Chapter X: The Negotiations for a Russo-German Alliance, 1904

Early in July, 1904, Herr von Holstein offered his resignation because of personal differences with Baron Richthofen. In doing so, he stated that the prestige of Germany had diminished during the past years “while our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling us”; and as “difficult situations” were to be anticipated, he was happy to be relieved of responsibility. Count Bülow patched up the quarrel, but his comment to Herr von Holstein’s remarks is illuminating:

Now he [Herr von Holstein] speaks of our shrunken prestige just as the Bismarckian press does. But I cannot believe that Holstein, like that press, attributes the decline of our authority to the dismissal of the great Chancellor. Since that dismissal, from the non-renewal of the Russian Reinsurance Treaty and the East Asiatic Triple Alliance to the handling of the Moroccan and Egyptian questions, from the so-called Urias letter to Vienna to the publication of the Swinemünde dispatch, from the turn in 1896 against England to the Shanghai and Pauncefote difference with that Power, nothing of significance has happened in our foreign policy without Holstein’s advice.[481]

The results of those errors, so frankly confessed, were apparent: the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, the exclusion of Germany from the entente movement and from the Moroccan settlement, the British efforts to approach Russia,[482] animosity between Great Britain and Germany. They all caused that attempt at a new orientation of policy which in 1900 Count Bülow had threatened in this eventuality.

One of the most favorable aspects of the German foreign relations was the _rapprochement_ with the United States in 1903 and 1904. There was cordial friendship between President Roosevelt and Baron Sternburg, the German ambassador,[483] and the two governments both desired to maintain the integrity of China during the current war.[484] The President mistrusted Russia, about whom he could say nothing good, and France in their policy toward China, and he met difficulty in trying to co-operate with Great Britain.[485] As he was ambitious to mediate peace between Russia and Japan when the time came, he turned to Germany for aid, in August expressing the wish “to go hand in hand with Germany in East Asia.”[486] The German government perceived in this co-operation a means of protecting its interests in China, of issuing from its relative international isolation, and of preventing France and Great Britain from mediating peace—an event which might enable them to form a triple grouping with Russia or even a quadruple combination with Russia and Japan.[487] Count Bülow therefore cordially responded to the President’s invitation,[488] seeking at the same time to increase the latter’s suspicion of France and Great Britain.[489]

As the German government realized the limitations to this intimacy with the United States, it sought a more effective association in an alliance with Russia. In January, 1904, the Chancellor had been unconcerned about such an alliance;[490] but by July he was waiting for the “psychological moment” in which to propose a renewal of the former “League of the Three Emperors.”[491]

The advent of that moment seemed highly probable. Since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian people, government, and sovereign had drawn closer to Germany.[492] On June 1, “dearest Nicky” wrote to his cousin “Willy” (so they addressed each other), “I know that you feel for us in this serious time and it is a comfort to realize that one’s _real friends_ think and sympathize with one.”[493] And “Willy,” in his replies, overflowed with affection and advice—advice that varied from directing “Nicky” upon how to conduct war to lecturing him on the “piratical” practices of his ships, from urging him to send his Black Sea fleet through the Dardanelles in spite of British opposition to reporting gossip which would antagonize him against Great Britain and France.[494]

In October the opportunity arose for the German move toward an alliance. A Russian company had given a contract to the Hamburg-American Line to furnish coal for the Russian Baltic fleet which was to sail for the war zone about the middle of that month.[495] As the German firm intended to use mainly English coal, it had chartered a number of British ships and had given a subcontract to a British firm to aid it in the transportation. None the less, on learning of the transaction, the British press bitterly attacked Germany for thus violating neutrality. In view of this attack Count Bülow on October 4 instructed Baron Romberg, first secretary of the German embassy in St. Petersburg, to make a communication to the Russian government as follows: Baron Romberg should state to Count Lamsdorff that this press campaign might provoke a war but that the German government would not prevent the execution of the coaling contract, that it “would run the risk of having the English kindle fire-rockets in Japan.” If war did occur with Japan and Great Britain, Germany would hold France also responsible; for not only would a large element among the French advocate grasping the opportunity for revenge against Germany, but also the arousing of the British zeal for war would be a direct result of the Entente Cordiale. “So if we lose our colonies, trade, merchant marine, and perhaps also a part of our war fleet in an unequal battle on the sea . . . . a reckoning with France on land would become unavoidable for us.”[496]

Count Lamsdorff showed no inclination to respond to this feeler. On October 19, while thanking the German government for its friendship, he refused to credit either Great Britain or Japan with bellicose intentions against Germany. He interrupted Baron Romberg to assure him that nothing was to be feared from France; not a word did he utter about an alliance.[497]

Meantime, the Russian Baltic squadron sailed, and in the night of October 21 occurred the Dogger Bank disaster which brought war between Great Britain and Russia dangerously close.[498] The “psychological moment” had come, reasoned Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein. Defeated in the Far East, menaced by revolution, and excited by this new danger, Russia should welcome the project of an alliance with the strongest military power in Europe. So on October 24 Herr von Holstein, who usually held aloof from all ambassadors, explained the German proposition to Count Osten-Sacken,[499] the Russian representative. Three days later the Emperor’s influence with the Czar, who was thought to be more pliable and more favorably inclined than his Foreign Minister, was brought into play. In a letter to Nicholas II the Emperor wrote:

For some time English press has been threatening Germany, on no account to allow coals to be sent to your Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is not impossible, that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest against our coaling your ships coupled with a _sommation_ to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would be absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally France of the obligations she has taken over in the treaty of Dual Alliance with you, the _casus foederis_. It is out of the question, that France on such an invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty towards her ally. Though Delcassé is an Anglophile _énragé_, he will be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris! In this way a powerful combination of 3 of the strongest continental Powers would be formed to attack, whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting. . . . . My news from London say, that the Press and mob make a noise, the Admiralty some fuss, but that Government, Court and Society look with greatest calm at the event as an unhappy accident, arising from to great nervousness.[500]

This broad hint, amounting almost to a proposal of alliance itself, was immediately effective. The Czar replied two days later:

As you say . . . . Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind. It will mean peace and rest for the world.[501]

On the next day a draft of a treaty and a long explanatory letter, both composed by the Chancellor and Herr von Holstein,[502] were sent by the Emperor to the Czar. This draft, which was intended to test how far the Russian government would go, provided for a “defensive alliance . . . . to localize as far as possible the Russo-Japanese War.” The first article was the most important:

In case one of the two Empires shall be attacked by a European Power, its ally will aid it with all its force on land and sea. The two allies, in that case, would make common cause for the purpose of recalling to France the obligations which she has assumed by the terms of the Franco- Russian treaty of Alliance.

By the second article neither Power was to conclude a separate peace with a common adversary. The third article was designed to safeguard Germany in the coaling affair and to continue the alliance after the current war was over. It read:

The engagement of mutual aid is equally valid in case acts performed by one of the high contracting parties during the war such as the delivery of coal to a belligerent should give place after the war to reclamations of a third Power, as pretended violations of the right of neutrality.

In the letter the Emperor emphasized the defensive and the purely European character of the alliance. “It is very essential that America should not feel threatened by our agreement,” he wrote. He denounced France, “this republic of miserable civilians,” “the French radicals, Clemenceau and all the rest of the tag-rag and bobtail” for not fulfilling France’s obligations to her ally.

I positively know that as far back as last December the French Finance Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another power, France would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, even though England sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the English have handed Morocco over to France. The certainty, that France intends to remain neutral and even to lend her diplomatic support to England, is the motive, which gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard of state of things will change as soon as France finds herself face to face with the necessity of eventually choosing sides. . . . . The radical party . . . . abhors war and militarism, while the nationalist party while not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England and against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The main result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that France must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her treaty- obligations toward Russia. . . . . This consummation once reached, I expect to maintain peace and you will be left an undisturbed and free hand to deal with Japan. . . . . Of course, before we can take any steps in this question and approach France that tiresome North Sea incident must first have been brought to a close.

For, he continued, the French foreign office had already accepted the British view of the incident, and in case of difficulty over this matter, France would choose the British side. At the close of his letter the Emperor wrote that only he and Count Bülow knew of the project, and that when they had finished the draft the Chancellor had said: “May God’s blessings rest upon the work of the two monarchs and may the mighty three-Power group, Russia, Germany, France, preserve forever the peace of Europe. God grant it!”[503]

The real object of this extravagant show of devotion to Russia was of course to inveigle her into an alliance. It did not signify a desire for a general conflict; the German government appreciated the British naval power too keenly for that.[504] Moreover, since it knew how averse the Russian government and especially the Czar were to an extension of the war, it emphasized the pacifying influence which the proposed alliance would exercise. The German leaders doubtlessly realized, however, that they were running a big risk, since Count Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy in London, had warned them that Great Britain would regard an alliance between Germany and Russia, no matter how defensive in character, as an aggression directed against the security of the British Empire.[505]

The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein considered the risk worth while, because, if the alliance could be concluded, they expected France, under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, to enter the new grouping. If she did so, they no doubt reasoned, the Entente Cordiale would be destroyed, the work of M. Delcassé would be blocked, and, instead of Great Britain, Germany would be the center of the new combination. France, as the weakest member of the firm, would have to take orders from both her partners. In fact, the German government openly expressed to the Czar the expectation that in case of a war the control over the French army and navy would be put into German hands. If France, refusing to enter the alliance, elected to range herself with Great Britain and if the Russo-German alliance alone were made, the German statesmen apparently thought that the Dual Alliance would be broken, France would again be at the mercy of the German military power, and the possibility of an Anglo-Russian accord would be destroyed. The gains, both positive and negative, to be derived by Germany from such an alliance would be enormous. Its completion would constitute a far-reaching diplomatic revolution.[506]

In Russian governmental circles opinion was divided. The Czar, who had proposed the alliance without consulting his Foreign Minister,[507] was its staunchest supporter. Weak and dependent, he usually agreed with his most recent adviser. His imagination, which could be vivid at times, was given freer rein because of his indolence. In 1903 he had succumbed to the arguments and ambitions of the adventurer, M. Bezobrazov, about Manchuria and Korea and had brought on the war with Japan. As the necessary European part of that program, M. Bezobrazov had advocated an understanding between the Dual and the Triple alliances. This aspect had not been achieved, probably owing to Count Lamsdorff’s opposition.[508] But the war was taking a disastrous course for Russia, revolution was threatening, and the German Emperor’s telegram arrived while the crisis with Great Britain was still acute and when Russia, according to the British Ambassador, would have welcomed a war with that Power.[509] The forlorn and troubled Czar returned readily to the idea of an alliance when William II suggested it.

Count Lamsdorff was wary of this move from the start. Not a very strong personality, he was unable at times to maintain control of the foreign policy, yet he was a capable and loyal official who, when necessary, spoke frankly to his master. The Czar was actuated chiefly by sentiment and emotion; his Minister by shrewd diplomatic calculations. Although the one did not grasp the German motives, the other did; and the prospect of feeling “the heavy weight . . . . of the iron bands” of a German alliance was not to his liking. Count Lamsdorff did not believe that Russia needed this alliance as he felt certain that Great Britain would not attack her.[510] Furthermore, the conclusion of an agreement of neutrality about Balkan affairs with Austria-Hungary late in October relieved his country from danger in that quarter.[511]

On the other hand [he wrote to Count Osten-Sacken], we manifestly need the friendship of our powerful neighbor for the security of our extensive frontier, for our provisioning with coal and other contrabands, etc. All this must be seriously considered and we must endeavor not to permit our relations with Berlin to deteriorate, although Paris must also not be disregarded. Only through the preservation of this balance will Russia succeed in obtaining all possible advantages from both sides.[512]

When the German draft of the treaty arrived, the Dogger Bank crisis was over, but the Russian government remained embittered because Great Britain had made special naval preparations and a detachment of British cruisers, cleared for action, had followed the Russian fleet from Vigo to Tangier.[513] Still, that was no reason to assume the “iron bands” of a German alliance. The Czar and his Foreign Minister immediately set to work to make the terms more favorable for Russia.[514] They modified the first and third articles.[515] In the latter, to be kept secret, they incorporated a _quid pro quo_ by which Russia should receive German support in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace. The revised first article was the more important. The first sentence remained as before; but, instead of stipulating that Russia and Germany both advise France to enter the alliance, the second sentence was changed to read: “His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias will take the steps necessary to initiate France into this accord and to invite her to associate herself in it as ally.” The Czar told the Emperor that the revised Article I must stand without change.[516]

When the Russian government had been brought to this point, the German leaders revealed their real aim. They were, of course, obliged to accept the new first article; but the Emperor, in his reply to Nicholas II, November 17, made it plain that France would have to choose sides, even though, as he frankly wrote, “doubtless the French would much prefer any other grouping of Powers to that of the Alliance _a trois_ as in 1895.” The chief revisions asked by the German government were in the introduction and in Article III. The former was changed to read: The Emperor and the Czar “for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace in Europe have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of defensive alliance.” According to an entirely new Article III the treaty should remain in force until denounced one year in advance; however, it was left to the Czar to set any time limit he wished.

These revisions transformed the basis of the negotiation. They made the alliance a general one to continue after the war. The changes were explained on the ground that, in the previous version, the treaty had been aimed too openly at Great Britain, and that, while this was the case, it was not politic to make the fact too evident.

The Russian _quid pro quo_ in Article III was also rejected. Germany preferred not to help Russia in the negotiations for peace for fear of antagonizing the United States and of driving her into British arms, although the Emperor excused this refusal by explaining that if this secret clause became known, public opinion might consider the treaty an aggressive one binding Germany to defend the Russian conquests. Instead, he proposed that the previous Article III be made into an extra secret article in which the second sentence should read: “It follows from the the terms of the first sentence of Article I that Germany will associate herself with no action whatever that might imply hostile tendencies to Russia.” That clause, wrote the Emperor, would safeguard Russia against the repetition of any such congress as that of 1878, whereby she had been deprived of her Turkish conquests.

In his accompanying letter to the Czar, for which Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein furnished the rough draft, the Emperor urged a quick signing of the agreement, adding the extraordinary proposal that Russia make some military demonstration on the Persian-Afghan frontier. “Even should the forces at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on India itself,” he wrote, “they would do for Persia—which has no army—and a pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will do wonders in England and have remarkably quieting influence on the hot headed Jingoes in London.” He also warned the Czar against Anglo-French ambitions to mediate at the desire of Japan.[517]

In St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff persuaded the Czar to proceed slowly with the negotiations, and, more important still, to consult France before concluding any agreement. So on November 23 Nicholas II telegraphed the German Emperor to that effect, adding:

As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications on the text; whereas if allready approved by us both, it will seem as if we tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might easily happen, which I think is neither your wish.[518]

The Germans realized that this answer spelled defeat for them; because if the treaty became known to the French government that government would of course strenuously resist its completion. In fact, the Emperor was sure that M. Delcassé would at once publish the news of the proposed alliance, that a war cry in England would then burst forth, and that the timid Czar would back out. As he aptly expressed it, Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte had “spat in the German soup.”[519] On November 26 he replied with a refusal to let France know a word of the affair; it would be better to drop the whole matter until a more suitable moment, he declared. Although disgusted at this display of “cold feet,” as he put it, William II showed no especial anger or uneasiness in his answer and asked Nicholas II to continue their intimacy as before.[520]

On the receipt of that reply Count Lamsdorff had to persuade his master all over again, because the latter was more anxious to make the alliance than he was to be considerate of his ally.[521] Certainly his letter of October 29 to William II was such as to warrant confidence that he would be willing to force the alliance upon France whether she wished it or not. Count Lamsdorff argued that the relations of Russia and Germany were sufficiently close to hold them together without an alliance. He declared that France’s intimacy with Great Britain had not caused her to be disloyal to her ally. While he doubted whether she could be won to the proposed combination, he urged her right to be consulted beforehand and denied that she would disclose the secret. She must be won gradually, he said, and not confronted with a _fait accompli_ which might force her back upon Great Britain.[522]

It is obvious that Count Lamsdorff sought by this method to quash the project or render it harmless. He succeeded only partly in winning over his master. In the reply to the Emperor on December 7 Nicholas II once more asked permission to obtain the French reaction to the main lines of the alliance, even though the original document itself be kept secret from her. “In case of a negative answer,” he wrote in conclusion, “the second phase of Art. I of the draft of the treaty ought to be left out I think.”[523] Thus, even in case Germany refused his request, the Czar was still apparently willing to make an alliance with her to the entire exclusion of France.

While the Russian government was preparing this answer, the Germans lost patience. Prospects for success seemed doubtful if not entirely hopeless. The declarations of the French press that the Dual Alliance remained as firm as ever and that Germany’s attempts to win Russia had failed caused the Chancellor to suspect that news of the negotiations had leaked out. Threats to seize the German vessels coaling the Russian fleet appeared in the Japanese press; the British government laid restrictions upon the shipping of coal to that fleet. In November and December Germany began to fear a British attack.[524]

Since October the British press had returned to its campaign of calumniation against Germany, seeing a German plot behind every British difficulty. In the autumn a redistribution of the British naval forces had weakened the Mediterranean fleet and concentrated the main strength in home waters. Germany perceived in this rearrangement a tangible proof of the new alignment of Great Britain with France and of the growing British animosity toward her.[525]

Hence when in November several articles appeared in _Vanity Fair_ and in the _Army and Navy Gazette_ proposing that the German fleet be “Copenhagened”[526] as useless for any other purpose than to attack Great Britain,[527] German public opinion took these threats seriously. The Emperor wrote to Count Bülow on November 23 that “the situation assumes more and more the aspect of that immediately preceding the Seven Years’ War.”[528] The German navy department began hurried measures to recall the vessels in foreign waters.[529] Taking a saner view, the Chancellor, by means of an interview published in the _Nineteenth Century_ for December and a speech in the Reichstag on December 5, sought to calm both his own and the British people by an absolute disclaimer of the thought of war between the two countries and by a denial that in the construction of her fleet Germany intended any hostility toward Great Britain.[530] But by December 5 Herr von Holstein himself came to credit the possibility of a British attack.[531]

While this situation seemed serious, the Chancellor was more concerned by the fact that the completion of the coaling of the Russian fleet would soon deprive Germany of her hold over Russia.[532] On December 6 he instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to inquire peremptorily of the Russian government whether Germany could rely upon its full support in case the coaling led to war. The Ambassador was to state that if no satisfactory answer were received by the time the Russian fleet reached Madagascar the Hamburg-American Line would be forbidden to continue its task. This telegram, which was followed on the next day by a similar one from the Emperor to Nicholas II,[533] forced the negotiations back to the very point from which they had started.

Upon receipt of this message the Czar, highly agitated, immediately telegraphed that his letter of the same date (December 7) had evidently crossed the other on the way and would explain everything.[534] But when that letter arrived, William II demanded that they settle the coaling affair by signing a convention concerning it at once.[535] Thus, Germany herself destroyed the possibility of continuing the previous negotiations and of concluding, perhaps, a defensive alliance with Russia alone. The Czar could only acquiesce.[536] On December 12 Count Lamsdorff gave written assurance to the German government that Russia would make common cause with it in case the coaling led to war.[537]

The promptness with which the Russian government agreed to the German demand showed how essential to Russia was the continued coaling of her fleet, which within about a week would reach Madagascar. Count Lamsdorff felt entirely safe in making the assurance of support, for, as he frankly said to the German Ambassador, he did not believe that either Great Britain or Japan would let things come to war.[538] Also he particularly wished to avoid antagonizing Germany while she was permitting a Russian loan of 231,000,000 rubles to be made in Berlin.[539] The Minister was elated over the turn which the Russo- German negotiations had taken. By changing the basis of discussion from that of a defensive alliance to that of a specific agreement limited to a definite eventuality, the German government had adopted his own policy of close friendship and co-operation without an alliance. His battle with both Germany and the Czar was won by the German government itself.

On riper thought the German foreign office perceived that this Russian promise did not cover all cases in which war might arise as a result of German friendliness. It had no doubt had time since the arrival of the Czar’s letter of December 7 in which to appreciate its mistake in hastily changing the basis of negotiation. Hence on December 12 it instructed Count Alvensleben to propose to the Russian government a general defensive agreement. By its terms Russia would be bound to aid Germany in case of a conflict arising: first, because of any German act of “benevolent neutrality” in favor of Russia during the current war; or, second, because of the coaling affair during and after the war. The Ambassador was to declare that if Russia did not accept this agreement the coaling would be discontinued.[540] What was here proposed amounted practically to Articles I and III of the first German treaty draft with the parts pertaining to France omitted, and was in keeping with the Czar’s letter of December 7.

Since the instructions arrived after Count Lamsdorff had accepted the earlier German demand, the exasperated Ambassador consulted his government before executing them.[541] Count Bülow then realized that the Russian Minister would not receive the proposal favorably and that the German government would seem not to know its own desires if it persisted in this new demand. Furthermore, on December 18, he was assured by Count Metternich that, although a Dogger Bank affair between Great Britain and Germany or the passage by Germany of a stronger naval law might precipitate a crisis, the British did not seek a war and had no intention of starting one.[542] Hence the Chancellor canceled the instructions. Instead, he notified the Russian Minister, December 26, that “within the limits which care for our own safety prescribes, we shall be glad to aid Russia as previously.”[543] The coaling was continued without mishap.[544]

On December 21 William II repeated to the Czar his refusal to permit the consultation of France about the project of alliance, hoping thereby to reopen the discussion.[545] But Nicholas II, in his reply of December 25, did not mention the matter.[546]

Just at this moment of profound disappointment to the German government another outlet seemed to open up. On December 26 it learned that the Japanese government was thinking of sending Viscount Aoki to Berlin in the next year in order to establish closer contact with it on the questions to be considered in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace.[547] The German government reacted cordially to this project. The Emperor William, still unable to comprehend the failure of the Russian negotiations, had visions of Germany’s so mediating peace between Russia and Japan as to form an agreement _à trois_ with them.[548] Apparently without consulting the foreign office he appealed to the Czar on January 2 “as your faithful friend” for a statement of his plans for the future, “so that if possible, I make myself useful to you and be enabled to shape the course of my policy.”[549] As Nicholas II ignored this request—the third rebuff from Russia within two months—the Emperor wanted to cultivate Japan so zealously that Count Bülow had to hold him back for fear of antagonizing Russia.[550]

The German government, particularly Herr von Holstein, continued to apprehend that France and Great Britain would endeavor to mediate peace and form a new quadruple grouping with Russia and Japan by partitioning China.[551] To obviate that possibility it had attempted during the past months to draw closer to President Roosevelt[552] and to keep check upon the Russian views about peace. But since Russia had rebuffed this endeavor[553] as well as an alliance, Count Bülow turned late in December, 1904, to Japan and the United States in order to escape from “the sulking-corner in which not only England but also Russia is seeking to hold us.”[554] In January, 1905, the German government intensified its campaign to arouse President Roosevelt’s mistrust of Great Britain and France. Articles in the semiofficial press in Paris, assertions by M. Doumer, president of the French Chamber and intimate friend of M. Delcassé, and discreet soundings by French, British, and Russian diplomats gave body to the German fears. Count Bülow emphasized to the President the menace of this new quadruple alliance to both the United States and Germany. At the Count’s suggestion in January Mr. Roosevelt obtained from the Powers an assurance of the territorial integrity of China during the negotiations for peace.[555] This move brought the German government and Mr. Roosevelt into greater intimacy. The latter suspected France and Russia, but not Great Britain.[556] He refused to believe rumors of a Russo-German agreement, and credited the German denials of those reports.[557] With Japan, however, the German government was not so successful; hearing those same rumors, the Japanese government decided in February not to send Viscount Aoki to Berlin.[558]

In the same month the German government tried once more to make an agreement with Russia, this time over Austria-Hungary. Torn by national conflicts, that empire was not expected to survive the death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph. Count Bülow therefore proposed to the Russian Foreign Minister that they sign a public treaty of territorial disinterestedness in case of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire. While Count Lamsdorff agreed to make the accord, he stipulated that it be kept secret, and left its formulation to the proposer. Thereupon the German foreign office, fearing that the existence of a secret Russo- German treaty might become known and might make Japan and the United States mistrustful of Germany and doubting whether the Russian Minister would really conclude the accord, decided to drop the project.[559]

Thus the negotiations between Germany and Russia worked only to the detriment of Germany’s international relations. They were in large part responsible for the acuteness of British anger at Germany and for the collapse of the proposed Aoki mission. And had it not been for President Roosevelt’s ignorance of Continental affairs, they would no doubt have turned him against Germany. Although protestations of friendship were exchanged between the German and Russian rulers and governments, the German Emperor and his government were greatly chagrined at their failure.[560] They had found the bonds of the Dual Alliance tighter than they had expected, and had suffered a rebuff by a Power in the very worst straits. Believing that another opportunity to solve Germany’s international problems in this way would likely not be offered, the German foreign office next attempted the employment of force.

[Footnote 481: Both letters, the one by Holstein, the other by Bülow, dated July 11 and July 13, respectively, are given in Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 33 ff.]

[Footnote 482: It is of course apparent that the German government anticipated no immediate success from these British efforts. Signs of Anglo-Russian antagonism were too numerous (see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxi).]

[Footnote 483: Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, p. 36.]

[Footnote 484: _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxx, A; Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 397 f.]

[Footnote 485: Dennett, pp. 36 ff., 42; Sternburg to F. O., Sept. 27, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 542, No. 6266.]

[Footnote 486: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 536, No. 6264.]

[Footnote 487: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 535 ff., No. 6264; Bülow to Bernstorff, Sept. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 6051; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 218 ff., No. 6052. Eckardstein informed Bülow in August, 1904, of attempts being made by Witte to introduce negotiations for peace with Hayashi. Bülow was not in favor of an early peace. See Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 76 ff.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. 341; Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_, p. 297; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 2, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 387 f., No. 6167.]

[Footnote 488: Bülow to Sternburg, Sept. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 541, No. 6265.]

[Footnote 489: See _ibid._, Nos. 5977, 6259 ff.]

[Footnote 490: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 5943; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 23, 1903, _ibid._, 73 ff., No. 5967.]

[Footnote 491: Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 202, No. 6043. Richthofen opposed the project (memo. by Richthofen, undated although probably written early in July, 1904, _ibid._, 194 ff., No. 6042. This intention did not prevent Bülow from negotiating a commercial treaty with Russia in July, 1904, which Witte, Russian minister, declared exacted a tribute from Russia “much greater than any war indemnity on record” (Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 196 ff., No. 6043; Dillon, pp. 323 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 413 f.).]

[Footnote 492: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff., No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No. 6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, May 11, 1904, _ibid._, 177 ff., No. 6033, and following documents.]

[Footnote 493: Nicholas II to William II, June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 181, No. 6034.]

[Footnote 494: See their correspondence in Goetz, pp. 337 ff.; also in _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6028 n., 6034, 6035, 6037, 6039, 6056, 6057, 6062 and n., 6064 and n., 6073 and n. The Emperor’s letters were dated Feb. 11, March 29, June 6, June 12, June 28, July 17, July 23, Aug. 19, Oct. 8, Oct. 10; the Czar’s replies were dated June 1, July 20, July 31, Sept. 28, 1904.]

[Footnote 495: Bernhard Huldermann, _Albert Ballin_ (Berlin, 1922), pp. 146 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6077 ff.]

[Footnote 496: Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 257 ff., No. 6084.]

[Footnote 497: Romberg to F. O., Oct. 19, 1904, _ibid._, 259, No. 6085.]

[Footnote 498: See above.]

[Footnote 499: Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27, 1904, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 456 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, p. 97.]

[Footnote 500: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 27, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 303 f., No. 6118. Their correspondence was entirely in English, in the use of which they made frequent mistakes. Osten-Sacken reported on Nov. 4 a conversation with Bülow in which the latter, repeating the remarks of Holstein, declared that in case the British government objected to the coaling of the Russian ships by the German firm, “we should apparently be forced to ask the St. Petersburg cabinet whether we should refuse this objection and thus assume the risk of a war with England and become your [Russia’s] ally; or would Russia prefer to dispense with . . . . the coaling . . . . which in this case we should have to prohibit as incompatible with Germany’s neutrality” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 463).]

[Footnote 501: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 305, No. 6119.]

[Footnote 502: Bülow and Holstein were the proponents of the alliance. Richthofen and Tirpitz, secretary of the Navy Department, opposed it (Alfred von Tirpitz, _Erinnerungen_ [Leipzig, 1920], pp. 143 ff.).]

[Footnote 503: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 30, 1904, Goetz, pp. 346 ff.; Bülow to William II, Oct. 30, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 305, No. 6120, and Anlage I and II.]

[Footnote 504: Mühlberg to Tschirschky, Aug. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 238 f., No. 6069; Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 204, No. 6043.]

[Footnote 505: Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 220, No. 6052.]

[Footnote 506: “It is a matter here of a really great and, for the onlooking world, wholly unexpected transformation [_Weichenstellung_],” wrote Bülow to the Emperor, Nov. 16, 1904 (_ibid._, 312, No. 6125).]

[Footnote 507: See the report from Lamsdorff to the Czar of Holstein’s conversation with Osten-Sacken on Oct. 24, and the Czar’s minute to it (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 455 f. and n.; cf. Savinsky, p. 97).]

[Footnote 508: Langer, _Europ. Gespr._, June, 1926, pp. 397 f.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 354 f.]

[Footnote 509: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 35, No. 26.]

[Footnote 510: A. Savinsky, “Guillaume II et la Russie. Ses Dépêches à Nicholas II, 1903-1905,” _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 790 f.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6044 ff.; Savinsky, p. 97. Savinsky was an official in the Russian foreign office in the confidence of Lamsdorff, _G.P._, XIX, 505, editor’s note).]

[Footnote 511: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clviii.]

[Footnote 512: Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10, 1904, _Kreigsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 464 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 99.]

[Footnote 513: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 25, No. 24; 34 f., No. 26.]

[Footnote 514: On receipt of that draft the Czar wrote to Lamsdorff: “To-day I received the Emperor’s letter with the treaty draft. As I read it, I laughed aloud. The content of the three articles touches France mostly. The last point concerns the particular object of dissatisfaction of the German Government with the British action in the coaling operation. This, however, is a private affair of both states. . . . . The matter must be considered from all sides, and a more desirable counterproposal for us must be composed” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 461).]

[Footnote 515: Lamsdorff to Nicholas II, Nov. 4, 1904, _ibid._, pp. 462 f.]

[Footnote 516: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 310 ff., No. 6124 and Anlage.]

[Footnote 517: William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 17, 1904, Goetz, pp. 349 ff.; Savinsky, p. 102; Bülow to William II, Nov. 16, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 312 ff., No. 6125 and Anlage. The treaty draft is given in Goetz, pp. 146 f. See also Alexander Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign Minister_ (New York, 1921), pp. 34 f.]

[Footnote 518: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 317, No. 6126, Anlage; Savinsky, pp. 102 f.]

[Footnote 519: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f., No. 6126.]

[Footnote 520: Bülow to William II, Nov. 24, 1904, _ibid._, 318 f., No. 6127 and Anlage; William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26, 1904, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 471 f.; Savinsky, pp. 103 f.]

[Footnote 521: Iswolsky makes an attempt to exonerate the Czar of the charge of disloyalty to France, but his argument is not convincing (Iswolsky, pp. 27, 36 f.).]

[Footnote 522: Report of Lamsdorff for Nicholas II, Nov. 23, 1904, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 473 ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 789 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 104 ff.]

[Footnote 523: He inclosed a draft of the proposed communication to France. See Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 322 ff., No. 6131.]

[Footnote 524: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No. 6088; _ibid._, chap. cxxxvi.]

[Footnote 525: Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20, 1904, _ibid._, 652, No. 6349, and following documents; Flotow to Bülow, Oct. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 286 f., No. 6105 and following documents.]

[Footnote 526: This was the expression used.]

[Footnote 527: Memo. by Metternich for Bülow, Dec. 25, 1904, _ibid._, 367 ff., No. 6156; report of Marine Attaché Coerper, Jan. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 379 f., No. 6161; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 329; Admiral Sir Edward E. Bradford, _Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson_ (London, 1923), p. 197.]

[Footnote 528: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f., No. 6126; Graf Robert Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_ (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 86 f.]

[Footnote 529: On this war scare see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi.]

[Footnote 530: J. L. Bashford, “Great Britain and Germany: A Conversation with Count von Bülow, German Chancellor,” _Nineteenth Century_, Dec., 1904, pp. 873 ff.; Bülow, _Reden_, II, 123 ff.]

[Footnote 531: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 358 f., No. 6153.]

[Footnote 532: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No. 6088.]

[Footnote 533: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 320 f., No. 6129; William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 322, No. 6130.]

[Footnote 534: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII ( 1922), 794 f.; Savinsky, p. 107.]

[Footnote 535: William II to Nicholas II, undated, _G.P._, XIX, 325, No. 6132.]

[Footnote 536: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 11, 1904, _ibid._, 325 f., No. 6134.]

[Footnote 537: On December 11 Lamsdorff stated to Alvensleben that as soon as the Czar had made a decision he would be ready to agree with Germany on the “modality of co-operation” in case of a conflict. On the next day in his note to that government he did not mention this matter, and as Germany seemed satisfied, he never returned to it. See Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 11 and 12, 1904, _ibid._, 325 ff., Nos. 6134 ff.; Lamsdorff to Alvensleben, Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 329, No. 6137; Savinsky, p. 108.]

[Footnote 538: Alvensleben, to F. O., Dec. 11, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 325 f., No. 6134.]

[Footnote 539: M. A. de Wolfe Howe, _George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services_ (New York, 1920), pp. 121 f.; Schulthess (_Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_), p. 255.]

[Footnote 540: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 326 f., No. 6135; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 342 f. Nos. 6142 f.]

[Footnote 541: Editor’s note giving a summary of a dispatch from Alvensleben on Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, p. 342.]

[Footnote 542: On Dec. 13 Metternich was called to Berlin for consultation as to the effect which a Russo-German agreement of any sort would have on Anglo-German relations. Schulenburg and Eulenburg, of the German embassy in London, also were asked about the attitude of the British toward Germany. They all believed that the British would not tolerate as much from Germany as they would from Russia. See memo. by Bülow, Dec. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 331 f., No. 6139, and editor’s note; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 332 ff., No. 6140; Schulenburg to Bülow, Dec. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 359 ff., No. 6154; memo. by Eulenburg, Dec. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6155; Alfred von Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, Band I; _Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924), pp. 13 f. A few days later Lascelles tried to argue with both Bülow and Holstein that the British fear of the German navy was more reasonable than the German fear of the British navy. And on Dec. 26 Holstein declared to Lascelles as follows: “In the present instance a situation had been created by the action of the Press which was fraught with the gravest of all dangers, viz.: that of two great nations being involved in war, for if any untoward incident had arisen which gave rise to an acrimonious discussion between the two Governments it would have been almost impossible to have settled it owing to the atmosphere which the Press campaign had created.” Nevertheless both parties agreed that Anglo-German relations had become easier. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec. 28, 1904, _B.D._, III, 56 ff., No. 65. At about the same time King Edward, Lansdowne, and Balfour all branded the German fears of a British attack as foolish; and the British condemned them as hypocritical. But the press war continued into January as bitterly as before. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 372 f., No. 6157; and following documents. See also Schulthess (1905), p. 3; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 331 f.; Friedrich Thimme, “Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz: Aus den Papieren Paul H. von Schwabach’s,” _Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1929, p. 307.]

[Footnote 543: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 342 f., Nos. 6142 f.; Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 343 ff., No. 6144.]

[Footnote 544: Mühlberg to Tirpitz, Jan. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 265 ff., No. 6089, and following documents.]

[Footnote 545: William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 340 f., No. 6141; also Goetz, p. 354. The letter was written by the foreign office.]

[Footnote 546: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 25, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 346, No. 6145.]

[Footnote 547: Memo. by Eckert, Nov. 18, 1904, Received Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 395 ff., No. 6176.]

[Footnote 548: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. 6178.]

[Footnote 549: William II to Nicholas II, Jan. 2, 1905, _ibid._, 404 f., No. 6180.]

[Footnote 550: William II to Bülow, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 411, No. 6187; Bülow to William II, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 412, No. 6188. On Jan. 16, 1905, the Emperor wrote: “The action of Delcassé and Lamsdorff is unspeakably treacherous and common. This trio [France, Great Britain, and Russia, who he thought desired to divide China] must be opposed by a German-American-Japanese league. That must be done quickly and energetically. Above all America’s mistrust of France and Russia be nourished” (Emperor’s minute to the dispatch from Bülow to William II, Jan. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 562, No. 6280).]

[Footnote 551: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 551 ff., No. 6275. The Emperor also suffered from the “nightmare of the coalitions,” but his suffering assumed more varied forms. At one moment he feared a Franco-Anglo-American-Japanese grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco- Russian grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-Russo-Japanese grouping (see _ibid._, Nos. 5925, 5945, 6187, 6280).]

[Footnote 552: See _ibid._, chap. cxxxix.]

[Footnote 553: Romberg to Bülow, Dec. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 394 f., No. 6175.]

[Footnote 554: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 402 f., No. 6178.]

[Footnote 555: See Dennett, pp. 77 ff., 162, 171 f.; Dennis, pp. 392 f., 397; Bülow to William II, Dec. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 547 ff., No. 6274, and following documents.]

[Footnote 556: See, among others, Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 3 and 9, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 567 f., No. 6285; 570, No. 6287.]

[Footnote 557: Dennett, pp. 73 ff., 50; Dennis, pp. 367 f., 385 ff. The anonymous document which Dennis quotes must have been written some time early in 1905, for it refers to events which occurred in January, 1905.]

[Footnote 558: Arco to F. O., Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 407, No. 6183; Arco to Bülow, March 16, 1905, _ibid._, 413 ff. No. 6190.]

[Footnote 559: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clix.]

[Footnote 560: Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 343 f., No. 6144; William II to Bülow, Dec. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 346 f. No. 6146; Bülow to Alvensleben, Jan. 1, 1905, _ibid._, 347 f., No. 6147; Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. 6178.]