Chapter LXII (4)

[88] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the
assassins of Phrynichus.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man’s real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number, to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Ectioneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.[89] Theramenês, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenês himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout, “Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work.” The idea of the old democracy was in every one’s mind, but no man uttered the word; the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklês from arrest, without doing him any injury.[90]

[89] See Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato. The fact that
Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred,
before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this
Oration (c. 2, 4, 5, pp. 672, 674, 679, Reisk.), and has all the
air of truth.

[90] Thucyd. viii, 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenês, or
Deinarchus, against Theokrinês (c. 17, p. 1343), the speaker,
Epicharês, makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at
Ectioneia by Aristokratês uncle of his grandfather. The allusion
chiefly deserves notice from its erroneous mention of Kritias
and the return of the Demos from exile, betraying a complete
confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and
those in the time of the Thirty.

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklês was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenês, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy,—and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible,—stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendency of the Four Hundred; yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the senate-house; and they appear now, when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.[91] Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by, in Peiræus, but on the verge of Munychia, and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenês, pursuant to the forms of the anterior democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri, in the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city, and close by their own senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of _The_ Five Thousand, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened, for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.[92] The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the reëstablishment of harmony in the theatre of Dionysus.[93]

[91] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of
the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the
rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he
pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and
to have drawn up a list containing nine thousand names instead of
five thousand.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred,
that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending
concord, Περὶ ὁμονοίας. All his eloquence was required just now,
to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united
action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv, p. 500, ed. Olear.)
expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several
times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann,
Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii, p. 276.

[92] Thucyd. viii, 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ~ἀπὸ πολλῶν
καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ
ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ~.

[93] Thucyd. viii, 93. ξυνεχώρησαν δὲ ὥστ᾽ ~ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν~
ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ ~περὶ ὁμονοίας~.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the
day following the morrow; at least it seems impossible that the
city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbor of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbor; others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbor: others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium, in a southerly direction. Having doubled the Cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasiæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.[94]

[94] Thucyd. viii, 94.

Though relieved, when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly, they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbor. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos, the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.[95] Thymocharês, the admiral, conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to thirty-six sail.

[95] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 676, Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that
Polystratus was in command of the fleet, possibly enough, in
conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian
practice (c. 5, p. 679). His son, who defends him, affirms that
he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii, 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board
these ships under Thymocharês, almost the only point which we
learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

He had scarcely reached the harbor and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment, he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbor. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharês, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait, less than seven miles broad, indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but, to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time, so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbor, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated, and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves, not far from Eretria; yet not less than twenty-two triremes, out of the whole thirty-six, fell into the hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa,—except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian kleruchs,—declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before, and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.[96]

[96] Thucyd. viii, 5; viii, 95.

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed, her nearest and most precious island torn from her side; an island, which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbor.[97] The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before, during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years’ truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy’s fleet. The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded, even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. Nor was there any second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable,—alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas—more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures—off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis and Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendency, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the city.[98] And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade: moreover, its mere transfer from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigor, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynichus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation, so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans, not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.[99] And this is the second occasion, we may add, on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadês in retaining the armament at Samos.

[97] Thucyd. viii, 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later
period, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 64, p. 409: τὰ
ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατασκευασθησόμενα ὁρμητήρια ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, etc.; and
Demosthenês, De Coronâ, c. 71; ἄπλους δ᾽ ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς
Εὐβοίας ὁρμωμένων λῃστῶν γέγονε, etc.

[98] Thucyd. viii, 96. Μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτου
ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ
τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔρημον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον
αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. ~Ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν
ἐποίησαν~· καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες,
ἤ εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν
βοηθῆσαι, etc.

[99] Thucyd. viii, 96; vii, 21-55.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.[100] Accordingly, the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly; and that too in the Pnyx itself, the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well calculated to reinspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smouldering for the four last months. In this assembly, the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred:[101] even those, who, like the Board of elders entitled probûli had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed: 1. To depose the Four Hundred; 2. To place the whole government in the hands of _The Five Thousand_; 3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply, either for himself or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of _The_ Five Thousand; 4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.[102] Such were the points determined by the first assembly held in the Pnyx. The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, etc., were renewed: after which many other assemblies were also held, in which nomothetæ, dikasts, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theramenês,[103] to restore Alkibiadês and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprizing them of what had recently occurred at Athens, as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

[100] Thucyd. viii, 97.

[101] It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence,
the remarkable dialogue of contention between Peisander and
Sophoklês, one of the Athenian probûli, mentioned in Aristotel.
Rhetoric. iii, 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the
Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at
Athens.

This was not Sophoklês the tragic poet, but another person of
the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of
Thirty.

[102] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν
εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πνύκα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε
εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες ~τοῖς
πεντακισχιλίοις~ ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· ~εἶναι δὲ
αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται~· καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν,
μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ
ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ~νομοθέτας καὶ τἄλλα
ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν~.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points.
First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real
definite list of citizens, containing five thousand names,
neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in
the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional
language, but in the sense of ξυγγραφεῖς (c. 67), “persons to
model the constitution, corresponding to the ξυγγραφεῖς appointed
by the aristocratical party a little before,” to use the words of
Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall
(Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 51, 2d ed.), Dr. Arnold really
admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says: “Of course
the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy
arms must _have much exceeded five thousand_: and it is said in
the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias, p.
675, Reisk.), that he drew up a list of nine thousand. But we
must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms _were eligible
into the number of the Five Thousand_, whether the members were
fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been
proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five
Thousand (viii, 93).”

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means
conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydidês—εἶναι
δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται. These words distinctly
signify, that all who furnished heavy arms _should be of the
Five Thousand, should belong of right to that body_, which
is something different from _being eligible_ into the number
of the Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise.
The language of Thucydidês, when he describes, in the passage
referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93, the projected formation of
the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very
different: καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, etc.
M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, bk. ii, ch. 21, p. 268, Eng.
Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number
existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination,
neither realized nor intended to be realized, coincides with
the full meaning of this passage of Thucydidês, as well as with
everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that ὁπόσοι ὅπλα παρέχονται means persons
furnishing arms, not for themselves alone, but for others also
(Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 15.)

As to the second point, the signification of νομοθέτας, I
stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political
language: see the explanation earlier in this History, vol. v,
ch. xlvi, p. 373. It is for the commentators to produce some
justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it:
“persons to model the constitution; commissioners who drew up the
new constitution,” as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest,
translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture
to believe that νομοθέται, is a word which would not be used in
that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy,
and intended to act with the democracy; for it implies a final,
decisive, authoritative determination; whereas the ξυγγραφεῖς,
or “commissioners to draw up a constitution,” were only invested
with the function of submitting something for approbation to the
public assembly or competent authority; that is, assuming that
the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover, the words καὶ τἄλλα would hardly be used in immediate
sequence to νομοθέτας, if the latter word meant that which the
commentators suppose: “Commissioners for framing a constitution,
_and the other things towards the constitution_.” Such
commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in
their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most
material items in the new constitution, if we are so to call it,
have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote,
before these νομοθέται are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named
six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment
when Sparta was mistress of Athens, and when the people were
thoroughly put down, are not called Νομοθέται, but are named
by a circumlocution equivalent to Ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα
ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι, οἳ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους συγγράψουσι, καθ᾽ οὓς
πολιτεύσουσι.—Αἱρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε συγγράψαι νόμους καθ᾽
οὕστινας πολιτεύσοιντο, τούτους μὲν ἀεὶ ἔμελλον ξυγγράφειν τε
καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, etc. (Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 3, 2-11.) Xenophon
calls Kritias and Chariklês the nomothetæ of the Thirty (Memor.
i, 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of Νομοθέτης (applied most generally to
Solon, sometimes to others, either by rhetorical looseness or by
ironical taunt), or Νομοθέται, a numerous body of persons chosen
and sworn, see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sects. 3, 33, 37; Andokidês
de Mysteriis, sects. 81-85, c. 14, p. 38, where the nomothetæ are
a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising, conjointly with the
senate, the function of accepting or rejecting laws proposed to
them.

[103] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad.
c. 5, and Diodorus, xiii, 38-42) mentions Theramenês as the
principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from
exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias,
wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are
cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of
the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

Thucydidês bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.[104] But he does not countenance the belief, as he has been sometimes understood, nor is it true in point of fact, that they now introduced a new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy seemingly with only two modifications, first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage; next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the senate and the dikastery exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the senate, the dikasts, the nomothetæ, the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the assembly, the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals, or defended any law when it was impugned, must have worked for the time without pay.

[104] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί
γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς
τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν
τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former
volumes, and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see
vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 330.)

Moreover, the two modifications above mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realized, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank, as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing, indeed, a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarkation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand,—and not they alone, but others besides,[105]—shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,[106] the Four Hundred had themselves, after the demolition of their intended fortress at Ectioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands, appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of _The_ Five Thousand; and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus—if, indeed, it ever existed—was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description given of it, to illustrate my position that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy: next, it served the purpose of Theramenês and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition, to use modern phraseology, within the limits of the oligarchy; that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves: lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible; for Alkibiadês and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Five Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.[107]

[105] The words of Thucydidês (viii, 97), εἶναι δὲ ~αὐτῶν~,
ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται, show that this body was not composed
_exclusively_ of those who furnished panoplies. It could never
have been intended, for example, to exclude the hippeis, or
knights.

[106] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

[107] Thucyd. viii, 86.

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state;[108] while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the parali. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence, amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

[108] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους,
ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways; so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the reëstablishment, entire or partial, of the pay.[109] And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of the diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.

[109] See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh’s
Corpus Inscriptionum, part i, nos. 147, 148, which attest
considerable disbursements for the diobely in 410-409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same
years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Chorêgi
at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi, of
Lysias—Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας, c. 1, 2, pp. 698-700, Reiske.

How far or under what restriction, any reëstablishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event,—at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June 410 B.C.), when the senate of Five Hundred, the dikasts, and other civil functionaries, were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice,—exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly, Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,[110] prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

[110] About the date of this psephism, or decree, see Boeckh,
Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 168, in the comment
upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included
in the English translation by Mr Lewis; also Meier, De Bonis
Damnatorum, sect. ii, pp. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the
date of it after the Thirty; see Hellen. Alterth. ii, ix, p. 267.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. “If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athênê. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious odor. Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him.[111] Let the oath be as follows: ‘I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage by word, by deed, and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and their descendants. And I hereby break and renounce all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.[112]’ Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath, immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;[113] invoking upon him who keeps it, good things in abundance; but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family.”

[111] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.)—Ὁ
δ᾽ ἀποκτείνας τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα, καὶ ὁ συμβουλεύσας, ὅσιος ἔστω
καὶ εὐαγής. Ὀμόσαι δ᾽ ~Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας~ καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων,
~κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους~, ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sievers (Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis,
Berlin, 1833, pp. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not
clear.

[112] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.)
Ὁπόσοι δ᾽ ὅρκοι ὀμώμονται Ἀθήνῃσιν ἢ ~ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ~ ἢ ἄλλοθί
που ἐναντίοι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, λύω καὶ ἀφίημι.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here
made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators,
both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be
abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos
(Thucyd. viii, 75), is intended to be sworn by every one,
including those who had before been members of the oligarchical
conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the
covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or
ξυνωμοσίαι among themselves, in so far as it pledged them to
anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii, 54-81).

[113] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99, (c. 16, p. 48, R.)
Ταῦτα δὲ ὀμοσάντων ~Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες~ καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων, τὸν
νόμιμον ὅρκον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, etc.

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the senate-house. It plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which _all_ the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which _all_ Athenians had political rights, not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.[114] This decree became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidês, unless specially reënacted. But the column on which it stood engraved still remained, and the words were read upon it, at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.[115]

[114] Those who think that a new constitution was established,
after the deposition of the Four Hundred, are perplexed to fix
the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann
and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was
restored at the time when Alkibiadês returned to Athens in 407
B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats Alterthümer, s. 167, note
13.

[115] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. sect. 131, c. 31, p. 225: compare
Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 138, c. 34, p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is
the mention of the name of _Solon_ by the orators, we should
find it in this passage of Andokidês. He calls this psephism
of Demophantus _a law of Solon_ (sect. 96): see above in this
History, vol. iii, ch. xi, p. 122.

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria, was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklês, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia:[116] Aristarchus alone made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march—with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city—to Œnoê, on the Bœotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Bœotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Œnoê should be surrendered to the Bœotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Bœotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position, a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.[117]

[116] Thucyd. viii, 98. Most of these fugitives returned six
years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the
Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the
persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the
senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias cont. Agorat. sect.
80, c. 18, p. 495).

Whether Aristotelês and Chariklês were among the number of the
Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De
Quadringent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

[117] Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ
ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, etc.

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle—or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies—that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadvert upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it,—who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril to their country,—was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves,—Theramenês, Aristokratês, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probûli,—all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, whereby the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenês evaded this difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood foremost to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta, sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price, and connected with the construction of the fort at Ectioneia for the reception of an enemy’s garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favor in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenês who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deeds, was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.[118]

[118] Lysias cont. Eratosthen., c. 11, p. 427, sects. 66-68.
Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι,
Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλτάτους ὄντας αὑτῷ, κατηγορῶν
ἀπέκτεινεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἦλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν
πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς
τοὺς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hellen., ii, 3, 30-33.

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês, seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus, as I have mentioned a few pages above, had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground, and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who claimed to have assassinated him.[119] The other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês,[120] were presented in name to the senate by the generals, of whom probably Theramenês was one, as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy’s ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved: That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial; that the thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the dikastery, on the charge of high treason, and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and, if condemned, was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.[121]

[119] That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of
Phrynichus, preceded the trial of Antiphon, we may gather from
the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see
Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834, B: compare Schol. Aristoph.
Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about
the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydidês.
Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two
foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim
was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote
of citizenship, Thrasybulus of Kalydon, Apollodorus of Megara
(Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18, 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29,
p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night,
“near the fountain, hard by the willow-trees:” which is quite
contradictory to Thucydidês, who states that the deed was done
in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the
speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the
assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the
proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead
body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklês were
put to death for undertaking its defence, is certainly in part
false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Œnoê,
Alexiklês at Dekeleia.

[120] Onomaklês had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus,
as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn
(Thucyd. viii, 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydidês (p. xxii, in Dr. Arnold’s
edition), it is stated that Onomaklês was executed along with
the other two; but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch
contradicts this.

[121] Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834; compare Xenophon,
Hellenic. i, 7, 22.

Apolêxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration,
v. Στασιώτης.

Though all the three persons thus indicated were at Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the senate, yet, before it was executed, Onomaklês had fled; so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklês. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydidês describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him;[122] and the poet Agathon, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven, the chiefs of executive justice at Athens, to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their properties were confiscated, their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription: “The residence of Antiphon the traitor,—of Archeptolemus the traitor.” They were not permitted to be buried either in Attica, or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.[123] Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

[122] Thucyd. viii, 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii, 5.

Rühnken seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphont. p. 818,
Reisk.) in considering the oration περὶ μεταστάσεως to be
Antiphon’s defence of himself; though Westermann (Geschichte der
Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This
oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

[123] So, Themistoklês, as a traitor, was not allowed to be
buried in Attica (Thucyd. i, 138; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Themistocl.
ii, 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither
secretly.

Such was the sentence passed by the dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honor to the slayers of Phrynichus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.[124]

[124] It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt.
pp. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and
rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty
orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered
spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage,
pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the
score of near relationship (ἐπεδικάσατο). Kallæschrus was himself
one of the Four Hundred, perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems
singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female
in marriage, by right of near kin (τοῦ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι), could
extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of
citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron, who made the motion in
the senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial, had
been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as
Theramenês (Harp. v. Ἄνδρων).

The note of Dr. Arnold upon that passage (viii, 68) wherein
Thucydidês calls Antiphon ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, “inferior to
no man in virtue,” well deserves to be consulted. This passage
shows, in a remarkable manner, what were the political and
private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydidês.
It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical
party; and that, while the exaggerations of opposition-speakers,
or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and
Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred, exaggerations of the
oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not
make him like a man the worse. But it shows, at the same time,
his great candor in the narration of facts: for he gives an
undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the
treason, of Antiphon.

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus, perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Œnoê to the Bœotians. The latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned:[125] though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander, he himself having escaped, was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompense to Apollodorus, one of the assassins of Phrynichus:[126] probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence, which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for, by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle of Eretria, and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability, according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office. Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors: but most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted; partly, we are told, by bribes to the logistæ, or auditing officers, though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.[127]

[125] Xenoph. Hellenic. i, 7, 28. This is the natural meaning
of the passage; though it _may_ also mean that a day for trial
was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may
possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which
took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians.
The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia,
and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see
Lysias, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, Or. xviii, ch. 4, p. 604: Pro
Polystrato, Orat. xx, c. 7, p. 688; Andokidês de Mysteriis, c.
17, p. 50.

[126] Lysias, De Oleâ Sacrâ, Or. vii, ch. ii, p. 263, Reisk.

[127] “Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui cum
Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt:
omnibus autem rationes reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent,
proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita.”
(Wattenbach, De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65.)

From the psephism of Patrokleidês, passed six years subsequently,
after the battle of Ægospotamos, we learn that the names of such
among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial,
were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and
condemned either to fine or to various disabilities; Andokidês de
Mysteriis, sects. 75-78: Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὸς
ἐγγέγραπται, ἢ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων ἔστι
που γεγραμμένον, ~πλὴν ὁπόσα ἐν στήλαις γέγραπται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε
μεινάντων~, etc. These last names, as the most criminal, were
excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidês.

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned
Four Hundred: 1. Those who remained to stand the trial of
accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they
could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who
did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned _par
contumace_.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those
of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans: ἄλλο
τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these
partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before,
sect. 75: οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι ~ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων~ ἐν
τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἅπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δ᾽ ἐν
τῷ δήμῳ οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ βουλεῦσαι, where the preposition ἐπὶ
seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of
intimate connection, like the phrase ἐπὶ προστάτου οἰκεῖν (see
Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).