Chapter LXIII (2)

In Milêtus, as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation:[156] Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;[157] while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.[158] Having quitted Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August (411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.[159]

[156] Thucyd. viii, 109.

[157] Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and
seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion
in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of
Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name
of Pharnabazus.

[158] Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part
company with the historian Thucydidês, whose work not only closes
without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks
off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived,
except by those who have been called upon to study his work with
the profound and minute attention required from an historian of
Greece. To pass from Thucydidês to the Hellenica of Xenophon,
is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian
history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even
so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical
purposes and conceptions of Thucydidês, as set forth by himself
in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree
altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting
models before him from which to derive them; nor are the eight
books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the
last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or
in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the
harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his
full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional
force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every
attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent
occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition
of Thucydidês, most generally on points where I dissented from
him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold’s
edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of
Thucydidês, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain
for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which
pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold
deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be
bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving
and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely
as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are
continually adopted by Göller in the second edition of his
Thucydidês, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I
do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence
among English students of Thucydidês, I have thought it my
duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which
his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history
different from my own.

[159] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9.

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadês returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasêlis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernês, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.[160] At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus, before his departure from Milêtus, in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadês going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison: from Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.[161]

[160] Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this
influence of Alkibiadês over the satrap as if it were real.
Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

[161] Thucyd. viii, 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον. Haack and Sievers
(see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this
as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in
the year.

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossêma by the squadron from Eubœa, at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê, on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue; at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counter-balancing reinforcement.[162] As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved; yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.[163]

[162] Diodorus (xiii, 46) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 27) speak of
his coming to the Hellespont by accident, κατὰ τύχην, which is
certainly very improbable.

[163] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 6, 7.

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons, for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavored without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the seaboard to a distance more than two miles inland.[164] We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

[164] Diodor. xiii, 47-49.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.[165] We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity.[166] Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

[165] Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen.
p. 12; and p. 65, note 58) controverts the reality of these
tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned
in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks,
by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, ὅσα γε
κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich
(Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly
explained this phrase of Thucydidês as meaning, in the place here
cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the
surprise of Platæa and the Peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these
disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.

[166] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 25.

Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos, seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King’s express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians.[167] Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

[167] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæûs at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos.[168]

[168] Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact,
which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of
Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. “We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King.” Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on shipboard, partly ashore,—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities,—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at sixty, the highest at eighty.[169]

[169] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14-20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the
events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, Commentat.
in Xenoph. Hellen. note, 62, pp. 65, 66, _seq._

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratês, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors at Sparta: “All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do.[170]” The ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy, with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius—ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had already been at Athens as envoy before—was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event,—which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself,—nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

[170] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ κᾶλα· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were; that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war; but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.[171]

[171] Diodor. xiii, 52.

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them: insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.[172]

[172] Diodor. xiii, 53.

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character[173]. They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon, during the last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political peculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

[173] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. liv, p. 455.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratês to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens:[174] nor can we doubt that Alkibiadês and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.

[174] Diodor. xiii, 52.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.[175] Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed, past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus,—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have arrived.

[175] Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears
to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as
insincerely meant: Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης
~ἀπιστήσαντες~ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο; compare also Schol. ad
Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.

If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker, like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place called Aspaneus, the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.[176]

[176] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606.

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April, 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June, 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies drained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C., had been comparatively restricted.

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing-port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.[177] The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now reëstablished under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenês, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

[177] See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1,
22. καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσοπόλει), καὶ ~τὴν
δεκάτην~ ἐξέλεγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27;
and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii, 64.

The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was
something known and preëstablished.

Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the
first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is
evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the
Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see
Herodot. vi, 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens
of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont.
Ergokl. sect. 6.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus, especially,[178] the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,[179] under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.[180]

[178] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48,
c. 14, p. 474.

[179] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[180] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.

The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia, the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.[181]

[181] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of
Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont,
fled first to _Sestos_, and afterwards to Byzantium. But _Sestos_
was the _Athenian_ station. The name must surely be put by
inadvertence for _Abydos_, the Peloponnesian station.

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen, and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.[182] Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, under proclamation “to go and succor the goddess Artemis;” as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.[183] From these enemies, Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however, during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadês, the Athenian, cousin and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name, whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.[184]

[182] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34; i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64)
confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.

[183] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these
twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν,
and then αἱ ἕτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι. But it appears to
me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come
to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have
been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan
ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems
impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty
Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus in addition to those which
he took with him to the Hellespont.

[184] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their head-quarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadês was proceeding to marshal them all together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternize with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be reëstablished, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.[185] Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

[185] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês, in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who, however, came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylos was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.[186] But Anytus, on his return, encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.[187] Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

[186] Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon
(Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere
retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his
employment of the name _Koryphasion_, and not of _Pylos_, prove
how much he wrote after Lacedæmionian informants.

[187] Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration, v. Δεκάζων, and
in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72, ed. Didot
(Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 127).

It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.[188]

[188] Diodor. xiii, 65.

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year, seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed, it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by nine Athenian triremes.[189] But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. The Chalkêdonians, having notice of the project, deposited their movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.[190] But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadês, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion, or temple of Heraklês, belonging to the Chalkêdonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratês, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratês himself killed.[191]

[189] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

[190] Polyb. iv, 44-45.

[191] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii, 66.

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenês and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.[192] Oaths to this effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadês from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadês should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadês, while two relatives of Alkibiadês came to Chalkêdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadês took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

[192] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Καλχηδονίους
Ἀθηναίοις ὅσονπερ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι·
Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν ~Καλχηδονίοις~, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα
πρέσβεις ἔλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former
chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their
project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent
allies, for an _ad valorem_ duty of five per cent. on imports
and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydidês (vii,
28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out,
in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the
Chalkêdonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was
the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at
the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note
upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν ~Καλχηδονίοις~. He
notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τὴν
Φαρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly
far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Καλχηδονίοις,
he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.

Alkibiadês had employed his period of absence in capturing Selymbria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus, and Bœotians under Kœratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Klearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.[193]

[193] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch,
Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium,
which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and
probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem
described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii,
xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.[194] Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians,—all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay,—were directed, after the siege of Chalkêdon, to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, Bœotius and others, were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.[195]

[194] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 1.

[195] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 2-3.