Chapter XXVII: Section 3: And be it further resolved, That a sufficient sum of (2)

General: I have received your despatch in regard to General
Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as
they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and
doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My
men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by
rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who
intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard
pressed.

John A. MCCLERNAND,
_Major-General commanding_.

The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of
this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there
was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other
evidence of demoralization.

After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege.
The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this worked
diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and
satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for
a final assault.

There was a great scarcity of Engineer officers in the beginning,
but under the skillful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of
the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, (p. 389)
and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined
this command during the siege, such practical experience was
gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to
conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular
Engineer officers.

On the afternoon of the 3d of July a letter was received from
Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the Confederate forces
at Vicksburg, proposing an armistice and the appointment of
commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place.
The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted,
resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg
at 10 o'clock A.M., July 4, 1863, on the following terms: The
entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to
take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the
proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a
parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed then side arms
and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers
one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores
sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking
utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport
such articles as could not well be carried. These terms I
regarded more favorable to the government than an unconditional
surrender. It saved us the transportation of them north, which at
that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited
amount of river transportation on hand, and the expenses of
subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against
Johnston, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson,
and our river transportation to be used for the movement of
troops to any point the exigency of the service might require.

I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence
may be fully understood, that after my answer to General
Pemberton's letter of the morning of the 3d, we had a personal
interview on the subject of the capitulation.

The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in
the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be
forwarded as soon as received.

I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's
division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis,
Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the sixteenth army corps, and
assigned Major-General C. C. Washburne to command of same. On the
11th of June, Major-General F. J. Herron's division from the
Department of the Missouri arrived; and on the 14th two divisions
of the ninth army corps, Major-General J. G. Parke commanding,
arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the
investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large
reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's division was
put into position on the extreme south of the city, and Lauman's
division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and
Kimball's divisions and Parke's corps were sent to Haines's
Bluff. This place I had fortified to the land side and every
preparation made to resist a heavy force. Johnston crossed Big
Black river with a portion of his force, and everything indicated
that he would make an attack about the 25th of June. Our position
in front of Vicksburg having been made as strong against a sortie
from the enemy as his works were against an assault, I placed
Major-General Sherman in command of all the troops designated
to look after Johnston. The force intended to operate against
Johnston, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was
one division from each of the thirteenth, fifteenth, and (p. 390)
seventeenth army corps and Lauman's division. Johnston, however,
not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg
was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I
should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th,
and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move
upon receipt of orders if the assault should prove a success. His
preparations were immediately made, and when the place
surrendered on the 4th two days earlier than I fixed for the
attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force
increased by the remainder of both the thirteenth and fifteenth
army corps, and is at present investing Jackson where Johnston
has made a stand.

In the march from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, covering a period of
twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from government
stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of
these were taken in haversacks at the start, and were soon
exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country
through which we passed. The march was commenced without wagons,
except such as could be picked up through the country. The
country was abundantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and
mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever
appeared in better spirits or felt more confident of success.

In accordance with previous instructions, Major-General S. A.
Hurlbut started Colonel (now Brigadier-General) B. H. Grierson
with a cavalry force from La Grange, Tennessee, to make a raid
through the central portion of the State of Mississippi to
destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of
creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on
Vicksburg. On the 17th of April this expedition started, and
arrived at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May, having successfully
traversed the whole State of Mississippi. This expedition was
skillfully conducted and reflects great credit on Colonel
Grierson and all of his command. The notice given the raid by the
Southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has
been one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war, and
will be handed down in history as an example to be imitated.
Colonel Grierson's report is herewith transmitted.

I cannot close this report without an expression of thankfulness
for my good fortune in being placed in co-operation with an
officer of the navy who accords to every move that seems for the
interest and success of our arms his hearty and energetic
support. Admiral Porter and the very efficient officers under him
have ever shown the greatest readiness in their co-operation, no
matter what was to be done or what risk to be taken, either by
their men or their vessels. Without this prompt and cordial
support my movements would have been much embarrassed, if not
wholly defeated.

Captain J. U. Shirk, commanding the Tuscumbia, was especially
active and deserving of the highest commendation for his personal
attention to the repairing of the damage done our transports by
the Vicksburg batteries.

The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in
five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the
capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg
and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of
thirty-seven thousand (37,000) prisoners, among whom were fifteen
general officers; at least ten thousand men killed and (p. 391)
wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman and Green,
and hundreds and perhaps thousands of stragglers, who can never
be collected and reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an
army of sixty thousand men have fallen into our hands, besides a
large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads,
locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, &c., and much was
destroyed to prevent our capturing it.

Our loss in the series of battles may be summed up as follows:

Killed. Wounded. Missing.

Port Gibson 130 718 5
Fourteen Mile creek (skirmish) 4 24 --
Raymond 69 341 32
Jackson 40 240 6
Champion's Hill 426 1842 189
Big Black railroad bridge 29 242 2
Vicksburg 545 3688 303

Of the wounded many were but slightly wounded, and continued on
duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their
recovery. Not more than one-half of the wounded were permanently
disabled.

My personal staff and chiefs of departments have in all cases
rendered prompt and efficient service.

In all former reports I have failed to make mention of company A,
4th regiment Illinois cavalry volunteers, Captain S. D. Osband
commanding. This company has been on duty with me as an escort
company since November, 1861, and in every engagement I have been
in since that time rendered valuable service, attracting general
attention for their exemplary conduct, soldierly bearings and
promptness. It would not be overstating the merits of this
company to say that many of them would fill with credit any
position in a cavalry regiment.

For the brilliant achievements recounted in this report, the Army
of the Tennessee, their comrades of the Ninth Army corps,
Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and the navy
co-operating with them, deserve the highest honors their country
can award.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General United States Army_, _commanding_.

_____

_General Pemberton to General Grant._

To Headquarters, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice
for--hours, with a view of arranging terms for the capitulation
of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will (p. 392)
appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named
by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find
convenient.

I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood,
which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite
period.

This communication will be handed you under flag of truce by
Major-General J. S. Bowen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.

_____

_General Grant to General Pemberton._

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To In the Field, near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an
armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of
capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc.

The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course
can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional
surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much
endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always
challenge the respect of all adversaries, and I can assure you
will be treated with all respect due to prisoners of war.

I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to
arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than
those indicated above.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.

_____

_General Grant to General Pemberton._

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To Near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will
submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of
Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms
proposed, I will march one division as a guard and take
possession at 8 A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out
and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to
march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their
side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry
officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed (p. 393)
all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions
are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be
taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary
cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons, also,
counting two horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to
transport such articles as cannot be carried along.

The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded
officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.

The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst
officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.

_____

_General Pemberton to General Grant._

To Headquarters, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for
this garrison and post.

In the main your terms are accepted; but in justice both to the
honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of
Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if
acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us.

At 10 o'clock, A.M., to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works
in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison
under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms,
stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will
take possession.

Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the
rights and property of citizens to be respected.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.

_____

_General Grant to General Pemberton._

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be
acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every (p. 394)
officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which with
the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take
some time. Again I can make no stipulations with regard to the
treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not
propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be
as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers
will be allowed their private baggage and side arms, and mounted
officers one horse each.

If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the
front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 A.M.,
and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners
until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.

Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms
by 9 o'clock A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected,
and shall act accordingly.

Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed
along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have
been notified from firing upon your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.

_____

_General Pemberton to General Grant._

To Headquarter, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 4, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this day, and in reply to say that the terms
proposed by you are accepted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.

_____

_General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General._

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi,
To In the Field, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
COLONEL J. C. KELTON, December 23d, 1863.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Colonel: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department,
of date Washington, October 16th, 1863, delivered to me by the
Secretary of War, at Louisville, Kentucky, on the 18th of the
same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the
Mississippi," comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the
Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order (p. 395)
assuming command, together with the order of the War
Department, referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at
Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga.
My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance
of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by
the Secretary of War, of the difficulties with which the Army of
the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long,
mountainous, and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Alabama,
to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans
would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To
guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I
also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October,
from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would
be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date,
"I will hold the town till we starve."

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of
October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being
placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered
the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport
preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between
that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain.
The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with
Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I made
a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side
of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the
reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at
Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that
could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon
road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley.
Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable
route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga,
to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite
Whitesides, there to cross to the south side to hold the road
passed over by Hooker. In the meantime and before the enemy could
be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of
Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown
across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of
hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry
road, and orders were given accordingly.

It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley
with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of
the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to
Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had
little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have
defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the
range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the
Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by
the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry,
would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across
Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops
in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the
foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand
men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen
hundred of which under Brigadier-General W. B. Hagen, in sixty
pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated (p. 396)
quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the
foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October,
landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised
the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills
covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but four
or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the
material for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river
across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the
attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was
ferried to the south bank of the river; 2nd the almost
inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley, at its outlet to
the river and below the mouth of Lookout creek were secured. By
ten o'clock A.M. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the
river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the
desired road nearer the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over
which to pass troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions
were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been
driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great
loss of the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as
to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main
camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley.

On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by
the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to
Chattanooga, with the 11th Army Corps, under Major-General
Howard, and Geary's Division of the 12th Army Corps, and
proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from
Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading
from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of
Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The Division that
started under command of Palmer for Whitesides, reached its
destination, and took up the position intended in the original
plan of this movement. Three movements so successfully executed,
secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain
supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely,
the main wagon road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's
Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and
Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from
Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to
but eight miles.

Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically
invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river
above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout
Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river
picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in
Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and
Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held
possession of the country north of the river, but it was from
sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to
any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so
reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for
moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men
alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat
would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy,
occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking our very
fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating
forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in
supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious
route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over (p. 397)
Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another
week.

The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in
Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and
shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain
our position, and so fully was he impressed of the importance of
keeping from us these lines, lost to him by surprise, and in a
manner he little dreamed of, that in order to regain possession
of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's
forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's Division of the
12th Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley.
This attack failed, however, and Howard's Corps, which was moving
to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by
him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of
Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the line of
communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee river.

Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the
sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing
through my hands.

By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at
Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that
had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and
Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight
miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats
was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army,
but actual suffering was prevented.

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching
Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of
Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling
strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to
retain all his forces and recall those he had detached,
directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge
with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's
communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by
telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance
of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to
make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the
inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at
Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present,
to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival
of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the
meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for
operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the
movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate
presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed
to Burnside as follows:

"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can
tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.
With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last
moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions.
Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across
the river just at and below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, as
soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same
time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge (p. 398)
and from there push a force on to the railroad between
Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and, if
he can, carry Lookout Mountain, The enemy now seem to be looking
for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further
confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from
Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over
a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being
concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole
force is going up Lookout Valley.

"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear
will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the
19th, as the earliest day for making the combined movement as
desired.

"Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time.
I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston
and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem
would be left for solution.

"Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of
Sparta. I will ascertain, if they have started and inform you. It
will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand
men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed
after they got even one day east of here.

"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."

On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch
of date the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger
of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was
afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to
our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant
Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my Staff, sent at the
instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the
condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed
him as follows:

"To Chattanooga, November 15th, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on
to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the
despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you
should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that
portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess, holding
to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the
Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on
that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio
army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little
Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with
an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly
conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I
did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and
then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay
out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of
more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my
attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it
might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it
possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it
advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee; (p. 399)
to resist the crossing of it would be in danger of capture, but I
would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible,
reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only
army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."

Previous reconnoissances, made first by Brigadier-General W. F.
Smith, Chief Engineer, and afterward by Thomas Sherman, and
myself in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga
and north of the Tennessee river, extending as far east as the
mouth of the North Chicamauga, and also of the mouth of the South
Chicamauga, and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the
same could be made from the north bank of the river, without
exciting suspicions on the part of the enemy, showed good roads
from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of
hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's
positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be
seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy, but not seeing
anything further of them as they passed up in rear of these
hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they
were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river
for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the
north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that
the banks of the river from the mouth of South Chicamauga Creek,
westward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, were watched
only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of
operations indicated in my despatch of the 14th to Burnside.

Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all
the force possible against one given point, namely Missionary
Ridge, converging toward the north end of it, it was deemed best
to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's
attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's Corps of
his command to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following
instructions were given Thomas:

"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS.

"All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being
provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain
and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as
might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is
for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a
division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee
river just below the mouth of the Chicamauga, his crossing to be
protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the
river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure
the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad
tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will
co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should
be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the
necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre,
and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whereon
ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as (p. 400)
possible on the most practical line for making an attack
up the valley Your effort will then be to form a junction with
Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of
Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as
possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried,
communication will at once be established between the two armies
by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will
then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will
be easily held by Geary's Division and what troops you may still
have there belonging to the old army of the Cumberland. Howard's
corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday
night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness
for such orders as may become necessary. All the troops will be
provided with two days cooked rations in haversacks and one
hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that
no ammunition is wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will
call on the Engineer Department for such preparations as you may
deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the
creek.

"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."

A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman with the
following communication:

"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

"Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person,
and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions
will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that
a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with
the South; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly
located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected, until
the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however,
what is not now shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a
brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in
time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chicamauga, and
may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.

"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."

Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides,
our division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction
of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the
Tennessee to near the mouth of South Chicamauga, where they were
kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a
crossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were
built and placed in the North Chicamauga, near its mouth, a few
miles further up, without attracting the attention of the enemy.
It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the
21st of November, but owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable
to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with (p. 401)
Generals Morgan L. Smith's, John E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's
divisions of the 15th Corps, under command of Major-General
Frank P. Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry
having been broken by the drift consequent upon the rise in the
river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division
(Osterhaus') was detained on the south side, and was on the night
of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by eight o'clock
the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in
this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the
original plan.

A deserter from the rebel army, who came into our lines on the
night of the 22d November, reported Bragg falling back. The
following letter from Bragg, received by flag of truce on the
20th, tended to confirm this report:

"To "Headquarters, Army of the Tennessee,
"MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "In the Field, 20th November, 1863.
"Commanding United States Forces, Chattanooga.

"General: As there may still be some non-combatants in
Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would
dictate their early withdrawal.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Braxton BRAGG,
"_General commanding_."

Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order,
Thomas was directed early on the morning of the 23d to ascertain
the truth or falsity of this report by driving in his pickets and
making him develop his line. This he did with the troops
stationed at Chattanooga, and Howard's corps (which had been
brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended danger to our
pontoon bridges from the rise in the river and the enemy's rafts)
in the most gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line
and securing to us what is known as "Indian Hill" or "Orchard
Knoll," and the low range of hills south of it. These points were
fortified during the night and artillery put in position on them.
The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to
deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward
ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join
Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started,
but was brought back in consequence of our attack.

On the night of the 23d of November Sherman, with three divisions
of his army, strengthened by Davis' division of Thomas', which
had been stationed along on the north bank of the river,
convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready
for operations.

At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the
river, just below the mouth of the South Chicamauga, by dawn of
day, the pontoons in the North Chicamauga were loaded with thirty
armed men each, and floated quietly past the enemy's pickets,
landed and captured all but one of the guard, twenty in number,
before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The
steamboat "Dunbar" with a barge in tow, after having finished
ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman, with
which to move Thomas' artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to
aid in crossing artillery and troops, and by daylight of the (p. 402)
morning of the 24th of November, eight thousand men were
on the south side of the Tennessee and fortified in rifle
trenches. By twelve o'clock M. the pontoon bridges across the
Tennessee and the Chicamauga were laid, and the remainder of
Sherman's forces crossed over, and at half-past three P.M. the
whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the
railroad tunnel was in Sherman's possession. During the night he
fortified the position thus secured, making it equal if not
superior in strength to that held by the enemy.

By three o'clock of the same day, Colonel Long with his brigade
of cavalry of Thomas' army, crossed to the south side of the
Tennessee, and to the north of South Chicamauga Creek and made a
raid on the enemy's lines of communications. He burned Tyner's
station, with many stores, cut the railroad at Cleveland,
captured near a hundred wagons, and over two hundred prisoners.
His own loss was small.

Hooker carried out the part assigned him for this day, equal to
the most sanguine expectations. With Geary's division (12th
Corps) and two brigades of Stanley's division (4th Corps) of
Thomas' army, and Osterhaus' division (15th Corps) of Sherman's
army, he scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain, drove the
enemy from his rifle pits on the northern extremity and slope of
the mountain, capturing many prisoners, without serious loss.

Thomas having done on the 23d, with his troops in Chattanooga,
what was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his
advanced position during the day and pushed the 11th Corps
forward along the south bank of the Tennessee river across Citico
creek, one brigade of which with Howard in person, reached
Sherman just as he had completed the crossing of the river.

When Hooker emerged in sight of the northern extremity of Lookout
Mountain, Carlin's brigade of the 14th Corps was ordered to cross
Chattanooga creek and form a junction with him. This was effected
late in the evening and after considerable fighting.

Thus on the night of the 24th, our forces maintained an unbroken
line with unbroken communications, from the north end of Lookout
Mountain through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of
Missionary Ridge.

On the morning of the 25th, Hooker took possession of the
mountain top with a small force, and with the remainder of his
command in pursuance of orders, swept across Chattanooga Valley,
now abandoned by the enemy, to Rossville. In this march he was
detained four hours in building a bridge across Chattanooga
creek. From Rossville he ascended Missionary Ridge and moved
northward toward the centre of the now shortened line.

Sherman's attack upon the enemy's most northern and most vital
points was vigorously kept up all day. The assaulting column
advanced to the very rifle pits of the enemy, and held their
position firmly and without wavering. The right of the assaulting
column being exposed to the danger of being turned, two brigades
were sent to its support. These advanced in the most gallant
manner over an open field on the mountain side to near the works
of the enemy, and laid there, partially covered from fire for
some time. The right of these two brigades rested near the head
of a ravine or gorge in the mountain side, which the enemy took
advantage of, and sent troops, covered from view below them (p. 403)
and to their right rear. Being unexpectedly fired into from
this direction, they fell back across the open field below them,
and reformed in good order in the edge of the timber. The column
which attacked them was speedily driven to its entrenchments by
the assaulting column proper.

Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the
enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to
the railroad bridge across Chicamauga Creek, his rear and stores
at Chicamauga Station. This caused the enemy to mass heavily
against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the
position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird's division of the
14th Corps was ordered to Sherman's support; but receiving a note
from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary,
Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.

The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously
looked for and momentarily expected, moving north on the ridge,
with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the
ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the
ridge in the centre, with strong columns; but the time
necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near
Chattanooga creek, detained him to a later hour than was
expected. Being satisfied, from the latest information from him,
that he must by this time be on his road from Rossville, though
not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy in his
desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was
weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order
the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move
forward his troops, constituting our centre,--Baird's division
(14th Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (4th Corps), and
Johnson's division (14th Corps),--with a double line of
skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by
the whole force, and carry the rifle pits at the foot of
Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines in the
rifle pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.

These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle pits
at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a
moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of
the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following
closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They
encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near
thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from still well filled
rifle pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was
seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was
steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.

In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire
encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the
enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused
confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

The nearness of night and the enemy still resisting the advance
of Thomas' left, prevented a general pursuit that night, but
Sheridan pushed forward to Mission Mills.

The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy
abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of
Sherman, and by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat, and
the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain,
Chattanooga Valley and Missionary Ridge were in our possession,
together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small
arms.

Thomas was directed to get Granger with his corps, and (p. 404)
detachments enough from other commands, including the force
available at Kingston, to make twenty thousand men, in readiness
to go to the relief of Knoxville, upon the termination of the
battle at Chattanooga, these troops to take with them four days'
rations and a steamboat loaded with rations to follow up the
river.

On the evening of the 25th November orders were given to both
Thomas and Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning,
with all their available force except that under Granger,
intended for the relief of Knoxville.

On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chicamauga
Station, and Thomas' forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on
the Rossville road toward Grayville and Ringgold.

The advance of Thomas' forces reached Ringgold on the morning of
the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in the
gorge and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge, from which they
dislodged him after a severe fight, in which we lost heavily in
valuable officers and men, and continued the pursuit that day
until near Tunnel Hill, a distance of twenty miles from
Chattanooga.

Davies' division (14th Corps) of Sherman's column reached
Ringgold about noon of the same day. Howard's Corps was sent by
Sherman to Red Clay to destroy the railroad between Dalton and
Cleveland, and thus cut off Bragg's communication with
Longstreet, which was successfully accomplished.

Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving
Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized
retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the
country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only
last until about the 3d of December. It was already getting late
to afford the necessary relief. I determined, therefore, to
pursue no further. Hooker was directed to hold the position he
then occupied until the night of the 31st, but to go no further
south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was directed to march to
the railroad crossing of the Hiwassee, to protect Granger's flank
until he was across that stream, and to prevent further
re-enforcements being sent by that route into East Tennessee.

Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had
not yet got off, nor would he have the number of men I had
directed. Besides he moved with reluctance and complaints. I
therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions
of Sherman's forces had marched from Memphis and had gone into
battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him
with his command, and orders in accordance therewith were sent
him at Calhoun, to assume command of the troops with Granger in
addition to those with him, and proceed with all possible
dispatch to the relief of Burnside.

General Elliott had been ordered by Thomas on the 26th of
November, to proceed from Alexandria, Tennessee, to Knoxville,
with his cavalry division to aid in the relief of that place.

The approach of Sherman caused Longstreet to raise the siege of
Knoxville and retreat eastward on the night of the 4th of
December. Sherman succeeded in throwing his cavalry into
Knoxville on the night of the 3d.

Sherman arrived in person at Knoxville on the 6th, and after a
conference with Burnside in reference to "_organizing a pursuing
force large enough to either overtake the enemy and beat him (p. 405)
or drive him out of the State_," Burnside was of the opinion
that the corps of Granger, in conjunction with his own
command, was sufficient for that purpose, and on the 7th
addressed to Sherman the following communication:

"To "Knoxville, December 7th, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.

"I desire to express to you and to your command my most hearty
thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief
during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied that your
approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed,
I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command,
but the corps of General Granger, necessary for operations in
this section, and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the
forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby
rendering portions of General Thomas' less secure, I deem it
advisable that all the troops now here, except those commanded by
General Granger, should return at once to within supporting
distance of the forces operating against Bragg's army. In behalf
of my command I again desire to thank you and your command, for
the kindness you have done us.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, _Major-General_."

Leaving Granger's command at Knoxville, Sherman with the
remainder of his forces returned by slow marches to Chattanooga.

I have not spoken more particularly of the result of the pursuit
of the enemy, because the more detailed reports accompanying this
do the subject justice. For the same reason I have not
particularized the part taken by Corps and Division Commanders.

To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I feel under
more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which
he discharged the duties of his position, and desire that his
services be fully appreciated by higher authority.

The members of my staff discharged faithfully their respective
duties, for which they have my warmest thanks.

Our losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and
330 missing; total 5616. The loss of the enemy in killed and
wounded was probably less than ours, owing to the fact that he
was protected by his entrenchments, while our men were without
cover.

At Knoxville, however, his loss was many times greater than ours,
making his entire loss at the two places equal to, if not
exceeding ours. We captured 6142 prisoners, of whom 239 were
commissioned officers; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery
carriages and caissons, and 7000 stand of small arms.

The armies of the Cumberland and of the Tennessee, for their
energy and unsurpassed bravery in the three days battle of
Chattanooga and the pursuit of the enemy, heir patient endurance
in marching to the relief of Knoxville, and the Army of the Ohio
for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of
Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the
gratitude of their country.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General U. S. A._

No. 74. (p. 406) PLATE LXXIV.

_March 17, 1862._

A grateful country to her generous son Cornelius Vanderbilt.
[Rx]. Bis dat qui tempori dat 1865.

CORNELIUS VANDERBILT.

[_Free Gift of Steamship Vanderbilt._]