Chapter XVII: The Conference of Algeciras (2)

As the pressure of the delegates was so strong, M. Révoil and the Duke of Almodovar began on March 11 to consider tentatively the plan of associating actively a Swiss inspector with the French and Spanish in the policing of Tangier.[1182] Nothing could be decided until the new French government was formed. Meanwhile, the opposition of views became public in the Conference session of March 11 when two matters remaining unsolved on the question of the bank were taken up. In a previous sitting Sir Arthur Nicolson, in agreement with M. Révoil, had proposed that three censors be chosen to oversee the bank. In accepting this proposal Herr von Radowitz stipulated that in order to preserve the principle of internationality the censors should be chosen by the respective governments from the personnel of the banks interested in the Moroccan state bank and that a copy of the censors’ reports should be sent to the governments of the signatory Powers. The French delegates, however, desired that the first censors be selected by the committee drawing up the statutes of the bank and should thereafter be chosen by co-optation and that their reports should be sent to the council of administrators of the bank. The French continued to demand four shares, while Germany was willing to concede them only three.[1183] At the session on the next day M. Révoil refused the Austrian proposal to give the command in Casablanca to an officer of a third Power, but agreed to the inspection by one, preferably a Swiss.[1184]

In reporting M. Révoil’s pertinacity to Berlin on March 11, Herr von Radowitz stated: “I have been told by all my colleagues, even the English, that after our action they would no longer consider justified the French adherence to the points declared inacceptable by us and they have so expressed themselves to M. Révoil.”[1185] On the next day Marquis Visconti Venosta said in confidence to Herr von Radowitz that the latter would “not be able to come to an arrangement with M. Révoil without a positive intervention of the government at Paris. . . . .”[1186] The same day the _Lokalanzeiger_ published an exaggerated report from its correspondent at Algeciras in which the “complete isolation” of France in the committee was spoken of; Italy, Russia, the United States, and even Great Britain, the article read, had put themselves on the German side.[1187]

Instead of maintaining a dignified silence while public opinion and the persuasion of the Powers compelled France to give way or break up the Conference, Prince Bülow tried to increase the pressure by beginning a diplomatic and press campaign against France. With German thoroughness he overdid the thing. On March 12 he sent telegrams to the German ambassadors at Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, Washington, and Paris in which he stated that the generous concessions granted by Germany on March 10 had made agreement seem possible. Then all had been placed in doubt again by sudden and unexpected opposition from the French delegates. The other delegates, including the British, he continued, had expressed to Herr von Radowitz and to M. Révoil their opinion that France should now recede; and, after repeating Marquis Visconti Venosta’s statement, he asked the various governments to intervene at Paris “so that the voice of reason will again rule there and further opposition be given up.”[1188]

The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments agreed to advise France to accept the Austrian compromise. Sir Edward Grey, whom Count Metternich did not ask to intercede in behalf of the plan as he believed that the British Minister would refuse, welcomed the German concessions but loyally upheld the French proposals.[1189] Mr. Roosevelt unexpectedly replied most adversely.

In a letter on March 7 the President advised the Emperor to accept his proposal of February 19. He justified his interference by quoting a passage from Baron Sternburg’s letter to him on June 28, 1905, to the effect that “the Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, during the coming conference, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most practical.” He warned the German government that it would lose “credit” and “moral power” in the world if the Conference failed.[1190] In his reply on March 12 the Emperor announced his acceptance of the Austrian plan, and urged the President to support it.[1191]

Upon receiving that reply Mr. Roosevelt on March 14 denounced the Austrian project to Baron Sternburg as “absurd because it favors the very ideas the conference has been trying to eliminate namely partition and spheres of influence,” and also because it was impracticable. On the other hand, “placing French and Spanish officers in the same ports gives according to my view a safer guarantee than placing them separately in single ports,” he said. In spite of that reply, however, Prince Bülow regarded the German position as “at present not at all unfavorable.”[1192]

Meanwhile, the French were restoring their front. In Paris a new government was formed by M. Sarrien on March 14 with M. Bourgeois at the foreign office. M. Bourgeois, with whom Prince Radolin was on cordial terms, was known to be a conciliatory statesman interested in harmonizing international differences. But he could hardly begin his career in office with an unpopular concession on the Moroccan question. He renewed M. Révoil’s instructions, refusing to compromise on the police in any manner whatever.

It was a bold act. The French government knew that the Russian, Italian, British, and Austrian governments disapproved. Several influential members of the French Parliament tried to persuade M. Bourgeois that the British government, influenced by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would withdraw its support from France. The new cabinet was alarmed by the British advice to accept a neutral police in Casablanca rather than break up the Conference, and some of the ministers suspected that Great Britain and Germany were about to come to an arrangement leaving France in the lurch. In a French cabinet meeting M. Clémenceau was at first the only minister to combat these doubts.[1193]

But the move succeeded. M. Bourgeois quickly repulsed the intervention, half-hearted as it was, of the Russian, Italian, and Austrian ambassadors in Paris in favor of the Austrian plan; he even gathered from his conversation with the Austrian representative that the latter’s government would try to persuade Germany to relinquish her stand on the policing of Casablanca.[1194] In addition, as soon as the French instructions were published, Sir Edward Grey immediately informed the French government that Great Britain would “of course” support it.[1195]

When he learned of the French doubts about the continuation of British aid, he rather indignantly replied that the French leaders, MM. Bourgeois, Etienne, and Clémenceau,

should be told that there has never been any question here of discontinuing our support to France. We have given it throughout at Algeciras and in every capital in Europe where required and shall continue this so long as the French wish it and trust us. Cordial co- operation with France in all parts of the world remains a cardinal point of British policy and in some respects we have carried it further than the late Government here were required to do.

Any advice Nicolson has given to Révoil has been on the understanding that this support would be continued, and if he has given advice freely it has been because of his complete confidence that this was understood by his French colleague. The same is true of my conversations with Cambon. . . . . The Prime Minister has been cognizant of all I have said and has cordially approved of it.

Sir Arthur Nicolson denied that either directly or indirectly had he ever said to the German delegates that France ought to give way on any point.[1196] Sir Edward Grey informed the other governments that the British fidelity to France would continue as before. And on March 18 _Le Temps_ published the instructions to Sir Arthur Nicolson so that public opinion could see how complete that support was.[1197]

If the French leaders intended to bring Great Britain back unreservedly into line by expressing these doubts about British support, they succeeded. M. Bourgeois could with more assurance inform the German Ambassador that France had receded as far as she would. On March 17 Prince Radolin reported his words as follows:

The Minister added that he stood on the defensive, that he supported entirely the previous policy of Rouvier and Révoil, . . . . that he had agreed in principle with the appointment of a general inspector from some lesser state “subject to agreement on details” but that under no circumstances would he permit the inspector to exercise a command or a collaboration. That is a question of principle, a vital question for France and her prestige in Algeria. Moreover in case the conference ends without result, the _status quo_ is no disadvantage for France. Germany, not France, had demanded the conference. “It is your turn now to speak, but not of the police. It is lost effort.”

He accused the German government of being responsible for the pressure of the other Powers on France. According to instructions, Prince Radolin replied in a serious tone but without threat that the steps taken by those governments were caused by Germany’s great concessions of March 10.[1198] But the vote of confidence given without debate to the new cabinet by the Chamber on March 19 showed that M. Bourgeois interpreted French feeling correctly.[1199]

There were signs at Paris and Algeciras as early as March 17 that Austria was seeking some new way out of the deadlock, and that Germany might accept the French view about Casablanca.[1200] Before the Austrian mediation had time to materialize, however, the renewed intervention of the American government turned the scales in favor of France. On March 16 Prince Bülow had replied to Mr. Roosevelt with arguments showing that the Austrian plan would preserve the unity and integrity of Morocco whereas the French plan would divide the country into spheres of influence.[1201] The President remained unconvinced. Thinking that the whole German action was intended to humiliate France, he and American public opinion took the French side. While he no longer believed that Germany aimed at war with her western neighbor, he and his advisers did suspect her of intending by the Austrian proposal to gain a port and a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Germany’s extreme demands were arousing dissatisfaction among the other delegates at Algeciras, he told Baron Sternburg, and Austria and Russia had already asked him to advise Germany to moderate them. So, while he declared that he would not hold out if the other Powers accepted the Austrian plan, he remained hostile to it. He threatened to publish the entire correspondence on the subject if the Conference failed. Baron Sternburg learned that Mr. Root had said privately that Germany’s attitude at the Conference was “petty and unworthy of a great nation,” that she was fast losing the confidence of the world. In reiterating the American stand, Mr. Root wrote to the Ambassador: “If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement [as the Austrian plan].”[1202]

With the net drawing tighter around Germany, Prince Bülow notified President Roosevelt on March 19 that Germany would accept the American plan of having French and Spanish officers in about equal numbers co- operate in each of the ports, supervised by a general inspector from another nation.[1203] President Roosevelt was jubilant over Germany’s acceptance of his plan. He immediately proposed it to the French government and asked the British to support him.[1204]

From this side the President met with strenuous opposition. France and Spain would have nothing to do with the idea of mixed police, except if necessary in Tangier and Casablanca. Complaining of too many peacemakers,[1205] Sir Edward Grey supported the Franco-Spanish view. Mr. Roosevelt suddenly grew timid and refused to defend his project before the Conference.[1206] The German government was therefore forced to fall back on Austrian mediation.[1207]

In a private conversation on March 23 Count Welsersheimb informed M. Révoil that Germany might sacrifice her demand for a neutral police at Casablanca if France would make reciprocal concessions. M. Révoil was willing to limit the number of French shares in the bank to three. But for the other unsettled problems of determining how much international control should be established over the police and bank and how the police should be divided among the various ports, the two men failed to find a solution. On the first question the German government demanded as a _conditio sine qua non_ that the inspector should be made responsible to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise a general supervision over the police. M. Révoil, on the other hand, supported by the British and Spanish delegates, desired that the diplomatic corps be excluded from intervening in this matter at all. On the question of the bank the Germans wanted the various governments and the diplomatic corps at Tangier to have some authority over the censors while the French did not. As to the division of ports the French formally requested that the settlement of this problem and of other details should be left for France and Spain to determine later with the Sultan; the Germans preferred to have the Conference itself divide the ports between these two Powers.[1208]

At that point the Conference again reached a deadlock. With victory in view the French, on March 26, refused to give way;[1209] while the Germans, who had already made the great concession, sought to save as much as they could. They felt compelled to be firmer because the publication in _Le Temps_ on March 21 of the very pro-French instructions to the Russian delegate at Algeciras, succeeding the publication of the French and British instructions, made it appear as if the German government were being coerced into retreat.[1210] With one or two exceptions, the delegates, anxious to conclude the Conference and attributing little importance to these matters, were inclined to think that France ought to recede on the question of the responsibility of the inspector.[1211] President Roosevelt was once more urging that both France and Spain be given a joint mandate and that they accept from the Conference a joint responsibility for every port no matter how the ports were divided.[1212] After the session on March 26, the mediators again set to work. Germany agreed for France and Spain to divide the ports as they wished and to submit their decision to the Conference for approval. Both Powers made concessions on the question of the control of the bank. On the most difficult problem of the responsibility of the police inspector, the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian first delegates met privately at M. Révoil’s suggestion and worked out a formula. Then Mr. White submitted it to the German delegates, and the latter accepted it (March 27).[1213] The difficulties were thereby settled.

In the meantime trouble, which did not come to the surface, had arisen between France and Spain. The Franco-Spanish accord of 1905 had provided for the policing of only five ports, whereas the Conference had dealt with all eight. France wanted the other three left to her; but Spain refused. On March 18 she requested that Tangier be given to her, but the French government rejected the suggestion, offering instead to agree that Casablanca as well as Tangier should be policed by French and Spanish together. This offer was refused by Spain, who on about March 25 made the additional request that she should be given an extra share in the bank by the Conference instead of receiving it later from France according to agreement. The French would not accede to this, but by March 31 the two Powers decided that the officers should be Spanish in Tetouan and Larache, French and Spanish in Casablanca and Tangier, and French in the other four ports.[1214]

The Conference accepted this division, together with the following terms on the police: They should function for five years; they should be inspected at least once a year by a Swiss officer stationed at Tangier[1215] who should report to the Sultan; this officer was also empowered to make as many special reports as he saw fit; he should likewise send a copy of these reports to the dean of the diplomatic corps in order that that body might

confirm that the Moroccan police is functioning in conformity with the decisions taken by the Conference and that it may see whether it guarantees in an efficacious manner and in conformity with the treaties the security of persons and of the property of foreigners as well as that of commercial transactions; . . . . in case of demand before it by an interested legation the diplomatic corps may, after advising the representatives of the Sultan of its action, request the inspector to make an inquiry and draw up a report on the complaint made.

On the question of the bank it was stipulated that the censors should be chosen with the approval of their governments by the various state banks of the countries involved. Instead of using the expression that the censors should exercise “the supervision of the administration of the Bank in the name of the signatory Powers,” a phrase to which the French objected as smacking of internationalization again, the delegates substituted the less colorful one that the censors should exercise “the supervision of which they are invested by the present Act in that which concerns the administration of the bank.”[1216]

Thus, formulas were found. Details were cleared up; minor points settled. On April 7 the delegates signed the general act. The Conference of Algeciras was ended.[1217]

The conclusions of the Conference were determined by the exigencies of international relations and the interests of European Powers, not by the needs of Morocco. The less interested Powers had aimed chiefly at preserving peace in Europe. France and her satellite, Spain, had been concerned with maintaining their interests in Morocco and with preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone had endeavored to defend Moroccan rights, and she had done so only because that policy had been in accord with her interests. The Moroccan delegates had in general been disregarded by the Conference, which assumed that the Sultan would under pressure accept its decisions. Although the assembly had formally acknowledged the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan, it had shown little more regard for them than had the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904-5. While the open door had been allowed, the French and Spanish military control in Morocco assured to those two Powers the main economic advantages. In view of the terms of the Franco-Spanish accord of 1905, it was certain that those Powers would not preserve equality of economic treatment. France and Spain had both fought internationalization so effectively that the international supervision established was entirely inadequate to command respect. The idea that a Power might be charged by the other Powers with the exercise of a mandate for the sake of the “backward people” had not as yet been seriously considered by any government. In February and March President Roosevelt and the German government had discussed the proposal of granting to France and Spain a mandate in Morocco “from all the Powers, under responsibility to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights and opportunities”[1218]—that is, for the advantage of the Western Powers not for that of Morocco—but the trouble lay in the absence of any existing machinery which would have enabled it to be put into effect.

The reforms provided for were hardly more than a beginning. They were unsatisfactory both to the Moroccans and to the French and the Spanish. The Moroccan government was surprised at the outcome of the Conference, having expected that France would be arraigned before that body as before a tribunal. The mass of the Moroccan people remained hostile to reform; they were turning their homage more to the pretender and to Raisouli. Even those ministers who recognized the necessity for change denounced the Conference proposals as benefiting the Europeans and European trade in Morocco but not the Moroccan government. “The conference has turned Morocco over to the French,” said El Tores, a delegate to that assembly, to Dr. Rosen. He thought that either acceptance or rejection of the Conference act by the Sultan would be a misfortune.[1219] Ben Sliman, the Moroccan foreign minister, was equally despondent.

He regarded the outlook after the decision of the Conference as simply hopeless [so Mr. Lowther reported his assertions]. If the Makhzen assented to the Conference’s decision there was an end to the Moorish Government, as a Government. The ports were thereby practically handed over for ever to the Powers. These were of importance to Europeans and of a certain financial value to the Sultan although they were but a small part of the country and their populations a mere handful of those of the Sultan’s subjects, who, in normal times, had acknowledged His Majesty’s rule, and paid taxes. But the decisions of the Conference Ben Sliman considered, in practice if not in theory, left the Sultan no means or hopes of doing anything to re-establish order and restore prosperity to the vast mass of his people, to whose needs at large the proposed reforms were totally inadequate and he was deeply disappointed with them.

His Excellency would therefore infinitely have preferred the reforms to have been so framed that the Powers would have exercised some kind of direction, assistance and advice at the Court itself, the influence of which would have been, in course of time, felt throughout the country to the great advantage of all concerned. As it was, the Makhzen seemed to be left in as impotent and ridiculous a position as ever in the eyes of its subjects.[1220]

Opinion at court was divided upon whether to accept the decisions of the Conference or not. When the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tangier officially communicated the Conference act to the Sultan, the latter tried to delay a decision and to discuss certain points. But on June 18 he reluctantly signed the act with reservations. All indications pointed to the opposition of the Moroccan government to any serious efforts at reforms.[1221]

The Conference had made inadequate provisions for coping with Moroccan opposition. There could be no half-measures in handling Morocco. Europe had to leave her alone entirely or give the mandatory Powers complete freedom to “shoot” reforms into the land. The right to police eight towns would just suffice to involve France and Spain in a series of petty, indecisive clashes with the natives. If they wished to employ more military authority, they would have either to obtain the permission of the Powers or to risk another international crisis by taking an unauthorized initiative. As soon as the execution of the reforms should begin, the inadequacy of all this diplomatic activity would become evident. The Moroccan problem had not been solved.

[Footnote 1070: The Conference opened later than was originally planned, the immediate cause being the marriage of the Infanta Maria Theresa, sister of King Alfonso, to Prince Ferdinand of Bavaria, on Jan. 12. The King of Spain had wanted in December to move the meeting place to Madrid, and both the French and German governments had agreed; but as the Sultan opposed, the proposal had been dropped. Bülow’s opinion was that it made no difference to Germany whether the Conference met at Madrid or Algeciras or elsewhere. “It was a mistake that we originally settled ourselves on Tangier,” he wrote, Dec. 25, 1905. See _G.P._, XXI, 25 ff., Nos. 6911, 6913 ff.; _B.D._, III, 160, No. 196; _L.j., 1901-5_, No. 368; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1906, Protocols et comptes rendus de la Conférence d’Algéciras_ (1906), 5, No. 2 (hereafter referred to as _L.j., 1906_).]

[Footnote 1071: Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 90 ff., 503 f.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96, No. 6952. Tardieu’s book contains almost an official account of the Conference from the French side. He was present as representative of _Le Temps_ and had access to the fullest information, as his articles showed. His book is an excellent example of patriotic historiography carried almost to a hysterical extreme, and his interpretations have to be read with the greatest caution. Dr. Hammann criticized the work when it appeared in 1907 in two articles, one in _Grenzboten_, 1907, p. 12, the other in the _Kölnische Zeitung_, March 30, 1907 (editor’s note, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f.). See also the masterly criticism of French policy by Dickinson, _The International Anarchy 1904-1914_, pp. 134 ff.]

[Footnote 1072: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 243, No. 268; Tardieu, pp. 85 f.]

[Footnote 1073: Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Révoil to Rouvier, Jan. 18, 1906, _L.j., 1906_, 11, No. 4.]

[Footnote 1074: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 9 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 229, No. 248.]

[Footnote 1075: _L.j., 1906_, 264 ff., No. 37.]

[Footnote 1076: _Ibid._, 5 ff., No. 3, and following documents; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 91, No. 6947; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 92, No. 6948; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 119 ff., No. 6967; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 230 f., No. 249.]

[Footnote 1077: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 231 ff., Nos. 250 f.; Monts to F. O., Jan. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 126, No. 6970; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 130 f., No. 6975.]

[Footnote 1078: Révoil wished to push matters into the open sessions of the Conference as much as possible, where he would have more support (Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 119 f., No. 6967).]

[Footnote 1079: As seen below, the German government was proposing several alternative solutions of that question, and the German delegates seem also to have been discussing others on their own initiative. See Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 25 and 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 235, No. 256; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 144 ff.]

[Footnote 1080: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 24, 25, 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 234, No. 254; 235 f., Nos. 256 f.; 236 ff., Nos. 259 f.; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.]

[Footnote 1081: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 128 ff., No. 6974.; Tardieu, pp. 141 ff.]

[Footnote 1082: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4 and 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 242, No. 266; 243 f., No. 268.]

[Footnote 1083: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114, No. 6965.]

[Footnote 1084: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 30, 1906, _ibid._, 128, No. 6973; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29 and 31, 1906, _ibid._, 128 ff., Nos. 6974 f.; Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 132 ff., No. 6977; Tardieu, p. 142.]

[Footnote 1085: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 99 ff., No. 6956; Tardieu, pp. 160 ff. A proposal similar to No. 1 had been made to Roosevelt by Bülow earlier in January (Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54 f., No. 6926). Bülow also offered to support Italy in seeking a general mandate on the police, manifestly in order to create antagonism between Italy and France. The offer was rejected and was soon dropped by Bülow who feared that Italy might later help France penetrate Morocco in return for French aid to Italy in Tripoli. See Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 53 f., No. 6925; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 6965; Tardieu, pp. 146 f. There is no proof in the published British and German documents of Tardieu’s assertion that in January the German government also offered to support Spain in seeking this general mandate. See _ibid._, pp. 145, 155 f. Cf. Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]

[Footnote 1086: Tardieu, p. 146 n.; Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 123 ff., No. 6968.]

[Footnote 1087: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.]

[Footnote 1088: The German government did not desire British mediation, as it feared that Great Britain might try to pose as the protector of France and strengthen the Entente Cordiale (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114 f., No. 6965).]

[Footnote 1089: Sternburg to F. O., Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 102 f., No. 6958.]

[Footnote 1090: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 123 ff., No. 6968; 127, No. 6972. On Feb. 3 Goluchowski declared to the German Ambassador that Austria would go with her ally on the questions of the police and the bank “through thick and thin” (Holstein to Wedel, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137, No. 6981). Dr. Kriege, of the German foreign office, was sent on a special mission to Vienna on Feb. 2 to gain the Austrian support (memo. by Kriege, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137 ff., No. 6982; Wedel to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140, No. 6983). A cabinet crisis in Italy on Feb. 1 prevented the German government from taking any immediate steps to gain Italy’s active support. But Bülow expected Visconti Venosta to be willing to mediate. On Feb. 8 a new government was formed in Rome under Sonnino (Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 143 ff., No. 6987).]

[Footnote 1091: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 131, No. 6976. Bülow also instructed Sternburg to interest the American financiers in the Moroccan state bank so that they would press their government to oppose the French plan and to favor the German one. At the Chancellor’s request, the German banker, Mendelssohn, who was to take charge of German interests in the Moroccan bank, endeavored to arouse the Dutch, American, and Austrian bankers in the same way. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 145 f., No. 6987; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 148, No. 6989.]

[Footnote 1092: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140 f., No. 6984; Tardieu, pp. 152 f.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 500; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 239, No. 262.]

[Footnote 1093: Nicolson reported that Tattenbach argued as follows: “He observed that situation had completely changed since Conference had been agreed upon, and that now _vis-a-vis_ to France I was exactly in the same position as the other delegates. He continued that if I urged my French colleague to make all required concessions on police question, my words would be decisive; while if I declined to say those words, I should be practically encouraging my French colleague to resist; and he hinted that if the Conference fell through a great deal of the responsibility would fall on me.” See Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, 1906, _B.D._, III, 241, No. 265; 242 f., No. 267; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 281; Tardieu, pp. 147 f.]

[Footnote 1094: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 141 f., No. 6985; Tardieu, pp. 153 f.]

[Footnote 1095: The Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, M. Ojeda, had approved it. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 145 and note, No. 6987. On the German attempts to win over Spain see Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]

[Footnote 1096: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 143 ff., No. 6987.]

[Footnote 1097: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 10, 1906, _ibid._, 148 f., No. 6990; 155, No. 6996; Dennis, pp. 501 f.]

[Footnote 1098: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 151, No. 6992.]

[Footnote 1099: Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6989.]

[Footnote 1100: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 9, 12, 1906, _ibid._, 149 ff., No. 6991; 155 f., No. 6997; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 155, No. 6996; Tardieu, p. 172.]

[Footnote 1101: Quoted from a memorandum given by Radowitz to Révoil on that date. See Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 162 f., No. 7004; Tardieu, pp. 175 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 253, No. 284.]

[Footnote 1102: Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 122, No. 6967; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 151, No. 6992. See the documents in _B.D._, III, 227 ff., Nos. 246 ff.]

[Footnote 1103: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 156 f., No. 6998; Tardieu, pp. 158 f., 194 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 298 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279.]

[Footnote 1104: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 12 and 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 157 ff., No. 6999; 166 f., No. 7007.]

[Footnote 1105: Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., No. 6994.]

[Footnote 1106: Tardieu, pp. 198 ff.; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 154, No. 6995.]

[Footnote 1107: Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 7 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 146 f., No. 6988; 152, No. 6993. Holstein was the inspirer of these dispatches. See Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., No. 6994. On the press war see also Tardieu, pp. 167 ff.]

[Footnote 1108: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 159 f. and note, No. 7000; Tardieu, p. 195. The telegram to Washington, dispatched the next day, was not of identical wording with the others but to the same effect (Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 163 f., No. 7005).]

[Footnote 1109: Tardieu, pp. 74, 163, 167, 176 f., 196; _G.P._, XXI, 152 n.]

[Footnote 1110: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D_, III, 248 f., No. 278; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 254 f., No. 285; Metternich to F. O., Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 164 ff., No. 7006.]

[Footnote 1111: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 244, No. 269; 245, No. 271; Tardieu, p. 154. The accusation was not deserved.]

[Footnote 1112: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 253, No. 283; Tardieu, pp. 79 f., 158 ff., 204 f., 246 ff.; Witte, pp. 298 ff.; _G.P._, XXI, 125 f. n.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp. 386 f.]

[Footnote 1113: According to Bompard, the Russian government was not certain that the Liberal government in London would support France as whole-heartedly as its predecessor had done. Grey’s assertions early in February reassured it entirely (Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, and Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 62 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 7 and 8, 1906, _B.D._, III, 245 f., Nos. 272 f.; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 246, No. 274).]

[Footnote 1114: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 489.]

[Footnote 1115: Tardieu, pp. 160 ff.; Bishop, I, 489.]

[Footnote 1116: Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, quoted in Royal Cortissoz, _The Life of Whitelaw Reid_ (New York, 1921), II, 329 f., 347; Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.]

[Footnote 1117: Tardieu, pp. 161 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 246 ff., Nos. 275 f.]

[Footnote 1118: Radolin to F. O., Feb. 13 and 15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 160 f., No. 7001; 171 f., No. 7010; Tardieu, pp. 200 f.; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 250 f., No. 280; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 259 f., No. 290.]

[Footnote 1119: Tardieu, pp. 179 f., 249 ff. White was very critical of the German tactics in his dispatches to Washington, especially of the German attempt to negotiate directly with the Quai d’Orsay while the Conference was going on (White to Root, Feb. 11, 1905, Dennis, p. 502 and note; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 257 f., No. 287).]

[Footnote 1120: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 172, No. 7011; Tardieu, p. 181; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260 f., No. 292. Révoil was contemplating an involved, vague reply when he talked to Nicolson. At the latter’s advice it was made concise and straightforward (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 287).]

[Footnote 1121: Root to Sternburg, Feb. 19, 1906, quoted in Bishop, I, 489 ff., _G.P._, XXI, 181 ff., No. 7019; Tardieu, pp. 249 f., 180.]

[Footnote 1122: Italy had been chosen for obvious reasons, for she was bound to France by the accords of 1900 and 1902 and to Germany by the Triple Alliance. As such, her choice might be acceptable to both Powers (Tardieu, p. 181).]

[Footnote 1123: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 173 f., No. 7013; Tardieu, pp. 187, 249 ff.]

[Footnote 1124: Bülow’s minute to _G.P._, XXI, 183, No. 7019; Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1906, in Bishop, I, 491 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Tardieu, p. 250.]

[Footnote 1125: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 213, No. 7038.]

[Footnote 1126: The plan was drawn up with the aid of Glasenapp of the Deutsche Bank and of Mendelssohn, who was to take over the German shares in the bank. See Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 27, 1906; _ibid._, 115 ff., No. 6966; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 114 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.]

[Footnote 1127: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 117 f.; Tardieu, pp. 184 f., 221 ff.]

[Footnote 1128: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 f., 120 ff., 136 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204, No. 7031; 205, No. 7033; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _B.D._, III, 265 f., No. 298.]

[Footnote 1129: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 176 f., No. 7015.]

[Footnote 1130: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 ff.]

[Footnote 1131: Rouvier suggested to Révoil that the representative of France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary meet informally and try to find a solution on the police. Nicolson and White opposed the idea as impracticable, and it was soon dropped (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260, No. 291).]

[Footnote 1132: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 178 f., No. 7017; Tardieu, pp. 194 f., 204 f.]

[Footnote 1133: Tardieu, pp. 246 ff.; Schoen to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 192, No. 7025; Eulenburg to William II, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 194, No. 7027 and Anlage, Witte to Eulenburg, Feb. 20, 1906; Witte, p. 301.]

[Footnote 1134: Bülow to Schoen, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 193, No. 7026; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 7028; Eulenburg to Witte, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 202 ff., No. 7030; Tardieu, pp. 195, 295.]

[Footnote 1135: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 211 ff., No. 7037; Witte, p. 301; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311.]

[Footnote 1136: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279, No. 320; Spring Rice to Knollys, March 1, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65 f.]

[Footnote 1137: Tardieu, pp. 247, 249; Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 234 f., No. 7052; Schoen to Bülow, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 251 ff., No. 7068. The article so embittered the German government that Bülow would not show it directly to the Emperor but informed him of it personally so as to take away the sting (see the minutes to the dispatch from Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235, No. 7052).]

[Footnote 1138: A visit of the London City Council to Paris, Feb. 8, gave occasion for confirming the Entente Cordiale (_G.P._, XXI, 185 ff. and note, No. 7021). Grey also intimated to Metternich that France would be willing to eliminate the thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom in Morocco as provided for in the Anglo-French accord. See Metternich to F. O., Feb. 19 and 20, 1906, _ibid._, 179 ff., No. 7018; 185 ff., Nos. 7021 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 263 f., No. 296.]

[Footnote 1139: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 22, 24, 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 269, No. 303; 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311; 278 f., No. 320; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _ibid._, 264 f., No. 297; 270, No. 304; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65.]

[Footnote 1140: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 258, No. 288. Apparently it was not mentioned to the French at all.]

[Footnote 1141: Memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 266 f., No. 299.]

[Footnote 1142: Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, believed that the way to prevent Germany from attacking France because of some French action in Morocco was for Great Britain to inform Germany that she is “absolutely ‘solidaire’ with France as far as the Moroccan question is concerned.” He feared that if Great Britain did leave France in the lurch, “an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain” (memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, and Hardinge’s minute, _ibid._, 266 ff., No. 299). Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, a prejudiced, bitter opponent of Germany, suspected that Germany might demand and seize a port in Morocco or obtain a lease as she had done at Kiaouchau in China. He advised warning the Sultan against Germany. Sir Edward Grey regarded the proposal as premature so long as the Conference was sitting, but said that the eventualities referred to should be kept in mind (minutes to dispatch from Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _ibid._, 272, No. 308).]

[Footnote 1143: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 168 f., No. 7008; Monts to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 161 f., No. 7002; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 162 and note, No. 7003; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Monts to Bülow, March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 286 ff., No. 7103; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _ibid._, 216 f., No. 7043; Tardieu, pp. 198 f., 205 f.; Grey to Egerton, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262, No. 295; Egerton to Grey, March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 283, No. 325.]

[Footnote 1144: “C’est la pire des solutions,” wrote Tardieu, p. 155 and elsewhere. See the conversation between Ojeda and Stumm reported by the latter on Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 189 ff., No. 7024; Tardieu, pp. 155 ff., 199 f.; Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22 and 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; 236, No. 258.]

[Footnote 1145: Tardieu writes that the instructions were “all that France wished” (Tardieu, pp. 207 f., 255).]

[Footnote 1146: Tardieu has a long story about German threats and intimidations toward Spain between Feb. 11 and 20. The King of Spain, he writes, was angry, but Ojeda listened to the siren voice of Stumm, first secretary of the German embassy in Madrid. According to the German documents, Stumm had at least two conversations with Ojeda during February, one on Feb. 20, trying without success to influence Spain to support the German proposals (_G.P._, XXI, 145, 189 ff.). On the Spanish proposal see Tardieu, pp. 199 f., 188 ff., 207 ff.; Grey to Cartwright, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262 n., No. 295; 271, No. 307; Cartwright to Grey, Feb. 21, 22, 24, 1906, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 301; 270 f., No. 305; 273, No. 310; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 269, No. 302; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 271, No. 306.]

[Footnote 1147: The Belgian government informed him that its delegate had orders to abstain from voting in case of a conflict, and to participate actively in the Conference only when the commercial interests of Belgium were involved. The Dutch government said that its delegate would vote with the majority. Sweden replied that she would abstain from voting in case of disagreement (Tardieu, p. 257).]

[Footnote 1148: As Sir Edward Grey knew how interested Austria was in keeping Great Britain and Germany friendly, he impressed upon the Austrian government, Feb. 26, “how unfortunate” was the German stand on the police, and “how impossible it was to improve the relations between England and Germany as long as there was this dispute between Germany and France about a matter on which we had an Agreement with France which was publicly known to the whole world, and which had been the very beginning of our friendship with France” (Grey to Goschen, Feb. 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 276 f., No. 316).]

[Footnote 1149: Tardieu, pp. 202 f.]

[Footnote 1150: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 14 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 166 f., No. 7007; 175 f., No. 7014. To the Italian and American governments Goluchowski openly censured the German attitude (Tardieu, p. 203, and above; Goschen to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 273, No. 309).]

[Footnote 1151: Memo. by Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 213 f., No. 7039; Tardieu, pp. 257 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279, No. 320.]

[Footnote 1152: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _ibid._, 278, No. 318; 279, No. 320.]

[Footnote 1153: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 177 f., No. 7016; Tardieu, pp. 187, 266 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 276, No. 315.]

[Footnote 1154: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 274, No. 311.]

[Footnote 1155: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 25 and 26, 1906, _ibid._, 274 ff., Nos. 312 f.; Tardieu, Part III, chap. ii, _passim_, pp. 268 ff.]

[Footnote 1156: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 21, March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204 f., No. 7032; 233 f., No. 7051; Tardieu, pp. 143 ff., 227, 223 ff.]

[Footnote 1157: Tardieu, pp. 275 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 159 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 3 and 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f. and note, No. 7051; Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282, No. 323; 283 f., No. 326. The French press played up that vote as a great victory; the German press and government took the opposite view. Nevertheless, the German delegates complained to the Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and even the Austrian delegates about their actions; and the vote undoubtedly helped to accomplish the object of Nicolson and Révoil.]

[Footnote 1158: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 168 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 285 ff., No. 330; Tardieu, pp. 283 ff.]

[Footnote 1159: Nicolson to Grey, March 3 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282 f., No. 324; 285, No. 328. On March 7 Grey again advised the Spanish government to stand firmly with France and Great Britain (Grey to de Bunsen, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 285, No. 329).]

[Footnote 1160: Tardieu states that on March 5 Tattenbach openly said so to several of the delegates (p. 291). Bülow also found it necessary to bolster up the courage of the German delegates. See memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 256, No. 7069. See also Metternich to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 188, No. 7023; Radowitz to Bülow, Feb. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 217 ff., No. 7044; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 7048; 243 ff., Nos. 7061 f. King Edward’s visit to Paris, March 4-5, at which time he showed special favor to Delcassé, was also a significant sign to the Germans (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 510; Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 284, No. 327).]

[Footnote 1161: On this episode see Tardieu, pp. 241 ff., 296; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 278, No. 319; Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 284, No. 327; Nicolson to Grey, March 8, 1906, _ibid._, 288, No. 331; memos. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 206 ff., and note, Nos. 7034 f.; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 7047; 240 f., No. 7059; 250 f., No. 7067; Bülow to Radolin, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 240, No. 7058. Courcel spoke to Louis, of the French foreign office, about the project on March 5. On the next day Rouvier mentioned it to Radolin, only to refuse it. On Holstein’s views see also Lascelles to Grey, March 1, 1906, _B.D._, III, 280 f. and inclosure, No. 321.]

[Footnote 1162: Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 37 f.; memo. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 208 f., No. 7035; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; _ibid._ p. 338, editor’s note.]

[Footnote 1163: See the conversation with Tschirschky on March 16 recorded by Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, pp. 146 f.]

[Footnote 1164: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f., No. 7045; 262 f., No. 7077; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 187 f.]

[Footnote 1165: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 224 f., No. 7046.]

[Footnote 1166: Goluchowski reluctantly agreed to mediate on that basis at first, but after learning of the vote of March 3 and after consulting Welsersheimb he changed his mind (Wedel to F. O. March 1 and 4, 1906, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 7049; 238 f., No. 7056).]

[Footnote 1167: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Radowitz to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235 f., No. 7053.]

[Footnote 1168: Bülow to Radowitz, March 6 and 7, 1906, _ibid._, 245 f. and note, No. 7063; Bülow to Wedel, Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 248 f. and note, No. 7065.]

[Footnote 1169: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 183 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261 ff., Nos. 7076 ff., Nicolson to Grey, March 8 and 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288, No. 331; 289 ff., No. 334. Visconti Venosta, informed at the last minute of the proposed Austrian mediation, refused angrily to co-operate in it. Why he did so is difficult to see. He claimed that the Austrian project was not in keeping with the German view which he represented. This, however, seems a poor excuse, for he had approved the project when it was first suggested. It seems more likely that Visconti Venosta was seeking to avoid taking the Austro- German side publicly against France. The Austrian government was more alarmed at his refusal than was the German government, which consoled itself with the fact that the Italian delegate was performing useful work under cover. See Wedel to F. O., March 9 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 269, No. 7083; 271 f., No. 7087; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 257, No. 7070; Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 272 and note, No. 7088.]

[Footnote 1170: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 189 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 270, No. 7085; Tardieu, p. 293; Nicolson to Grey, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292 f., No. 337. By these words Radowitz did not mean that Germany would accept the French terms, as Tardieu imagines (Tardieu, pp. 308 ff., 313).]

[Footnote 1171: Nicolson to Grey, March 9 and 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f., No. 332; 294, No. 338; Grey to Bertie, March 9, 1906, _ibid._, 289, No. 333; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336; Radowitz to F. O., March 8 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261, No. 7075; 264 f., No. 7079; 269 f., No. 7084; Dennis, p. 503. Cf. Tardieu, pp. 297 f., 308 f.]

[Footnote 1172: Grey to Nicolson, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292, No. 335.]

[Footnote 1173: Bertie to Grey, March 2, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. 322.]

[Footnote 1174: Tardieu, pp. 299 f., 309 f., 321, 328; Grey, _Twenty- five Years_, I, 103.]

[Footnote 1175: Nicolson to Grey, March 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f., No. 322; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336.]

[Footnote 1176: Radolin to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 265 f., No. 7080.]

[Footnote 1177: On March 5, 6, and 7, Bülow showed no inclination to accept the French plan, but held firmly to the Austrian one. See Bülow to Wedel, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 239, No. 7057; 248 f., No. 7065; memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 256, No. 7069. He may, however, have made this statement to the Prince of Monaco without explaining that by “the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power” he really meant the Austrian plan and did not intend an acceptance of the French plan. Tardieu’s assumption that Bülow made the surrender and then receded from his concession after the fall of the French government on March 7, hoping to exploit this embarrassing situation, is, so far as we can tell, devoid of foundation (Tardieu, pp. 293 ff., 314 f.).]