Chapter LXIV (3)

The generals, in their public letter, accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honored with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylênê, was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklês and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.[268] The generals probably received the notice of their recall at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenês, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, and Thrasyllus,—Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê,[269]—came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

[268] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 1; Diodor. xiii, 101: ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ
τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπῄνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιϊδεῖν ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ
τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας χαλεπῶς διετέθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking
about nothing but _dead bodies_, in place of the living ναυαγοὶ
spoken of by Xenophon.

[269] Lysias, Orat. xxi (Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας), sect. vii.

On their first arrival, Archedêmus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,[270] imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the dikastery, and accused him besides before the dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned, either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

[270] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 2. Archedêmus is described as τῆς
Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος. What is meant by these words, none
of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The
text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems
plausible; some word like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκατεύσεως, having
reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which
would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedêmus
against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedêmus, whatever it was, must have been
sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the
fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedêmus with the person of that
name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii, 9. There seems
no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedêmus was derided by Eupolis and
Aristophanês as having sore eyes, and as having got his
citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran.
419-588, with the Scholia). He is also charged, in a line of an
oration of Lysias, with having embezzled the public money (Lysias
cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25, Orat. xiv).

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were summoned before the senate to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle, and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If, however, any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavorable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the senator Timokratês,[271] a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.[272]

[271] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους δ᾽ εἰπόντος, ὅτι ~καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι~, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε.

[272] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4.

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission, therefore, was wholly their own: they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenês. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much, when he denied the justification which the generals had set up founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so: either they might have done so before the storm came on, or there never was any storm of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.[273] Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us, in express words, that Theramenês contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasybulus—another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character—concurred with Theramenês in this same accusation of the generals,[274] though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle, or so terrible as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

[273] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησία ἐγένετο,
ἐν ᾗ τῶν στρατηγῶν ~κατηγόρουν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θηραμένης μάλιστα,
δικαίους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς
ναυαγούς~. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ~οὐδενὸς ἄλλου~ καθήπτοντο, ἐπιστολὴν
ἐπεδείκνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ
ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

[274] That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenês in accusing the
generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the
generals to have made (i, 7, 6): Καὶ οὐχ, ~ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν
ἡμῶν~, ἔφασαν, ψευσόμεθα φάσκοντες ~αὐτοὺς αἰτίους~ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasybulus as well as
Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the
latter was the most prominent and violent.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenês and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly, what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals, does not directly bring forward, that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it, thus putting in controversy the matter of fact which formed their solitary justification. Moreover, we come—in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenês and Thrasybulus—to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is, however, a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves; for it was they two to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty; it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they, the generals, made no charge against Theramenês and Thrasybulus, well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They, the generals, at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylênê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê; Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly, it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenês. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here, then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenês and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men; next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves. If this latter were really true, how came the generals, in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it? Euryptolemus, an advocate of the generals, speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly, while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good-nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals, he said, were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon; an unhappy dissuasion, in his judgment, which Theramenês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.[275]

[275] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 17. Euryptolemus says: Κατηγορῶ μὲν
οὖν αὐτῶν ὅτι ~ἔπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας~, βουλομένους πέμπειν
γράμματα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ
Θρασυβούλῳ τετταράκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ τριήρεσιν ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς
ναυαγοὺς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Εἶτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν
ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων· καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας,
νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινων ἄλλων ἐπιβουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν
ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe ἔπεισαν as equivalent to ἀνέπεισαν or
μετέπεισαν placing a comma after ξυνάρχοντας. This is unusual,
but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or
his conduct, might be expressed by πείθειν, though it would more
properly be expressed by ἀναπείθειν; see ἐπείσθη, Thucyd. iii, 32.

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramenês and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus represents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own seamen, from taking any steps to pick up, what he calls, the dead bodies for burial; that they suspected Theramenês and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people, and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly, Diodorus says, the Athenians were excessively indignant against Theramenês; who, however, defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will, and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramenês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.[276]

[276] Diodor. xiii, 100, 101.

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramenês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramenês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramenês himself, two years afterwards, in his defence before the Thirty, that he was not the first to accuse the generals; they were the first to accuse him; affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to hinder him from performing it; they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said, from the beginning, that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water; much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men.[277]

[277] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. If Theramenês really did say, in
the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals,
that which he here asserts himself to have said, namely, that
the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to
put to sea, his accusation against the generals must have been
grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty
at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle;
before the storm arose; before they gave the order to him. But I
think it most probable that he misrepresented at the later period
what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the
actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact
and justification.

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramenês at the time of the Thirty, and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either, I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs; but that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order; next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general’s division, were probably never assembled; or, if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction, even as given by Euryptolemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.[278] In a proceeding where every interval even of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships, and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that, towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.[279] Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realized; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenês feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service, as we see that most of the generals did; while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations.[280] All were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavorable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay, partly from the bad weather, the duty remained unexecuted, and the seamen on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

[278] The total number of ships lost with all their crews was
twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews, speaking in round
numbers, would be five thousand men. Now we may fairly calculate
that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her
crew, or one hundred men, after the action; not more than half
would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled
ships would thus contain one thousand living men, wounded and
unwounded. It will be seen, therefore, that I have understated
the number of lives in danger.

[279] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33.

[280] We read in Thucydidês (vii, 73) how impossible it was to
prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after
their last maritime victory in the Great Harbor, when they were
full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on
board and the floating bodies _before_ they went ashore. It is
remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely
overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never
even thought of asking permission, always granted by the victors
when asked, to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii,
72).

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, “How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty, in our official despatch to the Athenian people?” Here the generals differed among themselves, as Euryptolemus expressly states: Periklês and Diomedon carried it, against the judgment of their colleagues, that in the official despatch, which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all, nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenês and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament,—communications not less efficacious than the official despatch, in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens,—they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenês. Having thus a man like Theramenês to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder _him_ from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blamable.[281] As they had made light of this alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him, so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

[281] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 32. The light in which I here place
the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus,
but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of
Theramenês under the government of the Thirty, just before he was
going to put Theramenês to death: Οὗτος δέ τοι ἐστὶν, ὃς ταχθεὶς
ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ
Λέσβον ναυμαχίᾳ, ~αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος~ ὅμως τῶν στρατηγῶν
κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, ~ἵνα αὐτὸς περισωθείη~. (Xen. ut
sup.)

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was,
as Diodorus states expressly, that Theramenês was ordered to pick
up the men on the wrecks, might have done it if he had taken
proper pains, and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this
impression arise? Of course, through communications received from
the armament itself. And when Theramenês, in his reply, says
that the generals themselves made communications in the same
tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him, in spite
of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention
of him, and in spite of their speech in the public assembly
afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and
prevented them from accusing him, forcing them to adhere to the
statement first made, of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established, even by the
enemies of Theramenês, are: 1. That Theramenês accused the
generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for
the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach
of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for _him_.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other, having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The really serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy, if we suppose more than one thousand seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave, it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings leaving these men so exposed, or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such that he hesitated to give the order, there would probably be found officers and men to volunteer, against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now, unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ,—for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them,—there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios; recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only one hundred and twenty stadia broad,[282] about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprized of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbor, and then to sail into it again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard, and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbor of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls “a fair wind.”[283] Now it is scarcely possible that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylênê and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios, it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seaman, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them, even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ, discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back.

[282] Strabo, xiii, p. 617.

[283] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 37. Ἐτεόνικος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι (the
signal-boat, with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔθυε
τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι,
καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνθεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα
ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἦν δὲ τὸ ~πνεῦμα οὔριον~, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις
τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πεζὸν ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μήθυμνην, τὸ
στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσας. Κόνων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῦς, ἐπεὶ οἵ τε
πολέμιοι ἀπεδεδράκεσαν, ~καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος εὐδιαίτερος ἦν~, ἀπαντήσας
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἀνηγμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ
τοῦ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees, by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the
proceedings of Konon, that he went out of the harbor “as soon as
the wind became calmer;” that it blew a strong wind, though in
a direction favorable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios.
Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately:
he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm.
The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly
compatible with, indeed even favorable to, the escape of the
Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of this memorable event, in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramenês and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory, but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements, and contradictions between them and Theramenês, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramenês. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence,—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramenês, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them,—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favor and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.[284] Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged—we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking—that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved to adjourn the whole decision until another assembly; but that in the mean time the senate should meet, should consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals, and should submit a proposition to that effect to the approaching assembly.

[284] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ
βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὐτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν
νόμον....

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ~ἔπειθον~ τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense
~ἔπειθον~ must be noticed: “they _were persuading_,” or, _seemed
in the way to persuade_, the people; not ἔπεισαν the aorist,
which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon, do not imply that the
generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking
before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and
defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person
accused had a measured time for defence—by the clepsydra, or
water-clock—allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt
him; a time doubtless much longer than any single speaker would
be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

It so chanced that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race; handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleisthenês, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes, and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, etc., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia, the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratric roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athênê, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this, celebrated every year, naturally provoked in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest: “Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent, where are they? The deceased, where or how did they die?” Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, at least all those among them who were freemen, had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and revolting: “They fought like brave men, and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them.” To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends,—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathizing family circle,—was well calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.[285]

[285] Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression
respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals;
ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ᾽ ἐκείνων δίκην
λαβεῖν; Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenês,[286] to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. Theramenês might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia, by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well calculated to arouse.

[286] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην
παρεσκεύασαν ἀνθρώπους ~μέλανα ἱμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῷ
κεκαρμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑορτῇ~, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
ἥκοιεν, ~ὡς δὴ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἀπολωλότων~.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who
gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding;
representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and
vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased
(xiii, 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist.
of Greece, ch. xxx, vol. iv, pp. 117-125), follow Xenophon
on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the
generals at Athens as “popular prejudices;” “excitement produced
by the artifices of Theramenês,” (Dr. Thirlwall, pp. 117-124.)
“Theramenês (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend
the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as
mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight.”

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the
most unfavorable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it
deserves (see p. 116, the note): “It looks as if Xenophon had
_purposely involved the whole affair in obscurity_.” Compare also
p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon, of
which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall, so far as to supply,
without contradicting any of his main allegations, an omission
which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account
of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but
I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenês as the
producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at
Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of
the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the
men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the
public mind. It would, in my judgment, have been unaccountable
if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all
instigations of Theramenês. The moment that we recognize this
capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively
perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis
Hellen. pp. 25-30), suppose Theramenês to have acted in concert
with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to
bring about the ruin of generals odious to them, several of whom
were connected with Alkibiadês. I confess, that I see nothing to
countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is
only secondary, not the grand and dominant fact of the period.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable, than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening, but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenês, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others,—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias, under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenês is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but, for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little if any abatement. This is one forcible reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result, and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my judgment, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly, the senator Kallixenus—at the instigation of Theramenês, if Xenophon is to be believed—proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: “The Athenian people having already heard, in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim: All citizens who think the generals guilty, for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty, by the result of the voting, they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê.”[287] One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.[288]

[287] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 8, 9.

[288] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 34.

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens,—and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals,—probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose, and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial; alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians; formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the dikasts; while those dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred; and submitted, for their lives, honors, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannônus,—originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case, but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence,—which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should, in all cases, be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannônus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.[289]

[289] I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall
in Appendix iii. vol. iv, p. 501, of his History, on the subject
of the psephism of Kannônus. The view which I give in the text
coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr.
Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannônus was the only enactment at Athens which
made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons
at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial
proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were
ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism
of Kannônus, with its various provisions, would yet have the
benefit of this its particular provision, namely, severance of
trial.

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to
appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition
unheard of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of
the senate offended against the law in several different ways.
It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery;
it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a
measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be
condemned or absolved by one and the same vote; and, in this last
respect, it sinned against the psephism of Kannônus. Euryptolemus
in his speech, endeavoring to persuade an exasperated assembly
to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism
of Kannônus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells
upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs
over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials,
by offering his relative Periklês to be tried _first_. The words
δίχα ἕκαστον (sect. 37) appear to me to be naturally construed
with κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου ψήφισμα, as they are by most commentators,
though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this
was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the
proposition of the senate presented, I mean the judging and
condemning all the generals by _one_ vote. It was upon this
point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the
obstinate resistance of Sokratês turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph.
Memor. i, 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have
been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannônus, appears to me to
have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the
much-discussed passage of Aristophanês, Ekklezias. 1089:—

Τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου σαφῶς
Ψήφισμα, βινεῖν δεῖ με διαλελημμένον,
Πῶς οὖν δικωπεῖν ἀμφοτέρας δυνήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes, “that the young man is
comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree
of Cannônus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each
side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are
corrupted, clearly understood the passage.”

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words
completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanês does not compare
his situation _with that of the culprit_, but _with that of
the dikastery which tried culprits_. The psephism of Kannônus
directed that each defendant should be tried separately:
accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented
for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment’s delay,
the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself
into two halves, or portions; which was perfectly practicable,
whether often practised or not, as it was a numerous body.
By doing this, κρίνειν διαλελημμένον, it could _try both the
defendants at once_: but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanês compares himself to the
dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified
by the pun of βινεῖν διαλελημμένον in place of κρίνειν
διαλελημμένον. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate
customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been
served. Accordingly he says: “Clearly, I ought to be divided
into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of
Kannônus, to deal with this matter: yet how _shall_ I be _able_
to serve both at once?”

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in
Aristophanês; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth
of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of
Kannônus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself,
and to have misled every one else.

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as grossly illegal and unconstitutional, presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the Graphê Paranomôn, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which, according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the Graphê Paranomôn more closely and righteously applied.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus—especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance—were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the senate. They loudly clamored, that “it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose:” and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.[290] The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said: “Athenians! I was myself a wrecked man in the battle; I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country.” Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men, reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers’ souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.[291] Doubtless there were other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

[290] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο
παράνομα φάσκοντες ξυγγεγραφέναι Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι
τινες· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα
~δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ ἂν
βούληται~. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ
αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ~ἐὰν μὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν
ἐκκλησίαν~, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἠναγκάσθησαν ἀφιέναι
τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting
the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in
spite of constitutional obstacles.

[291] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 11. Παρῆλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοὺς
ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ
ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing in the whole compass
of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more
profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech;
though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and
contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to
dismiss everything which goes to inculpate the generals, and to
justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was
mere stage-trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond
Xenophon, when he says (p. 119, vol. iv): “A man was _brought
forward_, who _pretended_ he had been preserved by clinging to a
meal-barrel, and that his comrades,” etc. So Mr. Mitford: “A man
was produced,” etc. (p. 347).

Now παρῆλθε does not mean, “_he was brought forward_:” it is a
common word employed to signify one who _comes forward_ to speak
in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii, 44, and the participle
παρελθὼν, in numerous places).

Next, φάσκων while it sometimes means _pretending_, sometimes
also means simply _affirming_: Xenophon does not guarantee the
matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false.
He uses φάσκων in various cases where he himself agrees with the
fact affirmed (see Hellen. i, 7, 12; Memorab. i, 2, 29; Cyropæd.
viii, 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition;
nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should
disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man
which is at all improbable; nay, more, it is plain that several
such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest
pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with
this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that
numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been
in circulation; doubtless many false, but many also perfectly
true.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the prytanes,—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis,—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus: he threatened, amidst encouraging clamor from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratês; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratês could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining prytanes without his concurrence.[292] It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate; a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

[292] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20;
Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18; iv, 4, 2.