Chapter IV: Delcassé’s Policy Toward Great Britain and Germany, 1898-1902

M. Delcassé assumed office at a most unpropitious time for the success of his policy with reference to Great Britain. On September 1, 1898, he remarked to Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador, that “he had always . . . . regarded as eminently desirable a cordial understanding between England, France, and Russia,” and offered his service “in soothing the way both at St. Petersburgh and Paris for the attainment of this object.”[123] From then until March of the next year he repeatedly urged Lord Salisbury, British premier and foreign minister, to agree to a general understanding on all matters at issue, so that Great Britain and France could exchange the old relation of hostility for one of friendship.[124] But in spite of the French Minister’s cordiality the Fashoda crisis in the autumn and early winter of 1898 brought the two countries perilously close to war.[125] Anglo-Russian difficulties in China and elsewhere also remained acute.[126] Furthermore, Lord Salisbury replied to M. Delcassé that French ministries were too unstable to deal with.[127] Hence, instead of improving, relations between the two countries became more strained. In the late winter and early spring of 1899, the bellicose stand on the Fashoda affair taken by the British government and press aroused a general fear in France of a British attack.[128] By August, the French Foreign Minister complained bitterly to the British Ambassador that “the conduct of her Majesty’s Government seemed to show a deliberate intention of being unfriendly to France in every possible way,” and added that “he began to believe that the politicians who argue that there is nothing to be done with England are right.”[129]

During the period of the Boer War, the presence of Lord Salisbury at the foreign office, the bitter feeling of the French against the British, the continued Anglo-Russian trouble in China, and the British attempt to align with Germany prevented M. Delcassé from obtaining any results.[130] In fact, conditions were more favorable for the pursuance of a directly anti-British policy. The Russian government wished it, and worked for closer concert against Great Britain among the Continental Powers.[131] The Spanish government had the more far-reaching ambition of bringing about a definite Continental union against Great Britain.[132] Italy was at odds with the latter. The German Emperor and his government had been wooing France and making veiled proposals for co-operation since 1890.[133] And French feeling toward Germany had become more amicable than at any time since 1870.

The French Foreign Minister did not deviate from his original purpose,[134] but tried rather to be friendly to both Great Britain and Germany, to play between them for the advantage of France; and, warned by Mr. Chamberlain’s[135] open advocacy in November, 1899, of an alliance with Germany and the United States and by the signs of an Anglo-German _rapprochement_, he sought to eliminate the occasion for this alliance.[136] This policy had been foreshadowed during the Fashoda crisis.

In December, 1898, immediately after France had retreated before the British demands, M. Delcassé in a conversation with Herr Arthur von Huhn, correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, had bitterly denounced the brutal threats of Great Britain against France, had expressed his fear that that Power was seeking war in order to have an excuse for destroying the French fleet, and had proposed a _rapprochement_ with Germany for pursuing a common policy against British encroachments and for making colonial accords.[137] Simultaneously with this indirect overture, which had never been followed up by either government, the French Minister had threatened the British government with the acceptance of indirect proposals from Germany for co-operation against it if Great Britain did not change her attitude toward France and assent to his offer of a general accord.[138]

During 1899 M. Delcassé had turned farther away from Great Britain and had sought means of holding her in check.[139] But when the Boer War broke out, he held aloof from any movements for intervention, even risked unpopularity by publicly denouncing the expressions of rabid anti-British sentiment on the part of the French people.[140] Upon the retirement of Lord Salisbury from the foreign office in November, 1900, he again suggested a general understanding to the British government.[141] He was accused of being Anglophile to the detriment of French interests, particularly in Morocco;[142] for many of the French writers advocated a policy of co-operation with Germany for the settlement of colonial questions (among which, of course, would be included the Moroccan), while Great Britain could not effectively object.[143] But M. Delcassé was willing merely to occupy the Saharan oases back of Algeria during the war and to initiate the French policy for the eventual acquisition of the Sherifian Empire.

Not that the French Foreign Minister was averse to any accord with Germany. As already seen, he made an indirect overture to the German government for an agreement while the Moroccan missions were in Europe in 1901. Although rebuffed on that occasion, he made another attempt in October of the same year at the urging of the Spanish and the Russian governments.[144] At this time M. Jules Hansen, a French agent, stated to the German Ambassador in Paris that M. Delcassé had recently expressed to him the earnest wish to meet Count Bülow personally. The problem was where and how to meet. The French Minister had said that if the Count would come secretly and unofficially to Paris, he would greet him most heartily and would make a public visit to Berlin in return.[145]

Although very much interested, Count Bülow refused to run the risk. The time was inopportune, he said; the French government and people must first be more solicitous of closer relations with Germany.[146] That reply postponed the matter to the Greek calends.

In 1902 M. Delcassé made a concentrated effort to establish the French claim to ascendancy in Morocco. His negotiations with Italy, which led to the agreement of November of that year, and those with Spain, which in December proved abortive, have already been considered. Simultaneously therewith, M. Delcassé again endeavored to negotiate with Great Britain and, perhaps, with Germany on the same question.

On several occasions in January and February, M. Cambon, the French ambassador at London, discussed Anglo-French differences, including the Moroccan one, with Mr. Chamberlain, British colonial minister, and with Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary since November, 1900. While the British officials showed some interest, no progress was made.[147] For after the publication of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in February, France was forced to declare with her ally that the Dual Alliance extended to the Far East.[148] Under pressure from Russia[149] and with the hope of obtaining support while negotiating a treaty with Siam,[150] the French government drew closer to Germany.

Late in June the French Ambassador, in asking the German views on the Siamese question, remarked to Count Bülow that “the present good relations between Germany and France justified the hope that France would receive the support [_coup d’épaule_] of Germany in the Siamese affair.”[151] As the German government ignored the suggestion, however, and as the French government was alarmed at the growing influence of certain Englishmen, particularly Kaid Maclean, over the Sultan of Morocco, M. Delcassé determined, in spite of probable Russian objection,[152] to open the Moroccan question with the British government.

On July 23, when M. Cambon asked Lord Lansdowne about discussing fully the Moroccan problem, the British Minister replied that he would be ready to consider it “in the frankest possible manner.”[153] On August 6, therefore, the Ambassador officially proposed an accord over the future of Siam and Morocco. After a consideration of the former question, the two men took up the latter one. While asserting that the French government preferred that the Moroccan problem should not become acute, the Ambassador desired that the two governments “frankly discuss the action which they might be constrained to adopt in the event of Morocco passing ‘into liquidation.’” Spain, he explained, could be satisfied by a sufficient allowance of hinterland behind her coastal possessions; Tangier could be converted into an international and open port—for France could not allow it to pass into the hands of any European Power; and beyond the Spanish line, France would expect “exclusive influence.”

Lord Lansdowne replied that although he listened to the French proposal with great interest, yet since Italy, Spain, and Germany had also at various times manifested a concern in the Moroccan question, he regarded with the “greatest apprehension” any attempt to deal prematurely with a liquidation of that land, which “would be sure to lead to serious complications.” The Ambassador answered that at any rate there could be no harm “in discussing these eventualities in good time.” He pointed out that Spain and Germany had both failed egregiously in their attempts to establish themselves in Morocco, and that at present Germany was “not to the front there or elsewhere in the Mediterranean.” But the British Foreign Secretary, denying that his government had made any difficulties in Morocco for France, postponed further consideration of the proposal until after the government holiday.[154] When in October M. Cambon returned to the subject, Lord Lansdowne not only replied that the French terms were unsatisfactory, but he also refused to discuss the possibility of a liquidation of Morocco.[155]

In the meantime, M. Delcassé had been again seeking the co-operation of Germany. In September the German government assured France of its disinterestedness in Siam, provided German economic interests remained uninjured. Although this reply contained no mention of the larger request for support made by the French Ambassador in June, yet the latter, in expressing the satisfaction of his government with the German answer, added that this opportunity had been used to emphasize the community of French and German interests, and not only in Siam. To this broad hint the German government made no response.[156]

In the next month the Spanish Ambassador in Paris reported to Prince Radolin that the French Foreign Minister had recently said to him:

I do not believe that Germany wishes to come to an understanding with France. . . . . Four years ago it was said to M. de Noailles at Berlin that there were points upon which the two countries might place themselves in accord. I found the matter so important that I immediately took it to the president of the Republic and to the premier. I was authorized by them to telegraph to M. de Noailles that I was disposed to treat with Germany on all points on which the two countries would be able to agree. M. de Noailles reported that they had informed him in the _Wilhelmstrasse_ that in view of its importance the question deserved to be studied. That was four years ago. Since then not a word more has been said on that subject. Our ambassador still awaits a response.[157]

The German government replied to this overture with recriminations against the French Minister. It complained that his proposals had lacked in concreteness, that France had rejected several German offers of co- operation, and it accused M. Delcassé of consistent bias in favor of Great Britain.[158]

When this reply was passed on to M. Delcassé by the Spanish Ambassador late in November, he remarked, “Then M. de Noailles is a fool”; thereafter he had no business to transact with the German representative.[159]

The refusal by both the British and the German governments of the French overtures was followed in December by that of the Spanish government to sign the agreement over Morocco. So M. Delcassé’s campaign of 1902 terminated in failure. At the end of the year he reverted to the policy of the _status quo_, and, anxious about the situation in Morocco, proposed to Lord Lansdowne that if disorders there should necessitate action “the Powers interested should take counsel together as to its nature and scope, and should agree that there should be no single-handed intervention . . . . on the part of any one Power.” In approving this policy the British Minister asked M. Cambon for a further explanation of the phrase “interested Powers.” The latter replied that Great Britain, France, and Spain were the ones referred to, that Italy had no interest in Morocco, and that the French government was solicitous of excluding the United States, and, above all, Germany from that group. He thought that “it would be most desirable that if Germany were at any moment to come forward and attempt to assume a conspicuous rôle, it should be intimated to her that she had no _locus standi_.” Upon that point Lord Lansdowne refused to commit himself.[160]

M. Delcassé had shown a pro-British inclination from the start, and it may be that his approaches to Germany had been intended primarily to press Great Britain to an agreement. Certainly they had been sufficiently vague to be in harmony with the traditional French attitude of irreconcilability with the victor of 1870-71. But they had also been concrete enough to show the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of negotiating with Germany on acceptable terms. Whether M. Delcassé was sincere in those overtures cannot be said, although he seems to have been. At any rate, despairing of Germany, he devoted his full energies in 1903 toward achieving an accord with Great Britain, from whom no irredentist problem separated France.

[Footnote 123: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 1, 1899, _B.D._, I, 216, No. 262.]

[Footnote 124: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 163, No. 188, and other documents in chaps. iv, v. Delcassé went so far as to state to Monson on Sept. 28, 1898, that “he would much prefer an Anglo- French to a Franco-Russian alliance.” See Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1898, _ibid._, 171, No. 198.]

[Footnote 125: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898, _ibid._, 169, No. 196, and other documents in the same chapter.]

[Footnote 126: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 37, No. 58; and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]

[Footnote 127: So stated by Paul Cambon in an interview in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920.]

[Footnote 128: Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899, _B.D._, I, 199, No. 241.]

[Footnote 129: Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _ibid._, 212, No. 259. Cambon had in March made similar complaints to Salisbury (Salisbury to Monson, March 15, 1899, _ibid._, 211, No. 257).]

[Footnote 130: For expression of French public opinion against Great Britain see two articles by Ernst Lavisse in the _Revue de Paris_, Feb. 1, 1899, and Jan. 1, 1900. See also Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899, _B.D._, I, 200 f., No. 242; Mévil, _De la paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 128 f.; Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years; Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906_ (London, 1914), pp. 193 f., 209 f.; J. A. Spender, _Life, Journalism, and Politics_ (London, 1927), I, 183 ff.; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 209.]

[Footnote 131: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp. 27, 36; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 27, 1899, _B.D._, I, 234 f., No. 287; Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov. 3, 1899, _ibid._, 237, No. 291; _G.P._, Vol. XV, chaps. ic, ci, ciii.]

[Footnote 132: See above, chap. iii; also Emil Bourgeois et Georges Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_ (Paris, 1922), p. 276.]

[Footnote 133: The German Emperor made a special endeavor to win France; hence his numerous telegrams of congratulations or condolence to French leaders, his toasts and decorations for French officers, etc. The French called him the “new Lohengrin.” Both he and Bülow made repeated hints to the French representatives for a _rapprochement_; and one of the Emperor’s favorite schemes to form a Continental grouping against Great Britain and the United States was well known from his frequent references to it. See Theodor Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_ (Munich, 1924), pp. 110, 114, 117, 123 f.; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5860-71; Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 277 ff., 256 f.; William II to Bülow, Oct. 29, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 406 ff., No. 4394; and the editor’s long note thereto, pp. 406 ff. On June 4, 1899, the French Ambassador reported a conversation between the French naval attaché, Buchard, and the Emperor in which the latter said: “The hour is certainly come when the Continent must defend itself against England and America, and I think that it is necessary for Germany and France to rely upon each other [_s’appuient l’une sur l’autre_].” And Buchard added, “The Emperor is very desirous of establishing good relations with you” (Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 279). See also Spring Rice to Villiers, April 24, 1900, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. A Record_ (Boston and New York, 1929), I, 220.]

[Footnote 134: How entirely alien to Delcassé’s mind was the idea of a Continental alliance with Germany was shown by the fact that in August, 1899, at his instigation the phrase “the maintenance of the equilibrium between the forces of Europe” was introduced into the Dual Alliance. See Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. L’alliance franco-russe_ (Paris, 1918), pp. 94 f.; Dickinson, _The International Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), p. 108; Georges Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_ (Paris, 1927), pp. 87 ff.]

[Footnote 135: Chamberlain was Colonial minister in the Unionist cabinet.]

[Footnote 136: In September, 1898, Delcassé had spoken to Monson of the rumors of an “alliance” between Great Britain and Germany (Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _B.D._, I, 162, No. 187).]

[Footnote 137: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No. 3558.]

[Footnote 138: Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898, _B.D._, I, 185, No. 221; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, _ibid._, 196, No. 238.]

[Footnote 139: Count Witte writes in his _Memoirs_ (New York, 1921), p. 178, that when Delcassé came to St. Petersburg in August, 1899, he sought means of accomplishing this end, and urged the Russian government to push the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway so that in emergency Russia could threaten India. Leon y Castillo, Spanish ambassador at Paris and an intimate friend of the Minister, likewise stated in round terms to Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, in May, 1899, that Delcassé belonged to the party desirous of a closer understanding with Germany (Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 125 ff., No. 4210. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Barclay records that upon Delcassé’s departure for St. Petersburg in August, 1899, the latter said to him that “there was nothing he [Delcassé] personally would welcome more warmly than a state of feeling which would permit the two Governments [French and British] to negotiate a solution of their outstanding difficulties in a friendly give-and-take spirit” (Barclay, p. 170).]

[Footnote 140: Barclay, pp. 169 f.; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 1, 1899, _B.D._, I, 242, No. 300; Monson to Salisbury, Nov. 7, 1899, _ibid._, 239, No. 294; Wolff to Salisbury, June 9, 1900, _ibid._, II, 258, No. 210.]

[Footnote 141: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 214.]

[Footnote 142: According to an anonymous article, “Quatre ans de politique extérieure,” _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Oct., 1902, pp. 24 f., 31, on one occasion during the Boer War when a deputy asked Delcassé if he did not think this an opportune time to settle the Moroccan affair with Great Britain, the Minister replied, “How do you wish me to speak with the English Government? It is so occupied that it has no time to reply.”]

[Footnote 143: Robert de Caix, writing in the _Bulletin_, was one of these. Moreover, in March, 1901, not long after the German Emperor’s visit to England, Delcassé took advantage of the opportunity offered by the presence of the British mission in Paris for announcing the accession of King Edward VII to the throne, to let the British know that the French government wanted a “good understanding” with them (Lee, II, 14 f.).]

[Footnote 144: It must be remembered that Delcassé was then discussing the Moroccan problem with the Spanish Ambassador, who sought to use that question as the means for paving the way to the new Continental combination. Moreover, the Czar and the German Emperor, together with their foreign ministers, had an interview at Danzig in September at which the Russian Minister openly advocated a Russo-German alliance. From Danzig the Czar journeyed to France, and a short time thereafter occurred Delcassé’s indirect overture to Radolin. On the meeting at Danzig see Bülow’s account of the conversations on Sept. 12, 14, 1901, in _G.P._, XVIII, 28 ff., Nos. 5393-95; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, pp. 17 ff.]

[Footnote 145: The identical project was also proposed to Radolin by Pallain, governor of the Banque de France. Hansen also remarked that an important Russian personage had told him positively that Lamsdorff had spoken to Delcassé of the trip to Berlin. The idea seems to have been suggested to the Russian Minister by the German Emperor (Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 27, 1901, _ibid._, 782 ff., No. 5873).]

[Footnote 146: Bülow to Radolin, Nov. 6, 1901, _ibid._, 785, No. 5874.]

[Footnote 147: Metternich to F. O., Jan. 30, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 342 f., No. 5186; Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_ (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), II, 379; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, _B.D._, II, 262 f., No. 320; interview with Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920; Monson to Lansdowne, Feb. 6, 1902, _B.D._, I, 274, No. 339. Lansdowne was so much interested in the French Ambassador’s ideas that the latter wrote him a letter enumerating the differences which might be treated. King Edward read the letter and declared to Cambon, “It is excellent. You must go on” (interview with Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920).]

[Footnote 148: A few days later, however, Delcassé spoke in the Chamber so vaguely of this declaration and emphasized so strongly France’s pacific intentions that he cast great doubt upon its value. See Mévil, pp. 81 f. n.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 21 f.; see also Newton, pp. 226 f.]

[Footnote 149: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the French Ambassador, March 20, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 179 f., No. 5064. In February the Russian government urged the German government to enter into an agreement against the new alliance, but the offer was refused (_ibid._, chap. cx, Part B).]

[Footnote 150: On Siamese affairs, an old cause of trouble between Great Britain and France, see _ibid._, XVIII, 795 ff., Nos. 5881-83; Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 242; _Quest. dipl. et col._, Nov. 15, 1902, pp. 577 ff.; and others.]

[Footnote 151: Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 795 f., No. 5881.]

[Footnote 152: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 160 ff., No. 5051; Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 25, 1903, _ibid._, 349, No. 5195.]

[Footnote 153: Lansdowne to Monson, July 23, 1902, _B.D._, II, 263 f., No. 321.]

[Footnote 154: Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, _ibid._, 264 ff., No. 322.]

[Footnote 155: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 268 ff., No. 325; Newton, pp. 268 f.]

[Footnote 156: Mühlberg to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 795 f., No. 5882; Schlözer to F. O., Sept. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 797, No. 5883.]

[Footnote 157: Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 797 ff., No. 5884.]

[Footnote 158: Richthofen to Radolin, Oct. 23, 1902, _ibid._, 799 f., No. 5885. These accusations were unfair. In the previous June in a dispatch to Metternich, ambassador at London, two instances had been mentioned in which the French government had tried to secure the co- operation of Germany. The editors of _G.P._ admit that one of these proposals was definite; and in August, 1901, Holstein of the German foreign office had written that the French government was “not in itself irreconcilable.” That admission speaks volumes. Moreover, the German reply admitted that the French Ambassador had usually taken the initiative in these attempts at co-operation. See Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, _ibid._, 795 f., No. 5881; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 341, No. 5184.]

[Footnote 159: Radolin to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1902, _ibid._, XVIII, 801, No. 5886. As an explanation for this very marked attitude, Delcassé said to a third party that he had tried to co-operate with Germany but had been refused (Memo. by Klehmet, April 19, 1903, _ibid._, 801 f., No. 5887). None the less, up to Oct., 1903, the French government continued to approve the investment of French capital in the Bagdad Railway (memo. by Rosen, Oct. 29, 1903, _ibid._, 456 ff., No. 5274).]

[Footnote 160: This conversation occurred on Dec. 31, 1902. Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 31, 1902, _B.D._, II, 274 ff., No. 330; Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 28, 1902, Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 31, 1902, Newton, pp. 269 f.]