Chapter XIII: Letter V: Roxbury, Dec. 20, 1776 (1)

The American army having providentially escaped from Long-Island, gen. Sullivan was immediately sent upon parole, with a verbal message from lord Howe to the congress; importing, that though he could not at present treat with them in that character, yet he was very desirous of having a conference with some of the members, whom he would consider as private gentlemen. He informed them that he, with the general, had full powers to compromise the dispute between Great-Britain and America, upon terms advantageous to both—that he wished a compact might be settled at a time, when no decisive blow was struck, and neither party could say that it was compelled to enter into such agreement—that, were they disposed to treat, many things which they had not yet asked, might and ought to be granted—and that, if upon the conference, they found any probable ground of an accommodation, the authority of congress would be afterward acknowledged to render the treaty complete. The general arrived at congress with this message on the 2d of September; and was desired to reduce it to writing. They received a letter at the same time from gen. Washington, acquainting them with the removal of the army from Long-Island. On the 5th, gen. Sullivan was requested to inform lord Howe, “that congress being the representatives of the free and independent states of America, they cannot with propriety send any of their members to confer with his lordship in their private characters, but that ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee of their body to know whether he has any authority to treat with persons authorised by congress for that purpose in behalf of America, and what that authority is, and to hear such propositions as he shall think fit to make respecting the same. The next day they elected by ballot, for their committee, Messrs. Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge. Eight days after, the committee met lord Howe, upon Staten-Island, opposite to Amboy, where his lordship received and entertained them with the utmost politeness; the committee in their report, summed up the account of the conference, by mentioning that it did not appear to them, that his lordship’s commission contained any other authority of importance than was contained in the act of parliament; for that as to the power of enquiring into the state of America, which his lordship mentioned to them, and of conferring and consulting with any persons the commissioners might think proper, and representing the result to the ministry, they apprehended any expectation from the effect of such power would have been too precarious for America to have relied upon, had she still continued in her state of dependence. Thus the hopes of negociation by the commissioners ended. The friends to independency rejoiced that it was brought to so happy a conclusion. They almost trembled lest it should prove insnaring and something should take place under it, which, in the present distressed circumstance of their military affairs, might demolish the fabric they were erecting. It served to gain time for recovering from the shock occasioned by the losses sustained on Long-Island. If it delayed the operations of gen. Howe, it answered another valuable purpose; and it is hard otherwise to account for his delay. The committee managed with great dexterity; and maintained the dignity of congress. Their sentiments and language became their character. His lordship was explicitly and authoritively assured, that neither the committee, nor the congress which sent them, had authority to treat in any other capacity than as _independent states_. His lordship had “no instructions on that subject.” The Americans must therefore fight it out, and trust in God for success.

General Washington’s situation, after evacuating Long-Island, was truly distressing. The check which the detachment had sustained, dispirited too great a proportion of the troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and dispair. The militia were dismayed, intractable and impatient to return. Great numbers went off, by companies at a time, by half regiments, and in some instances, almost by whole ones. The flying camp was too literally such. Whole battalions of them ran off from Powle’s (the mode of spelling Pauls two hundred years back[19]) Hook and the height of Bergen, upon the firing of a broadside from a man of war, when no one was hurt by it. An entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-being of an army, made his condition still more alarming; and occasioned a want of confidence in the generality of the troops. The number of men fit for duty, taken in the main body and all the out posts, was for some days under 20,000; but the militia, too contemptible to merit the name of soldiers, with the new levies, alike despicable, composed more than a third of the army. The militia did inexpressible damage, by telling the other troops—“all is gone—the regulars must overcome.” By such language the men became more and more disheartened. What is said of the militia is not peculiar to those from any one state: as to their intractableness, and disregard of order and subordination, it is common to all militia, and must be generally expected; for men who have been free, and never subject to restraint or any kind of controul, cannot, in a day, be taught the necessity, or be taught to see the expediency of strict discipline. Within nine days after the evacuation, the number of the sick, by the returns, formed one quarter of the whole army.

Such were circumstances, that they demanded the greatest harmony possible among the troops; whereas no small animosity prevaled between those of the nothern and southern states, occasioned by general and illiberal reflections freely dealt out at head quarters. It was not countenanced by the commander in chief; but the adjudant general assiduously endevoured to make and promote it; so that his excellency, in order to remedy it in some measure, appointed David Henley, esq. deputy adjutant general. The day this appointment was announced to the army in general orders, the 6th of September, a letter was written to a member of congress, which says, “The infamous desertions, the shameless ravages, seditious speeches and mutinous behaviour which prevail in your army, call in the loudest language for a reform. The militia here are only an armed rabble, and all the troops are without discipline. If the congress does not raise an army for three years or during the contest, all the best officers will quit it. Had we been wise to engage the men, at first, during the war, we should now have had an army to have met British troops on an equal footing. As to having recourse to a militia, it is a most wretched subterfuge, experience has demonstrated they will not stand fire. They will not fight from home. Men must learn to fight as they learn any thing else. We have an exceeding good commander in chief, who is not wanting in intrepidity, nor the truest patriotism. I wish him more able counsellors and spirited assistants. Be assured, Sir, that our men have in a great measure, lost that virtue which first engaged them to fight, and are sinking into an army of mercenaries.”

One lieutenant colonel Zeidwitz was tried for writing a letter to the late governor Tryon, wherein he declared his attachment to the royal cause, and promised his service upon certain conditions: he was sentenced to be cashiered, and rendered incapable of any future military command. This strange sentence was owing to a militia brigadier general, and others of a similar judgment who being members of the court, said “it was only an attempt to correspond;” and so the fellow escaped.

General _Washington_ divided has army, leaving 4500 in the city of _New-York_, and posting 6,500 at _Hearlem_, and 12,000 at _Kingsbridge_.[20] On the hills at, or in the neighborhood of these places forts had been erected, which the troops garrisoned.—The strongest was _Fort Washington_, nigh Hearlem, of difficult access, and overlooking the North-River, the passage of which it was meant to secure by the aid of Fort Lee, opposite to it on the Jersey side. When it became clear to the general, that the enemy meant to throw their whole army between part of his in New-York and its environs, and the remainder about Kingsbridge, he removed his quarters to col. Roger Morris’s, ten miles from New-York, and not very distant from Fort Washington. The day before the committee of congress met lord Howe, five ships of war were sent up the East River; on which it was thought necessary to evacuate the city as fast as possible, and to remove the sick, the ordnance, stores and provisions. Colonel Glover was employed in this service; he began upon it about nine at night. By sun rise the next morning, his brigade had got safe over the Jerseys, the sick in and about the city amounting to 500. On the Saturday, he was ordered to have the tents struck, and the heavy baggage carried down the North-River to be transported up in boats, while the tents and light baggage were carried up in waggons. This was completed about nine at night, when an alarm took place; and he was ordered to march his brigade to Haerlem to join gen. M’Dougall, leaving the whole baggage of two regiments behind, which afterward fell into the enemy’s hands. The next morning they marched to Kingsbridge. The poor lads had just unslung their packs, when up drives an express with an account that the enemy were landing: on which they marched back without any kind of refreshment, joined five other brigades, about 7000, and formed on Haerlem plains.

General Howe, having fully prepared for a descent on New-York Island, embarked a strong division of the army under the command of gen. Clinton and others, in boats at the head of Newtown inlet and at another place higher up, where they could not be observed by the Americans, who expected that the attack would be made on the side next to the East-River, and had therefore thrown up works and lines to defend themselves. [Sept. 15.] About eleven o’clock, gen. _Howe’s_ troops landed, under cover of the five ships of war, in two divisions, between Kep’s-bay and Turtle-bay, the Hessians in one place and the British in another. As soon as gen. _Washington_ heard the firing of the men of war, he rode with all dispatch toward the lines; but to his great mortification, found the troops posted in them retreating with the utmost precipitation; and those ordered to support them, Parsons and Fellow’s brigades, flying in every direction, and in the greatest confusion. His attempts to stop them were fruitless though he drew his sword and threatened to run them through, cocked and snapped his pistols. On the appearance of a small part of the enemy, not more than sixty or seventy, their disorder was increased, and they ran off without firing a single shot, and left the general in a hazardous situation, so that his attendants, to extricate him out of it, caught the bridle of his horse, and gave him a different direction. Three large ships were stationed in the North-River, opposite to those in the East-River; both of them kept up a constant cannonading with grape shot and langrage quite arcoss the island. The Hessians upon their landing, seized and secured in a neighbouring building as enemies, some persons, who had been placed there to serve as guides, which for a while subjected them to difficulty.—When the British were completely landed, they marched on toward the Kingsbridge road. The American brigades, that had fled upon the enemy’s approaching the lines, stopped not till met by col. Glover’s and the five other bridges, who were hastening down to them. Upon the junction, the whole marched forward and took post on some heights, when all at once, about 8000 of he enemy as was thought, hove in sight on the next height and halted. Gen. Washington at first consented to his troops marching forward to give them battle; but on a second consideration, counter-ordered as he could not have any dependence on the militia and the flying camp, which composed half the number then present. When the Americans were withdrawn and no prospect of action remained, the British generals repaired to the house of Mr. Robert Murray, a gentleman of the quaker persuasion. The lady of the house being at home, entertained them most civilly, with what served for, or was _cakes_ and _wine_. They were well pleased with the entertainment and tarried there near two hours or more; gov. Tryon seasoning the repast, at times, by joking Mrs. Murray about her American friends, for, she was known to be a steady advocate for the liberties of the country. Meanwhile, the Hessians and the British, except a strong corps which marched down the road to take possessions of the city, remained upon their arms inactive; which gave gen. _Putnam_ the opportunity of escaping with about 3500 men, including the guards, who had been left to shift for themselves, when colonel Glover had been ordered away from New-York. The general in order to escape any troops that might be advancing upon the direct road to the city, betook himself to that which lies along side the North-River, and marched to the end, where it turns off short to the right, and leads on to another and norrower, that goes to Blooming-dale. By this last road, he avoided every dangerous approach to the enemy, and retreated with safety. But nothing could have been easier than to have prevented his getting into it. A good body of troops with two field pieces, in about 20 minutes or less, could have taken such a position as would have necessarily cut off Putnam’s retreat. Col. Grayson has repeatedly said speaking humorously, “Mrs. Murray saved the American army.” On the day that gen. Howe’s forces landed and the following one they made prisoners 354 privates and 17 officers.[21] Many think the general was greatly mistaken in landing on the island instead of throwing his army around it above Kingsbridge, and thereby hemming in the whole body of the Americans at once. Such a manœuvre they view as having been within the compass of easy practice, considering what a naval and military apparatus he had at his service.

[Sept. 16.] On the Monday there was a tolerable skirmish between two battalions of light infantry and highlanders, and three companies of Hessian riflemen commanded by brigadier Leslie, and detachments from the American army under the command of lieut. col. Knolton, of Connecticut, and major Leich of Virginia. The col. received a mortal wound, and the major three balls through his body, but is likely to do well. Their parties behaved with great bravery, and being supplied with fresh troops, beat the enemy fairly from the field. The lost of the Americans except in col. Knolton, a most valuable and gallant officer was inconsiderable; that of the enemy between 80 and 100 wounded, and 15 or 20 killed. This little advantage inspired the Americans prodigiously. They found it required only resolution and good officers to make an enemy, they stood too much in dread of, give way.[22] The men will fight if led on by good officers, and as certainly run away if commanded by scoundrels. Sunday was an instance of the last, and the next day a confirmation of the first assertion. On Sunday, the officers, instead of heading and leading the men on to attack the enemy when landing, were the first to scamper off.

[Sept. 21.] A few day after the British had possessed themselves of New-York, a most terrible fire happened. A thousand houses, near one fourth of the city, were laid in ashes. Trinity church, the public charity school, the rector’s house, and a Lutheran chapel were among the buildings which were consumed. The loss sustained in houses, &c. by the corporation of Trinity church, is thought, upon a moderate computation, to be more than £.15,600 sterling. The fire broke out at a dram-shop, close in with the water side, on Whitehall-slip, about one o’clock in the morning. The reports spread of its breaking out in several places at the same time, were erroneous. Every thing was very dry, and a brisk southerly wind blew. The flames soon caught the neighboring houses, spread, raged with inconceivable violence, and made all the subsequent havock. There were few citizens in town; and the fire engines and pumps were out of order. Two regiments went immediately to the place, and many boats full of men were sent from the fleet; to these, under Providence, it was owing that the whole city was not reduced to ashes. A gentleman[23] who was at Bergen (opposite the spot where the fire first broke out) saw it soon after it began, observed its progress, and is persuaded that it was not purposely kindled, but was merely accidental,[24] and the probable consequence of the sailors having been suffered to go on shore the day before to regale and frolic. The dryness of the materials, the brisk southerly wind, and the covering of the houses (shingles instead of slate or tiles) easily account for its spreading, without calling in the aid of incendiaries.

A brigadier writes concerning the animosity in the American army above noticed—“It has already risen to such a height, that the Pennsylvania and New-England troops would as soon fight each other as the enemy. Officers of all ranks are indiscriminately treated in a most contemptible manner, and whole colonies traduced and vilified as cheats, knaves, cowards, paltroons, hypocrites, and every term of reproach, for no other reason but because they are situated east of New-York. Every honor is paid to the merit of good men from the south; the merit, if such be possible, from the north, is not acknowledged; but if too apparent to be blasted with falshood, is carefully buried in oblivion. The cowardice or misbehavior of the south, is carefully covered over, the least misconduct in the gentlemen of the north, is published with large comments and aggravations.”

Congress have at length adopted a new code for the government of the army. It was become absolutely necessary. “No laws can be too severe for the government of men who live by the sword, and who have this only reply for their ravages—_quis negat arma tenenti_?” This was the language of a gentleman whose concern in the army gave him the best opportunity of procuring certain information; and who said further to a member of congress—“Absolute tyranny is essential to the government of an army, and every man who carries arms, from the general officer to the private sentinel, must be content to be a temporary slave, if he would serve his country as a soldier. Almost every villanny and rascality that can disgrace the man, the soldier or the citizen, is daily practised without meeting the punishment they merit. So many of our officers want honor, and so many of our soldiers want virtue, civil, social, and military, that nothing but the severest punishments will keep both from practices which must ruin us. The infamous and cruel ravages, which have been made on the wretched distressed inhabitants of this unfortunate island (New-York) by many of our soldiers, must disgrace and expose our army to detestation. I have heard some tales of woe, occasioned by the robberies of our army, which would extort sighs from the hearts of tygers. Our men are at present only robbers; that they will soon be murderers unless some are hanged, I have little doubt.” The difficulty which the army has been under, from the want of almost every necessary, tents, campkettles, blankets and clothes of every kind, may have contributed toward the cause of these complaints. Unless the men can get supplied in a regular way, they will be inclined, notwithstanding the most positive general orders to the contrary, to help themselves, however irregularly; and when once they begin to trespass from necessity, they are tempted to proceed for convenience or pleasure.

[Sept. 24.] Nearly at the same time, an officer high in rank and much esteemed, communicated his thoughts in these words:—“We are now upon the eye of another dissolution of the army. Unless some speedy and effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be lost. The few who act upon principles of disinterestedness are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the ocean. As the war must be carried on systematically, you must establish your army upon a permanent footing, and give your officers good pay, that they may be, and support the character of gentlemen, and not be driven, by a scanty allowance, to the low and dirty arts, which many of them practise, to filch the public of more than the difference of pay would amount to. The men must be engaged by a good bounty for the continuance of the war. To depend upon militia is assuredly resting on a broken staff. They cannot brook subordination. It would be cheaper to keep fifty or hundred thousand in constant pay, than depend upon half the number, and supply the other half occasionally by militia. If I was to declare upon oath, whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter. No man who regards order, regularity and economy, or who has any regard for his own honor, character or peace of mind, will risk them upon militia.”—While the American cause is thus exposed, some gentlemen observe with pleasure of the enemy [Sept. 25.] that—“Though they are brave, and furnished with all matters, yet from some causes, they discover very little of the great or vast in their designs and executions.”

It is not strange that there is a number of bad officers in the continental service, when you consider that many were chosen by their own men, who elected them, not from a regard to merit or any love of discipline, but from the knowledge they had of their being ready to associate with them on the foot of equality. It was the case in divers instances, that when a company was forming, the men would choose those for officers who consented to throw their pay into a joint stock with the privates, from which captains, lieutenants ensigns, sergeants, corporals, with drummers and privates, drew equal shares. Can it then be wondered at, however mortifying it may prove, that a captain should be tried and broken for stealing his soldiers blankets, or that another officer should be found shaving his men in the face of distinguished characters! Time must and will clear the army or these despicable commission-bearers.

Too many of the regimental surgeons have made a practice of selling recommendations to furloughs and discharges at a less sum than a shilling a man. Only one of the number supposed to merit the same distinction, was drummed out of the army for such a scandalous conduct. Had all who deserved it, met the like reward, a good reform would have been made: that one is too pitiful a subject to have his name recorded. He charged each man six-pence sterling, and any one was welcome to a certificate for that sum. Several of the regimental surgeons had no professional abilities, had never seen an operation of surgery; were unlettered and ignorant to a degree scarcely to be imagined. Others were amazingly deficient in the article of professional apparatus. From one general return of fifteen regiments, it appeared that for fifteen surgeons and as many mates, all the instruments (which were reported to be private property) amounted only to six sets of amputating—two of trepanning—fifteen cases of pocket instruments—seventy-five crooked and six straight needles—four incision knives for dilating wounds or other purposes—and three pair of forceps for extracting bullets.

Since the evacuation of New-York, the sick have suffered very much for want of necessaries, and have been in a miserable situation; but it appears to have been owing greatly to untoward circumstances, hurry, confusion, and actual want of the requisites for affording relief. The sick have amounted to many thousands, including what have been at different places; and many hundreds, if not some thousands, have been swept off by various diseases. Much censure has been cast upon Dr. Morgan, director-general of the hospital, for the sufferings which the sick have endured, more than is due, as apprehended. The army ought to have been early provided with medicines, instrumets and bandages, by a continental druggist or chosen committee, before the campaign began, instead of having them to procure afterward; and the militia which came late to the field, should have been provided by the different states, before they joined the army.

An unsuccessful attempt was made on the British out-post on Montresor-Island. A large party of Americans, in five flat-bottomed boats, under the command of colonel Jackson, went down Haerlem river to attack it, a little after four in the morning. They had two pieces of cannon with them; the post was guarded by about eighty men. The Brune frigate being at anchor near the island, fired at the boats in the dark, and sunk one of them. The colonel landed, and a skirmish ensued; but several of the officers and men behaved most scandalously; instead of supporting him they pushed off, so that he was obliged to retreat. He was himself wounded, and left two and twenty wounded behind. Major Thomas Henly, brother to the deputy adjutant-general, an intrepid officer, was killed.

General _Howe_ had at length ripened his plan for cutting off gen. _Washington_’s communication with the eastern states, and enclosing him on all sides in his fastnesses on the north end of New-York island; which ought to have been executed a month back, by a bold and unexpected removal of the troops from Long-Island in the first instance, to Rochelle or the neighborhood.

The greater part of the army, being embarked in flat boats and other small craft, passed through Hell-gate, a passage terrible in name, but no way dangerous at the proper time of tide; entered the Sound [Oct 12.] and landed early in the morning, on _Frog_’s-_Neck_, in Westchester county, belonging to New-York, upon the side of Connecticut. Gen. Washington’s army, fit for duty, present and on command at different posts, militia included, was about 19,000. Officers and men were in expectation of active service. The former were out frequently in reconnoitering parties; the latter were looking out for the arrival of gen. Lee, on his way to the camp. The Americans had no intention of quitting their ground upon the island and the neighborhood of Kingsbridge; but a number of regiments were sent forward to counteract the operations of the enemy. When the royal army was landed, the general’s found they could not get upon the continent, by reason of the causeway’s being broken down, and of works being erected to oppose them. Six days were spent here to little purpose, while a dozen other places were open, where the troops might have landed with scarce any or no opposition or difficulty attending them. On the last of these days the second division of foreign mercenaries arrived at New-York. The fleet consisted of seventy-two sail, having on board 4000 Hessians, 1000 Waldeckers, two companies of chasseurs or riflemen, 200 English recruits, and 2000 baggage horses. The horse transports were heavy sailing Dutchmen. They left St. Helen’s the 28th of June, were obliged to put into Plymouth the 7th of July, and sailed from thence the 19th.

[Oct. 14.] General Lee arrived in the American camp two days after gen. Howe’s landing. The troops were mightily elated with his presence, and felt themselves stronger by 1000 men upon the occasion; for they had great confidence in his abilities, and expected much from him, because of the success which had attended him at Charleston. The general found that there was a prevailing inclination among the chief officers for remaining on the island. He strongly urged the absolute necessity of removing toward East and Westchester. Gen. Washington called a council of war. [Oct. 16.] Lee asked what they meant by entertaining a thought of holding their position, while the enemy had the command of the water on each side of them, and were so strong both in their front and rear; and when there was a bridge before them, over which they must pass to escape being wholly enclosed. He soon convinced them how much they had been mistaken. All agreed that the bulk of the army should quit the island. He was also for withdrawing the garrison from Fort Washington. Gen. Greene was otherwise minded, and argued, that the possessing of that post would divert a large body of the enemy, and keep them from joining the troops under general Howe. The latter had left earl Percy, with two brigades of British troops and one of Hessians, about 5000 men, in lines near Haerlem, to cover New-York from the insults of the garrison. Greene further urged the advantage it would be of in covering, with Fort Lee, the transportation of provision and other articles up the North-River, for the service of the American troops. He stated also, that the garrison could be brought off at any time by boats from the Jersey side of the river. It was concluded that the possession of Fort Washington and the lines annexed to it, should be continued; and more than 2000 men were assigned to this service.

General Howe, on the other hand, while at Frog’s-Neck, received provisions, stores and a reinforcement [Oct. 18.] then re-embarked several corps, passed round Frog’s-Neck, landed at the mouth of Hutchinson’s river, and secured a passage for the main body, which crossed at the same place, advanced immediately, and lay that night upon their arms, with their right near Rochelle. On their march to this ground they were annoyed by a regiment or two of Americans and one of the rifle battalions, whom gen. Lee posted behind a wall, and secreted for that purpose. Their advanced party was repulsed twice; and the Americans did not leave the wall till the enemy advanced a third time, in solid columns, when they gave them several fires, and then retreated by gen. Lee’s order. The British are thought to have lost a considerable number. The Americans had a few killed, and about sixty wounded. On the 21st the right and centre of the army moved two miles to the northward of Rochelle, on the road to the White Plains. Lieut. col. Rogers, with his corps of Rangers, was detached to possess Marrineck, where the carelessness of his sentries exposed him to surprise, by which he suffered. [Oct. 22.] Gen. Howe was joined by gen. Knyphausen, with the second division of Hessians and the regiment of Waldeckers.

General Washington, while moving the army from York island into the country, was careful to march and form the troops so as to make a front toward the enemy, from Eastchester almost to White Plains, on the east side of the highway, thereby to secure the march of those who were behind on their right, and to defend the removal of the sick, the cannon, stores, &c. Thus they made a line of small, detached and entrenched camps, occupying every height and strong ground, from Valentine’s Hill, about a mile from Kingsbridge on the right, to near the White Plains on the left. But the movement was attended with much difficulty, for want of waggons and artillery horses. The baggage and artillery were carried or drawn off by hand. When a part was forwarded, the other was fetched on. This was the general way of removing the camp equipage and other appendages of the army. The few teams which were at hand, were no ways equal to the service; and their deficiency could be made up only by the bodily labor of the men.

[Oct. 25.] The royal army moves in two columns, and takes a position with the _Brunx_ in front; upon which the Americans quit their detached camps, and leaving a corps near Kingsbridge, assemble their main force at White Plains, behind enintrenchments thrown up by the advanced corps. Every thing being prepared for bringing on an action, gen. Howe marches the troops early in the morning [Oct. 28.] in two columns toward the White Plains, the left being commanded by gen. Heister. All gen. Washington’s advanced parties being drove back to their works before noon, the army forms with the right upon the road to Marrineck, about a mile distant from the American centre, and the left at the Brunx, about the same distance from the right flank of their intrenchments. Gen. M’Dougall, with about 1600 men possesses an advantageous hill separated from the right flank of the interenchments by the Brunx, which by its windings covers the general’s troops from the left of the royal forces. Gen. Leslie, with the second brigade of British troops the Hessian grenadiers under col. Donop, and a battalion of the Hessian corps, are ordered to dislodge him. Previous to their attack col. Rall, commanding a brigade of the Hessians, on the left, passes the Brunx, and gains a post which enables him to annoy the flank of M’Dougall’s corps, while engaged with the other forces in front. Four regiments of militia, upon the approach of about 250 light horse, run away and leave the general with 600 men; who defend the hill for about an hour, against the whole fire of twelve pieces artillery, and of the musketry and cavalry, with the loss of forty-seven men killed and seventy wounded.[25] The gaining of this post take up some considerable time, which is prolonged by the Americans supporting a broken and scattered engagement in defence of the adjoining walls and enclosure. In the evening, the Hessian grenadiers are ordered forward within cannon shot of the intrenchments, the second brigade of the British forms in the rear, and the two Hessian brigades in the left of the second. The right and centre do not quit the ground on which they have formed. In this position the whole royal army lie upon their arms during the night, expecting to attack the enemy’s camp the next day. The next day [Oct. 19.] they advance to a hill, on which col. Glover commands, and where he has one brass twenty-four, a six, and a three pounder, and three iron twelve pounders. They form a line as far as he can see from right to left, and appear to be about 12,000. They approach in four columns, the cavalry and artillery in front, and continue doing it till within about three quarters of a mile of the hill, then file off to the left to take post on a hill to the colonel’s right, which overlooks that he is posted on. They have to pass a valley. He reserves his fire till they get into it, in order to ascend the hill; he begins with the three pounder, next the six, reserving the brass twenty-four till the last. They are put into great confusion; however they ascend the hill with the light horse, and one piece of artillery, a three pounder, fire it four times and retreat.

Gen. Howe, observing that gen. Washington’s lines were much strengthened by additional works, deferred all further attack till the arrival of more troops from those which had been left with lord Percy, to watch the garrison of Fort Washington. He had declined bringing on a general action, the preceding day, upon observing that gen. Washington had formed a second line;[26] but the American discipline was so defective, that had the former attacked, the superior discipline of his troops would probably have obliged the first line to have given way, which by falling back upon the second, might have occasioned a total defeat. A general engagement was expected by the Americans; and the soldiers were very desirous of coming to blows with the enemy, and wished much to engage. During the engagement with gen. Leslie’s corps, the American baggage was moving off in full sight of the enemy. The then position of the continental army, general Lee condemned as the most execrable. He was of opinion, that had the enemy attacked the centre, and brought on a general engagement, the Americans must have met with a total defeat, or have lost all there baggage, though they had now organized themselves, and had procured ox-teams and further conveniencies. On the other hand gen. Washington did not reinforce and support the right wing, for he meant that the enemy should attack the centre. The corps under general Leslie must have suffered very considerably, for from an authentic return of his own brigade, since found on the ground, it appears that the killed of it were a lieutenant colonel, 2 captains, a lieutenant, an ensign, a sergeant, and 22 privates; and that the wounded were 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 12 sergeants, and 109 privates.[27] The British made only 30 privates, and 4 officers and staff, prisoners at White Plains.[28] But the Americans conjectured at first that they had suffered a much greater loss, not less than 400 in killed, wounded and missing. They were soon convinced of there mistake. A number of the militia who ran off at the sight of the light horse in the beginning and were missing for a while, were found afterward. The killed and wounded however, were probably more than given above, owing to the scattered engagements, distinct from that upon the hill. In the several skirmishes which have happened since the junction of Knyphausen, the Americans have taken a number of prisoners, Hessians, Waldeckers and a few British. The Germans were much afraid of being murdered as soon as they were caught, and were very agreeably disappointed on meeting with civility and kindness.

Gen. Howe, having been joined by the troops from lord Percy, made dispositions for attacking the American lines early on the last of October; but an extreme wet night and morning prevented the execution at the time appointed, and it was not attempted afterward, though the day proved fair. Gen. Washington gained intelligence of his danger, by a deserter; drew off most of his troops at night, totally evacuated his camp early in the morning of November the first; and took higher ground toward the North-Castle district, leaving a strong rear guard on the heights and in the woods of White-Plains. An order was given by the British commander to attack this corps; but the execution of it was prevented by a violent rain. Col. Austin of the Massachusetts, who commanded the guards and sentries, being heated with liquor, burnt the town on White-Plains, unnecessarily and without any orders.

The British general, perceiving that Washington meant to avoid an engagement, and that the nature of the country would not admit of his being forced, made a sudden and unexpected removal [Nov. 5.] from the several posts he had taken in the front of the Americans, and advanced toward Kingsbrigde and the North-River. Gen. Knyphausen had been sent off before, and encamped on the 2d near the bridge on New-York Island, the Americans who were in the neighbouring heights having quitted the same, and retired to Fort Washington.

An acceptible break here offers for amusing you with an anecdote or two. Gen. Lee, while at White-Plains, lodged in a small house close in with the road, by which gen. Washington had to pass when out on reconnoitring. Returning with his officers they called in and took a dinner. They were no sooner gone, than Lee told his aids, “You must look me out another place, for I shall have Washington and all his puppies continually calling upon me, and they will eat me up.” The next day Lee seeing Washington out upon the like business, and supposing that he should have another visit, ordered his servant to write with chalk upon the door—No _victuals dressed here to-day_. When the company approached and saw the writing, they pushed off with much good humor for their own table, without resenting the habitual oddity of the man.

It happened, that a garden of a widow woman, which lay between the two camps, was robbed at night. Her son a mere boy, and little of his age, asked leave for finding out and securing the pilferer, in case he should return; which being granted, he concealed himself with a gun among the weeds. A British grenadier, a strapping highlander, came and filled his large bag; when he had it on his shoulder, the boy left his covert, came softly behind him, cocked his gun, and called out to the fellow, “You are my prisoner; if you attempt to throw your bag down I will shoot you dead: go forward in that road.” The boy kept close to him, threatened, and was always prepared to execute his threatening. Thus the boy drove him into the American camp, where he was secured. When the grenadier was at biberty to throw down his bag, and saw who had made him prisoner, he was most horridly mortified, and exclaimed—“A British grenadier made prisoner by such a d——d brat—by such a d——d brat.” The American officers were higly entertained with the adventure, made a collection for the boy, and gave him some pounds. He returned fully satisfied with the losses his mother had sustained. The soldier had side arms, but they were of no use, as he could not get rid of his bag[29].”

[Nov. 8.] Gen. Washington wrote to gen. Greene at Fort Lee, “Sir, the late passage of the three vessels up the North-River, (which we have just received advice of) is so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions we have thrown into it, that I cannot but think it will fully justify a change in the disposition which has been made. If we cannot prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer, to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington, as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to col. Magaw to defend it to the last. The best accounts from the enemy assure us of a considerable movement among their boats the last evening; and so far as can be collected from the various sources of intelligence, they must design a penetration into Jersey, and fall down upon your post. You will therefore immediately have all the stores, &c. removed, (from your post) which you do not deem necessary, for your defence; and as the enemy have drawn great relief, from the forage and provision they have found in the country, and which our tenderness spared, you will do well to prevent their receiving any fresh supplies there, by destroying it, if the inhabitants will not drive off their stock, and remove the hay, grain, &c. in time. Experience has shown that a contrary conduct is not of the least advantage to the poor inhabitants, from whom all their effects of every kind, are taken without distinction, and without the least satisfaction. Troops are filing off from hence as fast as our circumstances and situation will admit, in order to be transported over the river with all expedition.”

The next day general Greene answered—“Sir, upon the whole I cannot help thinking the garrison (at Fort Washington) is of advantage; and I cannot conceive it to be in any great danger; the men can be brought off at any time, but the stores may not be so easily removed; yet I think they can be got off in spite of the enemy, if matters grow desperate. This post is of no importance only in conjunction with Mount Washington. I was ever there the last evening, and the enemy seem to be disposing matters to besiege the place; but colonel Magaw thinks it will take them till December expires before they can carry it. If the enemy do not find it an object of importance, they will not trouble themselves about it; if they do, it is a full proof they feel an injury from our possessing it. Our giving it up will open a free communication with the country, by way of Kingsbridge, that must be a great advantage to them and injury to us.”

[Nov. 12.] Within a few days gen. Washington crossed the North-River with a part of his army, and stationed himself in the neighborhood of Fort Lee. The troops left at Northcastle, under general Lee [Nov. 14.] were 7500 strong, including the 3000 militia of general Lincoln’s division (whose time of service ended on the 17th) and 1700 of general Fellows’s brigade (whose service ended on the 1st of December.) As the dissolution of the army was approaching apace with the end of the year, gen. Washington applied to the Massachusetts for 4000 men, militia. [Nov. 16.] Gen. Lee addressed the old, under Lincoln, and conjured the officers and soldiers, as they regarded the sacred cause in which they were engaged, to continue in their present posts a few days longer, till Thursday at the most, assuring them it was of the last importance. But they were not to be prevailed upon, though their own commander urged a compliance to the utmost of his power. All except general Lincoln and about 150 privates, went off the next day. Mean while the royal army approached Fort Washington, and on the 15th general Howe summoned the commanding officer to surrender, who answered, that he would defend himself to the last extremity. General Washington received an account of the summons at Hackinsack, immediately repaired to Fort Lee, and had partly crossed the North-River, when he met generals Putnam and Greene, who were just returning from thence, and informed him that the troops were in high spirits, and would make a good defence; it being late at night, he returned. Now was the moment for withdrawing the garrison, and one would think, that as the attack was fixed for the next day, gen. Howe designed by the summons, that it should be taken on the approaching night, and wished by that mean to save the men that he would otherwise lose. But defence had been concluded upon.

[Nov. 16.] The royal army therefore make four attacks upon the fort the next morning; while they are advancing, generals Washington, Putnam and Greene, and col. Knox, with their aids, having crossed the river, are making up to it. Some one or other perceiving the danger of their being soon shut in, urges their returning instantly. The commander in chief is hardly persuaded, and complies with reluctance; but the company insist upon it, and prevail. The first attack, on the north side, is conducted by gen. Knyphausen, at the head of two columns of Hessians and Waldeckers. The second, on the east side, is led on by gen. Matthew, at the head of the first and second battalions of light infantry, and two battalions of guards, supported by lord Cornwallis with a body of grenadiers and the thirty-third regiment. These forces advance by the East-River, and land out of flat boats, by Haerlem Creek, upon the enemy’s right. The third attack, intended chiefly as a feint, is conducted by lieut. col. Sterling, with the forty-second regiment. The last attack is made by lord Percy, with the corps he commands on the south of the island. All the attacks are supported with a numerous, powerful and well served artillery.

The Hessians under gen. Knyphausen, have a thick wood to pass, where col. Rawling’s regiment of riflemen are posted; a warm engagement commences, and is continued for a considerable time, in which the former are much exposed, and lose in killed and wounded, near upon 800 men by that single regiment. Mean while the light-infantry land; and are exposed, as before landing, to a very brisk and continual fire from the enemy, who are covered by the rocks and trees among which they are posted. The former, however, extricate themselves by clambering up a very steep and rough mountain, when they soon disperse the enemy, and make way for the landing of the rest of the troops without opposition. Lord Percy having carried an advanced work on his side, col. Sterling is ordered to attempt a landing with the forty-second regiment, upon the left of the enemy’s lines toward New-York; and two battalions of the second brigade are directed to support him. He advances his boats through a heavy fire, and forcing his way up a steep height, gains the summit, and takes 170 prisoners, and then penetrates across the island. The detachment from the flying camp of the Americans, having given way and quitted their station, without making a firm stand, col. Magaw leaves the lines, and throws himself into the fort, lest the royal army should get possession of it before him. Col. Rall, who leads the right column of gen. Knyphausen’s attack, having forced the enemy in the mean time, pushes forward to their advanced works, and lodges his column within a hundred yards of the fort. This done, he summons them to surrender; and upon gen. Knyphausen’s appearing, it is agreed that the troops be considered as prisoners of war, and that the officers should keep their baggage and side arms.

The number of prisoners, including officers, amounted to 2700, beside those taken by the forty-second regiment. Gen. Greene wished to have been entrusted with the defence of the fort on the day of attack, as did some other generals. He blames colonel Magaw for suffering the troops to crowd into the fort, upon their quitting the lines, instead of ordering them to the brow of the hill facing the north, where the Hessians attacked; and is of opinion, that if they had been placed there, the royal army might have keen kept off till night, when the troops might have been removed. But the capital mistake was their not being removed the preceding night.

While the attack was carrying on, a captain Gooch boldly ventured to cross over from Fort Lee, with a letter from general Washington to colonel Magaw, acquainting him, that if he could hold out till night, the garrison should be taken off. He delivered the letter, pushed through the fire of the enemy, preferring that danger to being made a prisoner, and escaped unhurt. General Washington could view several parts of the attack; and when he saw his men bayonetted, and in that way killed, while begging quarter, he cried with the tenderness of a child, and exclaimed at the barbarity that was practised. His heart has not been yet steeled by plunging into acts of cruelty. When general Lee read the letter sent by express, giving an account of Fort Washington’s being taken, resentment and vexation led him, unfeeling as he was in common, to weep plentifully. He wrote on the 19th to the commander in chief, “O! general, why would you be over-persuaded by men or inferior judgment to your own? It was a cursed affair.” He had exclaimed before, upon hearing that the defence of it was to be risked, “Then we are undone.”

From that moment it was apparent, that the British ships could safely pass up and down the North-River, in defiance of all the obstructions thrown in the channel, and of the forts Washington and Lee, the American commander concluded that these were no longer eligible, and that Fort Washington ought to be evacuated while it could be done; which occasioned his letter of the 8th. When he came to Fort Lee, soon after crossing the North-River, he found no measures had been taken toward such evacuation, in consequence of that letter. General Greene, of whose judgment he entertained a good opinion, decidedly opposed it; other opinions coincided with Greene’s; it was thought politic to waste the campaign without coming to a general action on the one hand, and without suffering the enemy to over-run the country on the other; every impediment which stood in their way, was judged a mean to answer these purposes, and when thrown into the scale with those opinions which were opposed to evacuation, caused that warfare in the mind of the commander in chief, and that hesitation which have ended in the loss of the garrison. The advisability of attempting to hold the post, being repugnant to his own judgment, the event which has happened fills him with the greater regret. But he will exhibit an instance of generosity and magnanimity, by submitting silently to all the censure that may be cast upon him, sooner than injure the character of those whose advice has ensnared him.