Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (5)

Though Napoleon had not a marine capable of competing with ours, he had, during the last war, become aware that any number of French gun-boats could sail along their own coasts under the protection of the numerous batteries, and hence he conceived the project of uniting these with others at Boulogne, so as to form collectively a flotilla capable of effecting an invasion of England, whose attention was to be divided by an attempt on Ireland, for which purpose an army and fleet were assembled at Brest.

The means by which this invasion of the Kentish or Sussex coast was to be effected is worth adverting to. The various towns of France were invited to construct flat-bottomed boats, to be distinguished by the names of the towns and departments which furnished them. They were divided into three classes, and transported to the nearest port-town, thence coastwise to Boulogne, there to be filled with troops, and convoyed to the English shores by ships of war. It has been the custom to deride this armament, but had it not been for Nelson’s subsequent victory at Trafalgar, I see no cause to doubt that sooner or later it might have been successful. In our day of steam-ships the way to prevent the success of a similar project is by the maintenance of a navy more efficiently manned than modern governments appear to think necessary for national safety.

I do not mean efficiency as to the _number_ of vessels of war—for in my early day the number was very great, but their efficiency, from causes already mentioned, very trifling. I mean, rather, that every care should be taken to keep a sufficient number in a high state of discipline; but above all, that the stimulus of reward for merit should be so applied, as that parliamentary influence should not interfere with officers, nor a paltry hankering after saving with the crews.

The _Arab_ was sent to watch the enemy in Boulogne. To those acquainted with the collier build, even as they appear in the Thames to this day, it is scarcely necessary to say that she would not work to windward. With a fair wind it was not difficult to get off Boulogne, but to get back with the same wind was—in such a craft—all but impossible. Our only way of effecting this was, by watching the tide, to drift off as well as we could. A gale of wind anywhere from N.E. to N.W. would infallibly have driven us on shore on the French coast.

Under such circumstances, the idea of effectively watching the port, as understood by me,—viz. to look out for troop-boats inshore,—was out of the question, our whole attention being necessarily directed to the vessel’s safety. Considering this compromised, I wrote to the admiral commanding, that the _Arab_ was of no use for the service required, as she would not work to windward, and that her employment in such a service could only result in our loss by shipwreck on the French coast.

My letter was no doubt forwarded to the Admiralty, for shortly afterwards an order arrived for the _Arab_ to convoy the Greenland ships from Shetland, and then to cruise in the North Sea, to _protect the fisheries_. The order was, in fact, to cruise to the N. E. of the Orkneys, _where no vessel fished, and where consequently there were no fisheries to protect_!!! Not so much as a single whaler was seen from the mast-head during the whole of that lonely cruise, though it was as light by night as by day.

The Board had fairly caught me, but a more cruel order could not have been devised by official malevolence. It was literally naval exile in a tub, regardless of expense to the nation. To me it was literally a period of despair, from the useless inactivity into which I was forced, without object or purpose, beyond that of visiting me with the weight of official displeasure.

I will not trouble the reader with any reminiscences of this degrading command, or rather dreary punishment, for such it was no doubt intended to be, as depriving me of the opportunity of exerting or distinguishing myself; and this for no better reason, than my having most truly, though perhaps inconsiderately, urged, in justification of the promotion of the gallant lieutenant of the _Speedy_, that all Lord St. Vincent’s chief officers had been promoted for an action in which fewer men fell in a three-decker than in my brig.

Of this protracted cruise it is sufficient to state that my appointment to the _Arab_ was dated October 5th, 1803, and that she returned to England on the 1st of December, 1804, a period which formed a blank in my life.

On my arrival, Lord St. Vincent, fortunately for me, had quitted, or rather had been compelled to retire from the Admiralty. The late Duke of Hamilton, the premier peer of Scotland, and my excellent friend, was so indignant at my ignominious expulsion from active service, where alone it would be beneficial to the country, that, unsolicited by any one, he strongly impressed upon Lord Melville, the successor of Lord St. Vincent, the necessity of relieving me from that penal hulk, the _Arab_, and repairing the injustice which had been inflicted on me, by employing me on more important service. Lord Melville admitted the injustice, and promptly responded to the appeal, by transferring me from the wretched craft in which I had been for fifteen months in exile—to the _Pallas_, a new fir-built frigate of 32 guns.

CHAP. X.

CRUISE OF THE _PALLAS_.

ORDERS OF THE PALLAS EMBARGOED.—CAPTURE OF THE CAROLINA.—ARRIVAL OF THE
PRIZES.—CAPTURE OF PAPAL BULLS.—A CHASE.—ADMIRAL YOUNG.—ELECTION FOR
HONITON.—NOVEL ELECTION TACTICS.—BECOME A REFORMER.—PAINFUL RESULTS.

On my appointment to the _Pallas_, Lord Melville considerately gave me permission to cruise for a month off the Azores under Admiralty orders. The favour—the object of which was to give me an opportunity of trying my luck against the enemy, independent of superior command—was no doubt granted in consideration of the lengthened, not to say malevolent, punishment to which I had been condemned in the _Arab_.

My orders were to join my ship at Plymouth, with a promise that my instructions should be forwarded. In place of this, and in disregard of Lord Melville’s intention, the Admiralty orders were embargoed by the Port Admiral, Sir W. Young, who had taken upon himself to recopy them, and thus to convert them into orders _issued under his authority_. The effect was, to enable him to lay claim to the admiral’s share of any prize-money that we might make, even though captured out of his jurisdiction, which extended no further than the Sound.

The mention of this circumstance requires brief comment, in order to account for the result which followed. Perhaps the most lucid explanation that can be given will be an extract from a letter of Lord St. Vincent to the Admiralty when in command of the Channel fleet. “I do not know,” says Lord St. Vincent, “what I shall do if you feel a difficulty to give orders to despatch such ships as you may judge necessary to place under my command. I have a notion that he (Admiral Young) _wishes to have the power of issuing orders for their sailing, in order to entitle him to share prize-money_!!” (BRENTON, vol. ii. p. 249.) From this extract from Lord St. Vincent, it is evident that if Admiral Young, according to the system then prevailing, had the power—as on his Lordship’s authority unquestionably appears—of paralysing the operations of a whole fleet, on the question of sharing prize-money, remonstrance on my part against the violation of Admiralty promises, made by Lord Melville himself, would have been disregarded. Nothing was therefore left but to submit.

The first object was to equip the _Pallas_ with all speed; and for this we were obliged to resort to impressment, so much had my do-nothing cruise in the _Arab_ operated against me in the minds of the seamen. Having, however, succeeded in impressing some good men, to whom the matter was explained, they turned to with great alacrity to impress others; so that in a short time we had an excellent crew. This was the only time I ever found it necessary to impress men.

As the cruise off the Western Islands—when arrived there—was restricted to a month, it was matter of consideration how to turn such orders to the best account, without infringing on the letter of my instructions. We therefore crossed the Bay of Biscay, and having run to the westward of Cape Finisterre, _worked up_ towards the Azores, so as to fall in with any vessels which might be bound from the Spanish West Indies to Cadiz.

Scarcely had we altered our course, when, on the 6th of February, we fell in with and captured a large ship, the _Carolina_, bound from the Havannah to Cadiz, and laden with a valuable cargo. After taking out the crew, we despatched her to Plymouth.

Having learned from the prisoners that the captured ship was part of a convoy bound from the Havannah to Spain, we proceeded on our course, and on the 13th captured a second vessel, which was still more valuable, containing, in addition to the usual cargo, some diamonds, and ingots of gold and silver. This vessel was sent to Plymouth as before.

On the 15th, we fell in with another, _La Fortuna_, which proved the richest of all, as, besides her cargo, she had on board a large quantity of dollars, which we shifted into the _Pallas_, and sent the ship to England.

On the 16th, we captured a fine Spanish letter-of-marque, with more dollars on board; but as a heavy sea then running prevented us from taking them on board the _Pallas_, these were therefore despatched with her to Plymouth.

Whilst securing the latter vessel, we observed at sunset an English privateer take possession of a large ship. On seeing us—evidently knowing that we were an English man-of-war, and therefore entitled to share in her capture—the privateer crowded all sail and made off with her prize in company. Unluckily for this calculation, the prize was subsequently taken by a French squadron, when it turned out that the captured vessel—the _Preciosa_—was the richest of the whole Spanish convoy, having, in addition to her cargo, no less than a million dollars on board. Singularly enough, the privateer belonged to my agent Mr. Teed, from whom I afterwards learned the value of the vessel which his captain’s mistaken greed had sacrificed.

The sensation created on the arrival of the prizes at Plymouth was immense, as the following curious extracts from a local paper will show.

“_February_ 24.—Came in the _Caroline_ from Havanah with sugar and
logwood. Captured off the coast of Spain by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. The _Pallas_ was in pursuit of another with a very valuable
cargo when the _Caroline_ left. His Lordship sent word to Plymouth,
that if ever it was in his power, he would fulfil his public
advertisement (stuck up here) for entering seamen, of filling their
pockets with Spanish ‘pewter’ and ‘cobs,’ nicknames given by seamen to
ingots and dollars.

“_March_ 7.—Came in a rich Spanish prize, with jewels, gold, silver,
ingots, and a valuable cargo, taken by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. Another Spanish ship, the _Fortuna_, from Vera Cruz, had
been taken by the _Pallas_, laden with mahogany and logwood. She had
432,000 dollars on board, but has not yet arrived.

“_March_ 23.—Came in a most beautiful Spanish letter-of-marque of
fourteen guns, said to be a very rich and valuable prize to the
_Pallas_, Captain Lord Cochrane.”

A still greater sensation was excited by the arrival of the _Pallas_ herself, with three large golden candlesticks, each about five feet high, placed upon the mast heads. The history of these is not a little curious. They had been presented by the good people of Mexico, together with other valuable plate, to some celebrated church in Spain, the name of whose patron saint I forget, and had been shipped on board one of the most seaworthy vessels.

Their ultimate destination was, however, less propitious. It was my wish to possess them, and with this view an arrangement had been made with the officers and crew of the _Pallas_. On presenting the candlesticks at the Custom-house, the authorities refused to permit them to pass without paying the full duty, which amounted to a heavier sum than I was willing to disburse. Consequently, although of exquisite workmanship, they were broken in pieces, and thus suffered to pass as old gold.

The following incident relating to the capture of one of the vessels had escaped my recollection, till pointed out in the _Naval Chronicle_ for 1805. It is substantially correct.

“Lord Cochrane, in his late cruise off the coasts of Spain and
Portugal, fell in with, and took, _La Fortuna_, a Spanish ship bound
to Corunna, and richly laden with gold and silver to the amount of
450,000 dollars (132,000_l._), and about the same sum in valuable
goods and merchandise. When the Spanish captain and his supercargo
came on board the _Pallas_, they appeared much dejected, as their
private property on board amounted to the value of 30,000 dollars
each. The captain said he had lost, in the war of 1779, a similar
fortune, having then been taken by a British cruiser, so that now, as
then, he had to begin the world again. Lord Cochrane, feeling for the
dejected condition of the Spaniards, consulted his officers as to
their willingness to give them back 5,000 dollars each in specie. This
being immediately agreed to, his lordship ordered the boatswain to
pipe all hands, and addressing the men to the like purpose, the
gallant fellows sung out, ‘Aye, aye, my lord, with all our hearts,’
and gave the unfortunate Spaniards three cheers.”

Another curious circumstance must not be passed over. In one of the captured vessels was a number of bales, marked “_invendebles_.” Making sure of some rich prize, we opened the bales, which to our chagrin consisted of pope’s bulls, dispensations for eating meat on Fridays, and indulgences for peccadilloes of all kinds, with the price affixed. They had evidently formed a venture from Spain to the Mexican sin market, but the supply exceeding the demand, had been reconsigned to the manufacturers. We consigned them to the waves.

On our way home we were very near losing our suddenly acquired wealth and the frigate too. Whilst between the Azores and Portugal, one of those hazes common in semi-tropical climates, had for some time prevailed on the surface of the sea, the mast-heads of the ship being above the haze, with a clear sky. One day the look-out reported three large ships steering for us, and on going aloft I made them out to be line-of-battle ships in chase of the _Pallas_. As they did not show any colours, it was impossible to ascertain their national character, but, from the equality of the fore and maintopgallant masts, there was little doubt they were French.

The course of the frigate was immediately altered, and the weather changing, it began to blow hard, with a heavy sea.

The _Pallas_ was crank to such a degree, that the lee main-deck guns, though housed, were under water, and even the lee quarter-deck carronades were at times immerged.

As the strange ships were coming up with us hand over hand, the necessity of carrying more sail became indispensable, notwithstanding the immersion of the hull.

To do this with safety was the question. However, I ordered all the hawsers in the ship to be got up to the mast-heads and hove taut. The masts being thus secured, every possible stitch of sail was set, the frigate plunging forecastle under, as was also the case with our pursuers, which could not fire a gun—though as the haze cleared away we saw them repeatedly flashing the priming. After some time the line-of-battle ships came up with us, one keeping on our lee-beam, another to windward, each within half a mile, whilst the third was a little more distant.

Seeing it impossible to escape by superior sailing, it appeared practicable to try a manœuvre, which might be successful if the masts would stand. Having, as stated, secured these by every available rope in the frigate, the order was given to prepare to clew up and haul down every sail at the same instant. The manœuvre being executed with great precision,—and the helm being put hard a-weather, so as to wear the ship as speedily as possible,—the _Pallas_, thus suddenly brought up, shook from stem to stern, in crossing the trough of the sea. As our pursuers were unprepared for this manœuvre, still less to counteract it, they shot past at full speed, and ran on several miles before they could shorten sail, or trim on the opposite tack. Indeed, under the heavy gale that was now blowing, even this was no easy matter, without endangering their own masts.

There was no time for consideration on our part, so having rapidly sheeted home, we spread all sail on the opposite tack. The hawsers being still fast to the masts, we went away from our pursuers at the rate of thirteen knots and upwards; so that a considerable distance was soon interposed between us and them; and this was greatly increased ere they were in a condition to follow. Before they had fairly renewed the chase night was rapidly setting in, and when quite dark, we lowered a ballasted cask overboard with a lantern, to induce them to believe that we had altered our course, though we held on in the same direction during the whole night. The trick was successful, for, as had been calculated, the next morning, to our great satisfaction, we saw nothing of them, and were all much relieved on finding our dollars and his Majesty’s ship once more in safety. The expedient was a desperate one, but so was the condition which induced us to resort to it.

Of the proceeds of the above-mentioned captures—all made within ten days—Sir William Young, on the strength of having recopied my orders from the Admiralty, _claimed and received_ half my share of the captures. No wonder that Lord St. Vincent said of him, that he wished to “_have the power of giving orders, and so share prize-money_.”

Being then young and ardent, my portion appeared inexhaustible. What could I want with more? The sum claimed and received by Admiral Young was not worth notice.

On our return to Plymouth the country was on the eve of a general election, and the time appeared a fitting one to carry out my long cherished scheme of getting into Parliament. The nearest borough in which there was a chance was Honiton, and accordingly I applied to the port admiral for leave of absence to contest that “independent” constituency. The prize-money procured it without scruple.

My opponent was a Mr. Bradshaw, who had the advantage of a previous canvass. From the amount of prize-money which was known to have fallen to my share, that gentleman’s popularity was for a moment in danger, it being anticipated that I should spend my money sailor fashion, so that it became unmistakably manifest that the seat in Parliament would be at my service, if my opponent were outbid! To use the words of “an independent elector” during my canvass: “You need not ask me, my lord, who I votes for, I always votes for Mister Most.”

To the intense disgust of the majority of the electors, I refused to bribe at all, announcing my determination to “stand on patriotic principles,” which, in the electioneering _parlance_ of those days, meant “no bribery.” To my astonishment, however, a considerable number of the respectable inhabitants voted in my favour, and my agent assured me that a judicious application of no very considerable sum, would beat my opponent out of the market. This, however, being resolutely refused, the majority voted in favour of his five pound notes, and saved my friends of the Admiralty Court and other naval departments from an exhibition of misplaced zeal, which, as subsequently proved, could only have ended in my parliamentary discomfiture.

To be beaten, even at an election, is one thing; to turn a beating to account is another. Having had decisive proof as to the nature of Honiton politics, I made up my mind that the next time there was a vacancy in the borough, the seat should be mine without bribery. Accordingly, immediately after my defeat, I sent the bellman round the town, having first primed him with an appropriate speech, intimating that “all who had voted for me, might repair to my agent, J. Townsend, Esq., and _receive ten pounds ten_!”

The novelty of a defeated candidate paying double the current price expended by the successful one—or, indeed, paying anything—made a great sensation. Even my agent assured me that he could have secured my return for less money, for that the popular voice being in my favour, a trifling judicious expenditure would have turned the scale.

I told Mr. Townsend that such payment would have been bribery, which would not accord with my character as a reformer of abuses—a declaration which seemed highly to amuse him. Notwithstanding the explanation that the ten guineas was paid as a reward for having withstood the influence of bribery, the impression produced on the electoral mind by such unlooked-for liberality was simply this—that if I gave ten guineas for being beaten, my opponent had not paid half enough for being elected; a conclusion which, by a similar process of reasoning, was magnified into the conviction that each of his voters had been cheated out of five pounds ten.

The result was what had been foreseen. My opponent, though successful, was regarded with anything but a favourable eye; I, though defeated, had suddenly become most popular. The effect at the next election, must be reserved for its place in a future chapter.

It was this election that first induced me to become a parliamentary Reformer, or as any one holding popular opinions was called in those days, a “Radical,” _i. e._ a member of a political class holding views not half so extreme as those which form the parliamentary capital of reformers in the present day, and even less democratic than were the measures brought in during the last session of parliament by a Tory Government, whose predecessors consigned to gaol all who, fifty years ago, ventured to express opinions conferring political rights on the people.

It is strange that, after having suffered more for my political faith than any man now living, I should have survived to see former Radical yearnings become modern Tory doctrines. Stranger still, they should now form stepping-stones to place and power, instead of to the bar of a criminal court, where even the counsel defending those who were prosecuted for holding them became marked men.

Still it is something worth living for—even with the remembrance of my own bitter sufferings, for no greater offence than the advocacy of popular rights, and the abolition of naval abuses.

CHAP. XI.

SERVICES IN THE _PALLAS_ CONTINUED.

SERVICES IN THE PALLAS.—THE PALLAS AT HALIFAX.—CLAMOUR OF
SHIPOWNERS.—SAIL FROM THE DOWNS.—CAPTURE A VESSEL.—THE POMONE SENT
TO ENGLAND.—CAPTURE OF THE TAPAGEUSE.—THE FRENCH RUN ASHORE.—CHASE
OF THE CORVETTES.—OFF CHASSERON.—COLD APPROVAL OF LORD ST.
VINCENT.—CRUISE OF THE PALLAS.—SIGHT THE FRENCH SQUADRON.—FRENCH
SIGNAL HOUSES.—THE ISLE OF AIX.—ENGAGE THE FRENCH SQUADRON.—JOINED
BY THE KINGFISHER.—DETAILS OF THE ACTION.—CONSTRUCTION OF KITES.

On the 28th of May 1805, the _Pallas_ again sailed from Portsmouth in charge of a convoy for Quebec. On this voyage little occurred worthy of note, beyond the fact that when we made the American coast we were, from a cause presently to be mentioned, no less than thirteen degrees and a half out in our _dead reckoning_! The reader must not imagine that we were 800 miles out of our course, for that was corrected whenever observations of the sun or stars could be obtained; but as these might at any time be rendered uncertain from the fogs prevalent on the banks, the most vigilant care was necessary to prevent the ship and convoy from being wrecked.

In my former voyage in the _Thetis_ we had the advantage of a very clever man on board—a Mr. Garrard—who not being able to subsist on his salary as assistant astronomer and calculator at Greenwich, was glad to accept the berth of schoolmaster on board my uncle’s frigate. From the instructions of this gentleman, I had formerly profited considerably, and was not a little pleased when he applied to me for a similar berth on board the _Pallas_. With so skilful an observer, there could be no mistake about the error just mentioned; which arose from this circumstance, that for the sake of economy, the Navy Board or the dockyard authorities had surrounded the binnacle of the _Pallas_ with iron instead of copper bolts; so that the compass was not to be depended upon. Fortunately the atmosphere was tolerably clear, so that no danger was incurred.

As, however, I had no inclination to risk either the ship or my own reputation amongst the fogs of Canada for the sake of false economy, the course of the _Pallas_ and her convoy was directed to Halifax, there to free the compass from the attraction of iron. On demanding copper bolts from the dockyard officers, they were refused, on the ground that permission must be first obtained from the authorities in London! To this I replied, that if such were the case, the _Pallas_ should wait with the convoy at Halifax whilst they communicated with the Admiralty in England! for that on no account should she enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence till our compass was right. The absurdity of detaining a convoy for six months, on account of a hundred weight of copper bolts was too much even for dockyard routine, and the demand was with some difficulty conceded.

It would be wearisome to detail the uninteresting routine of attending the convoy to Quebec, or of my taking charge of another for the homeward voyage; further than to state, that from the defect of having no proper lights for the guidance of the convoy by night, the whole lost sight of us before reaching the Lizard; where we arrived with only one vessel, and that in tow.

The carelessness of merchant captains when following a convoy can only be estimated by those who have to deal with them. Not only was this manifested by day, but at night their stern cabins glittered with lights, equally intense with the convoy light, which therefore was not distinguishable. The separation of the convoy on the following day was thus rather a matter of course than of surprise.

This want of proper distinguishing lights, and the consequent dispersion of convoys, were thus frequent causes of the capture of our merchantmen, and to remedy this I constructed a lamp powerful enough to serve as a guide in following the protecting frigate by night. The Admiralty, however, neglected its application, or even to inspect my plan.

Some few years afterwards, the clamour of shipowners compelled the Board to direct its attention to the subject, and, passing over my communications, they offered a reward of fifty pounds to the inventor of the most suitable lamp for the purpose. On this I directed my agent, Mr. Brooks, to offer my lamp _in his own name_, feeling convinced that my connection with it would, if known, ensure its rejection. He did so, and after repeated trials against others at Sheerness, Spithead, and St. Helen’s, the fifty pound prize was adjudged to Mr. Brooks _for my lamp_!! The fact afterwards becoming known, _not a lamp was ever ordered_, and the merchantmen were left to the mercy of privateers as before. I do not relate this anecdote as telling against the _directing_ powers of the Admiralty, but with the _administrative_ powers, it was then and afterwards clearly a fixed rule that no invention of mine should be carried into effect.

On our way home, we one day made an experiment which even now I believe might occasionally be turned to account; viz. the construction of gigantic kites to give additional impetus to ships. With this view a studdingsailboom was lashed across a spare flying jibboom to form the framework, and over this a large spread of canvass was sewn in the usual boy’s fashion. My spars were, however, of unequal dimensions throughout, and this and our launching the kite caused it to roll greatly. Possibly too I might not have been sufficiently experienced in the mysteries of “wings and tail,” for though the kite pulled with a will, it made such occasional lurches as gave reason to fear for the too sudden expenditure of His Majesty’s stores. The power of such machines, properly constructed, would be very great; and in the case of a constant wind, might be useful. The experiment, however, showed that kites of smaller dimensions would have answered better.

On our return to England in December, the _Pallas_ was ordered to join the squadron of Admiral Thornborough, appointed to operate on the French and Spanish coasts. Instructions were, however, given to cruise for a few days off Boulogne before finally proceeding to Plymouth.

We sailed from the Downs on the 23rd of January 1806, and on the 31st seeing a French merchant vessel at anchor near the mouth of the river Somme, the boats were sent inshore to cut her out. On nearing her, a battery opened fire on them, when we wore and engaged the battery, whilst the boats brought off the vessel, with which we anchored in Dover roads on the following morning.

On the 8th of February, the _Pallas_ sailed from Dover, and stood over towards the French coast, where we captured a fast sailing lugger, having on board a number of letters addressed to various persons in London. Shortly after this we were ordered to join the Admiral.

On the 22nd the _Pallas_ sailed with Vice Admiral Thornborough’s squadron from Plymouth, and remained in company till the 24th of March, when seeing some vessels off Isle Dieu, the boats went in chase, and returned with seven French fishing smacks; to the surprise of whose crews we bought their fish, and let them go.

From information communicated by the fishing boats the _Pallas_ ran off shore, and in the night following, returned and captured a vessel freighted with wine, which was taken on board the frigate. The next night the boats again went in, and brought off another vessel similarly laden. On the following morning we made sail with our two prizes, but observing a brig at anchor off Sable d’Olonne, ran in again after dark, and sent the boats to cut her out. A fire being opened on the boats from the town, we discharged several broadsides, on which the townspeople desisted, and the brig was brought off. Whilst engaged in this operation, another brig was seen to run ashore for safety. On the morning of the 28th, the boats were again despatched to get her off, when, the people mustering along shore to attack them, we fired several shotted guns to warn them from interfering, and the brig was safely brought out.

This propensity of French crews thus to run their vessels ashore—on being chased by boats—was principally caused by a galley which had been constructed at my own expense by the Deal boatbuilders, and shipped on board the _Pallas_. She rowed double banked, and required eighteen hands at the oars, and this together with her beautiful build rendered her perhaps the fastest boat afloat. Escape from such a craft being hopeless, she became so notorious, that the enemy’s coasters ran their vessels ashore, and jumping into their boats, thus saved themselves from being made prisoners.

On the 29th, we manned the largest prize, the _Pomone_, and sent her to England in charge of the others. On the same day we fell in with the admiral, and supplied the squadron with prize wine, of which a large quantity had been taken, most of the vessels captured being laden with wine of fine quality, on its way to Havre for the Parisian market.

On quitting the squadron, we proceeded to the southward in chase of a convoy, one of which we captured, and on the 5th of April ran for the Garonne, having received intelligence that some French corvettes were lurking in the river and its vicinity, one of which vessels was reported to be lying some miles up the river as a guardship. Keeping out of sight for the remainder of the day, I determined on making an attempt to cut her out on the following night.

After dark the _Pallas_ came to an anchor off the Cordovan lighthouse, and the boats, manned with the whole crew of the frigate, except about forty men, pulled for the corvette, under the command of their gallant First Lieutenant Haswell, who found her at 3 A.M. on the morning of the 6th, anchored near two batteries. As the weather was thick when the attack was made, the boats came upon the enemy unawares, and after a short but gallant resistance, the corvette was carried, proving to be the _Tapageuse_ of 14 guns.

No sooner was this effected, than two others, whose presence was unexpected, came to her rescue. Lieutenant Haswell, however, promptly manned the guns of the captured vessel, and beat off his assailants, the tide rendering it imprudent for the prize or the boats to follow in pursuit.

Whilst this was going on, the _Pallas_ remained at single anchor waiting for the boats, and soon after daylight three strange sail appeared to windward, making for the river. As the private signal was unanswered, there could be no doubt but that they were enemies, to oppose whom we had only forty hands on board, the remainder of the crew, as previously stated, being in the prize brig.

There was no time to be lost, and as it was of the first importance to make a show of strength, though we possessed none, I immediately set the few hands we had to fasten the furled sails with rope yarns; the object being to cut the yarns all at once, let fall the sails, and thus impress the enemy with an idea that from such celerity in making sail we had a numerous and highly disciplined crew.

The manœuvre succeeded to a marvel. No sooner was our cloud of canvass thus suddenly let fall than the approaching vessels hauled the wind, and ran off along shore, with the _Pallas_ in chase, our handful of men straining every nerve to sheet home, though it is surprising that the French officers did not observe the necessary slowness of the operation.

By superior sailing we were soon well up with one of them, and commenced firing our bow guns—the only guns, in fact, we were able to man. Scarcely had we fired half a dozen shots, when the French captain deliberately ran his ship ashore as the only way of saving himself and crew. The corvette was dismasted by the shock and immediately abandoned by the crew, who got ashore in their boats; though had they pulled on board the _Pallas_ instead, we were literally incapable of resistance.

After the crew had abandoned the wreck, we ran nearly close, and fired several broadsides into her hull, to prevent her floating again with the tide. Whilst thus engaged, the other corvettes, which had previously run out of sight, again made their appearance to the S. S. W. under a press of sail, evidently coming up fast to the assistance of their consort.

As it was necessary once more to take the initiative, we quitted the wreck, ran up our colours, and gave chase, firing our bow guns at the nearest, which soon afterwards followed the example of the first, and ran ashore too,—with the same result of being dismasted—the crew escaping as in the case of the other.

Of the remaining corvette we for a time took no notice, and made sail towards the mouth of the Garonne to pick up our crew, which had necessarily been left on board the vessel captured on the river. As the _Pallas_ neared the Cordovan lighthouse, we observed the third corvette making for the river. Finding herself intercepted she also ran on shore, and was abandoned in like manner.

The chase of these corvettes forms one of my most singular recollections, all three being deliberately abandoned and wrecked in presence of a British frigate with only forty men on board! Had any one of the three known our real condition, or had we not put a bold face on the matter, we might have been taken. The mere semblance of strength saved us, and the panic thereby inspired destroyed the enemy.

Having joined our prize—the _Tapageuse_—the prisoners were shifted on board the _Pallas_, which made sail in quest of the squadron, rejoining it on the 10th, when, by order of Admiral Thornborough, the prisoners were distributed among different ships.

The subjoined despatches will afford further explanation of the events just narrated.

“_Pallas_, off Chasseron, 8th April, 1806.

“SIR,—Having received information—which proved correct—of the
situation of the corvettes in the river of Bordeaux, a little after
dark on the evening of the 5th, the _Pallas_ was anchored close to the
shoal of Cordovan, and it gives me satisfaction to state that about 3
o’clock on the following morning the French national corvette, _La
Tapageuse_, of 14 long 12-pounders and 95 men, who had the guard, was
boarded, carried, and cut out, about twenty miles above the shoal, and
within two heavy batteries, in spite of all resistance, by the first
lieutenant of the _Pallas_, Mr. Haswell, the master, Mr. Sutherland,
Messrs. Perkyns, Crawford, and Thompson, together with the
quartermasters and such of the seamen and crew as were fortunate
enough to find places in the boats.

“The tide of flood ran strong at daylight. _La Tapageuse_ made sail. A
general alarm was given. A sloop-of-war followed, and an action
continued—often within hail—till by the same bravery by which the
_Tapageuse_ was carried, the sloop-of-war, which before had been saved
by the rapidity of the current alone, was compelled to sheer off,
having suffered as much in the hull as the _Tapageuse_ in the rigging.

“The conduct of the officers and men will be justly appreciated. With
confidence I shall now beg leave to recommend them to the notice of
the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty.

“It is necessary to add, that the same morning, when at anchor waiting
for the boats (which, by the by, did not return till this morning),
three ships were observed bearing down towards the _Pallas_, making
many signals, and were soon perceived to be enemies. In a few minutes
the anchor of the _Pallas_ was weighed, and with the remainder of the
officers and crew we chased, drove on shore, and wrecked one national
24-gun ship, one of 22 guns, and the _Malicieuse_, a beautiful
corvette of 18 guns. Their masts went by the board, and they were
involved in a sheet of spray.

“All in this ship showed great zeal for his Majesty’s service. The
warrant officers and Mr. Tattnall, midshipman, supplied the place of
commissioned officers. The absence of Lieutenant Mapleton is much to
be regretted. He would have gloried in the expedition with the boats.
The assistance rendered by Mr. Drummond of the Royal Marines was such
as might have been expected. Subjoined is the list of wounded,
together with that of vessels captured and destroyed since the 26th
ult.

“I am, &c. &c. COCHRANE.

“To Vice-Admiral Thornborough.”

“_Prince of Wales_, off Rochefort, 9th April, 1806.

“MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship a copy of a
letter I have this day received from Captain Lord Cochrane of H. M. S.
_Pallas_, under my orders. It will not be necessary for me, my Lord,
to comment on the intrepidity and good conduct displayed by Lord
Cochrane, his officers and men, in the execution of a very hazardous
enterprise in the Garonne, a river, the most difficult, perhaps, in
its navigation, of any on the coast. The complete success that
attended the enterprise, as well as the destruction of the vessels of
war mentioned in the said letter on the coast of Arcasson, speaks
their merits more fully than is in my power to do. To which may be
fairly added, that nothing can show more clearly the high state of
discipline of the crew of the _Pallas_ than the humanity shown by them
in the conflict.

“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“EDWARD THORNBOROUGH.

“The Right Hon. the Earl St. Vincent.”

“_Hibernia_, off Ushant, April 14th, 1806.

“SIR,—I yesterday received from Admiral Thornborough a letter with its
enclosure from Captain Lord Cochrane, of which copies are herewith
transmitted for the information of my Lord Commissioner of the
Admiralty.

“The gallant and successful exertions of the _Pallas_ therein
detailed, reflect very high honour on her captain, officers and crew,
and call for my warmest approbation.

“I am, &c. &c. ST. VINCENT.
“W. Marsden, Esq.”

The cold, reluctant praise bestowed by this letter, was no doubt intended by Lord St. Vincent as a wet blanket on the whole affair, and contrasts strongly with the warm-hearted sailor-like frankness of Admiral Thornborough. It had its full effect; not a word of approbation did I receive from the Admiralty. The _Tapageuse_ was not bought into the navy, though a similar vessel, subsequently captured by another officer at the same place, was purchased. My First Lieutenant, Haswell, was not promoted. In short, if we had done something worthy of disapprobation, it could scarcely have been more marked. On this subject further comment will presently become necessary.

To return to our cruise. On the 14th of April we again quitted the squadron, and made for the corvettes run on shore on the 7th. The French had erected a battery for the protection of one of them which was still sound in the hull; but we silenced the battery and set fire to the corvette. After this the _Pallas_ proceeded towards the wreck of the northermost vessel stranded, but as strong breezes came on, and she was evidently breaking up in the surf, we deemed it prudent to work off shore, and in so doing captured another vessel, which turned out to be a French packet.

On the 20th the _Pallas_ ran down abreast of the remaining corvette, and out boats for the purpose of burning her; but these being exposed to the fire of another battery which had been thrown up to protect the wreck, and the _Pallas_ not being able, on account of the shoaliness of the water, to get near enough to fire with effect, we desisted from the attempt, and again made sail.

On the 23rd we came to an anchor off the Malmaison passage, and on the following day reconnoitred the French squadron inside Isle Rhe. Whilst thus engaged, the British squadron appeared to windward, and shortly afterwards came to an anchor.

On the 24th we worked up to windward to join the admiral, and on the following day stood into Basque Roads to reconnoitre the enemy’s squadron. On approaching within gunshot, a frigate and three brigs got under weigh, and we made sail to meet them, endeavouring to bring them to action by firing several broadsides at them. On this they tacked after returning the fire, and stood in under their batteries. Having completed our reconnoissance, we beat out again and rejoined the admiral, to whom I made the annexed report.

“H. M. S. _Pallas_, off Isle d’Aix, April 25th, 1806.

“SIR,—Having stood within gunshot of the French squadron this morning,
I find it to consist of the following vessels.

“One of three decks, 16 ports below; one of 80 guns, 15 ports; three
of 74, 14 ports; two heavy frigates, of 40 guns; three light frigates,
13 ports on main-deck, and three brigs of from 14 to 16 guns.

“The _Calcutta_[31] is not among them. Neither are there any
corvettes, unless a very clumsy 20-gun ship can be called one. The
ships of the line have all their topmasts struck and topgallant yards
across. They are all very deep, more so than vessels are in general
for common voyages.

“They may be easily burned, or they may be taken by sending here eight
or ten thousand men, as if intended for the Mediterranean. If people
at home would hold their tongues about it[32], possession might thus
be gained of the Isle d’Oleron, upon which all the enemy’s vessels may
be driven by sending fire vessels to the eastward of Isle d’Aix.

“A frigate and the three brigs were ordered to get under weigh. These
stood towards the _Pallas_ and exchanged a few broadsides. After
waiting from ten o’clock till past two, close to Isle d’Aix, we were
obliged to come out no better than we went in. They could not be
persuaded to stand from under their batteries.

“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“Edw. Thornborough, Esq.,
“Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”

-----

Footnote 31:

An Indiaman, recently captured by the French off St. Helena.

Footnote 32:

It is a curious fact, that there being no such thing as confidence or
secrecy in official quarters in England, the French were as well
advised as to our movements as were our own commanders, and were
consequently prepared at all points.

-----

Having found by experience that the French had organised a system of signal-houses, by means of which they were able to indicate the exact position of an enemy, so as to warn their coasters from impending danger, I resolved on destroying one of their principal stations on Isle Rhe, at the town of St. Martin. The result will be gathered from the subjoined despatch to Admiral Thornborough.

“_Pallas_, St. Martin’s Road, Isle Rhe, May 10th, 1806.

“SIR,—The French trade having been kept in port of late, in a great
measure by their knowledge of the exact position of his Majesty’s
cruisers, constantly announced at the signal-posts; it appeared to me
to be some object, as there was nothing better to do, to endeavour to
stop this practice.

“Accordingly, the two posts at Point Delaroche were demolished, next
that of Caliola. Then two in L’Anse de Repos, one of which Lieutenant
Haswell and Mr. Hillier the gunner took in a neat style from upwards
of 100 militia. The marines and boats’ crews behaved exceedingly well.
All the flags have been brought off, and the houses built by
government burnt to the ground.

“Yesterday too the zeal of Lieutenant Norton of the _Frisk_ cutter,
and Lieutenant Gregory of the _Contest_ gun-brig, induced them to
volunteer to flank the battery on Point d’Equillon, whilst we should
attack in the rear by land; but it was carried at once, and one of
fifty men who were stationed to three 36-pounders was made
prisoner—the rest escaped. The battery is laid in ruins—guns
spiked—carriages burnt—barrack and magazine blown up, and all the
shells thrown into the sea. The convoy got into a river beyond our
reach. Lieutenant Mapleton, Mr. Sutherland, master, and Mr. Hillier
were with me, and as they do on all occasions so they did at this time
whatever was in their power for his Majesty’s service. The petty
officers, seamen, and marines failed not to justify the opinion that
there was before reason to form; yet it would be inexcusable were not
the names of the quartermasters Barden and Casey particularly
mentioned, as men highly deserving any favour that can be shown in the
line to which they aspire.

“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.

“Edw. Thornborough, Esq.,
“Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”

Early in the morning on the 14th of May, the _Pallas_ again stood in
close to the Isle of Aix, to renew her reconnoissance of the French
squadron under Admiral Allemand, then anchored at the entrance of
the Antioche passage, and also in the hope of once more getting
within range of the vessels which we had failed to bring to an
action on the 25th ultimo. In order to prevent their again taking
shelter under the batteries on Isle d’Aix, we cleared for action and
ran within range of the latter; the frigate shortly afterwards
getting under weigh to meet us.

Scarcely had she done so, than the three brigs also got under weigh
to support her, making a formidable addition to the force to be
encountered, the frigate alone showing a broadside superior to ours.
We however remained under our topsails by the wind to await them,
and when, the brigs came within point-blank shot, a broadside from
the _Pallas_ dismantled one of them. We then veered and engaged the
frigate and the other brig—the batteries on Isle d’Aix meanwhile
firing at us.

After an hour’s fighting, we observed that considerable damage had
been done by the fire of the _Pallas_ to the frigate and another of
the brigs, the maintopsail yard of the latter being cut through, and
the aftersails of the frigate shot away, though the action was not
continuous, owing to the frequent necessity on our part of tacking
to avoid shoals.

About one o’clock we managed to gain the wind of the frigate, and
running between her and the batteries, gave her two or three smart
broadsides, on which her fire slackened, and she showed signs of
meditating a retreat. Perceiving this, I directed Mr. Sutherland,
the master, to lay us aboard, which at 1.40 P.M. was gallantly but
rather too eagerly effected.

Just at this moment, unobserved by us, the French frigate grounded
on a shoal, so that on coming in contact, the spars and rigging of
both vessels were dismantled. The concussion drove our guns back
into the ports, in which position the broadside was again
discharged, and the shot tore through her sides with crushing
effect, her men taking refuge below, so that the only return to this
broadside was three pistol shots fired at random. The French captain
was the only man who gallantly remained on deck.

To clear away our own wreck was one object; to board the frigate the
next; but two more frigates were observed to quit the enemy’s
squadron, and crowd all sail to her assistance. This, in our
crippled condition, was too much; there was, therefore, nothing for
it but to quit the grounded ship and save ourselves. Accordingly we
bore up, and made what sail was possible, cutting away and repairing
the wreck as we best could; the two frigates following in chase.

Fortunately the sloop _Kingfisher_, commanded by the gallant
Captain, now Admiral, Seymour, seeing our disabled condition,
promptly ran down and took us in tow[33]; on which the enemy
desisted from the pursuit, turning their attention to their disabled
consort. The subjoined report to Admiral Thornborough details a few
other particulars of the action, though at that time we neither knew
the names nor the strength of our opponents.

“His Majesty’s Ship _Pallas_, 14th May,
“Off the Island of Oleron, May 15th, 1806.

“SIR,—This morning when close to Isle d’Aix, reconnoitring the French
squadron, it gave me great joy to find our late opponent, the black
frigate, and her companions the three brigs, getting under sail; we
formed high expectations that the long wished-for opportunity was at
last arrived.

“The _Pallas_ remained under topsails by the wind to await them; at
half-past eleven a smart point blank firing commenced on both sides,
which was severely felt by the enemy. The maintopsailyard of one of
the brigs was cut through, and the frigate lost her aftersails. The
batteries on l’Isle d’Aix opened on the _Pallas_, and a cannonade
continued, interrupted on our part only by the necessity we were under
to make various tacks to avoid the shoals, till one o’clock, when our
endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy and get between him and the
batteries proved successful; an effectual distance was now chosen, a
few broadsides were poured in, the enemy’s fire slackened. I ordered
ours to cease, and directed Mr. Sutherland, the master, to run the
frigate on board, with intention effectually to prevent her retreat.

“The enemy’s side thrust our guns back into the ports, the whole were
then discharged, the effect and crash were dreadful; their decks were
deserted; three pistol shots were the unequal return.

“With confidence I say that the frigate was lost to France had not the
unequal collision tore away our foretopmast, jibboom, fore and
maintopsailyards, spritsailyards, bumpkin, cathead, chain plates,
forerigging, foresail, and bower anchor, with which last I intended to
hook on, but all proved insufficient. She was yet lost to France had
not the French admiral, seeing his frigate’s foreyard gone, her
rigging ruined, and the danger she was in, sent two others to her
assistance.

“The _Pallas_ being a wreck, we came out with what sail could be set,
and his Majesty’s sloop the _Kingfisher_ afterwards took us in tow.

“The officers and ship’s company behaved as usual; to the names of
Lieutenants Haswell and Mapleton, whom I have mentioned on other
occasions, I have to add that of Lieutenant Robins, who had just
joined.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.”

“_Killed._—David Thompson, marine.

“_Wounded._—Mr. Andrews, midshipman, very badly; John Coger, and three
other seamen, slightly.

“Edw. Thornborough, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”

-----

Footnote 33:

“Since the publication of the first edition, Admiral Seymour has
kindly supplied me with the following interesting particulars,
which had escaped my recollection: