Chapter LXVIII: Sokrates

Different spirit shown towards Sokratês and towards the
sophists.—Birth and family of Sokratês.—His physical and
moral qualities.—Xenophon and Plato as witnesses.—Their
pictures of Sokratês are in the main accordant.—Habits of
Sokratês.—Leading peculiarities of Sokratês.—His constant
publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation.—Reason
why Sokratês was shown up by Aristophanês on the stage.—His
persuasion of a special religious mission.—His dæmon, or
genius—other inspirations.—Oracle from Delphi declaring that
no man was wiser than he.—His mission to test the false
conceit of wisdom in others.—Confluence of the religious
motive with the inquisitive and intellectual impulse in his
mind—numerous enemies whom he made.—Sokratês a religious
missionary, doing the work of philosophy.—Intellectual
peculiarities of Sokratês.—He opened ethics as a new subject
of scientific discussion.—Circumstances which turned the
mind of Sokratês towards ethical speculations.—Limits of
scientific study as laid down by Sokratês.—He confines study
to human affairs, as distinguished from divine—to man and
society.—Importance of the innovation—multitude of new and
accessible phenomena brought under discussion.—Innovations
of Sokratês as to method—dialectic method—inductive
discourses—definitions.—Commencement of analytical
consciousness of the mental operations—genera and
species.—Sokratês compared with previous philosophers.—Great
step made by Sokratês in laying the foundation of formal
logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematized by
Aristotle.—Dialectical process employed by Sokratês—essential
connection between method and subject.—Essential
connection also between the dialectic process and the
logical distribution of subject-matter—one in many and
many in one.—Persuasion of religious mission in Sokratês,
prompting him to extend his colloquial cross-examination
to noted men.—His cross-examining purpose was not confined
to noted men, but of universal application.—Leading
ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokratês—contrast
between the special professions and the general duties
of social life.—Platonic dialogues—discussion whether
virtue is teachable.—Conceit of knowledge without real
knowledge—universal prevalence of it.—Such confident
persuasion, without science, belonged at that time to
astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man
and society—it is now confined to the latter.—Sokratês
first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the
appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts.—Earnestness
with which Sokratês inculcated self-examination—effect of
his conversation upon others.—Preceptorial and positive
exhortation of Sokratês chiefly brought out by Xenophon.—This
was not the peculiarity of Sokratês—his powerful method
of stirring up the analytical faculties.—Negative and
indirect scrutiny of Sokratês produced strong thirst,
and active efforts, for the attainment of positive
truth.—Inductive process of scrutiny, and Baconian spirit, of
Sokratês.—Sokratic method tends to create minds capable of
forming conclusions for themselves—not to plant conclusions
ready-made.—Grecian dialectics—their many-sided handling of
subjects—force of the negative arm.—The subjects to which
they were applied—man and society—essentially required such
handling—reason why.—Real distinction and variance between
Sokratês and the sophists.—Prodigious efficacy of Sokratês in
forming new philosophical minds.—General theory of Sokratês
on ethics—he resolved virtue into knowledge, or wisdom.—This
doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole.—He was
led to this general doctrine by the analogy of special
professions.—Constant reference of Sokratês to duties of
practice and detail.—The derivative reasonings of Sokratês
were of larger range than his general doctrine.—Political
opinions of Sokratês.—Long period during which Sokratês
exercised his vocation as a public converser.—Accusation
against him by Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon.—The real
ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not
been preferred before.—Inevitable unpopularity incurred
by Sokratês in his mission.—It was only from the general
toleration of the Athenian democracy and population, that
he was allowed to go on so long.—Particular circumstances
which brought on the trial of Sokratês.—Private offence of
Anytus.—Unpopularity arising to Sokratês from his connection
with Kritias and Alkibiadês.—Enmity of the poets and rhetors
to Sokratês.—Indictment—grounds of the accusers—effects
of the “Clouds” of Aristophanês, in creating prejudice
against Sokratês.—Accusation of corruption in teaching was
partly founded on political grounds.—Perversion of the
poets alleged against him.—Remarks of Xenophon upon these
accusations.—The charges touch upon the defective point of
the Sokratic ethical theory.—His political strictures.—The
verdict against Sokratês was brought upon him partly
by his own concurrence.—Small majority by which he was
condemned.—Sokratês defended himself like one who did not
care to be acquitted.—The “Platonic Apology.”—Sentiment
of Sokratês about death.—Effect of his defence upon the
dikasts.—Assertion of Xenophon that Sokratês might have been
acquitted if he had chosen it.—The sentence—how passed in
Athenian procedure.—Sokratês is called upon to propose some
counter-penalty against himself—his behavior.—Aggravation
of feeling in the dikasts against him in consequence of
his behavior.—Sentence of death—resolute adherence of
Sokratês to his own convictions.—Satisfaction of Sokratês
with the sentence, on deliberate conviction.—Sokratês in
prison for thirty days—he refuses to accept the means of
escape—his serene death.—Originality of Sokratês.—Views
taken of Sokratês as a moral preacher and as a skeptic—the
first inadequate, the second incorrect.—Sokratês, positive
and practical in his end; negative only in his means.—Two
points on which Sokratês is systematically negative.—Method
of Sokratês of universal application.—Condemnation of
Sokratês one of the misdeeds of intolerance.—Extenuating
circumstances—principle of orthodox enforcement recognized
generally in ancient times.—Number of personal enemies made
by Sokratês.—His condemnation brought on by himself.—The
Athenians did not repent it. 399-496

HISTORY OF GREECE.