Chapter XV: The Treaty of Björkö and Its Annulment (2)

While these conversations were unsuccessful, Sir Charles Hardinge thought that “the improvement which has already shown itself in the relations between England and Russia only requires careful fostering to bear fruit in due season.”[955] To that end it was necessary for the two governments to find some opportunity for disinterested co-operation—an opportunity which the Conference of Algeciras was to afford—and for Russian public opinion to reciprocate the amicable feelings of the British so that an Anglo-Russian understanding would be built upon a durable basis, like that of the Entente Cordiale. The British press was doing its share in bringing about this change of attitude. In fact, British public opinion felt more relieved than it had in months. The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the signing of the Franco-German agreement of September 28—all cleared the diplomatic atmosphere. The _Matin_ revelations on October 5 concerning the supposed British offer of alliance to France in the previous summer placed Great Britain in a somewhat embarrassing position before the world as a disturber of peace. Moreover, it was recognized that Anglo-German animosity had almost caused a Russo-German alliance, and that, to make a settlement with Russia, Great Britain should restore better relations with Germany.[956] So British public opinion was ready to be friendly with Russia, and, in part, with Germany. During the autumn, sections of the British people, although not the government, tried to smooth over the animosities with Germany. A meeting was held in London early in December for that purpose at which eminent politicians, business men, representatives of the press, clergymen, and others were present to further the work.[957] As German public opinion responded to these efforts, a general _détente_ set in.[958]

[Footnote 865: On these differences see Mühlberg to Metternich, July 18, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 638, No. 6863 and following documents; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 334 ff., 346 ff.]

[Footnote 866: Even Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, admitted to Metternich that “in a Franco-German war in view of the prevailing opinion here [in England] England would be actively on the French side.” See Metternich to Bülow, July 19 and 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 639 f., No. 6864; 646 ff., No. 6867; Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905, _ibid._, 641 ff., No. 6866.]

[Footnote 867: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, XXX, 497, No. 6237.]

[Footnote 868: Bülow to F. O., July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 435 f., No. 6206. The telegrams between the two rulers were in English.]

[Footnote 869: See the correspondence between Holstein and Bülow, July 21-24, 1905, _ibid._, 436 ff., Nos. 6203-14. It was Holstein who determined the whole policy of the German foreign office on this question. Bülow served only as his mouthpiece. Richthofen and Metternich, and also General Moltke (who in 1906 became chief of staff), were all opposed to the project of alliance, but their opinions were either not asked or were disregarded. See Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 488, No. 6235; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 659 ff., No. 6871; Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167.]

[Footnote 870: They conversed in English. In the Emperor’s account of the interview he gives the Czar’s statements in that language.]

[Footnote 871: The Czar was also unpleasantly surprised to learn that King Edward VII was supporting the candidacy of his son-in-law, Prince Carl of Denmark, for the Norwegian throne. Nicholas II favored Prince Waldemar, Carl’s younger brother, while the Emperor favored choosing a member of the House of Bernadotte. It looked to him, said Nicholas, as if Great Britain were endeavoring thereby to get her fingers on Norway with the possible purpose of acquiring the port of Christiansund from which to block the Skaggerrack. See the references given in the succeeding footnote.]

[Footnote 872: “Watchwords of the Common Brethren for 1905.” It was a book of proverbs.]

[Footnote 873: There is another account of the meeting written by Bülow on Aug. 18 immediately after a talk with the Emperor which does not agree in all details with this one written by the Emperor on the day after the meeting occurred. The two versions supplement each other. But the one of July 25 reproduces better the atmosphere in which the affair took place. The other version is as follows: The Czar declared that he wished to go hand in hand with the Emperor, his only friend. The latter asked why the treaty had not been signed in the previous autumn. The reply was that France had opposed it, that he (the Czar) had had to maintain the Dual Alliance, and that France and Germany had been hostile. The Emperor then said that those relations were better, that he wished France and Germany to become friends, that the Moroccan question was to be used for that purpose, and that an understanding over it would certainly be reached. The Czar replied that if that were the case then nothing stood in the way of a Russo-German treaty. The Emperor then produced a copy of the treaty and it was signed immediately. See memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 502 f., No. 6240. The other accounts of the Björkö interview are as follows: Tschirschky to Bülow, July 24, 1905, _ibid._, 454 ff., No. 6218; William II to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _ibid._, 458 ff., No. 6220; Bülow to F. O., July 24, 1905, _ibid._, 452, No. 6215; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 428; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, p. 115; Helmuth von Moltke, _Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, 1877-1916_ (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 325 ff. The treaty was countersigned by Grand Duke Michael, Tschirschky, and Admiral Birileff, the last two apparently without reading it. The Grand Duke was asked to sign it because William II feared that Nicholas II might be deposed and Michael made czar. Naturally he did not mention his reason.

The Czar wished to consider an agreement guaranteeing to the King of Denmark the possession of his territory, so that in case of war Russia and Germany would be sure of being able to defend the Baltic Sea north of the Belt. A declaration of Danish neutrality would not suffice, Nicholas argued to the Emperor, because in case the opponent did not respect it and seized the territory as a base of operation, Germany and Russia would be in a difficult situation. But the Emperor, who together with his government was opposed to touching this important question, put Nicholas off with a promise to consider the matter with Bülow.

The Emperor also urged the Czar at this interview to grant to the Russian people a habeas corpus act which would guarantee their civil liberties, and to call a general council of state to consider the question of a constitution.]

[Footnote 874: _G.P._, XIX, 459.]

[Footnote 875: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. 374.]

[Footnote 876: Bülow to F. O., July 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 453 f., No. 6217; Holstein to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _ibid._, 457 f., No. 6219.]

[Footnote 877: Bülow to F. O., July 27, Aug. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 470 f., Nos. 6224 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]

[Footnote 878: Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 467 f., No. 6222; 476 f., No. 6228.]

[Footnote 879: The German government was particularly concerned lest Roosevelt become mistrustful on account of this interview and the conclusion of an alliance with Russia. It even considered imparting the terms of the treaty to him, but in view of the need for secrecy decided not to. Instead, on July 28, the Emperor wrote personally to Roosevelt making it appear that the interview dealt only with matters pertaining to the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace (Mühlberg to Bussche- Haddenhausen, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 614, No. 6319). On this discussion about whether to notify Roosevelt of the accord see _ibid._, Nos. 6203, 6206-8, 6221, 6223.]

[Footnote 880: He meant the one Germany feared of Russia, France, Great Britain, and Japan.]

[Footnote 881: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 468 ff., No. 6223; memo. by Holstein, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 474 ff., No. 6227.]

[Footnote 882: Bülow to F. O., July 28, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 476 f., No. 6228; 482 f., No. 6231.]

[Footnote 883: Bülow to F. O., July 30, Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 477 ff., No. 6229; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]

[Footnote 884: Bülow to William II, July 30, 1905, _ibid._, 477 ff., No. 6229; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6232.]

[Footnote 885: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2, 5, 9, 1905, _ibid._, 481 ff., Nos. 6230 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]

[Footnote 886: Bülow to William II, July 24, 27, 1905, _ibid._, 452, No. 6216; 471 ff., No. 6226; Bülow to F. O., July 27-29, 1905, _ibid._, 471, No. 6225; 476 ff., Nos. 6228 f.]

[Footnote 887: It is highly probable that Bülow took this step not so much because of defects in the treaty, but rather because the Emperor had disregarded his authority by making those important changes without consulting him. Under the persuasion of Richthofen he took this course in order to uphold his authority and to teach the Emperor a lesson (Eckardstein, III, 166; editor’s note in _G.P._, XIX, 481 f., note).]

[Footnote 888: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No. 6231; 488 ff., No. 6235.]

[Footnote 889: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 496 ff., No. 6237.]

[Footnote 890: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No. 6231; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]

[Footnote 891: Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 6, 14, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6232; 487 f., No. 6234; 501, No. 6239; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 493 ff., No. 6236; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 498 ff., No. 6238; memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 502 f., No. 6240.]

[Footnote 892: Meyer to Roosevelt, Aug. 1, 1905, quoted in Howe, _George von Lengerke Meyer_, p. 188.]

[Footnote 893: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. 195.]

[Footnote 894: Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 495, No. 6236.]

[Footnote 895: Memo. by Spring Rice for a letter to Roosevelt, July 10, 1905, Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Aug. 10, 1905, quoted in Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 476, 484.]

[Footnote 896: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No. 6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869; Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 651 ff., No. 6870. The Emperor did not fear an attack at the time, but certainly at some later date. He thought that the maneuvers were meant to remind Denmark that she was an outpost for Great Britain just as Portugal was and that she must not be too familiar with Germany. And with an English princess married into the Swedish royal family and King Edward’s son-in-law seeking the Norwegian throne, he feared that Norway would also become a British satellite (William II to Bülow, July 30, 1905, quoted in a dispatch from Bülow to F. O., July 30, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 477 ff., No. 6229). Even so sane a person as General Moltke, who in the next year became chief of staff, confided to his diary on July 30, 1905: “The visit of the Channel Fleet in the Baltic announced by England is to be regarded as a demonstration. . . . . The English are inciting in the most unbelievable fashion, they are telling the most despicable lies about us, and are representing Germany as the evil spirit in the whole world. . . . . The future lies dark before us. May Germany have the strength to bear difficult times” (Moltke, p. 331).]

[Footnote 897: 4 Hansard, Vol. CLI, cols. 113, 122, 136 ff., 143.]

[Footnote 898: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No. 6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869. As a matter of fact, the maneuvers had been planned for some time, and to begin with had no political significance. No direct connection existed between their inception and the meeting at Björkö, but it is very probable that the British government was not at all averse to their occurring at the time (cf. Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 200). Wilson was in command of the British fleet (see also _G.P._, XIX, 478, editor’s note).]

[Footnote 899: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 109, 113; Bradford, p. 205.]

[Footnote 900: The German government learned of this fact in August but not of its approval by the British government. See Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 658, No. 6870; Lee, II, 348, 353. On the quarrels of King Edward and his German nephew see Lee, II, 346 ff.; _G.P._, 648 ff., Nos. 6868, 6870; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 330.]

[Footnote 901: William II to Nicholas II, Aug. 22, 1905, Goetz, p. 377; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 95 f., No. 91 and editor’s note; Newton, pp. 337 f.]

[Footnote 902: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 477.]

[Footnote 903: _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 65 f.]

[Footnote 904: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, Oct. 15, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 477, 491; Radolin to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198; M. Bompard states that Witte used the word “alli” (Bompard, “Le traité de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue de Paris_, XXV [May 15, 1918], 438).]

[Footnote 905: Bompard, XXV, 432; Witte, p. 415; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 174 f.]

[Footnote 906: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 477.]

[Footnote 907: Bompard, XXV, 432 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 313.]

[Footnote 908: Bompard, XXV, 424 f. Just when Bompard learned this fact is not evident, but apparently he did so soon after the interview. Cf. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 127, No. 168.]

[Footnote 909: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 477 f.]

[Footnote 910: There are various statements about the date upon which Lamsdorff learned of the treaty. See Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign Minister_, pp. 49 f.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798; A. Nekludow, “Autour de l’entrevue de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, p. 139; Nekludow was a secretary in the Russian embassy in Paris in 1905 (Witte, p. 426; Savinsky, p. 114). The correct date is given in a dispatch from Lamsdorff to Nelidow on Oct. 9, where the Foreign Minister stated that he was first told of the treaty by the Czar just before the latter’s departure for Finland on Aug. 30 (or Sept. 12, according to the new calendar). See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 487. The Czar excused his delay to Lamsdorff on the grounds that he had promised William II to preserve secrecy. See _ibid._, p. 487; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; cf. Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.]

[Footnote 911: There is no substantiation in _G.P._ for the assertion by Savinsky that the Czar told Lamsdorff that William II had asked him then to make known the accord to the French government (Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII [1922], 799; Savinsky, p. 115).]

[Footnote 912: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 799; Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 486 ff.]

[Footnote 913: This was certainly the case. Even apart from the fact that the military clauses of the Dual Alliance provided for a war against Germany, the political clauses as revised in 1899 stated the aim of the alliance to be “the maintenance of the general peace and of the European balance of power” (Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria- Hungary_, II, 206 ff.).]

[Footnote 914: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. 137 f.; Savinsky, _ibid._, XII (1922), 799 ff.; Witte, p. 425; Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, Sept. 28, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 480 f., 486 ff.; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 1905, _ibid._, p. 483.]

[Footnote 915: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 800 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 118 ff., 126 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 6 and 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 485 ff.; Witte, pp. 415 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 44, 49.]

[Footnote 916: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Sept. 14, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 478.]

[Footnote 917: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 479 f.]

[Footnote 918: Hardinge to Lansdowne, July 25, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 93 f., No. 89; Spring Rice to G. Balfour, July 29, 1905, and Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 481 f., 496.]

[Footnote 919: Radolin to Bülow, July 22, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198. On July 26 the German government was about to inaugurate a press campaign against Witte, thinking that he was pro-British (Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 468, No. 6222).]

[Footnote 920: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 205, No. 195.]

[Footnote 921: Witte, pp. 293 f., 416 f.; Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_, pp. 350 f.; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503 f., No. 6241; Witte’s interview in _Le Temps_, reprinted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 439; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 15, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 491; Lee, II, 307 f.]

[Footnote 922: William II to Bülow, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505, No. 6242.]

[Footnote 923: At the Emperor’s request Bülow said nothing to him about the Björkö treaty. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 505 ff., No. 6243.]

[Footnote 924: On the meeting at Rominten see the following: Witte, pp. 416 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 50 ff.; Dillon, pp. 396 f.; Goetz, pp. 379 ff.; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 507 f., Nos. 6244 f.; William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246.]

[Footnote 925: William II to Nicholas II, Sept. 26, 1905, Goetz, pp. 379 ff.]

[Footnote 926: Bülow instructed the Emperor to that effect. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 506, No. 6243. See the dispatch from the Emperor to Bülow on Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246.]

[Footnote 927: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f., No. 193; 205 f., No. 195.]

[Footnote 928: Bompard, XXV, 441 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 318 f.]

[Footnote 929: In his memoirs Witte represented himself the dupe of the two rulers; when he read the document itself, he wrote, he was horrified. He claimed that he was largely responsible for the annulment of the treaty (Witte, pp. 425 ff.; Dillon, pp. 358 ff., 354, 413 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 125). These accounts by him were both of a much later date, when he had been out of favor for several years and held a deep grudge against his master. Consequently he wanted to paint the latter’s perfidy toward France as black as possible. That Witte thought the treaty so harmful at the time is difficult to believe. See his letter to Eulenburg, Oct. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 519 f., No. 6250, Anlage; Witte, p. 424; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 496 f.]

[Footnote 930: See the following: Witte, pp. 427 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 54 ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 801; Dillon, pp. 361 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9 and 27, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 487, 495; Bompard, XXV, 422 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 120 ff.]

[Footnote 931: Lamsdorff met with a similar response from Bompard. According to the latter, Lamsdorff suggested a combination of Russia, France, Germany, and the United States as a counterpoise to the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, “in the same manner that the political equilibrium of Europe was maintained by the Dual and Triple Alliances.” See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 211 f., No. 198; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5 and 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 497, 501 f.]

[Footnote 932: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 15, 18, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 481 f., 489 f.]

[Footnote 933: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 7, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 512 f., No. 6247.]

[Footnote 934: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 514, No. 6248; William II to Bülow, Oct. 12 and 17, 1905, _ibid._, 515 ff., Nos. 6249 f. The reply to Witte was made by Eulenburg at the same time. See Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 520 f., No. 6251; Eulenburg to Witte, Oct., 1905, _ibid._, 521, No. 6252. Cf. Bompard, XXV, 443 ff. Bülow approved of the line taken by his master, for he earnestly desired to continue the negotiations (Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 520, No. 6251).]

[Footnote 935: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 12, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 488.]

[Footnote 936: The letter was delivered by Osten-Sacken, Russian ambassador at Berlin, to give it full official character. See _G.P._, XIX, 522 ff., No. 6254 and Anlage. The Czar approved this reply as early as Nov. 10. Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, undated though bearing the date of approval by Nicholas II of Nov. 10. See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 495 f.; Iswolsky, pp. 55 f.; Bompard, XXV, 443 ff.; Witte, p. 429; Savinsky, pp. 123 f.]

[Footnote 937: William II to Bülow, Nov. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 524 f., No. 6255. The Emperor thought that Russia had shown little appreciation of German friendship during the recent war, and he declared to Bülow that the coalition of Russia, France, and Great Britain was _de facto_ already existent. In the same letter he stated that Germany alone, since Russia refused her aid, must win France to the new project. For the reply to the Czar see William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26 and 28, 1905, _ibid._, 526 f., Nos. 6256 f. That the German government continued to hold the alliance as valid is seen from a memorandum composed by the foreign office for the Emperor just before the latter’s meeting with the Czar at Swinemünde, July, 1907 (_ibid._, p. 528 n.).]

[Footnote 938: _Ibid._, 527 f., No. 6528. See also Bompard, XXV, 447; Witte, p. 429; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 313.]

[Footnote 939: Both letters are quoted in _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.]

[Footnote 940: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. 142, 144. See also the correspondence between the two rulers, Jan. 21 and 29, 1906, _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.; Goetz, p. 386.]

[Footnote 941: Iswolsky, p. 56.]

[Footnote 942: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1, 4, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; 211 f., No. 198; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 203.]

[Footnote 943: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 198 f., No. 191.]

[Footnote 944: _Ibid._, chap. xxiv.]

[Footnote 945: Cf. Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 177, No. 172_a_; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 498.]

[Footnote 946: Hardinge to Knollys, May, 1905, Lee, II, 306; Hardinge to Lansdowne, May 30, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 195 f., No. 189.]

[Footnote 947: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 178 f., No. 172 (_b_); Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 4, 1905, Newton, pp. 327 f.]

[Footnote 948: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 2, 9, 26, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 170 f., No. 159; 178 f., No. 172 (_b_); 199 ff., No. 192 and following documents.]

[Footnote 949: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 3 and 5, 1905, _ibid._, 204 f., No. 194; 207 f., No. 196; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 501.]

[Footnote 950: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 8, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 205 ff., No. 195; 208 ff., Nos. 197 f.; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 17 and 25, 1905, _ibid._, 212 f., No. 199; 217 f., No. 203.]

[Footnote 951: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 211 f., No. 198, Lansdowne’s minute; _ibid._, pp. 521 f.; report from London, Oct. 30, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, No. 22; report from St. Petersburg, Nov. 8, 1905, _ibid._, No. 23; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 663 ff., No. 6360; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _ibid._, XXV, No. 8501; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 665, No. 6361; Schoen to Bülow, Jan. 28, 1906, _ibid._, XXV, 5 f., No. 8502; Miquel to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 666 ff., No. 6362; Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, 523, No. 6254. On Oct. 21, 1905, King Edward instructed Hardinge to express to the Czar “my earnest desire that the best and most durable relations should be established between the two countries, and that all important points should be discussed in the most amicable spirit and arranged as soon as possible” (Edward VII to Hardinge, quoted in Lee, II, 310). On Oct. 12 Lord Sydenham received a letter from Balfour stating that “the time is propitious for an understanding with Russia.” Lord Sydenham, a member of the Defence Committee, wrote a draft of an agreement with Russia and sent it to the Premier, Oct. 20. On Nov. 1 he discussed Persian railways with Balfour and Sir Charles Hardinge, and, after Balfour had left, he (Sydenham) and Hardinge talked over the draft agreement. Hardinge believed that the Russians would accept it (Colonel Lord Sydenham, _My Working Life_ [London, 1927], p. 182).]

[Footnote 952: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 21, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 214, No. 201; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., No. 6253.]

[Footnote 953: Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Gwynn, II, 8; G. Balfour to Spring Rice, Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, I, 503.]

[Footnote 954: Eckardstein, I, 218 f.]

[Footnote 955: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 216, No. 202.]

[Footnote 956: Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., No. 6253; Howe, p. 209.]

[Footnote 957: Report from London, Oct. 23, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 80 f.; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 636 ff., No. 6340. Party leaders, magazines, newspapers, and various societies in England took up the work. The _Times_, however, continued its anti- German campaign. In December, Colonel Repington published an article therein, warning the public against friendliness with Germany (Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _Vestigia_ [London, 1919], pp. 262 f.). See also E. T. Raymond, _The Life of Lord Rosebery_ (New York, 1923), p. 211; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 208; Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 198 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 18 and 22, Nov. 2, Dec. 3 and 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 669 ff., Nos. 6879 ff.; Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 191 f.]

[Footnote 958: See Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 690, No. 6886.]