Chapter LXV (1)

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

The victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement[306] is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made. Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

[306] The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as
referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the Ranæ of
Aristophanês. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority:
for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 406) says that
Æschinês (De Fals. Legat. p. 38, c. 24) mentions the overtures
of peace, I think that no one who looks at that passage will be
inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it, we may observe:—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far
from being conclusive when standing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians,
are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them
after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, namely:—

To evacuate Dekeleia, and each party to stand as they were.
Not only the terms are the same, but also the person who stood
prominent in opposition is in both cases the same, _Kleophon_.
The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of
those after the battle of Kyzikus.

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the
Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are
left unnoticed by Xenophon, appears to me highly improbable. In
reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the
testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgment, the silence of
Xenophon; but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events
makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the
first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook
the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by
far the more decisive of the two.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by laboring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw, or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers; he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town; at any rate, a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers,—a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon’s house,—he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy, and inquired on what ground the man was put to death; upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news became diffused, and immediately the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away.[307]

[307] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1-4.

Eteonikus availed himself of the alarm to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away this starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month’s pay, he immediately put the troops on shipboard, taking pains to encourage them, and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless, the ephors complied with the request substantially, sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him, under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigor to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favor he had assiduously cultivated during his last year’s command, the clubs and factious combinations, which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition, all hailed his return with exultation. Discountenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer. Nevertheless, such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen, constituted new trierarchs, summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios, together with all the other scattered squadrons, and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.[308]

[308] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 10-12.

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander’s second advent felt more violently than at Milêtus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined, if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited, to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milêtus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents, and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme, fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise, and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than one thousand, fled into exile. Milêtus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.[309]

[309] Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 8.

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendency among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill, in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance; and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis; Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures, but also the Phenician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.[310]

[310] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 14; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendent factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well paid, he could keep it united, and direct it whither he chose, without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos; for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon, together with Philoklês and Adeimantus; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramenês also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the dokimasy.[311] The fleet comprised one hundred and eighty triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus, stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan gulf, named Kedreiæ, which was in alliance with Athens, and thence proceeded to Rhodes.[312] He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.[313] The Athenians were prepared to follow him thither when they learned that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land force; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighboring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine, so that the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.[314]

[311] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

[312] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 15, 16.

[313] This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the
coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it
appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii, 104:
Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch,
Lysand. c. 9.

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios, when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the sea-side of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of one hundred and eighty triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up, to a place called Ægospotami.[315]

[315] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 20, 21.

Ægospotami, or Goat’s River—a name of fatal sound to all subsequent Athenians—was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. But it was an open beach, without harbor, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; since the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus, in a good harbor, with a well-furnished town in his rear, and a land-force to coöperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned,—the men having already taken their morning meal,—and ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift-sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their seamen had actually dispersed ashore.[316]

[316] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 22-24; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 10;
Diodor. xiii, 105.

For four successive days this same scene was repeated; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadês—who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing—rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus, and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.[317] Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth day, Lysander ordered the scout-ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of one hundred and eighty, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation;[318] the trireme of Konon himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders, and the consecrated ship called paralus, always manned by the _élite_ of the Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the paralus. All the remaining triremes, nearly one hundred and seventy in number, were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed, and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighboring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.[319]

[317] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10;
Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii, 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 8) represent
Alkibiadês as wishing to be readmitted to a share in the command
of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he
would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and
compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37)
alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadês.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadês should have talked of
anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian
land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of
the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the
face of Lysander’s fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and
intelligible.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi, (Ἀπολ.
Δωροδ.) s. 12.

[319] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 11;
Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8; Polyæn.
i, 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii, 106) gives a different representation of this
important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than
that of Xenophon.

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander,—which must have been very great, since the total crews of one hundred and eighty triremes were not less than thirty-six thousand men,[320]—we hear only of three thousand or four thousand native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklês and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which, however, surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else: for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that the city would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well aware that, to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city, and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly, he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the paralus, with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes, to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait—with singular daring, under the circumstances—to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander’s triremes, always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting, lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy’s powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.[321]

[320] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πάσας (ναῦς)
Λύσανδρος ἔλαβε πρὸς τῇ γῇ· τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ
~ξυνέλεξεν~· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔφυγον ἐς τὰ τειχύδρια.

[321] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Diodor. xiii, 106: the latter is
discordant, however, on many points.

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by a wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known on the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed off and the prisoners carried across to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly, the most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklês, having captured a Corinthian and Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the other; but in this debate, some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Ægospotami; and that they had determined—chiefly on the motion of Philoklês, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus—that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklês may have expressed personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.[322] In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, three thousand or four thousand in number, were massacred forthwith, Philoklês himself at their head.[323] The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corinthian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

[322] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 31. This story is given with
variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. and by Cicero de Offic.
iii, 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off, and
the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to
the Æginetans.

[323] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 32; Pausan. ix, 32, 6; Plutarch,
Lysand. c. 13.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals, taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for it was the general belief afterwards, not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also, that the Athenian fleet was sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of this suspicion both Konon and Philoklês stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.[324] Konon even preferred an accusation against Adeimantus to this effect,[325] probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C. conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting the majority of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

[324] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1. 32; Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s.
38; Pausan. iv, 17, 2; x, 9, 5; Isokratês ad Philipp. Or. v,
sect. 70. Lysias, in his Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος (s. 58), speaks of the
treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the
disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the
generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice
the corruption (xiii, 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in
describing the battle of Ægospotami. His description differs on
many points from that of Xenophon (Theopomp. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

[325] Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401, c. 57.

The great defeat of Ægospotami took place about September 405 B.C. It was made known at Peiræus by the paralus, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the Hellespont. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. “On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the Æginetans, Melians, Skionæans, and others.” After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.[326] For Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis, and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own walls, was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

[326] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 3; Diodor. xiii, 107.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.[327] His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Sthenelaus as harmost, with a garrison. Next, he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylênê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a dekarchy, or dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens, to introduce similar changes. In Thasus, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed: there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklês, under the false assurance of an amnesty: when assembled under this pledge, they were all put to death.[328] Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself, together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Spartan for Athenian ascendency.[329] But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander’s entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos, they still held out: the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle.[330] With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependence upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

[327] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 2; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

[328] Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. It would
appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand.
c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the
parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however, it
we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch’s Life of Lysander.

[329] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς δὲ παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς
σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, etc.

[330] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 6. εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς
ἀφειστήκει Ἀθηναίων, πλὴν Σαμίων· οὗτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων
ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες to refer
to the violent revolution at Samos, described in Thucyd. viii,
21, whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical
government established. The word σφαγὰς is used by Xenophon
(Hellen. v, 4, 14), in a subsequent passage, to describe the
conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends
at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the
preterite participle πεποιηκότες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But
this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is
not uncommon with Xenophon: see κατηγορήσας, δόξας, i, 1, 31;
γενομένους, i, 7, 11; ii, 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should
have chosen this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their
oligarchical citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The
democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated,
seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to
hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised
though the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them
personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did, when he
had them substantially in his power (ii, 3, 6), if they had now
committed any fresh political massacre.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful, all her kleruchs, or out-citizens, whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.[331] The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent cities,[332] were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral, within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared, as best they could, for an honorable resistance.

[331] Xenoph. Memorab. ii, 8, 1; ii, 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympos. iv,
31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24, p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese
through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these
dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but
most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen.
iv, 8, 5).

[332] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14, p.
474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant
of ἀτέλεια, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon
metics at Athens.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly, Patrokleidês—having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judicially passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers—submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing; all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ, or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office; all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing; all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability; nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties, all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted: Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their trial; those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus, or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes.[333]

[333] This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidês is
given at length in the Oration of Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects.
76-80: Ἃ δ᾽ εἴρηται ἐξαλεῖψαι, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι,
μηδὲ μνησικακῆσαι μηδέποτε.

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidês, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.[334] The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;[335] especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were, for the most part, not men politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of: indeed, a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.[336] But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty, that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia; she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace, or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied,[337] in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, preceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege, was utterly impossible.

[334] Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πίστιν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας
δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

[335] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους
ποιήσαντες ἐκαρτέρουν.

[336] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii,
De Bonis Niciæ Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been
passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with
the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia, we do not know. The decree
is mentioned by Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. sects. 122, 123, p. 164.

[337] Isokratês adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71; compare Andokidês
de Reditu suo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii,
sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of
supply of corn to Athens.

At length, about November, 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic gulf, having sent intimation beforehand, both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians, that he was approaching with a fleet of two hundred triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under king Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Acadêmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty sail; next, ravaging Salamis, blocked up completely the harbor of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.[338]

[338] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9; Diodor. xiii, 107.

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger, that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbor of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the ephors did not even deign to admit the envoys to an interview, but sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible, and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in custody, and a general vote was passed,[339] on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

[339] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 12-15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sects.
10-12.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of the senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued to become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances, Theramenês offered himself to the people to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the ephors was in regard to Athens, whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended, farther, to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably insure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others,—but with no express powers to conclude,—simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who, he alleged, had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenês, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering, that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer.[340]

[340] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont.
Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects.
65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in
Xenophon Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed, to such a point that numbers actually died of starvation, without any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions.[341] Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the dikastery which tried him, contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.[342] Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

[341] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 15-21; compare Isokratês, Areopagit.
Or. vii, sect. 73.

[342] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 15, 16, 17; Orat.
xxx, cont. Nikomach. sects. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon,
though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of
Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i, 7, 35), is not to be reconciled
with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished
earlier than this period, in a sedition (στάσεως τινος γενομένης
ἐν ᾗ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε), before the flight of Kallixenus from his
recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have
been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering
between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He
must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of
an accused party in prison before trial, nor long postponement
of trial when he was under recognizance were at all in Athenian
habits.

By the time that Theramenês returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become, that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the ephors that he had come with unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.[343] Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power to Sparta, apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: that the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed; that the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory; that they should surrender all their ships of war; that they should readmit all their exiles; that they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognizing the same enemies and friends.[344]

[343] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 19; vi, 5, 35-46; Plutarch, Lysand.
c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting
aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition
of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the
Bœotian contingent serving under Lysander at Ægospotami, honored
in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along
with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and
along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x, 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations so habitual with Isokratês, to
serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the
_only_ parties, among all the Peloponnesian confederates, who
gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratês, Orat. Plataic. Or.
xiv, sect. 34).

Demosthenês says that the Phocians gave their vote, in the same
synod, against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat.
c. 22, p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv, 63, and Polyæn. i, 45, 5, as well as
from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the
Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans
against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

[344] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor.
xiii, 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian
decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture
of G. Hermann, αἱ χρήδοιτε instead of ἃ χρὴ δόντες, has been
adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems
very uncertain.

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a skytalê,—or roll intended to go round a stick, of which the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the ephors another, corresponding,—Theramenês went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open, there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.[345]

[345] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii, cont.
Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating
peace upon Theramenês, who plainly ought not to be required to
bear it; compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-20.

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion,[346]—about the middle or end of March,—that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus, twenty-seven years, almost exactly, after that surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appear to have been serving with his army,[347] and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the ephors, in their skytalê, had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.[348] The unfinished ships in the dockyards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined.[349] To demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was however, a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom.[350] How many days were allowed for this humiliating duty imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, tutelary, and commanding works of their forefathers, we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore, by strict construction, forfeited their title to the peace granted.[351] The interval seems, however, to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labor, as well as the melancholy character of the work to be done, too short a time had been allowed at first.

[346] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says, however, that this
was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of
Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month
Boedromion.

[347] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18.

[348] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; ii, 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c.
14. He gives the contents of the skytalê _verbatim_.

[349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 50. ἔτι
δὲ τὰ τείχη ὡς κατεσκάφη, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολεμίοις παρεδόθησαν,
καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθῃρέθη, etc.

[350] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ᾽
αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ
Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

[351] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sect. 75, p. 431, R.;
Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Diodor. xiv, 3.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial means of resistance, did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.[352] After so long an endurance of extreme misery, doubtless the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to contend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days, there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past, exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly the remnant of that faction which had set up, seven years before, the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,[353] who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Ecteioneia, as a means of insuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honor, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

[352] Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the
acropolis, which is recorded in the inscriptions among the
articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Attic. Nos. 150-152, p. 235.

[353] Lysias. Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 80.