Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (4)

The remainder of the combined squadron got safely back to Cadiz after an encounter between the _Formidable_ and _Venerable_. I am aware that the preceding account of the action with the French ships at Algesiras differs in some respects from that compiled by naval historians from the despatches; but this circumstance will not prevent me from giving my own version of a conflict in which it was my misfortune to be a reluctant spectator. The _Real Carlos_, one of the ships blown up, bore the flag of the Spanish Admiral, Moreno, who with Admiral Linois was said to be at the time on board a Spanish frigate.

CHAP. VII.

ADMIRALTY RELUCTANCE TO PROMOTE ME.

LETTER FROM SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE.—SECOND LETTER FROM SIR
ALEXANDER.—BOTH WRITTEN UNKNOWN TO ME.—RELUCTANCE OF LORD ST.
VINCENT TO PROMOTE ME.—LETTER FROM MY FATHER TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
URGING MY RIGHT TO PROMOTION.—LORD ST. VINCENT’S REPLY.—ITS
FALLACY.—HIS LORDSHIP’S REASONING A SUBTERFUGE.—PROMOTION OF MY
FIRST LIEUTENANT REFUSED. MY IMPRUDENT REMARK TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
WHO BECOMES MY ENEMY.—FURTHER EFFORT TO PROMOTE LIEUTENANT
PARKER.—ADMIRALTY REFUSAL ALSO.—LIEUTENANT PARKER’S EVENTUAL
PROMOTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SHAMEFUL TREATMENT.

It has been already stated that not only was the action with the _Gamo_ for some time unnoticed in the customary manner, but the post rank to which the rule of the service entitled me from the result of the action, was withheld. My friends, being naturally surprised at the retention of what was no favour on the part of Lord St. Vincent, but my unquestionable right, respectfully pointed out to his lordship the nature of the services rendered.

The subjoined letter addressed to Lord St. Vincent by my kind uncle Sir Alexander Cochrane, in reference to the _Speedy’s_ escape from a Spanish frigate (see page 100), was written previous to that relating to the capture of the _Gamo_, but is worthy of record on grounds generally connected with the naval service.

“MY LORD,—Yesterday we received accounts of your Lordship’s being
placed at the head of the Admiralty, on which occasion I beg to offer
my congratulations. I never subscribed to the opinion that a naval
officer ought not to be First Lord of the Admiralty, and from your
Lordship’s thorough knowledge of the service, we may now hope for that
support on many occasions which we could not look for from those
who—not having borne the brunt of the day, or being bred to the
Navy—could be but bad judges either of officers’ characters, or the
motives which on many occasions actuate them.

“Doubtless your Lordship has already received numerous weighty
applications for the promotion of young men in the service, nor would
I presume to add to their number but from the obliging expressions
your Lordship once made me in favour of Lord Cochrane, had you
remained longer on this station. I have the less reserve on this
occasion, as I think his Lordship has a claim to be made post, from
the presence of mind by which he lately saved H.M.’s sloop _Speedy_,
which he at present commands. This I beg leave to recount.

“He had taken several prizes off Carthagena, when, one morning, he
found himself close under the guns of a Spanish frigate.

“His only chance of escape was, either to board the frigate, in the
hope of finding her unprepared, or to pass off the _Speedy_ as a
Danish sloop of war.

“With one of these objects he stood towards her under Danish colours,
but, on a near approach, found her too formidable to be carried by the
few hands he had on board. On being hailed to know what brig it was,
he gave, through the medium of a Danish quartermaster, the name of a
Danish brig lately arrived on the station. On being ordered to come on
board the frigate with his commission, he informed the Spaniards that
his orders from the court of Denmark were not to send a boat on board
any foreign man of war, but that if they had any doubts of his not
being a Danish sloop of war, they were at liberty to board him.

“On this a boat left the frigate, but just as they were almost
alongside the _Speedy_, they were informed that she was in quarantine,
being only a few days from Algiers, where the plague at that time
existed. On this the Spanish officers in the boat refused to touch a
rope, and returned to the frigate, when her captain told Lord Cochrane
that he knew his brig, and wished him a pleasant voyage.[26]

-----

Footnote 26:

As the reader is aware, we had previously painted the _Speedy_ in
imitation of the Danish brig.

-----

“I have ever been of opinion that rewards for bold services cannot be
too great, and I must confess, that where one of his Majesty’s ships
is saved by presence of mind similar to what I have related, great
praise is due to her commander.

“Your Lordship will, I hope, excuse me for trespassing a little longer
in favour of my nephew, who is now twenty-five years old, a time of
life that promotion can only be of use. His father has expended his
whole fortune in discoveries which will be of great use to the
public—but the real sufferer is Lord Cochrane. The liberality of your
Lordship’s mind will see this in its true light, and also plead my
excuse for the liberty I have taken.

“Hoping that your Lordship’s health is reinstated, &c. &c.

“I am, your Lordship’s, &c. &c.
“ALEXANDER COCHRANE.

“The Right Hon. Lord St. Vincent.”

I was not aware till recently that Sir Alexander had kindly made this application on my behalf. At the time the preceding letter was written he did not know of the capture of the _Gamo_; the _Ajax_, which he commanded, being then before Alexandria. On learning our success, he again wrote to Lord St. Vincent as follows:—

“_Ajax_, off Alexandria, June 10th, 1801.

“MY LORD,—I some time ago wrote your Lordship in favour of my nephew
Lord Cochrane, recommending his being made post.

“I hope your Lordship received my letter, and that you viewed Lord
Cochrane’s conduct in the light I did. But if my persuasions were not
then judged of sufficient weight, I may now with much confidence come
forward and claim for my nephew the palm of victory in both ways, by
an act hardly equalled in this war of naval miracles, considering the
great inequality of force between the _Speedy_ with fifty-four men,
and a xebec frigate of thirty-two guns and 319 men.

“Well knowing that nothing gives your Lordship more pleasure than
having an opportunity of rewarding merit, let the rank of the person
be what it may, I am confident your Lordship will, on the present
occasion, do every justice to Lord Cochrane, though should his
promotion have arisen from his former exploits it would be more
grateful to my feelings, more especially as his subsequent conduct
will do honour to your Lordship’s appointment.

“I believe I told your Lordship, in my former letter, that Lord
Cochrane has the world before him. He has three younger brothers to
take care of, one of whom boarded at his side[27] when the Spaniard
was carried. Unfortunately he has not served his time; if he had I
dare say your Lordship would think him worthy of promotion for his
conduct on that occasion.

-----

Footnote 27:

Archibald.

-----

“It will give me much pleasure to hear that your Lordship’s health is
quite re-established, and that you may long live to enjoy it, is the
sincere wish of

“Your Lordship’s
“Most obedient and humble servant,
“A. COCHRANE.

“P.S. I wish I could give your Lordship any pleasing intelligence from
this quarter; but ever since the death of Sir R. Abercromby,
procrastination has been the order of the day. Never was a gallant
army so lost as the present. God grant some man of sense may come out
to command them, and save the remnant from destruction. Delay in this
climate is worse than death; five men fall a sacrifice to disease for
one in the field, and yet I don’t think it unhealthy; our troops
suffer from being encamped on burning sands.”

Even this request from a distinguished officer—preferred unknown to me—failed to obtain what was no favour, but my right according to the invariable rule of the service. There was even then clearly some sinister influence at work, of the real cause for which I am to this day ignorant, and can only surmise that it might have arisen from my, no doubt, freely expressed opinions on being appointed to convoy the wretched packet which led to my capture; or perhaps from the still more indiscreet plainness with which I had spoken of the manner in which the French fleet had been unfortunately permitted to escape Lord Keith.

Brenton, in his Life of Lord St. Vincent, thus alludes to the delay in my promotion: “Lord St. Vincent _was so much pressed_ on the subject of Lord Cochrane’s promotion for taking the _Gamo_, that it became almost a point of etiquette with the earl _not to make him a captain_! An illustrious person is reported to have said, ‘My Lord, we must make Lord Cochrane “post;”’ to which Lord St. Vincent replied, ‘The First Lord of the Admiralty knows _no must_.’”

There is no doubt that Captain Brenton received this account from Lord St. Vincent himself, and as the object of his book was to shield his lordship in questionable matters, we may receive this version as it was given to his biographer.

The only direct application that I was at the time aware of having been made was a letter from my father to Lord St. Vincent, _after_ the post rank had been reluctantly conceded by placing me _at the bottom of the list_, below others previously my juniors in the service! My father’s letter and Lord St. Vincent’s reply are subjoined.

“No. 14, Mortimer Street, Sept. 23, 1801.

“MY LORD,—I beg leave, in behalf of my son, Lord Cochrane, who is now
in Scotland, to bring under your Lordship’s view, for your
consideration, some facts and circumstances which may not hitherto
_officially_ have come to your Lordship’s knowledge, from the perusal
of which I flatter myself it will appear to your Lordship that there
are few instances of as much being performed by one individual in the
like space of time, and with a force so inferior.

“When I first heard of Lord Cochrane’s engagement with the _Gamo_, I
reckoned it as a matter not admitting of a doubt that your Lordship
would reward him by immediately appointing him to a post ship, and I
was the more confirmed in this belief from the circumstance that the
_Gamo was not taken by surprise_, but at noonday, after an action of
an hour and ten minutes; during all of which time the _Gamo’s_ yards
were locked with the _Speedy’s_ rigging. The determination of the two
vessels to engage was mutual; Lord Cochrane turned up his ship’s
company at five in the morning, and informed them of his intention to
engage the Spanish frigate.

“The anxiety I must naturally feel for whatever concerns the honour
and rank of my son, led me, on Wednesday last, to inquire at the
Admiralty how his name stood on the post captains’ list. And I must be
allowed to state the surprise and disappointment I felt on finding
several masters and commanders on the Mediterranean station—his
juniors long before, and for several months after, the taking of the
_Gamo_—now placed before him on that list.

“I beg leave to call your Lordship’s attention to what Lord Cochrane’s
feelings must be, and what the situation he will be placed in on
service from this supersession; and whether his being thus postponed
in rank will not have a tendency to detract from the merit of one of
the most gallant actions during this or any other war? And whether it
may not induce the public at large, or the Navy in particular, to
believe that your Lordships have had cause to disapprove of some part
of Lord Cochrane’s conduct?

“If all the circumstances of the engagement had come to your
Lordship’s knowledge in due time, I am persuaded you would have shown
an additional mark of your approbation of Lord Cochrane by making him
post from the date of the capture of the _Gamo_, or, at least, that
you would not have put over him a number of masters and commanders on
the Mediterranean station, who, perhaps equally capable as he of
distinguishing themselves, have not been equally fortunate in similar
opportunities. I am likewise convinced, my Lord, that those individual
officers, who have thus been preferred to him, would not think it any
matter of injustice that Lord Cochrane should retain, as post captain,
the same seniority he held over them, both before and after his
engagement, as master and commander.

“Allow me therefore to request that your Lordship will be pleased to
give Lord Cochrane that rank in the navy which it is presumed he would
have held if the circumstantial accounts of his engagements had
reached your Lordship at an earlier date, or that he had not been so
unfortunate as to have been taken by three French line-of-battle
ships. I cannot suppose any censure is intended to attach to his
conduct on that point; for, in the narrative of his capture, your
Lordship will see that during a chase of several hours upon a wind, he
received the broadside and bow-chasers of a seventy-four gun ship, and
did not strike until, at the distance of musket shot, he received a
full broadside of round and grape from the _Dessaix_.

“I do not, however, my Lord, rest my son’s claim for seniority in
promotion solely upon the capture of the _Gamo_.[28] Although these
particulars, from their being stated in Lord Cochrane’s letters to
Captain Dixon of the _Généreux_, are known to your Lordship, yet I
cannot help here repeating them, as _from their not being published in
the Gazette_ a very erroneous opinion generally prevails that the
_Gamo was taken_ by surprise, and not after so long and close an
engagement as was really the case.

-----

Footnote 28:

“He has,” &c. &c. [Here follows a recapitulation of particulars,
with which the reader is already acquainted.]

-----

“But perhaps, my Lord, I may in the whole of this letter have been
impelled, by the ardour and anxiety of my own feelings, to urge that
which your Lordship’s good intentions may have wholly anticipated
towards Lord Cochrane. If so, my Lord, I have only to entreat your
excuse for a zeal on my part for the honour and character of my son,
for which I hope parental sensations will plead a forcible apology.

“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“DUNDONALD.

“The Right Hon. Lord St. Vincent.”

To this letter Lord St, Vincent next day replied as follows:—

“Admiralty, Sept. 24, 1801.

“MY LORD,—I can have no difficulty in acknowledging that the capture
of the _Gamo_ reflects the highest degree of credit on Lord Cochrane
and the officers and crew of the _Speedy_.

“The first account of that brilliant action reached the Admiralty
_very early in the month of August_ (it was fought on the 6th of May),
previously to which intelligence had been received of the capture of
the _Speedy_, by which Lord Cochrane was made prisoner.

“Until his exchange could be effected, and the necessary inquiry into
the cause and circumstances of the loss of that sloop had taken place,
it was impossible for the Board, consistently with its usual forms, to
mark its approbation of his Lordship’s conduct. Lord Cochrane was
promoted to the rank of post captain on the 8th of August, the day on
which the sentence of acquittal for the loss of the _Speedy was
received_—which was all that could under existing circumstances be
done.

“Having entered into this explanation with your Lordship, it remains
for me only to add that, however disposed the Board might be to pay
attention to the merits of his Lordship, it could not, consistent with
its public duty, give him rank from the time of the capture of the
_Gamo_—a measure quite unprecedented—without doing an act of injustice
to other deserving officers.

“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“ST. VINCENT.

“The Earl of Dundonald.”

I shall not shrink from canvassing this matter, the less because Lord St. Vincent has been represented as considering himself bored on the subject. An account of the capture of the _Gamo_ did reach the Admiralty, though later than it ought to have done, and was unjustifiably laid aside. Little that I effected was allowed to find its way into the _Gazette_! Even the log extracts given in the two last chapters, though relating to matters which occurred sixty years ago, are, for the most part, news to the public of the present generation.

But supposing that information relative to the capture of the _Gamo_ had not reached the Admiralty before the news of my being made prisoner, even then it clearly entitled me to post rank from _the date of my acquittal_. Lord St. Vincent asserted that it entitled me to promotion only from the date on which news of my acquittal _was received_! Reference to the Navy List at the time will show that the postponement of my rank was rather owing to the bane of the Admiralty—family influence, and that some of my former juniors were put over my head because it was politically imperative on the Board to promote others before me.

That my promotion to post rank for a previous action was impossible, because I had some time afterwards the misfortune, whilst in a trumpery sloop, to be captured by three French ships of the line; and therefore could not be promoted “_until my exchange could be effected_,” was a subterfuge unworthy of Lord St. Vincent. Had this been the rule of the Admiralty, officers taken prisoners by the French could neither have been tried nor promoted, for _there was no system of exchange_, so that the reward of their services would not depend upon the discretion of the Admiralty or the generosity of their country, but on the will of the enemy’s Minister of Marine, who might detain them prisoners till the close of the war.

By Lord St. Vincent’s interpretation of the Admiralty rule, I should not have been promoted _at all_, or even tried for the loss of the _Speedy_, if, as Lord St. Vincent asserted, no promotion could be given till “my exchange was effected.” The fact is, that I never was exchanged, in the Admiralty sense of the term; for at that period, as has been said, there was no exchange of prisoners with France, nor had any previously taken place for many years. The _Hannibal_ and _Speedy’s_ prisoners owed their liberation to the fact that the French did not know what to do with them; and I owed mine to the fact of Captain Keats having, a few days after I had been liberated on parole, taken a ship of the line, the _San Antonio_; for whose second captain, by courtesy of Admiral Linois towards that officer, my liberation was effected.

Still it was not so much the neglect to promote me, of which proper complaint was made, as the injustice of placing over my head especially, a younger man and a junior officer, gazetted on the same day for a subsequent service, to the success of which he in no degree contributed.[29] Further discussion is unnecessary, my object being to show the principle, or rather want of it, which prevailed at the Admiralty where influence was concerned.

-----

Footnote 29:

The action in the Straits of Gibraltar, alluded to at page 128, when
Captain Keats destroyed two line-of-battle ships, and captured a
third, the remainder of the squadron being witnesses only.

-----

It must, however, be explained, that these remarks in no way apply to the officer promoted, but to the act of promotion. That officer was my former messmate Lieutenant—afterwards Admiral—Dundas, a truly honourable man, whom, in later years, I was proud to call my friend. Strangely enough, the Admiralty which had placed him before me on the list, killed him in the end through grief at his inability to reform abuses; he having been called to the Board, where he worked so assiduously in the vain endeavour to purge the corruption around him, that his health became undermined, and he was one day found dead in a retiring room of the Augean establishment at Whitehall.

Before quitting the Mediterranean, a letter was addressed by me to Lord St. Vincent, requesting him to promote my gallant First Lieutenant Parker, who, as stated in my despatch, was severely wounded in boarding the _Gamo_. No answer being returned to this application, up to the period of my arrival in England, another letter was forwarded to his lordship, which met with the same reception, and afterwards a third, which produced from Lord St. Vincent the reply that my application could not be entertained, for that “it was unusual to promote two officers for such a service,—besides which the small number of men killed on board the _Speedy_ did not warrant the application.”

It was impossible not to feel nettled at a reply so unexpected: that because few men had been killed on board the _Speedy_, her first lieutenant was considered unworthy of promotion, though terribly cut up. To argue with a First Lord is no doubt an imprudent thing for a naval officer to attempt, and my remonstrance in this instance had such an effect as to get my name placed on the black list of the Admiralty, never again to be erased.

In my letter to Lord St. Vincent, the following incautious observations were made, viz. that “his reasons for not promoting Lieutenant Parker, because there were only three men killed on board the _Speedy_, were in opposition _to his lordship’s own promotion to an earldom_, as well as that of his flag-captain to knighthood, and his other officers to increased rank and honours: for that in the battle from which his lordship derived his title there was only _one man_ killed on board his own flagship, so that there were more casualties in my sloop than in his line-of-battle ship.”

From the receipt of that letter Lord St. Vincent became my bitter enemy, and not he only, but his successors thought it incumbent on them to perpetuate his lordship’s displeasure. My reply was no doubt keenly felt at the time, when it was a common remark in the Navy that the battle of St. Vincent was gained by the inshore squadron, under Nelson, the commander-in-chief being merely a spectator, at a distance which involved only the loss of one man in his own ship.

Notwithstanding this refusal of the First Lord to promote my lieutenant, my determination was to persevere with the Board collectively, and accordingly I addressed an official letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Nepean, embodying Lord St. Vincent’s reply, and concluding, that “if their Lordships judge by the small number killed, I have only to say that it was fortunate the enemy did not point their guns better:” indeed, had I not taken care to place the _Speedy_ in a position where the Spanish guns went over her, many would have swelled the list whom it was my happiness to have saved.

This letter was dated May 12th, 1802, and, receiving no reply, the annexed official letter was addressed to their Lordships on the same subject:—

“14 Old Cavendish-street, May 17, 1802.

“MY LORDS,—The anxiety I feel for the promotion of a meritorious
officer, Lieutenant Parker, late of the _Speedy_, whose name I have
not seen in the recent list of commanders, even though a very
extensive promotion has taken place, induces me to address your
Lordships.

“Lieutenant Parker served as sole lieutenant of the _Speedy_ at the
capture of the _Gamo_, of 32 guns and 319 men, carried by boarding,
after an action of upwards of an hour; during the greatest part of
which time the yards and rigging of the vessels were locked together.
In boarding and carrying the Spanish vessel he was severely wounded by
a sword, run through his thigh, and a musket-ball lodged in his chest.

“I have always understood it to be an invariable rule with the Board
of Admiralty, to promote officers of unimpeachable character who have
distinguished themselves in action, or who have been first lieutenants
of His Majesty’s ships of war at the capture of vessels of superior
force—especially of a force so very superior as that of the _Gamo_ to
the _Speedy_; the latter, as your Lordships know, mounting 14
4-pounders, having on board only 54 men, whilst the force of the
_Gamo_ was 32 guns, with a complement of men six times greater than
that of the _Speedy_.

“When these circumstances are brought to your Lordships’ recollection,
I am fully convinced that you will see proper to reward Lieutenant
Parker by appointing him to the rank of commander in His Majesty’s
service, which will tend to cherish and promote that spirit of
exertion among the lieutenants, subordinate officers, and crew,
without whose zealous co-operation the endeavours of the captain alone
would prove of small avail.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.

“To the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty.”

On the 26th of May the following reply was received from the
Secretary:—

“Admiralty Office, 26th May, 1802.

“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your Lordship’s letter to me of the 17th inst., and the
representation which accompanied it, and am commanded by their
Lordships to acquaint you that your application to me is perfectly
regular, _but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the
Board_.

“I am, &c. &c.
“E. NEPEAN.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

Determined not to be foiled in what I conceived to be the right of
Lieutenant Parker, I replied to the Secretary as follows:—

“Old Cavendish-street, May 27th, 1802.

“SIR,—I have been favoured with your letter acknowledging that you had
received and read to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty my
letter of the 17th inst., and that you are commanded by their
Lordships to acquaint me that my application to you was perfectly
regular, but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the
Board.

“I have, therefore, to request that you will inform the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, although I have received your
letter, still I wait in expectation to be favoured with an answer to
the representation which, through you, I had the honour to transmit to
their Lordships.

“I am, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.

“E. Nepean, Esq., Sec. to the Admiralty.”

The reply to this necessarily cut short all further correspondence.

“Admiralty Office, 29th May, 1802.

“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your letter of the 27th inst., and have nothing in command
from their Lordships to communicate to you.

“I am, &c. &c.
“EVAN NEPEAN.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

In spite of this rebuff, I nevertheless continued to persevere, but
it was not till some years afterwards that the promotion of
Lieutenant Parker was obtained, with a result to that able and
gallant officer which proved his ruin, and eventually caused his
death.

The circumstances under which this took place were positively
diabolical. Despairing of promotion, Lieutenant Parker had retired
to a little farm near Kinsale, by the cultivation of which, in
addition to his half-pay, he was realising an existence for his
family. From my determined perseverance on his behalf, he was at
length made commander, and ordered to join the _Rainbow_ sloop,
represented to be stationed in the West Indies. Selling off
everything, even to his household furniture, he proceeded to
Barbadoes, and reported himself to Sir Alexander Cochrane; but, as
the vessel could not be found, Sir Alexander furnished him with a
passage to look for her at the Bermudas, where he supposed she might
be fitting for sea. Not finding her there, Lieutenant Parker
returned to Barbadoes, when _it became evident that no such vessel
was on the North American station_.

On ascertaining this, poor Parker returned to England a ruined man.
Lord Melville, who had succeeded as First Lord, expressed his
surprise and regret that such a circumstance should have occurred,
and promised the unhappy man that he should not only be amply
compensated for the loss and expense attending his outfit and
fruitless voyage to the West Indies, but that he should have another
command on the first opportunity. This generous intention was
however counteracted, for _he never received either the one or the
other_.

Lieutenant Parker’s loss, consequent to the sale of his property,
the expense attendant on settling his family, together with his
outfit and voyage, amounted to upwards of 1000_l._ His prospects
ruined, his domestic arrangements destroyed, and his pride wounded,
his spirit and constitution gradually gave way, and at length
overwhelmed with sorrow he sank into a premature grave, leaving a
wife and four daughters to deplore the loss of their only protector.

I never could find out who had thus imposed on one of the most
gallant officers in the Navy this infamous deception, concocted,
doubtless, out of pure malevolence to myself. Be he whom he may, I
am very sorry that it is not in my power to hold up his name to the
execration of posterity. It is even at the present day the duty of
the Admiralty to remedy the injury inflicted on his destitute
family—for he had left four daughters unprovided for, who had no
opportunity to escape from indigence.

CHAP. VIII.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.

POLITICAL FAVOURITISM.—REFUSAL OF FURTHER EMPLOYMENT.—NAVAL
CORRUPTION.—DOCKYARD PRACTICES.—SHAMEFUL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR.—ECONOMY THE REMEDY.—RESULTS OF MEDICAL ECONOMY.—EMPTY PHYSIC
BOTTLES.—SEAMEN’S AVERSION TO THE SERVICE.—A POST CAPTAIN AT
COLLEGE.

It will be evident on a perusal of the previous chapter, that there was no fixed principle for the promotion of officers who had distinguished themselves, but that however desirous the Board might be to reward their services, it was in the power of persons holding inferior offices to thwart the intentions of the Board itself.

Were such a principle admitted, nothing could be more detrimental to the service. Let every officer know the regulated reward for a national service, with the certainty that he cannot be deprived of it, and rely upon it, that whenever opportunity presents itself, the service will be performed. There is nothing mercenary, or even selfish about this; but, on the contrary, an ambition which should be carefully fostered.

In my own case, I can conscientiously avow my leading motive to have been that of exerting myself to the utmost in the hope of thereby attaining promotion in my profession, to which promotion the capture of an enemy’s frigate, as well as of a large number of privateers and other vessels, had entitled me, according to a judicious rule for the encouragement of efforts useful to the nation—to a place on the list, from which I conceived myself unjustly excluded by the promotion of a younger man, a junior commander too, for no great apparent reason than that of his father being a personal and political friend of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

To those who may think my conduct towards the First Lord and the Board disrespectful, I can only say, that were my life to begin anew, with my present experience of consequences, I would again pursue the same course. I cannot imagine anything more detrimental to the interests of the Navy and the nation, than political favouritism on the part of the Admiralty—of itself sufficient to damp that ardour which should form one of the first requisites for future command. I would rather say to the young officer—“If you have, in the exercise of your profession, acquired a right which is wrongfully withheld—demand it, stick to it with unshaken pertinacity;—none but a corrupt body can possibly think the worse of you for it; even though you may be treated like myself—you are doing your country good service by exposing favouritism, which is only another term for corruption.”

Favouritism on the part of the Admiralty must ever be the bane of the Navy, and may prove its ruin. Either let it be understood that the institution is a parliamentary vote market, or that it is what it ought to be—an institution for the promotion of zeal by the reward of merit. Only let it not sustain both characters, or between the two stools the country may one day go to the ground.

Such was the offence taken by the authorities at my persistence in my own right, and in that of the officers under my command, that an application to the Board for another ship met with refusal; and as it was clear that Lord St. Vincent’s administration did not again intend to employ me, the time on my hands was devoted to an investigation of those abuses which were paralysing the Navy; not that this was entered upon from any spirit of retaliation on the Admiralty, but as preparatory to the more ambitious aim of getting into Parliament, and exposing them.

One of the most crying evils of our then naval administration had fallen heavily upon me, though so young in command—viz. the Admiralty Courts; but for the peculations consequent on which, the cruise of the _Speedy_ ought to have sent home myself, officers, and crew, with competence. As it was, we got all the fighting, whilst the Admiralty Court and its hungry parasites monopolised the greater portion of our hard-won prize-money. In many cases they took the whole! and in one case brought me in debt, though the prize was worth several thousand pounds!

Hitherto no naval officer had ventured to expose, in Parliament or out of it, this or indeed any other gross abuse of the naval service; and having nothing better to do, want of employment appeared to offer a fitting opportunity for constituting myself the Quixote of the profession; sparing no pains to qualify for the task, though well aware of its arduous, if not hopeless nature—as directed against a mass of corruption, such as—it is to be hoped—may never again strike at the noblest arm of our national safety a blow worse than any enemy can inflict.

After what has been stated with regard to my unpleasant relations with Lord St. Vincent and his Board of Admiralty, it will perhaps be better not personally to enter on the subject of then existing naval abuses, lest I might be suspected of exaggerating their extent. Some such explanation is necessary in justification of the course which I subsequently thought it my duty to pursue, but it will answer every purpose to have recourse to the experience of a contemporary officer—Captain Brenton, the biographer of Lord St. Vincent—in justification of my self-imposed task:—

“In the first edition of the Naval History, I have commented on the
profligate system of hired vessels and transports. In this—borough
influence reigned paramount, and the most solid information was
disregarded when the perpetrator of the greatest frauds was a
supporter of Government.”—(BRENTON’S _Life of Lord St. Vincent_, p.
167.)

“A ship purchased by a man of influence was a certain fortune to him.
He cleared his money in the first year at the rate of 400_l._ per
month, and if the ship were coppered at 7500_l._ per annum. About
twenty copper-bottomed transports were lying for three years in the
harbour of Messina, without being employed in any duty.”—(p. 169.)

The expense of these alone, no doubt all owned by “men of influence” as Captain Brenton terms them, was for the three years 270,000_l._ As these transports formed only a trifling illustration of the system, there is little wonder at the enormous accumulation of the national debt, for results so inadequate.

Captain Brenton might have gone farther, and stated with great truth, that not only were transports hired from men of influence, but that vessels utterly worthless were purchased by the Government from their political supporters, and then patched up into ships of war! It was my misfortune to be subsequently appointed to _a collier_ so converted—with what result will appear in the sequel.

From the ships let us follow Captain Brenton into the dockyards:—

“When Mr. Colquhoun, in his celebrated police reports, stated that the
Government was plundered from the dockyards at the rate of _a million
a year_, he was supposed to have exceeded all probability. I am
satisfied he was under the mark, and if the _consequences_ of these
frauds are added to the amount of peculation, the aggregate will be
frightful. The manner in which the villany was carried on was dreadful
indeed. _Whole ships’ crews were destroyed at one fell swoop._ Every
ship was supposed to have a certain number of bolts driven to secure
her fabric. The tops and points of the bolts only were driven, and the
rest was carried away. It is probable that the loss of the _York_ of
64 guns, and the _Blenheim_ of 74 guns, was the consequence. The
_Albion_, 74, we know to have been nearly lost by this hellish
fraud.”—(BRENTON, pp. 159, 160.)

“I can remember what our slop clothing was, for which the poor seamen
were charged an extravagant price; the contract being _always given as
a matter of favour for electioneering purposes_.”—(p. 156.)

“Not only were the grossest impositions practised in the supply of the
most important stores, by sending in damaged goods, but even the raw
materials were _again sold_ before they reached their
destination.”—(p. 157.)

“At the cooperage of Deptford, 1020_l._ 10_s._ 5_d._ was charged for
work proved to be worth only 37_l._ 2_s._ 3_d._ At the cooperage at
Plymouth, the king’s casks were stolen, and sixty-four of them were
found in one brewery.”—(p. 183.)

“It was a common expression with the receiving clerks that they ‘_had
not been hampered_,—’ when they refused to receive articles into
store. The ‘hampering’ meant a bribe in the shape of wine or other
articles, as the price of their certificates.”—(p. 155.)

“It would scarcely be believed to what extent peculation was carried
on in every department.”—(p. 155.)

“Hampers of wine and ale were liberally supplied to the inspectors of
timber, and I conclude that the same treatment was applied to the
measuring clerks of the dockyard.”—(p. 179.)

“From the foregoing it may be inferred that the dockyards were the
most fruitful sources of plunder and national ruin.”—(p. 180.)

“Report No. 6 relates to the dockyards, wherein a shameful system of
plunder had long existed.”

“Reports 10 and 11 state other abuses to an enormous extent, so that
Lord St. Vincent used the elegant expression that ‘_our dockyards
stank of corruption_.’”—(p. 190.)

From this disgraceful picture let us pass on to another still more revolting:—

“The victualling establishment at home was not less corrupt. The
charge for the supply of prisoners of war was ample, but three-fourths
of the amount was pilfered. The same nefarious system pursued in the
hospitals abroad was followed at home in a more guarded manner, and
_fortunes were made_ by cheating the sick and wounded seamen out of
the comforts and necessaries allowed them by a grateful country. Lord
Cochrane endeavoured to procure better rations and treatment for the
French prisoners, but the charge of sick and wounded prisoners of war
fell in its administration into the hands of a set of villains whose
seared consciences were proof against the silent but eloquent
pleadings of their fellow-creatures.”—(p. 165.)

“Report No. 7 relates to the hospitals, beginning with Stonehouse at
Devonport. Here was discovered waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance,
and villany to a disgusting extent. Four thousand gallons of porter
were consumed in six months, being more than four times the proportion
used in Haslar. On board the _Calne_ hulk, appropriated to sick
prisoners of war, the surgeon’s chief assistant kept a table for the
officers at the cost of 1500_l._ or 2000_l._ a year. He could afford
the purser a large salary, in lieu of his share of the profit of the
concern. The worst and most scandalous feature was, that when the
wretches in the wardroom were rioting in luxury they were consuming
the necessaries which the Government had liberally supplied for the
use of the sick prisoners of war.

“I hope there is sufficient virtue in Parliament to punish _great
delinquents_, if not the country will not stagger long under the
practice of these blood-sucking leeches.”—(_Letter of Lord St.
Vincent, quoted by Brenton._)

Abroad the condition of affairs was infinitely worse, both as regarded the navy and army. The following extract from the “Annual Register,” at a period when the press hardly dared to speak truth, will serve as a sample of the practices prevailing wherever an official staff was to be found:—

“The abuses committed in the West Indies are said to exceed everything
that was ever stated in romance. The commissioners are stated to have
discovered that forged bills and receipts, for articles never
purchased, and bills drawn on Government indorsed under forged and
fictitious names, were common and notorious. They found a most base
collusion between the officers of Government and the merchants and
contractors, by which the latter were allowed to charge stores at a
much higher rate than they might have been obtained for in the market.
In one instance it was discovered, that to conceal this iniquity, a
bribe of 18,000_l._ had been given; in another a bribe of 35,000_l._
Vessels, houses, stores, &c. were usually hired at most extravagant
rates, in consequence of fraudulent contracts, where others might have
been obtained much cheaper. But worse than either of these iniquities
was the diabolical fraud of suffering the merchants and contractors to
furnish His Majesty’s troops with inferior and bad rum, and other
articles, at an extravagant rate, by which the lives of the troops
were endangered, as well as the country defrauded. And, for the
purpose of committing these practices, all free competition for the
supply of articles was prevented; and every obstacle was put in the
way, even of the purchase of bills on the Treasury. They were dated in
one island and negotiated in another; and they were sold at a much
more advantageous exchange than that at which the officers debited
themselves in their accounts.”

There is no doubt but that Lord St. Vincent was desirous of putting a stop to this national plunder, and the wholesale destruction of sick, wounded, and prisoners, which was its direct consequence; but the means he took were inadequate. His lordship’s remedy was “_economy!_” leaving the influential delinquents in quiet possession of their places. The most extravagant contracts and profuse expenditure of the public money were thus to be cured by no expenditure at all on necessary objects.

One of Lord St. Vincent’s agents in this notable scheme, was a Dr. Baird, who possessed his lordship’s highest confidence. To this person was confided the task of regenerating the hospitals. As may be supposed, from his profession, economy in medicine was the first step. An order was issued that blue ointment and pills, requisite only for complaints that might be avoided, were doled out in _minimum_ quantity. The consequence was, that the captains and surgeons of ships of war had to purchase these essential medicines out of their own pockets! more especially as a subsequent order was issued that no such complaints, should be treated in the hospitals!

A more barbarous regulation was enforced, viz, that from the expense of _lint_ in dressing wounds, _sponge_ should be substituted, as it might be used over again! The result was that even slight cases became infected by the application of sponges which had been used on putrescent sores, and this shameful practice cost the lives or limbs of many. I was myself on a survey at the Devonport hospital, where seven persons had lost limbs from this cause! and proposed to the other surveying captains to draw up a representation to the Admiralty on the consequences of applying infected sponge; but the advice was not followed for fear of giving offence.

One of the unfortunate sufferers, amongst others, was a son of the boatswain or gunner of the then flagship, the _Salvador del Mundo_. The poor boy had bruised his shin, to which an infected sponge was applied, and he lost his leg! Persons so mutilated had no claim on the service for pension or reward. It was this very hospital to which Captain Brenton, in the preceding extracts, applied the terms “waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance, and villany to a disgusting extent.” The remedy was the application of infected sponge!!

Dr. Baird had the oddest possible notions of the mission with which he was entrusted. As to striking at the root of an evil he had not the most remote conception, otherwise than by saving. He one day said to me; “The extravagance of this place is incredible. I have to-day found what will save one thousand pounds.” “Ah, Doctor,” said I, “what is that?” “Why,” replied he, “would you believe it, in the cellars under the hospital I have found tens of thousands of empty physic bottles! Did you ever hear of such waste!” And the doctor set busily to work to dispose of the empty bottles in order to pay for his medicines,—this being his idea of correcting the most crying evil of the hospital.

A still more absurd instance of the doctor’s economy gave rise at the time to considerable amusement. Everybody knows that a sailor requires as much looking after as a child. It was Jack’s practice when sick in hospital, to get out and scale a wall for the purpose of smuggling in spirits, these of course undoing the little that medical treatment could effect. To put an end to the practice, the authorities had ordered the wall to be raised, but Dr. Baird stopped the work, because a coating of broken glass-bottles on the top of the old wall would be more economical to the nation and equally effectual! A _chevaux de frise_ of broken glass was accordingly put on, but, to the doctor’s annoyance, Jack, with a brickbat, pounded up the broken glass, and got to the spirit shop as before. Whereupon the doctor declared his belief that “sailors were as far gone in wickedness as the hospital authorities themselves.”

These were the kinds of reform adopted, the ultimate result being that Lord St. Vincent was more blamed than had been any of his predecessors, and was, on quitting the Admiralty, driven to the undignified alternative of _filing a string of affidavits in the King’s Bench in defence of his character_![30]

-----

Footnote 30:

See Brenton, vol. ii. p. 356.

-----

Much has been said about the difficulty of manning the Navy, by persons who had not a knowledge of the arbitrary and cruel practices above mentioned, and of many others on which it would be tedious to dilate, but which, under pretence of zeal for the promotion of the service, rendered the service at that time almost intolerable. No man acquainted with the facts can wonder that interminable cruises, prohibition to land in port, constant confinement without salutary change of food, and consequent disease engendering total debility, should have excited disgust, and even terror of a sailor’s life; to which may be added, the condemnation of invalids to harbour-duty, far more severe than duty afloat, with no chance of escape but by a return to actual service, where, strange to say, though unfit, such men were again received!

The instances of abuses just given form but a brief outline of the state of the Navy at that period. From these the reader may imagine the rest. Suffice it to say, that I used all diligence to store both my memory and note-book with facts, to be used when I might be able to expose them with effect.

No opportunity, however, immediately occurring, I betook myself to the College of Edinburgh, then distinguished by possessing some of the most eminent professors in the kingdom. In the early part of this volume the desultory and imperfect education which fell to my lot has been noticed. It had, nevertheless, sufficed to convince me of the truth of the axiom that “knowledge is power,” and also to decide that in my case power if proportioned to knowledge could be of no very high order. It was therefore my determination to increase both to the best of my ability.

It was, perhaps, an unusual spectacle for a post-captain fresh from the quarter-deck, to enter himself as a student among boys. For my self-imposed position I cared nothing, and was only anxious to employ myself to the best advantage. With what success may be judged from the fact of my never being but once absent from lectures, and that to attend the funeral of a near relative.

Whilst at Edinburgh, I made few acquaintances, preferring secluded lodgings and study without interruption to the gaiety of my contemporaries. Besides which, if my object of getting into Parliament were to be accomplished, it was necessary to be economical, since all that the Admiralty Court had been pleased to leave me of my prize-money would not more than suffice to satisfy the yearnings of a small borough, for which the only hope of election was by outbribing my antagonists.

Amongst my contemporaries at the Edinburgh College was Lord Palmerston, who resided with the most eminent of the then Scotch professors, Dugald Stewart, and attended the classes at the same time with myself.

I might also mention others, of whose society in after life I should have been proud, had not the shameful treatment which it was afterwards my lot to experience from a corrupt faction, driven me from society at a time when it ought to have afforded me a welcome relaxation from hard and unintermitting exertions in the service of my country.

CHAP. IX.

EMPLOYMENT IN THE _ARAB_.

APPOINTMENT TO THE ARAB.—PROJECTED INVASION BY NAPOLEON.—THE ARAB
ORDERED TO WATCH THE FRENCH COAST.—THEN TO CRUISE IN THE NORTH
SEA.—RETIREMENT OF LORD ST. VINCENT.

On the renewal of war with France in 1803, application was made by me to the Admiralty for a ship, first taking the precaution to visit the various dockyards to see what vessels were ready, or in preparation. My object was to obtain a suitable vessel, which should enable me to operate inshore and harass the French coast in the Atlantic, as the _Speedy_ had done the Spanish coast in the Mediterranean. My success there formed sufficient warrant for such an application, as, previous to the Peace of Amiens, the enemy’s coasting trade from Bayonne to Boulogne had been carried on almost with impunity.

My application was made to Lord St. Vincent, who informed me that at present there was no vessel available. Having ascertained beforehand what vessels were in preparation for sea, I began to enumerate several, all of which his lordship assured me were promised to others. On mentioning the names of some in a less forward state, an objection was raised by his lordship that they were too large. This was met by a fresh list, but these his lordship said were not in progress. In short, it became clear that the British Navy contained no ship of war for me.

I frankly told his lordship as much, remarking that as “the Board was evidently of opinion that my services were not required, it would be better for me to go back to the College of Edinburgh and pursue my studies, with a view of occupying myself in some other employment.” His lordship eyed me keenly, to see whether I really meant what I said, and observing no signs of flinching,—for beyond doubt my countenance showed signs of disgust at such unmerited treatment,—he said, “Well, you shall have a ship. Go down to Plymouth, and there await the orders of the Admiralty.”

Thanking his lordship, I left him, and repairing to Plymouth, found myself appointed to the _Arab_. There was some difficulty in finding her, for my sanguine imagination had depicted a rakish craft, ready to run over to the French coast, and return with a goodly batch of well-laden coasters. In place of this, a dockyard attendant showed me the bare ribs of a collier, which had been purchased into the service in the manner described by Captain Brenton, as quoted in the last chapter. I would not have cared for this, but a single glance at the naked timbers showed me that, to use a seaman’s phrase, “she would sail like a haystack.” It was not my wish however to complain, but rather to make the best of the wretched craft provided for me; and therefore there was nothing to be done but to wait patiently whilst she was completed,—for the most part with old timber from broken-up vessels.

As soon as the _Arab_ was ready for sea, instead of being permitted to make a foray on the French coast—for which, however, she was ill-adapted—orders were given to take a cruise round the Land’s End, into St. George’s Channel, and return to Plymouth.

This experimental service being accomplished, without result of any kind, although we sighted several suspicious vessels, which from our bad sailing qualities we could not examine; on our return, the _Arab_ was ordered to join the force then lying in the Downs, quietly watching the movements of the enemy on the opposite coast.