Chapter IX: The Maritime Republics in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth (1)

CENTURIES

THE AFFAIRS OF PISA AND GENOA

In the disputes between the emperors and the popes, the Pisans followed the Ghibelline, the Genoese, the Guelf party. Both republics, too, late in the twelfth century, often replaced their consuls by podestas, and both were the frequent theatre of strife between the nobles and the populace. In Genoa, from 1190 to 1216, there appears to have been a struggle whether consuls or the podesta should govern the state, for during that period we find both, and, from 1216 to 1252, podestas alone. But, as the popular assemblies were still convoked whenever any important decision was to be made, and as the podesta, like the consul, was elected, the citizens still retained some of their ancient privileges. These, however, were not the only changes in the form of the executive; the podesta was sometimes replaced by the _capitano_, sometimes by the _abbate_, and at other times by the _anziano_--dignities of which we find frequent instances in the thirteenth century. But none appear to have enjoyed a long lease of power; often the very next election, according as faction or prejudice or love of novelty prevailed, ended their name with their administration; they could, however, hope that in the perpetually revolving wheel of change their dignity might again attain the summit--a hope which was almost sure to be realised. “At present,” says the archbishop of Genoa, who wrote towards the close of the same century, “we have an abbot and elders; whether we must soon change them or not, no one can tell; but at least let us pray God that we may change for the better, so that we are governed well, no matter whether we obey consuls, or podestas, or captains, or abbots.”

[Sidenote: [1262-1298 A.D.]]

The good prelate proceeds to illustrate this truth by quaintly comparing the different forms of government to three keys, one of gold, one of silver, the third of wood; though the material of these, he observes, is very differently estimated, one is in reality as good as another, provided it does its office, that of opening. The first _capitano_ surnamed Boccanera, owed his election to the mob, whom he had gained by flattery, and whom he persuaded to be no longer governed by tyrannical podestas; his election was for ten years; a council of thirty-two elders was elected to aid, or, rather, to obey him; a judge, two secretaries, and twelve lictors were constantly to await his orders; and a knight and fifty archers were appointed his body-guard. A man with powers so ample was sure to become a tyrant; and we accordingly find that in the second year of his administration a conspiracy was formed to depose him. This time he triumphed; but when half his term was expired, a confederacy of the nobles, aided by the populace, compelled him to retire into private life.

Into the endless domestic quarrels of the Guelfs and Ghibellines at Genoa and Pisa, and the consequent alliances--alliances of momentary duration--contracted in both cities with the emperor, the pope, or the king of Naples, we cannot enter; and if we could, nobody would thank us for the wearisome detail. As in Lombardy, the nobles were often banished, and as often recalled. The year 1282 is more famous in the annals of both republics, as the origin of a ruinous war between them. Pisa, with her sovereignty over Corsica, Elba, and the greater part of Sardinia; with her immense commerce, her establishments in Spain, Asia, and Greece, her revenues and stores, had little to gain and much to lose, by contending with a poor and perhaps braver power. If Genoa had less wealth, she had equal enterprise, an equal thirst for gain, and equal ambition. Where so much rivalry existed, it would easily degenerate into discord; and petty acts of offence were followed by general hostilities. In one of their expeditions the fleet of the Pisans was almost destroyed by a tempest; a second, by the enemy; a third, after a bloody conflict off the isle of Meloria, was all but annihilated, and the loss in killed was five thousand, in prisoners eleven thousand. These prisoners the victors refused to ransom and for a reason truly Italian--that the retention of so many husbands in captivity would prevent their wives from renewing the population, and that Pisa must in consequence decline. This infernal policy succeeded; when, after sixteen years’ warfare, peace was made, scarcely a thousand remained to be restored to their country.

But Pisa had other enemies; all the cities of Tuscany, with Florence at their head, entered into an alliance with Genoa to crush the falling republic, which had rendered itself so obnoxious by its Ghibelline spirit. In this emergency, convinced how feeble must be the divided efforts of its municipal magistrates, Pisa subjected itself to the authority of an able and valiant noble, Ugolino della Gheradesca, who dissipated the formidable confederacy, and, by some sacrifice of territory, procured peace. Not less distracted was the internal state of the republic, now the Ghibellines, now the Guelfs being called by the populace to usurp the chief authority. Though the Genoese had less domestic liberty, since they were more frequently under the control of some one tyrant, they were in general much more tranquil. In 1312 they submitted to the emperor Henry of Luxemburg, but evidently with the resolution of throwing off the yoke the moment he repassed the Alps; while the submission of the Pisans was sincere. Two years afterwards the _capitano_ or dictator of the latter reduced Lucca, and humbled the Florentines; but such was his own tyranny that the people expelled him. His fate is that of all the petty rulers of Italy; yet, though after this expulsion the forms of a republic were frequently restored, the spirit was gone; there was no patriotism, no enlightened notions of social duties; violence and anarchy triumphed, until the citizens, preferring the tyranny of one to that of many, again created or recalled a dictator. The war of the Pisans with Aragon for the recovery of Sardinia was even more disastrous than that with the Genoese. It ended in the loss of that important island, which had formed a considerable source of their resources.

The evils, indeed, were partly counterbalanced by the conquest of Lucca, which had sometimes proved a troublesome neighbour; but nothing could restore them to their ancient wealth or power, so long as they were menaced by so many rival states, especially those of Tuscany, and so long as they were distracted by never-ceasing domestic broils. In fact, at one time, their existence depended only on the imperial support; at another, on the dissensions or misfortunes of their enemies.

[Sidenote: [1284-1369 A.D.]]

The little republic of Genoa, which, in imitation of Venice, had forsaken its podestas, abbots, elders, and captains for a doge and senate--but a senate much less aristocratic than that of the ocean queen, was scarcely more enviable, though doubtless more secure. This republic, too, had its pretensions to Sardinia, and consequently a perpetual enemy in the Aragonese kings. Often vanquished, it implored the protection of the king of Naples or the duke of Milan, according as policy or inclination dictated. It had, however, a better defence in its natural position, in the barren rocks which skirted it to the north and east, and in the valour of its sailors; and when, as was sometimes the case, its protectors became its masters, the foreign garrison, being cut off from supplies both by sea and land, was soon compelled to surrender.

But Pisa had no such defence; and in 1369 she had the mortification to see the republic of Lucca restored to independence by the emperor Charles IV. On this occasion the Lucchese remodelled their constitution; they retained their _anziani_, or elders, with a gonfalonier at their head; both, however, in the fear of absolute sway, they renewed every two months. Ten _anziani_, with the gonfalonier, formed the seigniory, or executive government, and were assisted by a council of thirty-six, called _boni homines_, and elected every six months. Over these was the college of 180 members, who were annually elected.[b]

[Sidenote: [1339-1458 A.D.]]

Of all the republics, Genoa, in the fourteenth century, was accounted the most wealthy and powerful. But after throwing off the yoke of Robert, king of Naples, the city was agitated by continual commotions, in which the Guelfs and Ghibellines were alternately expelled. The institution of an officer called the abbot of the people, like that of the Roman tribunes, had been intended to repress the power of the nobles; and the attempt to dispense with this office was resisted by the commons, who chose for their abbot, Simone Boccanera, a nobleman of the Ghibelline party, and a zealous advocate for the popular cause. But his noble descent impelled him to decline an office which had hitherto been held by only one of the people; and the multitude overcame his scruples by changing the title of abbot to that of duke, or doge, in imitation of the Venetians (1339). A select few of the popular leaders were nominated as his council; but the authority of Boccanera appears to have been almost unlimited. He governed with firmness and discretion, and according to Giovanni Villani a conspiracy of the nobles was promptly and capitally punished. His reign was, however, suspended in 1344; the members of the noble families, Doria, Spinola, Fieschi, and Grimaldi reassembled in the suburbs, and the doge avoided a violent deposition by a secret retreat to Pisa. After some confusion, a nobleman, Giovanni da Murta, was proclaimed doge; but as renewed disorder convulsed the city, the contending factions agreed to submit their differences to Lucchino Visconti, and the rapacious arbitrator was prevented by death alone from occupying the distracted state.

After the death of Da Murta, a new doge was set up; but disorder within and defeat without induced Genoa to throw herself under the protection of Giovanni Visconti. On the death of that prelate she reassumed her independence; her original doge was recalled, and continued to rule until 1363. But from the death of Boccanera the state was torn by dissension for upwards of thirty years, and two rival families of the mercantile class, the Adorni, adherents of the Guelfs, and the Fregosi of the opposite party, alternately furnished Genoa with an ephemeral sovereign. In 1396 the reigning doge, Antonio Adorno, by an act of miserable impolicy, surrendered the state to Charles VI, king of France, who deputed the government to a renowned captain, Jean le Maingre, marshal of France, and lord of Boucicault. The stern severity of this approved soldier was manifested on his entry into the city; and two of the most refractory citizens, Battista Boccanera and Battista Luciardo, were at his command led out to execution. Boccanera’s head was severed from the body, and his companion was about to suffer, when a new commotion in the assembled crowd distracted the attention of the French guard. The criminal seized the propitious moment, and darting into the dense throng was lost among the multitude; but his place was instantly supplied by the officer whose neglect had permitted his escape, and whose head immediately rolled upon the ground at the mandate of the peremptory Boucicault. For eight years the Genoese were overawed by his rigorous government; but his absence favouring insurrection, the French lieutenant was assassinated, and the state was delivered from the yoke of France.

[Sidenote: [1458-1478 A.D.]]

But the spirit of independence was extinguished in Genoa, and she withdrew herself from the bondage of France to acknowledge Filippo, duke of Milan, as her master. Revolt from Milan and reinstatement of the doge were immediately followed by his deposition, and a new form of government was introduced by creating ancients and captains of the people. After a few months’ duration this government was dissolved, and Raffaello Adorno was created doge, and permitted to retain his power for nearly four years. A new struggle between the rival families once more convulsed the city; and whilst Alfonso, king of Naples, threatened Genoa with a most formidable invasion, a grievous pestilence raged among her citizens. In this complication of distress, the doge, Pietro Fregoso, with the approbation of the principal citizens, craved the protection of Charles VII, king of France; and the city being by treaty surrendered to that monarch was occupied in his name by John of Anjou. The union of the families Adorni and Fregosi enabled the Genoese to expel the French; an Adorno was for a moment raised to the duchy and then expelled by the Fregosi, and a Fregoso had scarcely mounted the throne ere he was displaced by his kinsman, the archbishop Paolo. The odious character of Paolo Fregoso threatened a speedy dissolution of his authority; and the keen-eyed Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, already regarded Genoa as his own. He obtained from Louis XI of France the cession of his rights; he secured a strong party amongst the discontented citizens; and a general revolt in April, 1464, enabled his friends to proclaim him lord of the city.

During the residue of the reign of Francesco and that of his son, Galeazzo Sforza, Genoa continued in repose; but the murder of the latter prince incited the family of Fieschi to attempt a revolt from Milan. The storm was, however, lulled by the presence of Lodovico and Ottaviano Sforza, the young duke’s uncles; and their creature Prospero Adorno was accepted by the people as their doge under the authority of the duke of Milan. A few months dispelled his authority; and Battistino Fregoso was proclaimed independent sovereign of Genoa.[17]

In the midst of these perpetual commotions, a new and singular association of private individuals took place in Genoa. The bank, or company, of St. George had been instituted about 1402, when a long course of warfare had drained the public treasury. The contributions, therefore, of private citizens were called in requisition, in security for the repayment of which the customs were pawned by the republic; whilst each lender participated in the receipts in proportion to the extent of his advances.

The administration of their affairs required frequent meetings of the body of creditors; and the palace over the custom-house being assigned to them, they organised a particular form of government. A great council of one hundred was established for deliberation on their common weal; whilst the supreme management of their affairs was entrusted to a directory of eight. The good order of their little government insured their prosperity; the increasing necessities of the republic required new advances; and the public lands were mortgaged to the bank, until that body became possessed of nearly all the territory appertaining to the state of Genoa. To the regulation and defence of this extending territory the company alone were attentive; and, without any interference on the part of the commonwealth, an annual election of their own officers furnished an adequate supply of governors and magistrates for the provinces. They wisely abstained from taking part in the unceasing changes in the government; and, alike indifferent to the cry of Adorni or Fregosi, were intent only on preserving their own independence, and securing from the successful ruler the due recognition of their laws and privileges. The administration of this society formed a striking contrast to that of public affairs. Instead of tyranny, corruption, and licentiousness, the bank of St. George presented a model of order, good faith, and justice; and the people obtained thereby an influence in the state, which more effectually preserved their liberty than all their violent attempts to depress the aristocracy.

_Naval Exploits_

[Sidenote: [1337-1354 A.D.]]

Notwithstanding the perpetual dissensions of Genoa, she long continued to maintain her naval renown; and whilst the plebeians were intent on the depression of the nobles, the family of Doria were conducting her fleets to the discomfiture of her enemies. Like her ancient rival Venice, she had long been acquainted with the Levant; and Galata and Pera, the suburbs of Constantinople, were the reward of services rendered to the Greek emperor.

(After Vicellio)]

After the peace of 1299 the Venetians, though strengthened by the alliance of the Aragonese, abstained for a time from renewing the contest; and the first attack upon the galleys of Genoa was punished by defeat and disgrace. A breach of faith on the part of Venice was resented by the seizure of all her traders in the Black Sea; but Genoa paid dearly for this aggression, and a signal defeat by the Venetians off Caristo nearly annihilated her fleet. In 1351 a powerful armament sailed from Venice under the command of Niccolo Pisani, one of the most distinguished commanders of his age; and a fierce encounter in the Dardanelles covered the sea with the fragments of the hostile vessels. But severely as the Genoese suffered on this occasion, they might fairly claim the victory, since the destruction of the Venetian and Aragonese galleys was more than double the loss which they themselves sustained; and Pisani admitted the defeat by leaving his enemies in possession of the scene of action. Even the seat of empire was threatened by the conquerors; and the Greek emperor averted their vengeance by the expulsion of his former allies from the capital. But the pride of Genoa soon afterwards sustained a severe check; her fleet, under Antonio Grimaldi, was surprised off Cagliari on the anniversary of the defeat of Caristo; and the loss of more than thirty ships and forty-five hundred prisoners reduced the public to despair. This disaster, however, was amply compensated by a splendid victory in the following year, achieved over Pisani by Andrea Doria and his nephew Giovanni; and to the bold and spirited manœuvre of the latter the success of the day was chiefly to be attributed. Whilst the Venetians lay within the harbour of Sapienza, a little island of the Morea, the younger Doria dashed into the port with twelve galleys, and, placing his force between the shore and the enemy, commenced a furious assault. Meanwhile the residue of the Genoese fleet attacked the galleys of Pisani in front, and most complete victory was obtained. The Venetians suffered an enormous loss of both vessels and men; and amongst the six thousand prisoners led in triumph to Genoa was the renowned commander Niccolo Pisani.

[Sidenote: [1354-1379 A.D.]]

The Genoese thus triumphant swept the coast of Barbary, assaulted and plundered Tripoli, and sold the city to a wealthy Saracen for 50,000 pieces of gold. A more important conquest was achieved eighteen years afterwards. At the coronation of Peter de Lusignan, king of Cyprus, a dispute for precedence arose between the consuls of Genoa and Venice, which the Cypriote authorities decided in favour of the latter. Irritated by this award, the Genoese attempted to assert their right by violence; and the Cypriotes, resenting an affront offered in the royal presence, flew to arms, and immediately put the offenders to death. Not content with this summary vengeance, they set on foot a general massacre through the island, and a single Genoese was left alive to convey the heavy tidings to the republic. A new fleet was forthwith sent from Genoa, commanded by Pietro Fregoso, and the island of Cyprus offered little resistance to the invaders. Nor can they be accused of want of moderation, since only three lives were sacrificed to the manes of their slaughtered countrymen. The king was restored to liberty, and even permitted to retain his title; but a yearly tribute of 40,000 florins was exacted by the conquerors.

A new offence soon kindled another war with Venice. So low had the Greek Empire fallen that the Genoese had taken upon themselves to dethrone the emperor Joannes Palæologus in favour of his son Andronicus, who promised them in return the island of Tenedos. But the deposed tyrant was supported by their ancient rival, who took advantage of the imperial schism to get possession of Tenedos; and Genoa, strengthened by the alliance of Louis, king of Hungary, Francesco da Carrara, lord of Padua, and the patriarch of Aquileia, declared war against the Venetians. The fleet of Genoa was commanded by Luciano Doria, that of Venice by Vittore Pisani. Fortune from the commencement favoured the Genoese; and in the month of May, 1379, a great and sanguinary battle off Chioggia was attended by a brilliant victory. The death of their admiral Doria, who fell in the first onset, inspired them with vindictive fury; and fifteen Venetian galleys and upwards of a thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the conquerors. Many of these were inhumanly butchered by the Genoese in revenge for the fall of Doria; whilst the defeated Pisani, returning to the capital, was plunged into a dungeon by the implacable government of Venice.

A reinforcement under Pietro Doria now enabled the Genoese to follow up their victory, and the island and city of Chioggia were captured with immense loss to the Venetians. The utmost consternation prevailed throughout Venice, and the most humiliating terms of peace were proposed by the disheartened senate. But the haughty Doria rejected all terms of accommodation. “Never, by the faith of God!” he exclaimed, “never, my lords of Venice, shall ye have peace till we have bridled those brazen horses of St. Mark’s; when they are bitted, ye may dare to talk of peace.”

Nothing can more strongly mark the consternation of the Venetian government than their yielding on this trying occasion to the outcries of the populace. In obedience to their urgent call Pisani was delivered from his dungeon and once more placed in command of the armament. Despair prompted the most vigorous preparations for defence; great rewards were promised to all whose exertions should be most conspicuous; and nobility was to be the reward of the thirty citizens who should pre-eminently distinguish themselves in preserving the state. The great aim of Pisani was now to blockade the Genoese fleet, which had taken up its station within the port of Chioggia. This daring enterprise was achieved with incredible labour and severe loss on the part of the Venetians. By sinking vessels laden with stones at the mouths of the several channels which led into the Lagune, he rendered all egress impossible.[g]

[Sidenote: [1379-1381 A.D.]]

The circumstances of the two combatants were thus entirely changed. But the Genoese fleet, though besieged in Chioggia, was impregnable, and their command of the land secured them from famine. Venice, notwithstanding her unexpected success, was still very far from secure; it was difficult for the doge to keep his position through the winter; and if the enemy could appear in open sea, the risks of combat were extremely hazardous. It is said that the senate deliberated upon transporting the seat of their liberty to Candia, and that the doge had announced his intention to raise the siege of Chioggia, if expected succours did not arrive by the 1st of January, 1380. On that very day, Carlo Zeno, an admiral, who, ignorant of the dangers of his country, had been supporting the honour of her flag in the Levant and on the coast of Liguria, appeared with a reinforcement of eighteen galleys and a store of provisions. From that moment the confidence of Venice revived. The fleet, now superior in strength to the enemy, began to attack them with vivacity. After several months of obstinate resistance, the Genoese, whom their republic had ineffectually attempted to relieve by a fresh armament, blocked up in the town of Chioggia, and pressed by hunger, were obliged to surrender. Nineteen galleys only out of forty-eight were in good condition, and the crews were equally diminished in the ten months of their occupation of Chioggia. The pride of Genoa was deemed to be justly humbled; and even her own historian Stella[h] confesses that God would not suffer so noble a city as Venice to become the spoil of a conqueror.

Each of the two republics had sufficient reason to lament their mutual prejudices and the selfish cupidity of their merchants, which usurps in all maritime countries the name of patriotism. Though the capture of Chioggia did not terminate the war, both parties were exhausted, and willing, next year, to accept the mediation of the duke of Savoy. By the Peace of Turin, Venice surrendered most of her territorial possessions to the king of Hungary. That prince and Francesco da Carrara were the only gainers. Genoa obtained the isle of Tenedos, one of the original subjects of dispute--a poor indemnity for her losses. Though, upon a hasty view, the result of this war appears more unfavourable to Venice, yet in fact it is the epoch of the decline of Genoa. From this time she never commanded the ocean with such navies as in days gone by; her commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is, till recent times, the most ignominious in those of Genoa. But this was partly owing to internal dissensions, by which her liberty, as well as glory, was for a considerable space of time suspended.

THE AFFAIRS OF VENICE[18]

[Sidenote: [1172-1319 A.D.]]

While Genoa lost even her political independence, Venice became more conspicuous and powerful than before.

The great Council of Venice, as established in 1172, was to consist of 480 citizens, equally taken from the six districts of the city, and annually renewed. But the election was not made immediately by the people. Two electors, called tribunes, from each of the six districts, appointed the members of the council by separate nomination. These tribunes, at first, were themselves chosen by the people; so that the intervention of this electoral body did not apparently trespass upon the democratical character of the constitution. But the great council, which was principally composed of men of high birth, and invested by the law with the appointment of the doge, and of all the councils of magistracy, seem, early in the thirteenth century, to have assumed the right of naming their own constituents. Besides appointing the tribunes, they took upon themselves another privilege; that of confirming or rejecting their successors, before they resigned their functions.

These usurpations rendered the annual election almost nugatory; the same members were usually renewed, and though the dignity of councillor was not yet hereditary, it remained, upon the whole, in the same families. In this transitional state the Venetian government continued during the thirteenth century; the people actually debarred of power, but a hereditary aristocracy not completely or legally confirmed. The right of electing, or rather of re-electing, the great council was transferred, in 1297, from the tribunes, whose office was abolished, to the council of Forty; they ballotted upon the names of the members who already sat, and whoever obtained twelve favouring balls out of forty retained his place. The vacancies occasioned by rejection or death were filled up by a supplemental list formed by three electors, nominated in the great council. But they were expressly prohibited, by laws of 1298 and 1300, from inserting the name of anyone whose paternal ancestors had not enjoyed the same honour. Thus an exclusive hereditary aristocracy was finally established. And the personal rights of noble descent were rendered complete in 1319, by the abolition of all elective forms. By the constitution of Venice as it was then settled, every descendant of a member of the great council, on attaining twenty-five years of age, entered as of right into that body, which of course became unlimited in its numbers.

[Sidenote: [1297-1319 A.D.]]

These gradual changes between 1297 and 1319 were first made known by Sandi.[i] All former writers, both ancient and modern, fix the complete and final establishment of the Venetian aristocracy in 1297.

But an assembly so numerous as the great council, even before it was thus thrown open to all the nobility, could never have conducted the public affairs with that secrecy and steadiness which were characteristic of Venice; and without an intermediary power between the doge and the patrician multitude the constitution would have gained nothing in stability to compensate for the loss of popular freedom. The great council had proceeded, very soon after its institution, to limit the ducal prerogatives. That of exercising criminal justice, a trust of vast importance, was transferred in 1179, to a council of forty members annually chosen. The executive government itself was thought too considerable for the doge without some material limitations. Instead of naming his own assistants or _pregadi_, he was only to preside in a council of sixty members, to whom the care of the state in all domestic and foreign relations, and the previous deliberation upon proposals submitted to the great council was confided.

This council of pregadi, generally called in later times the senate, was enlarged, in the fourteenth century, by sixty additional members; and as a great part of the magistrates had also seats in it, the whole number amounted to between two and three hundred. Though the legislative power, properly speaking, remained with the great council, the senate used to impose taxes, and had the exclusive right of making peace and war. It was annually renewed, like almost all other councils at Venice, by the great council. But since even this body was too numerous for the preliminary discussion of business, six councillors, forming, along with the doge, the seigniory, or visible representative of the republic, were empowered to despatch orders, to correspond with ambassadors, to treat with foreign states, to convoke and preside in the councils, and perform other duties of an administration. In part of these they were obliged to act with the concurrence of what was termed the college, comprising, besides themselves, certain select councillors, from different constituted authorities.

It might be imagined, that a dignity so shorn of its lustre as that of doge, would not excite an overweening ambition. But the Venetians were still jealous of extinguished power; and while their constitution was yet immature, the great council planned new methods of restricting their chief magistrate. An oath was taken by the doge on his election, so comprehensive as to embrace every possible check upon undue influence. He was bound not to correspond with foreign states, or to open their letters, except in the presence of the seigniory; to acquire no property beyond the Venetian dominions, and to resign what he might already possess; to interpose, directly or indirectly, in no judicial process, and not to permit any citizen to use tokens of subjection in saluting him.

As a further security, they devised a remarkably complicated mode of supplying the vacancy of his office. Election by open suffrage is always liable to tumult or corruption, nor does the method of secret ballot, while it prevents the one, afford in practice any adequate security against the other. Election by lot incurs the risk of placing incapable persons in situations of arduous trust. The Venetian scheme was intended to combine the two modes without their evils, by leaving the absolute choice of their doge to electors taken by lot.

[Sidenote: [1296-1310 A.D.]]

It was presumed that, among a competent number of persons, though taken promiscuously, good sense and right principles would gain such an ascendency, as to prevent any flagrantly improper nomination, if undue influence could be excluded. For this purpose, the ballot was rendered exceedingly complicated, that no possible ingenuity or stratagem might ascertain the electoral body before the last moment. A single lottery, if fairly conducted, is certainly sufficient for this end. At Venice, as many balls as there were members of the great council present were placed in an urn. Thirty of these were gilt. The holders of gilt balls were reduced by a second ballot to nine. The nine elected forty, whom lot reduced to twelve. The twelve chose twenty-five by separate nomination. The twenty-five were reduced by lot to nine; and each of the nine chose five. These forty-five were reduced to eleven, as before; the eleven elected forty-one, who were the ultimate voters for a doge.

A hereditary prince could never have remained quiet in such trammels as were imposed upon the doge of Venice. But early prejudice accustoms men to consider restraint, even upon themselves, as advantageous; and the limitations of ducal power appeared to every Venetian as fundamental as the great laws of the English constitution do to ourselves. Many doges of Venice, especially in the Middle Ages, were considerable men; but they were content with the functions assigned to them, which, if they could avoid the tantalising comparison of sovereign princes, were enough for the ambition of republicans. For life the chief magistrates of their country, her noble citizens forever, they might thank her in their own name for what she gave, and in that of their posterity for what she withheld.

For some years after what was called the closing of the great council by the law of 1296, which excluded all but the families actually in possession, a good deal of discontent showed itself among the commonalty. Several commotions took place about the beginning of the fourteenth century, with the object of restoring a more popular regimen. Upon the suppression of the last, in 1310, the aristocracy sacrificed their own individual freedom along with that of the people, to the preservation of an imaginary privilege. They established the famous Council of Ten, that most remarkable part of the Venetian constitution. This council, it should be observed, consisted in fact of seventeen, comprising the seigniory, or the doge and his six councillors, as well as the ten properly so called. The Council of Ten had by usage, if not by right, a controlling and dictatorial power over the senate and other magistrates; rescinding their decisions, and treating separately with foreign princes. Their vast influence strengthened the executive government, of which they formed a part, and gave a vigour to its movements, which the jealousy of the councils would possibly have impeded. But they are chiefly known as an arbitrary and inquisitorial tribunal, the standing tyranny of Venice. Excluding the old council of Forty, a regular court of criminal judicature, not only from the investigation of treasonable charges but of several other crimes of magnitude, they inquired, they judged, they punished, according to what they called reason of state.

The public eye never penetrated the mystery of their proceedings; the accused was sometimes not heard, never confronted with witnesses; the condemnation was secret as the inquiry, the punishment undivulged like both. The terrible and odious machinery of a police, the insidious spy, the stipendiary informer, unknown to the carelessness of feudal governments, found their natural soil in the republic of Venice. Tumultuous assemblies were scarcely possible in so peculiar a city, and private conspiracies never failed to be detected by the vigilance of the Council of Ten. Compared with the Tuscan republics, the tranquillity of Venice is truly striking. The names of Guelf and Ghibelline hardly raised any emotion in her streets, though the government was considered in the first part of the fourteenth century as rather inclined towards the latter party. But the wildest excesses of faction are less dishonouring than the stillness and moral degradation of servitude.[j]

[Sidenote: [1289-1325 A.D.]]

On the death of Giovanni Dandolo in 1289, the long delay of the electors to name a successor furnished an excuse to the populace to resume their ancient privilege; and they tumultuously hailed Jacopo Tiepolo as their doge. But Tiepolo, wisely declining an honour thus irregularly conferred, withdrew for a time from Venice, and the Forty-one at length fixed on Pietro Gradenigo, a nobleman extremely obnoxious to the people. With him originated a measure which forever shut out the commonalty; and the Forty, who were entrusted with the annual election of the council, were enjoined to re-elect all such members of the old council as were not declared unfit by twenty-nine voices. Not to render the people desperate, three commissioners were appointed to make supplemental lists of such other citizens as might be fit to fill vacancies caused by the rejection of the former, or the death of existing members of the council; which lists were in like manner subject to the approval of the Forty. But as three commissioners were appointed by the council itself, it was easy to foresee that this body would be careful to name such persons only as favoured their own order; and lest the electors should err on the popular side, a decree was soon afterwards made, by which they were forbidden to insert any person in their lists, who himself or whose ancestor had not formerly belonged to the great council. In course of time the commissioners were wholly suppressed; the council was declared permanent; and all who could prove themselves descended from one of this body were entitled to inscribe their names in the Golden Book, and to enter this noble assembly at the age of twenty-five.

_The Tiepolo Conspiracy, and the Council of Ten_

[Sidenote: [1325-1355 A.D.]]

These changes were not effected without some movement on the part of the people; and the suppression of a feeble conspiracy, and the punishment of its leaders, did not deter others from plotting against the power of the aristocracy. A numerous band of citizens, headed by Baiamonte Tiepolo (son of Jacopo), was formed, and extensive preparations were made for the subversion of the government. But detection having prematurely driven the conspirators into open revolt, they were easily overwhelmed and destroyed in the narrow streets of Venice; and this new conspiracy furnished an excuse for erecting that fearful tribunal--the Council of Ten. This formidable assembly, though originally only a temporary measure, was afterwards, in 1325, declared permanent. It was invested with arbitrary and almost unlimited powers; under pretence of watching over the safety of the republic, the Ten gradually assumed the government of the state, made peace and war, disposed of the finances, and even abrogated the proceedings of the great council. Their spies and emissaries pervaded every quarter of the city; they seized, imprisoned, or put to secret death, without responsibility to any higher authority; whilst no rank was secure from their machinations. Even the doge himself might tremble at their vigilance and severity; and the fate of Marino Falieri, thirty years after the permanent institution of this council, forms a striking event in the annals of this extraordinary oligarchy.[g]

_The Story of Marino Falieri_

Falieri, who had passed his fifteenth lustre, had married a young lady of great beauty and elegance, and the union was naturally, perhaps inevitably, accompanied by suspicions on the part of the doting husband. They chiefly fell on the president of the old or “criminal forty” (so called to distinguish that tribunal from two others of less dignity, which took cognisance of minor matters), whom he somewhat rudely expelled from his house at an entertainment he had given to the nobility. The president felt the insult the more deeply, as his attentions had not been devoted to the wife of the doge, but to one of her women. In the impulse of the moment he wrote on the throne of the doge a verse which, whether founded on truth or not, he knew must sorely wound him, as reflecting on his honour and the fidelity of his consort. It ran:

“_Marin Falieri dalla bella moglie_,
_Altri la gode ed egli mantiene_”

(Marino Falieri of the beautiful wife; others enjoy her, he maintains her). Falieri discovered the writer, and denounced him to the public advocates; but, contrary to his expectation, those men, considering the offence a venial one, carried the cause, not before the tremendous Council of Ten, but the Criminal Forty--the very tribunal of which the accused was president. The culprit met with favour; he was condemned only to one month’s imprisonment.

From this moment the doge indulged uncontrolled animosity against the tribunal, and even the whole order of nobles, whom he regarded as the betrayers of his honour. It was followed by the hope of revenge. He knew the dissatisfaction entertained by both the plebeians and the less privileged nobles towards the government, and he artfully endeavoured to foment it. His reply to a citizen who one day complained before him that a wife or daughter had been dishonoured or insulted by a member of the grand council, produced great impression: “You will never obtain justice. Have not I myself been insulted, without the hope of adequate redress?” In a short time he organised a conspiracy, the object of which was to open the grand council to the nobility and the election of the members of all the public functionaries, of the doge himself, to the citizens at large. The evening before the day fixed for its execution, it was denounced by one of the conspirators; others were arrested and tortured; numbers were executed.[b]

But the demands of justice were not yet satisfied, and the law claimed a larger sacrifice, a nobler victim. The process against Marino Falieri followed. On the morning of Thursday, the 16th of April, 1355, the old man was led from his apartments, attired in his robes of state, to the great council chamber, where he was confronted with his accusers and his judges. The bench was composed of the six privy councillors, nine of the decemvirs, and a _giunta_ of twenty sages, which had been specially convoked to meet the extreme gravity of the occasion. The latter had a deliberative voice merely, and no vote.

The articles of arraignment were no sooner read than Falieri made a candid and unreserved confession. He avowed all. He stigmatised himself as the worst of criminals, and as one deserving of the highest penalty which it was in the power of the laws to inflict. Without further preamble it was then put to the vote, whether the accused should suffer death. Five of the privy council and the nine decemvirs recorded their suffrages in the affirmative. It was a majority of fourteen to one. One voice alone, it seemed, asked mercy for him who had in the eyes of the aristocracy aggravated the crime of treason by fraternising with tradesmen and plebeians. After the delivery of the verdict the condemned was led back to the palace. It had been ordered that “Marino Falieri, being convicted of conspiring against the constitution, should be taken to the head of the grand staircase of St. Mark’s, and there, being stripped of the ducal bonnet and the other emblems of his dignity, should be decapitated.” The sentence was one which could not fail to strike an icy chill into every heart. But it was received by the doge with a placid equanimity worthy of the hero of Lucca.

The execution took place on the following morning at the hour of tierce. Giovanni Mocenigo, the senior privy councillor, followed by his five colleagues, the decemvirs, the advocates of the commune, and the other great officers of state, advanced to meet his serenity, who had been conducted under guard from his own apartments to the great council saloon. Forming a circle round him, they escorted him to the fatal spot which had been selected for the horrid catastrophe. A stupendous concourse of persons of all conditions had congregated to witness the spectacle. A gloomy and awful stillness reigned throughout the Piazza. The doge, amid a silence in which a whisper or a sigh would have been audible, implored the forgiveness of his countrymen, and extolled the equity of the doom which he was about to undergo. He was then uncrowned and disrobed. A black cap was substituted for the biretta, and a cloak of the same colour was cast across his shoulders. At an appointed signal he laid his head on the block, and at a single stroke the executioner severed it from his body. Immediately after the removal of the latter, the doors of St. Mark’s were thrown open, and the crowd entered in wild disorder, eager to catch a glimpse of the mutilated corpse, which was there exposed to view preparatory to burial (Friday, April 17th, 1355).

[Sidenote: [1355-1405 A.D.]]

Thus miserably perished, at the ripe age of seventy-seven, one of the greatest soldiers and statesmen whom Venice could boast; that same Falieri who during two and forty years of public services had earned as count of Valdemarino a splendid and enviable reputation. Such was the ignominious fall of a man whose versatile talents had enabled him to shine in every branch of official life, and whose uncontrollable passions brought his white hairs before the close of seven months from a throne to a scaffold. Falieri had survived most of his early friends, if not his domestic happiness; it was ruled that he should survive his honour also.

The ducal remains were interred without any mark of pomp at San Giovanni e Paolo, behind the monastery, and in the direction of the chapel of Santa Maria della Pace; and from a mixed motive of delicacy and pride the Ten directed their secretary to omit all direct allusions in the books of their transactions to his sentence and execution. The words, “Let it not be written” formed the sole clew afforded by the _Misti_ to a great crime and a great tragedy. The effigy of Falieri found its place after the sepulture in the hall, where the portraits of all his predecessors were hung. It was not till twelve years posterior to the event which has been narrated that the Ten, by a decree dated the 16th of March, 1367, caused it to be cancelled, and a black crape arras to be substituted, surmounted by the words, “_Hic est locus Marini Faletri decapitati pro criminibus_.”

Three centuries had passed away, when some labourers digging near the spot accidentally exhumed a sarcophagus. The discovery did not at the moment attract much curiosity, but the sarcophagus was eventually opened, and it was then found to contain a skeleton with the skull placed between the knees. This peculiarity was designated to indicate that the person, whose spirit was once dwelling in the now uniformed clay, had died by the hand of the executioner; and if any doubt still remained, the half-defaced inscription on the urn served to show that the bones of the unhappy Falieri were there.[k]

_Venetian Wars and Conquests_

[Sidenote: [1405-1450 A.D.]]

We have already earlier in this chapter told of the wars between Genoa and Venice, culminating in the humiliation of the former at Chioggia. The first success of Venice whetted the appetite of her people for further conquests. And the queen of maritime cities did not confine her aspirations to the scenes of her former victories.[a]

Her anxiety once more to display her banners upon _terra firma_ induced Venice to lend her aid to Gian Galeazzo Visconti against the Carraras, under the promise of the restitution of Treviso, which she had lost during the war of the Chioggia. The bad faith of the lord of Milan would fain have defrauded the Venetians of their share of the spoil, had not dread of their power compelled their ally to be reluctantly honest in his spoliation. By their friendly demonstrations towards Caterina, the widowed duchess of Milan, the Venetians next obtained the cession of Vicenza, Feltre, and Belluno; and Francesco Novello da Carrara, who already counted Vicenza as his prey, was ever baffled in his hopes. His son-in-law, the marquis of Ferrara, was compelled to declare against him; and the citizens of Verona, worn out by siege and famine, opened their gates to the troops of Venice. This important acquisition was followed up by a succession of easy victories; the greatest part of the Paduan territory submitted without a struggle; and the capital itself, wasted by hunger and the plague, promised a speedy surrender. A last desperate sortie was repulsed with terrible slaughter; and treachery opened the gates and admitted the forces of Venice. Carrara and his son Francesco Terzo had now no hope save in the clemency of the conquerors. They proceeded to Venice, were received with apparent cordiality, and immured in a dungeon. In this horrible vault they had the miserable satisfaction of embracing a son and brother, Jacopo da Carrara. After lingering nearly two months in this region of despair, the father was privately strangled in prison; and on the following day his two sons perished in a similar manner. Two brothers of this illustrious family still survived; of these, Ubertino terminated his life by sickness soon after the ruin of his house; and Marsilio expiated a rash attempt to regain Padua by a public execution in 1435. Thus by the destruction of the once potent families of Scala and Carrara, the tyrant of the Adriatic was predominant in Lombardy, and invested with a splendid territory, including Padua, Verona, and Vicenza. Fifteen years afterwards Friuli was wrested from the patriarch of Aquileia.[g]

An illustrious fugitive, Francesco Carmagnola, who arrived about this time at Venice, accomplished what Florence had nearly failed in, by discovering to the Venetians the project of the duke of Milan to subjugate them. Francesco Carmagnola had, by the victories he had gained, the glory he had acquired, and the influence he obtained over the soldiers, excited the jealousy, instead of the gratitude, of Filippo Maria, who disgraced him, and deprived him of his employment, without assigning any reason. Carmagnola returned to court, but could not even obtain an interview with his master. He retired to his native country, Piedmont; his wife and children were arrested, and his goods confiscated. He arrived at last, by Germany, at Venice; soon afterwards some emissaries of the duke of Milan were arrested for an attempt to poison him. The doge, Francesco Foscari, wishing to give lustre to his reign by conquest, persuaded the senate of Venice to oppose the increasing ambition of the duke of Milan.[l]

Francesco Carmagnola was amongst the first soldiers, if not the first captain of Italy, and well acquainted with all the troops, plans, secrets, and resources of Visconti, for his talents had recovered the duchy and he had long been that prince’s chief favourite and counsellor. Seeing Guido Torelli and others preferred before him, his enemies more heeded, and himself deprived of the Genoese government, he retired from court, but having secret notice, whether true or false, that Filippo intended to poison him, now fled to Venice and proved his sincerity, of which that government doubted, by this explanation. He also discovered many of Visconti’s secrets and his designs against Venice after the fall of Florence, most of which seem to have been corroborated by confidential letters of Visconti unfairly made use of by the Florentine government and sent to Ridolfi for that purpose.

A gentleman named Perino Turlo, who enjoyed the favour and confidence of Philip, was taken in an attack on Faenza, and being carried prisoner to Florence, there received his liberty accompanied by great attentions and flattery, and was finally dismissed (after declaring his belief that Philip wished the friendship of Florence) with an earnest entreaty to make peace between them. This was a scheme to ascertain Visconti’s real designs on Venice, in order to facilitate the pending negotiations with that state; but Perino soon returned with various propositions of peace which Philip, he said, most earnestly desired, and as a proof of his sincerity produced a _carte-blanche_ besides several letters which the seigniory instantly despatched to Venice because they contained matter of infinite danger to that republic. Lorenzo Ridolfi lost no time in showing them, and the Venetians, seeing the liberal offers therein made to Florence, the bold confidence of the Florentine ambassador in urging the league, the important communications and promises of Carmagnola, and the temptation of conquering Brescia which that captain had promised, determined to accept the alliance, and a treaty was completed early in 1426.

[Sidenote: [1426-1427 A.D.]]

This league with Florence was to endure for ten years with conditions extremely favourable to Venice whose real sources of strength still lay in commerce, and whose geographical position gave her considerable advantages in treating with Florence, to whom her co-operation both in force and situation was of the last importance in a Lombard war. The Venetian territory in that province from its recent acquisition had not yet become an integral portion of her national strength; it was but a lucky addition to an already consolidated power--a power still rising, absorptive, and hitherto unweakened by expansion, which therefore might be again lost without much dismay, because no national interests had as yet taken root or identified themselves in any way with those provinces. But for Florence war with Milan was ever a matter of vitality, and especially after so many disasters; wherefore she eagerly consented to any conditions, and peace, truce, and war were now equally submitted to the fiat of that cunning and unbending aristocracy. Venice also made some jealous terms about the Alexandrian trade, was moreover to have every conquest that might be achieved in Lombardy, and Florence all those in Romagna and Tuscany not already belonging to the church. Sixteen thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry were to constitute the minimum of the combined force, and strong armaments of galleys on the Main and flotillas on the Po were to act vigorously against Genoa and every other tangible point of Visconti’s territory. Pope Martin refused to join, but Siena followed Florence. Niccolo, marquis of Ferrara, accepted the command of the Florentines, and united with the league for the promised acquisition of Lugo and Parma if conquered. Amadeus, duke of Savoy, for his own especial objects, the lord of Mantua, and other Lombard seigniors all signed it, and Francesco, Count Carmagnola, was appointed generalissimo.