Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (8)

What became of the men forming the captured outpost I never knew, and was not anxious to inquire. Having placed the troops on board, we took off four brass field-pieces with their appendages, and threw the iron guns over the parapet; after which the Spaniards were allowed to ransack the fort. At 6 P.M. we laid a train to the French ammunition, and soon after the whole blew up. Spanish colours were then hoisted on the ruins, amidst the hearty cheers of thousands with arms in their hands, who had by this time flocked to the spot, though when we landed not a single inhabitant was to be seen. Soon after we gained possession, men, women, and children came from their hiding-places in abundance, expressing grateful satisfaction at the capture of the enemy.

It would have been well if the leaders of the French army in other parts of Spain could have seen the exasperation produced by the barbarous propensities of these detachments of troops, who appeared to be under no moral discipline. Except, perhaps, in actual fight, their officers had no control over them, so that their path was marked by excesses of every kind. This is a fatal mistake in armies, as the French afterwards found elsewhere—it degrades war into extermination. Our prisoners did not even deny that the Spaniards would only have exercised a just retaliation by immolating them, but contented themselves by saying that they would never have given in to the Spaniards whilst a man remained alive.

After we had blown up the castle, the _Cambrian_ arrived, and to her, by permission of her captain, we transferred half our prisoners. On the following morning we sailed from Mongat, having first presented the chief commanding the Spaniards with two of the field-pieces taken the day before, together with a sufficient supply of powder and ammunition.

General Duhesme reached Barcelona by making a _détour_ into the interior, after an absence of about a month, during which the destruction of the roads had been going on. He was highly exasperated with the unfortunate inhabitants, though for no better reason than that all his plans had been thwarted, and, pointing the guns of the citadel on the town, he threatened it with destruction, unless his force was supplied with 12,000 rations daily, with wine and brandy in proportion; following up this injustice by seizing the most respectable inhabitants for the purpose of extorting ransoms for their liberation.

Great credit is due to the Catalans for the spirit thus manifested at a time when all the more important strongholds of Catalonia were in the hands of the enemy. I say Catalonia, as being concerned with that province only, though there was reason to know that the like patriotism was manifested in the western provinces, though, from the preponderance of the enemy, with less effect.

Even when Duhesme had reached Barcelona, he had great difficulty in maintaining himself, as the activity of the patriots in cutting off his supplies by land was worthy of their cause, and the _Impérieuse_ and other English vessels of war took care that he got no supplies by sea.

On the 31st of July I addressed the subjoined despatch to Lord Collingwood:—

“H. M. S. _Impérieuse_, off Mongat, Catalonia,
“31 July, 1808.

“MY LORD,—The castle of Mongat, an important post, completely
commanding a pass on the road from Gerona to Barcelona, which the
French are now besieging, and the only post between these towns
occupied by the enemy, surrendered this morning to his Majesty’s ship
under my command.

“The Spanish militia behaved admirably in carrying an outpost on a
neighbouring hill. Lieutenant Hore of the marines took possession of
the castle, which, by means of powder, is now levelled with the
ground, and the pending rocks are blown down into the road, which in
many other places is also rendered impassable to artillery, without a
very heavy loss of men if the French resolve to repair them.

“I enclose to your Lordship a list of the prisoners, and of the
material part of the military stores, all of which that could be
useful to the Spaniards have been delivered to them.

“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.

“The Rt. Hon. Lord Collingwood.”

Having effected everything possible at Mongat, we made sail on the 4th of August, and anchored off San Felin, where,—whilst the ship was employed in filling up water—I rode five miles into the country to inspect a battery which the Spaniards had erected to prevent the French from marching on the town. It was situated on an eminence, commanding the road to Gerona and Mataro, and was completely surrounded by high trees, so as not to be visible from the road. If properly defended, it would have presented a formidable obstacle, but as it was, the French infantry would have taken it in a few minutes. I gave the Spaniards instructions how to strengthen the position, but as they told me they could in a short time collect 3000 armed peasantry, I bid them rather rely on these by maintaining a guerilla warfare, which, if conducted with their usual judgment and activity, would harass the enemy more than the battery.

The Catalans made capital guerilla troops, possessing considerable skill in the use of their weapons, though previously untrained. A character for turbulence was often attributed to them; but, in a country groaning under priestcraft and bad government, the sturdy spirit of independence, which prompted them to set the example of heroic defence of their country, might be, either mistakenly or purposely—the latter the more probable—set down for discontent and sedition. At any rate, the descendants of men who, in a former age, formed the outposts of the Christian world against Mahomedism, in no way disgraced their ancestors, and became in the end the terror of their enemies. One quality they pre-eminently possess, viz. patience and endurance under privation; and this added to their hardy habits and adventurous disposition, contributed to form an enemy not to be despised—the less so that they were in every way disposed to repay the barbarities of the French with interest.

At 8 A.M. on the 6th, the _Impérieuse_ got under sail from San Felin, and passing close to Palamos, arrived in the afternoon at Rosas, where we found the _Montague_ and _Hind_, to the latter of which we transferred the prisoners. The _Hind_ was bound for Port Mahon with the Governor of Figueras and his family, who had to be escorted to the ship by the marines of the _Montague_, in order to protect him from popular vengeance, so exasperated were the Spaniards on account of the governor’s cowardice or treachery in allowing the French to enter the fortress he had commanded, though from its position and strength he could easily have held out.

The fortress of Figueras was about twelve miles from Rosas, and was a place of amazing strength, having been constructed for the defence of one of the principal passes on the borders of Spain, and being well garrisoned and provisioned, it ought certainly to have withstood a considerable force. The Rosas people had a right to be indignant at its pusillanimous surrender, for not only did this expose their town, but it formed a marked contrast to one of their own exploits, when, being attacked by a large French force, they drove them back with the loss of 300 men.

On the 7th we filled up with water at a wretched place on the opposite side of the Bay of Rosas, and on the 8th sailed for San Felin, where we arrived on the 9th. On the 10th we were again off Barcelona, when a flag of truce was sent by the French to ask what had become of the troops we had taken at Mongat. On the 11th, we bore up for San Felin and were joined by our gunboat, after which we proceeded to see what was being done on the French coast, and bore up for Marseilles.

My object in proceeding in this direction was, that as the French troops kept out of our reach, there was no beneficial object to be gained by remaining on the Spanish coast; and it occurred to me, that by giving the French, in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, a taste of the evils they were inflicting on their Spanish neighbours, it would be possible to create an amount of alarm, which would have the effect of diverting troops intended for Catalonia, by the necessity of remaining to guard their own seaboard. It is wonderful what an amount of terrorism a small frigate is able to inspire on an enemy’s coast. Actions between line-of-battle ships are, no doubt, very imposing; but for real effect, I would prefer a score or two of small vessels, well handled, to any fleet of line-of-battle ships.

On the 15th we stood into the Bay of Marseilles, and anchored off the mouth of the Rhone, which was distant about eight miles. Sent the gun-boat in chase of a small vessel, but the crew ran her on shore, and escaped. The gun-boat burned her, and joined us again on the following morning, when we anchored abreast of a telegraph employed in signalising our appearance on the coast. Here was a hint, the beneficial nature of which could not be doubted, and at once I decided on destroying the enemy’s communications along shore. As a commencement, this telegraph was demolished without opposition.

On the 16th sent the gun-boat in chase of two vessels, close to Cette. They escaped, but she brought back a boat with four men, who gave such information as induced me to send her on a cruise.

On the 17th, there being nothing in sight, we made preparations for destroying the signal-station on the island of Boni, which commands the entrance to the Rhone. Landing ninety men in the boats, we were just in time to see the troops in charge of the station abandon it; and having possessed ourselves of the signals, we blew up the place and returned to the ship.

We then got under weigh, and by 4 o’clock were close to Montpelier, firing on a fort as we passed. Perceiving another signal-station in the vicinity, we again out boats, and proceeded to destroy it, but found this not so easy a matter as on the last occasion, for we had two rivers to ford, each midleg in mud, and had moreover to encounter a fire of musketry, but at a distance which did no harm, so that with some difficulty we accomplished our object. This station was called Frontignan, the one last blown up being named La Pinede. At 8 P.M. we returned to the _Impérieuse_, with no other damage than being thoroughly encased in mud.

In the night we ran out about ten miles, having no confidence in the anchorage, and at daylight on the 19th again went in shore, carefully feeling our way by the lead, which showed us that the soundings were highly dangerous. We, nevertheless, came to an anchor off a place called Dumet, when we again out boats and destroyed another signal tower, together with four houses connected with it. At 2 P.M. we got under sail and bore up, joining the gun-boat to leeward. Supplying her with a new yard and bowsprit, her former spars being carried away, we sent her in shore.

On the 21st it fell so calm, that the _Impérieuse_ had to be brought to an anchor in Gulf Dumet. At 3 A.M. the boats were manned to destroy a building which we had been informed was a custom-house. This having been set fire to, they returned on board, and were shortly afterwards despatched to destroy another signal-station; but as troops were now perceived on the lookout, it was not worth while to risk the men, and the boats were recalled. We then got under sail, passing once more close to Montpelier and Cette, where we again joined the gun-boat, and stood into the Bay of Perpignan—forming the west portion of Marseilles Bay—where we destroyed another signal-station called Cañet.

At 3 A.M., on the 24th, the morning being still dark, we manned three boats to destroy another signal-station called St. Maguire, about three miles distant, and at about half-past four, when within ten yards of the beach, were saluted by two heavy guns with grape, which, passing over the boats, luckily did no damage. Fearing an ambuscade, we pulled out of reach of musketry, but calculating that the French would not venture far in the dark—my favourite time for attacks of any kind—instead of returning to the ship, we made straight for the signal-station, and blew it up amidst a dropping fire of musketry, which, as we could not be distinguished, failed in its direction, and consequently did no harm. Having completed our work, we next marched along the beach in line towards a battery, observed on the previous evening, skirmishing as we proceeded, our boats meanwhile covering us with their 9-pounders; the French also keeping up a constant fire with their guns, but in a wrong direction.

On storming the battery, with the usual British cheer, the enemy rushed out in an opposite direction, firing as they went, but without effect. We then took possession of two brass 24-pounders, but whilst making preparations to get them off were alarmed by recall guns from the frigate, from the masthead of which, as day was now beginning to break, a force of cavalry had been seen making for us over the crest of a hill.

We had already had one narrow escape, for on taking possession of the battery it was found that the magazine was prepared for blowing us up, but fortunately, in the hurry of its late occupants to escape, the match had not caught fire. There was, however, now no time to be lost, so placing a barrel of powder under each gun and setting fire to the matches, both were blown up, as was also the battery itself by lighting the match attached to the magazine.

This somewhat staggered the cavalry in pursuit, but they soon recovered, and some smart skirmishing took place on our retreat to the boats, which all the time maintained a well-directed fire on the enemy, keeping them in check, so that we got clear off with the loss of one seaman only—a gallant fellow named Hogan—who was blown up and terribly shattered, in consequence of a cartouch box buckled round his waist having exploded while setting fire to the trains. We otherwise arrived safe on board about 7 A.M., somewhat fatigued by the night’s adventure.

We now got under sail, passing close to Perpignan, and were fired upon from Point Vendré, where a French brig of war lay at anchor under the fortification, and therefore was too well protected to be safely interfered with.

In this cruise against the French signal stations, the precaution of obtaining their signal books before destroying the semaphores was adopted; and in order to make the enemy believe that the books also were destroyed, all the papers found were scattered about in a half-burnt condition. The trick was successful, and the French authorities, considering that the signal books had been destroyed also, did not deem it necessary to alter their signals, which were forwarded by me to Lord Collingwood, who was thus informed by the French semaphores, when re-established, of all the movements of their own ships, as well as of the British ships from the promontory of Italy northward!

CHAP. XVI.

CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_—CONTINUED.

THE FRENCH FLEET.—THE MOLE OF CIOTAT.—THE GULF OF FOZ.—TAKE POSSESSION
OF THE BATTERY.—SILENCE THE BATTERIES.—ANCHOR OFF CETTE.—DESPATCH
THE PRIZES.—HOW WE OBTAINED FRESH WATER.—DEMOLISH A
TELEGRAPH.—FRIGATE TO LEEWARD.—ORDERED TO GIBRALTAR.—INGRATITUDE OF
GOVERNMENT.—LETTER OF LORD COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER OF LORD COCHRANE.

On the 2nd of September the _Impérieuse_ rejoined the fleet off Toulon, and received orders from Lord Collingwood to renew operations on the enemy’s coasts. As the French, though by our previous operations, and by the spirit thereby inspired amongst the inhabitants, were disinclined to advance into Catalonia, they were nevertheless in considerable force in the neighbourhood of Figueras and Rosas, we therefore leisurely sailed in the direction of the latter port.

Keeping well in with the French coast, some gunboats were observed at 8 A.M. on the following morning close in with the town of Ciotat, between Toulon and Marseilles. One of these being somewhat detached, we hoisted out all boats in chase, but on the remaining gunboats and a battery on shore opening a heavy fire on them, they were recalled, and we cleared for action. At 10 A.M. six sail of French line-of-battle ships were observed to quit Toulon, but as they were far to leeward, there was nothing to apprehend from their interference; indeed after manœuvring for a short time, they returned to port, no doubt satisfied that the firing which had taken place was of little importance.

At 11 A.M. we anchored under an island, within range of our main deck guns, but in such a position as to shelter us from the fire of the battery, which, finding that their guns could not be brought to bear, commenced a constant discharge of shells; but as no accurate aim could be taken, these inflicted no damage, though occasionally dropping near us. Taking no notice of these, we out boats, and sending them to a point out of sight of the battery, commenced throwing rockets into the town, which was twice set on fire; but as the houses were for the most part built of stone, the conflagration was confined to the spot where it had broken out. Our reason for molesting the town was that the inhabitants everywhere showed themselves in arms to oppose us.

Finding the place impervious to rockets, and the ship being too far out for a successful cannonade, we got under weigh, and took up a position within range of the fort, on which we continued firing till 8 P.M., almost every shot falling in the place. As it now came on to blow hard from the N.W., we were obliged to anchor.

During the night the enemy had got up a large gun close to the lighthouse, and by 10 o’clock on the following morning, a squadron consisting of four line-of-battle ships and three frigates left Toulon and commenced beating up towards us. We therefore did not again open fire, being unwilling to excite the squadron to pursue us.

However, at 3 P.M., as a large settee was running into the mole of Ciotat, we discharged two shots at her, which went over and fell in the town. Upon this the mortar battery, seeing their squadron approaching, again opened fire, but, as before, without effect. We took no notice of this, but seeing the enemy manning the gun at the lighthouse, we beat to quarters, and prepared everything in case they should fire upon us, which was done at 4 P.M.

We again opened a heavy fire upon the town, every shot telling upon the houses, from which the inhabitants fled, no person being anywhere visible. At the expiration of an hour the lighthouse people left off firing, and the gun was pointed eastward to show that they did not intend to renew the conflict, upon which we ceased also, my object being not to batter the town, but to get possession of some of the numerous vessels anchored within the mole.

This purpose was, however, defeated by the perseverance of the Toulon squadron, the headmost ship of which—a fine frigate—was now within six miles of us, and coming up fast, supported by the others. We therefore thought best to get under weigh, and did so under the fire of batteries and mortars, none of which touched us. As soon as the enemy’s fleet saw us under sail, they bore up and again ran into Toulon.

On the 6th at midday, we anchored in the Bay of Marseilles, within half a mile from the shore, just out of range of the strongly fortified islands in the bay. Our appearance created the greatest alarm on the coast, from which people were hurrying with their movables beyond the reach of shot. We had, however, no intention to molest them.

The _Impérieuse_ was now becalmed till midday on the 7th, when a breeze springing up, we again got under sail, and exchanged signals with the _Spartan_, which shortly afterwards joined company. Having discovered three vessels lying in a small cove, we out boats, and brought out two of them, setting fire to the other. As the enemy had numerous troops ashore, they opened a brisk fire on the boats, and would probably have defeated our intention, had not the ships kept up a fire upon them whenever they approached. Thus aided, the boats lost only one man, with another wounded.

On the 8th the _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ stood towards the Gulf of Foz, where, seeing a number of troops placed for the defence of a signal telegraph, both ships manned boats, and in addition to the seamen, the marines of the _Impérieuse_ were sent with a nine-pounder field piece—one of our prizes from Duhesme’s army. On effecting a landing, the enemy’s troops retired to the interior, when, firing two volleys after them, the telegraph named Tignes was taken and blown up, the signals being secured as before.

On the 9th we passed close to Port Vendre, _Spartan_ in company, and anchored about a mile from the shore; but an alarm having been raised, and the troops on shore having got our range, we were at 3 A.M. on the 10th, compelled to shift our position.

Before daylight the boats of both ships were manned, and pulled on shore, a battery firing at us, but as the shot went over, no mischief was done. Our seamen and marines having landed to the right of the battery, the enemy’s troops fled, and we took possession, spiking the guns, destroying their carriages, and blowing up the barracks. These operations were scarcely completed, when a considerable body of troops made their appearance in the distance, and by the time we returned on board, a number of cavalry and artillery had assembled on the site of their demolished battery.

We now passed close to a small fishing town, where other guns were observed in position, both on the right and on the left, these being manned by regular troops and backed by hundreds of armed peasantry, who showed a bolder front than had the garrison of the battery recently destroyed. By way of feint, to draw off the attention of the cavalry, both _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ manned their small boats and the rocket boats with the ships’ boys, dressed in marines’ scarlet jackets, despatching these at some distance towards the right, as though an attack were there intended. The device was successful, and a body of cavalry, as we anticipated, promptly set off to receive them.

Meanwhile the ships stood towards the town, under a smart fire from the batteries, the shot from which several times took effect. When close in, the _Impérieuse_ opened her broadside, and the _Spartan_ following, an incessant fire was kept up for an hour, at the expiration of which the marines of both ships were landed. As soon as the boats touched the shore, the enemy fled from the battery, the guns of which were immediately spiked.

The cavalry, which had gone off to repel the sham attack to the right, having found out the trick which had been played upon them, were now seen galloping back to save the battery, which had just been rendered useless, and from which our marines were now re-embarking. So intent were they on rescuing their guns, that they did not appear to have noticed the altered position of the ships, which, as soon as the horsemen approached within musket shot, opened upon them with grape so effectually, that all who were not knocked out of their saddles rode off as fast as they could, and the marines leisurely returned to their respective ships.

As the French troops had now taken shelter in the town, and the people were everywhere armed, I returned to the _Impérieuse_ for the large boats, in each of which a gun was mounted, with the object of clearing the beach and silencing the other battery. By 6 o’clock this was accomplished, not only the battery, but many of the houses and vessels being destroyed. As our boats neared the town, a numerous body of troops again began a brisk fire with musketry; and by the time one of the largest vessels, which yet remained undemolished, could be blown up, the fire became so warm that it was advisable to cease from further operations, and we returned to the frigate.

In this affair a considerable number of people must have been killed ashore during the five hours and a half continued firing; the cavalry and infantry engaged amounting to several hundreds, whilst the armed inhabitants mustered in equal, if not superior numbers. Neither _Spartan_ nor _Impérieuse_ had any killed, and only a few wounded, though, from their proximity to the shore, the rigging of both ships was a good deal cut up, and several shots passed through their hulls. Besides the seamen, we had only fifty marines engaged, thirty from the _Impérieuse_, and twenty from the _Spartan_.

On the 11th at 8 P.M. we anchored off the town of Cette, just out of gunshot, the batteries on shore however maintaining a brisk fire, which was consequently thrown away.

At midnight two boats were despatched from the _Impérieuse_ and one from the _Spartan_, to throw rockets into the town, the batteries continuing their fire in all directions till daylight, but doing no damage.

At 4 A.M. on the 12th we got under weigh, and when within a mile of the shore, between Cette and Montpellier, sent the boats to burn two large pontoons, close to the signal station, which the _Impérieuse_ had attempted to destroy on the 18th _ultimo_. One of the pontoons was burned, and the other blown up without opposition, together with the signal station and other public buildings which we had not been able to destroy on the former occasion. A number of troops showed themselves, but were contented with firing at a harmless distance. As nothing more remained to be done, we again made sail.

On the morning of the 13th a convoy was discovered in shore. As soon as they saw us, the vessels composing it altered their course, and by 12 o’clock had taken refuge in a deep bay in the vicinity, it being, no doubt, calculated that we should not venture to pass over an extensive shoal, which almost closed up the entrance of the bay. By careful sounding we, however, managed to effect a passage, and three of the smaller vessels perceiving that we should attain our object, passed over the opposite end of the shoal and got away.

About midday it blew a hurricane, and both ships were rapidly driving towards shore, but by letting go another anchor they were brought up. In about a couple of hours the wind abated, when we weighed and anchored close to the remaining vessels, taking possession of the whole that remained, viz. a ship, two brigs, a bombard, a xebec, and a settee, but all aground. We, however, succeeded in getting off the ship, one brig, the bombard, and settee. The remainder were burned. During these operations a body of French troops lined the beach; we did not, however, attempt to molest them, as it was still blowing so hard that the prizes were with difficulty got off.

On the 16th we despatched some of the prizes to Gibraltar, and the remainder to Rosas. The _Spartan_ now parted company with us to rejoin the Toulon fleet, and the _Impérieuse_ held on her course for Rosas with the prize brig in tow, she having been so much damaged by beating on the shoals before she was captured, as to require the greatest exertion to keep her afloat.

On the 18th we came to an anchor off Rosas, and on the 23rd, having patched up our prize, she was sent to Gibraltar in charge of Lieutenant Mapleton.

On the 24th the _Impérieuse_ again sailed for the French coast, and passing Cette, stood into the Gulf of Foz.

In these cruises our greatest difficulty was to procure fresh water, which was only to be obtained on the enemy’s coast, so that the men had frequently to be placed on short allowance. As we were now destitute of this necessary, I determined to run for the entrance of the Rhone, and fill up with water by a novel expedient. Our foretopmast studding-sails were sewn up and converted into huge bags nearly watertight, these—as the water at the river’s mouth was brackish—were sent in the boats higher up the stream where it was pure. The bags being there filled, were towed alongside the ship, and the water pumped as quickly as possible into the hold by means of the fire engine, the operation being repeated till we had obtained a sufficient supply.

Having thus replenished our water, we made an attempt to obtain fresh meat also at the enemy’s expense. Whilst engaged in watering, a number of cattle had been observed grazing on the banks of the river, and a party was taken on shore to secure some. But this time circumstances were against us. The lowlands on the banks of the river having been flooded, we found on landing a complete morass; the men nevertheless gave chase to the cattle, but they were so wild, that after a run of three miles, often up to the middle in water, nothing was caught but the herdsman, a poor wretch, who no doubt believing, according to current report in France, that the English killed all their prisoners, began to prepare for death in the most exemplary manner, scarcely crediting the evidence of his senses on being liberated.

In this excursion we had perceived a new telegraph station, about three miles from Foz, the building being complete with the exception of the machine. We set fire to the building, but the destruction not being fully accomplished, the boats were again sent on shore to blow it up, which was done in the presence of about a hundred troops assembled for its protection. A shot from the ship was so well aimed that it fell right amongst the party, killing one man and wounding several. A few more shots completely dispersed them in such haste as to compel them to relinquish their dead comrade.

On inspecting the abandoned body through a glass, it evidently appeared to be that of an officer, and hence it occurred to me that he might have papers about him which would prove useful. In order to secure them, if there were any, the frigate’s barge was again despatched on shore, but before the men could land, a horse was brought from the interior, and the body being laid across him, a shot was fired from the ship over the heads of the party in charge of the horse, which becoming restive, the body was again abandoned. The boat’s crew having by this time landed, found it to be that of an officer, as I had conjectured, the poor fellow having been nearly cut in two by a round shot. As no papers of any consequence were found, our men wrapped him in a sheet which the troops had brought with the horse, and again returned on board.

The _Impérieuse_ continued her course along the coast, and on the 3Oth, seeing some small vessels at anchor near Boni, the boats were sent to destroy them. This being effected in the face of a detachment of troops and the armed population of a small fishing town, the latter also shared the same fate. Passing close to Boni, we saw several vessels at anchor, and made preparations to attack them, but it coming on to blow hard from the westward, we held on our course towards Marseilles, off which a large polacca-rigged ship passed astern of the _Impérieuse_, out of gunshot. The boats were lowered, but the wind increasing, they had to be taken on board again, and the polacca got into Marseilles, which was then distant about eight miles.

On the 1st of October we again passed close to Ciotat, but saw nothing to attract our attention. On the 2nd some French ships were discovered at anchor near the land to the westward of Toulon, and several guns were fired at us from four batteries on the coast, but without damage, as we were not within reach of shot.

Seeing a frigate to leeward, we exchanged numbers, and found her to be our former consort the _Spartan_, which had been engaged in reconnoitring the enemy’s port. Shortly afterwards she bore up and made all sail, the French line-of-battle ships quitting port in pursuit. When within about four miles of these we came to the wind, and the _Spartan_ signalled that, since the previous evening, five of the enemy’s frigates and a storeship had sailed from Toulon.

As the _Spartan_ again signalled for us to pass within hail, I went on board, and from the information communicated, bore up in search of the admiral. Not finding him where we expected to fall in with him, we ran with a fair wind for Minorca, arriving off Port Mahon on the 5th.

As there was only a Spanish ship of the line in harbour, we again proceeded in quest of the flagship, and soon after midday fell in with her on her way to Minorca. On communicating to Lord Collingwood intelligence of the escape of the five frigates from Toulon, his lordship ordered the _Impérieuse_ to Gibraltar with despatches. We therefore wore ship and made sail for that port, where we arrived without further incident.

For these operations on the coast of France I never received the slightest acknowledgment from the Admiralty, though, regardless of prize-money, I had completely disorganised the telegraphic communication of the enemy, from the seat of war in Catalonia to one of the principal naval arsenals of France; and had created an amount of terrorism on the French coast, which, from inculcating the belief that it was intended to be followed up, prevented the French Government from further attempts at throwing a military force on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. This, as has been said, was my object, as the Spaniards were now in alliance with us. For the panic thus created on the French coast, and its consequences, French writers have given me credit, but the British Government none!

By people of narrow views it has been said that such operations formed no business of mine, and that my zeal exceeded my discretion, which I deny. The commander-in-chief, Lord Collingwood—confiding in my discretion—had sent me to do what I could to assist the Spaniards and annoy the French—and I am proud to say that both objects were effected to his lordship’s satisfaction, as will appear from his letters. What damage can I do to the enemy? was my guiding principle, and the excitement of accomplishing the mischief was my only reward,—for I got no other.

To the disgrace of the then corrupt British administration, which withheld not only reward, but praise, because I had connected myself with a radical constituency, and had set up as a reformer of naval abuses, nothing was manifested in return for these services but hatred. I am proud, however, to make known the subjoined testimony of Lord Collingwood, who gave me the credit of paralysing the enemy’s operations by the panic which the _Impérieuse_ created on the coast of France; thus neutralising military expeditions intended to act against Catalonia, or, in other words, preventing, by means of a single frigate, the march of an army into the Mediterranean provinces of Spain, where it could at the time have operated with complete effect. Posterity may not believe the effect of these exertions as narrated by myself. To Lord Collingwood they _must_ give credit.

“Admiralty Office, Jan. 7th, 1809.

“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD,
_Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. WELLESLEY POLE, _dated on board the_
Ocean, _off Toulon, the 19th of October, 1808_.

“SIR,—I enclose a letter which I have just received from the Right
Honourable Lord Cochrane, captain of the _Impérieuse_, stating the
services in which he has been employed on the coast of Languedoc.
Nothing can exceed the zeal and activity with which his lordship
pursues the enemy. The success which attends his enterprises clearly
indicates with what skill and ability they are conducted, besides
keeping the coast in constant alarm—causing a general suspension of
the trade, and harassing a body of troops employed in opposing him. He
has probably prevented _these troops which were intended for Figueras
from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of
their own coasts_.

* * * * * * * *

“I have the honour to be, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”

(Enclosure.)

“_Impérieuse_, Gulf of Lyons, 28th Sept. 1808.

“MY LORD,—With varying opposition, but with unvaried success, the
newly constructed semaphoric telegraphs—which are of the utmost
consequence to the safety of the numerous convoys that pass along the
coast of France—at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan,
Canet, and Fay, have been blown up and completely demolished, together
with their telegraph houses, fourteen barracks of _gens d’armes_, one
battery, and the strong tower on the lake of Frontignan.

“Mr. Mapleton, first lieutenant, had command of these expeditions.
Lieutenant Johnson had charge of the field pieces, and Lieutenant Hore
of the Royal Marines. To them, and to Mr. Gilbert, assistant-surgeon,
Mr. Burney, gunner, Messrs. Houston Stewart[40] and Stoven,
midshipmen, is due whatever credit may arise from such mischief, and
for having, with so small a force, drawn about 2000 troops from the
important fortress of Figueras in Spain, for the defence of their own
coasts.

“The conduct of Lieutenants Mapleton, Johnston, and Hore, deserves my
praise, as well as that of the other officers, Royal Marines, and
seamen.

“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your obedient servant, &c.
“COCHRANE.

“Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood.”

_Impérieuse._—None killed, none wounded, one singed in blowing up the
battery.

_French._—One commanding officer of troops killed. How many others
unknown.

-----

Footnote 40:

The present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, commanding Her
Britannic Majesty’s squadron on the North American station.

-----

CHAP. XVII.

CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.

CAPTURE A SETTEE.—GET UNDER SAIL.—FIGHT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTS AND
FRENCH.—MAKE SAIL FOR ROSAS.—FORT TRINIDAD.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN
WEST.—BRAVERY OF THE CATALAN.—REPULSE OF THE FRENCH.—ATTACK OF THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—THE FRENCH REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS.—OCCUPATION OF
CATALONIA.—THE CASTLE OF TRINIDAD.—NATURE OF OUR POSITION.—NATURE OF
OUR OPERATIONS.—MANUFACTURE OF A MAN-TRAP.—LOSE MY NOSE.—THE FRENCH
ASSAULT ROSAS.—PRACTICE OF THE FRENCH.—PRESENTIMENT.—THE FRENCH
ATTACK.—THE ATTACK REPULSED.—BRAVERY OF A FRENCH SOLDIER.—HEAVY GALE
OF WIND.—UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT.—EVACUATE THE FORTRESS.—STAND TOWARDS
LA ESCALA.—LETTER FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD.—DESPATCH TO LORD
COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY.—TESTIMONY OF THE
SPANIARDS.—SIR WALTER SCOTT.—OFFICIAL GRATITUDE.

On the 19th of October we again quitted Gibraltar for the eastward, having learned that the French frigates which had succeeded in getting out of Toulon were at anchor in St. Fiorenzo bay, in the island of Corsica. After leaving Gibraltar, we stood over towards the Spanish possessions on the Barbary coast, and finding everything right there, passed on to the Zaffarine Islands, inside of which we anchored for the purpose of painting and refitting the ship, which stood much in need of renovation.

This being accomplished, we again sailed on the 29th, and on the 31st arrived in the harbour of Carthagena, where we found the Russian ambassador to Austria on his way to Trieste. No English man-of-war having been here since our former visit, we were received with great hospitality and attention by the authorities and inhabitants, who unanimously expressed their delight at being at peace with England; though, as a Spanish fleet lay dismantled in the harbour, it struck me that they might aid England to better purpose by looking after the enemy. Even their convoys had to be protected by English ships, for whilst we lay at Carthagena, the _Myrtle_ arrived from Tarragona, with twelve sail of transports which she had convoyed thither with Spanish troops from Lisbon, and again returned for more.

The _Impérieuse_ left Carthagena on the 10th of November, and rounding Cape Palos, passed between Majorca and the mainland, where, on the 11th, we captured a settee. On the 12th we anchored off Barcelona, which place was still in possession of the French. The _Cambrian_ was at anchor in the roads.

At night we sent the boats of the _Impérieuse_ to throw rockets into the fort, and at daylight on the following morning got under weigh, but perceiving two boats full of men in chase of some Spanish settees, we lowered ours, and pulled for the boats, which on seeing our intention, abandoned their prey, and ran in under the forts for protection.

On our arrival at Barcelona the _Cambrian_ went out for a run, leaving the _Impérieuse_ to watch the enemy. On her return we again out boats, and proceeded to blow up a fort close to the entrance of Llogrebat river, and succeeded in so far shattering its foundations, as to render it useless. On the 14th the _Impérieuse_ anchored near the mouth of this river for the purpose of watering, sending at the same time a boat to throw rockets into the barracks, in order to divert the attention of the Barcelona garrison.

Having completed watering on the 15th, we again got under sail, and resumed our position before the town, shortly after which we observed about 2000 of the French army march out and ascend the hills, where they soon became engaged with a large body of Spanish peasantry. The ships followed, keeping as far as practicable in shore; but still at too great a distance to render any material assistance to the patriots, who were at last forced from their position. As soon as this action was over, the batteries commenced firing shells at us. In place of replying to this, both ships opened a heavy fire on the portion of the town occupied by French troops, amongst whom, as we afterwards learned from the Spaniards, our shot told with great effect.

Irritated by this unexpected movement, the whole of the batteries ashore began to ply us with shot and shell, the latter of which were thrown with excellent precision as regarded their direction, but fell either over or short of us, two only bursting near the _Impérieuse_, but without doing us any harm. The _Cambrian_, lying a little farther out, escaped with similar impunity. With round shot the batteries were in our case more lucky, one of these passing through the barge and galley, and another striking the muzzle of a brass 32-pounder on the forecastle, in such a way as to render it useless, though without injury to the men who were at the time working the guns.

The circumstances under which the destruction of this gun was effected, are too curious to be passed over.

By an extraordinary coincidence the enemy’s shot entered the muzzle at the moment our men were firing it, so that the two shots met in the bore! The consequence was, that the gun was blown up nearly in the middle, the exterior being forced into a globular form—to our great annoyance, for this gun was one of our most useful weapons.

On the 17th another action took place between the mountaineers and a French force on the hills, the object of the patriots being to get possession of the heights, where the French had established a battery, but which on every side annoyed the _cordon_ of irregular troops employed in intercepting provisions, from which the Spaniards could not dislodge them, though they appeared to make their attacks with so much judgment and vigour as to compel the enemy to remain on the defensive. In the present case the attack was unsuccessful, the patriots being compelled to retire without accomplishing their object.

After this affair was concluded, several Spanish officers came on board the _Impérieuse_, and spoke confidently of being able to drive in the French advanced force as soon as General Reding’s force joined. They informed me that the presence of the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ had been of great use, by compelling the French to keep a considerable portion of their troops in the town, and to employ others in manning the coast batteries, so that few were available for operations elsewhere; but beyond this we had no opportunity of assisting the patriots, as the heights to which the enemy clung so tenaciously were beyond the reach of shot or shell from the ships.

On the 19th I received information of the French having invested Rosas, and knowing that Lord Collingwood attached considerable importance to this place, I considered it my duty, in accordance with his lordship’s instructions, to proceed in that direction, hoping that the _Impérieuse_ might there render substantial service; we therefore left the _Cambrian_ before Barcelona, and made sail for Rosas, where we arrived on the following day. As it fell calm, the ship was compelled to anchor ten miles from the fortress.

On our arrival a heavy cannonade was going on between the ships and a French battery thrown up on the cliff above Fort Trinidad. The _Impérieuse_, as has been said, being out of range, I took the gig and landed in the town, to ascertain how we might best employ ourselves. Having satisfied myself on this point, I sent back the gig with orders for the frigate to make every effort to get within range of the French troops surrounding the town, so as to enfilade them. As the calm continued, she was, however, unable to approach till the following day, I meanwhile remaining in Rosas, to encourage the Spanish troops, whose spirit was beginning to give way.

Previous to our arrival the marines of the _Excellent_, together with some Spanish troops, had occupied the citadel. Many of these having been wounded, the _Excellent_ took upwards of forty on board and sailed, leaving the _Fame_ to watch the place, and her commander withdrew some thirty marines, who, with sixty or seventy Spaniards, occupied Fort Trinidad. The departure of the _Excellent_ in the first place, and the withdrawal of the marines in the second, greatly dispirited the Spaniards, who on the evening of the 21st began to quit the town in boats.

A brief outline of what had occurred previous to my arrival in the _Impérieuse_, will here be requisite, in order to comprehend the events which followed. On the 6th of November a body of 6000 French, or rather Italians, coming from Figueras, had taken possession of the town and the heights commanding the roads. The inhabitants forthwith fled; but the _Excellent_ and _Meteor_, then lying in the harbour, speedily drove out the invaders.

On the assault of the town some of the inhabitants had fled to the citadel, which was in a wretched condition, one of its bastions having been blown down during the last war; and such had been the negligence of the Spanish military authorities, that it had received no better repair than a few planks and loose stones; whilst the stores were even in a more wretched condition than the works. It was, however, necessary to put it, as far as possible, in a defensible condition, and to this Captain West, of the _Excellent_, energetically applied himself.

To the eastward of the town, on an eminence commanding the harbour, stood Fort Trinidad, of which a description will presently be given. In this fortress Captain West placed five-and-twenty of the _Excellent’s_ marines, in addition to the Spaniards who manned the fort; and, at the same time, sent fifty seamen into the citadel to support the garrison.

The Spanish governor, O’Daly, now sent a request to the Junta of Gerona for reinforcements; but the French, managing to intercept his despatches, caused it to be reported to the Junta that the English had taken forcible possession of the fortress, and deposed the governor; whereupon, in place of sending reinforcements, the Junta wrote to Captain West, demanding an explanation of conduct so extraordinary, and, till this explanation revealed the trick, it remained undiscovered.

On the 9th the citadel was attacked by General Reille, and a breach effected; but Captain West, placing the _Meteor_ in a position to flank the breach, and sending some boats to enfilade the shore, prevented the assault, and despatching more seamen to the citadel, the next day it was again in a tolerably defensive state, so much so that Captain West had sallied out with the seamen and effected the rescue of a party of Catalonian militia.

The French commander, thus foiled by the gallantry and judgment of Captain West, now deemed it necessary to proceed against Rosas by regular siege, but first made an attempt to storm Fort Trinidad, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss; but the fort was so much in danger that, in order to prevent surprise, Captain West reinforced it with thirty additional marines, who entered by means of rope ladders.

The French now, despite opposition from the ships, began to erect batteries on the heights for the demolition of Fort Trinidad, and threw up an entrenchment 300 yards from the citadel, for the purpose of breaching that also. A 3-gun battery opened against the town walls, and the joint effect of these being occasionally directed against the ships compelled them to retire out of range.

Captain West was now superseded by Captain Bennett of the _Fame_, and, as a breach had nearly been effected in the lower bomb proof of Fort Trinidad, Captain Bennett withdrew the marines. At this juncture I arrived at Rosas in the _Impérieuse_, having, indeed, come there to render what assistance I could to the Spaniards, and, knowing the endurance, as well as indomitable bravery of the Catalan or _Michelet_[41] character; feeling, moreover, assured that the Junta of Gerona would supply early assistance, I determined to replace the marines which Captain Bennett had withdrawn, with others from my own frigate. As it was generally known amongst vessels on the Mediterranean station that I was acting under discretionary orders from Lord Collingwood, Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, and notwithstanding that he was my senior officer, did not attempt to thwart my resolution, probably because he considered that by so doing he might be interfering with the instructions given me by Lord Collingwood.

-----

Footnote 41:

A name given at this period to the irregular Catalonian troops, as
well as to other Spaniards embodied with them, from one of their old
leaders, Michelet de Prato, the companion of Cæsar Borgia, and the
principal agent in many of his atrocities. In the old wars of Arragon,
they were called Almogavares, and at the period of which I write had
lost little of their traditional daring, or that ready ingenuity in
difficulties, which supplied the want of a more efficient warlike
equipment.

-----

On the 22nd, after having given further instructions on board the _Impérieuse_ for annoying the enemy during my absence, I again went on shore to the citadel, into which the French were incessantly throwing shells, but without much effect; for although every shell fell within the place, the shelter was excellent, and no great damage was done.

Having ascertained the position of the enemy’s entrenchments, I returned on board, and despatched a party from the frigate to fire upon them at the distance of about 600 yards, as well as to harass the batteries in course of construction. The work was so well performed by our men as to embarrass the troops in the batteries, and thus lessen their fire on the citadel, the preservation of which, till further assistance should arrive, was my principal object. A battery of 24-pounders on the top of a cliff, and therefore inaccessible to our fire, kept up, however, an unremitting fire on Fort Trinidad, every shot striking; but the fort being bomb-proof, without injury to the little garrison, which, like that of the citadel, was well sheltered, but had no means of returning the fire except occasionally by musketry.

After pounding away at the fort for several days, the French made up their minds to storm, but on coming within range of musket-shot, they got such a reception from the garrison as to render a hasty retreat imperative. As their discomfiture was visible from the ship, we fired a salute of twenty-one guns by way of sarcastic compliment, but the enemy had not the politeness to return the courtesy.

The _Impérieuse_ now got under weigh, and cleared for action, taking up a position to the left of the citadel, and within musket-shot of the French lines, into which we poured such a storm of shot as to drive out the enemy. Satisfied with the success, I went on shore at Rosas, and got 700 Spaniards to embark in the boats, afterwards putting them on board a light vessel, with the intention of landing them at the back of Fort Trinidad, so as to dislodge the troops from the battery on the cliff, and throw the guns over. The movement was, however, detected by the French commander, and a force which had just been engaged at a distance was hastily recalled, and rushed on, driving the Spaniards and some Germans before them. Manning the batteries, the French instantly turned their attention to the _Impérieuse_, against which they directed such a well-aimed shower of shells as rendered it imperative to get under sail and anchor out of range.