Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (3)
On discovering the real character of our neighbour, the _Speedy_ hoisted Danish colours, and spoke her. At first this failed to satisfy the Spaniard, who sent a boat to board us. It was now time to bring the Danish quartermaster into play in his officer’s uniform; and to add force to his explanations, we ran the quarantine flag up to the fore, calculating on the Spanish horror of the plague, then prevalent along the Barbary coast.
On the boat coming within hail,—for the yellow flag effectually repressed the enemy’s desire to board us—our mock officer informed the Spaniards that we were two days from Algiers, where at the time the plague was violently raging. This was enough. The boat returned to the frigate, which, wishing us a good voyage, filled, and made sail, whilst we did the same.
I have noted this circumstance more minutely than it merits, because it has been misrepresented. By some of my officers blame was cast on me for not attacking the frigate after she had been put off her guard by our false colours, as her hands—being then employed at their ordinary avocations in the rigging and elsewhere—presented a prominent mark for our shot. There is no doubt but that we might have poured in a murderous fire before the crew could have recovered from their confusion, and perhaps have taken her, but feeling averse to so cruel a destruction of human life, I chose to refrain from an attack, which might not, even with that advantage in our favour, have been successful.
It has been stated by some naval writers that this frigate was the _Gamo_, which we subsequently captured. To the best of my knowledge this is an error.
“_December_ 24.—Off Carthagena. At daylight fell in with a convoy in
charge of two Spanish privateers, which came up and fired at us; but
being to windward we ran for the convoy, and singling out two,
captured the nearest, laden with wine. The other ran in shore under
the fort of Port Genoese, where we left her.
“25.—Stood for Cape St. Martin, in hope of intercepting the
privateers. At 8 A.M. saw a privateer and one of the convoy under Cape
Lanar. Made sail in chase. They parted company; when, on our singling
out the nearest privateer, she took refuge under a battery, on which
we left off pursuit.
“30.—Off Cape Oropesa. Seeing some vessels in shore, out boats in
chase. At noon they returned pursued by two Spanish gun-boats, which
kept up a smart fire on them. Made sail to intercept the gun-boats, on
which they ran in under the batteries.
“_January_ 10, 1801.—Anchored in Port Mahon, and having refitted,
sailed again on the 12th.
“16.—Off Barcelona. Just before daylight chased two vessels standing
towards that port. Seeing themselves pursued, they made for the
battery at the entrance. Bore up and set steering sails in chase. The
wind falling calm, one of the chase drifted in shore, and took the
ground under Castel De Ferro. On commencing our fire, the crew
abandoned her, and we sent boats with anchors and hawsers to warp her
off, in which they succeeded. She proved to be the Genoese ship _Ns.
Señora de Gratia_, of ten guns.
“22.—Before daylight, stood in again for Barcelona. Saw several sail
close in with the land. Out boats and boarded one, which turned out a
Dane. Cruising off the port till 3 A.M., we saw two strange vessels
coming from the westward. Made sail to cut them off. At 6 P.M. one of
them hoisted Spanish colours and the other French. At 9 P.M. came up
with them, when after an engagement of half an hour both struck. The
Spaniard was the _Ecce Homo_ of eight guns and nineteen men, the
Frenchman _L’Amitié_ of one gun and thirty-one men. Took all the
prisoners on board the _Speedy_.
“23.—Still off Barcelona. Having sent most of our crew to man the
prizes, the number of prisoners on board the _Speedy_ became
dangerous; we therefore put twenty-five of the Frenchmen into one of
their own launches, and told them to make the best of their way to
Barcelona. As the prizes were a good deal cut up about the rigging,
repaired their damages and made sail for Port Mahon, where we arrived
on the 24th, with our convoy in company.
“28.—Quitted Port Mahon for Malta, not being able to procure at
Minorca various things of which we stood in need; and on the 1st of
February, came to an anchor at Valetta, where we obtained anchors and
sweeps.”
An absurd affair took place during our short stay at Malta, which would not have been worthy of notice, had it not been made the subject of comment.
The officers of a French royalist regiment, then at Malta, patronised a fancy ball, for which I amongst others purchased a ticket. The dress chosen was that of a sailor—in fact, my costume was a tolerable imitation of that of my worthy friend, Jack Larmour, in one of his relaxing moods, and personated in my estimation as honourable a character as were Greek, Turkish, or other kinds of Oriental disguises in vogue at such reunions. My costume was, however, too much to the life to please French royalist taste, not even the marlinspike and the lump of grease in the hat being omitted.
On entering the ball-room, further passage was immediately barred, with an intimation that my presence could not be permitted in such a dress. Good humouredly expostulating that, as the choice of costume was left to the wearer, my own taste—which was decidedly nautical—had selected that of a British seaman, a character which, though by no means imaginary, was quite as picturesque as were the habiliments of an Arcadian shepherd; further insisting that as no rule had been infringed, I must be permitted to exercise my discretion. Expostulation being of no avail, a brusque answer was returned that such a dress was not admissible, whereupon I as brusquely replied that having purchased my ticket, and chosen my own costume in accordance with the regulations, no one had any right to prevent me from sustaining the character assumed.
Upon this a French officer, who appeared to act as master of the ceremonies, came up, and without waiting for further explanation, rudely seized me by the collar with the intention of putting me out; in return for which insult he received a substantial mark of British indignation, and at the same time an uncomplimentary remark in his own language. In an instant all was uproar; a French picket was called, which in a short time overpowered and carried me off to the guard-house of the regiment.
I was, however, promptly freed from detention on announcing my name, but the officer who had collared me demanded an apology for the portion of the _fracas_ concerning him personally. This being of course refused, a challenge was the consequence; and on the following morning we met behind the ramparts and exchanged shots, my ball passing through the poor fellow’s thigh and dropping him. My escape, too, was a narrow one—his ball perforating my coat, waistcoat, and shirt, and bruising my side. Seeing my adversary fall, I stepped up to him—imagining his wound to be serious—and expressed a hope that he had not been hit in a vital part. His reply—uttered with all the politeness of his nation—was, that “he was not materially hurt.” I, however, was not at ease, for it was impossible not to regret this, to him, serious _dénouement_ of a trumpery affair, though arising from his own intemperate conduct. It was a lesson to me in future never to do anything in frolic which might give even unintentional offence.
On the 3rd of February we sailed under orders for Tripoli, to make arrangements for fresh provisions for the fleet. This being effected, the _Speedy_ returned to Malta, and on the 20th again left port in charge of a convoy for Tunis.
24th.—At the entrance of Tunis Bay we gave chase to a strange sail, which wore and stood in towards the town, anchoring at about the distance of three miles. Suspecting some reason for this movement, I despatched an officer to examine her, when the suspicion was confirmed by his ascertaining her to be _La Belle Caroline_, French brig of four guns, bound for Alexandria with field-pieces, ammunition, and wine for the use of the French army in Egypt.
Our position was one of delicacy, the vessel being in a neutral port, where, if we remained to watch her, she might prolong our stay for an indefinite period or escape in the night; whilst, from the warlike nature of the cargo, it was an object of national importance to effect her capture. The latter appearing the most beneficial course under all circumstances, we neared her so as to prevent escape, and soon after midnight boarded her, and having weighed her anchor, brought her close to the _Speedy_, before she had an opportunity of holding any communication with the shore.
The following day was employed in examining her stores, a portion of her ammunition being transferred to our magazine, to replace some damaged by leakage. Her crew, now on board the _Speedy_ as prisoners, becoming clamorous at what they considered an illegal seizure, and being, moreover, in our way, an expedient was adopted to get rid of them, by purposely leaving their own launch within reach during the following night, with a caution to the watch not to prevent their desertion should they attempt it. The hint was taken, for before daylight on the 27th they seized the boat, and pulled out of the bay without molestation, not venturing to go to Tunis lest they should be retaken. We thus got rid of the prisoners, and at the same time of what might have turned out their reasonable complaint to the Tunisian authorities, for that we had exceeded the bounds of neutrality there could be no doubt.
On the 28th we weighed anchor, and proceeded to sea with our prize. After cruising for some days off Cape Bon we made sail for Cagliari, where we arrived on the 8th of March, and put to sea on the 11th with the prize in tow. On the 16th, anchored in Port Mahon.
On the 18th we again put to sea, and towards evening observed a large frigate in chase of us. As she did not answer the private signal, it was evident that the stranger was one of our Spanish friends on the look-out. To cope with a vessel of her size and armament would have been folly, so we made all sail away from her, but she gave instant chase, and evidently gained upon us. To add to our embarrassment, the _Speedy_ sprung her maintopgallant-yard, and lost ground whilst fishing it.
At daylight the following morning the strange frigate was still in chase, though by crowding all sail during the night we had gained a little upon her; but during the day she again recovered her advantage, the more so as the breeze freshening, we were compelled to take in our royals, whilst she was still carrying on with everything set. After dark, we lowered a tub overboard with a light in it, and altering our course thus fortunately evaded her. On the 1st of April we returned to Port Mahon, and again put to sea on the 6th.
“_April_ 11.—Observing a vessel near the shoal of Tortosa, gave chase.
On the following morning her crew deserted her, and we took
possession. In the evening anchored under the land.
“13.—Saw three vessels at anchor in a bay to the westward of Oropesa.
Made sail up to them and anchored on the flank of a ten-gun fort.
Whilst the firing was going on, the boats were sent in to board and
bring out the vessels, which immediately weighed and got under the
fort. At 5:30 P.M. the boats returned with one of them; the other two
being hauled close in shore, we did not make any further attempt to
capture them. As the prize, the _Ave Maria_, of four guns, was in
ballast, we took the sails and spars out of her, and set her on fire.
“On the following morning at daybreak, several vessels appeared to the
eastward. Made all sail to intercept them, but before we could come
up, they succeeded in anchoring under a fort. On standing towards
them, they turned out to be Spanish gun-boats, which commenced firing
at us. At 10 A.M. anchored within musket-shot, so as to keep an angle
of the tower on our beam, thus neutralising its effect. Commenced
firing broadsides alternately at the tower and the gun-boats, with
visible advantage. Shortly before noon made preparation to cut out the
gun-boats, but a fresh breeze setting in dead on shore, rendered it
impossible to get at them without placing ourselves in peril. We
thereupon worked out of the bay.
“15.—Two strange sail in sight. Gave chase, and in a couple of hours
came up with and captured them. Made sail after a convoy in the
offing, but the wind falling light at dusk, lost sight of them.
“On the 26th we anchored in Mahon, remaining a week to refit and
procure fresh hands, many having been sent away in prizes. On the 2nd
of May put to sea with a reduced crew, some of whom had to be taken
out of H.M.’s prison.”
We again ran along the Spanish coast, and on the 4th of May were off Barcelona, where the _Speedy_ captured a vessel which reported herself as Ragusan, though in reality a Spanish four-gun tartan. Soon after detaining her we heard firing in the W. N.-W., and steering for that quarter fell in with a Spanish privateer, which we also captured, the _San Carlos_, of seven guns. On this a swarm of gun-boats came out of Barcelona, seven of them giving chase to us and the prizes, with which we made off shore, the gun-boats returning to Barcelona.
On the following morning the prizes were sent to Port Mahon, and keeping out of sight for the rest of the day, the _Speedy_ returned at midnight off Barcelona, where we found the gun-boats on the watch; but on our approach they ran in shore, firing at us occasionally. Suspecting that the object was to decoy us within reach of some larger vessel, we singled out one of them and made at her, the others, however, supporting her so well that some of our rigging being shot away, we made off shore to repair, the gun-boats following. Having thus got them to some distance, and repaired damages, we set all sail, and again ran in shore, in the hope of getting between them and the land, so as to cut off some of their number. Perceiving our intention, they all made for the port as before, keeping up a smart fight, in which our foretopgallant-yard was so much injured, that we had to shift it, and were thus left astern. The remainder of the day was employed in repairing damages, and the gun-boats not venturing out again, at 9 P.M. we again made off shore.
Convinced that something more than ordinary had actuated the gun-boats to decoy us—just before daylight on the 6th we again ran in for Barcelona, when the trap manifested itself in the form of a large ship, running under the land, and bearing E. S.-E. On hauling towards her, she changed her course in chase of us, and was shortly made out to be a Spanish xebec frigate.
As some of my officers had expressed dissatisfaction at not having been permitted to attack the frigate fallen in with on the 21st of December, after her suspicions had been lulled by our device of hoisting Danish colours, &c., I told them they should now have a fair fight, notwithstanding that, by manning the two prizes sent to Mahon, our numbers had been reduced to fifty-four, officers and boys included. Orders were then given to pipe all hands, and prepare for action.
Accordingly we made towards the frigate, which was now coming down under steering sails. At 9·30 A.M., she fired a gun and hoisted Spanish colours, which the _Speedy_ acknowledged by hoisting American colours, our object being, as we were now exposed to her full broadside, to puzzle her, till we got on the other tack, when we ran up the English ensign, and immediately afterwards encountered her broadside without damage.
Shortly afterwards she gave us another broadside, also without effect. My orders were not to fire a gun till we were close to her; when, running under her lee, we locked our yards amongst her rigging, and in this position returned our broadside, such as it was.
To have fired our popgun 4-pounders at a distance would have been to throw away the ammunition; but the guns being doubly, and, as I afterwards learned, trebly, shotted, and being elevated, they told admirably upon her main deck; the first discharge, as was subsequently ascertained, killing the Spanish captain and the boatswain.
My reason for locking our small craft in the enemy’s rigging was the one upon which I mainly relied for victory, viz. that from the height of the frigate out of the water, the whole of her shot must necessarily go over our heads, whilst our guns, being elevated, would blow up her main-deck.
The Spaniards speedily found out the disadvantage under which they were fighting, and gave the order to board the _Speedy_; but as this order was as distinctly heard by us as by them, we avoided it at the moment of execution by sheering off sufficiently to prevent the movement, giving them a volley of musketry and a broadside before they could recover themselves.
Twice was this manœuvre repeated, and twice thus averted. The Spaniards finding that they were only punishing themselves, gave up further attempts to board, and stood to their guns, which were cutting up our rigging from stem to stern, but doing little farther damage; for after the lapse of an hour the loss to the _Speedy_ was only two men killed and four wounded.
This kind of combat, however, could not last. Our rigging being cut up and the _Speedy’s_ sails riddled with shot, I told the men that they must either take the frigate or be themselves taken, in which case the Spaniards would give no quarter—whilst a few minutes energetically employed on their part would decide the matter in their own favour.
The doctor, Mr. Guthrie, who, I am happy to say, is still living to peruse this record of his gallantry, volunteered to take the helm; leaving him therefore for the time both commander and crew of the _Speedy_, the order was given to board, and in a few seconds every man was on the enemy’s deck—a feat rendered the more easy as the doctor placed the _Speedy_ close alongside with admirable skill.
For a moment the Spaniards seemed taken by surprise, as though unwilling to believe that so small a crew would have the audacity to board them; but soon recovering themselves, they made a rush to the waist of the frigate, where the fight was for some minutes gallantly carried on. Observing the enemy’s colours still flying, I directed one of our men immediately to haul them down, when the Spanish crew, without pausing to consider by whose orders the colours had been struck, and naturally believing it the act of their own officers, gave in, and we were in possession of the _Gamo_ frigate, of thirty-two heavy guns and 319 men, who an hour and a half before had looked upon us as a certain if not an easy prey.
Our loss in boarding was Lieutenant Parker, severely wounded in several places, one seaman killed and three wounded, which with those previously killed and wounded gave a total of three seamen killed, and one officer and seventeen men wounded.
The _Gamo’s_ loss was Captain de Torres—the boatswain—and thirteen seamen killed, together with forty-one wounded; her casualties thus exceeding the whole number of officers and crew on board the _Speedy_.
Some time after the surrender of the _Gamo_, and when we were in quiet possession, the officer who had succeeded the deceased Captain Don Francisco de Torres, not in command, but in rank, applied to me for a certificate that he had done his duty during the action! whereupon he received from me a certificate that he had “conducted himself like a true Spaniard,” with which document he appeared highly gratified, and I had afterwards the satisfaction of learning that it procured him further promotion in the Spanish service!
Shortly before boarding an incident occurred which, by those who have never been placed in similar circumstances, may be thought too absurd for notice. Knowing that the final struggle would be a desperate one, and calculating on the superstitious wonder which forms an element in the Spanish character, a portion of our crew were ordered to blacken their faces, and what with this and the excitement of combat, more ferocious looking objects could scarcely be imagined. The fellows thus disguised were directed to board by the head, and the effect produced was precisely that calculated on. The greater portion of the Spaniard’s crew was prepared to repel boarders in that direction, but stood for a few moments as it were transfixed to the deck by the apparition of so many diabolical looking figures emerging from the white smoke of the bow guns; whilst our other men, who boarded by the waist, rushed on them from behind, before they could recover from their surprise at the unexpected phenomenon.
In difficult or doubtful attacks by sea,—and the odds of 50 men to 320 comes within this description,—no device can be too minute, even if apparently absurd, provided it have the effect of diverting the enemy’s attention whilst you are concentrating your own. In this, and other successes against odds, I have no hesitation in saying that success in no slight degree depended on out-of-the-way devices, which the enemy not suspecting, were in some measure thrown off their guard.
The subjoined tabular view of the respective force of the two vessels will best show the nature of the contest.
_Gamo._ │ _Speedy._
│
Main-deck guns.—Twenty-two long │Fourteen 4-pounders.
12-pounders. │
Quarter-deck.—Eight long │None.
8-pounders, and two 24-pounder │
carronades. │
No. of crew, 319. │No. of crew, 54.
Broadside weight of shot, 190 lbs.│Broadside weight of shot, 28 lbs.
Tonnage, 600 and upwards. │Tonnage, 158.
It became a puzzle what to do with 263 unhurt prisoners now we had taken them, the _Speedy_ having only forty-two men left. Promptness was however necessary; so driving the prisoners into the hold, with guns pointing down the hatchway, and leaving thirty of our men on board the prize—which was placed under the command of my brother, the Hon. Archibald Cochrane, then a midshipman—we shaped our course to Port Mahon—not Gibraltar, as has been recorded—and arrived there in safety; the Barcelona gun-boats, though spectators of the action, not venturing to rescue the frigate. Had they made the attempt, we should have had some difficulty in evading them and securing the prize, the prisoners manifesting every disposition to rescue themselves, and only being deterred by their own main deck guns loaded with cannister, and pointing down the hatchways, whilst our men stood over them with lighted matches.
The subjoined is Lord Keith’s letter in reply to my official announcement of our success.
“_Foudroyant_, off Arab’s Tower,
“9th June, 1801.
“MY LORD,—I have received your lordship’s letter of the 13th ult.,
enclosing a copy of your letter to Captain Dixon, detailing your
engagement with and capture of the Spanish xebec of 32 guns; and
cannot fail to be extremely gratified with the communication of an
event so honourable to the naval service, and so highly creditable to
your lordship’s professional reputation, and to the intrepidity and
discipline of the _Speedy’s_ officers and men, to all of whom I
request your lordship will make my perfect satisfaction and
approbation known.
“I have the honour to be, My Lord,
“Your Lordship’s most obedient servant,
(Signed) “KEITH.
“The Right Hon. Lord Cochrane,
“_Speedy_.”
As a matter of course, my report of the capture of the _Gamo_ was, in the first instance, made to the commandant at Port Mahon, the commander-in-chief being in Egypt. It should have been forwarded by him to the Secretary of the Admiralty, but was delayed for upwards of a month, thus affording a pretence for not promoting me to post rank, according to the recognised rules of the service.
From information on the affair being thus delayed, it was generally believed at home, that the _Gamo_ had been taken by surprise, instead of after a close engagement, deliberately decided on, and announced to the officers and crew of the _Speedy_ at five o’clock in the morning, the hands being turned up for the purpose. The consequence of the delay was a postponement of my post commission for upwards of three months, viz. from the 6th of May to the 8th of August; and what was of more consequence, a misunderstanding with Lord St. Vincent, which bore most unfavourably upon all my future prospects. Upon this subject much will have to be said in a subsequent chapter.
The subjoined is a copy of my official report to the senior officer commanding at Port Mahon; and also of his remarkably concise comment thereon, when tardily transmitting the same to the Secretary of the Admiralty.
_Copy of a letter from_ Capt. M. DIXON, _of H.M.S. Genereux, to_ E.
NEPEAN, Esq., _Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Port Mahon, 9th
June, 1800_.
“SIR,—I have the pleasure to transmit a copy of Lord Cochrane’s letter
relative to the very spirited and brilliant action with a Spanish
xebec frigate.
“I have the honour, &c.
“MANLEY DIXON.
“E. Nepean, Esq.”
“H. M. Sloop _Speedy_, off Barcelona,
“6th May, 1800.
“SIR,—I have the pleasure to inform you, that the sloop I have the
honour to command, after a mutual chase and warm action, has captured
a Spanish xebec frigate of 32 guns, 22 long 12-pounders, 8 nines, and
2 heavy carronades, viz. the _Gamo_, commanded by Don Francisco de
Torres, manned by 319 officers, seamen, and marines.
“The great disparity of force rendered it necessary to adopt some
measure that might prove decisive. I resolved to board, and with
Lieut. Parker, the Hon. A. Cochrane, the boatswain and crew, did so,
when, by the impetuosity of the attack, we forced them to strike. I
have to lament, in boarding, the loss of one man only; the severe
wounds received by Lieut. Parker, both from musketry and the sword,
one wound received by the boatswain, and one seaman.
“I must be permitted to say that there could not be greater
regularity, nor more cool determined conduct shown by men, than by the
crew of the _Speedy_. Lieut. Parker, whom I beg leave to recommend to
their Lordships’ notice, as well as the Hon. Mr. Cochrane, deserve all
the approbation that can be bestowed. The exertions and good conduct
of the boatswain, carpenter, and petty officers, I acknowledge with
pleasure, as well as the skill and attention of Mr. Guthrie, the
surgeon.
“I have the honour to be, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“M. Dixon, Esq.”
_Speedy’s force at commencement of action._
Fifty-four officers, men, and boys, 14 4-pounders. Three killed and 8
wounded.
_Gamo’s force at commencement of action._
Two hundred and seventy-four officers, seamen, and supernumeraries.
Forty-five marines. Guns, 32. Don Francisco de Torres, the boatswain,
and 13 men killed, 41 wounded.
CHAP. VI.
CRUISE OF THE _SPEEDY_ CONTINUED.
THE SPEEDY SENT TO ALGIERS.—INTERVIEW WITH THE DEY.—SPEEDY RETURNS TO
MINORCA.—ATTACK ON OROPESA.—ENEMY’S VESSELS DESTROYED.—LETTER OF
THANKS FROM LORD KEITH.—SPEEDY SENT IN CONVOY OF A PACKET.—CAPTURED
BY THREE FRENCH LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS, AND TAKEN TO ALGESIRAS.—ATTACK
BY SIR J. SAUMAREZ’S SQUADRON.—LOSS OF THE HANNIBAL.—CAPTURE OF
DOCKYARD ARTIFICERS.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN KEATS.
Our success hitherto had procured us some prize money, notwithstanding the peculations of the Mediterranean Admiralty Courts, by which the greater portion of our captures was absorbed.
Despite this drawback, which generally disinclined officers and crews from making extraordinary exertions, my own share of the twelvemonth’s zealous endeavours in our little sloop was considerable, and even the crew were in receipt of larger sums than those constituting the ordinary pay of officers; a result chiefly owing to our nocturnal mode of warfare, together with our refraining from meddling with vessels ascertained to be loading in the Spanish ports, and then lying in wait for them as they proceeded on their voyage.
One effect of our success was no slight amount of ill concealed jealousy on the part of officers senior to myself, though there were some amongst these who, being in command of small squadrons instead of single vessels, might, had they adopted the same means, have effected far more than the _Speedy_, with an armament so insignificant, was calculated to accomplish.
After remaining some days at Port Mahon to refit, we prepared to return to our cruising ground, where, from private information, we knew that other prizes were at hand. In place of being permitted so to do, the _Speedy_ received an order to proceed to Algiers, for the purpose of representing to the Dey the illegality of his cruisers having taken a British vessel in retaliation for an Algerine captured whilst violating the law of blockade.
The mission was a singular one to be entrusted to the captain of one of the smallest and worst armed vessels in the British service. Remonstrance, to be effectual with a piratical government, ought to have been committed to an officer armed with sufficient force at least to induce respect. There was, however, no alternative but to obey, and a short time saw us at anchor off the mole of the predatory potentate.
The request for an interview with his highness occasioned no little dissatisfaction amongst his ministers, if those who were quite as much his masters as his subordinates could be so termed. After some consultation, the interview was, however, granted, and a day was appointed to deliver my message.
The invariable Moslem preliminary of taking coffee having been gone through, I was ushered through a series of galleries lined with men, each bearing on his shoulder a formidable looking axe, and eyeing me with an insolent scowl, evidently meant to convey the satisfaction with which they would apply its edge to my vertebræ, should the caprice of their chief so will.
On reaching the presence of the Dey—a dignified looking and gorgeously attired person, seated cross-legged on an elevated couch in one corner of the gallery and surrounded by armed people of most unprepossessing appearance—I was marched up between two janizaries, and ordered to make three salaams to his highness.
This formality being complied with, he rudely demanded, through the medium of an interpreter, “What brought me there?” The reply was that “I was the commander of an English vessel of war in the roads, and had been deputed, on behalf of my government, respectfully to remonstrate with his highness concerning a vessel which his cruisers had taken contrary to the laws of nations.” On this being interpreted, the ferocious scowls of the bystanders were exchanged for expressions of injured innocence, but the Dey got in a great passion, and told the interpreter to inform me that “remonstrance came with an ill grace from us, the British vessels being the greatest pirates in the world, and mine one of the worst amongst them,” which complimentary statement was acknowledged by me with a formal bow.
“If I did right,” continued the Dey, through his interpreter,—“I should put you and your crew in prison, till (naming a captured Algerine vessel) she was restored; and but for my great respect for the English government, and my impression that her seizure was unauthorised, you should go there. However, you may go, with a demand from me that the vessel unjustly taken from us shall be immediately restored.”
This decision appeared to be anything but satisfactory to the oligarchy of which his court was composed, as savouring of a clemency to which they were little inclined. From the boisterous conversation which ensued, they were evidently desirous of prolonging my stay to an indefinite period, or perhaps of terminating it summarily through the instrumentality of the axemen who lined the galleries, as a few years afterwards they terminated the existence of the Dey himself.
To confess the truth, there was some room for self-congratulation on quitting the presence of such barbarians, to whom I was not fairly accredited for such a mission. However, the remonstrance confided to me being duly delivered, we returned to Minorca, to report progress, though not without being chased by an Algerine cruiser on our way. As the _Speedy_ outsailed her, and as there was no beneficial object to be gained by interfering with her, we stood on without further notice.
On arriving at our former cruising ground, we encountered a Spanish privateer of six guns, which was captured. This vessel was fitted out at my own private expense, and my brother appointed to command her, as a tender to the _Speedy_; several enemy’s vessels having previously escaped for want of such aid.
In a few days after this, we fell in with the _Kangaroo_, Captain Pulling, who, being senior to me, was therefore my commanding officer. Running down the coast in company, we attacked the fort of Almanara, and after silencing it, brought off a Spanish privateer of seven guns.
On the 8th of June, the _Speedy_ ran into Oropesa, where, on the 13th and 14th of April, we had the previous action with the fort and gun-boats. Perceiving several vessels at anchor under the fort, it was deemed advisable to make off shore, with the intention of running in again at midnight, and cutting some of them out.
We had not proceeded far, before we again fell in with the _Kangaroo_, when informing Captain Pulling of what we had seen, he declined the night attack, preferring to postpone operations till the following day. Accordingly, at noon on the 9th, we went in, and made out a twenty-gun xebec and three gun-boats, with ten sail of merchantmen under their convoy. It was determined to attack them as they lay; the _Kangaroo_ anchoring well up to and engaging the fort, whilst the _Speedy_ and her tender under my brother’s orders, encountered the xebec and the gun-boats—the _Speedy_ anchoring in a line between those vessels and the _Kangaroo_.
For some hours an incessant cannonade was kept up on both sides, the _Kangaroo’s_ fire flanking the fort, whilst the slackened fire of the Spanish vessels showed that our shot had told. At this juncture, a twelve-gun felucca, and two more gun-boats having arrived from Valentia to their assistance, the Spaniards took heart, and the action became nearly as brisk as before.
The felucca and the newly arrived gun-boats were, however, for a time beat off, and after an hour’s additional firing, the xebec, two gun-boats, and some of the convoy were sunk; the remaining gun-boats shortly afterwards sharing the same fate.
The action had now continued for upwards of nine hours; during which the _Speedy_ had expended nearly all her ammunition, viz. 1400 shot, and the _Kangaroo_ was much in the same predicament. As the felucca and gun-boats had again come up, it was necessary to effect something decisive. Captain Pulling, therefore, slipping his cable, shifted close to the fort, which was soon afterwards abandoned, and the _Speedy_ closed with the felucca and her consorts, which forthwith fled. Had they remained, we had not half a dozen rounds left to continue the action.
Both vessels now hoisted our boats, and made for the merchantmen. Three of these had been sunk, and four others driven on shore; we, however, brought away the three still afloat. By this time a number of Spanish troops lined the beach for the protection of the vessels ashore, and as we had scarcely a shot left, it was impracticable to reply to the musketry, within range of which the boats must necessarily have been placed had the attempt been made. We therefore relinquished the endeavour to get off the stranded vessels.
It may be useful here to remark that on board the _Kangaroo_ were some guns fitted on the non-recoil principle, and that during the action these broke from their breechings; one, if not more, endangering the vessel by bounding down the hatchways into the hold.
The subjoined letter of thanks for this affair was forwarded to Captain Pulling by Lord Keith, who was then at Alexandria, watching the movements of the French in Egypt.
“_Foudroyant_, Bay of Aboukir,
“10th July, 1801.
“SIR,—I have received your letter of the 10th of June, detailing the
attack made by the _Kangaroo_ and _Speedy_ upon the fort of Oropesa
and the enemy’s armed vessels at anchor under its protection, on 9th
of that month; as well as upon the tower of Almanara on a former day:
and while I offer my congratulations upon the successful issue of your
enterprise, I cannot withhold my approbation of the persevering and
determined conduct manifested by you and by Captain Lord Cochrane, as
well as by the officers and companies of both the sloops on these
occasions, and I request that my satisfaction may be communicated by
you to his lordship, and that you and he will make the same known to
the officers and companies of the _Kangaroo_ and the _Speedy_.
“I am, &c. &c.
“KEITH.
“Capt. Pulling, _Kangaroo_.”
On our return to Port Mahon with the prizes, the _Gamo_ had not been purchased by the Government; but, to my regret, this useful cruiser had been sold for a trifle to the Algerines, whilst I was condemned to continue in the pigmy and now battered craft by which she had been taken. To have obtained command of the _Gamo_, even as a means of deception on the enemy’s coast, I would scarcely have changed place with an admiral.
But a more cruel thing still was in store for me. The commandant lived in the house of a Spanish merchant who had a contract for carrying the mails to Gibraltar. The vessel employed for this purpose was a notoriously bad sailer, and when the _Speedy_ was ready for sea, instead of being permitted to return to our cruising ground, she was ordered to convoy this tub of a packet to Gibraltar, with further instructions to take the letter-bag on board the _Speedy_, protect the packet, put the mail on board her as soon as we arrived off the Rock, and return without holding any communication with the shore! the evident object of the last injunction being that the service which had been thrust upon us should not become known!
The expectation of the packet-master, doubtless, was that we should put to sea out of privateer reach. In place of this, we ran along the Spanish coast, our superior sailing enabling us, without delay, to scrutinise every creek as we passed. Nothing, however, occurred, till we were close in with a bay, or rather indentation of the shore near Alicant, where seeing some vessels at anchor, we made towards them, on which they weighed and deliberately ran ashore. To have stopped to get them off would have been in excess of our instructions. To set fire to them was not, and as one was laden with oil, and the night following very dark, the result was a blaze which illumined the sky for many miles round.
Unluckily for us, three French line-of-battle ships, which afterwards turned out to be the _Indomitable_, the _Dessaix_, and the _Formidable_, were in the vicinity, and being attracted by the light of the burning vessels, ran in shore to see what was the matter.
At daybreak, on the morning of July 3rd, these large ships were observed in the distance, calling up to our imaginations visions of Spanish galleons from South America, and accordingly the _Speedy_ prepared for chase. It was not till day dawned that we found out our mistake, the vessels between us and the offing being clearly line-of-battle ships, forbidding all reasonable hope of escape.
It was about four o’clock in the morning when we made out the French ships, which immediately on discovering us gave chase. Being to windward, we endeavoured to escape by making all sail, and, as the wind fell light, by using our sweeps. This proving unavailing, we threw the guns overboard, and put the brig before the wind; but notwithstanding every effort, the enemy gained fast upon us, and, in order to prevent our slipping past, separated on different tacks, so as to keep us constantly within reach of one or the other; the _Dessaix_, being nearest, firing broadsides at us as she passed when tacking, at other times firing from her bow chasers, and cutting up our rigging.
For upwards of three hours we were thus within gunshot of the _Dessaix_, when finding it impossible to escape by the wind, I ordered all the stores to be thrown overboard, in the hope of being able, when thus further lightened, to run the gauntlet between the ships, which continued to gain upon us.
Watching an opportunity, when the nearest line-of-battle ship was before our beam, we bore up, set the studding sails, and attempted to run between them, the French honouring us with a broadside for this unexpected movement. The _Dessaix_, however, immediately tacked in pursuit, and in less than an hour got within musket shot. At this short distance, she let fly at us a complete broadside of round and grape, the object evidently being to sink us at a blow, in retaliation for thus attempting to slip past, though almost without hope of escape.
Fortunately for us, in yawing to bring her broadside to bear, the rapidity with which she answered her helm carried her a little too far, and her round shot plunged in the water under our bows, or the discharge must have sunk us; the scattered grape, however, took effect in the rigging, cutting up a great part of it, riddling the sails, and doing material damage to the masts and yards, though not a man was hurt. To have delayed for another broadside would have been to expose all on board to certain destruction, and as further effort to escape was impotent, the _Speedy’s_ colours were hauled down.
On going aboard the _Dessaix_, and presenting my sword to the captain, Christie Pallière, he politely declined taking it, with the complimentary remark that “he would not accept the sword of an officer who had for so many hours struggled against impossibility,” at the same time paying me the further compliment of requesting that “I would continue to wear my sword, though a prisoner”—a request with which I complied; Capt. Pallière at the same time good-naturedly expressing his satisfaction at having terminated our exploits in the cruising line, they having, in fact, special instructions to look out for us. After this reception it is scarcely necessary to add that I was treated with great kindness by my captors.
Thus ended the thirteen months’ cruise of the _Speedy_, during which we had taken and retaken upwards of 50 vessels, 122 guns, and 534 prisoners.
After the capture of the _Speedy_, the French line-of-battle ships stood along the coast, and proceeded with her, and the unlucky packet which had been the primary cause of the disaster, to Algesiras. During this passage I had ample opportunity of observing the superior manner in which the sails of the _Dessaix_ were cut, and the consequent flat surface exposed to the wind; this contrasting strongly with the bag reefs, bellying sails, and breadbag canvass of English ships of war at that period.
As there was no force at Gibraltar adequate to an attack of the French squadron, the authorities lost no time in transmitting intelligence of their arrival to Sir James Saumarez, then blockading the Spanish squadron in Cadiz. The French meanwhile proceeded to water and refit, evidently with the intention of passing the Straits with the first fair wind.
Quitting Cadiz, Sir James Saumarez immediately sailed for Algesiras with his squadron, consisting of the _Cæsar_, _Venerable_, _Audacious_, _Hannibal_, _Superb_, _Pompée_, _Spencer_, _Calpe_, and _Thames_, these reaching the bay on the 6th of July.
At the time of their first appearance I was conversing with Captain Pallière in his cabin, when a lieutenant reported a British flag over Cabritta point, and soon afterwards the top-gallant masts and pendants of a British squadron became visible. We at once adjourned to the poop, when the surprise of the French, at the sight of a more numerous squadron, became not unreasonably apparent; Captain Pallière asked me “if I thought an attack would be made, or whether the British force would anchor off Gibraltar?” My reply was “that an attack would certainly be made, and that before night both British and French ships would be at Gibraltar,” at the same time adding that when there, it would give me great pleasure to make him and his officers a return for the kindness I had experienced on board the _Dessaix_!
The French admiral, however, determined that his ships should not be carried across the bay if he could help it. Before the British squadron had rounded the point, the French out boats, with kedges and stream anchors, for the purpose of warping in shore, so as to prevent the approaching squadron from cutting them out; but the order was so hurriedly executed, that all three ships were hauled aground, with their sterns presented to the approaching British force; a position which could not have been taken by choice, for nothing could apparently be more easy than to destroy the French ships, which, lying aground stern on, could only use their stern chasers.
To employ their consequently useless hands to some purpose, the French landed a considerable portion of their crews to man the Spanish batteries on the island, as the ship’s guns could not be brought to bear. Two of the British ships anchored, and opened upon the French ships aground, but being exposed to the fire of some of the newly manned forts higher up the bay, the heavy guns of which were admirably handled by the French seamen, both the British vessels slipped their cables, and together with the remainder of the squadron, which did not anchor at all, backed their main-top-sails for the purpose of maintaining their position. The wind, however, blowing from the westward, with a rapid current sweeping round the bay, thwarted this intention, and the British squadron quickly drifted past the enemy, firing as they went.
Perhaps I ought previously to have mentioned an incident demonstrative of the _sang froid_ of my captor. After having satisfied himself that an action with a superior force was inevitable, Capt. Pallière remarked, “that it should not spoil our breakfast,” in which he had invited me to join him. Before the meal was ended, a round shot crashed through the stern of the _Dessaix_, driving before it a shower of broken glass, the _debrís_ of a wine bin under the sofa.
We forthwith jumped up from table, and went on the quarter-deck, but a raking shot from Sir James Saumarez’s ship sweeping a file of marines from the poop, not far from me, I considered further exposure on my part unnecessary, and went below to a position whence I could nevertheless, at times, see what wasgoing on.
The _Hannibal_, having with the others forged past the enemy, gallantly filled and tacked with a view to get between the French ships and the shore, being evidently unaware of their having been hauled aground. The consequence was that she ran upon a shoal, and remained fast, nearly bow on to the broadsides of the French line-of-battle ships, which with the shore batteries and several gunboats opened upon her a concentrated fire. This, from her position, she was unable to return. The result was that her guns were speedily dismounted, her rigging shot away, and a third of her crew killed or wounded; Captain Ferris, who commanded her, having now no alternative but to strike his colours—though not before he had displayed an amount of endurance which excited the admiration of the enemy.
A circumstance now occurred which is entitled to rank amongst the curiosities of war. On the French taking possession of the _Hannibal_, they had neglected to provide themselves with their national ensign, and either from necessity or bravado rehoisted the English flag upside down. This being a well-known signal of distress, was so understood by the authorities at Gibraltar, who, manning all government and other boats with dockyard artificers and seamen, sent them, as it was mistakenly considered, to the assistance of the _Hannibal_.
On the approach of the launches I was summoned on deck by the captain of the _Dessaix_, who seemed doubtful what measures to adopt as regarded the boats now approaching to board the _Hannibal_, and asked my opinion as to whether they would attempt to retake the ship. As there could be no doubt in my mind about the nature of their mission or its result, it was evident that if they were allowed to board, nothing could prevent the seizure of the whole. My advice, therefore, to Captain Pallière was to warn them off by a shot—hoping they would thereby be driven back and saved from capture. Captain Pallière seemed at first inclined to take the advice, but on reflection—either doubting its sincerity, or seeing the real state of the case—he decided to capture the whole by permitting them to board unmolested. Thus boat by boat was captured until all the artificers necessary for the repair of the British squadron, and nearly all the sailors at that time in Gibraltar, were taken prisoners!
In this action the French and Spaniards suffered severely both as regarded ships and men, their masts and hulls being much knocked about, whilst several Spanish gunboats were sunk. The wonder to me was that the British squadron did not anchor, for the French ships being aground, stern on, could have offered little resistance, and must have been destroyed. It is true that the batteries on shore were admirably served, and thus constituted a formidable obstacle; but had not the squadron drifted past the French ships, the latter might have been interposed between the batteries and the British force, when the fire of the former would have been neutralised, and the enemy’s ships aground destroyed with comparatively little loss. It is not, however, my purpose or province to criticise the action, but simply to give the details, as personally witnessed from that extraordinary place, for a British officer, the deck of a French ship!
Neither the imprisonment of the captured crews, nor my own, was of long duration. The day after the action, Sir J. Saumarez sent Capt. Brenton into Algesiras Bay with a flag of truce, to endeavour to effect an exchange of the gallant Capt. Ferris, his officers, and crew. At that time there was no regulated system of exchange between the belligerent powers, but Capt. Brenton succeeded in procuring the release of the crew of the _Hannibal_ and the entrapped artificers, together with the officers and men of the _Speedy_. Admiral Linois would not at first give me up, but, on further consideration, allowed me to go with the other officers to Gibraltar on _parole_. My complete release was eventually effected for the second captain of the _St. Antonio_, taken shortly afterwards.
The French ships having lost no time in communicating with the Spanish admiral at Cadiz, he promptly appeared off Algesiras with a reinforcement of six ships of the line, several frigates, and gunboats. The enemy having by this time warped off their grounded ships, as well as the _Hannibal_, and having by the 12th got them in sea-going order, the whole sailed from Algesiras, followed by the British squadron, which, by great exertions, had been got in readiness for pursuit.
Of the action which subsequently took place I have no personal knowledge, other than that of a scene witnessed by myself from the garden of the commissioner’s house, in which I was staying.
The enemy were overtaken at dusk, soon after leaving the bay, and when it had become dark, Captain Keats, in the _Superb_, gallantly dashed in between the two sternmost ships, firing right and left, and passed on. Of course I do not assert myself to have been personally cognisant of the way in which the attack was made, the firing only being visible from the Rock, but that this is the correct version of the affair rests upon indisputable authority. The movement was so rapidly executed, that the _Superb_ shot ahead before the smoke cleared away, and the Spanish ships, the _Real Carlos_, 112, and the _San Hermenegildo_, 112, mistaking each other for the aggressor, began a mutual attack, resulting in the _Real Carlos_ losing her foretop-mast, the sails of which—falling over her own guns—caught fire. While in this condition the _Hermenegildo_—still engaging the _Real Carlos_ as an enemy—in the confusion fell on board her and caught fire also. Both ships burned till they blew up, and nearly all on board perished; a few survivors only escaping on board the _Superb_ as Captain Keats was taking possession of a _third_ Spanish line-of-battle ship, the _San Antonio_—for whose second captain, as has been said, I was exchanged.
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The autobiography of a seaman (volume 1 of 2)Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (3)
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