Chapter XXIX: Letter XIII: Roxbury, Nov. 12, 1778 (1)

Lieutenant colonel Ethen Allen was at length exchanged; and congress granted him a brevet commission of colonel, [May 14.] in reward of his fortitude and zeal in the cause of his country.

General Sullivan being sent to command at Providence, gen. Pigot who was at Newport, inferred that there was a design of attacking Rhode-Island whenever an opportunity offered: the latter therefore concluded upon an expedition that might delay or frustrate the event. Lieutenant col. Campbell, with about 500 British and Hessians was sent off in the night of the 24th, passed up the river, and landed from the ships, tenders, and boats before day, between Warren and Poppasquash-point. At day-light [May 25.] they marched in two bodies, one for Warren, and the other for the head of Kickemut-river, where they destroyed about seventy flat-bottomed boats, and set fire to one of the state gallies, which was extinguished without doing much injury. They burnt also a quantity of pitch, tar, plank, &c.—They then fired the meeting-house at Warren, and several dwelling houses; and retreated toward Bristol, where their ships and boats had fallen down to receive them. In Bristol they burnt two and twenty houses, and through mistake, the church instead of the meeting-house. The destruction of houses and places of worship, was afterward attributed chiefly to the licentiousness of the soldiers, who treated both friends and foes with cruelty, plundering houses and robbing women of their shoe-buckles, gold rings and handkerchiefs. They carried off with them a state galley. A few days after, a party of 150 men were sent from Newport, to burn the saw-mills and contiguous houses at Tiverton. They fired an old mill and old house near the place of landing; and then proceeded for the town, to execute the business they were sent upon; but the bridge leading to it being defended by five and twenty men, they could not cross, though they attempted it repeatedly. The advancing season will close these small excursions, by bringing forward more capital operations; and for the counteracting of which the Americans must depend much upon supplies from France.——This reminds me, that on the 28th, a French 50 gun ship, with 350 men, a brig and a schooner, bringing arms and dry goods, arrived in James River, Virginia, from Rochford. Congress the next day, to commemorate the agreeable event which has taken place between France and the United States, resolved that a new continental frigate, built in the Massachusetts, and lately launched, should be called the _Alliance_. Within three weeks after, the command of her was bestowed upon captain Peter Landais.

In the beginning of June the Trident arrived in the Delaware, with the earl of Carlisle, Mr. Eden and governor Johnstone, three of the commissioners for restoring peace between Great-Britain and America. On the 9th Sir Henry Clinton informed gen. Washington of their being at Philadelphia, and requested a passport for doctor Ferguson, their secretary, with a letter from them to congress. The general declined granting a passport, which was unanimously approved by congress. The refusal made it necessary to forward the letter, with the acts, a copy of their commission and other papers, by the common intercourse. They were received by an express from Washington on the 13th, and the letter was read till some offensive language against his most Christian majesty offered, on which the further reading of it was suspended till the 16th, when the reading of that and the other papers was finished. They were referred to a committee, who drew up a letter to be sent by the president, in answer to the letter and papers from the commissioners, which was unanimously agreed to by the delegates on the 17th, and was as follows—“I have received the letter from your excellencies on the 9th instant, with the enclosures, and laid them before congress. Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human blood, could have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so disrespectful to his most Christian majesty, the good and great ally of these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the honor of an independent nation. The acts of the British parliament, the commission from your sovereign, and your letter, suppose the people of these states to be subjects to the crown of Great-Britain, and are founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly inadmissible. I am further directed to inform your excellencies that congress are inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been conducted. They will therefore be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, when the king of Great-Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets and armies.—I have the honor to be, your excellencies most obedient and humble servant.” Before this letter could be received by the commissioners, a movement took place at Philadelphia, which must have completely frustrated all negociation, had the same been even in a train answering to the wishes of the British agents, for it indicated an apprehension of great danger to the royal forces should they continue in the city.”

Mr. Eden brought with him secret orders for the speedy evacuation of Philadelphia; they were so secret as not to be made known either to himself or governor Johnstone. Whether the earl of Carlisle met with the like treatment, is not yet ascertained. It has been publicly asserted, that the orders were dated exactly three weeks before the commissioners sailed from England, which carries the date back to the last of March. On their delivery, Sir Henry Clinton immediately applied himself to the putting of them into execution. By the eighteenth every thing being ready, the British army evacuated the city, at three o’clock in the morning. They proceeded to Gloucester-Point, three miles down the river, and before ten the whole had passed in safety across the Delaware, into New Jersey. At ten they began their march to Haddonfield, which they reached the same day. Your curiosity may make you desirous of knowing in what condition the British left Philadelphia. An American son of liberty, who visited it in the beginning of July, wrote to his friend—“The whole north side of the city, before you enter, is a promiscuous scene of ruin. Upon getting into the city, I was surprised to find it had suffered so little. I question whether it would have fared better, had our own troops been in possession of it, that is, as to the buildings.” The necessary preparations for its evacuation, could not be concealed from general Washington; when the appearance of their intending to march through Jersey became serious, he detached general Maxwell’s brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that state, to impede the progress of the royal troops, so as to give the American army time to come up with them, and to take advantage of any favorable circumstances that might offer. Some time before, gen. Lee having been exchanged, had joined the army at Valley-forge. The evening preceding the evacuation, the principles of the operations proper to be adopted, were taken up and fully discussed by his excellency and the general officers, when it appeared to be the common sentiment, that it would be highly criminal to hazard a general action with the enemy at present, as by it they might lose every advantage which a three years war, combined with many fortunate circumstances, had given to America. The next day his excellency, after observing, “near 11,000 men would be able to march off the ground in a condition for service,” proposed in writing, a set of queries to the several general officers, in order to learn the particular opinion of each, as to “what is to be done?” which was to be returned on paper. The answers were in common the same with the prevailing sentiment of the council on the preceding day. Gen. Mifflin was not of the number consulted. He would have gloried in being present to have taken an active part upon this occasion; but by some secret manœuvres was thrown at a distance. He desired and obtained leave of congress, on the 4th of May, to join the army, and repaired to Valley-forge. Some of the general officers were disgusted at the thought of his returning to his command now the campaign was opening, to share in the honors it might yield, when he had not shared with them in the peculiar distresses of their winter-quarters. When their sentiments came to be known to certain members of congress, measures were taken to produce and perfect the following motion on June 11th, “That gen. Washington be directed to order an enquiry to be made into the conduct of major-general Mifflin, late quarter-master-general, and the other officers who acted under him in that department; and if it shall appear that the extraordinary deficiencies thereof, and the consequent distresses of the army were chargeable to the misconduct of the quarter-master-general, or any of the said officers, that a court-martial be held on the delinquents.” When this enquiry was ordered to be made, he was with the army, and in a fair way of obtaining a just proportion of his countrymen’s confidence. He clearly saw the meaning of the stroke; but the order made it necessary for him to obtain leave of absence for some weeks, to collect materials for his justification.

When intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton’s having evacuated Philadelphia and marched to Haddonfield, reached the American head-quarters, the next measure to be taken by gen. Washington, was apparent. Gen. Greene, by his conduct and industry as quarter-master-general, had effected such a happy change in the line of his department, as enabled his excellency with great facility to move with the whole army and baggage from Valley-forge in pursuit of the enemy. The troops proceeded to and crossed the Delaware at Corriel’s ferry; when a select corps of 600 men were immediately detached under col. Morgan, to reinforce gen. Maxwell. The slow advance of Sir Henry, led his excellency to suspect that he had a design of bringing on a general action, could he draw the Americans into the lower country. This consideration, and a desire of refreshing the troops after the fatigues they had endured from rainy and excessive hot weather, determined the American general to halt about five miles from Princeton. While there he stated to the general officers [June 24.] the following facts—“the enemy’s force is between 9 and 10,000 rank and file—the American army on the ground is 10,684 rank and file, beside the advanced brigade under general Maxwell, of about 1200, and about 1200 militia,” on which he proposed the question, “Will it be advisable to hazard a general action?” The answer was—“Not advisable, but a detachment of 1500 to be immediately sent to act as occasion may serve, on the enemy’s left flank and rear, in conjunction with the other continental troops and militia already hanging about them, and the main body to preserve a relative position, to act as circumstances may require.——Lee, Stirling, Greene, Fayette, Steuben, Poor, Paterson, Woodward, Scott, Portail, Knox.” The detachment was immediately made under general Scott. The same day Sir Henry concluding that gen. Washington, who had alway hitherto avoided a general action, would not now give into it against every dictate of policy, and that the American views were directed against his baggage, in which part he was indeed vulnerable, determined to take the right hand road leading to Sandy-Hook, instead of making for the Rariton, where he suspected general Gates with the northern army might join that under general Washington. Gates arrived at Fishkill about the middle of May, to take the command in that quarter. The troops under him were so few, that he could not answer for the defence of that pass through the highlands, with which he was entrusted; and was persuaded that if the enemy made a sudden and determined push to carry it, the militia would not come in time to save it. On the 17th of June draughts arrived, and militia were hourly expected; after mentioning this in a letter to congress, he exclaims—“Thank heaven for the precious time the enemy have so foolishly lost!” He had no idea of marching for the Rariton; but his cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry, was at this period so posted, as to give the alarm of an attack upon New-York: and he proposed moving the main body of his army to White-Plains, and taking a strong camp in that neighbourhood, to keep up the alarm: which was highly approved of by gen. Washington, and procured his thanks. On the 25th his excellency moved his army to Kingston. Upon receiving intelligence that Sir Henry was prosecuting his route towards Monmouth court-house, he dispatched 1000 select men under brigadier gen. Wayne, and sent the Marquis de la Fayette to take the command of the whole advanced corps, with orders to seize the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy’s rear. Gen. Lee declined the command, as he was against attacking, on which it was offered to the marquis, who accepted it with pleasure. In the evening of the same day, the whole army marched from Kingston, intending to preserve a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and arrived at Cranberry early the next morning. The intense heat of the weather, and a storm coming on, made it impossible to resume the march that day without great injury to the troops. The advanced corps, being in consequence hereof too remote from the main body, and too far upon the right to be supported, the marquis had orders sent him to file off by his left toward English-town, which he executed early in the morning of the 27th. Sir Henry being sensible of the approach of the American army, changed the disposition of his troops, and placed in the rear what were deemed the best, consisting of all the grenadiers, light-infantry and chasseurs of the line; at the same time gen. Knyphausen was requested to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge of his division, which made the first column. Under the head of baggage was comprised, not only all the wheel carriages of every department, but also the bat-horses—a train which, as the country admitted but of one rout for carriages, extended near twelve miles. The alteration made by Sir Henry laid gen. Washington under the necessity of increasing the number of the advanced corps. His excellency embraced this opportunity of gratifying gen. Lee, with the consent of the marquis. Lee observed that his having declined the command of the advanced corps had lessened him in the opinion of officers and soldiers, wished to be appointed afresh. Washington would not consent to remove the marquis; but a reinforcement being wanted, he detached Lee with two brigades to join the marquis at English-town, and of course to take upon him the command of the whole. The main body marched the same day, and encamped within three miles of that place. Morgans corps was left hovering on Sir Henry’s right flank, and the Jersey militia, amounting to about 700, under gen. Dickinson, on his left. The royal army was strongly encamped in the neighbourhood of Monmouth court-house, where they halted till the morning of the 28th. When once arrived at the heights of Middletown, about twelve miles in advance, there would have been no possibility of attempting any thing against them with a prospect of success, the American general therefore determined to attack their rear the moment they moved from their present ground, and communicated his intention to Lee, who was ordered to make the necessary disposition, and to keep his troops in readiness for the shortest notice. The like was done with respect to the troops under his own immediate command.

[June 28.] General Knyphausen moved at day-break: Sir Henry, that he might not press upon him, did not follow till near eight o’clock, with the other division, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 5th brigades of British, two battalions of British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, a battalion of light-infantry, the guards, and the 16th regiment of light-dragoons, a body of troops not easily to be equalled.

About one o’clock in the morning, gen. Lee received a letter from gen. Washington, and in pursuance of the directions it contained, wrote to gen. Dickinson to select some hundreds of his best men, and detach them as nigh to the British rear as he could. These troops were to act as a corps of observation, and to forward the earliest intelligence respecting the enemy. He also ordered col. Morgan to advance with the men under his command so near as to attack them on their first movement: but it was left to him how to act, only he was to take care and not expose his troops, in that manner as to disable him from acting in conjunction with Lee, should there be a necessity for it. Orders were likewise sent to Grayson, as the commanding officer of the two brigades (of Scot and Varnum) consisting of about 600 men, to get them instantly in readiness to march. By daylight they entered English-town; but it was not till between five and six that they marched from thence toward Monmouth court-house, having been detained for want of guides. Nearly at the same time, Lee gave orders to the several detachments and Maxwell’s brigade, to prepare for marching immediately, leaving their packs behind under proper guard: they followed the two just mentioned brigades about seven o’clock. About five Dickinson sent an express to general Washington, informing that the front of the enemy had began their march. His excellency instantly put the army in motion, and sent orders to Lee to move on and attack them, unless there should be _very powerful reasons to the contrary_;[87] and acquainted him that he was marching to support him, and for doing it with the greater expedition and convenience, should make the men disencumber themselves of their packs and blankets. The exceptive clause in the orders rendered them discretionary; they manifested the earnest desire of the commander in chief, that an important blow might be struck which the enemy should feel; but Lee could not consider them as requiring him to risk a general engagement, in direct repugnency to the spirit of those councils of war that had been repeatedly held upon the subject. While Lee was advancing with his column, he sent forward an aid to order Grayson to push on as fast as possible and attack the enemy. Before the aid overtook him, he had passed Freehold meeting-house with the two brigades. The aid delivered Lee’s orders: but gave it as his opinion, that Grayson had better not move on, for that he had been informed that the main body of the enemy was near Monmouth court-house and was thought to be marching to attack them, of which circumstance he supposed Lee was ignorant. The aid on his return fell in with Dickinson, who gave him the same information, and charged him with a message to Lee. Lee conformed to it on its delivery, and gave orders for posting two militia regiments upon a hill for the securing of a particular road, and then pushed forward over a morass or ravine, by the bridge or sauseway, to a height where Dickinson was with a few militia. During his stay on this height, intelligence of the most extraordinary nature was continually brought him. Some asserted, that the enemy had moved off with precipitation, and that it was only a covering party which remained; others averred, that the main force was still on the ground, and filing off in columns to the right and left—one while the enemy’s troops were turning the flanks of the American’s—at another, pushing in front. These opposite reports occasioned Varnum’s brigade, and part of Scott’s, and col. Durgee’s brigade of Lee’s column, to pass and repass the bridge over the morass several times, as it was universally agreed to be by no means warrantable to risk an action, with a ravine in the rear, over which there was only one good passage. While these marchings and counter-marchings took place, the marquis de la Fayette arrived at the head of the main body of Lee’s troops; when the general having reconnoitred a wood, into which it had been reported a battalion or two of the enemy had thrown themselves, and being satisfied that it was groundless, determined to march on, and ascertain with his own eyes, the number, order and disposition of the enemy, and then to conduct himself accordingly. His whole command amounted to about 4000 men, exclusive of Morgan’s corps and the Jersey militia; and consisted of gen. Scott’s detachment, gen. Wayne’s, gen. Maxwell’s brigade, gen. Varnum’s, general Scott’s and col. Jackson’s regiment. When they had nearly passed through the woods, with which the country abounds, and were arrived at a point facing the court-house, and on the edge of a plain about three miles in length and one in breadth, they were formed, but within the skirt of the wood, that the enemy might not discover them. Here they remained while generals Lee and Wayne, and a few others, went out upon the right and rode forward to reconnoitre. From the observations Lee made, and the intelligence he obtained, he concluded that the forces he saw, were no other than the enemy’s covering party, and entertained hopes of an interval between them and the main body, sufficient to afford him the opportunity of cutting them off. That he might perfect this business, Wayne was appointed to command 700 men, to whom were attached two pieces of artillery. Wayne was to attack the covering party in the rear faintly, so as to halt them, but not with vigor lest that should occasion their retreating with celerity to the main body, or drawing from it so powerful a reinforcement as to defeat the principal design.—Mean time Lee was to endeavor, by a short road leading to the left, to gain the front of the party. While marching on this road, one of gen. Washington’s suite came up to procure intelligence. Lee, with a fixed firm tone of voice and countenance which suggested confidence of success, desired him to infrom his excellency, that the enemy did not appear well to understand the roads; that the route he was on cut off two miles; that the rear of the enemy was composed of 1500 or 2000; that he expected to fall in with them, and had great certainty of cutting them off; and that general Wayne and col. Butler were amusing them with a few loose shot while he was performing the route. Wayne’s command was advanced to the right and drawn up. The enemy appeared just in the edge of the wood upon an eminence with their light-dragoons. A few of the American light-horsemen were advanced upon the right, at a very considerable distance. One of Lee’s aids-de-camp observed the queen’s light-dragoons parading as though they meant to charge these American light-horsemen, who had no officer of eminence to head them: he therefore rode up and advised them to let the British dragoons come as near as could be done with safety, and then to retreat off to where gen. Wayne was, and let him receive them. The British horse pursued till they came near the general, when receiving a fire from col. Butler’s regiment, posted on the skirt of a wood, they wheeled and galloped off in great haste to their own body; as they were retiring, the two pieces of artillery fired a few shot at them. Wayne then advanced, and encouraged his men to follow on, and charge the enemy with bayonets. The aid rode back to Lee, who immediately sent him forward to Wayne, with orders that he should only feign an attack, and not push on too precipitately, as that would subvert his plan and disappoint his intentions. Lieut. col. Oswald, who commanded the artillery, supposed that the enemy were retreating, and so passed the morass in front, over a causeway, into a grain field, and began to cannonade. This happened after ten o’clock.—About the same time a part of Lee’s troops issued out of a wood on the left of, and about a mile below the court-house, in small columns, and in an oblique direction with respect to the royal forces, rather toward their right, and within cannon shot.—These were drawn up ready to face the Americans, with their right near a wood, and their left on open ground, covered by their cavalry, and forming an obtuse angle with the court-house. The cavalry filed off to the left, as if with design to attempt something on the right of Lee’s troops, which occasioned an order to the marquis de la Fayette to wheel his column by his right, and to gain and attack the enemy’s left flank. Lee having also ordered to the right the three regiments in Wayne’s detachment, Wesson’s, Stewart’s and Livingston’s, rode toward Oswald’s artillery and reconnoitred the enemy, who appeared in full view, marching back again toward the court-house, and in greater numbers than was expected, so that Lee said, he believed he was mistaken in their strength.

Let us now advert to the manœuvres of Sir Henry Clinton. Soon after he had begun with his column to follow gen. Knyphausen, reconnoitring parties of the Jersey militia appeared on his left flank. The queen’s rangers fell in with, and dispersed some detachments among the woods in the same quarter. His rear-guard having descended from the heights above Freehold into the plain, some American columns appeared likewise descending into it, and began the cannonade on his rear, which was returned by a superior fire. At this instant intelligence was brought to Sir Henry, that the enemy were discovered marching in force on both his flanks. He conjectured that the object of the Americans was the baggage, which at that juncture was engaged in defiles that continued for miles. He conceived that the only means of parrying the apprehended blow, was by facing about, attacking the corps which harrassed his rear, and pressing it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return from his flanks to its assistance. Thinking that the measure might possibly draw on a general action, he sent for a brigade of British, and the 17th light dragoons from Knyphausen’s division, and at the same time gave directions that on their arrival they should take a position for covering his right flank. He then made a disposition, and advanced in a direction toward the right of the Americans.

This happened while Lee was reconnoitring. The American column to the left of him, under gen. Scott, quitted the wood, crossed a morass, and formed in the plain field, about a hundred yards in front of Maxwell, who expected an opportunity to form his brigade by Scott’s moving to the right, as there was a vacancy between the latter and the troops with Lee. These were at that moment moving to the right, and every step they gained came nearer to the royal forces, who were also pushing to the right of the Americans. Lee’s discernment led him immediately to send off one of his aids with orders to Scott, whom he supposed to be in the wood on the other side of the morass, to halt his column in the wood, and continue there till further orders; that there might be no possible misconception, another aid was speedily dispatched with similar orders. Before these could be delivered, Scott had mistaken the movements on his right for a retreat; and apprehended danger to his own column in case of its remaining where he was, notwithstanding his detachment and Maxwell’s brigade, with the other troops to the left, made full two-thirds of Lee’s whole command, and though the enemy appeared to bend their course from the left to the right of the Americans. Under such apprehension, Scott re-crossed the morass, re-entered the wood, and retreated; Maxwell and the others did the like of course. When the first aid reached that part of the wood to which he had been directed, and found that Scott had marched off the ground, he rode back; while returning he met the second aid, and acquainted him with what had taken place; upon their coming to Lee, and communicating their information, the general discovered much surprise, and expressed his disapprobation of Scott’s conduct in strong terms; but immediately upon the intelligence, directed a light-horse officer to carry orders to the marquis de la Fayette to return to the court-house. A general retreat now commenced on the right, till the troops reached Freehold and a neighboring wood. When these were quitted, the British pursued as far as the village, where they halted. Mean while the Americans marched on and passed the next morass in front of Carr’s house, about half a mile from the village. The retreats and advances which took place were attended with cannonadings on each side. The halt of the British, on account of the intense heat of the weather, and their having suffered severely from fatigue, admitted of the Americans halting also for a considerable space, which heat and fatigue had rendered equally necessary for them. But upon the advance of the British from Freehold, and Lee’s discerning that the position he at first meant to occupy with the design of receiving the enemy and baffling their attack, was not suitable; the whole of his command, Scott, Maxwell, and the others having now joined the corps which before formed the right, were ordered to retreat from the neighbourhood of Carr’s house toward a wood and eminence behind the morass they had crossed in the morning, which had been pointed out to him as a desirable and proper spot. Before they had wholly left the ground about Carr’s house, the British cavalry made a sudden and rapid charge upon some parties of the American horse, who were in the rear reconnoitring. It was expected they would have attempted a charge on the whole rear, but they did not venture upon it.

Soon after Lee with his columns issued out of the woods below the court-house into the plain, gen. Washington was advancing with the main body of the army between English-town and Freehold meeting. Expecting from the information brought him, than the van of Lee’s command and the rear of the British would ere long engage, he ordered the right wing under gen. Greene to go to the right to prevent the enemy’s turning his right flank: and then prepared to follow with the left wing directly in Lee’s rear to support him. While this disposition was making, he learned, to his great surprise, from a countryman, that the continental troops were retreating. Though the account was confirmed by two or three persons whom he met on the road, after moving a few paces forward, yet he appeared to discredit it, having not heard any firing except a few cannon a considerable time before. He rode on, and between Freehold meeting and the morass, which he had just crossed, met the retreating troops marching toward the same, as Lee meant that they should re-pass it and then occupy the ground behind it, where he proposed making a stand against the enemy. Washington was exceedingly alarmed at finding the advanced corps falling back upon the main body, without the least notice given him. He desired one of the retreating colonels to march his men over the morass, halt them on the eminence, and refresh them. Seeing Lee at the head of the next column, he rode up to him with a degree of astonishment and indignation, and proposed certain questions that implied censure. Lee felt it, and answered with warmth and unsuitable language. Hard and irritating words passed between them for a short space, when Washington rode on toward the rear of the retreating troops. He had not gone many yards before he met his secretary, who told him that the British army were within fifteen minutes march of that place, which was the first intelligence he received of their pushing on so briskly. He remained there till the extreme rear of the retreating troops got up, when looking about, and judging the ground to be an advantageous spot for giving the enemy the first check, he ordered col. Stewart’s and lieut. col. Ramsay’s battalions to form, and incline to their left, that they might be under cover of a corner of woods, and not be exposed to the enemy’s cannon in front. Lee having been told by one of his aids, that Washington had taken the command, answered, “Then I have nothing further to do;” turned his horse and rode after his excellency in front. Washington on his coming up asked, “Will you command on this ground or not? If you will, I will return to the main body and have them formed upon the next height.” Lee replied, “It is equal to me where I command.” Washington then told him, “I expect you will take proper measures for checking the enemy.” Lee said, “Your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field.” Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with the utmost expedition on the eminence with the morass in front. Immediately upon his riding off a warm cannonade commenced between the British and American artillery on the right of Stewart and Ramsay; between whom and the advanced troops of the British army a heavy fire began soon after in the skirt of the woods before mentioned. The British pressed on close, their light-horse charged upon the right of the Americans, and the latter were obliged to give way in such haste, that the British horse and infantry came out of the wood seemingly mixed with them. The action then commenced between the British and col. Livingston’s regiment together with Varnum’s brigade, which had been drawn up by Lee’s order, and lined the fence that stretched across the open field in front of the bridge over the morass, with the view of covering the retreat of the artillery and the troops advanced with them. The artillery had timely retired to the rear of the fence, and from an eminence discharged several grapes of shot at the British, engaged with Livingston’s and Varnum’s troops; these were soon broken by a charge of the former and retired. The artillery were then ordered off. Prior to the commencement of the last action, Lee sent orders to col. Ogden, who had drawn up in the wood nearest the bridge, to defend that post to the last extremity, thereby to cover the retreat of the whole over the bridge. Lee was one of the last that remained on the field, and brought off the rear of the retreating troops. Upon his addressing general Washington, after passing the morass, with—“Sir, here are my troops, how is it your pleasure that I should dispose of them?” he was ordered to arrange them in the rear of English-town.

The check the British received, gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the main army in the wood and on the eminence to which Lee had been directed and was retreating. On this were placed some batteries of cannon by lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which played upon the British with great effect, and seconded by parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to their advance. Gen. Greene, who had early filed off to the right, on intelligence of the retreat of the advanced corps, marched up, and took a very advantageous position on the right of Stirling. The British finding themselves warmly opposed in front, attempted to turn the American left flank, but were repulsed. They also made a movement to the American right, with as little success. Greene having advanced a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground, which not only disappointed their design, but severely infiladed those in the front of the left wing. In addition to this, Wayne advanced with a body of troops, and kept up so severe and well directed a fire, that the British were soon compelled to give way. They retired and took the position about Carr’s house, which Lee had before occupied. Here their flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could be approached only through a narrow pass. Washington however, resolved to attack them; and for that purpose ordered gen. Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigade, to move round upon their right, and gen. Woodward to their left; and the artillery to gall them in front; but they were prevented getting within reach before dark. They remained upon the ground which they had been directed to occupy, during the night, with an intention to begin the attack early the next morning, and the main body continued lying upon their arms in the field of action, to be in readiness for supporting them. During the action, Washington animated his forces by his gallant example; and by exposing his person to every danger common to the meanest soldier, taught them to hold nothing too dear for the good of their country. At night he laid down and reposed himself in his cloak, under a tree, in hope, as may be supposed, of a general action the ensuing day; for it appears from several circumstances, that he was all along rather desirous of that event, notwithstanding the prevailing contrary opinion of the general officers whom he consulted. In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton’s troops were employed in removing their wounded; and about twelve o’clock[88] at night, they marched away in such silence, that though Poor lay extremely near them, their retreat was effected without his knowledge. They left behind them four officers and about forty privates, whose wounds were too dangerous to permit their removal.

The extreme heat of the weather, the distance Sir Henry had gained by marching in the night, and the fatigue of the Americans, made a pursuit on the part of gen. Washington impracticable and fruitless. It would only have been fatal to numbers of the men, several of whom died on the day of action through the excessive heat; for Farenheit’s thermometer was at 96 degrees in the Jerseys, and is said to have been 112 at Philadelphia. It was a deep sandy country through which they marched, almost destitute of water; but had there been a plenty, many more would probably have perished by unguarded drinking to allay their thirst; some were lost in that way. Sir Henry, without having been joined by the brigade of British and the 17th light dragoons from Knyphausen’s division, secured by his manœuvres the arrival of the royal army in the neighborhood of Sandy-Hook on the 30th of June, without the loss of either the covering party or the baggage; but not without a considerable diminution of troops; for by a moderate calculation, from the evacuation of Philadelphia down to that day, about eight hundred deserted, a great number of whom were hessians. By the returns of the officers who had the charge of the burying parties, they left 245 non-commissioned and privates on the field, and four officers. There were also beside these, several fresh graves and burying holes found near the field, in which they had put their dead before they had quitted it.[89] Fifty-nine of their soldiers perished without receiving a wound, in the same manner as several of the Americans, merely through fatigue and heat. The loss of lieut. col. Monckton, who was slain, was much lamented by the British. Upward of a hundred were made prisoners, including the officers and privates left upon the field. On the part of the Americans, lieutenant-colonel Bonner and major Dickinson, officers of distinguished merit, were slain; beside six others of inferior rank, and 61 non-commissioned and privates. The wounded were 24 officers and 136 non-commissioned and privates. The missing amounted to 130, but many of them, having only dropped through fatigue, soon joined the army. General Washington commended the zeal and bravery of the officers in general, but particularized Wayne as deserving special commendation. The behavior of the troops in general, after recovering from the first surprise, occasioned by the retreat of the advanced corps, was mentioned as what could not be surpassed. The public acknowledgments of congress were very flattering to the army, and particularly so to the general and his officers. The general having declined all further pursuit, detached only some light troops to attend the motions of the royal forces, and drew of the main body of his army to the borders of the North-River.

The general, on his second interview with Lee upon the day of action, intimated by his reinstating and leaving him in the command of the advanced corps, that he meant to pass by what had happened without further notice; but the latter could not brook the expressions used by the former at their first meeting; and therefore wrote him two passionate letters, which occasioned his being put under an arrest, and brought to trial four days after the action, on the following charges, exhibited against him by his excellency—1st, For disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions—2dly, For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, by making an _unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat_—3dly, For disrespect to the commander in chief, in two letters, dated the 1st of July and the 28th of June. The letter dated 1st of July, was so dated through mistake, being written on the 28th of June. On the 12th of August, the court-martial, at which lord Stirling presided, found him guilty upon every charge, and sentenced him to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States of North-America, for the term of twelve months. The terms of the second charge were softened down, as he was only found guilty of misbehavior before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, and in some few instances, a disorderly retreat. Many were displeased with the conduct of the court-martial; and thought he ought not to have been found guilty, except upon the last charge. They argued, “It appears from Washington’s own letter, and other circumstances, that it was submitted to Lee’s judgment whether to attack, in what manner, and when. There was manifest proof of Lee’s intending to attack, in hope of cutting off the enemy’s covering party; but he altered his opinion as to the promising prospect he had of doing it, on his coming into the plain, reconnoitring the enemy, and concluding that they were more numerous than before supposed; and upon finding Scott had quitted the point of wood where he meant to order him to remain, he judged an immediate retreat necessary. The detachment with which Lee was, amounted to no more than one-third of his whole command; Scott’s column, Maxwell’s brigade, and the other troops to his left, being full two-thirds. When he began to retire, the main body was more than six miles distant, though advancing. The enemy’s force was rendered the more formidable by their great superiority in cavalry, which was thought to be between four and five hundred. The ground being open, was by no means advantageous to the Americans, as the British cavalry could have turned their flank. Would then an immediate attack, under these circumstances, though it might have distressed the enemy’s rear on the first onset, have been advisable, as it might probably have involved a general action before the detachment could have received support? Did not prudence dictate falling back, and taking a new position, rather than hazarding an action in the plain? If Lee’s judgment determined for the affirmative, how could he be declared guilty of disobeying orders?” The circumstances already noted are in favor of the retreat’s being necessary in the first instance; and when commenced, the prosecution of it was absolutely necessary till a good position could be taken for making an effectual stand against the enemy, to which position Lee was marching when met by Washington. The strenuous efforts of the British after the main army was drawn up in that position, before they retired three miles from the scene of action, tend also to justify the commencement of the retreat. No mention should have been made of its being in a few instances, unless such instances were really chargeable to Lee’s misconduct; whereas of these few it is certain, that some were owing to fatigue and the enormous heat of the weather. The very sentence of the court-martial is in favor of Lee’s innocence as to the two first charges; for a year’s suspension from command is in no wise proportioned to his crimes, if guilty. Several are of opinion that he would not have been condemned on these two, had it not been for his disrespectful conduct toward Washington. On the other hand, some have surmised, that his manœuvres were owing either to treachery or want of courage; but they who have the opportunity of knowing him most, will be furtherest from such apprehensions.[90]

No sooner had Sir Henry Clinton with the army evacuted Philadelphia, than lord Howe prepared to sail with the fleet for New-York. Repeated calms retarded his passage down the Delaware, so that he could not quit the river till the evening of June the 28th: however he anchored off Sandy-Hook the next day, followed by the transports. The succeeding day Sir Henry arrived, and the artillery, baggage, and part of the troops were removed from the main, as the weather permitted: the rest of the army passed, on the 5th of July, over a bridge of boats across a narrow channel to Sandy-Hook. They were afterward carried up to New-York. On the 7th, lord Howe received advice that the Toulon squadron was arrived on the coast of Virginia. Count d’Estaing anchored at night on the 8th at the entrance of the Delaware, after being 87 days at sea. On that day the count wrote to congress: on the receipt of his letter, they sent word to gen. Washington, that it was their desire he would co-operate with the count, in the execution of such offensive operations as they should mutually approve. The same day the congress resolved that a suitable house should be provided for Monsieur Gerard and chose a committee of five to wait on him upon his arrival, and conduct him to his lodgings. The next morning d’Estaing weighed and sailed toward the Hook, and in the evening of the 11th anchored without it. Had not bad weather and unexpected impediments prevented, the count must have surprised Howe’s fleet in the Delaware, as the latter would not have had time to escape after being apprized of his danger.—The destruction of the fleet must have been the consequence of such surprisal; and that must have occasioned the inevitable loss of the royal army, which would have been so enclosed by the French squadron on the one side, and the American forces on the other, that the Saratoga catastrophe must have been repeated. This fatal stroke would have been of an amount and magnitude (with respect to both the marine and land service, and the consequences hanging upon it) not easily to be conceived. The prevention of it, by the various hindrances that d’Estaing met with on his voyage, ought to be considered by Great-Britain as a signally providential deliverance.

Lord Howe’s fleet consisted only of six 64 gun ships, three of 50, and two of 40, with some frigates and sloops. Count d’Estaing had twelve ships of the line, several of which were of great force and weight of metal, one carrying 90, another 80, and six 74 guns each; he had beside present with him three of the four stout large frigates that had attended him on his voyage. He anchored on the Jersey side, about four miles without the Hook; and American pilots of the first abilities, provided for the purpose, went on board the fleet: among them were persons whose circumstances placed them above the rank of common pilots. Lord Howe had the advantage of possessing the harbor formed by Sandy-Hook, the entrance of which is covered by a bar, and from whence the inlet passes to New-York. As it could no be known whether the French would not attempt passing in force over the bar, it was necessary that the British should be prepared to oppose them. On this occasion a spirit displayed itself not only in the fleet and army, but through every order and denomination of seamen, that is not often equalled. The crews of the transports hastened with eagerness to the fleet, that it might be completely manned; masters and mates solicited employment, and took their stations at the guns with the common sailors, the light-infantry, granadiers, and even wounded officers so contended to serve as marines on board the men of war, that the point of honor was obliged to be decided by lot. In a word, the patriotism, zeal, bravery and magnanimity which appeared at this juncture, was a credit even to Great-Britain. It must however be acknowledged, that the popularity of lord Howe, and the confidence founded on his abilities, contributed not a little to these exertions. But the American pilots declaring it impossible to carry the large ships of d’Estaing’s squadron over the bar into the Hook, on account of their draught of water, and gen. Washington pressing him to sail to Newport, he left the Hook after eleven days tarriance, [July 22.] and in a few hours was out of sight. Nothing could be more providential. While he remained, about twenty sail of vessels bound to New-York fell into his possession: they were chiefly prizes taken from the Americans; but had he stayed a few days longer admiral Byron’s fleet must have fallen a defenceless pray into his hands. That squadron had met with unusual bad weather and being separated in different storms, and lingering through a tedious passage, arrived, scattered, broken, sickly, dismasted, or otherwise damaged, in various degrees of distress, upon different and remote parts of the American coast. Between the departure of d’Estaing and the thirtieth of July, the Renown of 50 guns from the West-Indies, the Raisonable and Centurion of 64 and 50 from Hallifax, and the Cornwall of 74 guns, all arrived singly at Sandy-Hook. By his speedy departure a number of provision ships from Cork escaped also, together with their convoy.—They went up the Delaware within fifty miles of Philadelphia after lord Howe had quitted the river, not having obtained any information of what had happened. The British ministry had neglected countermanding their destination, though orders for the evacuation of Philadelphia had been sent off so early as to have admitted of their receiving fresh directions where to have steered, before sailing. Great rejoicings were made at New-York upon their safe arrival, especially as provisions were much wanted by both the fleet and army.

As the bar prevented all attempts on the part of d’Estaing against Howe’s fleet within the Hook, a plan was concerted for attacking Rhode-Island; and gen. Sullivan, who commanded at Providence, was employed in assembling an additional body of New-England militia. Such was the eagerness of people to cooperate with their new allies, and their confidence of succeeding and reaping laurels, that some thousands of volunteers, gentlemen and others from Boston, Salem, Newbury-Port, Portsmouth, &c. engaged in the service. When d’Estaing was arrived off point Judith on the 29th, the pilots who were to have facilitated his entrance into Newport, were wanting, which occasioned a delay. But on the morning of August the 5th, his operations commenced, when the British set fire to the Orpheus, Lark, Juno and Cerbarus frigates and several other vessels at the appearance of two of his fleet standing in near Prudence island to attack them. The Flora and Falcon were sunk afterward. The next day the American troops marched from Providence to Tiverton under the command of general Greene, who had been dispatched by gen. Washington from the main army to assist in the expedition. His excellency also sent on the marquis de la Fayette at the head of two thousand troops, who by a rapid march joined the militia in season. Gen. Sullivan’s first letter to the count informed him, that he was not ready to act, and desired that the attack might be suspended. It was agreed between them that they should land their forces at Portsmouth on the tenth in the morning. On the eighth the French fleet went up the middle passage leading into Newport harbour, when the British batteries began a severe cannonade, which was returned with great warmth.