Chapter XXX: Letter XIII: Roxbury, Nov. 12, 1778 (2)

The royal troops on the island, having been just reinforced with five battalions, were about 6000 under the command of Sir Robert Pigot, who took every possible means of defence. The force under general Sullivan was composed of about 10,000 men. Upon his receiving intelligence early on the ninth, that the enemy had evacuated their works on the north end of the island, and retreated within their lines, about three miles from Newport, regardless of the agreement with d’Estaing, he concluded (as it appeared to him best) to push over without loss of time. The army was immediately put in motion; about eight o’clock the right wing, under gen. Greene, began to cross from Tiverton, and the rest of the Americans followed in order. The Massachusetts militia were attended by Mr. Hancock as their major-general. About two in the afternoon a fleet consisting of near 25 sail, was discovered standing in for Newport, which came to off Point Judith for the night. Lord Howe had determined to attempt the preservation of the island; but notwithstanding all his exertions, could not reach sight of it till the day after the French fleet had entered the harbour. Though his own exceeded the other in point of number, yet it was far inferior with respect to effective force and weight of metal. He had one ship of 74 guns—seven of 64—five of 50—six from 44 to 32—and twelve smaller vessels including fire ships and bomb ketches. When he first appeared, the garrison were much elated, but upon learning that he brought no provision, of which they were nearly exhausted, they were equally dejected. A sudden change of wind favoring the count, he stood out to sea with all his squadron, about eight o’clock the next morning. They were severely cannonaded as they passed by the batteries, but received no material damage. Howe deeming the weather gage of too great an advantage to be added to the superior force of the count, contended for that object with all the skill of an experienced seaman; while the count was as eager to preserve it. This contest prevented an engagement on that day; but the wind on the following still continuing adverse to the design of Howe, he determined to make the best of present circumstances, and wait the approach of the count. A strong gale, which increased to a violent tempest, and continued for near forty-eight hours, put by the engagement. Two of the French ships were dismasted and others much damaged. The Languedoc, of 90 guns, d’Estaing’s own ship, lost her rudder and all her masts; and was met in that condition on the evening of the 13th, by the Renown, of 50 guns. Captain Dawson bore down without hoisting colours. The count ordered captain Caleb Gardner, who was on board as a pilot, to hail him, that he might know what ship it was. Dawson made no answer, but ran with a full sail and fair wind till he was under the stern of the Languedoc, then hoisted English colours, fired in great and small shot, and musketry, and sailed off. The Languedoc upon that fired two chace guns after him, when he never attempted to approach her more. The same evening the Preston, of fifty guns, commodore Hotham, fell in with the Tonant of eighty guns, with only her main mast standings, and attacked her with spirit, but night put an end to the engagement. The junction of six sail of the French squadron, prevented all further attempts upon their two disabled ships by the Renown and Preston in the morning. On the 16th the Isis of 50 guns, capt. Raynor, was chased by the Cæsar, capt. Bouganville, a French 74 gun. Neither had suffered in the tempest. A close and desperate engagement was maintained on both sides, with the greatest obstinacy, for an hour and an half, within pistol shot. The Cæsar at length put before the wind and sailed off, the captain having lost his arm, the lieutenant his leg, a number of men being killed and wounded, and the ship considerably damaged. The Isis had suffered so in her mast and rigging that she could not attempt a pursuit.

The troops under gen. Sullivan now demand our attention. When they had landed, they possessed themselves of the heights near the north end of the island. They suffered no less than the ships by the tempest. The wind blew most violently, attended with a flood of rain through the whole day of the 12th, and increased so at night that not a marquee or tent could stand; several of the soldiers perished by the severity of the storm, many horses died, the greatest part of the ammunition delivered to the troops was damaged, and the condition of the army was deplorable. On the 14th, the storm was over, and the weather clear and fine. The garrison having enjoyed better accommodations, and greater security than the Americans, Sir Robert Pigot had a fair opportunity of attacking the latter while dispirited and worn down by the painful scenes from which they had just immerged. Gen. Greene and some British officers are of opinion, that a bold and vigorous onset under these cirsumstances would have been highly proper and successful. But as nothing of this kind happened the day was spent by the Americans in drying their clothes, &c. and getting in order for an advance. The next morning they marched at six o’clock, and took post about two miles from the British lines. By the 20th they had opened two four gun batteries; but their approaches were slow. About two o’clock in the afternoon the French fleet was discovered standing for Newport. At seven gen. Greene and the marquis de la Fayette went on board the Languedoc, to consult upon measures proper to be pursued for the success of the expedition in which they were engaged. They urged d’Estaing to return with his fleet into Newport harbor. He was apparently inclined to a compliance: but all the captains and principal officers on board were rather unfriendly to him. He being a land officer, they thought it an affront to their understandings, and a piece of injustice done to their merits and services, to have him appointed to the command over their heads. They therefore crossed him in every measure, that looked like giving him any kind of reputation, in order if possible, to bring him into disgrace. His instructions from the court of France were to go to Boston, if the fleet met with any misfortune, or if there appeared a superior British fleet upon the cost. The count had met with a misfortune, the Cæsar which had steered for Boston was missing, and a superior British fleet was expected. All the officers insisted upon his following the instructions, and entered into a formal protest against prosecuting the expedition any further. About twelve o’clock at night of the 21st, Greene and the marquis returned, and made a report of what had passed. The next day letters went on board from generals Sullivan and Hancock; as also a protest dated—Camp before Newport, Aug. 22, 1778—and signed by John Sullivan, N. Greene, John Hancock, J. Glover, Ezek. Cornell, Wm. Whipple, John Tyler, Soloman Lovell, Jon. Fitconel. They protested in a solemn manner against the count’s taking the fleet to Boston, as derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his most Christian majesty and the interest of his nation, and destructive in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. One of the reasons assigned for the protest was, that the army and stores collected for the reduction of the island would be liable to be lost, by an opportunity’s being given to the enemy to cut off the communication with the main, and totally to prevent the retreat of the army. The best apology that can be made for this protest is, that it was designedly as a finesse to induce the captains of the French fleet to consent to its returning into the harbour of Newport. But it had not this effect and met with a spirited answer from the count, who sailed on the same day for Boston. Sullivan was so chagrined at the departure of the fleet, that contrary to all policy, he gave out in general orders on the 24th, “The generel cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it, though he can by no means suppose the army or any part of it endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining.” Two days after, in new orders, he endeavoured to smooth off the reflection contained in it, by declaring that he meant not to insinuated that the departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixed determination not to assist in the enterprise, and would not wish to give the least colour to ungenerous and illiberal minds to make such unfair interpretations. Count d’Estaing, when arrived in Boston port, wrote to congress on the 26th, and in his letter mentioned—the embarrassments of the king’s squadron as well on account of water as provisions, how his hopes were deceived with regard to these two articles, which were growing more and more important—that it was necessary for him to confine all his attention to the preservation of the squadron, and restoring it to a condition to act—that he was no longer at liberty to depend on deceitful expectations of watering and getting provisions. He justified his repairing to Boston from the situation of his ships, the advices of a squadron from Europe, the ignorance of what was become of lord Howe’s fleet, and the advantage that his lordship would have had for attacking him had he returned into Newport. He also expressed his displeasure at the protest.

It appears unreasonable to censure the count for repairing to Boston, when all his officers insisted so upon the measure; though, had he returned into Newport, the garrison would most probably have capitulated before Howe could have succoured them. Upon the fleet’s sailing for Boston, it was said—“There never was a prospect so favorable, blasted by such a shameful desertion.” A universal clamor prevailed against the French nation and letters were sent to Boston containing the most bitter invectives, tending to prejudice the inhabitants against d’Estaing and all his officers, to counteract which the cooler and more judicious part of the community employed their good offices. Between two and three thousand volunteers returned in the course of twenty-four hours, and others continued to go off, and even many of the militia, so that in three days Sullivan’s army was greatly decreased; it was soon little more in number than that of the enemy. An attempt to carry their works by storm, would have been too hazardous, had all the volunteers and militia remained, for the bulk of the troops had never been in action: the necessity of a retreat was therefore apparent (as soon as there was a certainty of the French fleet’s being gone) though in the morning of the 23d, the Americans had opened batteries consisting in the whole of 17 pieces of heavy artillery, 2 ten inch mortars and three five and a half inch howitzers. Greene was against retreating hastily, lest the appearance of timidity and inferiority should bring out the enemy upon them: but he and Glover prepared for an expeditious retreat, in case Clinton should arrive with a reinforcement, that so no damage might ensue from the delay. By the 26th all the spare heavy artillery and baggage were sent off the island; and on the 28th at night, between nine and ten o’clock, the army began to move to the north end. It had been that day resolved in a council of war, to remove thither, fortify the camp, secure a communication with the main, and hold the ground, till it could be known whether the French fleet would soon return to their assistance. The marquis de la Fayette, by request of the general officers, set off for Boston to request their speedy return. The count could not consent to the return of the fleet, but made a spirited offer of leading the troops under his command from Boston, and of co-operating against Rhode-Island. The march of Sullivan’s army was conducted with great order and regularity, and the troops arrived on their ground about three in the morning, with all the baggage, stores, &c. About seven, [Aug. 29.] they were alarmed by a brisk fire of musketry in their front, between their advanced corps of infantry and the enemy, who had pushed out after them upon discovering the retreat. Sullivan asked the opinion of the generals upon the occasion, and Greene advised to march and meet them, for he truly supposed that they were come out in small detachments which might be cut to pieces; and further apprehended that by advancing in force upon the western road, they might possibly head that part of the enemy which marched down upon the eastern, and so unexpectedly possess themselves of Newport.—Had this measure been adopted, the Americans would probably have gained very great advantages, as the whole of the enemy’s force on the western road consisted only of the Hessian chasseurs and the Anspach regiments of Voit and Seaboth under gen. Lossberg. On the east road was gen. Smith with the 22d and 43d regiments, and the flank companies of the 38th and 54th. To the latter were opposed col. Henry B. Livingston and his light troops; to the former lieut. col. Laurens with his. The enemy’s superiority in numbers obliged each to give way, but a retreating fire was kept up with the greatest order. The advanced corps being reinforced, they gave the enemy a check, make a gallant resistance, and at length repulsed them. But the British commander sending reinforcements to both Lossberg and Smith, the Americans were obliged to retire nigh to the front line of the main army, which was drawn up in order of battle. The British advanced very near to the American left, but were repulsed by Glover, and retired to Quaker-hill. The royal troops soon availed themselves of two heights on Sullivan’s right; where they placed several pieces of artillery, and began about nine o’clock, a severe cannonade on a redoubt, an advanced post on his right, which was returned with double force. Skirmishing continued between the advanced parties until near ten; when two British sloops of war and other armed vessels, having gained his right flank and began a fire, their associates on land bent their force that way, and endeavored to turn Sullivans’s right, under cover of the ships, and to take his advanced redoubt; which brought on a warm and brisk fire of musketry between the contending parties, that was kept up by each side’s throwing in reinforcements, till the action became in some degree general, and near 1200 Americans were engaged. The last of these that were sent forward, got up just in time to prevent the success of the enemy, who were making their third effort to take the redoubt; but they were broken, and retreated to the heights in great confusion, leaving on the field many of their killed and wounded. After the retreat, the field of battle could not be approached by either party without being exposed to the cannon of the other army. The heat of the action was from two till near three o’clock in the afternoon. The firing of artillery continued through the day; the musketry, with intermission, six hours. The Americans make their loss in killed 30, in wounded 132, and in missing 44. The British account makes their killed 38, wounded 210, and missing 12. General Greene, in a letter to the commander in chief, said, “Our troops behaved with great spirit, and the brigade of militia under general Lovell advanced with great resolution and in good order, and stood the fire of the enemy with great firmness. Lieut. col. Livingston, col. Jackson, and col. H. B. Livingston, did themselves great honor in the transactions of the day; but it is not in my power to do justice to col. Laurens, who acted both the general and partizan. His command of regular troops was small, but he did every thing possible to be done by their numbers.” The brigade under general Lovell belonged to the Massachusetts. Greene, who commanded in the attack, did himself the highest honor by the judgment and bravery he exhibited. He attended strictly to the action the whole time, watching the movements of the enemy, and where to throw in the necessary reinforcements. Gen. Sullivan the next morning received advice that lord Howe had again sailed; that a fleet was off Block-Island; and that d’Estaing could not come so soon as he expected; on which it was concluded to evacuate Rhode-Island. The sentries of both armies being within 400 yards of each other, the greatest attention was requisite. To cover the design of retreating, a number of tents were brought forward [Aug. 30.] and pitched in sight of the enemy, and the whole army employed in fortifying the camp. At the same time the heavy baggage and stores were falling back and crossed through the bay. At dark the tents were struck, the light baggage and troops passed down, and by twelve o’clock the main army had crossed. It was about that time when the marquis de la Fayette arrived from Boston. He was most sensibly mortified that he was not in the action. That he might not be out of the way in case of one, he had rode from the island to Boston, near 70 miles distant, in seven hours, and returned in six and a half. He got back, time enough to bring off the pickets and other parties that covered the retreat of the army, which he did in excellent order; not a man was left behind, nor the smallest article lost. The honor arising from so good a retreat, though great, did not compensate for the sore disappointment gen. Sullivan met with when in full expectation of taking Newport. The place must have fallen had not count d’Estaing left the harbour, or had he returned after chasing lord Howe to a considerable distance. The glory of vanquishing a British squadron, and of obtaining a triumph over a first rate naval officer, and a country against which he had a personal animosity (though in prospect only) tempted him as may be thought into a situation that proved the ruin of the principal object in view when he steered from before Sandy-Hook for Newport, and agreed upon a co-operation with Sullivan’s army. The fleet off Block-Island was bound for Rhode-Island, and had on board Sir Henry Clinton, with about 4000 troops. Sir Henry hoped to have effected a landing, so as to have made Sullivan’s retreat very precarious, but the latter was completed the night before his arrival. [Sept. 1.] The day after, lord Howe, who had changed his course upon hearing that d’Estaing had left Rhode-Island, arrived off the entrance of Boston port in the evening. Upon observing the position of the French fleet, and deeming every attempt against them ineligible, he left the Boston coast the next morning; but this appearance in and standing up the bay to the entrance of the port, spread a prodigious alarm. Sir Henry being disappointed, returned for New-York; but off New-London left the fleet, with directions to gen. Grey to proceed to Bedford and the neighborhood, where several American privateers resorted, and a number of captured ships lay. They reached the place of destination on the fifth of September; the troops were immediately landed, and between six in the evening and twelve the following day, destroyed about 70 sail of shipping, beside a number of small craft. They also burnt the magazine, wharfs, stores, ware-houses, vessels on the stocks, all the dwelling-houses at M’Pherson’s wharf, and the principal part of the houses at the head of the river, together with the mills and some houses on the east side of the river. Bedford, or as it is frequently called Dartmouth, suffered to the amount of near £.20,000 sterling in rateable property, viz. buildings. The other articles destroyed were worth a much more considerable sum. The troops proceeded from thence to Martha’s Vineyard, where they destroyed a few vessels, and made a requisition of the militia arms, the public money, three hundred oxen, and 10,000 sheep, which was complied with. The last contribution was a most desirable one, and afforded a grateful repast to thousands upon being safely conveyed to New-York.

Here let me close our account of military operations, with an extract from gen. Washington’s letter of August the 20th, and then attend to the negociations of the British commissioners, and the acts of congress, His excellency thuse expressed himself—“It is not a little pleasing, nor less wonderful to comtemplate, that after two years manœuvreing and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes, that perhaps ever attended any one contest since the creation, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and the offending party in the beginning, is now reduced to the use of the spade and pick-axe for defence. The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith, and more than wicked that has not gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligations.”

Governor Johnstone, meaning to avail himself of former connections, endeavored to commence or renew a private correspondence, with several members of congress, and other persons of consideration. In his letters to them, he used a freedom with the authority under which he acted, not customary with those intrusted with delegated power, and gave such a degree of approbation to the conduct of the Americans in the past resistance which they had made, as is seldom granted by negociators to their opponents. In a letter to Joseph Reed, esq. of April the 11th, he said—“The man who can be instrumantal in bringing us all to act once more in harmony, and to unite together the various powers which this contest has drawn fourth, will deserve more from the king and people, from patriotism, humanity and all the tender ties that are effected by the quarrel and reconciliation, than ever was yet bestowed on human kind.” On the 16th of June, he wrote to Robert Morris, esq.—“I believe the men who have conducted the affairs of America uncapable of being influenced by improper motives; but in all such transactions there is risk, and I think, that whoever ventures should be secured: at the same time, that honor and emolument should naturally follow the fortune of those who have steered the vessel in the storm, and brought her safely to port. I think Washington and the president have a right to every favor that grateful nations can bestow, if they could once more unite our interest, and spare the miseries and devastations of war.” On Sunday the 21st of June, Mr. Reed received a written massage from Mrs. Ferguson, expressing a desire to see him on business which could not be committed to writing. On his attending in the evening, agreeable to her appointment, after some previous conversation, she enlarged upon the great talents and amiable qualities of governor Johnstone, and added, that in several conversations with her, he had expressed the most favorable sentiments of Mr. Reed; that it was particularly wished to engage his interest to promote the objects of the British commissioners, viz. a re-union of the two countries, if consistent with his principles and judgment; and that in such case it could not be deemed unbecoming or improper in the British government to take a favorable notice of such conduct; and that in this instance Mr. Reed might have ten thousand pounds sterling, and any office in the colonies in his majesty’s gift. Mr. Reed, finding an answer was expected, replied—“_I am not worth purchasing, but such as I am, the king of Great-Britain is not rich enough to do it._” However right the principles might be, on which this insinuating scheme of conciliation was adopted, its effects were untoward. On the ninth of July congress ordered—“That all letters received by members of congress from any of the British commissioners or their agents, or from any subject of the king of Great-Britain, of a public nature, be laid before congress.” The above letters being communicated, and Mr. Reed making a declaration [Aug. 11.] of what has been above related, congress resolved that the same “cannot but be considered as direct attempts to corrupt and bribe the congress—that as congress feel, so they ought to demonstrate, the highest and most pointed indignation against such daring and attrocious attempts to corrupt their integrity—and that it is incompatible with the honor of congress to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse with the said George Johnstone, esq. especially to negociate with him upon affairs in which the cause of liberty is concerned.” Their proceedings in this business were expressed in the form of a declaration, a copy of which was ordered to be signed by the president, and sent by a flag to the commissioners at New-York. This declaration drew out an exceeding angry and vehement one from the gentleman in question, in which the immediate operations of passion were rather too apparent. The tone of his publications accorded but badly with the high and flattering eulogiums which he had so lately bestowed on the Americans in those very letters which were the subject of the present contest. It was dated the 26th of August, and transmitted to congress, together with a declaration of the same date from lord Carlisle, Sir Henry Clinton and Mr. Eden, which went to a total and solemn disavowal, so far as related to the present subject, of their having had any knowledge, directly or indirectly, of those matters specified by congress. The declarations were accompanied by a requisition from the three last named commissioners respecting the troops lately serving under gen. Burgoyne, in which they offered to ratify the convention, and required permission for the embarkation of the troops. But congress resolved, [Sept. 4.] “That no ratification of the convention, which may be tendered in consequence of powers, which only reach that case by construction and implication, or which may subject whatever is transacted relative to it to the future approbation or disapprobation of the parliament of Great-Britain, can be accepted by congress.”

When all hope of further negociation with congress was at an end, the commissioners directed their future publications in the manner of appeals to the people at large: Whereby they seemingly realized the charge repeatedly made, that their only object was, under the insiduous appearance of conciliation, to excite either a separation among the colonies, or the people to tumults against their respective governments. Congress not only permitted, but forwarded the republishment of all matters upon the subject: while different American writers undertook to obviate the effect, which the publications issued by the commissioners might have upon the body of the people. The strongest argument which the Americans advanced upon the occasion was, that they had already concluded a solemn treaty with France for the establishment and on the footing of their independence, that should they break their faith with France, they would forfeit their credit with all foreign nations, be considered as faithless and infamous, and forevermore be cut off from even the hope of foreign succour; and at the same time they should be throw on the mercy of those, who had already pursued every measure of fraud, force, cruelty and deceit, for their destruction: as neither the king, the ministers, nor the parliament of Great-Britain, would be under the necessity of ratifying any one condition which they agreed upon with the commissioners; or, if they even found it necessary to ratify them for present purposes, it would be only to call a new parliament and then to undo the whole.

The appeals of the commissioners to the people proving ineffectual, they changed their conduct and denounced hostility and destruction, in their most terrific forms, to those who had rejected conciliation and friendship. They published [Oct. 3.] a signal valedictoroy manifesto and proclamation; and therein warned the people of the total and material change which was to take place in the future conduct of hostilities, should they still persevere in their obstinacy; and more especially as that was said to be founded upon the pretended alliance with France.——The Americans were virtually threatened with all the extremes of war, and to have their country desolated. Be it noted that “The concessions made in the manifesto and proclamation by the commissioners, contain a renunciation of every principle upon which the king’s ministers have pretended to justify the foundation, or the pursuit of any one object of the war. Thus the irretrievable disgrace of having waged a cruel war for anjustifiable and destructive ends, is fixed upon Britain, by a public avowal upon principle, that the terms offered by America in 1774, before the war, ought to have been accepted as foundations of peace, from their own intrinsic equity and merit, as being _more beneficial to the mother country, and more safe to all parties_.”[91] Several packages of manifestos, which enclosed a number translated into the German language, and one printed on vellum and signed by lord Carlisle, Sir Henry Clinton, and William Eden, esq. were made up in order to be sent with flags to congress and the particular states in the union. Congress upon being informed of it, declared that the agents employed to distribute the said papers were not entitled to protection from a flag, while engaged in the prosecution of such nefarious purposes; and recommended it to the several states to secure and keep them in close custody, but at the same time to print the manifestos in the news-papers, to convince the people of the insiduous designs of the commissioners. [Oct. 30.] They also published a manifesto, on their part, in which they complained bitterly of the mode practised by the British in carrying on the war, of the treatment their soldiers and sailors had met with, and of their meanly assailing the representatives of America with bribes, with deceit, and the servility of adulation. After other charges, expressed in the severest language, they concluded with solemnly declaring—“If our enemies presume to execute their threats, or persist in their present career of barbarity, we will take such exemplary vengeance as shall deter others from a like conduct. We appeal to that God who searcheth the hearts of men, for the rectitude of our intentions; and in his holy presence declare, that as we are not moved by any light and hasty suggestions of anger or revenge, so, through every possible change of fortune, we will adhere to this our determination.”

The commission has been attended with the singular circumstance of a letter from the marquis de la Fayette, to the earl of Carlisle, challenging that nobleman, as first commissioner, to the field, there to answer in his own person, and in single combat, for some harsh reflections on the conduct of the French court and nation, which appeared in those public instruments that he and his brethren had issued in their political capacity. The inexperience and heat of youth hurried him into this impropriety against the advice of his warmest American friends, who foresaw that his challenge would of necessity be slighted.

The other proceedings of congress, which have been passed over, while the negociation has been considered, are now to be related.

Congress being convinced by experience, that the regulation of prices was an evil, and increased instead of lessening the difficulties it was meant to cure, recommended in the beginning of June, to the several legislatures that had adopted the measure, the suspension or repeal of their laws for that purpose. The commissary general, col. Wadsworth, had no hope of feeding the army, while the regalating acts prevailed. Before the recommendation it was supplied by a violation of the acts, or by contracts made before they took place. [June 27.] Congress adjourned to meet the Thursday following at the state-house in Philadelphia. When a sufficient number of states were represented, [July 7.] they had before them a packet of letters which had passed between gen. Heath and gen. Philips, consequent to the death of lieut. Richard Brown of the 21st British regiment, belonging to the convention troops at Cambridge. He determined upon passing the lines on the 17th of June (in a chaise, between two women of easy virtue) contrary to general orders. The sentry upon stopping him was treated with contempt. The lieutenant would go on without assigning any reason, though repeatedly ordered to stop, on which the sentry shot him through the head at Prospect-hill. The language of Philip’s letter upon the occasion, was so offensive, that Heath confined him to his quarters, under a guard; and insisted on his signing a new parole. These measures produced other letters pro and con. The whole were submitted to the inspection of congress, who approved of Heath’s conduct.

[July 16.] They had before them a paper from Mr. Gerard, wherein he thanked them for the quick dispatch with which they had provided for the first wants of the French squadron; it was accompanied with a memorandum of the provisions that would be further wanted. Congress meaning to procure it upon the easiest terms, appointed a committee to make the purchases; but Mr. Chase one of the Maryland delagates, improved the knowledge his seat secured him, for directing in season a private acquaintance to buy; and thereby counteracted the committee so effectually, that they could not answer the end of their appointment. It is no extravagant conjecture, that Mr. Chase shared in the profits made by his communications.

[Aug. 6.] The hon. Sieur Gerard was introduced to an audience by two members of congress appointed for the purpose, and being seated in his chair, his secretary delivered to the president a letter from his most Christian majesty, informing his _very dear great friends and allies_, that he had nominated the Sieur Gerard, to reside among them in the quality of minister plenipotentiary. The minister was after the reading of it, announced to the house whereupon he arose and addressed congress in a speech, which when finished in the French language, was delivered by his secretary to the president; to which the latter returned an answer in English. A profusion of compliments passed upon the occasion, in the hearing and presence of a numerous audience: for the vice-president, the supreme executive council, the speaker and assembly of Pennsylvania, were invited to be there; and each member of congress had the liberty of giving two tickets for the admittance of other persons. An entertainment given by congress to the Sieur Gerard, closed the novel, important and joyful transactions of the day.

[Sept. 11.] Congress resolved upon an application to Sir Henry Clinton for passports to American vessels to transport provisions and fuel to Boston for the use of the convention troops; and that if such passports were not granted within three days after application, or measures adopted by him for supplying them by the 5th of October, they would deem themselves justifiable in removing the said troops to such parts of the United States as they can be best subsisted in. The applications to Sir Henry having had no effect, they resolved on the 16th of October, that the necessary steps should be taken for removing, with all convenient speed, the convention prisoners to Charlotte-ville, in Albemarle county, Virginia.

[Sept. 14.] Congress proceeded to the election of a minister plenipotentiary to the court of France, and the ballots being taken, Dr. Benjamin Franklin was elected. In their instructions to him on the 26th of October, he was directed to obtain, if possible, the French king’s consent for expunging from the treaty of commerce the 11th and 12th articles, as inconsistent with that equality and reciprocity which form the best security for perpetuating the whole. The marquis de la Fayette had entered into arrangements with congress for co-operating with the court of France in an expedition against Canada; the plan of which the doctor was also to lay before the minister. It was proposed that 4 or 5000 French troops should be sent to assist in the business. The marquis’s attachment to the American cause and thirst for glory, would naturally engage him in such a project (wherein he would be likely to hold a considerable command) with the utmost purity of intention. But how far Mr. Gerard might artfully insinuate the first idea into his mind, in expectation of introducing a larger body of French troops into Canada for distant political purposes, to which the marquis was a total stranger, cannot be easily ascertained. The docter was to inculcate the certainty of ruining the British fishery on the banks of Newfoundland, and consequently the British marine by reducing Halifax and Quebec. The importance of such reduction to France on the one hand, and to America on the other, was stated.

The following observations on the finances of America were likewise to be communicated to the French minister.

“At the commencement of the war, it was obvious that the permanent revenues and resources of Great-Britain must eventually overbalance the sudden and impetuous sallies of men contending for freedom on the spur of the occasion, without regular discipline, determinate plan, or permanent means of defence. America having never been much taxed, nor for a continuing length of time, being without a fixed government, and contended against what was once the lawful authority, had no funds to support the war; and the contest being upon the very question of taxation, the levying of imposts, unless from the last necessity, would have been madness.—To borrow from individuals, without any visible means of repaying them, while the loss was certain from ill success, was visionary.—A measure therefore which had been early adopted, and thence became familiar to the people, was pursued; this was the issuing of paper notes representing specie, for the redemption of which the public faith was pledged. As these were to circulate from hand to hand, there was no great individual risk unless from holding them too long, and no man refused to receive them for one commodity, while they would purchase every other.—This general credit however, did not last long. It menaced so deeply the views of our enemies, who had built their hopes on the defeat of our resources, that they and their partizans used every effort to impeach its value. Their success in one instance of this kind, alway made room for another, because he who could not relieve his wants with our paper would not part with has property to procure it.—To remedy this evil, the states as soon as formed into any shape of legislature, enacted laws to make the continental paper a lawful tender, and indeed to determine its value, fixing it by penalties at the sum of specie expressed on the face of it. These laws produced monopoly throughout.—The monopoly of commodities, the interruption of commerce, and the successes of the enemy, produced a depreciation: the laws devised to remedy this evil, either increased or were followed by an increase of it.—This demanded more plentiful emissions, thereby increasing the circulating medium to such a degree as not only to exclude all others, but furnish a superabundant quantity to increase the depreciation. The several states, instead of laying taxes to defray their own private expences, followed the example of congress, and issued notes of different denominations and forms. Therefore to counterfeit became easier, and the enemy did not neglect to avail themselves of this great, though base advantage; and hence arose a further depreciation. Calling the husbandman frequently to arms, who had indeed lost the incitements to industry from the cheapness of the necessaries of life in the beginning, compared with other articles, which took a more rapid rise, soon reduced that abundance which preceded the war; this, added to the greater consumption, together with the ravages and subsistence of the enemy, at length pointed the depreciation to the means of support. The issues from this moment became enormous and consequently increased the disease from which they arose, and which must soon have become fatal, had not the successes of America and the alliance with France kept it from sinking entirely. The certainty of its redemption being now evident, we only suffer from the quantity. This however, impairs not only the value simply in itself, but as it calls for continued large emissions, so the certainty that every thing will be dearer than it is, renders every thing dearer than it otherwise would be; and _vice versa_. Could we possibly absorb a part of the inundation which overwhelms us, every thing would be cheaper, from the certainty that it would become cheaper. The money can be absorbed but three ways—The first is by taxation, which cannot reach the evil while the war continues; because the emissions must continue, to supply what is necessary over and above even the nominal produce of taxes; and the taxes cannot be very productive, by reason of the possession of part and ravagement of other parts of the country by the enemy; and also from the weakness of governments yet in then infancy, and not arrived to that power, method and firmness, which are the portion of elder states——The second method is by borrowing, and is not efficient, because no interest can tempt men to lend paper now, which paid together with that interest in paper a year hence, will not probably be worth half as much as the principal sum is at present; and whenever the case shall alter, then in proportion to the depreciation will be the loss of the public in what they borrow, to say nothing of the enormous burdens for which they must pay interest in specie, or what is equal to, if so much as what hath been emitted could be borrowed as to render the remainder equally valuable with silver.—The last method is by very considerable loans or subsidies in Europe, and is the only mode at once equal to the effect desired, and free from the foregoing exceptions, for if such a sum is drawn for, at the advanced exchange, as by taking up the greatest part of our paper to reduce the exchange to par, the paper then remaining will be fully appreciated, and the sum due will not nominally, and therefore in the event not actually exceed its real value.—But to this mode there are objections: 1. Subsidies by any means equal to our necessities can hardly be expected, while our allies, being engaged in a war, will want all the money they can procure: and 2. Loans cannot probably be obtained without good guarantee, or other security which America may not perhaps be able to procure or give.—But until our finances can be in a better situation, the war cannot possibly be prosecuted with vigor: and the efforts made, feeble as they must be, will be attended with an oppressive weight of expence, rendering still more weak the confederated states.—This will appear from the foregoing observations, and also from hence that the present, and in all probability the future seat of the war, (that is the middle states) is so exhausted, that unless by the strenuous voluntary exertions of the inhabitants, no great number of men can possibly be subsisted; and such exertions cannot be expected without the temptation of money more valued than ours is at present.”

Five days befere the date of the instructions above related congress, upon the application of the marquis de la Fayette, granted him leave to return to France, and directed the president to write him a letter of thanks for that disinterested zeal which led him to America, and for the services he had rendered to the United States by the exertion of his courage and abilities on many signal occasions. They also ordered Dr. Franklin to cause an elegant sword, with proper devices, to be made and presented him in the name of the United States: and crowned the whole with a letter recommending him to his most Christian majesty. The marquis took leave of congress, by letter, the 26th of October. The next day when it was received, a letter from the marquis was read, giving an account of the brave conduct of capt. Tonzar, in taking possession of a piece of artillery from the enemy, in which action he lost his right arm: whereupon congress promoted him to the rank of lieut. colonel in the service of the United States, by brevet, and appointed him a pension for life, of thirty dollars per month.

Let us resume our narration of military operations.

So early as the 8th of February gen. Scuyler wrote to congress—“There is too much reason to believe that an expedition will be formed (by the Indians) against the western frontiers of this state (New-York) Virginia and Pennsylvania.” The next month he informed them—“a number of Mohawks, and many of the Onondagoes, Cayugas and Senecas will commence hostilities against us as soon as they can: it would be prudent therefore early to take measures to carry the war into their country; it would require no greater body of troops to destroy their towns than to protect the frontier inhabitants.” No effectual measures being taken to repress the hostile spirit of the Indians, numbers joined the tory refugees, and with these commenced their horrid depredations and hostilities upon the back settlers, being headed by col. Butler and Brandt, an half-blooded Indian, of desperate courage, ferocious and cruel beyond example. Their expeditions were carried on to great advantage, by the exact knowledge which the refugees possessed of every object of their enterprise, and the immediate intelligenc they received from their friends on the spot. The weight of their hostilities fell upon the fine, new and flourishing settlement of Wyoming situated on the eastern branch of the Susquehannah, in a most beautiful country and delightful climate. It was settled and cultivated with great ardor by a number of people from Connecticut, which claims the territory as included in its original grant from Charles II. The settlement consisted of eight townships, each five miles square, beautifully placed on each side of the river. It had increased so by a rapid population, that they sent a thousand men to serve in the continental army. To provide against the dangers of their remote situation. Four forts were constructed to cover them from the irruptions of the Indians.—But it was their unhappiness to have a considerable mixture of royalists among them; and the two parties were actuated by sentiments of the most violent animosity which was not confined to particular families or places; but creeping within the roofs and to the hearths and floors where it was least to be expected, served equally to poison the sources of domestic security and happiness, and to cancel the laws of nature and humanity.

They had frequent and timely warnings of the danger to which they were exposed by sending their best men to so great a distance. Their quiet had been interrupted by the Indians, joined by marauding parties of their own countrymen, in the preceding year; and it was only by a vigorous opposition, in a course of successful skirmishes, that they had been driven off. Several tories, and others not before suspected, had then and since abandoned the settlement; and beside a perfect knowledge of all their particular circumstances, carried along with them such a stock of private resentment, as could not fail of directing the fury, and even giving an edge to the cruelty of their Indian and other inveterate enemies. An unusual number of strangers had come among them under various pretences, whose behaviour became so suspicious, that upon being taken up and examined, such evidence appeared against several of them, of their acting in concert with the enemy, on a scheme for the destruction of the settlements, that about twenty were sent to Connecticut, to be there imprisoned and tried for their lives, while the remainder were expelled. These measures excited the rage of the tories in general to the most extreme degree; and the threats formerly denounced against the settlers, were now renewed with aggravated vengeance.

As the time approached for the final catastrophe, the Indians practised unusual treachery. For several weeks previous to the intended attack, they repeatedly sent small parties to the settlement, charged with the strongest professions of friendship. These parties, beside attempting to lull the people into security, answered the purposes of communicating with their friends, and of observing the present state of affairs. The settlers however, were not insensible of the danger. They had taken the alarm, and colonel Zebulon Butler had several times written letters to congress and gen. Washington, acquainting them with the danger the settlement was in, and requesting assistance; but the letters were never received, having been intercepted by the Pennsylvanian tories. A little before the main attack, some small parties made sudden eruptions, and committed several robberies and murders; and from ignorance or a contempt of all ties whatever, massacred the wife and five children of one of the persons sent for trial to Connecticut in their own cause.

At length, in the beginning of July, the enemy suddenly appeared in full force on the Susquehannah, headed by col. John Butler, a Connecticut tory, and cousin to col. Zeb. Butler, the second in command in the settlement. He was assisted by most of those leaders who had rendered themselves terrible in the present frontier war. Their force was about 1600 men, near a fourth Indians, led by their own chiefs; the others were so disguised and painted as not to be distinguished from the Indians, excepting their officers, who being dressed in regimentals, carried the appearance of regulars. One of the smaller forts, garrisoned chiefly by tories, was given up, or rather betrayed. Another was taken by storm, and all but the women and children massacred in the most inhuman manner.

[July 3.] Colonel Zeb. Butler, leaving a small number to guard Fort Wilkesborough, crossed the river with about 400 men, and marched into Kingston Fort, whither the women, children and defenceless of all sorts crowded for protection. He suffered himself to be enticed by his cousin to abandon the fortress. He agreed to march out and hold a conference with the enemy in the open field (at so great a distance from the fort as to shut out all possibility of protection from it) upon their withdrawing according to their own proposal, in order to the holding of a parly for the conclusion of a treaty. He at the same time marched out about 400 men well armed, being nearly the whole strength of the garrison, to guard his person to the place of parly, such was his distrust of the enemy’s designs. On his arrival he found no body to treat with him, and yet advanced toward the foot of the mountain, where at a distance he saw a flag, the holders of which, seemingly afraid of treachery on his side, retired as he advanced; whilst he, endeavoring to remove this pretended ill impression, pursued the flag till his party was thoroughly enclosed, when he was suddenly freed from his delusion by finding it attacked at once on every side. He and his men, notwithstanding the surprise and danger, fought with resolution and bravery, and kept up so continual and heavy a fire for three-quarters of an hour, that they seemed to gain a marked superiority. In this critical moment a soldier, through a sudden impulse of fear, or premediated treachery, cried out aloud, “the colonel has ordered a retreat.” The fate of the party was now at once determined. In the state of confusion that ensued, an unresisted slaughter commenced, while the enemy broke in on all sides without obstruction. Colonel Zeb. Butler and about seventy of his men escaped; the latter got across the river to Fort Wilkesborough, the colonel made his way to Fort Kingston, which was invested the next day [July 4.] on the land side. The enemy, to sadden the drooping spirits of the weak remaining garrison, sent in for their contemplation the bloody scalps of one hundred and ninety-six of their late friends and comrades. They kept up a continual fire upon the fort the whole day. In the evening the colonel quitted the fort and went down the river with his family. He is thought to be the only officer that escaped.

[July 5.] Colonel Nathan Dennison, who succeeded to the command, seeing the impossibility of an effectual defence, went with a flag to col. John Butler, to know what terms he would grant on a surrender; to which application Butler answered with more than savage phlegm, in two short words—_the hatchet_.—Dennison having defended the fort till most of the garrison were killed or disabled, was compelled to surrender at discretion. Some of the unhappy persons in the fort were carried away alive, but the barbarous conquerors, to save the trouble of murder in detail, shut up the rest promiscuously in the houses and barracks, which having set on fire they enjoyed the savage pleasure of beholding the whole consumed in one general blaze.