Chapter II: The Franco-Italian Entente, 1900-1902

When M. Delcassé assumed office in 1898, the Bismarckian system of agreements which had isolated France in Europe had already crumbled away. The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance had been followed by the lapse in 1896 of the ententes between Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Mediterranean.[50] The way was clear for the enterprising French Foreign Minister gradually to win the friendship of the last three Powers, previously joined in enmity against France. The first of these _rapprochements_ to bear fruit was the one with Italy.

During the nineties, Italian dissatisfaction with the foreign policy had been steadily growing. Italian leaders complained that Italy had suffered from a tariff war with France, that she had been unable to restrain France from denouncing Italian treaty rights in Tunis or from fortifying Bizerta, that she had failed to secure colonial territory in North Africa, especially in Tripoli, and in Abyssinia. They regarded the Triple Alliance and the good will of Great Britain as inadequate to Italian needs. They asserted that their country was the victim of the Triple Alliance, made to suffer by France because of membership in it, and not even protected against that Power, much less given compensatory benefits for these undeserved injuries. The anger directed at Great Britain was hardly less than that at Germany and Austria-Hungary.[51]

To meet these difficulties, the Marquis de Rudini, premier from 1896 to 1898, inaugurated a policy of friendship toward France which his successors in office continued. While remaining loyal to her alliances, the Marquis said, Italy would henceforth endeavor to prevent trouble with other Powers and to restore normal relations with France.[52]

In 1896 Italy and France settled their difficulties over Tunis. In 1898 a commercial treaty put an end to ten years of tariff warfare between them and opened the way to the flow of French capital into Italy.[53] In the same year the two countries made a settlement of the boundary line between their possessions on the Red Sea. So when M. Delcassé visited Rome in 1898, he found that both he and the Italian foreign minister, Marquis Visconti Venosta (1896-98), thought necessary a durable entente between their two countries which would respect the French possession of Tunis and the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance; and they agreed that the Mediterranean, which had previously divided their states, should become the means of their _rapprochement_.[54] The Italian Minister was overthrown before any further steps could be taken; but under his successor, Admiral Canevaro (1898-99), an opportunity was offered to initiate the negotiations which finally led to the consummation of the entente.

In March, 1899, France and Great Britain settled the differences growing out of the Fashoda affair by an agreement which assigned to the former the hinterland of Tripoli. Since Italian leaders regarded the eventual possession of Tripoli as vital to the welfare of their state, they felt that Italy had been betrayed by her supposed friend, Great Britain, and the Italian government appealed to its German ally for advice.[55] The latter remained noncommittal, Lord Salisbury equally so.[56] It was France, the supposed enemy, who applied balm to the wound. The French ambassador, M. Barrère, assured Admiral Canevaro that Italy “need in no way fear that she will find France in her path if she should ever have ambitions toward Tripoli.” When the Italian Minister asked for a written statement to that effect, M. Barrère replied that, although Tripoli was Turkish territory, M. Delcassé would “under conditions” attempt to find some way in which to satisfy this desire. Those conditions, of course, had to do with Italy’s relations to Morocco. The materials were thus at hand for an agreement.[57]

The negotiations were long drawn out; for, as France had Italy at her mercy, she drove a hard bargain. On December 14, 1900, Marquis Visconti Venosta, Italian foreign minister (1899-1901), and M. Barrère reached a secret agreement.[58] By its terms Italy received in writing a purely negative assurance that France harbored no designs upon Tripoli. The _quid pro quo_ for France was more valuable.

In that which concerns Morocco particularly, it is agreed . . . . that the action of France has for its object to exercise and safeguard the rights which result for her from the proximity of her territory to that empire. Thus defined, I [Marquis Visconti Venosta] have recognized that such action is not in our view of a nature to prejudice the interests of Italy as a Mediterranean Power. It has been likewise agreed that if there must result therefrom a modification of the political or territorial status of Morocco, Italy will reserve for herself, as a reciprocal measure, the right of eventually developing her influence in the Cyrenaic Tripolitaine.[59]

So vague a statement could be variously interpreted. M. Barrère thought that Italy had given France a free hand in dealing with Morocco so long as her action did not modify the political or territorial integrity of the land. Marquis Visconti Venosta declared later to the German Ambassador that the accord had only permitted France to take measures necessary for the defense of her frontier.[60] As either meaning could be read into the documents, the future course of Franco-Italian relations would determine which one would obtain.

The _rapprochement_, attested by M. Delcassé in the French Senate on February 11, 1901, and affirmed by a visit to Italian waters of the French fleet in April, had been facilitated by a number of circumstances. On the one hand, the Italian government was angry with Austria-Hungary for having excluded it, in violation of Article VII of their treaty of alliance, from the negotiation in 1897 of an agreement with Russia over Balkan affairs. Tariff difficulties with both allies were looming up, and an occasional irredentist voice was being heard. On the other hand, an anticlerical government in France made certain that in the near future at least the republic would not attempt to restore Rome to the pope. Moreover, King Victor Emmanuel, possibly influenced by his Montenegrin wife, leaned decidedly away from his father’s policy of strict adherence to the Triple Alliance toward one of closer friendship with France, and, if possible, with Russia.[61] Italian public opinion was likewise showing itself markedly pro-French, a tendency which M. Barrère’s courting of press and public helped to develop;[62] and when in 1901 the King chose the pro-French M. Zanardelli to form a cabinet, the Italians applauded.[63]

The affinity for France of the new cabinet and the greater defiance toward Italy’s allies were foreseen from the political past of some of its members. M. Zanardelli was a native of the Trentino, and would have been foreign minister in 1893 if the Austrian government had not objected.[64] M. Prinetti, the new foreign minister (1901-3), had spoken energetically in 1891 against the renewal of the Triple Alliance. M. de Martino, his undersecretary, had asked in the Italian Chamber, December, 1899, “how this Triple Alliance is able to serve Italy.”[65] The attitude of these men was soon manifested. Toward the end of the year the Premier was making veiled threats of a tariff war with his allies;[66] while M. Prinetti, ambitious, inflammatory, and unreliable, was engaged in negotiations with France which radically transformed the nature of Italy’s international obligations.

One of M. Prinetti’s first undertakings was to gain better terms for Italy with reference to Tripoli. He proposed to France that “each of the two Powers be able freely to develop its sphere of influence in the regions Tripoli and Morocco at the moment that it judges opportune and without the action of the one of them being subordinated to that of the other.”[67] The French government was willing to accept his overture for the sake of obtaining a freer hand in Morocco; it also saw an opportunity to win an even greater advantage. As the Triple Alliance was to be renewed in 1902, it determined to repeat its former endeavor to nullify the clauses in that treaty referring to France.[68]

M. Barrère argued the French case to the Italian government as follows: Italy had joined the Triple Alliance because of quarrels with France about the Mediterranean. As the two countries were now friends, with their difficulties already harmonized or capable of becoming so, should not their friendship be assured for the future by the removal of any aggressive point against France which the Triple Alliance might contain? Were the clauses of that treaty compatible with Franco-Italian friendship? “The alliance remains defensive,” so he summarized his arguments later to his government. “But it permits a very broad interpretation of the duties of the allies; if France, openly provoked, should declare war, could Italy regard this declaration as a defensive step on our part? It is doubtful.” So he concluded that “under defensive appearances, the Triple Alliance implied an eventually offensive character which ought to be eliminated in the interest of our security and of the relations of friendship between the two countries.” Above all, the French government desired to bring about the suppression of the anti-French military conventions or protocols between Italy and her allies.[69]

M. Prinetti acknowledged the force of these remarks. In June, 1901—that is, before Great Britain had turned away from Germany to France, and while Austria-Hungary and Italy were still on passable terms—he made a verbal agreement with M. Barrère by which the rights of Italy toward Tripoli were put on a par with those of France toward Morocco. In return he promised that the renewed treaty of the Triple Alliance should contain “nothing hostile” to France.[70]

The problem of adjusting Italy’s alliance obligations to her new international situation growing out of the Franco-Italian entente was taken up at the end of the year when negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance were begun.[71] To strengthen Italy’s hand, MM. Prinetti, Delcassé, and Barrère all attested publicly in December, 1901, and January, 1902, to the complete harmony of Franco-Italian interests in the Mediterranean; M. Delcassé referred pointedly to Tripoli and Morocco.[72] And the _Tribuna_ gave bold notice, January 2, that “Italy counts for something and can with her weight turn the scale one way or the other.”[73] In spite of his promises to France, however, M. Prinetti made very feeble efforts to change the Triple Alliance in accordance therewith. He said nothing to the German government about revising or omitting Articles II, IX, X, and the protocol[74] which Italy herself had had incorporated in the treaty. His sole proposal to Count Bülow, to whom he repeated his promise to M. Barrère, was that an introductory statement, intended for publication or for communication to France, should be included affirming the purely defensive character of the alliance. Other matters concerning Italy and her two allies were of far more importance to the Italian Foreign Minister in these negotiations. He wanted the allies officially to affirm Italy’s preponderant rights in Tripoli; he wished for them to have a more binding understanding about the Balkans; above all, he sought to make the renewal of the alliance contingent upon the negotiation of tariff treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary favorable to Italy. In discussing these questions with the German government he grew excited, wept, threatened to resign or not to renew the alliance. About those which concerned France he was more or less apologetic.[75]

German public opinion regarded the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ with misgivings. But the Chancellor assumed a nonchalant attitude, stating in the Reichstag, January 8, 1902:

The Triple Alliance still enjoys the best of health. . . . . The Triple Alliance is not a society for acquisition but an insurance company. It is not offensive but defensive; it is not aggressive but peaceful to a high degree. The Triple Alliance does not bar good relations between its members and other Powers, and I would not consider it proper if even a small part of the German press should show any uneasiness over Franco- Italian agreements. In a happy marriage the husband must not become jealous if his wife dances an innocent extra round with some one else. The main thing is that she does not run away from him, and she will not do so if she is best situated with him. . . . . The Franco-Italian agreements over certain Mediterranean questions do not violate the Triple Alliance. . . . . The goals of the present day _Weltpolitik_ extend to areas and objects which lie far from Germany’s boundaries. I name in this connection, for example, the north coast of Africa, Persia, the Far East.[76]

That speech, however, did not reflect the Chancellor’s actual feeling. He still assumed that, should any important change be made in the Mediterranean area, for instance in Morocco, Germany would be consulted;[77] but he relied upon Russia’s retarding influence, Great Britain’s hostility, and fear of Germany to prevent France from taking action in that land.[78] He was dissatisfied with the turn of affairs, and blamed Great Britain for having forced Italy into French arms by ignoring her interests.[79] He suspected that the Franco-Italian understanding contained more than M. Prinetti admitted.[80] He recognized the improvement in Italy’s international relations, and realized that her antagonism to Austria would thenceforth become sharper, and that her Tripolitan ambitions would be so zealous as possibly to cause trouble with Germany’s friend, the Turkish Sultan.[81] As to renewing the alliance, which he strongly desired, the Chancellor believed that self-interest and the known antagonism of Great Britain to the Dual Alliance would prevent Italy from changing camps.[82] Under other circumstances he might have been willing to make some further concessions to Italy in return for the renewal.[83] In the previous March he had relieved her from any obligations under the German-Italian military convention, although permitting the military conversations to continue as before.[84] But the Franco-Italian entente, the lever with which M. Prinetti expected to pry loose those concessions, was the very cause for Count Bülow’s refusing to permit any change whatever in the treaty. As the alliance was already defensive, he said, there was no need for an introductory statement to that effect. Pointing to the expectation voiced by the French press that anti-French clauses would be dropped, he declared that any modification would permit the French to draw the desired conclusion and thereby to belie the true nature of the alliance. Before he would renew the Triple Alliance he demanded of M. Prinetti an assurance that Italy had made no agreements with other states which could diminish its defensive forces. He even expressed his willingness to drop the alliance rather than make any changes in it, remarking that Italy’s adherence to it was of no fundamental importance. The Chancellor’s adamantine attitude was effective. By May, 1902, M. Prinetti agreed to the renewal.[85]

In March, 1902, M. Prinetti had reported to M. Barrère the probability of his failure. He had refused to communicate the text of the treaty to the Ambassador, but had declared that the protocols thereto must be abolished,[86] and that he was ready, so M. Barrère reported, to give France “assurances of a nature to leave no doubt in our mind as to the character and scope of this document” (the treaty of the Triple Alliance).[87] On May 7, M. Prinetti informed the French Ambassador that “it will be necessary for us to discuss the future of our relations in regard to that treaty.” Under French pressure, he agreed that “thenceforth it was in a direct understanding with us [France] that he should find the means of fixing the interpretation with regard to us which Italy intended to give to her obligations as an ally.” He was willing to put this understanding into writing.[88]

Before the proper negotiations were well under way, the actual renewal of the alliance forced M. Prinetti to declare in the Italian Chamber, May 22, 1902, as follows:

The Triple Alliance as it is and as it will be, completely and uniquely pacific and defensive, will remain in the future what it has been for years: the most solid rampart in the cause of peace. . . . . The Triple Alliance, containing nothing aggressive, either directly or indirectly against France, nothing which menaces her surety or tranquillity may not in any manner constitute an obstacle to the conservation and development of cordial relations with our Latin sister with whom we are and wish to remain friends. . . . . And since it has been said that there exists between certain Central Powers conventions and protocols adjoined to the Triple Alliance which modify its pacific character and would even be aggressive toward France, I hereby solemnly declare that there is no convention and no protocol of that nature.[89]

Presumably even prior to this statement, which was repeated in a formal note to the French government on June 4, M. Prinetti began negotiations with M. Barrère over the written agreement. It was the Ambassador’s intention that that agreement

would contain the engagement not to attack, not to join in any aggression on the part of one or several Powers against one of the contracting parties; not to consider as aggressive on the part of the contracting Powers the obligation to declare war in consequence of a manifest provocation [this was “the capital point” of the project, wrote M. Delcassé]; finally to abandon the military protocols and other dispositions of the same sort concerning us and envisaging war with us. If we are able to arrive at that result [wrote M. Barrère to his chief], we shall have obtained all that we could hope and desire.[90]

The negotiations were far enough along to permit M. Delcassé to declare in the French Chamber, July 3, as follows:

The declarations which have thus been made to us [by the Italian government] have permitted us to feel assured that the policy of Italy by virtue of her alliances is not aimed either directly or indirectly against France; that she will not in any case be a menace to us, either in a diplomatic form or through protocols or in international military stipulations; and that in no case and in no form will Italy become either the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression against our country.[91]

That statement was stronger and more inclusive than the one by M. Prinetti on May 22. It indicated the existence of a fuller understanding than the public knew of. It caused M. Prinetti some embarrassment when the German Ambassador brought up the subject. The Foreign Minister declared himself “somewhat astonished” at the speech; but after a feeble explanation in which he betrayed nothing, he remarked that “so far as he was concerned, he regarded the question as settled.”[92]

Meanwhile the Franco-Italian negotiations continued. On November 1, in an exchange of notes an understanding was reached by which Italy was given a free hand to develop her “sphere of influence” in Tripoli, and France the same right with reference to Morocco. Nor should the action of the one be necessarily subordinated to that of the other. Then followed a clause which M. Delcassé was particularly eager to have incorporated:[93]

In case France [Italy] shall be the object of a direct or indirect aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy [France] will preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in case France [Italy] as a result of direct provocation is forced to take, for the defence of her honor or security, the initiative of a declaration of war.

A conditioning clause was added:

In that eventuality the government of the Republic [the Royal government] must communicate beforehand its intention to the Royal government [the government of the Republic], so that the latter may verify that it is a case of direct provocation . . . . I am authorized to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of Italy [France] and that there will not be concluded by her any protocol or military disposition of an international contractual order which will be in disagreement with the present declarations.

The Italian government asserted that these declarations were in “complete harmony” with its existing international engagements. The agreement was to be secret and to obtain until the Italian government abrogated it. A supplementary statement by M. Prinetti defined the term “direct provocation” to mean one which concerned the “direct relations between the Power provoking and the Power provoked.”[94]

Was this accord compatible with the renewed and unchanged treaty of the Triple Alliance? With Article II it could be made to agree. Articles IX and X and the protocol it merely nullified but left standing.[95] It broke completely not the letter, but the spirit of the alliance. The dishonesty of the Italian Foreign Minister lay in three directions; toward the German government by permitting it to continue in the belief that the old relations as established in their treaty still obtained; toward the French government by informing it that this treaty contained nothing either directly or indirectly hostile to France, although Articles II, IX, X, and XI and the protocol of that treaty had been retained without any attempt to abolish them; toward Italy by not clarifying the situation.[96] The matter was so arranged that in the future the Italian foreign ministers would be able to determine whether or not the agreement with France would be abrogated and the clauses of the Triple Alliance, temporarily in abeyance, would again be called into action. The Italian government was safeguarding its country on both sides and giving up none of its securities, although its policy looked toward two different international orientations. This was the equivocal position between France and the Triple Alliance, later between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, which Italy was to occupy until she entered the World War.[97] The advantages of it lay in the fact that it gave greater mobility to Italian policy, that it caused Great Britain to iron out her differences with Italy early in 1902,[98] that it opened up a future of closer relations with Russia, and that it assured Italy of the future possession of Tripoli.

The French government profited most from these negotiations. M. Delcassé had won his initial victory in the execution of his policy.[99] He had, at least for the time being, nullified the anti-French clauses of the Triple Alliance and drawn Italy out of that group into a middle position.[100] He had also settled the important question of Morocco with the most jealous of the Mediterranean Powers, and had begun the process of pulling the Powers away from Germany and drawing them around France.

[Footnote 50: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Feb. 8, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 99 ff., No. 2664; Alfred Franzis Pribram (ed.), _The Secret Treaties of Austria- Hungary, 1879-1914_ (Eng. ed. by Archibald Carey Coolidge; Cambridge, 1920-21), I, 124 ff., 142 ff.]

[Footnote 51: For manifestations of this feeling see Pribram, II, 104, 106; _Memoirs of Francesco Crispi_ (ed. by Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi; trans. by Mary Prichard-Agnetti; London, 1914), III, 330 ff.; Hohenlohe to Bülow, Feb. 15, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 230 ff., No. 2766; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb. 5, 1896, _ibid._, 89, No. 2657; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb. 18, 1896, _ibid._, 89 ff., No. 2658; and in general the documents in _ibid._, chaps. lxviii, lxix. Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 15, 1902, _B.D._, I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. 356; Currie to Lansdowne, Nov. 27, 1900, Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 12, 1900, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 211 ff.]

[Footnote 52: Bülow to Hohenlohe, Nov. 26, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 285 f., No. 2813; Pückler to Hohenlohe, July 19, 1897, _ibid._, 286, No. 2814; Bülow to Hohenlohe, March 17, 1896, _ibid._, 293, No. 2819; Bülow to Hohenlohe, July 22, 1896, _ibid._, 296 ff., No. 2821; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1896, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 2823.]

[Footnote 53: _Política èstera italiana_ (1916), p. 499; André Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_ (Paris, 1910), pp. 97 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, April 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 716, No. 5833; Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._, pp. 39, 44 f., 48.]

[Footnote 54: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), p. 121; André Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de l’année, 1904_ (Paris, 1905), p. 14.]

[Footnote 55: Canevaro called it an act of “perfidy,” of “dishonesty,” a “sharp slap in the face.” See Saurma to F. O., March 29, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 429, No. 3946; Saurma to F. O., April 1, 1899, _ibid._, 429 f., No. 3947; Saurma to Hohenlohe, March 29, 1899, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 3948; Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 14, 1899, _ibid._, 434 f., No. 3952; Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), _Zur europäischen Politik_ (Berlin, 1919), I, No. 12; Rumbold to Salisbury, March 31, 1899, _B.D._, I, 203, No. 246; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, 203, No. 247.]

[Footnote 56: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 4, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 432 f., No. 3950; Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _ibid._, 435, No. 3953; Bülow to Romberg, April 29, 1899, _ibid._, 436, No. 3954; Romberg to F. O., April 30, 1899, _ibid._, 436 f., No. 3955; Bülow to Saurma, April 30, 1899, _ibid._, 437, No. 3956; Currie to Salisbury, Nov. 4, 1898, _B.D._, I, 194, No. 236; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, 204, No. 247; Currie to Salisbury, April 10, 1899, _ibid._, 204 f., Nos. 248 f.; Salisbury to Currie, April 25, 1899, _ibid._, 206, No. 251; Salisbury to Currie, May 13, 1899, _ibid._, 207, No. 252; Salisbury to Currie, Oct. 12, 1900, _ibid._, 282, No. 350. In Sept., 1900, Currie, apparently on his own initiative, appealed to his government to give the Lateran “some proof of our determination to stand by Italy in the event of her being attacked.” Lansdowne refused (Newton, pp. 211 ff.).]

[Footnote 57: Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 435, No. 3953; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _B.D._, I, 204, No. 247. See also Canevaro’s declaration in the Italian Senate, April 24, 1899, Senato, _Discussioni, XX Legislatura_ (2d sess.), p. 946, quoted by G. Salvemini, “La Triple Alliance,” _Revue des nationes latines_, Oct., 1916, p. 250. Also see the interview between Delcassé and Ojetta in _Giornale d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, reprinted in the _London Times_, Jan. 4, 1902.

Italy had formerly thought that she had vital interests in Morocco, and her hope to acquire the land had received expression in a clause concerning its future in the treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1891 (Pribram, I, 150 ff.; Vol. II, chap. iii). But the Moroccan vogue had passed; her wishes had become more modest. To be sure, the French occupation of Touat caused the Italian government in April, 1900, to declare excitedly to its German ally that the Moroccan question could become a reef upon which the House of Savoy might suffer shipwreck; but, as M. Prinetti later explained, what his predecessor in office had feared was that a French occupation of Morocco might force Italy to seize Tripoli in order to maintain the equilibrium of interests in the Mediterranean (Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 300, No. 5156; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 f., No. 5158; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 12, 1901, _ibid._, 718, No. 5834).]

[Footnote 58: On these negotiations, about which very little is known, see Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Les accords franco-italiens, 1900-1902_ (Paris, 1919), 1 f., No. 1. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter cited as _L.j., 1900-2_.) Salvemini, Oct., 1916, p. 249; Wedel to Bülow, March 31, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 712 ff., No. 5831; Metternich to F. O., Dec. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 726 f., No. 5840; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, 1902, _ibid._, 738 f., No. 5845; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _ibid._, 747 f., No. 5851; Diplomaticus, “The Shifting Foundations of European Peace,” _Fortnightly Review_, LXXVIII (Sept. 1, 1902), 370 f.; Anonymous, “The Marquis of Salisbury,” _Quarterly Review_, CXCVI (Oct., 1902), 664 ff.]

[Footnote 59: Terms of the accord given in _L.j., 1900-2_, 3 f., No. 1, Annexes I and II. See also Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 747 ff., No. 5851.]

[Footnote 60: Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, _L.j., 1900-2_, 1 f., No. 1; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 747 f., No. 5851.]

[Footnote 61: See Bülow to Wedel, Nov. 30, 1900, _G.P._, XVIII, 502 f., No. 5704. The King made his first state visit to St. Petersburg in 1902 (A. Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_ [London, ——], pp. 25 f.).]

[Footnote 62: On Barrère’s activity see Currie to Salisbury, Jan. 18, 1899, _B.D._, I, 281, No. 347; Currie to Salisbury, April 24, 1899, _ibid._, 205, No. 250; memo. by Richthofen, Dec. 17, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 507 f., No. 5708.]

[Footnote 63: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12; _London Times_, Dec. 16, 1901, p. 5; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, chap. xxii.]

[Footnote 64: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12 f., quoting Un Bresciano, “L’intervènto e le pressióni dell Austria nella crisi ministeriale de 1893” (_Nuova antologia_, Oct. 16, 1915).]

[Footnote 65: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, pp. 13 f.; Prinetti’s explanation of this speech in the Chamber, June 14, 1901, is quoted in _Política, èstera italiana_, pp. 536 f. See also Zanardelli’s interview in the _New York World_, quoted in _London Times_, March 27, 1901, p. 5.]

[Footnote 66: Dispatch of Jan. 24, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 91.]

[Footnote 67: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 ff., No. 11.]

[Footnote 68: It had attempted to do this or to break the alliance in 1891 and 1896. See _G.P._, Vol. XI, chap. lxix; _ibid._, Vol. VIII, chap. lxv.]

[Footnote 69: These arguments are contained in Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 ff., No. 11. One other argument, which, however, M. Barrère probably did not use with Prinetti, he formulated as follows: “What is more, nothing prevented her [Italy] from going beyond the actual text of the treaty, if she should judge that her political interests demanded it of her.” See also Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197. The military agreement of 1887 between the allies had become known to the French government soon after its signing. See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 198; also Jules Hansen, _L’alliance franco-russe_ (Paris, 1897), p. 42. In March, 1901, _Matin_ published a version of it and demanded its annulment (quoted in the _London Times_, March 27, 1901).]

[Footnote 70: According to other reports from the German Ambassador in Rome, Prinetti promised “nothing aggressive” (Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, June 27, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 512, No. 5711; 757, No. 5858).]

[Footnote 71: See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197.]

[Footnote 72: The occasion for these statements was the French occupation of Mytilene, which alarmed Italian public opinion. See Prinetti’s speech in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 14, 1901, Cámera dei Depitatio, _Discussioni_, p. 6747; Delcassé’s interview in _Giornale d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, quoted in the _London Times_, Jan. 4, 14, 1902; Barrère’s speech on Jan. 1, 1902, before the French colony in Rome, quoted in _ibid._, Jan. 2, 1902; Delcassé’s speech before the French Senate, March 20, 1902, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 605.]

[Footnote 73: _London Times_, Jan. 4, 1902.]

[Footnote 74: Article II of the Triple Alliance read as follows: “In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, is attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other contracting parties will furnish to the party attacked aid and assistance with all their forces. The same obligation is incumbent upon Italy in case of an aggression not directly provoked by France against Germany.” Articles IX, X, XI, and the protocol provided for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Cyrenaic, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco, and, in certain eventualities, for an aggressive attack by Italy aided by her allies, upon France. See the document given in _G.P._, VII, 99 ff., No. 1426.]

[Footnote 75: On these negotiations see _ibid._, Vol. XVIII, chaps. cxxii, cxxv.]

[Footnote 76: Bernhard von Bülow, _Reden_ (hrsg. von Johannes Penzler; Leipzig, 1903), I, 243 ff.]

[Footnote 77: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 721, No. 5835.]

[Footnote 78: Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 727 f., No. 5841; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 5709.]

[Footnote 79: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _ibid._, 720 f., No. 5835.]

[Footnote 80: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 524, No. 5715; Mühlberg to Bülow, April 25, 1902, _ibid._, 589, No. 5754; Bülow to F. O., April 26, 1902, _ibid._, 590 f., No. 5755; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 728 ff., No. 5852; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, _ibid._, 735, No. 5844.]

[Footnote 81: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 5709.]

[Footnote 82: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 523 ff., No. 5715; Wedel to Bülow, April 10, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 715 f., No. 5832; 723, No. 5836; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 509 f., No. 5709.]

[Footnote 83: Bülow to Wedel, Feb. 24, 1902, _ibid._, 545, No. 5727.]

[Footnote 84: _Ibid._, chap. cxxiv.]

[Footnote 85: See the documents in _ibid._, chaps. cxxii, cxxiv, esp. Nos. 5712, 5727, 5749, 5755.]

[Footnote 86: This was easily said since the German government had in the previous year released Italy from her obligations under the military convention (see above). Prinetti made it appear as a special favor yet to be performed.]

[Footnote 87: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 12, No. 11.]

[Footnote 88: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _ibid._, 4 f., No. 3; Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 12 f., No. 11.]

[Footnote 89: Quoted in Salvemini, July, 1917, p. 321.]

[Footnote 90: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 5, No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]

[Footnote 91: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Chambre, July 3, 1902, pp. 444 f.]

[Footnote 92: Wedel to Bülow, July 6, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 758 f., No. 5859.]

[Footnote 93: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]

[Footnote 94: Terms given in _ibid._, 7 ff., Nos. 7 and 8. On July 20 Barrère reported that Prinetti regarded the following cases as examples of direct provocation:

“1. The publication of sharpened dispatches [_dépêches maquillées_] by Prince Bismarck in 1870; King William’s refusal to receive M. Benedetti.

“2. The Schnaebele incident.”

As examples of indirect provocation, Prinetti cited “Prince Hohenzollern’s candidacy to the throne of Spain, and such indirect initiative in Far Eastern affairs which do not aim at one of the contracting Powers, although that initiative may displease it and appear contrary to its direct interest” (Barrère to Delcassé, July 20, 1902, _ibid._, 7, No. 6). The choice of examples is significant.]

[Footnote 95: See above.]

[Footnote 96: For a severer criticism of his actions see G. Lowes Dickinson, _The International Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), pp. 94 ff. Dickinson asserts that the Italian Minister broke both the letter and the spirit of the Triple Alliance. The analogy of this agreement to that of Bismarck’s reinsurance treaty with Russia of 1887 was remarked upon by Italian statesmen at the time (see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, _B.D._, I, 284, No. 353). Bismarck’s pacific attitude toward Russia was well known, however, and he was not responsible for the inclusion of the anti-Russian clauses in the Austro-German treaty of the Alliance. See Trützschler v. Falkenstein, _Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr von 1887_ (Berlin, 1924), chap. v., and _G.P._, Vol. V. The Italian government, on the other hand, had not only pursued an anti-French policy, but had been responsible for including the clauses antagonistic to France in the treaty of the Triple Alliance.]

[Footnote 97: For analyses of the Italian policy see Rodd to Lansdowne, July 9, 1902, _B.D._, I, 292 ff., No. 364; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366. For the German discussion see below. Mr. Bertie in October, 1903, formulated his conception of the Italian King’s foreign policy as follows: “His aim, I believe, is that Italy should be a link between the several Powers of Europe and at the same time remain a partner in the Triple Alliance: that France should have hopes of drawing Italy away from Austria and Germany, and that those two Powers should be made to feel that an understanding between Italy and France and perhaps even with Russia also is possible. As to England the King probably feels pretty sure that her interests will not seriously clash with those of Italy, and he relies on England standing in the way of French supremacy in the Mediterranean” (Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366).]

[Footnote 98: On the renewal of the Anglo-Italian entente see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 284, No. 353; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 1, 1902, _ibid._, 285, No. 355; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 5, 1902, _ibid._, 286, No. 356; Lansdowne to Currie, Feb. 3, 1902, _ibid._, 287, No. 359; Lansdowne to Currie, March 7, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 361; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 10, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 362.]

[Footnote 99: This he realized. See _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., Nos. 2 f.]

[Footnote 100: Cf. Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 13, No. 11.]