers in reduced
circumstances, are educated at these schools either free or at
reduced charges, but are required to complete the course and to
graduate.

[19] Uniform does not vary according to regiments or divisions. There
is only one type for the whole of the infantry, one for the cavalry,
and so on (see UNIFORMS, NAVAL AND MILITARY). Officers largely obtain
their uniforms and equipment, as well as their books and technical
literature through the _Kai-ko-sha_, which is a combined officers'
club, benefit society and co-operative trading association to which
nearly all belong.

[20] The term _maru_ subsequently became applicable to merchantmen
only, war-ships being distinguished as _kan_.

[21] The reader should be warned that absolute accuracy cannot be
claimed for statistics compiled before the Meiji era.

[22] The _yen_ is a silver coin worth about 2s.: 10 _yen_ = £1.

[23] In addition to the above grant, the feudatories were allowed to
retain the reserves in their treasuries; thus many of the feudal
nobles found themselves possessed of substantial fortunes, a
considerable part of which they generally devoted to the support of
their former vassals.

[24] The Bank of Japan was established as a joint-stock company in
1882. The capital in 1909 was 30,000,000 _yen_. In it alone is vested
note-issuing power. There is no limit to its issues against gold or
silver coins and bullion, but on other securities (state bonds,
treasury bills and other negotiable bonds or commercial paper) its
issues are limited to 120 millions, any excess over that figure being
subject to a tax of 5% per annum.

[25] The amounts include the payments made in connexion with what may
be called the disestablishment of the Church. There were 29,805
endowed temples and shrines throughout the empire, and their estates
aggregated 354,481 acres, together with 1¾ million bushels of rice
(representing 2,500,000 _yen_). The government resumed possession of
all these lands and revenues at a total cost to the state of a little
less than 2,500,000 _yen_, paid out in pensions spread over a period
of fourteen years. The measure sounds like wholesale confiscation.
But some extenuation is found in the fact that the temples and
shrines held their lands and revenues under titles which, being
derived from the feudal chiefs, depended for their validity on the
maintenance of feudalism.

[26] This sum represents interest-bearing bonds issued in exchange
for fiat notes, with the idea of reducing the volume of the latter.
It was a tentative measure, and proved of no value.

[27] In this is included a sum of 110,000,000 _yen_ distributed in
the form of loan-bonds among the officers and men of the army and
navy by way of reward for their services during the war of 1904-5.

[28] When war broke out in 1904 the local administrative districts
took steps to reduce their outlays, so that whereas the expenditures
totalled 158,000,000 _yen_ in 1903-1904, they fell to 122,000,000 and
126,000,000 in 1904-1905 and 1905-1906 respectively. Thereafter
however, they expanded once more.

[29] This includes 22¼ millions of loans raised abroad.

[30] The problem was to induce the co-operation of a feudatory whose
castle served for frontier guard to the fief of a powerful chief, his
suzerain. The feudatory was a Christian. Nobunaga seized the Jesuits
in Kioto, and threatened to suppress their religion altogether unless
they persuaded the feudatory to abandon the cause of his suzerain.

[31] The mutilation was confined to the lobe of one ear. Crucifixion,
according to the Japanese method, consisted in tying to a cross and
piercing the heart with two sharp spears driven from either side.
Death was always instantaneous.

[32] See _A History of Christianity in Japan_ (1910), by Otis Cary.

[33] The Imperial cities were Yedo, Kioto, Osaka and Nagasaki. To
this last the English were subsequently admitted. They were also
invited to Kagoshima by the Shimazu chieftain, and, had not their
experience at Hirado proved so deterrent, they might have established
a factory at Kagoshima.

[34] _A History of Japan_ (Murdoch and Yamagata).

[35] H.M.S. "Phaeton," which entered that port in 1808.