Chapter XXVI: Section 3: And be it further resolved, That a sufficient sum of (1)

money to carry this resolution into effect is hereby appropriated
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.

Approved December 17, 1863.

_____

_General Grant to General Cullum._

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,
To Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE W. CULLUM,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri.

General: I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional
surrender, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen
thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a
large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about
fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the
command of Generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments were sent
around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat (or boats),
and with instructions not to pass it.

The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column
arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o'clock, m. At
this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The
fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually
approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the
line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats
and re-enforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the
investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn
closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On the evening of
the 13th, the gunboats and re-enforcements arrived. On the 14th a
gallant attack was made by flag-officer Foote upon the enemy's
river batteries with his fleet.

The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and bid fair
to result favorably, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the
armed boats, so that they were carried back by the current. The
remaining two were very much disabled also, having received a
number of heavy shots about the pilot-houses and other parts of
the vessels. After these mishaps, I concluded to make the
investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially
fortify, and await repairs to the gunboats. This plan was
frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous attack
upon our right wing, commanded by Brigadier-General J. A. (p. 373)
McClernand, and which consisted of his division and a portion
of the force under General L. Wallace.

The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of
several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers suffered
out of proportion. I have not the means of determining our loss,
even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of twelve
hundred killed, wounded and missing. I shall retain here enough
of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately
shipped off, and not left for recapture.

About the close of this action the ammunition and cartridge boxes
gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers,
produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did
not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion, and,
consequently, great demoralization existed with him. Taking
advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon our left (enemy's
right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was
most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of
victory. The battle lasted until dark, and gave us possession of
part of the intrenchment. An attack was ordered from the flank
after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions
under McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hours of
exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was
gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points
thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for
the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their
efforts at an early hour in the morning. This morning, at a very
early hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a
flag of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the
correspondence which ensued is herewith enclosed.

I could mention individuals who especially distinguished
themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade
commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received.

Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, McClernand
and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of them were
with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready
to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves.

At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's command,
I was absent, having received a note from flag officer Foote,
requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call on me,
in consequence of a wound received the day before.

My staff: Colonel J. D. Webster, first Illinois artillery, chief
of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general;
first lieutenants C. B. Lagone and William S. Hillyer, aids; and
Lieutenant Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief engineer and Colonel
John Riggin, junior, volunteer aid, are all deserving of personal
mention for their gallantry and services.

For details, see reports of engineers, medical director and
commanders of divisions and brigades to follow.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Brigadier-General U. S. A._, _commanding_.

_____

[Copy.] (p. 374)

_General Buckner to General Grant._

Headquarters, Fort Donelson,
To February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL U.S. GRANT,
Commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson.

Sir: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the
present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the
commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of
commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces
and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice
until twelve o'clock to-day.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
_Brigadier-General C. S. A._

_____

[Copy.]

_General Grant to General Buckner._

Headquarters, Army in the Field,
To Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862.
GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER,
Confederate Army.

Sir: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appointment of
commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.
No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Brigadier-General commanding_.

_____

[Copy.]

_General Buckner to General Grant._

Headquarters, Dover, Tennessee,
To February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT,
United States Army.

Sir: The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to
an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force
under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant
success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the
ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, Sir, your very obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
_General commanding C. S. A._

_____

_General Orders No. 2._ (p. 375)

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,
Fort Donelson, February 17th, 1862.

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the
troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by
their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant.

For four successive nights, without shelter during the most
inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in
large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly
fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were
added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to
receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day,
resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without
conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down
rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of
war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of
our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live
in the memory of a grateful people.

U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General commanding_.

_____

_General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General._

To Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
COLONEL J. C. KELTON, Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 6, 1863
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces,
from the date of my assuming the immediate command of the
expedition against Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the reduction of
that place.

From the moment of taking command in person I became satisfied
that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side, and, in
accordance with this conviction, I prosecuted the work on the
canal, which had been located by Brigadier-General Williams,
across the peninsula, on the Louisiana side of the river, with
all vigor, hoping to make a channel which would pass transports
for moving the army and carrying supplies to the new base of
operations thus provided. The task was much more herculean than
it at first appeared, and was made much more so by the almost
continuous rains that fell during the whole of the time this work
was prosecuted. The river, too, continued to rise and make a
large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of our
camps and the canal.

Finally, on the 8th of March, the rapid rise of the river (p. 376)
and the consequent great pressure upon the dam across the
canal, near the upper end, at the main Mississippi levee, caused
it to give way and let through the low lands at the back of our
camps a torrent of water that separated the north and south
shores of the peninsula as effectually as if the Mississippi
flowed between them. This occurred when the enterprise promised
success within a short time. There was some delay in trying to
repair damages. It was found, however, that with the then stage
of water, some other plan would have to be adopted for getting
below Vicksburg with transports.

Captain F. E. Prime, Chief Engineer, and Colonel G. G. Pride, who
was acting on my staff, prospected a route through the bayous
which run from near Milliken's Bend on the north and New Carthage
on the south, through Roundaway Bayou into the Tensas river.
Their report of the practicability of this route determined me to
commence work upon it. Having three dredge boats at the time, the
work of opening this work was executed with great rapidity. One
small steamer and a number of barges were taken through the
channel thus opened, but the river commencing about the middle of
April to fall rapidly, and the roads becoming passable between
Milliken's Bend and New Carthage, made it impracticable and
unnecessary to open water communication between these points.

Soon after commencing the first canal spoken of, I caused a
channel to be cut from the Mississippi river into Lake
Providence; also one from the Mississippi river into Coldwater,
by way of Yazoo Pass.

I had no great expectations of important results from the former
of these, but having more troops than could be employed to
advantage at Young's Point, and knowing that Lake Providence was
connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream
through which transports might pass into the Mississippi below,
through Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers, I thought it possible
that a route might be opened in that direction which would enable
me to co-operate with General Banks at Port Hudson.

By the Yazoo Pass route I only expected at first to get into the
Yazoo by way of Coldwater and Tallahatchie with some lighter
gunboats and a few troops and destroy the enemy's transports in
that stream and some gunboats which I knew he was building. The
navigation, however, proved so much better than had been expected
that I thought for a time of the possibility of making this the
route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines Bluff,
Mississippi, and small class steamers were accordingly ordered
for transporting an army that way. Major-General J. B. McPherson,
commanding seventeenth army corps, was directed to have his corps
in readiness to move by this route; and one division from each
the thirteenth and fifteenth corps were collected near the
entrance of the Pass to be added to his command. It soon became
evident that a sufficient number of boats of the right class
could not be obtained for the movement of more than one division.

Whilst my forces were opening one end of the Pass the enemy was
diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeded in
gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of
the Tallahatchie and Yallobusha. The advance of the expedition,
consisting of one division of McClernand's corps from Helena,
commanded by Brigadier-General L. F. Ross, and the 12th and 17th
regiments of Missouri infantry, from Sherman's corps, as (p. 377)
sharpshooters on the gunboats, succeeded in reaching Coldwater
on the 2d day of March, after much difficulty, and the partial
disabling of most of the boats. From the entrance into Coldwater
to Fort Pemberton, at Greenwood, Mississippi, no great difficulty
of navigation was experienced nor any interruption of magnitude
from the enemy. Fort Pemberton extends from the Tallahatchie to
the Yazoo at Greenwood. Here the two rivers come within a few
hundred yards of each other. The land around the fort is low, and
at the time of the attack was entirely overflowed. Owing to this
fact, no movement could be made by the army to reduce it, but all
depended upon the ability of the gunboats to silence the guns of
the enemy and enable the transports to run down and land troops
immediately on the fort itself. After an engagement of several
hours the gunboats drew off, being unable to silence the
batteries. Brigadier-General I. F. Quinby, commanding a division
of McPherson's corps, met the expedition under Ross with his
division on its return from Fort Pemberton, on the 21st of March,
and being the senior, assumed command of the entire expedition,
and returned to the position Ross had occupied.

On the 23d of March I sent orders for the withdrawal of all the
forces operating in that direction, for the purpose of
concentrating my army on Milliken's Bend.

On the 14th day of March, Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding
Mississippi squadron, informed me that he had made a
reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou, and partially through Black
Bayou toward Deer Creek, and so far as explored these water
courses were reported navigable for the smaller iron-clads.
Information given mostly, I believe, by the negroes of the
country, was to the effect that Deer Creek could be navigated to
Rolling Fork, and that from there through the Sunflower to the
Yazoo river there was no question about the navigation. On the
following morning I accompanied Admiral Porter in the ram Price,
several iron-clads preceding us, up through Steele's Bayou to
near Black Bayou.

At this time our forces were at a dead-lock at Greenwood, and I
looked upon the success of this enterprise as of vast importance.
It would, if successful, leave Greenwood between two forces of
ours, and would necessarily cause the immediate abandonment of
that stronghold.

About thirty steamers of the enemy would have been destroyed or
fallen into our hands. Seeing that the great obstacle to
navigation, so far as I had gone, was from overhanging trees, I
left Admiral Porter near Black Bayou and pushed back to Young's
Point for the purpose of sending forward a Pioneer corps to
remove these difficulties. Soon after my return to Young's Point
Admiral Porter sent back to me for a co-operating force. Sherman
was promptly sent with one division of his corps. The number of
steamers suitable for the navigation of these bayous being
limited, most of the force was sent up the Mississippi river to
Eagle's Bend, a point where the river runs within one mile of
Steele's Bayou, thus saving an important part of this difficult
navigation. The expedition failed, probably more from want of
knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than
from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and
bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this
knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were
encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to
Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy
time to move forces to effectually checkmate further (p. 378)
progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few
hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo.

All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a
line of operations which has proven eminently successful.

For further particulars of Steele's Bayou expedition see report
of Major-General W. T. Sherman, forwarded on the 12th of April.

As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on
the Mississippi near Milliken's Bend to New Carthage I determined
to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below
Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water
then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us
a point on the Mississippi river, would also protect the main
line of communication by water. Accordingly the thirteenth army
corps, Major-General J. A. McClernand commanding, was directed to
take up its line of march on the 29th day of March for New
Carthage, the fifteenth and seventeenth corps to follow, moving
no faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to
them.

The roads though level were intolerably bad, and the movement was
therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's Plantation, two
miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou
Vidal was broken in several places, thus leaving New Carthage an
island.

All the boats that could be were collected from the different
bayous in the vicinity, and others were built, but the
transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly
tedious. Another route had to be found. This was done by making a
further march around Vidal to Perkins' Plantation, a distance of
twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from
Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side
of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad
roads to contend against, supplies of ordnance stores and
provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to commence the
campaign on the opposite side of the river.

At the same time that I ordered the occupation of New Carthage,
preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg
batteries with Admiral Porter's gunboat fleet.

On the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter's fleet and the
transports Silver Wave, Forest Queen, and Henry Clay ran the
Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected
as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary
stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck
more or less frequently while passing the enemy's batteries, and
the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a shell or by other means,
was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were
somewhat injured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of
either was hurt.

As these boats succeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six
more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries.
These latter, viz.: Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City,
Horizonia, and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of
the 22d April, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged
condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the
water line, and sunk on the Louisiana shore soon after passing
the last of the batteries. The crews of these steamers, with (p. 379)
the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Captain D. Conway,
and the Silver Wave, Captain McMillan, were composed of
volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this
dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by
hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose
services were accepted will be given in a separate report.

It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the
present volunteer army of the United States, that there is
nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or
professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the
duty required in almost every regiment.

The transports injured in running the blockade were repaired by
order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for
such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to
afford all the assistance in his power for the furtherance of the
success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports
were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to
be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded
with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats
that run the blockade; one half of them got through in a
condition to be used.

Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg it was
found necessary to extend our line of travel to Hard Times,
Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to
take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from
Milliken's Bend, our starting point.

The thirteenth army corps being all through to the Mississippi
and the seventeenth army corps well on the way, so much of the
thirteenth as could be got on board the transports and barges
were put aboard and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on the 29th
of April. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns
of the enemy, and the troops land under cover of the gunboats and
carry the place by storm.

At 8 o'clock A.M. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for
more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out
in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it
seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's
batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were
too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from
the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known
to be lined with rifle-pits, besides the field artillery could be
moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an
attempt at landing. This determined me to again run the enemy's
batteries, turn his position by affecting a landing at Rodney, or
at Bruinsburg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly orders
were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times,
Louisiana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand
Gulf. At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all
the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the
passage, and these without injury. I had some time previously
ordered a reconnoissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to
ascertain if possible from persons in the neighborhood the
character of the road leading to the highlands back of
Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that
there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which
determined me to land there.

The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced (p. 380)
at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports
being used for the purpose.

As soon as the thirteenth army corps was landed, and could draw
three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed
to cross until the troops were all over) they were started on the
road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that
the highlands should be reached without resistance.

The seventeenth corps followed as rapidly as it could be put
across the river.

About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May, the advance of the enemy was
met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He
was forced to fall back, but as it was dark, he was not pursued
far until daylight. Early on the morning of the 1st I went out,
accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his
corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At
this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions,
both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken
position on both branches, thus dividing as he fell back the
pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the
country is such that a very small force could retard the progress
of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on
narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on
either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and
Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's
corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from
position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.

Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position
occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's
corps arrived.

McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated
messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and
Quinby's divisions of McPherson's corps to him.

I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and
could see how they could be used there to advantage. However, as
soon as the advance of McPherson's corps (Logan's division)
arrived, I sent one brigade to McClernand on the right, and sent
one brigade, Brigadier-General J. E. Smith commanding, to the
left to the assistance of Osterhaus.

By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the
immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon
obtained giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from
that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou
Pierre.

The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded,
and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place
late in the afternoon. He was pursued toward Port Gibson, but
night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another
stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.

In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across
Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's
division was sent to divert his attention whilst a floating
bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port
Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marched by
McPherson's corps to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream
bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced passing over it
at 5 o'clock the following morning.

On the 3d the enemy was pursued to Hawkinson's Ferry, with (p. 381)
slight skirmishing all day, during which we took quite a
number of prisoners, mostly stragglers from the enemy.

Finding that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and that the advance
of my forces was already fifteen miles out from there, and on the
road, too, they would have to take to reach either Vicksburg,
Jackson, or any intermediate point on the railroad between the
two places, I determined not to march them back, but taking a
small escort of cavalry, some fifteen or twenty men, I went to
the gulf myself, and made the necessary arrangements for changing
my base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.

In moving from Milliken's Bend, the fifteenth army corps,
Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, was left to be the last
to start. To prevent heavy re-enforcements going from Vicksburg
to the assistance of the Grand Gulf forces, I directed Sherman to
make a demonstration on Haines's Bluff, and to make all the
_show_ possible. From the information since received from
prisoners captured this ruse succeeded admirably.

It had been my intention, up to the time of crossing the
Mississippi river, to collect all my forces at Grand Gulf, and
get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores
before moving, and in the meantime to detach an army corps to
co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson and effect a
junction of our forces.

About this time I received a letter from General Banks giving his
position west of the Mississippi river, and stating that he could
return to Baton Rouge by the 10th of May; that by the reduction
of Port Hudson he could join me with 12,000 men.

I learned about the same time that troops were expected at
Jackson from the southern cities with General Beauregard in
command. To delay until the 10th of May, and for the reduction of
Port Hudson after that, the accession of 12,000 men would not
leave me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what I
had. Information received from day to day of the movements of the
enemy also impelled me to the course pursued. Whilst lying at
Hawkinson's Ferry waiting for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's
corps, which had come forward in the mean time, demonstrations
were made, successfully, I believe, to induce the enemy to think
that route and the one by Hall's Ferry above were objects of much
solicitude to me. Reconnoissances were made to the west side of
the Big Black to within six miles of Warrenton. On the 7th of May
an advance was ordered, McPherson's corps keeping the road
nearest Black river to Rocky Springs, McClernand's corps keeping
the Ridge road, with his corps divided on the two roads. All the
ferries were closely guarded until our troops were well advanced.
It was my intention here to hug the Black river as closely as
possible, with McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and get them to
the railroad, at some place between Edward's Station and Bolton.
McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and from there
into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, and public
stores, etc., and push west to rejoin the main force. Orders were
given to McPherson accordingly. Sherman was moved forward on the
Edward's Station road, crossing Fourteen Mile creek at Dillon's
Plantation; McClernand was moved across the same creek, further
west, sending one division of his corps by the Baldwin's Ferry
road as far as the river. At the crossing of Fourteen Mile (p. 382)
creek both McClernand and Sherman had considerable skirmishing
with the enemy to get possession of the crossing.

McPherson met the enemy near Raymond, two brigades strong under
Gregg and Walker, on the same day engaged him, and after several
hours hard fighting, drove him with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners. Many threw down their arms and deserted.

My position at this time was with Sherman's corps, some seven
miles west of Raymond, and about the centre of the army.

On the night of the 12th of May, after orders had been given for
the corps of McClernand and Sherman to march toward the railroads
by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward's
Station and the latter to a point on the railroad between
Edward's Station and Bolton, the order was changed and both were
directed to move toward Raymond.

This was in consequence of the enemy having retreated toward
Jackson after his defeat at Raymond, and of information that
re-enforcements were daily arriving at Jackson, and that General
Joe Johnston was hourly expected there to take command in person.
I therefore determined to make sure of that place and leave no
enemy in my rear.

McPherson moved on the 13th to Clinton, destroyed the railroad
and telegraph, and captured some important despatches from
General Pemberton to General Gregg, who had commanded the day
before in the battle of Raymond. Sherman moved to a parallel
position on the Mississippi Springs and Jackson road; McClernand
moved to a point near Raymond.

The next day Sherman and McPherson moved their entire forces
toward Jackson. The rain fell in torrents all the night before,
and continued until about noon of that day making the roads at
first slippery and then miry, notwithstanding, the troops marched
in excellent order without straggling and in the best of spirits
about fourteen miles, and engaged the enemy about 12 o'clock, M.,
near Jackson. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division,
Mississippi Springs with another, Raymond with a third, and had
his fourth division and Blair's division of Sherman's corps with
a wagon train still in the rear near New Auburn, while McArthur
with one brigade of his division of McPherson's corps was moving
toward Raymond on the Utica road. It was not the intention to
move these forces any nearer Jackson, but to have them in a
position where they would be in supporting distance if the
resistance at Jackson should prove more obstinate than there
seemed reason to expect.

The enemy marched out the bulk of his force on the Clinton road
and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from the
city. A small force of artillery and infantry took a strong
position in front of Sherman, about the same distance out. By a
determined advance of our skirmishers these latter were soon
driven within their rifle-pits just outside the city. It was
impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy at this part of
the line in time to justify an immediate assault; consequently
McPherson's two divisions engaged the main bulk of the rebel
garrison at Jackson, without further aid than the moral support
given them by the knowledge the enemy had a force to the south
side of the city and the few infantry and artillery of the enemy
posted there to impede Sherman's progress. Sherman soon
discovered the weakness of the enemy by sending a (p. 383)
reconnoitering party to his right, which also had the effect of
causing the enemy to retreat from this part of his line. A few of
the artillerists, however, remained in their places, firing upon
Sherman's troops, until the last moment, evidently instructed to
do so, with the expectation of being captured in the end. On
entering the city it was found that the main body of the enemy
had retreated north, after a heavy engagement of more than two
hours with McPherson's corps, in which he was badly beaten. He
was pursued until near night, but without further damage to him.

During that evening I learned that General Johnston, as soon as
he satisfied himself that Jackson was to be attacked, had ordered
Pemberton peremptorily to march out from the direction of
Vicksburg and attack our rear. Availing myself of this
information, I immediately issued orders to McClernand and Blair,
of Sherman's corps, to face their troops towards Bolton, with a
view of reaching Edward's Station, marching on different roads
converging near Bolton. These troops were admirably located for
such a move. McPherson was ordered to retrace his steps early in
the morning of the 15th on the Clinton road. Sherman was left in
Jackson to destroy the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops,
arsenals, and everything valuable for the support of the enemy.
This was accomplished in the most effectual manner.

On the afternoon of the 15th I proceeded as far west as Clinton,
through which place McPherson's corps passed to within supporting
distance of Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, which had
moved that day on the same road to within one and a half mile of
Bolton. On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 P.M., I ordered McClernand
to move his command early the next morning toward Edward's
Station, marching so as to feel the enemy, if he encountered him,
but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident
he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with
him.

About five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employees
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, who had passed through
Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my
headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about
eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the
whole force was estimated by the enemy at about twenty-five
thousand men. From them I also learned the positions being taken
up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had
determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day
longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring
his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him
at 5.30 A.M. to move with all possible speed until he came up
with the main force near Bolton. My despatch reached him at 7.10
A.M., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from
that time. A despatch was sent to Blair at the same time, to push
forward his division in the direction of Edward's Station with
all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish
communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep
it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson
was ordered forward at 5.45 A.M. to join McClernand, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to
communicate the information received, and with verbal
instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces.
At an early hour I left for the advance, and on arriving at the
crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad with the road (p. 384)
from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his
pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road
that had been destroyed by the cavalry of Osterhaus's division
that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's
division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from further
advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and
wagonmasters to draw their teams to one side and make room for
the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.
Passing to the front, I found Hovey's division of the thirteenth
army corps at a halt, with our skirmishers and the enemy's
pickets near each other. Hovey was bringing his troops into line,
ready for battle, and could have brought on an engagement at any
moment. The enemy had taken up a very strong position on a narrow
ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp
turn to the left approaching Vicksburg. The top of the ridge and
the precipitous hill-side to the left of the road are covered by
a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right of the road the
timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens
into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into a valley
extending for a considerable distance. On the road and into the
wooded ravine and hill-side Hovey's division was disposed for the
attack. McPherson's two divisions, all of his corps with him on
the march from Milliken's Bend (until Ransom's brigade arrived
that day after the battle), were thrown to the right of the road
properly speaking, the enemy's rear. But I would not permit an
attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from
McClernand, who was advancing with four divisions, two of them on
a road intersecting the Jackson road about one mile from where
the troops above described were placed, and about the centre of
the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north
and nearly the same distance off.

I soon heard from McClernand, through members of his staff and my
own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning, and found that
by the nearest practicable route of communication he was two and
a half miles distant. I sent several successive messages to him
to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous
firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, which
by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division
bore the brunt of the conflict, but finding the enemy too strong
for them, at the instance of Hovey I directed first one and then
a second brigade from Crocker's division to re-enforce him. All
this time Logan's division was working upon the enemy's left and
rear and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops
here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expecting
McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I
never felt a doubt at the result. He did not arrive, however,
until the enemy had been driven from the field, after a terrible
contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and
prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery. It was found
afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a
southerly direction for about one mile and to where it
intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west,
down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating
on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's division had,
unconscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this
road and compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent capture. As it
was, much of his artillery and Loring's division of his army was
cut off, besides the prisoners captured. On the call of Hovey
for more re-enforcements, just before the rout of the enemy (p. 385)
commenced, I ordered McPherson to move what troops he could by a
left flank around to the enemy's front. Logan rode up at this
time and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the
enemy he could come up from where he then was and capture the
greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward and found
the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours
withdrawn from their advanced position and were filling their
cartridge boxes. I directed them to use all dispatch and push
forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of
Logan's division. Proceeding still further forward, expecting
every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his
line, I found he was retreating. Arriving at the Raymond road, I
saw to my left and on the next ridge a column of troops which
proved to be Can's division and McClernand with it in person; and
to the left of Carr, Osterhaus's division soon afterward appeared
with his skirmishers well in advance. I sent word to Osterhaus
that the enemy was in full retreat, and to push up with all
haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered
Carr to pursue with all speed to Black river, and across it if he
could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of McPherson's troops had
already got into the road in advance, but having marched and
engaged the enemy all day they were fatigued, and gave the road
to Carr who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a
train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores and
other property.

The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with
McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front
of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the
nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover
his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill or Baker's
Creek was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps
and Logan's and Quinby's divisions (the latter commanded by
Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps.

Ransom's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came on to the field
where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy
had begun his retreat.

Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's
engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport,
and to Blair to join him at this latter place.

At daylight, on the 17th, the pursuit was renewed with
McClernand's corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly
posted on both sides of the Black river. At this point, on Black
river, the bluffs extended to the water's edge on the west bank.
On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of near one mile
in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to
three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from
the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the
inside line of this bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits,
with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately
in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing
this place, and Lawless brigade the right of his division. After
a few hours skirmishing Lawler discovered that by moving a
portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank he could get
a position from which that place could be successfully assaulted,
and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level
ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without
cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the
enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully (p. 386)
made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen
pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and
daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river
immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus
cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces
remaining on the east bank.

Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on the Black river
above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him.
By the morning of the 18th he had crossed the river, and was
ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built
floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for
crossing their commands by 8 A.M. of the 18th.

The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the
Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within
three and a half miles of Vicksburg to get possession of Walnut
Hills and the Yazoo river. This was successfully accomplished
before the night of the 18th. McPherson crossed Black river above
the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but
to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where
Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and
Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to
get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army
corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and
by the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was made
as complete as could be by the forces at my command.

During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not
without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the
demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats
outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at 2 P.M. on
this day.

The fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the
enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were
enabled to make a vigorous assault. The thirteenth and
seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced
positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The 20th and 21st
were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most
of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty
days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the
commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short
rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other
rations was beginning to be much felt. On the 21st my
arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being
complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg
by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this
course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this
time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was
at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, re-enforced
by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching
him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to
attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the
siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me
to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and
possess myself of all the railroads and practical military
highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory
west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far
advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved (p. 387)
government sending large re-enforcements much needed elsewhere;
and finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess
Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the
same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after the
failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the 21st
orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to
commence at 11 A.M. on the 22d. All the corps commanders set
their time by mine, that there should be no difference between
them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the
three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the
assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's
front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from
his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A
portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags
on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions and maintained them
there until night. Each corps had many more men than could
possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened
between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of
breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The
assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops,
but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and
artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted,
and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show
all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret
to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but
without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability
to ultimately succeed.

No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works with the
exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st regiment Iowa
volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of
these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The
work entered by him, from its position, could give us no
practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it
were carried and held at the same time.

About 12 M., I received a despatch from McClernand that he was
hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him
to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had
that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just
reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand
stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of
and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag
was then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and
McPherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed
to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on
his front. I also sent a messenger to McClernand, directing him
to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately
to the position I had just left on McPherson's line to convey to
him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that
he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson
I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which
the following is a copy:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
To In the Field near Vicksburg, Mississippi,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. May 22d, 1863.

General: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several
points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur
to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to (p. 388)
concentrate the whole or part of his command on this point?

John A. MCCLERNAND,
_Major-General commanding_.

P.S. I have received your despatch, my troops are all engaged,
and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.

MCCLERNAND.

The position occupied by me during most of the time of the
assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on
in front of the thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible
for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession
of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in
his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 M.
and 1 P.M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which
doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the
time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they
might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of
carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape
through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all
of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report
to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his
despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of
the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as
much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was
promptly and vigorously made and resulted in the increase of our
mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our
position or giving us other advantages.

About 3.50 P.M., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as
follows:

To Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, May 22, 1863.
Department of the Tennessee.