Chapter XXXV: Letter XVII: Rotterdam, Nov. 10, 1779

FRIEND G.

Toward the end of April, an expedition against the isle of Jersey was set on foot under Mr. de Nassau, who had no fortune, with a view of putting money into his pocket, from the rapine and plunder that would follow upon its success.[98] It so happened that admiral Arbuthnot, who you have heard sailed the 1st of May, with a squadron of men of war, and a prodigious convoy of merchantmen, and transports for America, fell in with the vessel, going express to England, with an account of the attack, and the apparent imminent danger of the island.—Upon that he ordered the convoy to wait for him at Torbay, and proceeded to the relief of Jersey. Though the failure of the expedition was the consequence, the French comforted themselves when they saw it had the unexpected effect of detaining admiral Arburthnot for a long time at Torbay, and of inducing the admiralty to order ten ships of the line, under admiral Darby, to join the former, for the safe escorting the convoy to a certain distance. Mr. Sartine upon obtaining information of this order, hurried the Brest fleet under count d’Orvilliers to sea.——There was not at the last moment, sailors sufficient to man it; but neither this, nor the non-arrival of two ships expected from Toulon, could prevail with him to risque losing the opportunity on the one hand of intercepting Darby on his return, and on the other of securing the junction of the French and Spanish fleets. Eight thousand land forces were put on board to serve as marrines, and to supply the defect of sailors. With this kind of equipage did the fleet sail on the 4th of June. There was a geeral exultation visible in the countenance of every Frenchman at Paris mixed with surprise, upon hearing that their fleet was sailed, and that there was no British force at sea to oppose them. Not a word was put into the Gazette of France of d’Orvilliers’ sailing. It is asserted, that Sartine being asked why he did not let a thing so public and so interesting, go into the gazette, his answer was—“The English ministry will not know it so soon any other way.” Darby, however, narrowly escaped, to the great disappointment of the keenest expectations of the French, who really looked upon his division as a sure prey. Foreigners are astonished at the present management of the British marine. They look back to former wars, when it was deemed a most consequential service, and the most concise mode of crippling the marine of France, and rendering their projects abortive, to block up the harbours of Brest and Toulon. When d’Orvilliers had sailed, a profound secrecy reigned at the court of France, as to his destination; but by the 6th of July, certain advices were received of his having joined the Spanish fleet upon the 24th of June. Before the junction, though not its apparent certainty, a manifesto was presented [June 16.] by the marquis d’Almodovar, the Spanish ambassador, accompanied with the notice of his immediate departure. The manifesto established this fact, that Spain had taken a decided part with France and America against Great-Britain. It cost the court of Versailles great pains to goad the Catholic king’s ministers to a decided resolution in the councils of Madrid; and after all, it has been said by respectable authority, “That there had been no declaration from Spain, if the English fleet had been at sea,” in force and in season to have prevented the junction, which was regarded as that on which the very salvation of France depended. The spirits of the French were as drooping as can be well conceived, till they had heard of that event, and of the arrival of the two reinforcements forwarded to count d’Estaing.[99]

When the Spanish ambassador once knew that d’Orvilliers sailed on the 4th of June, and that the British grand fleet remained at Spithead on the 14th, he must assure himself that the junction of the French and Spanish ones would take place, and could not be prevented by the other; and that therefore he might proceed without any demur to deliver the manifesto. This event will, most probably, be more favorable in the issue to the American states, than success in the Spanish mediation on the terms his Catholic majesty proposed, which were—That the two crowns of Great-Britain and France should disarm, and agree to a universal suspension of hostilities—that the plenipotentiaries of both should meet at an appointed place, to settle their respective differences—that a like suspension should be granted by Great-Britain to the American colonies (as they were stiled) which should not be broken, without giving to his Catholic majesty an anticipated notice of one year, that he might communicate it to the said American provinces; and that there should be a reciprocal disarming, and a regulation of the limits not to be passed by either, as to the places they might respectively occupy at the time of ratifying this adjustment—that there should come to Madrid one or more commissioners of the colonies and of his Britannic majesty, to agree in settling the preceding particulars, and others relative to the firmness of said suspension, and that, in the mean time, the colonies should be treated as independent in acting. The contents of the manifesto were laid before both houses of parliament the day after its being presented, and were accompanied with a message from the king. They both concurred unanimously in resolving to support with spirit and vigor, the war against the house of Bourbon. An answer was transmitted by his majesty’s secretary, lord Weymouth, to the masquis d’Almodovar, dated July 13th, ten days after the rising of parliament. This answer was received when a state paper was nearly printed off at Madrid, and which related the motives that induced the Spanish monarch to withdraw his ambassador and act hostilely against Great-Britain. This paper asserts that the British ministry, while they rejected the proposals made by Spain, were insinuating themselves at the court of France, by means of secret emissaries, and making great offers to her to abandon the colonies, and to make a peace with Britain, and at the same time were treating, by means of another emissary, with Dr. Franklin, to whom they made various proposals to disunite them from France, and to accommodate matters with Britain, not only holding out conditions similar to those which they had rejected when coming through his Catholic majesty, but including offers much more favorable to the Americans.

Count d’Orvilliers having received instruction, steered with the combined fleet, amounting to 66 ships of the line, for Plymouth. The coasts of Normandy and Brittany being at the same time crowded with troops, and the ports in the bay and channel with shipping, exhibited the appearance of an intended invasion of England or Ireland. D’Orvilliers passed Sir Chas. Hardy who was cruising in the bay, with near forty ships of the line (having sailed from Spithead the day on which the Spanish manifesto was presented) without their having the least knowledge of each other. He appeared off Plymouth in the evening [Aug. 16.] and the greatest part of the two following days; but without making any attempt, which, had it taken place immediately, must have succeeded, as the town was altogether in a defenceless state with “neither men, capable of standing to the guns, nor rammers, sponges, or other impliments for loading them.”[100]—The inhabitants and the neighbouring country were in the greatest confusion and the utmost alarm. But on Wednesday the 18th it providential began to blow almost a storm at east, which continued till the 22d, and forced the fleet below Plymouth; and the wind remaining strong in the same point for same days, prevented its return no less than Sir Charles Hardy’s coming into the channel.[101] The Ardent of 64 guns, on her way from Portsmouth to join Sir Charles, mistaking the combined for the British fleet, was taken in sight of Plymouth. D’Orvilliers ranged about the Land’s End, the Scilly Islands, and the chops of the channel, till the end of the month, without seeking to return and make an attack upon Plymouth. He might conclude, that it would be now too late, the first opportunity having been lost, especially as a very great sickness prevailed among the sailors and soldiers on board the fleet. Thus by a coincidence of circumstances, Plymouth, with the dock, the naval magazines &c.—were happily preserved, notwithstanding the criminal neglect of administration in not putting the place into a proper state of defence. It is a fact, that there was delivered to one of the ministry, on the 28th of July, a letter from France, acquainting him with the destination of the combined fleet, and the intention of attacking and destroying Plymouth.

[Aug. 31.] The wind favoring, Sir Charles Hardy gained the entrance of the channel in sight of the combined fleets, without their being able to prevent him. The enemy pursued him as high up as Plymouth, but did not venture much further. The sickness increasing on board the combined fleet to a most extreme degree, and their ships being otherwise much out of condition, and the equinox approaching, count d’Orvilliers thought it necessary to abandon the British coasts, and repair to Brest early in September. The whole country round about became an hospital, through the many thousands of sick that were landed. It was a most happy circumstance for the British merchants, that a large Jamaica fleet escaped and got into the channel about ten days before he first entered it; and that eight homeward bound East-Indiamen had timely notice of their danger, so as to have the opportunity of putting into Ireland.

In the beginning of September, adm. Barrington arrived with dispatches, giving an account of the taking of the isles of St. Vincent and Grenada, and of an action between adm. Byron and count d’Estaing. The count sailed for Grenada, and arrived off the island [July 2.] with a fleet of five or six and twenty ships of the line, about 12 frigates, and near 10,000 land forces, including marines. The defence of the place lay in about 150 soldiers, 350 militia, 200 volunteers, with some seamen; and its strength consisted in a fortified and entrenched hill, which commanded the fort, harbour, and capital town of St. George. The French landed between 2 and 3000 regulars, under count Dillon, the same evening; and the next day invested the hill, and made the necessary preparations for carrying it by storm the following night, as they would lose no time, lest admiral Byron’s fleet might arrive. The defence was obstinate, considering the force on each side. Although d’Estaing headed a column of the assailants in person, they were repulsed in the first onset, but their superior numbers at length prevailed, and the lines were carried after a conflict of about an hour and a half; the loss of the French, however, in killed and wounded, was considerable. The cannon taken on the top of the hill, being turned at break of day against the fort, the governor, lord Macartney, was under the necessity of proposing a capitulation. D’Estaing granted him but an hour for framing the articles, which, when presented, were rejected in the gross. The count proposed others so extraordinary that his lordship and the principal inhabitants thought it better to trust to the law and custom of nations, and to the justice of one court, and the interposition of the other, by surrendering at discretion, than to bind themselves to such unexampled conditions. His lordship, in expectation that the fortified hill was next to impregnable, had carried thither his plate, jewels and most valuable effects, and his principal officers had followed his example.[102] The count is charged with having exercised great severity and oppression; and it is said that his soldiers were indulged in such unbridled licence that the condition of the inhabitants would have been deplorable beyond description, but for the humanity and tenderness of the officers and privates of Dillon’s Irish regiment.

Meanwhile admiral Byron had returned to St. Lucie, from convoying the West-India fleet; but weakened through the ships he had sent with the trade to Great-Britain. He there received intelligence of the loss of St. Vincent; and immediately concluded with gen. Grant, to proceed with the land and naval forces for its recovery. On their passage they received information that d’Estaing had attacked Grenada, without being acquainted with de la Motte Picquet’s having joined him. They changed their intention, and steered for the relief of Grenada.

The British commanders arrived within sight of the French fleet at break of day, [July 6.] Their force consisted of 21 ships of the line and a single frigate. They were embarrassed by the somewhat greater number of transports which conveyed the troops. The French having received previous information of the approach of the British fleet, were then mostly getting under way, and those ships which had not already hoisted their anchors, slipt their cables, and kept stretching out to sea. The objects of the hostile commanders were totally different. The British admirals wanted to bring the enemy to close action in hopes of conquest and of saving Grenada. D’Estaing sought for no further advantage than the preservation of his new acquisition, which to him was a sufficient victory. His ships being cleaner, and consequently sailed better than the British, he chose a partial action, rather than be exposed to the doubtful issue of a desperate conflict. The first signal made by Byron was for a general chase; and the second, for the ships to engage and form as they could get up. By eight o’clock the action was commenced by adm. Barrington in the Prince of Wales, with the captains, Sawyer and Gardner in the Boyne and Sultan, they having closed with the van of the enemy. Being obliged to endure the whole weight of fire from that division, for a considerable time before they could be supported, and suffered accordingly; beside the damage of the ships and the loss of the men, the admiral was himself wounded. The French eluded every effort made by the British commanders to bring on a close and decisive engagement. When the evolutions on both sides, and the eagerness on one, threw a few of the British ships into a situation, which obliged them to endure a conflict with a much greater number of the enemy, a close engagement ensued. Thus the Grufton, the Cornwall and the Lion, sustained the whole fire of the French fleet. The Monmouth attempting singly to arrest the progress of the enemy’s van, hoping thereby to bring on a general action, but failing, was reduced almost to a wreck. The Suffolk, adm. Rowley with the Fame, suffered also considerably in similar situations.

The action ceased about twelve o’clock; but although renewed at two, and at other times, in a degree, during the evening, yet nothing essential was effected. During the heat of it, some British ships pushing their way to the very entrance of the harbour of St. George’s, beheld French colours on the fort, and were fired at by the batteries. The object of the British commanders was therefore totally changed. The relief of the island was at an end. The protection of the transports, along with that of the disabled ships, was now the main point to be considered. Three of the disabled ships were a great way astern: the Lion was obliged to bear away singly, in the best manner she could, before the wind. That and the other two might seemingly have been cut off by the French: but d’Estaing would not risk the bringing on of a decisive action by attempting their capture. In the evening, the Monmouth and the transports were ordered to make the best of their way to Antigua or St. Kitts. Byron drew up his line, reduced now to 19 ships, about three miles distant from d’Estaing, and expected to be attacked in the morning; but during the night, the count returned to Grenada. The loss of men in the British fleet was moderate; the other circumstances of the action however were exceeding grievous; for the great damage sustained by the ships in their masts and rigging, which could not be easily remedied in that quarter, afforded an astonishing superiority of force to the French, which while it continues, will render it impossible for the British longer to dispute the empire of the sea with them in the West-Indies.—All accounts concur in describing the French loss of men in the action as prodigious. The published number of officers killed and wounded, both in the naval and land departments, is considerable. The other must be in a great degree conjectural.

The latter end of July, there sailed from Port l’Orient the Bon Homme Richard, of 40 guns and 375 men, commanded by capt. Paul Jones, the alliance of 36 guns, the Pallas, a French frigate of 32, the Vengeance an armed brig of 12 together with a cutter: Jones acted as commodore to the squadron. He steered for the Western coast of Ireland and appeared off Kerry. From thence he ranged round the north of Scotland, till he came off Forth Frith on September the 19th; when he directed his course to Flamborough Head. Being off the Head, he fell in with the fleet [Sept. 23.] from the Baltic, under the protection of the Serapis, capt. Pearson, and the Countess of Scarborough, capt. Piercy. Before noon, capt. Pearson received intelligence from the bailiffs of Scarborough, of the squadron under Jones being on the coast. Between twelve and one the headmost of the fleet got sight of it, when the Serapis made all the sail she could to get between the enemy and the convoy, which she soon effected. Capt. Pearson, by four o’clock plainly discerning from the deck, that the squadron consisted of three large ships, and a brig, (the cutter was not now with them) made the Countess of Scarborough signal to join him, which was done about half past five. A little after seven, the Bon Homme Richard brought to within musket shot of the Serapis, when the fight began, and was maintained with equal fury on bath sides, each vessel using all possible means to gain an advantageous situation to rake the other. Capt. Pearson had infinitely the superiority over the Bon Homme Richard in working the Serapis, and obtained advantages in spite of every effort of Jones to prevent it. Jones to render such superiority useless, aimed at lying his ship athwart the hawse of the other. Though he did not succeed to his wish, yet as the bowsprit of the Serapis ran between his poop and mizen-mast, he seized the opportunity of lashing the vessels together, when the wind driving the head of the Serapis against the bow of the Bon Homme Richard, they became so close fore and aft, that the muzzles of their guns touched each other’s sides. In this position they engaged from half past eight till half past ten. But before it commenced, the Bon Homme Richard had received many 18lb. shot between wind and water, and was become very leaky. Her tier of 12 pounders was entirely silenced and abandoned. Her six 18 pounders, which were old, were of no service, and were fired but eight times in all. During the succeeding action, Jones made use only of three nine pounders, whose fire was seconded by that of his men in the round-tops. At the same time others threw such a quantity and variety of combustible matters into the decks, chains, and every part of the Serapis, that she was on fire not less than 10 or 12 times in different parts, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the same could be extinguished. At half past nine, by some accident the Serapis had a cartridge of powder set on fire, the flames of which communicating from one to another all the way aft, blew up all the people and officers abaft the main-mast, and rendered all those guns useless for the remainder of the action. When both ships were on fire together, as it happened at times, the spectacle was dreadful beyond expression. The Alliance repeatedly sailed round both while engaged, raking the Serapis fore and aft, and thereby killing or wouning many of her men on the quarter and main decks.[103]—After ten she came up afresh, and renewed the fire; but through the darkness of the night, and both ships being so close along side each other, it was not poured into the Serapis alone, but also into the Bon Homme Richard, eleven of whose men were killed, beside an officer mortally wounded, by one of her broadsides. Capt. Pearson however, perceiving that it was impracticable to stand out any longer with the least prospect of success, struck, after having (by his conduct, and persevering bravery) secured to his convoy the opportunity of saving themselves. The Serapis was a much superior ship to the Bon Homme Richard, being built on an excellent model, and carrying 44 guns in two tiers, the lower 18 pounders. The number of men killed and wounded on each side was necessarily great. Both ships suffered much, but the Bon Homme Richard was reduced to a wreck; she had near seven feet water in her hold, which kept increasing. The wounded were removed, and only the first lieutenant of the Pallas, with some men left on board to keep the pomps going, while the boats were disposed within call to take them in when occasion required. On the twenty-fifth the water rose to her lower deck and she went down; but nobody was lost with her.[104] It still remains to be mentioned, that the Countess of Scarborough engaged the Pallas for near two hours, when capt. Piercy was obliged to strike. Commodore Jones, with the remains of his flying squadron and prizes, made for Holland, and on the 3d of October anchored off the Texel. The commodore estimates the prizes taken and ransomed by the Bon Homme Richard, during her cruize, at more than £.40,000.

Sir Joseph Yorke soon applied to their high mightinesses for the delivering up of the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough. On the 29th of October, he presented a memorial to them, in which by his majesty’s order, he renews, “in the strongest and most pressing manner, his request that those ships and their crews may be stopped and delivered up, which the pirate Paul Jones, of Scotland, who is a rebel subject, and a criminal of the state, has taken.” Jones is stiled a pirate upon the supposition that his letters of marque or commission are illegal for want of being granted by a sovereign power, which the British do not allow the congress to be. But it may be at length discovered, that Jones’ letters are legal upon their own principles, and have been granted by the French, whatever, other letters he may possess. The whole of Jones’ expedition was probably concerted at Versailles, with the design of catching the eastern fleet laden with naval stores, while the continetal frigate, the Alliance was borrowed for a cover, and the cammand of the whole given to Jones on account of his acquaintance with the Irish and British coasts.—The memorial contains a threatening insinuation of serious consequences in case of non-compliance. The answer which their high mightinessess have given is in brief—“That they will, in no respect whatever, pretend to judge of the legality or illegality of the actions of those who have on the open sea, taken any vessels which do not belong to this country, and bring them into any of the ports of this republic; that they only open their ports to them to give them shelter from storms or other disasters, and oblige them to put to sea again with their prizes, without unloading or disposing of their cargoes, but letting them remain exactly as when they arrived; and that they are not authorized to pass judgment either on these prizes or the person of Paul Jones.” What would be the fate of Jones, could the British once make him their prisoner, is hard to determine; considering that capt. Cunningham was brought in irons from New-York to Falmouth, and sent ironed to Pendennis castle; from which however, he was removed in a few weeks to Mill prison, Plymouth; and being a native American, he is now rated as an exchangeable prisoner.

The present state of Ireland must not be passed over without notice.

The long continued embargo on provisions, the only staple export of that kingdom, has been viewed as particularly insulting and most highly resented by the people; on their reflecting that a set of contractors reaped the greatest benefit from it, while the interest of the country was sacrificed, and the whole nation distressed. Taxes became more numerous, and the national debt accumulated every session of parliament. Advantage was taken of these circumstances, and the peculiar situation of Great-Britain, by the most sagacious among the Irish, for the obtaining of those privileges which might otherwise never be secured. The doctrines of taxation without representation, and of unconditional submission, which ministry applied to America, were urged as matter of apprehension to Ireland; and it was openly said, that the chains forged for the former, in case of success, would afford a mode for the fetters which would soon be fitted for the latter. The smothered flame at length broke out with violence, on finding that parliament would afford them no effectual relief. Associations against the purchase and use of British manufactures, and for the encouragement of their own, became universal. But beside these, there were associations of a more effective and terrifying nature. Being alarmed with the danger of a French invasion, it was urged, that the defence of the kingdom must be placed in those who had the best interest in it. Military associations were therefore proposed, and universally adopted. The associators declared, that they were intended for the double purpose of defending their safety against foreign enemies, and their rights against domestic usurpation. In every part of the kingdom were seen instantly to arise, as if by magic, vast bodies of citizens, serving at their own charges, choosing their own officers, trained to great expertness, and obeying with remarkable regularity. No gentleman, no nobleman could show his face in the country, who did not fall in with the prevailing disposition. Men of considerable fortunes served in the ranks. All this business was accomplished without any sort of confusion or disorder; while the peace of the country, and obedience to the laws, were never more prevalent. The numbers of trained volunteers is supposed to be about 50,000; they are admirably appointed. Government saw these proceedings with astonishment. They wished to regulate this new and unexpected force and to bring it to act under the authority of the crown; but after a few feeble attempts, it was thought best to concur in a measure that could not be prevented. The Irish patriots having thus provided for the defence of the kingdom against foreign enemies, began to look toward their own rights; and in general disclaimed the authority of the British parliament over them, and condemned its interference in their affairs. On the 12th of October, the Irish parliament met. Upon a motion for the address, in answer to the speech of the lord-lieutenant, an amendment was moved and carried in the house of commons, which occasioned the insertion of the following words in their address to the throne—“We beg leave humbly to represent to your majesty, that it is not by temporary expedients, but by a free trade alone, that this nation is now to be saved from impending ruin.” The address from the lords contained similar expressions. Thus it appears that a free and unlimited commerce with the whole world is the _sine qua non_ with the patriots of Ireland, from which they mean not to depart. The prevailing unanimity in political sentiments among the Irish, has been greatly forwarded by their parliament’s having before followed the humane example of the British legislature in relaxing the penal restrictions of the laws against the English Roman Catholics. The addresses were carried up to the lord-lieutenant, with great parade, amid the acclamations of the people. The duke of Leinster, who commanded the Dublin volunteers, escorted the speaker in person upon the occasion, while, the streets were lined on both sides from the parliament-house to the castle, by that corps drawn up in their arms and uniforms. That nobleman had before moved for the thanks of the lords to the volunteer companies through the kingdom, which was carried with only one dissenting voice.

The present letter closes with mentioning, that the Spaniards have, for some months back, invested Gibraltar both by land and sea; the garrison seems to be under no apprehensions.

THE END OF VOLUME SECOND.

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Footnote 1:

General Montgomery’s letter of December 18.

Footnote 2:

Dr. Linn’s letter to me.

Footnote 3:

Colonel Meig’s manuscripts, and Dr. Linn’s letter, have furnished most
of the above particulars.

Footnote 4:

See the Marquis de Chastellux’s travels in North America, vol. ii. p.
275.

Footnote 5:

Most of the above from March the 6th, is taken from the manuscript
journal of a gentleman who continued in Boston, while in the hand of
the British generals.

Footnote 6:

Dr. Raffmsey’s History of the Revolution of South Carolina, vol. 1. p.
82, and onward.

Footnote 7:

Mr. Adam’s defence of the American Constitutions, p. 18.

Footnote 8:

Journals of Congress, vol. ii. p. 257.

Footnote 9:

Afterward captain George, of Watertown, near Boston.

Footnote 10:

Major, now col. Fuller, of Newtown, informed me of the particulars in
which he was concerned.

Footnote 11:

Letters of Mr. John Adams to Dr. Calkoen, p. 14.

Footnote 12:

Letters of Mr. Adams, p. 13.

Footnote 13:

The general’s letter to me.

Footnote 14:

It at length occasioned his death.

Footnote 15:

General Lee’s letter to congress.

Footnote 16:

General Washington’s letter.

Footnote 17:

The particulars of the retreat are taken from Dr. Rodgers’s
thanksgiving sermon; from col. Glover’s letters; and from the
information of persons who were present.

Footnote 18:

See M’Fingal, a modern Epic Poem, in four cantos, p. 82, Printed at
Hartford, in Connecticut, 1782. The Author is known to be Mr. John
Trumbull, the American Butler for wit and humor.

Footnote 19:

See queen Elizabeth’s bible, printed 1572, for Jugg, in Powle’s Church
Yard.

Footnote 20:

Colonel Glover’s letter.

Footnote 21:

The board of war.

Footnote 22:

General Washington’s letter to general Gates.

Footnote 23:

Mr. Griffiths, of New-York.

Footnote 24:

The same was confirmed to me by other gentlemen, while at New-York,
August 1785.

Footnote 25:

Col. Glover’s letter, dated North-Castle, Nov. 14, 1776.

Footnote 26:

Colonel Henly told me in the evening of Feb. 26, 1784, that gen. Lee,
when a prisoner asked gen. Howe, why he did not bring on a general
engagement, and received for answer the reason above mentioned.

Footnote 27:

Colonel Glover’s letter.

Footnote 28:

Board of war.

Footnote 29:

Mr. Vanbrugh Livingston, of New-York, told me he had this from major
Ross, of Lancaster in Pennsylvania, who saw the soldier brought in.

Footnote 30:

Loyalist’s letter, Nov. 10, 1777.

Footnote 31:

Mr. Mersereau, afterward an American deputy commissary of prisoners,
was my informer.

Footnote 32:

See Doctor Ramsay’s History, Vol. I. p. 153–161.

Footnote 33:

Mr. Adams’s Defence of American Constitutions, p. 106–108.

Footnote 34:

It is known in the neighborhood by the name of Split Rock only, though
generally put down in the maps Cloven Rock.

Footnote 35:

The general’s words in his own letter.

Footnote 36:

After having been employed some time in similar services, the enemy
grew suspicious of him, and upon that, without proof, put him into
prison, where he was starved to death.

Footnote 37:

Since colonel of horse.

Footnote 38:

In the maps it is put down Pennington: but the Jersey inhabitants in
common, would not know the place meant, unless you called it
Penny-town.

Footnote 39:

What relates to the attack upon the picket, &c. was confirmed to me,
August 11, 1785, at New York, by the Rev. Mr. Van Arsdelen, who had
the story from the Hessian officer commanding the picket.

Footnote 40:

See the letters of a Loyalist.

Footnote 41:

Remembrancer, part IV. p. 307.

Footnote 42:

The major’s letter to col. Harrison, one of gen. Washington’s
secretaries, after being exchanged for major Acland.

Footnote 43:

See col. Allen’s pamphlets, and also the hon. William Henry Drayton’s
publication at Philadelphia, Oct. 24, 1778, addressed to the
commissioners, Carlisle, Clinton and Eden.

Footnote 44:

Since appointed chief justice of Canada.

Footnote 45:

See his letter published in the Gazette, and in the Remembrancer, vol
V. p. 101.

Footnote 46:

Mr. Edm. Burke’s letter to the sheriffs of Bristol.

Footnote 47:

From the general returns of the army.

Footnote 48:

Sir William Howe’s narrative, p. 49.

Footnote 49:

General Washington’s letter of June 17.

Footnote 50:

A letter to gen. Washington, Remembrancer, Vol. V. p. 269.

Footnote 51:

Burgoyne’s State: earl of Balcarras, and earl of Harrington’s
declaration.

Footnote 52:

This account of the killed, and wounded and prisoners, on both sides,
is extracted from the journal of a British officer, who was afterward
taken and who mentioned the names of the officers killed and wounded
on his own side.

Footnote 53:

Consult the Trials of generals St. Clair and Scuyler for many facts
related respecting them.

Footnote 54:

Major Forbes’s account to the house of commons from Burgoyne’s State.

Footnote 55:

When the general was prisoner, he made this acknowledgment to one of
Scuyler’s suit, whom he asked whether he knew any thing of it, and who
pretended ignorance.

Footnote 56:

General Gates has repeatedly said as much in my hearing.

Footnote 57:

See the letters on this subject between Howe and Washington, and
others, in the Remembrancer, Vol. V. p. 214 to 220, and p. 250.

Footnote 58:

The board of war.

Footnote 59:

When the royal army quitted German-town, the Americans found in one of
the chimney hearths, some papers torn to pieces, and observing figures
upon them, certain officers attempted putting them together, and found
them to be the returns of the killed and wounded at German-town
battle, amounting to about 800.

Footnote 60:

They afterward diverted themselves and gen. Scuyler with this
relation. Many of the foregoing particulars were communicated to me by
the Rev. Mr. Kirkland, who was part of the time at Fort Scuyler, with
some of those Indians that were friendly to the Americans.

Footnote 61:

This is the substance of the relation given by Mrs. M’Neil who was in
company with Miss M’Rea when taken by the Indians.

Footnote 62:

See Marquis de Chastelleux’s Travels in North-America, Vol. I. p. 417.

Footnote 63:

Earl of Harrington before the house of commons.

Footnote 64:

Lincoln’s letter.

Footnote 65:

He was lieut. col. of militia, when he gave evidence on the trial of
the soldiers at Boston, in 1776.

Footnote 66:

Lieut. col. Kingston before the house of commons.

Footnote 67:

The board of war.

Footnote 68:

Burgoyne’s State of the Expedition from Canada.

Footnote 69:

Item.

Footnote 70:

Captain Money’s declaration in the house of commons.

Footnote 71:

Idem.

Footnote 72:

Earl of Balcarras.

Footnote 73:

Lieut. Col. Brooks was my informer.

Footnote 74:

Burgoyne’s State.

Footnote 75:

General Glover’s information given me at Boston, March 18, 1785.

Footnote 76:

Earl of Balcarras in the house of commons.

Footnote 77:

Idem.

Footnote 78:

Mr. James Beekman, an eminent merchant belonging to New York, and who
quitted Æsopus when Vaughan approached it, informed me of these
particulars, Sept. 29, 1783, at his house in Morris county, New
Jersey.

Footnote 79:

See the Loyalists’ Letters.

Footnote 80:

See James M. Varnum’s letter of Aug. 2, 1786, in the Providence
Gazette, who was the commanding general on the Jersey side.

Footnote 81:

General Washington mentioned it to me, when at his table; June 3,
1784.

Footnote 82:

She never reached her port, and has never been heard of since sailing.

Footnote 83:

When gen. Gates’s letters were examined by me, at his seat in
Virginia, the latter end of 1781, there was not a single paragraph to
be met with, that contained any intimation of his being concerned in
such a plan.

Footnote 84:

Dr. Ramsay’s History, vol. i. p. 129–138.

Footnote 85:

Capt. Vincent’s letter of March the 17th. Remembrancer, vol. vi. p.
143.

Footnote 86:

Lord Howe in the house of commons.

Footnote 87:

Gen. Washington’s letter of July 1, 1778, to congress.

Footnote 88:

In the London Gazette Extraordinary, Aug. 24, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton
is represented as writing in his official letter—“Having reposed the
troops till ten at night, to avoid the excessive heat of the day, I
took advantage of the moon-light to rejoin lieut. gen. Knyphausen.”
Poor Will’s Almanack, printed at Philadelphia, by Joseph Crukshank,
tells the public that the new moon was on June 24th, at ten in the
morning, and that on the 28th of June it set 55 minutes after ten at
night. Sir Henry could have had little advantage from the light of the
moon but four days old, and that was to set in an hour’s time, had he
marched off his troops precisely at ten; but if at about twelve, as
gen. Washington writes, and which is most likely to have been the
case, the moon light, below the horizon, could not have been of any
advantage.

Footnote 89:

General Washington’s letters.

Footnote 90:

In compiling several of the preceding pages, recourse has been had to
the public letters of Sir Henry Clinton and gen. Washington, to
various private letters and information, and to gen. Lee’s trial.

Footnote 91:

Hartley.

Footnote 92:

Pine-knots are so replete with turpentine, that they are fired and
used at night to illuminate the room; and lighted splinters are often
carried about in the houses of the Carolina planters instead of
candles.

Footnote 93:

This was a private letter; but was afterward published in Rivington’s
Royal Gazette, as written by the president of congress, Henry Laurens,
esq. It was known by several to contain a strong mark of
authenticity—the truth.

Footnote 94:

Dr. Ramsey’s History of the Revolution in South-Carolina, vol. I. p.
1.

Footnote 95:

The Massachusetts council.

Footnote 96:

Dr. John Erskine’s Considerations on the Spirit of Popery, p. 31.

Footnote 97:

Advocate M’I——’s Political Memoirs.

Footnote 98:

Political Memoirs.

Footnote 99:

Political Memoirs.

Footnote 100:

Mr. H—b—t’s declaration. Gentleman’s magazine for 1780, p. 109.

Footnote 101:

Gentleman’s magazine for 1779, p. 421–423.

Footnote 102:

The Paris account of the taking of Grenada.

Footnote 103:

The account printed in the Courier de l’Europe of November 5, 1779,
signed Paul Jones, states the matter so as to imply a denial of what
asserted in the Gazette account signed R. Pearson; but from the known
vanity of Jones, and the utter improbability of the Alliance’s
remaining totally inactive for so long a time, it is highly reasonable
to conclude, that the first account is erroneous.

Footnote 104:

Captain Jones’ account.

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Non-standard spelling not corrected. ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.