Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (9)

The firing between the batteries and the citadel was kept up during the night without intermission, and at daylight the Spaniards we had landed for the attack on the cliff battery appeared in such confusion, that it became necessary to despatch the boats to bring off a party of marines, who had been put on shore with them. Our men reported that the Spaniards had unaccountably refused to follow them to the attack, and, as is usual in such cases, had suffered far more severely than they would have done had they persevered in the attempt to capture the battery. On sending boats to bring off the Spaniards we only got 300 out of the 700, the remainder being either killed or made prisoners.

On the 23rd we again ran in under Fort Trinidad, but this time on the opposite side to the battery on the cliff, where we could effect considerable mischief, without receiving much in return. It now fell dead calm, so that it was lucky we had not taken up our former position, where we might have been terribly annoyed.

The French, without paying much attention to us, now appeared to redouble their efforts against both castle and citadel, whilst their troops mustered strongly on the hills, with the evident intention of an attack on both, the moment a breach became practicable.

Finding this to be the case, the _Fame_ withdrew her marines from Fort Trinidad, upon which I went ashore, and after careful inspection of the breach in course of formation, considering it still capable of prolonged defence, begged the commandant to hold out till next day, when he should be reinforced with marines from the _Impérieuse_, promising at the same time to remain myself in the fortress with the men. With some difficulty he was induced to consent to this arrangement, after telling me that it had been his intention to capitulate on the same evening.

Nor was the Spanish governor at all to blame for his intention to surrender the fortress. Captain Bennett had withdrawn his men, thinking, no doubt, that it was untenable, and that therefore nothing was to be gained by their exposure; so that the Spanish governor might fairly plead that further resistance had been deemed unavailing by the English themselves.

Lord Collingwood had, however, entrusted me with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards, and it appeared to me that the present was an instance where those orders might be carried into effect, for I had no doubt, if assistance arrived promptly, that the French would be compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, as they had done that of Gerona. In which case they would find themselves isolated at Barcelona; and being cut off, as they already were by land, and exposed to bombardment by sea, must surrender. The occupation of Catalonia, in short, turned on two points; 1st, whether the Junta of Gerona supplied an adequate reinforcement; and, 2ndly, whether I could hold Fort Trinidad till it arrived. Neither do I blame Captain Bennett for withdrawing his men. It was simply matter of opinion, his being that neither fort nor citadel would long hold out—mine, formed on actual inspection of the fort, that it was still in a condition to maintain itself, and being so, that its retention was essential for the preservation of the town and citadel. And had there been a little more alacrity on the part of the Gerona Junta in supplying reinforcements, that opinion would have been justified. Captain Bennett perhaps knew the dilatory habits of the Spaniards better than I did; but although my senior officer, he was disinterested enough not in any way to interfere with my plans.

Before daylight on the 24th we landed fifty men, ordering all the marines to follow after sunset. Our first object was to effect such repairs as would put the fort in a better state of defence, and this was accomplished without any great difficulty, as the French were confining their attention to one particular spot, where, by a constant succession of quick firing, they hoped to make a practicable breach. This we could not prevent, having no artillery to reply to theirs.

My principal ground for a belief in the practicability of holding the fort arose from the peculiar form and thickness of the walls, to penetrate which was no easy matter, if resolutely defended. Even if eventually successful, it would not be difficult to evacuate the fort by the lower portion, before the enemy could establish themselves in the upper, whilst a well constructed mine would involve both them and the castle in one common ruin.

The Castle of Trinidad stood on the side of a hill, having by no means a difficult descent to the sea, but this hill was again commanded by a higher and more precipitous cliff, which would have enabled an enemy to drive out the occupants with ease, but for the peculiar construction of the fortress.

Next to the sea was a fort constructed with strong walls some 50 feet high. Behind this and joined to it, rose another fort to the height of 30 or 40 feet more, and behind this again was a tower rising some 20 or 30 feet still higher, the whole presenting the appearance of a large church with a tower 110 feet high, a nave 90 feet high, and a chancel 50 feet. The tower, having its back to the cliff, as a matter of course sheltered the middle and lower portions of the fortress from a fire of the battery above it. Nothing, in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent heights could have been better adapted for holding out against offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them; this on our part being out of the question, as the French battery was too much elevated on the cliff for artillery to reach, whilst the tower which prevented their shot from annoying us, would also have prevented our firing at them, even had we possessed artillery.

It was to this tower therefore that the French chiefly directed their attention, as a practicable breach therein, followed by a successful assault, would in their estimation place the fortress at their mercy, so that we must either be driven out or forced to surrender. In consequence of the elevated position of the enemy’s battery on the cliff, they could however only breach the central portion of the tower, the lowest part of the breach being nearly sixty feet above its base, so that when practicable, it could only be reached by long scaling ladders.

A pretty correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the unnautical reader will imagine our small force to be placed in the nave of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western tower from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower, so that the breach in course of formation nearly corresponded to the great west window of the abbey. It will hence be clear that, in the face of a determined opposition, it would be no easy matter to scale the external wall of the tower up to the great west window, and more difficult still to overcome impediments presently to be mentioned, so as to get down into the body of the church. These were the points I had to provide against, for we could neither prevent the French from breaching nor storming.

It so happened, that just at the spot where the breach was in process of formation, there was a lofty bomb proof interior arch, upwards of fifty feet in height. This arch, reaching from the lower part of the breach to the interior base of the tower, was without much difficulty converted into an obstacle, of which the French little dreamed; viz. into a chasm, down which they must have plunged headlong had they attempted to penetrate an inch beyond the outer wall, even after they had gained it.

The only operation necessary was to break in the crown of the arch, so that all who on an assault ventured on penetrating farther than the outer wall of the breach, must of necessity be hurled to the bottom. But as the fall of a portion of the enemy might not deter the rest from holding possession of the outer wall till they were provided with the means of overcoming the obstacle, I got together all the timber at hand, and constructed a huge wooden case, exactly resembling the hopper of a mill—the upper part being kept well greased with cooks’ slush from the _Impérieuse_, so that to retain a hold upon it was impossible. Down this, with the slightest pressure from behind, the storming party must have fallen to a depth of fifty feet, and all they could have done, if not killed, would have been to remain prisoners at the bottom of the bomb proof.

The mantrap being thus completed,—and to do the Spaniards justice, they entered with ardour into the work,—the next object was to prepare trains for the explosion of the magazines, in case evacuation of the fort became compulsory. This was done in two places; the first deposit of powder being placed underneath the breach, with the portfire so arranged, as to go off in about ten minutes; the other beneath the remaining part of the fortress, with a portfire calculated to burn until we ourselves were safe on board the frigate.

The French were highly exasperated on finding that the castle had been reinforced from the _Impérieuse_, of which ship they had by this time not a few unpleasant reminiscences; they therefore adopted additional measures to put a stop to our co-operation.

In addition to the previously mentioned battery, another was erected on the cliff commanding the fortress; and on the 25th, upwards of 300 shots were directed at the tower, the result being a hole, which speedily widened into a tolerable breach. Our men were now engaged in blocking it up as fast as it was made, and working as they did under cover, no loss was sustained, though every shot brought down large masses of stone within the fortress; the French thus supplying us with materials for repair, though rendering a sharp look-out against splinters necessary.

On this day I received a wound, which caused me intolerable agony. Being anxious, during an ominous pause, to see what the enemy were about, I incautiously looked round an angle of the tower towards the battery overhead, and was struck by a stone splinter in the face; the splinter flattening my nose and then penetrating my mouth. By the skill of our excellent doctor, Mr. Guthrie, my nose was after a time rendered serviceable.

Whilst the enemy were breaching the tower, the boats of the _Impérieuse_ inflicted on them such severe chastisement, that detachments of infantry were stationed on the hills to drive off the boats with musketry; but our people managed to keep out of harm’s way, whilst directing a destructive fire upon the nearer portion of our opponents.

On the 26th the French renewed their fire; but as during the previous night we had filled up the breach with loose rubble, their progress was by no means rapid, the rubble forming almost as great an obstacle as did the wall itself. It was, however, evident that the breach must sooner or later become practicable, so that we turned our attention to the erection of interior barricades, in case of a sudden attempt to storm. In addition to these barricades festoons of top chains were brought from the ship, and suspended over the hopper and elsewhere; the chains being moreover armed with large fishhooks, so securely fastened, that there was little danger of those who were caught, getting away before they were shot.

The barricades constituted what may be termed a rampart within the breach, constructed of palisades, barrels, bags of earth, &c., these supplying the place of walls, whilst the descent from the crown of the bombproof to the bottom, constituted a formidable substitute for a ditch.

We got to-day a trifling though welcome reinforcement of sixty regular Spanish, or rather Irish troops in the Spanish service, and sent an equal number of peasants to Rosas; for though these men were brave, as are all Catalans, and ready enough, yet their want of military skill rendered them ill adapted to the work in hand. As soon as the Irish comprehended our means of defence, and the reception prepared for the enemy, their delight at the prospective mischief was highly characteristic, and could not have been exceeded had they been preparing for a “scrimmage” in their native country.

At midnight the French made a general assault on the town of Rosas, and after several hours’ hard fighting obtained possession. The _Impérieuse_ and _Fame_ now approached, and commenced a fire which must have caused great loss to the besiegers, but which failed to dispossess them. Towards morning—when too late—a detachment of 2000 Spanish troops arrived from Gerona! Six hours earlier would have saved the town, the preservation of which was the only object in retaining the fortress.

The practice of the French when breaching the walls of Rosas, was beautiful. So skilfully was their artillery conducted, that, to use a schoolboy similitude, every discharge “ruled a straight line” along the lower part of the walls; this being repeated till the upper portion was without support, as a matter of course, the whole fell in the ditch, forming a breach of easy ascent. This operation constituted an object of great interest to us in the fortress, from which the whole proceedings were clearly visible.

Having secured the town, the French redoubled their efforts against the castle, and had they continued with the same vigour, we must have been driven out. Two of our marines were killed by shot, as was a third by a stone splinter, so that with all my desire to hold out, I began to doubt the propriety of sacrificing men to the preservation of a place which could not be long tenable.

The French being also heartily tired of the loss they were sustaining from the fire of the ships and boats, sent us a flag of truce, with the offer of honourable capitulation. This being declined on our part, the firing recommenced more heavily than before.

On the 28th the fire of the enemy slackened, their troops being engaged in throwing up intrenchments and constructing batteries in the town, a second detachment of Spanish troops being on its way now that the place had fallen. Soon after midday they sent a small party with another flag of truce. As it was, however, evident that their object was this time to spy out the state of our defences, we threw some hand grenades towards them, to show that we would not hold any parley, on which they retired, and the firing was again renewed.

On the 29th the French opened upon the castle from five different batteries on the hills, but without damage to life, as our men were now kept close. The ships and bombs, however, directed upon them a destructive fire with shot and shell, which considerably damped their ardour. To-day all access to the citadel was cut off, the French having succeeded in erecting batteries on both sides the sea gates, so that all communication with the boats was rendered impossible.

The dawn of the 30th might have been our last, but from the interposition of what some persons may call presentiment. Long before daylight I was awoke with an impression that the enemy were in possession of the castle, though the stillness which prevailed showed this to be a delusion. Still I could not recompose myself to sleep, and after lying for some time tossing about, I left my couch, and hastily went on the esplanade of the fortress. All was perfectly still, and I felt half ashamed of having given way to such fancies.

A loaded mortar, however, stood before me, pointed, during the day, in such a direction that the shell should fall on the path over the hill which the French must necessarily take whenever they might make an attempt to storm. Without other object than that of diverting my mind from the unpleasant feeling which had taken possession of it, I fired the mortar. Before the echo had died away, a volley of musketry from the advancing column of the enemy showed that the shell had fallen amongst them, just as they were on the point of storming.

Rushing on, their bullets pattered like hail on the walls of the fort. To man these was the work of a moment; for, as may be supposed, our fellows did not wait for another summons, and the first things barely discernible amidst the darkness were the French scaling ladders ready to be placed at the foot of the breach, with an attendant body of troops waiting to ascend, but hesitating, as though the unexpected shell from our mortar rendered them uncertain as to our preparations for defence. To the purposeless discharge of that piece of ordnance we owed our safety, for otherwise they would have been upon us before we even suspected their presence; and so exasperated were they at our obstinate defence, that very little attention would have been paid to any demand for quarter. The French deserved great credit for a silence in their movements which had not even attracted the attention of the sentries on the tower.

Whilst the enemy were hesitating, we became better prepared, our men being ready at every point which commanded the breach. It was not in the nature of the French to slink off on being detected. In a few minutes on they came up the ladders, to the certainty of getting either into the mantrap, or of being hurled from the walls as fast as they came up, retreat being for a short time impossible, on account of the pressure from behind. There was now just light enough for them to see the chasm before them, and the wall was crowded with hesitating men. About forty had gained the summit of the breach, all of whom were swept off with our fire; whilst a crowd was waiting below for the chance of sharing the same fate. Giving them no time for deliberation, several shells which had been suspended by ropes half-way down the wall, were ignited, our hand grenades were got to work, and these, together with the musketry, told fearfully on the mass—which wavered for a few moments, and then retreated amidst the loud huzzas of our fellows. The French, however, gallantly carried off their wounded, though they were compelled to leave the dead, who, till the following morning, lay in a heap close to the foot of the tower.

Scarcely had we got rid of our assailants, when a numerous body of troops came down from the hills with muskets firing and drums beating, nothing doubting that their comrades were in possession of the fortress. Our lads, having their hands now free, returned their fire with excellent effect, dropping some at every discharge; when at length, finding that the assault had failed, and that we were able to offer effectual resistance, the detachment retreated up the hills as fast as they could, amidst the derisive cheering of our men.

The force which formed the storming party, consisted, as we afterwards learned from our prisoners, of one company of grenadiers, two of carabineers, and four of the voltigeurs of the 1st Light Regiment of Italy, in all about 1200 men. They were gallantly led, two of the officers attracting my especial attention. The first was dropped by a shot, which precipitated him from the walls, but whether he was killed or only wounded, I do not know, probably wounded only, as his body was not seen by us amongst the dead. The other was the last man to quit the walls, and before he could do so, I had covered him with my musket. Finding escape impossible, he stood like a hero to receive the bullet, without condescending to lower his sword in token of surrender. I never saw a braver or a prouder man. Lowering my musket, I paid him the compliment of remarking, that so fine a fellow was not born to be shot down like a dog, and that, so far as I was concerned, he was at liberty to make the best of his way down the ladder; upon which intimation he bowed as politely as though on parade, and retired just as leisurely.

In this affair we had only three men killed—one of the marines and two Spaniards, another Spaniard being shot through the thigh and the Spanish governor of the fortress through the hand; there were, however, a few minor casualties. The total loss of the enemy, judging from the dead left behind—upwards of fifty—must have been severe. My determination not to quit the fortress was therefore increased, as there was every reason to be satisfied with the efficacy of my hopper trap and fish-hook chains. In short, it was impossible for any one to get over the one or through the other. Not a Frenchman had advanced beyond the outer wall.

After this the enemy did not molest us much, except with musketry, which did no damage, as our men were well under cover. They, however, turned their attention to the citadel, the Spanish garrison replying smartly to their fire. The Spaniards with us in the castle likewise behaved with great gallantry, as did the soldiers of the Irish brigades in the Spanish service, by whom the peasants before mentioned had been supplanted. Had the latter remained, the repulse of our assailants might have been more difficult, though equally certain.

On the 1st of December we passed a tolerably quiet day, the French being engaged in erecting a new battery, to annoy our boats when coming on shore, with which they appeared to content themselves.

The 2nd passed over in the same quiet way.

On the 3rd the troops in the citadel made a sortie, apparently in the hope of dislodging the French from their intrenchments, and an obstinate engagement ensued, with considerable loss on both sides. By the time this was over, our friends on the hill had nearly completed another new battery, and were trying its effect on us somewhat unpleasantly, every shot knocking down great quantities of stone. A still more unpleasant circumstance was, that a heavy gale of wind had arisen, before which the _Impérieuse_ was visibly dragging her anchors, and might be compelled to go to sea, leaving us to defend ourselves till her return.

On the 4th, the French opened all their batteries on the citadel, eleven of their guns being brought to bear upon the old breach elsewhere mentioned as never having been properly repaired. At this point an immense number of shot and shell were directed, and towards night a breach was nearly practicable. This operation against the citadel seeming decisive, the new battery on the hill began upon us in the castle with redoubled vengeance, and every shot told with effect; the object no doubt being to storm both fortresses simultaneously on the following day.

An unfortunate accident occurred in the castle to-day. Five of our men were loading a gun, intended for employment against a body of French troops, who were throwing up an intrenchment below us, with the evident object of cutting us off from retreat or communication with the frigate; by some mischance the gun exploded, blowing off the arms of a marine, who died soon after, and knocking a seaman over the castle wall, a depth of fifty feet. The poor fellow was taken up by the boat’s crew, and carried on board in a dreadfully shattered condition.

At daylight on the 5th, the French again opened their batteries on the citadel, and by 8 A.M. the breach was quite practicable. A large body of troops had assembled for the assault, but the firing suddenly ceased on both sides, and from the number of men lounging about the breach, it was clear that a capitulation was in progress. Under these circumstances it became my duty not to sacrifice our marines and seamen to the mere excitement of fighting a whole army which could now pay us undivided attention. We therefore began to think of taking our departure, and getting our baggage collected, we made signals to the _Impérieuse_ for all boats to be in readiness to take us off, if the garrison in the citadel should capitulate. The battery, however, continued firing upon us as usual, and with decisive effect on the tower. Without taking any notice of this, we laid trains ready for blowing up the fort.

Soon after our signals were made, the _Fame_ and _Magnificent_—the latter of which had recently come into the anchorage—got under weigh and beat towards the landing-place. Our signals having been also understood by the French, the batteries overhead ceased firing, and a number of troops approached to take possession. At 11 A.M. we made the signal for the boats—the _Impérieuse_ attending them close in shore.

We now commenced evacuating the fortress, sending down the troops of the Bourbon regiment first; the Irish brigade next, and our marines and seamen last. On the boats pulling in, the ships opened fire with shot and shell upon the French. We did not, however, receive any molestation from the latter, whilst our men went down the rope ladders out of the fort, and by one o’clock all were out of the castle except the gunner and myself, we having remained to light the portfires attached to the trains.

After this we got into the boats also unopposed, but the moment they pulled off from the shore the French opened upon us with musketry and round shot, fortunately without injury to any one. A stiff breeze now blowing, enabled the _Impérieuse_ to get close in, so that we were soon on board.

The French having become practically acquainted with some of our devices were on their guard, and did not take possession of the castle immediately on our quitting it, and it was lucky for them that they did not, for shortly after we got on board the first explosion took place, blowing up the portion of the fortress which they had been breaching; but the second train failed, owing, no doubt, to the first shock disarranging the portfire. Had not this been the case, scarcely one stone of the castle would have remained on another.

In the evening I directed the _Impérieuse_ to get under weigh and stand towards La Escala, where we landed the Spanish troops. On the following morning the _Fame_ parted company for Lord Collingwood’s fleet; and leaving the _Magnificent_ at anchor with the bombs, we stood towards San Felin, having the mortification of seeing the French flag flying over what remained of the Castle of Trinidad, which we had so pertinaciously endeavoured to defend, and failing in this, should have wholly destroyed but for the accident of the second portfire becoming out of order.

In the defence of this fortress, we lost only three killed and seven wounded; the loss of the Spaniards amounting to two killed and five wounded. Next to the thorough accomplishment of the work in hand my care was for the lives of the men. Indeed, it is matter of congratulation to me that no commander having gone through such service ever had fewer men killed. Lord St. Vincent on a former occasion gave this as a reason for not promoting my officers, but even a rebuff so unworthy failed to induce me to depart from my system of taking care of the men, the death of one of whom would have affected me more than the death of a hundred enemies, because it would, in my estimation, have been attributable to my own want of foresight.

The destruction of the French must have been very great. We who were cooped up in the fortress had only one collision with them, but in that they suffered fearfully, whilst we escaped scot free. But the fire of the ships must have told upon them to a great extent.

The subjoined letters from Lord Collingwood to the Secretary of the Admiralty constitute the only commendations I received for the services detailed in the preceding chapters.

_Extract of a letter from_ VICE-ADMIRAL LORD COLLINGWOOD _to the_ HON.
W. W. POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean, _Dec. 14, 1808_.

“My letter of the 1st instant would inform you of the enemy having
laid siege to the castle of Rosas, and of the measures taken by the
British ships in that bay in aid of the Spaniards for its defence. The
_Scout_ joined the squadron off Toulon on the 7th, and by her I
received further accounts from Captain Bennett, of the _Fame_, of the
progress the enemy was making against that important fortress.

“Captain Lord Cochrane has maintained himself in the possession of
Trinity castle with great ability and heroism. Although the fort is
laid open by the breach in its works, he has sustained and repelled
several assaults, having formed a sort of rampart within the breach
with his ship’s hammock cloths, awnings, &c., filled with sand and
rubbish. _The zeal and energy with which he has maintained that
fortress excites the highest admiration. His resources for every
exigency have no end._ The Spanish governor of the castle is wounded
and on board the _Meteor_.

“COLLINGWOOD.”

This expression of opinion on the part of Lord Collingwood should have procured me some commendation from the Naval authorities at home; the more so as it was spontaneous on his lordship’s part, no official despatch from me on the subject having at that time reached him. I was, however, a black sheep at the Admiralty, and, had it been my good fortune to have been instrumental in raising the siege of Rosas, the only care taken by the Tory Government at home would, in all probability, have been how to conceal a knowledge of the fact from the public. After the evacuation and destruction of the fortress I addressed to Lord Collingwood the subjoined despatch.

“H. M. Ship _Impérieuse_, Bay of Rosas,
5th Dec. 1808.

“MY LORD,—The fortress of Rosas being attacked by an army of Italians
in the service of France (in pursuance of discretionary orders which
your lordship gave me, to assist the Spaniards whenever it could be
done with most effect), I hastened here. The citadel on the 22nd
instant was already half invested, and the enemy was making his
approaches towards the south-west bastion, which your lordship knows
was blown down last war by the explosion of a magazine and tumbled
into the ditch; a few thin planks and dry stones had been put up by
the Spanish engineers, perhaps to hide the defect; all things were in
the most deplorable state without and within; even measures for their
powder and saws for their fuses were not to be had, and mats and axes
supplied their place. The castle of Trinity, situated on an eminence,
but commanded by heights, was also invested. Three 24-pounders
battered in breach, to which a fourth was afterwards added, and a
passage through the wall to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected
on the 23rd, the marines of the _Fame_ were withdrawn. I went to
examine the state of the castle, and, as the senior officer in the bay
had not officially altered the orders I received from your lordship, I
thought this a good opportunity, by occupying a post on which the
acknowledged safety of the citadel depended, to render them an
effectual service. The remaining garrison consisted of about eighty
Spaniards, who were on the point of surrendering; accordingly, I threw
myself into the fort with fifty seamen and thirty marines of the
_Impérieuse_. The arrangements I made need not be detailed to your
lordship; suffice it to say, that about a thousand bags (made of old
sails), besides barrels and palisades, supplied the place of walls and
ditches, and that the enemy, who assaulted the castle on the 30th with
full 1000 picked men, were repulsed with the loss of their commanding
officer, storming equipage, and all who had attempted to mount the
breach. The Spanish garrison having been changed, gave good
assistance. As to the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, the
fatigues they underwent, and the gallant manner in which they behaved,
deserve every praise. I must, however, particularly mention Lieutenant
Johnson, of the navy, Lieutenant Hoare, of the marines, Mr. Burney,
the gunner, Mr. Lodowick, the carpenter, and Messrs. Stewart, Sloven,
and Marryat, midshipmen.

“Captain Hall, of the _Lucifer_, at all times and in every way gave
his zealous assistance. I feel also indebted to Captain Collens, of
the _Meteor_, for his aid.

“The citadel of Rosas capitulated at twelve o’clock this day. Seeing,
my lord, farther resistance in the castle of Trinity useless, and
impracticable against the whole army, the attention of which had
naturally turned to its reduction; after firing the trains for
exploding the magazines, we embarked in the boats of the
_Magnificent_, _Impérieuse_, and _Fame_.

“I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.

“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”

LORD COLLINGWOOD’S _Letter to the Admiralty._

“H.M. Ship _Ocean_, Jan. 7. 1809.

“SIR,—The _Impérieuse_ having with other ships been employed in the
Bay of Rosas, to assist the Spaniards in defending that fortress, and
Captain Lord Cochrane having taken on himself the defence of Trinity
Castle, an outwork of that garrison, I have received from him a
letter, dated the 5th of December, a copy of which is enclosed,
stating the surrender of Rosas by the Spaniards on that day, and of
his having embarked the garrison of Trinity Castle on board his ship
from the castle destroyed.

“The heroic spirit and ability which have been evinced by Lord
Cochrane in defending this castle, although so shattered in its works,
against the repeated attacks of the enemy, is an admirable instance of
his lordship’s zeal; and the distinguished conduct of Lieutenants
Johnson and Hoare, of the Royal Marines, and the officers and men
employed in this affair under his lordship, will, doubtless, be very
gratifying to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

(Signed, &c.) “COLLINGWOOD.

“To the Secretary of the Admiralty.”

To these despatches I may be pardoned for appending the following extract from the _Gerona Gazette_, as it appeared in the Naval Chronicle of 1809.

LORD COCHRANE.

The Spanish _Gerona Gazette_, when inserting a letter from Lord
Cochrane, January 1, 1809, subjoins the following liberal testimony to
his noble conduct:—

“This gallant Englishman has been entitled to the admiration and
gratitude of this country from the first moment of its political
resurrection. His generosity in co-operating with our earliest
efforts, the encouragement we received from the interest he took with
the commanders of the Balearic islands, to induce them to succour us
with troops and ammunition, can never be erased from our recollection.
The extraordinary services which we owe to his indefatigable activity,
particularly this city and the adjacent coast, in protecting us from
the attempts of the enemy, are too well known to be repeated here. It
is a sufficient eulogium upon his character to mention, that in the
defence of the castle of Trinidad, when the Spanish flag, hoisted on
the wall, fell into the ditch, under a most dreadful fire from the
enemy, his lordship was the only person who, regardless of the shower
of balls flying about him, descended into the ditch, returned with the
flag, and happily succeeded in placing it where it was.”

Without any degree of egotism, I may—considering that no praise beyond Lord Collingwood’s was ever awarded to me for my defence of Trinidad—be excused from adducing the following remarks, known to be from the pen of Sir Walter Scott.

“Thus, in consequence of our cooperation, were the French detained a
whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress, which,
without that cooperation, could not have resisted the first attack.
The event might have been different had there been a floating army off
the coast—the whole of the besieging force might then have been cut
off. Of the errors which the English Government committed in the
conduct of the Spanish war, the neglect of this obvious and most
important means of annoying the enemy, and advantaging our allies, is
the most extraordinary. Five thousand men, at the disposal of Lord
Cochrane or Sir Sidney Smith, or any of those numerous officers in the
British Navy who have given undoubted proofs of their genius as well
as courage, would have rendered more service to the common cause _than
five times that number on shore_, because they could at all times
choose their points of attack, and the enemy, never knowing where to
expect them, would everywhere be in fear, and everywhere in reach of
the shore in danger.

“Lord Cochrane, during the month of September 1808, with his single
ship the _Impérieuse_, kept the whole coast of Languedoc in
alarm,—destroyed the numerous semaphoric telegraphs, which were of the
utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French, and
not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into
Spain, but even excited such dismay that 2000 men were withdrawn from
Figueras to oppose him, when they would otherwise have been marching
farther into the peninsula. The coasting trade was entirely suspended
during this alarm; yet with such consummate prudence were all Lord
Cochrane’s enterprises planned and executed, that _not one of his men
were either killed or hurt_, except one, who was singed in blowing up
a battery.”

For none of the services detailed in the last two chapters did I ever receive praise or reward from the Admiralty authorities! though from the nature of the services they were necessarily accompanied by the deprivation of all chance of prize-money, either to myself, officers, or crew. The check opposed to the advance of the French in Catalonia—as testified by Lord Collingwood—was therefore made at _my expense_, without costing a farthing to the nation beyond the expenditure of ammunition; a strange contrast to some of the costly expeditions of the period for less results, and one which ought to have secured for me anything but the political animosity with which all my services were regarded.

CHAP. XVIII.

CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.

DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS.—ATTACK SOME FRENCH VESSELS.—FRENCH
OPERATIONS.—LETTER OF LORD COCHRANE.—LORD COLLINGWOOD.—OPERATIONS OF
THE ENEMY.—FALL IN WITH THE CYRENE.—SAIL FOR MINORCA.—APPLY FOR
LEAVE.—MOTIVES FOR LEAVING.—APATHY OF THE GOVERNMENT.—REPROACHED FOR
SERVICE.—NEGLECT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

When in the roads of San Felin, on the 7th of December, a boat came off with a request from the Spanish commandant that I would reconnoitre the enemy’s position in the direction of Gerona. I had, at first, considerable doubts whether compliance with a request to act in a military capacity came within the sphere of a naval officer’s duty; but considering that Lord Collingwood’s instructions were to aid the Spaniards by any means within my power, I resolved for once to forego my reluctance to leave the frigate, and accordingly accompanied the commandant and his staff in the direction of the enemy, whom we found assembled in such numbers as to render successful opposition out of the question.

Being unable to advise the Spaniards in this locality to adopt any beneficial course, or indeed how to act in any effective way against the enemy, we again sailed in the direction of Barcelona, where a Spanish force of 40,000 men, under General Vives, was closely investing the town, so as to cut off supplies from the French garrison. As the consequent scarcity of provisions affected the inhabitants also, all who could afford to hire boats were quitting the place with their families; the garrison offering no obstacle.

On the 17th, a body of French—or rather Italian troops embodied in the French army—made their appearance for the purpose of relieving the garrison. As they numbered only about 10,000, and the Spaniards fully 40,000, posted on the top of a hill, with every advantage in their favour, the defeat of the Franco-Italians appeared so much a matter of course as to induce me to go on shore to witness the engagement.

To my surprise, Vives allowed his flank to be turned, and the French attacking in front and rear at the same time the Spaniards became panic-struck, and fairly ran away. The rout was complete; and it was with difficulty that I managed to get on board the frigate.

Shortly after gaining the ship, a boat full of officers was seen to put off from the shore and make for the _Impérieuse_. On coming alongside, it was reported to me that General Vives was amongst their number, on which I returned a message expressive of disbelief; adding that it could not be the general, for that to my certain knowledge he was on shore, driving back the French who were attempting to relieve Barcelona. After some hesitation, General Vives personally avowed himself, and demanded a conveyance for himself, officers, and 1000 men to Tarragona; which demand being flatly refused, they left for the _Cambrian_, which lay at anchor not far off.

On the 19th we got under weigh, and soon after fell in with a vessel bound for Palamos, and crowded with families escaping from Barcelona, all of whom bitterly complained of the shameful treatment they had experienced at the hands of the French soldiery. On the 21st we came to off St. Philou, which had just been plundered of everything.

Nothing material occurred till the 30th, when, beating up towards Caldagues Bay, we received intelligence that several French vessels, bound to Barcelona with provisions for the relief of the French army, were at anchor there. To attack these, as we had reason to believe that there was a considerable body of the enemy at Caldagues, and as the harbour was not more than half a mile broad, was a dangerous affair, on account of the necessity of anchoring within point-blank range of musketry. It was, however, of great importance that the provisions should not reach their destination, and, in place of waiting for them to proceed on their voyage, I decided on attacking them as the convoy lay at anchor.

At mid-day we were close to the entrance of the harbour, and made out the convoy and two vessels of war in charge of them, the whole being protected by a battery and a number of French troops on the hills. Bringing the _Impérieuse_ to an anchor we commenced firing on the vessels of war, one of which shortly afterwards sank; when directing our attack on her consort, she also sank and fell on her broadside, the crew escaping on shore.

The protecting vessels being thus disposed of, we warped closer in shore for the purpose of silencing some guns which whilst engaged in sinking them had repeatedly struck us. In order to divide the enemy’s attention, a party of marines was despatched to make a feint of landing near the town, whilst with the other marines and the blue jackets we dashed on shore between the former and the French who were still firing on us from the battery. The latter, seeing the double attack and afraid of being cut off from their comrades in the town, ran off to the hills, abandoning their guns, which, on landing, we threw over the cliff, with the exception of four brass 18-pounders and one 24-pounder, which were taken on board the _Impérieuse_. We then blew up the magazine.

The coast being now clear, all boats were sent in to bring out eleven vessels laden with provisions, and by dark they were all close alongside, with our marines safely on board. They had, indeed, met with no opposition, the French troops in the town having run away and joined their comrades on the hills, the whole shortly afterwards marching in the direction of Rosas. During this affair the inhabitants remained quiet spectators on the hills—afraid to assist us, lest the French, who were certain to return on our departure, should retaliate after their usual fashion.

On the 31st we made an effort to raise the vessels of war which had sunk in shallow water near the shore, and after some time, succeeded in stopping the leak of the one which had fallen over on her broadside, and was full of water, which being pumped out she floated and was towed alongside the frigate.

By this time a number of Spanish boats from the neighbouring coast came in, and without ceremony set to work plundering our prizes! It was not till after some rough treatment from a party of marines sent for the protection of the captured vessels, that the Spaniards were made to comprehend that the prizes belonged to us and not to them!

Towards midnight the Spaniards gave us information that the French, with reinforcements from Rosas, were on the point of re-entering the town. We therefore sent a party of marines on board the brig-of-war to protect her from recapture.

Early in the morning of the 1st of January 1809, the enemy opened upon the brig with a smart fire of musketry, which the marines as smartly returned,—the frigate and a gun in the pinnace meanwhile plying the assailants with grape so effectually that they immediately abandoned their position, and marching round a hill, commenced firing from the other side, where, as the movement was anticipated by the frigate, they met with a similar reception immediately on showing themselves. Finding us fully prepared at all points, they followed the example of their predecessors, and retreated to the hills, offering no further opposition, whilst we were engaged in weighing the other vessel of war, in which we succeeded also. As soon as the French saw that they could not save either of these vessels, they abandoned the victuallers, and again marched off in the direction of Rosas.

The 2nd was employed in repairing our prizes, and in getting off other brass guns found on shore. On the 3rd we blew up the barrack and another magazine close to the town, without any further interference on the part of the enemy. Our operations being now completed, the smallest vessel of war was despatched to Lord Collingwood, off Toulon, with the following account of our success.

“His Majesty’s Ship _Impérieuse_, Caldagues,
2nd January, 1809.

“MY LORD,—Having received information of two French vessels of war,
and a convoy of victuallers for Barcelona being in this port, I have
the honour to inform your lordship, that they are all—amounting to
thirteen sail—in our possession.

“The French have been driven from the tower of Caldagues with the loss
of nine cannon, which they had mounted or were mounting on the
batteries.

“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.

“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”

“_La Gauloise_, cutter, 7 guns and 46 men, commanded by Mr. Avanet,
Member of the Legion of Honour.

“_La Julie_, lugger, 5 guns, 4 swivels, 44 men, commanded by Mr.
Chassereau.

“And eleven victuallers.”

In consequence of which his lordship was pleased to write to the Admiralty as follows:—

“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD,
_Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. W. W. POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean,
_at sea, the 6th of May 1809_.

“SIR,—I inclose—to be laid before their Lordships—a letter I have
received from Lord Cochrane, captain of his Majesty’s ship
_Impérieuse_, who has been for some time past employed on the coast of
Catalonia, and where the good services of his lordship in aid of the
Spaniards and in annoyance of the enemy could not be exceeded.

“I have, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”

Having put to sea with our prizes, except the smallest, which we gave to the Spaniards,—the _Impérieuse_ stood, on the 9th of January, towards Silva, anchoring in that port at 4 P.M. Observing a battery of ten guns mounted ashore, we landed, rolled them into the sea, and afterwards demolished the battery without opposition.

On the 10th, the Spaniards gave us intelligence of a large detachment of French troops being on their march from Rosas. Anticipating much the same kind of opposition as we had experienced at Caldagues, the marines were directed to take possession of the hill on which the demolished battery had been placed, and soon afterwards the enemy was seen advancing in three divisions. Shortly before reaching the hill, they halted and reconnoitred, after which they filed off towards the opposite mountain, and piled their arms in sight of the ship.

About noon they were reinforced by great numbers, and the whole advanced down the hill, their skirmishers keeping up a brisk fire upon our marines. As it was impossible for these to hold their position against such numbers, and as there was no particular object in so doing, it became necessary to embark them, for which purpose the boats had been placed in readiness. On the first appearance of the reinforcement, the French reentered their battery, but only to find the iron guns thrown in the sea and the brass ones in our possession. Exasperated at this, they opened upon us so heavy a fire of musketry that we were glad to get off as fast as we could, with the loss of three men.

Scarcely had we pushed off, when they manned a lower battery, which we had not had time to destroy—but though they fired very smartly, we had only two men wounded. It was fortunate we took precautions to reembark the marines in time—five minutes later would have lost us half their number, and we might have been compelled to leave some of the wounded. It was no less fortunate that, from the entrance being high and narrow, I had, before anchoring in a passage so exposed, taken the precaution of laying out a kedge to seaward, with something like a mile of coir rope attached, to be used in case of emergency. Hauling on this, we were quickly out of reach of the battery, but again anchored just within our own range of the enemy, when the frigate reopened her fire with shot and shell, keeping up an intermitting cannonade till after nightfall.

We learned in a curious way that the principal portion of the troops who attacked us were Swiss! About midnight a boat was reported alongside with a letter from the commandant of the troops with which we had been engaged. Wondering what he could want with me, I opened the letter, and found it to contain a rigmarole account of himself and the extraordinary achievements of his regiment, which belonged to some canton whose name I forget; the letter concluding with a request for a few _bottles of rum_!! I sent him the rum, together with a reply not very complimentary to his country or present occupation.

On the 11th some of our missing men got on board, and reported that the French had received still larger reinforcements, with heavy artillery, of which, indeed, we had ample proof, they having this morning got their guns to bear so accurately, that almost every shot struck us, so that it became necessary to display the better part of valour, and be off. The wind, unluckily for us, had died away, but a southerly air at length springing up, we put our prisoners ashore, and stood out of the bay, anchoring on the following day at Caldagues.

It would be tedious to narrate the remainder of our cruise, which chiefly consisted in sailing along the Spanish coast, and firing upon French troops wherever they came within reach, this being principally in the vicinity of Barcelona.

On one occasion only did we make much havoc amongst them, viz. on the 22nd. On the previous day we had been reconnoitring Barcelona, and fell in with the _Cyrene_. Whilst rounding a small promontory in company, we observed a foraging expedition of at least 5000 troops, with immense numbers of mules laden with provisions,—the spoil of the surrounding country,—coming along a road close to the sea. Both ships immediately beat to quarters, and running well within shot and shell range, commenced a heavy fire, which told admirably on the troops and convoy, as was evident from the disorder into which they were thrown. After about two hours persevering—though not continuous fire,—as from the strong breeze blowing, we were occasionally carried past the enemy, and lost time in regaining our position; the French abandoned their line of march, and filed off into the interior, the ships harassing their retreat with shells till they were out of range. The loss of the enemy on this occasion must necessarily have been very severe.

On the 30th we joined Admiral Thornborough’s squadron of thirteen sail at Minorca. On the following day we received the unwelcome intelligence of Lieutenant Harrison’s having been taken prisoner by the French. I had placed this excellent officer in command of the man-of-war cutter taken with the French convoy at Caldagues, and when off Tarragona he imprudently went on shore with only two hands, to gain information about us. On landing he was immediately surrounded by French troops, a body of whom was embarked in boats to regain possession of his cutter, but by promptly making sail she escaped.