Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (10)

Some time previous to this period I had applied to the Admiralty for permission to return to England. My reasons for the application were various, the ostensible ground being the state of my health, which had in reality suffered severely from the incessant wear and tear of body and mind to which for nearly two years I had been exposed. A more urgent reason was to get back to my place in the House of Commons, in order to expose the robberies of the Admiralty Courts in the Mediterranean, the officials of which were reaping colossal fortunes at the expense of naval officers and seamen, who were wasting their lives and blood for official gain! The barefaced peculations of these courts would be almost incredible, especially as regarded the Maltese Court, were there not some living at the present time who can testify to their enormity. To such an extent was this now carried, that a ship captured without cargo never yielded a penny to the captors, the whole proceeds being swallowed up by the Admiralty Court. With cargo, some trifling surplus might remain, but what between pilfering and official fees, the award was hardly worth the trouble of capture.

The effect of this upon the Navy generally was most disastrous, and not upon the Navy only, but upon the nation also, which had upwards of 1000 ships in commission without any result at all commensurable with the expenditure. Captains were naturally disinclined to harass themselves and crews for nothing, and avoided making prizes certain to yield nothing but the risk and trouble of capture, and which, in addition, might bring them in debt, as was the result in my own case.

It will now be evident why I preferred harassing the French army in Spain to making prizes for the enrichment of the officials of the Maltese and other Admiralty courts. It was always my aim to serve my country before my own interests, and in this case I judged it better to do so where the service could be most effectual. Prizes, of which the proceeds were monopolised by a body of corrupt officials, neither under the eye nor control of the government, were not worth troubling ourselves about; so I determined on a course of service where there were no prizes to take, but abundance of highly interesting operations to be undertaken. The frigate’s officers and crew willingly seconding my views, I now—more on their account than my own—put on record that _none_ of the services previously narrated, though lauded by the admirals commanding them, and by historians subsequently, were ever rewarded, either as regarded myself, or any one under my command, even promotion to the officers being shamefully withheld; their fault, or rather misfortune, consisting in having served under my command.

My chief motive, however, for wishing to return to England was, that during our operations against the French on the Spanish coast, I had seen so much of them as to convince me, that if with a single frigate I could paralyse the movements of their armies in the Mediterranean—with three or four ships it would not be difficult so to spread terror on their Atlantic shores, as to render it impossible for them to send an army into Western Spain. My object then was—as from long and unceasing experience I considered myself entitled to the command of more than one ship—to propose to the Government to take possession of the French islands in the Bay of Biscay, and to let me with a small squadron operate against the enemy’s sea-board there, as I had previously done with the _Speedy_ and _Impérieuse_, from Montpellier to Barcelona.

Had this permission been granted, I do not hesitate to stake my professional reputation that _neither the Peninsular war, nor its enormous cost to the nation, from 1809 onwards, would ever have been heard of_. It would have been easy—_as it will always be easy in case of future wars_—that is, provided those who have the direction of national affairs have the sagacity to foresee disaster, and, _foreseeing it, to take the initiative_, so to harass the French coast as to find full employment for their troops at home, and thus to render any operations in Western Spain, or even in foreign countries, next to impossible.

By members not aware of this power of harassing an enemy’s coast by means of a few frigates, the ministry was greatly blamed for not having sent a military force to Catalonia, instead of despatching the very inadequate force under Sir John Moore to the western shores of the Peninsula. That the latter step was a great mistake, likely only to end in disaster, is now admitted. But what I contend for is, that no military force was at all needed in Spain, had the government seized and held, by a comparatively small military force, the isles on the coast of France, viz., Isles Dieu, Rhe, Oléron, and a few others; following up or preceding this seizure by a limited number of active frigates harassing the whole western coast of France, which, in consequence, would not have been able to send a single regiment into Spain, and hence, as has been said, we should have had no Peninsular war with its hundreds of millions of national debt. Had the French been thus employed in the defence of their own coasts, the Spaniards on the west coast would have been a match for their enemies, as, with the assistance of a few small British frigates, they were rendered a match for them on the east coast. This was the work I was prepared to recommend to the British Government; considering, moreover, that from the part the _Impérieuse_ had taken in harassing the enemy on the east coast of Spain, I was fairly entitled to ask that any small squadron of frigates, appointed for the purpose of operating on the west coast of France, should be placed under my command.

How my plans for this end, and together with them, my own career as a naval officer, were sacrificed by an occurrence which forms the subject of the next chapters, will there be seen.

The reader will by this time have gathered some idea of what the _Impérieuse_ had effected, as testified by the warmly expressed satisfaction of Lord Collingwood; yet it will scarcely be believed that, in place of approbation, I was reproached for the expenditure of more sails, stores, gunpowder, and shot than had been used by any other captain in the service!

Attention to saving ropes and sails, though without other results, was praised. Expending them, though in energetic service, remarked with displeasure. Nothing that I had done was deemed worthy of notice at home, whilst officers who brought back them ships in as good condition as they left port, were honoured with praise and substantially rewarded; but no mark of approbation or reward was ever conferred on me till upwards of thirty years afterwards, the late Earl of Minto generously remedied the injustice by conferring upon me the ordinary good service pension. A comparison of my services with the services of those who were rewarded with pensions of 1000_l._ and 1200_l._ a year, will show the actuating principle of the Admiralties of those days, which bestowed on me nothing but marked neglect.

CHAP. XIX.

APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND FIRE-SHIPS IN BASQUE

ROADS.

UNDERTAKING AGAINST ROCHEFORT.—HOPES EXCITED.—PRESENT MYSELF AT THE
ADMIRALTY.—AM CONSULTED BY LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.—ANXIETY OF GOVERNMENT.—MY PLAN OF ACTION.—DECLINE THE
COMMAND.—THE COMMAND PRESSED UPON ME.—RETURN TO THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK.—LORD GAMBIER OBTAINS THE
LAURELS,—BUT DISSUADES THE ATTACK.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.

Almost immediately after arrival of the _Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, I received the subjoined letter from the Hon. Johnstone Hope, Second Lord of the Board of Admiralty:—

“Admiralty, March 21, 1809.

“MY DEAR LORD,—I congratulate you on your safe arrival after the
fatigues you underwent at Trinity. Be assured your exertions there
were highly applauded by the Board, and were done most ample justice
to by Lord Collingwood in all his despatches.

“There is an undertaking of great moment in agitation against
Rochefort, and the Board thinks that your local knowledge and services
on the occasion might be of the utmost consequence, and, I believe, it
is intended to send you there with all expedition; I have ventured to
say, that if you are in health, you will readily give your aid on this
business.

“Before you can answer this I shall be out of office, and on my way to
Scotland, as I found I could not continue here and keep my health. But
if you will write to Sir R. Brotherton in reply, and state your
sentiments on the getting at the enemy at Rochefort, I am sure it will
be kindly taken.

“I am, my dear Lord, your’s faithfully,
“W. JOHNSTONE HOPE.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

On the receipt of this letter hope appeared to dawn. The St. Vincent or any other official _animus_ against me had evidently been satisfied with the punishments with which I had in one shape or other been visited. I was now to be consulted and employed on matters in which my experience and services were to be fully recognised, and my ambition of being ranked amongst those brave defenders of my country, to whose example I had looked up, was about to be fulfilled! Alas, for the simplicity of my ideas! Nothing could be further from the intention of those who wanted to consult me!

Scarcely had the letter reached me, when a telegraphic message was transmitted from the Admiralty, requiring my immediate presence at Whitehall. A brief narrative of recent events will show the reason for the summons.

Early in the year Lord Gambier had been appointed to blockade the French fleet at Brest. Towards the end of February they, however, contrived to elude his vigilance, and got out without leaving a trace as to the direction taken. Despatching Admiral Duckworth in pursuit, his lordship returned to Plymouth. Admiral Duckworth meanwhile reached Cadiz, where he ascertained that the Brest fleet had not entered the Mediterranean. He then ran for Madeira, in the hope of obtaining intelligence of them, should they, as was feared in England, have made for the West Indies.

The fact was that the French squadron, consisting of eight sail of the line and two frigates, had gone to L’Orient, and liberated the ships there blockaded. They next made for Isle d’Aix, intending further to reinforce themselves with the ships at that anchorage, and thence proceed to harass our West India colonies. By the vigilance of Admiral Stopford they were, however, discovered and thwarted as to their ultimate purpose, though successful in forming a junction with the Rochefort squadron. On finding Admiral Stopford in their vicinity, though with four ships of the line only, they put into Basque Roads, subsequently withdrawing into Aix Roads, where Admiral Stopford having been reinforced, blockaded them with seven ships of the line. On the 7th of March Lord Gambier arrived in Basque Roads with an additional five sail, several frigates and small vessels, the British squadron being now numerically superior to that of the enemy.

On presenting myself at the Admiralty, the First Lord (Mulgrave) did me the honour to consult me confidentially as to the practicability of destroying or disabling the French squadron as it lay at anchor under the protection of the batteries of Isle d’Aix, where, as his lordship told me, the commander-in-chief did not consider it prudent to attack them. Lord Mulgrave further stated that the Board of Admiralty, fearing that “the French fleet might again slip out, as it had done at Brest, were extremely desirous that it should forthwith be destroyed. With that view they had already consulted various naval officers on the practicability of accomplishing the object by means of fire-ships; but that their opinions were discouraging.”

“Now,” added his lordship, “you were some years ago employed on the Rochefort station, and must, to a great extent, be practically acquainted with the difficulties to be surmounted. Besides which, I am told that you then pointed out to Admiral Thornborough some plan of attack, which in your estimation would be successful. Will you be good enough again to detail that or any other plan, which your further experience may suggest. But first let me tell you what Lord Gambier has written to the Admiralty on the subject.”

Lord Mulgrave then read me an extract from Lord Gambier’s letter, to the following effect, that “an attack by means of fire-ships was hazardous, if not desperate;” but that “if the Board of Admiralty wished to order such an attack, it should be done secretly and quickly.”

I respectfully reminded his lordship that he was asking me to suggest means for an attack which the admiral commanding considered “hazardous, if not desperate;” and which other naval officers, no doubt my seniors in the service, had pronounced impracticable. On both these accounts there was reason to fear that if means suggested by me were adopted, the consequence would be an amount of ill-feeling on the part of those officers, which any naval officer in my position should feel reluctant to provoke.

Lord Mulgrave replied that “the present was no time for professional etiquette. The Board was, if possible, bent on striking some decisive blow before the French squadron had an opportunity of slipping out; for if their sailing were not prevented they might get off to the West Indies, and do our commerce an immense amount of mischief. However,” added his lordship, “there is Lord Gambier’s letter. Give me your opinion on it.”

As this letter was afterwards made public, there can be no reason for withholding it.

“_Caledonia_, off the Nertuis d’Antioche,
“11th March, 1809.

“MY DEAR LORD,—The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron,
which I mentioned in my last letter, I find was injured in its
foundation, and is in no state of progress; it is, therefore, no
obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet, if you should be
disposed to attempt to destroy it.

“A trial was made six years ago, when a Spanish squadron lay at the
same anchorage, but without effect. The report of it you will find in
the Admiralty. It was made by Sir C. Pole.

“The enemy’s ships lie much exposed to the operation of fire-ships,
_it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt hazardous, if not
desperate_; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service.
If you mean to do anything of the kind, it should be with secrecy and
quickly, and the ships used should not be less than those built for
the purpose—at least a dozen, and some smaller ones.

“Yours, my dear Lord, most faithfully,
“GAMBIER..nf-

“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”

“You see,” said Lord Mulgrave, “that Lord Gambier will not take upon himself the responsibility of attack, and the Admiralty is not disposed to bear the _onus_ of failure by means of an attack by fire-ships, however desirous they may be that such attack should be made.”

It was now clear to me why I had been sent for to the Admiralty, where not a word of approbation of my previous services was uttered. The Channel fleet had been doing worse than nothing. The nation was dissatisfied, and even the existence of the ministry was at stake. They wanted a victory, and the admiral commanding plainly told them he would not willingly risk a defeat. Other naval officers had been consulted, who had disapproved of the use of fire-ships, and, as a last resource, I had been sent for, in the hope that I would undertake the enterprise. If this were successful, the fleet would get the credit, which would be thus reflected on the ministry; and if it failed, the consequence would be the loss of my individual reputation, as both ministry and commander-in-chief would lay the blame on me.

I had, however, no fear of failure in the plans at that moment uppermost in my mind, but from the way in which my co-operation was asked, I determined to have nothing to do with the execution of the plans, believing that I should have to deal with some who would rather rejoice at their failure than their success.

My reply to Lord Mulgrave, therefore, was, that, “the opinion of Lord Gambier, and the naval officers consulted by the Admiralty, as to the use of fire-ships, coincided with my own; for if any such attempt were made upon the enemy’s squadron, the result would in all probability be, that the fire-ships would be boarded by the numerous row-boats on guard,—the crews murdered,—and the vessels turned in a harmless direction. But that if, together with the fire-ships, a plan were combined which I would propose for his Lordship’s consideration, it would not be difficult to sink or scatter the guard-boats, and afterwards destroy the enemy’s squadron, despite any amount of opposition that might be offered. I further told Lord Mulgrave that my opinion agreed with the expression of Lord Gambier, that the fortifications on Isle d’Aix were “no obstacle;” though this opinion on my part was expressed for different reasons to the one assigned by his lordship, my own previous knowledge of the anchorage satisfying me that the channel was of sufficient breadth to enable an attacking force to interpose the enemy’s fleet between itself and Isle d’Aix, as well as to keep out of reach of the fortifications on Aix, even though those fortifications might be in a state of efficiency, in place of being “no obstacle,” from their dilapidated condition, as Lord Gambier had, no doubt, correctly described them.

I then briefly recapitulated to his lordship the outline of my plan, which, if seconded by the fleet, must certainly result in the total destruction of the French squadron. His lordship appeared very much gratified by the communication, and after praising its novelty and completeness, frankly expressed his entire confidence in the result, requesting me to put the substance of my suggestion in writing, so that he might at once lay it before the Board of Admiralty, which was then sitting.

The request was immediately complied with, and the letter placed in the hands of Lord Mulgrave, who shortly afterwards personally communicated to me his own satisfaction, and the entire concurrence of the Board in my plan. His lordship at the same time asked me “if I would undertake to put it in execution?”

I told him that “for reasons before assigned I would rather not do so, as being a junior officer, it would excite against me a great amount of jealousy. Besides which, Lord Gambier might consider it presumptuous on my part to undertake what he had not hesitated to describe as ‘hazardous, if not desperate.’ It was, moreover, by no means certain that Lord Gambier would be satisfied to put my plans in execution, as it was not impossible that he might deem them still more ‘desperate’ and ‘horrible’ than those to which he had already objected. I, however, assured his lordship that the plans were at the service of the Admiralty, and Lord Gambier also, irrespective of any share in their execution to which I might be considered entitled.”

“But,” objected his lordship, “all the officers who have been consulted deem an attack with fire-ships impracticable, and after such an expression of opinion, it is not likely they would be offended by the conduct of fire-ships being given to another officer who approved of their use.”

My answer was, “that the plan submitted to his lordship was not an attack with fire-ships alone, and when its details became known to the service, it would be seen that there was no risk of failure whatever, if made with a fair wind and flowing tide. On the contrary, its success on inspection must be evident to any experienced officer, who would see that as the enemy’s squadron could not escape up the Charente, their destruction would not only be certain, but, in fact, easy. The batteries on Isle d’Aix were scarcely worth notice, not so much from their dilapidated condition, though that was rightly estimated in Lord Gambier’s letter, as from there being plenty of room to steer clear of them, as well as from the ease with which the enemy’s ships might be brought between the fortifications and the ships attacking; the channel being sufficient for this purpose, as well as for their passage without any exposure to shot likely to be detrimental. As all this would be apparent to the officers of the fleet whenever the plan submitted should be communicated to them, I must emphatically repeat my objection to undertake its execution, not only on this ground, but for the additional reason that my health had been so much shattered by recent exertions as to require repose.

Lord Mulgrave did not deny the reasonableness of my objections, admitting that “although he did not believe Lord Gambier would feel hurt at my undertaking to put my own plan in execution, other officers might not be well pleased that its superintendence should be committed to a junior officer. On this ground he would reconsider the matter, and endeavour to find some one else to put it in execution.

I then took leave of Lord Mulgrave, who, next day, again sent for me, when he said, “My lord, you must go. The Board cannot listen to further refusal or delay. Rejoin your frigate at once. I will make you all right with Lord Gambier. Your own confidence in the result has, I must confess, taken me by surprise, but it has increased my belief that all you anticipate will be accomplished. Make yourself easy about the jealous feeling of senior officers; I will so manage it with Lord Gambier that the _amour propre_ of the fleet shall be satisfied.”

On this I requested a short time for final consideration, and before its expiration sent a letter to his lordship again declining the command; but at the same time informing him that it had ever been a maxim with me not to shrink from duty to my country under any circumstances, however disadvantageous to myself, and that if officers my seniors could not be found to put the project in execution, I would then waive further objection.

The immediate result was the following letter from Lord Mulgrave, who, contrary to the tenour of mine, had construed it into an unqualified acceptance of the command.

[Private.]

“Admiralty, March 25, 1809.

“MY DEAR LORD,—The letter I have just received from your lordship is
truly characteristic of the whole tenour of your professional life. If
your health will admit of your undertaking the important service
referred to, I am fully persuaded that I cannot so well commit it to
any other hands.

“I have the honour to be, with the highest esteem,
“Your lordship’s most faithful servant,
“MULGRAVE.

“The Lord Cochrane.”

“P.S. I think the sooner you go to Plymouth the better. You will there
receive an order to join Lord Gambier, to whom a secret letter will be
written, directing him to employ your Lordship on the service which we
have settled against the Rochefort fleet.”

I have been thus minute in detailing the circumstances connected with my acceptance of a command so unusual, because it has been said, and for anything that has appeared to the contrary, may still be considered, that I thrust myself into the position, which, as my own foresight had anticipated, became eventually a very serious one for me, as bringing upon my head an amount of enmity, such as even my own misgivings had not considered possible.

Having made the requisite suggestions to Lord Mulgrave relative to the contents and mode of fitting up the explosion vessels, the fire-ships to be employed being of the usual description, I returned on board the _Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, there to await further orders from the Admiralty.

Such was the despatch used, that by the 19th of March the Board was in a position to apprise Lord Gambier of the steps taken, by the following letter addressed to his lordship by the Board of Admiralty.

“Admiralty Office, March 19th, 1809.

“MY LORD,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to
acquaint your lordship, that they have ordered twelve transports to be
fitted as fire-ships, and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and
that Mr. Congreve (afterwards Sir W. Congreve) is under orders to
proceed to your lordship in a coppered transport (the _Cleveland_),
containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied with a
detachment of marine artillery, instructed in the use of them, and
placed under Mr. Congreve’s orders.

“That the vessels named in the margin (_Etna_, _Thunder_, _Vesuvius_,
_Hound_, and _Fury_), are likewise under orders to fit for sea with
all possible expedition, and to join you as soon as they may be ready.
That all preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship
to make an attack upon the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle
d’Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their
Lordships’ directions to you, to take into your consideration the
possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with
your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire-ships,
bombs, and rockets—or separately by any of the above-named means.

“It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you state to me for
their information, whether any further augmentation of force of any
description is in your opinion necessary to enable you to perform this
service with full effect, that it may be prepared and forwarded to you
without a moment’s delay—their Lordships having come to a
determination to leave no means untried to destroy the enemy’s
squadron.

(Signed) “W. W. POLE.

“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”

Lord Gambier’s reply to this intimation, that on the receipt of the above-mentioned appliances he would be expected to attack the French squadron, was, that “_if the Board_ deemed an attack practicable, he would obey any orders with which they might honour him, however great might be the loss of men and ships.” A plain declaration that he _still declined to take upon himself the responsibility of attack_.

It will be necessary to bear this fact in mind, as after the attack was made, Lord Gambier, in his first despatch to the Admiralty, gave me credit for everything but the success of my plan, and in his second despatch _omitted my name altogether as having had anything to do with either planning or executing it!!!_ and in the vote of thanks subsequently given to his lordship in parliament, the officers under my orders were thanked, but no mention whatever was made of me, either as having conducted, or even taken any part in the attack, the whole merit of which was ascribed to Lord Gambier, who was never nearer than nine miles to the scene of action, as will subsequently appear.

Lord Gambier’s answer to the previous letter from the Board is, however, so material to the right understanding of the events which followed, that it will be better to subjoin the whole of it.

“_Caledonia_, in Basque Roads,
“March 26th, 1809.

“SIR,—In obedience to their Lordships’ directions to me, contained in
your letter of the 19th instant, I beg leave to state that it is
advisable that I should be furnished with six gun-brigs in addition to
those I may be able to collect of such as are under my command; at
present there are only two at this anchorage. I shall, however, order
the _Insolent_ and _Contest_ to join me from Quiberon Bay; and I
should hope that the _Martial_ and _Fervent_ will shortly return from
Plymouth.

“It is proper I should state for their Lordships’ information, the
position in which the French fleet is at present anchored under the
Isle d’Aix, that their Lordships may be able to form a judgment of the
success that may be expected to attend an attack upon the enemy’s
fleet, in either of the modes directed by their Lordships in your
letter above-mentioned.

“The enemy’s ships are anchored in two lines, very near each other, in
a direction due south from the Isle d’Aix, and the ships in each line
not further apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I
imagined, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the
shoaliness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor
clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are
within point-blank shot of the works on the Isle d’Aix; such ships,
therefore, _as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by
red-hot shot, &c. from the island, and should the ships be disabled in
their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy’s fire until
they are destroyed_—there not being sufficient depth of water to allow
them to move to the southward out of distance.

“The enemy having taken up their position apparently with the view not
only to be protected by _the strong works on the Isle d’Aix_, but also
to have the entrance of the Charente open to them, that in case of
being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can
run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that are
favourable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serve
equally to carry them up the river.

“With respect to the attempt that may be made to destroy the enemy’s
ships with shells, &c., I am not competent to give an opinion until it
is ascertained whether the booms can be placed within the reach of
their mortars from the enemy’s ships, without being exposed to the
fire of the Isle d’Aix.

“I beg leave to add that, _if their Lordships_ are of opinion that an
attack on the enemy’s ships by those of the fleet under my command is
practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to
honour me with, _however great the risk may be of the loss of men and
ships_.

“I have the honour, &c.
“GAMBIER.

“The Hon. W. W. Pole.”

I have marked some passages of this singular letter in italics, for the purpose of showing their important bearing on subsequent events. On the 11th Lord Gambier had informed the Board of Admiralty—as to my own personal knowledge was the fact—that “the advanced work on the Isle d’Aix was _no obstacle to bombardment_.” “Now,” says his lordship, “_the ships attacking would, from the fire of this fort, be exposed to be raked by red-hot shot, and if disabled in their masts, must be destroyed_.” In the former letter his lordship stated that the fort was “_injured in its foundations_, and in no state of progress.” It is now characterised as “_the strong works_” on _the_ Isle d’Aix.

That there was really little damage to be feared from these fortifications, either to ships or bombs, was afterwards corroborated by the fact, that when a partial attack only was reluctantly made, neither suffered from their fire, the result proving that these works had from the first been rightly characterised by Lord Gambier as “_forming no obstacle_,” though magnified into “strong works.”

In my interview with Lord Mulgrave, I had stated to his lordship, that the works on the Isle d’Aix were no impediment, because of the facility with which the enemy’s ships could be brought between the attacking British force and the fortifications, so as completely to interpose between the fire of the latter. Lord Gambier does not appear to have taken this view, but he completely proved its soundness by stating that the enemy’s ships lay within point-blank shot of their own works, so as to expose them to the fire of their own forts on Aix, if these fired at all, whilst my previous knowledge of the anchorage made it a matter of certainty to me, that it was not difficult for the British fleet to place the enemy in such a position. Lord Gambier’s assertion was one of the main points relied on in the subsequent court-martial, and his lordship’s own letter just quoted is in direct contradiction to the evidence upon which he relied for acquittal.

A more singular declaration is made by his lordship, that if the enemy were attacked by “fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they could run up the river beyond their reach.” In place of this the result, as will presently be seen, proved that the attempt to do so only ended in all running ashore, with the exception of two, and they ultimately escaped up the river because they were not attacked at all! But we must not anticipate.

Had Lord Gambier been, as I was, from having previously blockaded Rochefort in the _Pallas_, practically acquainted with the soundings, he must have taken the same views that I had laid before Lord Mulgrave, and in place of writing to the Admiralty all sorts of evil forebodings to “men and ships,” he would have seen that the attack, with the means indicated, was certain in effect, and easy of accomplishment.

CHAP. XX.

SAIL FOR THE BASQUE ROADS.—MY AWKWARD POSITION.—ILL-HUMOUR OF THE
FLEET.—ADMIRAL HARVEY.—IMPRUDENCE OF ADMIRAL HARVEY.—COMPLAINS OF
LORD GAMBIER.—INACCURATE SOUNDINGS.—LORD GAMBIER’S TRACTS.—COBBETT’S
COMMENTS ON THE TRACTS.—DISSENSIONS IN THE FLEET.—LETTER TO LORD
MULGRAVE.—MY PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE.—NIGHT-WORK.—MY PRINCIPLES OF
ACTION.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—EXPLOSION VESSELS.

Without waiting to convoy the fire-ships and explosion vessels, the _Impérieuse_ sailed forthwith for Basque Roads in order to expedite the necessary arrangements, so that on their arrival no time might be lost in putting the project in execution; a point on which the Board of Admiralty was most urgent, not more in a belligerent than a political point of view, for as has been stated, the public was dissatisfied that the enemy had been permitted to escape from Brest; whilst our West Indian merchants were in a state of panic lest the French squadron, which had escaped the vigilance of the blockading force before Brest, might again slip out, and inflict irretrievable disaster on their colonial interests, then the most important branch of our maritime commerce.

The _Impérieuse_ arrived in Basque Roads on the 3rd of April, when I was received with great urbanity by the commander-in-chief; his lordship without reserve communicating to me the following order from the Admiralty:—

“Admiralty Office, 25th March, 1809.

“MY LORD,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought fit
to select Captain Lord Cochrane for the purpose of conducting, under
your lordship’s direction, the fire-ships to be employed in the
projected attack on the enemy’s squadron off Isle d’Aix, I have their
Lordships’ commands to signify their direction to you to employ Lord
Cochrane in the above-mentioned service accordingly, whenever the
attack shall take place; and I am to acquaint you that the twelve
fire-ships, of which you already had notice, are now in the Downs in
readiness, and detained only by contrary winds, and that Mr. Congreve
is also at that anchorage, with an assortment of rockets, ready to
proceed with the fire-ships.

“I am also to acquaint you that the composition for the six
transports, sent to your lordship by Admiral Young, and 1000 carcases
for 18-pounders, will sail in the course of three or four days from
Woolwich, to join you off Rochefort.

“I have, &c. &c.
“W. W. POLE.

“Admiral Lord Gambier.”

Whatever might have been the good feeling manifested by Lord Gambier, it did not, however, extend to the officers of the fleet, whose _amour propre_ Lord Mulgrave had either not attempted, or had failed to satisfy. Every captain was my senior, and the moment my plans were made known, all regarded me as an interloper, sent to take the credit from those to whom it was now considered legitimately to belong. “Why could we not have done this as well as Lord Cochrane?” was the general cry of the fleet, and the question was reasonable; for the means once devised, there could be no difficulty in effectually carrying them out. Others asked, “Why did not Lord Gambier permit us to do this before?” the second query taking much of the sting from the first, as regarded myself, by laying the blame on the commander-in-chief.

The ill-humour of the fleet found an exponent in the person of Admiral Harvey, a brave Trafalgar officer, whose abuse of Lord Gambier to his face was such as I had never before witnessed from a subordinate. I should even now hesitate to record it as incredible, were it not officially known by the minutes of the court-martial in which it some time afterwards resulted.[42]

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Footnote 42:

Minutes of a court-martial on Admiral Harvey, on board H. M. S.
_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, May 22nd, 1809.

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On ascertaining the nature of my mission, and that the conduct of the attack had been committed to me by the Board of Admiralty, Admiral Harvey came on board the flag-ship with a list of officers and men who volunteered, under his direction, to perform the service which had been thrust upon me. On Lord Gambier informing him that the Board had fixed upon me for the purpose, he said, “he did not care; if he were passed by, and Lord Cochrane or any other junior officer was appointed in preference, he would immediately strike his flag, and resign his commission!”

Lord Gambier said he “should be sorry to see him resort to such an extremity, but that the Lords of the Admiralty having fixed on Lord Cochrane to conduct the service, he could not deviate from their Lordships’ orders.”

On this explanation being good-naturedly made by Lord Gambier, Admiral Harvey broke out into invectives of a most extraordinary kind, openly avowing that “he never saw a man so unfit for the command of the fleet as Lord Gambier, who instead of sending boats to sound the channels, which he (Admiral Harvey) considered the best preparation for an attack on the enemy, he had been employing, or rather amusing himself with mustering the ships’ companies, and had not even taken the pains to ascertain whether the enemy had placed any mortars in front of their lines; concluding by saying, that had Lord Nelson been there, he would not have anchored in Basque Roads at all, but would have dashed at the enemy at once.”

Admiral Harvey then came into Sir Harry Neale’s cabin, and shook hands with me, assuring me that “he should have been very happy to see me on any other occasion than the present. He begged me to consider that nothing personal to myself was intended, for he had a high opinion of me; but that my having been ordered to execute such a service, could only be regarded as an insult to the fleet, and that on this account he would strike his flag so soon as the service was executed.” Admiral Harvey further assured me, that “he had volunteered his services, which had been refused.”

To these remarks I replied: “Admiral Harvey, the service on which the Admiralty has sent me was none of my seeking. I went to Whitehall in obedience to a summons from Lord Mulgrave, and at his lordship’s request gave the Board a plan of attack, the execution of which has been thrust upon me, contrary to my inclination, as well knowing the invidious position in which I should be placed.”

“Well,” said Admiral Harvey, “this is not the first time I have been lightly treated, and that my services have not been attended to in the way they deserved; because I am no canting methodist, no hypocrite, no psalm-singer, and do not cheat old women out of their estates by hypocrisy and canting! I have volunteered to perform the service you came on, and should have been happy to see you on any other occasion, but am very sorry to have a junior officer placed over my head.”

“You must not blame me for that,” replied I; “but permit me to remark that you are using very strong expressions relative to the commander-in-chief.”

“I can assure you, Lord Cochrane,” replied Admiral Harvey, “that I have spoken to Lord Gambier with the same degree of prudence as I have now done to you in the presence of Captain Sir H. Neale.”

“Well, admiral,” replied I, “considering that I have been an unwilling listener to what you really did say to his lordship, I can only remark that you have a strange notion of prudence.”

We then went on the quarter-deck, where Admiral Harvey again commenced a running commentary on Lord Gambier’s conduct, in so loud a tone as to attract the attention of every officer within hearing, his observations being to the effect that “Lord Gambier had received him coldly after the battle of Trafalgar, that he had used him ill, and that his having forwarded the master of the _Tonnant’s_ letter for a court-martial on him, was a proof of his methodistical, jesuitical conduct, and of his vindictive disposition; that Lord Gambier’s conduct, since he took the command of the fleet, was deserving of reprobation, and that his employing officers in mustering the ships’ companies, instead of in gaining information about the soundings, showed himself to be unequal to the command of the fleet.” Then turning to Captain Bedford, he said, “You know you are of the same opinion.”

Admiral Harvey then left the ship, first asking Captain Bedford “whether he had made his offer of service _on any duty_ known to the commander-in-chief?” To which Captain Bedford replied in the affirmative.

My reason for detailing this extraordinary scene, the whole of which, and much more to the same effect, will be found in the minutes of the court-martial previously referred to—is to show into what a hornets’ nest my plans had involuntarily brought me. It may readily be imagined that I bitterly regretted not having persisted in my refusal to have anything to do with carrying them into execution, for now they were known, all believed,—and, being my senior officers, had no doubt a right to believe—that they could execute them better than myself.

So far as regarded the neglect to take soundings of even the approaches to the channel leading to the enemy’s fleet, Admiral Harvey was quite right in his statement. Nothing of the kind had been attempted beyond some soundings on that part of the Boyart shoal, _farthest from the French fleet_! Had not my previous knowledge of the anchorage, as ascertained in the _Pallas_ a few years before, supplied all the information necessary for my conduct of the plans proposed, this neglect would in all probability have been fatal to their execution. Unlike Admiral Harvey, I am not, however, prepared to blame Lord Gambier for the neglect, as a slight acquaintance with the masters, whose duty it was to have made the examination, showed me that they were quite capable of misleading the commander-in-chief, by substituting their own surmises for realities. Certain it was, that although no soundings whatever of the approaches to the enemy’s fleet had been taken, those whose duty it was to have made them, as far as practicable, pretended to know more of the anchorage than I did![43] and had, no doubt, impressed the commander-in-chief that their reports were founded on actual observations.

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Footnote 43:

In the subsequent court-martial, one of these men constructed a chart
of the soundings, as from his own personal knowledge, and in his
verbal evidence said that he had never sounded at all! His chart was,
nevertheless, made the basis of the trial, to the exclusion of the
official charts!

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How far Admiral Harvey was justified in his intemperate allusions to the “_musters_” and _quasi_ religious practices on board the fleet, is a point upon which I do not care to enter, further than to state that these “musters” were found to relate to catechetical examinations of the men, and that I had not been many days in the fleet before the commander-in-chief sent a number of tracts on board the _Impérieuse_, with an injunction for their distribution amongst the crew.

Having by this time ascertained that, rightly or wrongly, the fleet was in a state of great disorganisation on account of the orders given to various officers for the distribution of tracts, and being naturally desirous of learning the kind of instruction thereby imparted, I found some of them of a most silly and injudicious character, and therefore declined to distribute them, but imprudently selected some, and sent them to my friend Cobbett, together with a description of the state of the fleet, in consequence of the tract controversy. It was a false step, though I did not at the time contemplate the virulent animosity which might be excited at home from Cobbett’s hard-hitting comments, nor the consequent amount of enmity to myself, which only ceased with my eventual removal from the Navy!

The fact was, that the fleet was divided into two factions, as bitter against each other as were the Cavaliers and Roundheads in the days of Charles I. The above-mentioned imprudent step incurred the ill will of both parties. The tractarian faction, consisting for the most part of officers appointed by Tory influence or favour of the Admiral, and knowing my connection with Burdett and Cobbett, avoided me; whilst the opposite faction, believing that from the affair of the tracts I should incur the irreconcilable displeasure of Lord Gambier, lost no opportunity of denouncing me as a concocter of novel devices to advance my own interests at the expense of my seniors in the service.

Strange as it may appear, almost the only persons who treated me with consideration were Lord Gambier, his second in command, Admiral Stopford, and his flag-captain, Sir H. Neale.

For this urbanity Lord Gambier had to incur the bitter sarcasm of the fleet—that when the Admiralty wanted to attack the enemy with fire-ships, he had denounced the operation as a “horrible and anti-Christian mode of warfare;” but that now he saw my plan of explosion vessels, in addition to fire-ships, was likely to be crowned with success, he no longer regarded it in the same light.

It was evident that amidst these contending factions, so fatal in a fleet where all ought to be zeal and unity of action—I should have to depend on myself. Disregarding, therefore, the disunion prevalent, and, indeed, increased four-fold by the further division of opinion with respect to Admiral Harvey’s disrespectful expressions to the commander-in-chief, I determined to reconnoitre for myself the position of the French ships, especially as regarded their protection by the batteries on Isle d’Aix, and for this purpose made as minute a _reconnaissance_ as was practicable.

Perhaps it ought to have been previously mentioned, that on the evening of our arrival, I had gone close in to the island, and had embodied the result of my observations in the following letter to Lord Mulgrave, to whom I considered myself more immediately responsible.

“_Impérieuse_, Basque Roads, 3rd April.

“MY LORD,—Having been very close to the Isle d’Aix, I find that the
western sea wall has been pulled down to build a better. At present
the fort is quite open, and may be taken as soon as the French fleet
is driven on shore or burned, which will be as soon as the fire-ships
arrive. The wind continues favourable for the attack. If your lordship
can prevail on the ministry to send a military force here, you will do
great and lasting good to our country.

“Could ministers see things with their own eyes, how differently would
they act; but they cannot be everywhere present, and on their opinion
of the judgment of others must depend the success of war—possibly the
fate of England and all Europe.

“No diversion which the whole force of Great Britain is capable of
making in Portugal or Spain, would so much shake the French government
as the capture of the islands on this coast. A few men would take
Oleron; but to render the capture effective, send twenty thousand men,
who, without risk, would find occupation for a French army of a
hundred thousand.

“The batteries on Oleron are all open, except two of no importance.
Isle Gros would also be of infinite use to our cruisers in the
destruction of the French trade.

“The commerce on this coast—and indeed on all the French coasts—is not
inferior to that of England in number of vessels and men employed,
though not in size of coasting craft.

“The coasting trade is the great nursery of English seamen, and yet we
strangely affect to despise the French coasting trade. Must not the
corn of the French northern provinces give food to the south? Are the
oil and wine of the south of no consequence to those who grow none for
themselves? I do not state these matters to your lordship but as an
answer to the opinions generally current in England, and, indeed, too
much entertained in the naval service also.

“Ships filled with stones would ruin for ever the anchorage of Aix,
and some old vessels of the line well loaded would be excellent for
the purpose.

“I hope your lordship will excuse the way in which I have jumbled
these thoughts together. My intentions are good, and if they can be of
any use, I shall feel happy.

“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your most obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.

“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”

In this hurried letter the reader will readily recognise the principles laid down by me in a former chapter, for the most advantageous mode of warfare, viz. by harassing the enemy on his own coast, and by a perpetual threat of a descent thereon at any moment, to prevent his employing his forces elsewhere.

In place of the advice being even taken in good part, I had afterwards reason to know, that the views briefly expressed in this letter were regarded by the government as an act of impertinence. Yet nothing could be more sound. The French islands captured, and occupied by an adequate force, protected by a few ships, would have kept the enemy’s coasts in a constant state of alarm, so that it would have been impossible for the enemy to detach armies to the Spanish peninsula; had this policy been pursued, the Peninsular war, as has been stated in a former chapter, and its millions of National Debt, would never have been heard of. So much does the useful or useless expenditure of war depend on the decision of a cabinet, which can practically know little of the matter.

As it was—the French laughed at the clouds of cruisers intent on watching their coasting trade, which was carried on almost without interruption; our vessels going in shore in the day time, when the French coasters kept close under their batteries, and going off shore in the night, when they pursued their course unmolested. Provisions and stores were thus moved as wanted from one part of the enemy’s coast to another, with absolute safety. The great number of prizes which had fallen to the lot of the _Speedy_, _Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ was almost solely owing to our working in shore at night, when the enemy’s coasters were on the move. In the day time we are usually out of sight of land, with the men fast asleep in their hammocks.

The constant readiness at sea for an enemy who never willingly left port, was, in those days, a great evil, though it was the one point inculcated by the Admiralty. It would have been far more to the purpose to have inculcated the necessity of damaging and alarming the limited seaboard of France, by means of small frigates capable of running in-shore, and to have left the French fleets, whenever they ventured out, to the supervision of squadrons composed of large ships, and specially appointed for the purpose. From the hundreds of ships then in commission, traversing the seas with no advantage to themselves or the country, such an arrangement would have annihilated the commerce, and with it the naval power of France. In place of this, attention to the condition of ships was the most certain way to reward. As the men could not always be employed in exercising guns and furling sails, a system of cleaning and polishing was enforced, till it became positive cruelty to the crews.

If the reader will refer to a previous letter of Lord Collingwood to the Board of Admiralty, he will fully comprehend my meaning. His lordship states that Lord Cochrane’s services on the coast of Languedoc in the _Impérieuse_ “kept the French coast in constant alarm, causing a total suspension of trade, and harassing a body of troops employed to oppose him; he has probably prevented those troops, which were intended for Figueras, from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of their own coasts.” For “Figueras” read “Corunna,” and it will be evident, that had the same course been generally pursued on the Atlantic coasts of France, by order, or even under the countenance of the Admiralty, Sir John Moore would neither have retreated nor fallen; because, from the occupation which the French army would have found on its own coasts, he could not have encountered one on the Spanish soil.