Chapter LXIII (1)

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

The oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of ninety-four triremes,[132] having remained not less than eighty days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions, of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phenician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsakus.

[132] Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the Chians—driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes—had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage,[133] yet Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.[134]

[133] Thucyd. viii, 61, 62 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες means a certain
success, not very decisive.

[134] Thucyd. viii, 63.

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion, Charmînus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê; but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.[135]

[135] Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichidês had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.[136] Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalê the next morning. It consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.[137]

[136] Thucyd. viii, 62.

[137] Thucyd. viii, 79.

Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus. Tissaphernês had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadês to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching out westward into the Ægean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milêtus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichidês seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milêtus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,[138] and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

[138] Thucyd. viii, 80-99.

Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Milêtus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernês. Unpaid, and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadês. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratês of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took refuge, however, on a neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.[139]

[139] Thucyd. viii, 83, 84.

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king’s territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits, and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently,[140] and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot—probably some place of honor—which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

[140] Thucyd. viii, 84. Ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη
τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν
τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ
θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽
ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα, etc.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges of Hermokratês, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.[141] At the same time he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.[142]

[141] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[142] Thucyd. viii, 87.

Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phenician ships were one hundred and forty-seven in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be fitted out for the service.[143] He waited for some time in pretended expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.

[143] Thucyd. viii, 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês
pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by
Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydidês does not assign any
precise number (Diodor. xiii, 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet
as intended to be augmented to a total of three hundred sail
(Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of
standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of this approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the assistance of Athens, but at the very least, _not_ to send it to the aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernês had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês, partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus—not without indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernês, indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one’s eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydidês supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.[144] The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

[144] Thucyd. viii, 87, 88, 99.

Having at length lost all hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernês; the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet[145]—seventy-three triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes—having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy’s fleet.[146] Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from Kymê under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnæan exiles, with some political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning, in case the enemy’s fleet should move northward.

[145] Diodor. xiii, 38.

[146] Thucyd. viii, 100. Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν ~τῇ Χίῳ~ εἴη, καὶ
νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν ~αὐτοῦ~, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ
Λέσβῳ, καὶ ~ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ~, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες,
ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, etc.

I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite
_Chios_, not opposite _Lesbos_. The words may admit either
sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ follow so immediately before: and the
situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the
northern portion of _Chios_.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet, if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three tesserakosts, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or sea-side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called Karterii, in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginusæ, close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs, on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the next day’s morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighboring places.[147]

[147] Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is
sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it
in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors
of Thucydidês; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as
they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting
the negative οὐ _on pure conjecture_, without the authority
of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of
criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger
recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M.
Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidês;
without even following the caution of Bekker in his small
edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in
brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, “_This
correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows
the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long
since._”

The words of Thucydidês, _without_ this correction, and as they
stood universally before Haack’s edition (even in Bekker’s
edition of 1821), are:—

Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες
ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυσῖν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς
τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ~ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ
τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν,
ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον~.
Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα, καὶ
ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν
Ἀργενούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μιτυλήνης, etc.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist
that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and
that it is indispensable to insert οὐ before πελάγιαι; so that
the sentence stands in their editions ~ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ
πελάγιαι~. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus
as sailing from the town of Chios _northward_, and going out at
the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough,
that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because
Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not
away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction
would be disputable. But the word πελάγιος, when applied to ships
departing from Chios,—though it may perhaps mean that they round
the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round
Lesbos,—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to
announce them as _departing by the outer sea_, or sailing _on the
sea-side_ (round the southern and western coast) _of the island_.
Accept _this meaning_, and the old words construe perfectly well.
Ἀπαίρειν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος is the natural and proper phrase
for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west
coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could
have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which
same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 80) the
squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit
out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read ~οὐ~ πελάγιαι
must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait
between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east
towards Phokæa, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus
expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain
why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the
Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself.
Whereas, by taking the circuitous route round the southern and
western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other:
and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of
the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly
course, _with Lesbos on his left hand_, but at a sufficient
distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ
τῆς Χίου πελάγιος (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 17), means to strike into
the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does
not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast
or the northeast corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the
Chians per head _three Chian tessarakostæ_. Now this is a small
Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to
find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified
by Thucydidês, contrasted with the different manner in which
Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen
(Hellen. i, 6, 12; ii, 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round
the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He
must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation
(perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and
this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of
the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian
landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard
_more_ provisions in kind, at the town of Chios; because he had
already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent
portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during
which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where
indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydidês
will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this
conjectural ~οὐ~. But I can show more: for this negative actually
renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least,
if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαίρουσιν οὐ πελάγιαι, ἀλλὰ, ought
to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging
to the same verb ἀπαίρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such
correlative participle, how are we to construe ἔπλεον? In order
to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to
have different words, such as: οὐκ ἄπῃραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον.
Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow
the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand
the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is
perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to
the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. “_The
fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but
when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight
to the continent._”

I hope that I am not too late to make good my γραφὴν ξενίας, or
protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship
which the recent editors have conferred upon this word ~οὐ~, in
c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these
editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the
word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydidês, published at
Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still
correctly printed, without the negative.

By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Harmatûs, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsular, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Milêtus, that, if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special look-out for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Elæûs.[148]

[148] Thucyd. viii, 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ, ...
ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον, καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ
ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ
Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους,
ὑπομίξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι
ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. ~Καὶ τὰς μὲν
ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ
ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι~· τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ
Μινδάρου ἅμα ἕῳ κατιδόντες, etc.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed
the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands
in my text, differently from all of them. The words, προειρημένης
φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι,
are explained by the Scholiast to mean: “Although watch had been
enjoined to them (i.e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at
Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that
they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case
the latter should sail out.”

Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this
construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and
confused. The former says: “This again is most strangely intended
to mean, προειρημένου αὐτοῖς ~ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων~
φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολεμίους.”

To construe τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ as equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων
φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very
glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves
another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable.
He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word ~καίτοι~, _although_,
from his own imagination. There is no indication of _although_,
either express or implied, in the text of Thucydidês; and it
appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive
a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when
annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually
denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of
cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something
opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an _although_; if
this latter be intended, then the word _although_ is expressed,
not left to be understood. After Thucydidês has told us that
the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at
Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive
absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains
why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us,
far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary
(such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to
watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact
by an express particle, such as _although_ or _notwithstanding_:
“The Athenians escaped, _although_ the Peloponnesians had
received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up.”
As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle
_although_ is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a
high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words,
προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν,
ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, _do_ assign the reason for the fact which had been
immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary;
namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos,
and escape from Sestos to Elæûs. That reason was, that the
Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders
from Mindarus, _to concentrate its attention and watchfulness
upon his approaching squadron_; hence it arose that they left the
Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ,
and the pronoun ~αὐτῶν~, which immediately follows, refers
to ~φίλων~ (_the approaching fleet of Mindarus_), not to the
Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators
construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to
me to have put them all wrong.

That τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν
φίλων ἐπίπλῳ is certain; but it is not equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων; nor is it possible to construe the words as
the Scholiast would understand them: “_orders had been previously
given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends_;” whereby we
should turn ὁ ἐπίπλους into an acting and commanding personality.
The “approach of their friends” is an event, which may properly
be said “to have produced an effect,” but which cannot be said
“to have given previous orders.” It appears to me that τῷ φιλίῳ
ἐπίπλῳ is the dative case, governed by φυλακῆς; “_a look-out
for the arrival of the Peloponnesians_,” having been enjoined
upon these guardships at Abydos: “_They had been ordered to
watch for the approaching voyage of their friends._” The English
preposition _for_, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek
dative; that is, the _object, purpose, or persons whose benefit
is referred to_.

The words immediately succeeding, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς
ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, are an expansion of consequences intended
to follow from φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ. “They shall watch for the
approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special
and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start.”
For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i, 24; viii, 109.
Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ~ἀνακῶς~, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς,
ἐπιμελῶς, the notes of Arnold and Göller here; and Kühner, Gr.
Gr. sect. 533, ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινός, for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words
ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the
Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the
arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt
and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty
of that squadron as respects the opposite Athenian squadron at
Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was
besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words ἢν ἐκπλέωσι refer _to Mindarus and his fleet
about to start from Chios, as their subject_, not to the
Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the
peculiarities of Thucydidês, and express the meaning in common
Greek: Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον·
προείρητο γὰρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναῦσιν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν
φίλων, ὅπως ~αὐτῶν~ (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι.
The verb φυλάσσειν here, and of course the abstract substantive
φυλακὴ which represents it, signifies to _watch_ for, or _wait_
for: like Thucyd. ii, 3. φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
περίορθρον; also viii, 41, ἐφύλασσε.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect
harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That
admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont,
but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is
difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy
of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders
beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Milêtus, before he
quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the
Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that
Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and
perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or
bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would
indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile
fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent
forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they
are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the
captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming
Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on
guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave
the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on
Mindarus, and come forth to help him. “Let your first thought be
to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont,
and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its
route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave
the Hellespont for a time unguarded.” Mindarus could not tell
beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor
was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all,
if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent,
_conditional_ upon his being able to get off (~ἢν ἐκπλέωσι~).
But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage,
to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The
Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his
special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was
approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to
lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians
opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they
could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could
learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could
render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what
manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian
squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the
Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Mindarus, which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhœteium. The latter immediately gave chase: but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Elæûs: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He waited at Elæûs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossêma, or the Dog’s Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatæ or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manœuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossêma. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Bœotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellênê, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossêma, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.[149]

[149] Thucyd. viii, 105, 106; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even
in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydidês.
It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from
Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority
of the Athenian pilots and the Peloponnesian epibatæ. He states
that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the
middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor:
this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent
conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of
Hecuba on the headland of Kynossêma.

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with the revolt of Eubœa, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossêma, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Eubœa.[150] This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which, in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokratês, survived to join Mindarus.[151]

[150] Thucyd. viii, 107; Diodor. xiii, 41.

[151] Diodor. xiii, 41. It is probable that this fleet was in
great part Bœotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck
commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of
Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by
Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the
words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were
the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But
we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he
was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i,
1, 23).

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of this undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to reëstablish her maritime power.[152]

[152] Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but
I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little
delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers,
Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note, p. 66).

See Colonel Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, for a description
of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii,
ch. xiv, pp. 259-265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth
of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching
two hundred feet (x, p. 400). But there must have been material
alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time
of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x, p. 447). The bridge here
described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for
one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad;
for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The
ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think
that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii,
47, οὐ in place of ὁ.

The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover, in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæûs, and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elæûs set them on fire.[153]

[153] Thucyd. viii, 107.

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first, through the hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus—the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;[154] and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

[154] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under
nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph.
Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.[155]

[155] Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.