Chapter XIV: The Moroccan Crisis, July-October, 1905

After Germany had forced France to lay the Moroccan problem before an international conference, M. Rouvier was no longer willing to give Germany a share in Morocco. Confident of British support and heartened by the friendly assertions of the German officials, he hoped to obtain a general mandate from the conference for executing the military, police, and financial reforms.[801] Thus resuming the original French policy toward Morocco, he took steps to fulfil it by way of that assembly.

Before negotiating with Germany over a program for the conference, M. Rouvier obtained the approval of his proposals from Great Britain and Spain.[802] He also felt it necessary to affirm and supplement the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 in accordance with the new situation and to make certain of Spain’s loyalty at the conference.

The new government formed in Madrid late in June showed immediately a more independent spirit toward France than its predecessor had done. Both M. Montero Rios, the premier, and M. Roman, the foreign minister, reiterated to the British Ambassador that “the chief aim of their foreign policy was to be on specially intimate terms with Great Britain, and to strengthen as far as possible the good understanding at present existing.” But they established closer contacts with Germany, and informed the British and French governments that while Spain would abide by the Franco-Spanish Agreement she had not “abnegated her personality,” and was free to take any course, in matters outside that agreement, “as might be dictated by her interests.” Spanish public opinion reflected the same sentiment. Some elements even wished to use the acceptance of the conference as an excuse for withdrawing from the Franco-Spanish agreement entirely. With the help of the British government and the blunders of Germany, that antagonized Spain, M. Rouvier ironed out the differences.[803] On September 1 the French and Spanish governments signed a secret agreement.[804] Its terms were as follows:

All officers and underofficers charged with the instruction and command of the native troops in Larache and Tetouan were to be Spanish, while those in Rabat and Casablanca were to be French. The policing of Tangier should be intrusted for fifteen years to a Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a Frenchman. Contraband traffic in arms should be suppressed by France and Spain, individually in certain areas, co- operatively in others. The two governments were to work together to the end that “the participation in the capital and the works of all public enterprises will be offered to subjects of the two nations.” In the state bank or in any other institution to be created the presidency should be reserved to France, while the degree of participation of Spain should be superior to that of any other Power except France.

The two Powers engage to observe this accord even in case where the stipulations of Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid of 1880 come to be extended to all economic and financial questions; they will aid each other before the Sultan . . . . to assure the loyal accomplishment of all that the present accord stipulates. Moreover, Spain being firmly resolved to act in complete accord with France . . . . and France proposing to act in the same way with Spain, it is agreed . . . . that the two Governments will assist each other and will proceed in common accord in the deliberations [at the conference] in that which concerns the stipulations of the convention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest and most amicable interpretation as well as in that which concerns the different objects of the present accord. They engage to extend to each other the most complete pacific aid on all questions of a general order concerning Morocco in harmony with the cordial and friendly entente between them with reference to the affairs of the Sherifian Empire.[805]

Both governments were well pleased with the terms. The British government also readily approved them. The transaction marked another step in drawing the three Powers closer together and in handing Morocco over to the charge of France and Spain.[806]

At the same time M. Rouvier began negotiations with the German government over the program for the conference. The two were at loggerheads from the start, for the German views of what constituted a just consideration of France’s interests in Morocco were different from those of the French. When, late in June, the Moroccan government offered to give various economic contracts to Germany and to appoint a few German officers for creating a small Moroccan army, Count Tattenbach was enthusiastically in favor of accepting the proposals.[807] Prince Bülow refused, and on July 11 instructed the Minister as follows:

As for your further deportment in Fez, . . . . keep in mind that you will soon have to co-operate with the French representative. We regard the concessions offered by the Sultan as desirable, but can accept them only if they are not in contradiction to the future decisions of the conference. Therefore . . . . delay making a decision about these offers. . . . .[808]

Nevertheless, the Chancellor planned for the conference to divide the police and military mandate in Morocco among the Powers in such a way that France would receive the mandate for the frontier region only, while Germany would receive it for “the western coastal towns from Rabat south . . . . as suitable for a future German sphere of interest.”[809] Furthermore, he expected Germany to receive her share of the economic advantages in the development of the entire land.[810]

To achieve these ends the German foreign office appointed Count Tattenbach as its representative at the conference,[811] even though he was highly objectionable to the French. It also instructed Prince Radolin on July 10 to inform M. Rouvier either directly or indirectly that “the desired understanding would be placed seriously in doubt” if he did not exclude M. Delcassé’s followers, such as M. Paul Cambon and M. Georges Louis,[812] from influence upon French foreign policy, or if he should appoint M. Révoil, former governor of Algeria and a reputed Germanophobe, as a delegate to the conference.[813] Prince Radolin was also to uphold Tangier as a meeting place for the assembly; for the German government believed that the anti-French and pro-German influence of the Moroccans would be more strongly exerted there than in some European town.[814] When the Ambassador stated his government’s requests to MM. Dupuy and Léon, both men begged him “not to put the pistol to M. Rouvier’s breast too sharply.” M. Rouvier was having enough difficulty with public opinion, they said.[815] The German government asked President Roosevelt to support its views about M. Révoil and about Tangier, but this time, after consulting the French government, the President refused.[816] M. Rouvier chose M. Révoil in spite of German opposition. Furthermore, asserting that Tangier was a dangerous hotbed of intrigue, he urged the choice of some European town.[817] By the end of July the German government was willing to acquiesce, although for bargaining purposes it reserved its public consent until later.[818]

It was not M. Rouvier’s determined stand which induced this acquiescence, but rather the unexpected signing by the German and Russian rulers of the Björkö treaty of alliance on July 24.[819] This treaty, which provided for the later association of France in the alliance, was signed by both sovereigns under the impression that the Franco-German agreement of July 8 had settled the Moroccan affair and had cleared the way for a _rapprochement_. In view of this changed situation Prince Bülow, on July 31, instructed the foreign office as follows:

1. We must reserve the possibility of permitting France a free hand in Morocco at the moment in which she has to decide about joining the Russo-German understanding. A better use of Morocco we could hardly find and that would be by far the most favorable close of our Moroccan campaign. 2. To attain this we need not relinquish too early our general position on the Moroccan question. But the French need not believe that our aim was ultimately to set foot in Morocco. It appears to me more advisable to permit the Moroccan question to rest for a time rather than to hasten it. Pushing or threatening at this moment on account of Morocco would only press France still closer to England and at the same time cause the Emperor Nicholas to suspect that directly after Björkö he is to be forced to choose between us and France.[820]

In keeping with this policy, Prince Bülow, Baron Richthofen, and Herr von Mühlberg all absented themselves from Berlin during the succeeding days, and left Count Pourtales, Prussian minister in Munich, in charge of the foreign office. As he was not in touch with the negotiations, Herr von Holstein and Dr. Kriege, the legal adviser, directed affairs. While the “Grey Eminence” approved the new direction to be given to the Moroccan policy,[821] he seemed entirely unable to relinquish a stand once taken or to sacrifice details for the achievement of a larger end. When his blunders brought him to the point of having to retreat or fight, he preferred _Machtpolitik_. Neither he nor his chief realized that some form of settlement of the Moroccan affair was necessary to allay French and British mistrust, and that their new policy of delay would prolong the period of crisis. This was particularly the case since the policy continued to lack unity. Herr von Holstein, Dr. Kriege, the Emperor, Count Tattenbach—each had his particular addition to make, whether it harmonized with the whole or not; and the gracious Prince Bülow, successor to Bismarck, accepted all contributions.

The most striking example of this lack of harmony was manifested by Count Tattenbach at Fez. Early in August the news spread that the Count had been instrumental in persuading the Moroccan government to grant to the German firm of Bourgeaud-Hansemann on July 30 a contract for building a mole in the harbor of Tangier at the price of 1,300,000 marks. It was also rumored that he was aiding negotiations between the Sultan and a group of German banks for a loan of 10,000,000 marks.[822]

The French press indignantly accused the German government of double- dealing. _Le Temps_ noted that Count Tattenbach had been recalled from Morocco several years before for a similar indiscretion. Germany had accused France, it said, of wishing to make a second Tunis of Morocco; but France did not intend to let Germany make a second Turkey of it. It asked that Germany again deal severely with Count Tattenbach. M. Clémenceau in _L’Aurore_ spoke bluntly in an article entitled “No Dupery,” and a few days later, even more strongly in one headed “C’est trop.” The press also attacked M. Rouvier for permitting the Germans to hoodwink him. If Parliament had been sitting, his position might have been precarious.[823]

These criticisms were undeserved. M. Rouvier had made every effort to prevent the concessions from being given. Both he and the British government had tried to block the negotiations as soon as reports of them came through. When the definite fact of the mole concession became known, M. Rouvier, supported by Lord Lansdowne, immediately strengthened his protests to the German government against Count Tattenbach’s actions. He declared that they infringed upon French rights,[824] that they were a breach of faith and a violation of the spirit of the accord of July 8, that they endangered the success of the conference, the harmony of Franco-German relations, and his own position as minister. It was not his fault, he said angrily, that Franco-German relations continued to be strained. He urged that the project for a loan be blocked, or if this were impossible, that the German government agree to repayment of the loan with funds from the Moroccan state bank to be established. The question whether the German or a French firm had a prior right to the contract for the mole, he asserted, should be left in abeyance until the conference should regulate the method of granting contracts for public works.[825] The Spanish government was equally angry at Germany because of Count Tattenbach’s acts. On August 23 M. Montero Rios poured out his wrath to the French Ambassador over Germany’s trampling on Spanish interests in Morocco. It was generally understood, he said, that Northern Morocco was reserved to Spain. Yet, he continued indignantly, Germany had acquired concessions in that area and had obtained a mortgage on the lands around Tangier.

Under all these provocations . . . . Spain had to remain mute [so the British ambassador reported his remarks]. France was the mouthpiece of the three Powers who were working together to save the situation in Morocco and His Excellency [M. Montero Rios] expressed an earnest hope that she would not yield all along the line to German pressure and would bear in mind what were the modest but real interests of Spain in Morocco. Señor Montero Rios concluded . . . . by bringing down his fist upon the table and saying, “we shall not forget what Germany has done to us on this occasion.”

When M. Jules Cambon warned the German Ambassador in Madrid on August 23 that “it might become necessary for the Powers mainly interested in Morocco to insist that all concessions recently obtained should be examined by the Conference before they were finally ratified,” M. Montero Rios heartily approved and volunteered to speak in like manner to Herr von Radowitz.[826]

The German government itself supported the loan in order to strengthen its hold over the Sultan and to calm his fears about Germany’s separate negotiations with France. The contract for the mole surprised and embarrassed Prince Bülow. He reprimanded Count Tattenbach for having transgressed his instructions and warned him to abide by them in the future.[827] Nevertheless, he upheld both transactions against the French complaints. He asserted to M. Rouvier that the negotiations for the contract had been under way for several months.[828] He claimed that the loan was not a “loan” but a harmless temporary “advance” which could be repaid at any time. Repeating the assurances of Germany’s disinterestedness in Morocco and of friendship for France, the German government refused M. Rouvier’s suggestions for an understanding about these two affairs and was unable to comprehend the French excitement.[829] As M. Rouvier felt that the facts spoke otherwise, the two governments reached an _impasse_ by the first of September.

At the same time the two governments came to a deadlock over the choice of a meeting place and the terms of the program for the conference. Although M. Rouvier submitted proposals about military and financial reforms on July 20 and August 1, respectively,[830] Germany did not reply until August 26. The delay was caused by the necessity of consulting Count Tattenbach, but the French government and press suspected that Germany was uneasy about possible defeat at the conference and was therefore putting France off so as to gain concessions from the Sultan.[831] In its answer the German government accepted the main lines of the French proposal, but refused to permit France to settle directly with Morocco the regulation of the police in the region of the frontier, and also declined to give way on the choice of Tangier as a meeting place. The German government planned for the conference to restrict France’s interest in Morocco to this frontier region.[832] But, on August 30, M. Rouvier met rejection with rejection. To permit the conference to decide upon the reorganization of the frontier region would, he wrote in a note to Prince Radolin, mean sacrificing an advantage and a right which France had enjoyed for sixty years.[833]

On the question of a meeting place M. Rouvier urged the Spanish government early in August to propose formally to the Powers that the conference be held in Spain. Thereby he would exert pressure on Germany to relinquish Tangier. M. Montero Rios was eager to obtain the honor for his country, but fearing a rejection of the proposal, he hesitated to make it. Under French and British persuasion, however, he dispatched a verbal note to France and Germany offering some town in Southwest Spain for the conference. As the German government made no reply, M. Montero Rios was “deeply hurt” at the “high-handed and discourteous manner” in which Germany was treating Spain.[834]

With affairs so confused, the Chancellor interfered. He sent Dr. Rosen, the future minister at Tangier, to Paris for direct negotiations. In reporting this intention to M. Bihourd on September 4, Prince Bülow expressed in general terms his desire for an entente and spoke of the mole and the loan as insignificant. But he declared that there was a line beyond which “German dignity” would not permit him to go and that if this attempt failed “we would be placed again in the situation which obtained before the accord of July 8.”[835]

Dr. Rosen, who was entirely unfamiliar with the history of the negotiations when he started to Paris, soon concluded that a change of policy was necessary. In France he found that both government and people were mistrustful, fast becoming embittered, and yet strongly desirous of a speedy settlement of the controversy. On September 8 he telegraphed to the Chancellor his opinion that the German government had already given assurances to France which entitled her to expect that the regulation of the frontier region would be excluded from the deliberations of the conference, and that to move her from this view would require “the speech of cannons” and not “juristic deductions.” He therefore proposed to regard this point as lost and to prevent France from spreading her influence further into Morocco by obtaining an exact definition of the limits of the frontier region. On the choice of a meeting place, he advised making concessions after all else was settled; the contract for the mole he would handle as a “bagatelle.” He foresaw greater difficulty in regard to the loan, which the French considered an act of duplicity; but he stated to Prince Bülow that he would endeavor to uphold it even though he regarded as untenable the German distinction between a “loan” and an “advance.”[836]

Dr. Rosen’s opinion, which Prince Radolin had held for some time, turned the scales. “As it appears to me,” wrote the Chancellor to Baron Richthofen on September 8, “we need above all to extricate ourselves from this Moroccan affair, which has apparently become confused, in such a way as to maintain our prestige in the world and to preserve the German economic and financial interests intact as much as possible.” He accepted Dr. Rosen’s proposals. Germany should yield on the questions of the frontier and the meeting place, and France on those of the mole and the loan.[837]

The ensuing negotiations, carried on by Dr. Rosen mainly with M. Révoil, were replete with dramatic moments.[838] By September 16, the two men reached agreement on most of the points. But when Dr. Rosen learned from M. Révoil that France expected to obtain at the conference a general mandate for the financial and police reforms in the whole of Morocco, he made the concession on the frontier question contingent upon an official French disclaimer of that intention.[839]

M. Rouvier rejected this demand. He offered several times to compensate Germany for her renunciation in Morocco by including other questions in the negotiations, such as those of the Bagdad and the Camerun railways.[840] Dr. Rosen declined to broaden the basis of the negotiations, however, and threatened to break them off (although in reality he had no intention of doing so) if the French persisted in their denial of his request.[841] When the French press began to attack Germany, the Chancellor warned M. Rouvier repeatedly that “if the French imagine that they can intimidate us or even publicly humiliate us, they are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war.” Conditions were much as they had been three months before.[842] Then the sudden intervention of M. Witte changed the situation.

Returning from Portsmouth, where he had represented Russia in the negotiations for peace with Japan, M. Witte stopped in Paris to arrange a loan for Russia. In discussing the project with M. Rouvier, he was told that France could not consider the loan until the conflict with Germany was settled.[843] Since he was interested in a quick solution of the Moroccan difficulty and since he favored a _rapprochement_ between Russia, Germany, and France against Great Britain,[844] M. Witte discussed matters with his friend Prince Radolin on the morning of September 23. Immediately after this conversation M. Witte saw the French Premier, and at the latter’s request returned that afternoon to urge the French views upon the German Ambassador. M. Rouvier was willing, M. Witte said to Prince Radolin, to give verbally the most formal declaration that he would not seek a mandate for Western Morocco at the conference, but since M. Rouvier believed that French public opinion would never accept a written one, he would rather resign than give it. Germany was sufficiently protected against that possibility in any case, the Premier had argued to M. Witte, by the requirement of unanimity in the conference. M. Rouvier had also promised, said M. Witte, to co-operate harmoniously with Germany at the assembly. M. Witte found a sympathetic listener in Prince Radolin, who was disgusted with Dr. Rosen’s policy. When later in the same afternoon the Prince, Dr. Rosen, and M. Rouvier met for further discussion, the Ambassador openly supported the French side. Hence Dr. Rosen had to yield.[845]

From Paris M. Witte went to Germany. At Berlin on September 25 he persuaded the Chancellor to accept M. Rouvier’s views;[846] and at Rominten on September 27-28 he was even more successful with the Emperor William II, who immediately telegraphed to Prince Bülow as follows:

Bring Rosen to reason so that that disgusting quarreling in Paris will cease. I am completely fed up on it . . . . [_Ich habe es gründlich satt_]. France must now . . . . be shown friendship and be permitted to save her face so that she will remain without rancour and will complete the turn necessary to bring her into our alliance.[847]

As a result of M. Witte’s intervention, the two Powers reached an understanding on September 28.[848] They agreed that the program for the conference should provide for police reform and the suppression of contraband traffic in arms by way of an international accord, except in the frontier region where the execution of that action should remain “the exclusive affair” of France and Morocco. A Moroccan state bank should be created, the Moroccan monetary system be stabilized, and funds be advanced for paying the police and for carrying out certain urgent public works. Improved methods of collecting the customs and of raising revenues should be provided. The Sultan should engage not to alienate any public service to the profit of particular interests. The principle of adjudication without regard to nationality should be followed in giving contracts for the construction of public works. The conference should meet at Algeciras in Spain. In a supplementary understanding the French government acknowledged the German “loan” to be an “advance”; but, while the control of that transaction should remain in German hands, the French banks were permitted to furnish one-half the sum necessary.[849] The German government also agreed that an investigation of the relative rights of the French and German firms to the contract for the mole should be made, although it was tacitly understood that the German firm would win.[850]

To make doubly sure that, apart from this agreement, France would have her hands free at the conference, M. Rouvier made the following declaration to the German government:

Aside from the agreement to be signed between the two governments, I am not bound on any point. I renew my affirmation that I have to the same degree as the Imperial Government the desire to avoid all open discord between us at the conference and to co-operate in effecting the solutions that respect best the interests and _amours propres_, in such a way that there will be neither victor nor vanquished. . . . . The guarantee for Germany lies in the fact that, since the decisions of the conference must be unanimous, her opposition will suffice to prevent the general mandate from being given to us.[851]

M. Rouvier thereby changed the statement transmitted by M. Witte to Prince Radolin that France would not strive for a mandate for Western Morocco to a less binding one which would leave France free to seek a mandate if she thought that Germany could be coerced into agreeing. This ambiguity was to cause trouble later.

The Sultan’s approval of this program was obtained with some difficulty. The monarch and his advisers were very diffident about reforms and feared what the outcome of the conference might be. They besieged Count Tattenbach with questions about the program, wanting to know why Morocco had been excluded from the negotiations, what the various clauses in it would result in, whether France would after all succeed in her object by way of the conference. Count Tattenbach, who was practically unsupported by the French Minister, replied that Morocco could not survive without reforms, that Germany would defend Morocco’s independence and integrity. As none of the Sultan’s advisers would shoulder the risk of approving the program to their master, Count Tattenbach had to do so. By October 22 he succeeded in his work. On December 1 the Sultan issued a circular letter inviting the signatory Powers to the conference.[852] The invitations were accepted.

On September 29, in reporting the conclusion of the Franco-German agreement, Dr. Rosen mentioned to his government for the first time the offers which M. Rouvier had made to include in the settlement the difficulties over the Bagdad and Camerun railways. Prince Bülow was immediately eager to open negotiations.

At the present time we must use every opportunity to create solidarity of interest between France and us [he instructed the foreign office on the next day]. Under the present circumstances every African agreement with France is useful to us. Naturally far more useful would be an understanding over the Bagdad Railway. We must always take into consideration the inclination of the English to come to terms with Russia over Asia Minor, whereby we would eventually be placed in the dilemma of suffering a defeat on the question of the Bagdad Railway or of arousing acute antagonism between Russia and us.

But, the Chancellor added, Germany must not show undue eagerness in the matter.[853]

When Prince Radolin broached the subject to the French Premier on October 18, the latter replied that he had offered “an even more far- reaching agreement” at a time when he had hoped to settle the Moroccan affair without a conference, but that under the circumstances he would consider the project only after the conference.[854] That the Chancellor could have expected any other reply showed how little understanding he had of the French state of mind.

Prince Bülow manifested the same obtuseness in an interview with M. Tardieu of _Le Temps_ on October 3 as a bid for friendlier relations with France. Repeating all the German criticisms of the French policy, the Chancellor declared:

I think that the conference, far from dividing us, ought to contribute to a _rapprochement_ between us. For that _rapprochement_, however, one condition is necessary: that French public opinion thoroughly recognize that the policy of isolating Germany is an object of the past. . . . . Today as yesterday, provided your colonial policy respects our commercial interests . . . . we will not obstruct you, but in case of need will aid you in Morocco and elsewhere.

He denied that Germany sought to force upon France an anti-British policy and that Germany had any ulterior motives in her friendship with Russia. He summed up the international situation as follows:

A double system of alliances, both pacific, assures equilibrium in Europe. On those alliances we can and must superimpose friendships. You are friends with Italy: nothing is better. We are friends of Russia: it is perfect. But we must not give to the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ an anti-German character or to the Russo-German _rapprochement_ an anti- French character.[855]

In spite of the Chancellor’s attempt at conciliation, French public opinion did not like the “schoolmaster” tone of his remarks and saw therein “the proof that the Moroccan incident had been only a pretext to intervene in the direction given to France’s foreign policy and to force France to modify it.”[856] In fact, not a single French newspaper spoke well of the German policy.[857] Rather, _Le Matin_ took occasion on October 5 to publish revelations to the effect that at the crucial French cabinet meeting of June 6 M. Delcassé had declared that

England was ready, whatever might happen, to aid France if the latter were the object of an unforeseen and improbable aggression. [It was further asserted in the article that] England, in effect, informed the Government of the Republic verbally that if France were attacked, she was ready to mobilize her fleet, to seize the Kiel Canal, and to land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The French Government was even told later that if it so desired, that offer would be made in writing.[858]

The reports were denied by M. Delcassé and by the French and British governments.[859] But the _London Times_ and the French press believed the first part of the revelations, although the _Times_ regarded the latter part as gossip.[860]

In Germany these revelations provoked an outburst of indignation. Still at odds with King Edward VII, the Emperor wanted to recall Count Metternich for an indefinite leave of absence unless the British government gave a satisfactory explanation of the disclosures.[861] But Prince Bülow knew that the Emperor’s suggestion could not be carried out merely on the basis of newspaper talk. In fact, he did not believe that the revelations were accurate.[862] Still he seized the opportunity to relieve his own position with German public opinion by giving instructions for the German press to accept the revelations as true. By these means M. Delcassé should be represented as having used the Moroccan affair to bring on a war with Germany, while Great Britain should be accused of inciting the French to unleash a world-war. The press should state that Germany had never thought of attacking France, of drawing France to her by force, or of playing France against Great Britain. “It is important that the German public understand how grave the international situation is, how necessary it is to be armed, and how wretched, in view of the seriousness of the world situation, party conflicts and the usual Philistine pettifogging appear.” By so using the press, the Chancellor wrote, “we embarrass our enemies in England and bring advantage to our naval proposals.”[863] Moreover, on October 26, when the Emperor dedicated a statue to Field-Marshal Count Moltke, he declared: “How we stand in the world you have seen. Therefore, the powder dry, the sword sharp, the goal known, the forces braced, and the pessimist banished, I drink to our nation in arms.”[864]

Here were the fruits of two months and a half of tedious and irritating negotiations. Starting with the assurance that the conference would meet and that the reforms would be internationally executed, Germany ended with the same assurance, a half-share in a loan of 10,000,000 marks and a petty contract for a mole. She began with the intention of winning France for the sake of completing a continental alliance with Russia; but by her blundering mismanagement of the Moroccan affair she ruined any chance for doing so. In June the victorious Germany had confronted a France fearful of war and subject to pressure. Since then Germany herself had been constantly receding before the determination of a united French nation. In June M. Rouvier had endeavored to “save France’s face”; by September, Prince Bülow was trying to “save Germany’s face.” The tables were turned.

[Footnote 801: Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.]

[Footnote 802: It was Lansdowne’s suggestion that Spain be included. See Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12 and 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 118 ff., Nos. 152 f.; Cambon to Lansdowne, July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 121 f., No. 157; Lansdowne to Manneville, July 21, 1905, _ibid._, 122, No. 158.]

[Footnote 803: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. June 29, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, D. July 1, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, July 7 and 11, 1905, _ibid._, 109 f., No. 136; 111 f., No. 138; 114, No. 144; 116, No. 148; Lansdowne to Nicolson, July 8, 1905, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 145; Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 119, No. 152.]

[Footnote 804: Nothing is known of these negotiations. See Vidal, _La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_, pp. 172 ff.; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España 1873-1918_, pp. 162 f.; Tardieu, _Revue des deux mondes_, Dec., 1912, p. 640; _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 58 ff., 156.]

[Footnote 805: The accord is reprinted in _Archives diplomatiques_, CXX (1911), 15 ff.]

[Footnote 806: Lansdowne to Lister, Aug. 30, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131, No. 173; Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 4 and 7, 1905, _ibid._, 136, No. 175; 137 f., No. 177; Cambon to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 136 f., No. 176; Lansdowne to Cambon, Sept. 9, 1907, _ibid._, 138, No. 179.]

[Footnote 807: Tattenbach to F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 444 f., Nos. 6714 f; Tattenbach to F. O., June 23 and 25, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 524 f. n.]

[Footnote 808: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19 and 20, 1905, _ibid._, 448 ff., No. 6718 f.; Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524 ff., No. 6774.]

[Footnote 809: Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.; Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 450, No. 6718; 525 f., No. 6774.]

[Footnote 810: Tattenbach had visions of persuading the Sultan to transfer his residence from Fez to Marrakech where he would be under German influence after Morocco was divided, and where Germany could then secure the appointment of Germans as the Sultan’s military instructors (Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.).]

[Footnote 811: Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524, No. 6774.]

[Footnote 812: Georges Louis was the political director of the French foreign office.]

[Footnote 813: Richthofen to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 521 f., No. 6771; Holstein to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 523, No. 6772.]

[Footnote 814: Mühlberg to Wedel, July 13, 1905, _ibid._, 526 f., No. 6775; Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _ibid._, 537, No. 6786. This choice was also desired by the Moroccan government for its own convenience (Lowther to Lansdowne, July 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 123, No. 161).]

[Footnote 815: Radolin to F. O., July 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 527, No. 6776.]

[Footnote 816: Bussche-Haddenhausen to F. O., July 25 and 30, 1905, _ibid._, 528 f., No. 6778; 529, No. 6779; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 488.]

[Footnote 817: His view was actively supported by the British government. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 119, No. 152; Lansdowne to Lowther, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 123, No. 163.]

[Footnote 818: Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537, No. 6786.]

[Footnote 819: See next chapter.]

[Footnote 820: Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1905, _ibid._, 531 f., No. 6782. Holstein expressed the same opinion.]

[Footnote 821: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 468 ff., No. 6223.]

[Footnote 822: The loan was proposed to the German banking house, Mendelssohn & Co., by an English firm in Tangier, Moses Pariente, in April, 1905. A syndicate of German banks, among them the Bleichröder group, the Mendelssohn group, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, was formed to make it. The loan, under negotiation during the summer and early autumn of 1905, was concluded on Oct. 4, 1905 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. 306). It was a purely temporary one to be guaranteed by some of the Sultan’s personal property in land, a fact which alarmed the French even more because it denoted a possible German design to acquire possession of territory in Morocco. On the matters of the mole and loan see the following: Chérisey to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260, No. 295; Saint-Aulaire to Rouvier, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No. 304; note signed by the French and German representatives, Sept. 28, 1905, _ibid._, 307 f., No. 352; Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 540 ff., No. 6789; Pourtales to Radolin, Aug. 19, 1905, _ibid._, 542 f., No. 6790; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1905, p. 299.]

[Footnote 823: Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff., Nos. 6794 f.; Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 2 and 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 126, No. 167; 128 f., No. 170.]

[Footnote 824: A French firm had been surveying and making estimates for some months with a view to obtaining that same contract as well as other contracts for the improvement of the Moroccan harbors. The French claimed that by Art. XXXIII of the contract between the Sultan and the French consortium of banks in the previous year the latter had been given a priority right to make all future loans to Morocco.]

[Footnote 825: Rouvier to Radolin, July 29, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 254 f., No. 292, and following documents; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No. 6784, and following documents; Lansdowne to Whitehead, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 125 f., No. 166; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 23 and 26, July 19 and 31, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 128; 101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.]

[Footnote 826: So Cambon informed Cartwright (Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 130, No. 172).]

[Footnote 827: Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 535 f., No. 6786.]

[Footnote 828: Tattenbach and Kühlmann both supported the contract for the mole, which, it was found, the Emperor had also approved. See Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 540, No. 6789; telegram from Tattenbach, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.; Lowther to Lansdowne, June 23 and 25, July 19 and 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 100, No. 128; 101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.]

[Footnote 829: Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No. 6784, and the following documents. Also Bihourd to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260 f., No. 296; note handed by Radolin to the French government, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 262 f., No. 298 and following documents.]

[Footnote 830: Rouvier to Radolin, July 20, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 253 f., No. 290; 253 f., No. 294; 256 ff., No. 294; Radolin to F. O., July 20, Aug. 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 528, No. 6777; 532 f., No. 6783.]

[Footnote 831: Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 128, No. 170.]

[Footnote 832: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537 f., No. 6787; Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 538 ff., No. 6788; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 22, dispatched Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 544 ff., No. 6792; Radolin to Rouvier, Aug. 26, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 283 ff., No. 323; memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No. 6798.]

[Footnote 833: Rouvier to Radolin, Aug. 30, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 290 ff., No. 331; Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff., No. 6794; Radolin to F. O., Aug. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 552 ff., Nos. 6796 f.; papers communicated by M. Geoffray, Sept. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131 ff., No. 174. In one matter during August the German government had, to its embarrassment, to support France. The Moroccan government seized illegally an Algerian subject. With the approval of the Powers, the French government demanded and soon obtained his release. See _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 301 ff.; _G.P._, XX, 552 n.; 559, No. 6801; _B.D._, III, 138, No. 178.]

[Footnote 834: Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug. 8 and 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 127 f., No. 169; 130, No. 172; Leon y Castillo, _Mis Tiempos_, II, 253.]

[Footnote 835: Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 557, No. 6799; 558 f., No. 6801; Bihourd to Rouvier, Sept. 4, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 297 f., No. 339.]

[Footnote 836: Memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No. 6798; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, inclosing a telegram from Rosen, _ibid._, 559 ff., No. 6802; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 563 f., No. 6804. Radowitz acknowledged on Sept. 7 to Jules Cambon that Germany would defend the selection of Tangier “only for form’s sake” (Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 7, 1905, _B.D._, III, 138, No. 178).]

[Footnote 837: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 562 f., No. 6803; Richthofen to Radolin, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 564 ff., No. 6805; Richthofen to Bülow, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 566 f., No. 6806.]

[Footnote 838: On these negotiations, apart from the references cited below, see Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 140, No. 182; Lansdowne to Bertie, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 140 ff., No. 183.]

[Footnote 839: He demanded an exchange of notes to the following effect: “Neither France nor Germany will propose exclusive candidatures to execute the military reforms at the conference. It is understood that for the execution of the reforms (except in the frontier region) Germany and France will remain on a basis of equality.” See Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 568 ff., No. 6808 and following documents; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 577, No. 6817.]

[Footnote 840: Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 593 f., No. 6833.]

[Footnote 841: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 568 ff., No. 6808.]

[Footnote 842: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18 and 19, 1905, _ibid._, 571 ff., Nos. 6810 ff.]

[Footnote 843: Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 416.]

[Footnote 844: See below.]

[Footnote 845: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503 f., No. 6241; Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 579 ff., No. 6819 and following documents; also Witte, pp. 416 ff. Cf. Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 77.]

[Footnote 846: Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505 ff., No. 6243.]

[Footnote 847: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508, No. 6245; William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246; Witte, pp. 417 ff.]

[Footnote 848: Witte’s claim in his memoirs to have prevented a Franco- German war was hardly justified. Germany did not intend war, but only intimidation (Witte, pp. 424 f.).]

[Footnote 849: The German government in turn admitted that this “advance” did not place in question the right of preference of the French banking consortium to make loans to Morocco.]

[Footnote 850: The accord is given in _L.j., 1901-5_, 307 ff., Nos. 351 f.; _G.P._, XX, 592, No. 6832; _B.D._, III, 142 ff., No. 184; 146 f., No. 188.]

[Footnote 851: Rouvier to Bihourd, Sept. 25, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 305 f., Nos. 349 f.; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 589, No. 6828; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 44 f. In December, M. Louis told Bertie that the German government had replied to Rouvier’s declaration by asserting that “though bound by their Agreement, they [Germany] reserved to themselves the faculty of supporting in the Conference any proposals made by another Government which they might consider good” (Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 158, No. 195). There is no reference to this statement in _G.P._]

[Footnote 852: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 357 f., 362 ff., 367, 313 ff.; _G.P._, XXI, Nos. 6889 ff., 6898; _B.D._, III, Nos. 165, 186 ff.]

[Footnote 853: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 595, No. 6834; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XXV, 196 f., No. 8622; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 197, No. 8623. It was at this time that the question of including France in the alliance made at Björkö was coming to the fore (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 136).]

[Footnote 854: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 596 f., No. 6836.]

[Footnote 855: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 497 ff., Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 593 f., No. 6833; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 594 f., No. 6834.]

[Footnote 856: Quoted from the report of the Belgian Minister at Paris to his government, Oct. 14, 1905 (_Zur europ. Politik_, II, 72). See also the article by De Caix in _Journal des debats_, quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500.]

[Footnote 857: _G.P._, XXI, 16, No. 6901.]

[Footnote 858: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500 f. The revelations were made by Stéphane Lauzanne, a journalist. Lauzanne denied that he had received his information from Delcassé. He stated that he had written the articles three months ago. See Lister to Lansdowne, Oct. 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 83 f., No. 100; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 84, No. 101. His assertions were in the main corroborated by two other French journalists, Eugène Lautier and Alexandre Ular, in _Figaro_, Oct. 13, 1905, and by Jaurès (_G.P._, XX, 666 n.).]

[Footnote 859: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 504; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Oct. 15, 16, 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 84 ff., Nos. 102 ff.; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No. 6873.]

[Footnote 860: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500, 503 f.; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 269 ff. n.]

[Footnote 861: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 666, No. 6876.]

[Footnote 862: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 667 f., No. 6877.]

[Footnote 863: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 10 and 12, 1905, _ibid._, 664 f., Nos. 6874 f.]

[Footnote 864: Schulthess, _1905_, p. 127.]