Chapter III: Part 3

Third. The weather became moderate. At day-light the battery was opened against the left face of the bastion of St. Diego, towards the saliant angle. One hundred seamen were appointed to assist the corps of artillery in this service. Our cannon, by the most excellent skill and management of Maj. Barker, and the officers under him, were served with such justness, quickness, and dexterity, that the twelve pieces on that face of the bastion were silenced in a few hours, and the Spaniards drove from them. We had but two men killed. At night we began a battery for three guns, on the left of our place of arms, to silence those that were in barbet upon the orillon of the bastion of St. Andrew, which annoyed our flank. We maintained a brisk fire of grape and musketry all the night, to prevent the enemy from repairing their embrasures and remounting the cannon. The mortars, now augmented to seven, were kept constantly playing upon the gorge of the bastion, and the contiguous defences.

Fourth. About three hours before day one thousand of the Indians attacked the cantonment of the seamen. They were encouraged to this attempt by the incessant rains in which they flattered themselves our fire-arms would be useless. Their approach was favoured by a great number of thick bushes that grew upon the side of a rivulet, which they passed in the night, and by keeping close, eluded the vigilance of the patroles. Upon the alarm, Col. Monson and Capt. Fletcher, with the piquets, were dispatched to the assistance of the seamen, who very sensibly kept firm in their posts, and were contented to repulse them till day-break; when a fresh piquet of the 79th regiment appearing upon the Indians right flank, they fled, were pursued, and dispersed, with the loss of three hundred men. Had their skill or weapons been equal to their strength and ferocity, it might have cost us dear. Although armed chiefly with bows, arrows, and lances, they advanced up to the very muzzles of our pieces, repeated their assaults, and died like wild beasts, gnawing the bayonets. This attack cost us some few men; but we lost a most excellent sea officer, Capt. Porter, lieutenant of the Norfolk, sincerely and justly lamented by all. We had scarce finished this affair, when another body of them, with part of the Spanish garrison, again attacked the church No 2. forced the Seapoys from their post in it, nearest the town, and took possession of the top, from whence they killed and wounded several of our people, who were entirely exposed to all their weapons. Notwithstanding this disadvantageous situation, the European soldiers maintained their post behind the church with great firmness and patience, and at last dislodged the enemy, with the assistance of some field-pieces, and the good conduct of Maj. Fell, field-officer of the day, Capt. Fletcher, and other brave officers sent to their relief. The Spaniards left seventy dead behind them, in and about the church. On our side, Capt. Strahan, of the 79th regiment, a very good officer, was mortally wounded, and forty private men wounded or killed. This was the enemy's last effort: all their Indians, excepting one thousand eight hundred, discouraged by their losses, returned home. Our working parties and the fire of our batteries, which had been a little interrupted by these attacks, recommenced with greater spirit than ever. We found likewise the good effects of giving the enemy no time to repair their embrasures or carriages in the night. They opened only an inconsiderable fire from three or four embrasures in the curtain, too oblique to have much effect: before night those defences were ruined.

Fifth. Maj. Barker's fire was so violent, that the breach appeared practicable. Our cannon from the three-gun battery silenced those of the enemy on the orillon of St. Andrew. We were in hopes that the Spaniards would be sensible of their danger, and think of giving up the town. But they were obstinate, without bravery, or any generous resolution of defending the breach. In the evening, the design of storming the place was communicated to the principal officers of each department only, and the necessary preparations made. [42]

Sixth. At four o'clock in the morning we filed off from our quarters, in small bodies, to give the less suspicion; and, by degrees, assembled at St. Jago's church; observing the utmost silence, and concealing ourselves in the place of arms, and the parallel between the church and the battery. Maj. Barker kept up a brisk fire upon the works, and those places where the enemy might be lodged or intrenched. Our mortars were well applied for the same purpose. At day-break we discerned a large body of Spaniards formed on the bastion of St. Andrew, which gave us reason to imagine they had got some information of our design, and intended to annoy us with their musquetry and grape from the retired flank of that bastion, where they had still two cannon placed: but upon the explosion of some shells that fell among them, they went off. We took immediate advantage of this, and by the signal of a general discharge of our artillery and mortars, rushed on to the assault, under cover of a thick smoke that blew directly upon the town. Sixty volunteers of different corps, under Lieut. Russel of the 79th, led the way, supported by the grenadiers of that regiment: the engineers, with the pioneers, and other workmen, to clear and enlarge the breach, and make lodgments, in case the enemy should have been too strongly intrenched in the gorge of the bastion, followed: Col. Monson and Maj. More were at the head of two grand divisions of the 79th: the battalion of seamen advanced next, sustained by the other two divisions of the 79th: the company's troops closed the rear. They all mounted the breach with amazing spirit and rapidity. The few Spaniards upon the bastion dispersed so suddenly, that it was thought they depended upon their mines. Capt. Stevenson had orders to make a strict search to discover them; but our precautions were needless. We met with little resistance, except at the Royal gate, and from the galleries of the lofty houses which surround the grand square. In the guard-house over the Royal gate one hundred of the Spaniards and Indians, who would not surrender, were put to the sword. [43] Three hundred more, according to the enemy's account, were drowned in attempting to escape over the river, which was very deep and rapid. [44] The Governor and principal officers retired to the citadel, and were glad to surrender as prisoners at discretion, as that place was in no good posture of defence. [45] Capt. Dupont of the 79th, with one hundred men, took possession of it. The Marquis of Villa Mediana, with the rest of the Spanish officers, were admitted as prisoners of war on their paroles of honour; and to conciliate the affections of the natives, all the Indians who fell into our hands were dismissed in safety. Our joy, upon this fortunate event, was greatly clouded by the loss of Maj. More, who was transfixed with an arrow near the Royal gate, [46] and died immediately, universally lamented for his good qualities, Capt. Sleigh of the grenadiers, and some other good officers, were wounded. We had about thirty private men killed or wounded. In consequence of the terms dictated to the Spaniards, the port of Cavite and citadel, with several large ships, and a vast quantity of warlike and naval stores, were surrendered to us. Capt. Champion, with 100 marines, and as many Seapoys, imbarked on board the Seahorse to take possession of it. The Spanish garrison of 300 men, on the approach of our people, mutinied against their officers, plundered some houses, and went off into the country with their arms.

As a small acknowledgment of the great services which the whole army had received from Capt. Kempenfelt, the Admiral's Captain, I begged he would act at Cavite with a commission as governor for his Majesty, being well assured that no one could discharge that trust with more conduct and abilities. [47]

Spanish officers of note prisoners of war

Don Felix de Eguiluz, Lieutenant-General of Artillery.

The Marquis of Villa Mediana, Brigadier-General, and Colonel of the King's regiment.

Don Miguel Valdes, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Commandant of the second battalion of ditto.

Don Joseph de Riarte, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Governor of the Cavite.

Don Francisco Rodriguez, Serjeant-Major of ditto.

Don Manuel Fernandes Toribio, Commandant and Serjeant-Major of the citadel of St. Jago.

Don Christoval Ros, Serjeant-Major of Manila.

Don Thomas de Castro, [48] Chief Engineer, and Colonel of the King's regiment.

14 Captains, 13 Lieutenants, 12 Ensigns, 2 Adjutants, 1 Physician, 1 Surgeon, 11 Serjeants, 261 Rank and File.

Of the Marine, 4 Captains, 2 Ensigns.

Of the Artillery, 1 Captain-Commandant, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 1 Adjutant, 1 Commissary.

Of the Irregular Pampangos, 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign. 2 Adjutants of the Cavite. 2 Adjutants of the citadel of St. Jago. 4 Adjutants of the city of Manila. 1 Captain and Engineer of ditto. Of the Cadet Company 5 The Governor-General's life-guard 8

Killed and Wounded of the British forces

79th reg. Killed: Maj. More, Capt. Strahan, Lieut. Fryar, 6 privates. Wounded: Capt. Sleigh of the grenadiers, Lieuts Hazlewood and Garnons, Ens. Hog, 45 pr.

Battalion of seamen. Killed: Capt. Peter Porter, lieutenant of the Norfolk, Mr. White, surgeon's mate of ditto, 7 pr. seamen, 5 marines. Wounded: Second-Lieut. Thomas Spearing, of the marines, of the Lenox, Mr. Neal, midshipman of ditto, one serjeant, 18 pr.

Company's troops. Drowned: Lieut. Hardwick, one serjeant, 2 pr. Wounded: one serjeant, 5 pr.

Artillery. Killed: one pr. Wounded: one serjeant, 3 pr.

Seapoys. Killed 8. Wounded 31.

Abstract

K. W. Tot.

Officers 6 6 12
Serjeants 1 3 4
Private 29 102 131
-- --- ---
36 111 147

Return of brass and iron ordnance, powder, shot, shells, &c. found in the town and citadel of Manila.

Brass ordnance, 342 serviceable, 8 unserviceable.

Iron ordnance, 108 serviceable, 15 unserviceable.

Brass mortars, 6 inch and beds ... 2 Iron howitzers 7.

Carriages, 66 serviceable, 85 unserviceable.

Of the above, 4 brass guns and 7 swivels were spiked, and 8 wounded.

Shot, of all sizes, from 28 pounders to four ounces, 18,073.

Grape ditto 2411.

Double-headed 118.

Link 88.

Spiked 39.

Lead, one and a half pounders, 1000.

Shells, from 13 inch to 7 inch, 44.

Hand granadoes 248.

Gunpowder boxes 38, computed to contain 2280 lb. Ditto matt bags 141, computed to contain 6345 lb. Cartridges filled, 894 4989 lb.

Musquets, repairable 270, unserviceable 257.

Ditto barrels 360.

Spontoons 4; halberts 12; bayonets, very old, 200; spunges, with rammer-heads, unserviceable, 200; bamboo cartridges, of different sizes, 240.

Return of brass and iron ordnance, &c. found at Cavite.

Brass ordnance, 137 serviceable, 1 unserviceable.

Iron ditto, 68 serviceable, 24 unserviceable.

Iron howitzers and carriages, 11 serviceable.

Carriages, 96 serviceable, 41 unserviceable.

Shot, of all sizes, from 52 pounders to 3 pounders, 13,620.

Double-headed ditto 411.

Link ditto 347.

Grape ditto 987.

Shells, 13 and 8 inch, 18.

Powder-boxes 138, containing 7680 lb.

Cartridges 1221, containing 7904 lb.

Musquets, 280 serviceable, 12 unserviceable.

Bayonets 108, cutlasses 28.

ROJO'S JOURNAL

Journal of what occurred at the attack and defense of the city of Manila, the capital of Philipinas islands, and of the archipelago of San Lazaro, from September 22 to October 5, 1762, the day on which it was taken by assault by Brigadier Guillermo Drapert, commander-in-chief of the British troops of the East Indias.

Before commencing this journal, it is fitting to give a brief description of the location of Manila, and of the destitute condition in which the enemy found its fortifications and defenses in order that we may present a clear idea of the vigorous resistance that was made even to the last extremity. [49]

The city of Manila, according to the map of Father Murillo, is located in 14° 40' of north latitude, and 158° 35' east longitude, on a tongue of land which terminates in a point, and forming the figure of a jug or flagon, whose extremity or neck is formed by the above point itself and contains the royal fort of Santiago. At the west it is terminated by a large bay at the north by the Pasig River, which bathes its walls. On the land side from south to east, it is defended by four flat bastions with their casemates, and right flanks covered with orillons, and with ditches, covered way, and glacis. Along the sea, the city is fortified by a long curtain with five little flat bastions, a reduct located at a great distance from the wall. The lines of defense have such disproportion from one another, that those bastions cannot be defended reciprocally. It is impossible, further, to prevent the approach by the curtain, because there is neither ditch nor terreplein. Then too, the parapets are only one foot wide, and the curtain six.

The curtain embracing the north side, bathed by the river, and which has a kind of curvature where it forms two reëntrant angles, is in the same condition of weakness as that of the sea, and is defended by two small bastions, which present the same defect noted above in their lines of defense.

From the bastion of San Gabriel to the gate of the Parián on the east of the city, is located a false screen or barbacan with its parapet and banquette. It is defective, for it is fallen, and has no gate for the retreat of the soldiers. The gate of the Parián is covered and defended by a small outer work in the form of a crown, and the royal gate by a ravelin so poorly placed and so poorly ordered, that it cannot defend the faces of the collateral bastions of San Andrés and of the foundry. The flanks of the two latter bastions are not any more capable of defending the faces of the ravelin. It must be added to the above that all those fortifications are very old and defective: the walls; the chemise, or revetement, three feet thick at the cordon, without counterfort; the escarp and counter-escarp fallen in part; and almost everything useless.

The covered way is very short and filled with thickets and bushes. Its parapet is in ruins and it has no stockade or palisade. It is so low, that it leaves the most essential parts of the bastions and curtains open clear to the foot. The embrasures are poorly placed. The gates on the sea side, are pierced through, and so old and so used up, that they cannot offer any resistance at all. The esplanades of the boulevards are so irregular and so rough, that it is impossible to maneuver with the artillery, which, besides, was mounted on ship's carriages so old that they could not be fired without danger of being dismounted.

The royal fort of Santiago is composed of two demi-bastions which dominate the city, and of a third one which points outward and prevents the approach of the enemy. It has two circular platforms, and several flanks intended for the same use. The curtains which unite these bastions have no terreplein, and the places from which to fire are distributed without any measure or proportion.

The garrison of this place consisted of the royal regiment, which has been composed, since its creation, of twenty companies of one hundred men apiece, under the command of captains, lieutenants, and ensigns. These companies have never been full, and have never amounted to fifteen hundred men. When the enemy arrived, this regiment was diminished to such an extent both by the mortality and desertion of some men, and by the different detachments which were told off for the galleons and for other posts, that there were not more than five hundred and fifty-six soldiers. There were only eighty cannoneers, and those even were native Indians, who were but little skilled in the management of artillery. At the arrival of the enemy, four militia companies were formed, of sixty men each, and called commercial troops. [50]

Manila never thought that it would be attacked by European nations. It supported the security in which it existed on the distance and remoteness of its position, in relation with Europe, and on the fact that such an example had never happened, although the two crowns had often been at war. In such confidence, they had been satisfied with putting the place in a state of defense against the Moros and neighboring nations who were little skilled in the art of war, the management of large artillery, muskets, and in the terrible artifice of throwing bombs, grenades, shells, etc. For in order that Manila might be defended against European nations, it would have needed four thousand well drilled men and all the corresponding equipment, things which this city has lacked even to the present. [51]

In this state of defense, on the twenty-second of September, 1762, at half-past five in the evening, a powerful fleet of thirteen vessels was seen. Although so unexpected a novelty caused the greatest surprise and the greatest astonishment, since there was no news in Manila of the war, and it was not supposed even that it had been declared, it was suspected nevertheless, that that was a hostile fleet. Consequently, his Excellency, Archbishop Roxo, governor and captain-general, gave on the spot the orders necessary and in accordance with the circumstances, to put the place in a state of defense, without forgetting to send to Cavite the help needed there.

While the preparations for the defense were being made, it was decided that it was necessary to write to the commander of the squadron, in order to tell him that he was to announce his nationality, for what purpose he had come, and the reason why he had entered the bay, without first having announced himself. The following night, an officer was assigned to bear this letter. [52] About eleven o'clock, next morning, a boat which had been sent from the squadron, drew up to the fort. It bore two English officers, and ours who was returning, with a communication signed by Admiral Samuel Cornis, and by Brigadier-general Drapert, commander-in-chief of the land forces of his Britannic Majesty assigned for the present expedition. In their letter they announced that they were coming by order of their sovereign, for the conquest of the islands. Consequently, they urged that the city of Manila, its fortifications, and its territory, be surrendered to them. If that were not done, or indeed if any resistance were made (which they did not expect, unless the authors of the resistance were crazy), they had brought formidable forces to make themselves masters of all the land by force of arms, and they would immediately commence hostilities after hearing the answer. [53]

The captain-general answered them that the proposition which had just been made could not be accepted by subjects so faithful to their king, and that they were all resolved to sacrifice their lives for the defense of religion and the honor of the arms of their sovereign. [54]

As soon as they had received the answer, the entire squadron began to move about six o'clock on the evening of the twenty-third. They approached as near as possible to the south shore of the city, opposite the reduct called San Antonio Abad, which was used as a casemate, and which was one good half-league distant from the city. That same night, and until daybreak, the people busied themselves in taking all the gunpowder from that post. But it was necessary to abandon the said post with some effects and a goodly quantity of saltpetre, for the enemy landed at that same place, under support from the artillery of their ships. They took possession of the reduct as well as of the churches of Malate, [55] Nuestra Señora de Guia, and Santiago, of the suburbs and shops along the seashore, between the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, which was eighty-five toises from the city, and the reduct. That same night two pickets of musketeers were detached from the garrison, commanded by ----, with orders to attack the enemy, to dislodge them if possible, and to prevent at the same time, the disembarking which was being continued along various places on the shore. The pickets suffered a very severe fire from the musketry of the enemy, who were stationed in the church of Santiago, and the neighboring houses, so that they retired in disorder.

On the twenty-fourth, about eight o'clock in the morning, they began to salute the enemy with artillery from the boulevards of the foundry and from San Andrés, but with little effect, because the enemy were behind the churches which protected them. [56]

At nine in the morning, a small galley entered the bay, coming from the Embocadero of San Bernardino, with the news that the galleon "Philippino" had anchored in Palapa, on its return from Nueva España. The hostile squadron detached a swift frigate and four armed chaloupes, which gave chase to the galley. Having fired some shots at it, the galley made shore at Tambobo. At the same time the majority of the people on that galley, soldiers and passengers leaped into the water. Two chaloupes captured it. The captain, a subaltern, who was in charge of the galley, and some persons who had stayed aboard, were made prisoners of war. The chaloupes tried to tow the galley, but not being able to succeed in it, they took all that they could out of it, [57] except two six-pounder cannons which they were unable to move; and thereupon abandoned the galley and went back to their squadron. The captain-general had that galley set afire, after the two cannons had been taken out of it.

The following night it was resolved to make a vigorous sortie in order to discomfit the enemy who were fortifying themselves with all haste in the churches of which we have just spoken, namely, Nuestra Señora de Guia, Malate, and Santiago. Two four-pounders were detached, with the necessary artillerymen and the men needed to manage those cannons, fifty musketeers of the regular troops, some militiamen, and eight hundred Indian natives with their spears. In charge of this expedition was Monsieur Fayette (a Frenchman in the service of Manila). He attacked the enemy at their posts. [58] The action lasted the greater part of the night, with a sharp fire on both sides; but Monsieur Fayette having recognized the invincible strength of the corps opposed to ours, and that fresh forces were continually coming to the enemy, ordered our men to retire a bit, and take position before the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, where he kept his post all night, firing on the church of Santiago until nine o'clock of the morning of the twenty-fifth, when all the troops came back under protection of a new force which was sent them from the city. [59] From that time until three o'clock in the afternoon, firing was suspended, because an officer of the hostile camp was received in the place, who was charged with a special mission. [60]

The bombardment continued without cessation. It did much damage to the buildings and killed some persons. The bombs that were picked up entire, were eighteen inches in diameter. They were kept to send back to the enemy in two mortars which were found in the royal magazines. That same night, some cannons loaded with grape were discharged on the enemy. To it was joined a fusillade which produced a good effect, for on the day of the twenty-sixth, [61] several corpses were to be seen from the place scattered between the glacis and the hostile trenches. Some muskets that had been left by those killed were picked up. Since the enemy did not take them away, their bodies were buried in the bellies of hungry foxes and dogs which were very numerous there, and which devoured them in a short time in the sight of our men who manned the walls.

At eight in the morning, some Indian and mestizo spearmen presented themselves before the enemy's trenches, without that movement on their part having been preceded by any order. On approaching the advanced outposts who were occupying the sacristies of the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, the bakery, and other neighboring houses, those Indians (although few in number), threw themselves on the enemy with such fury that they gained possession of the posts which have just been mentioned. They drove out the hostile musketeers, wounding and killing all that they met. But the English were promptly succored by a reënforcement of three hundred fusileers, who regained the posts that they had lost, and caused the Indians to retreat, to whom a signal was made from the bastion of San Andres to leave a clear field so that the fire of our artillery could have free play. The artillery did, by this means, great harm to the enemy.

During the progress of this bloody action, an officer of the camp was perceived, who was carrying a white flag. He was followed and accompanied by a young man clad in black, and by a drummer beating the chamade. The fire of our artillery was suspended, but the fusillade of the enemy continued with unequaled obstinacy, against the Indian spearmen who always sustained that fire. Consequently, the Indians attacked the English officer, killed him, and gave seven mortal wounds to the young man who accompanied him. The drummer was also killed, and another person who appeared to be the servant of the officer. The Indians cut off the head of the latter, but not being longer able to endure the hostile fire they retired to the covered way of the royal gate, which was opened for them so that they could reënter. Following are the facts of the case. The nephew of the archbishop, Don Antonio Sierra de Tagle, having been made prisoner on board the little galley and conducted aboard the flagship, of which we have spoken above, the English commander-in-chief had offered in advance to grant him his liberty, and the English officer was conducting him for that purpose. That young man died of his wounds. [62]

During the whole of this day, the bombardment continued with fury, the enemy having increased their batteries of the church of Santiago by three mortars. After dinner an officer was despatched to the camp of the enemy to agree upon a truce, so that they could take away the body of their officer who had been killed. They did so, but many other dead bodies were left. On our side also, some who had been wounded were brought in.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, a message was received from the English commander-in-chief, who urgently demanded the head of the English officer which the Indians had taken: as well as the author of that deed, with the threat that if it were not done, he would send the heads of all the prisoners whom they had in their power, and especially those of two officers, who had been made prisoners aboard the little galley. That demand was completely satisfied, and we were exculpated from a deed in which we had no part, and the blame for which was to be attributed to the lack of civilized customs among the Indians, and especially to the Sepoys, who, as has been said, did not cease to continue hostilities by their constant fire. Our captain-general (the archbishop), mounted on horseback, and went to see the hostile camp, in order to appease the trouble that that affair had aroused, and in fact it did not go farther.

The bombardment continued without cessation, and from half-past five in the evening until seven the flagship and another ship fired on the city, but with very slight result, for the balls which were fired horizontally were all buried on the shore, and those to which they gave a slight elevation, nearly all passed over the city, and were lost on the other side.

That same day, two mortars were fixed and placed in a battery on the rampart of the foundry, with which many bombs were thrown into the hostile camp and into the trenches.

On the twenty-ninth, [63] at six in the morning, the flagship and another vessel commenced to cannonade the bastion of the foundry, and made a desperate fire, which continued until eight o'clock with the same activity. From that time until ten it was moderated. In the afternoon of that same day, two craft entered by way of the great strait (of Mariveles). Immediately two of the enemy's squadron were detached, which having joined the two which were coming, anchored with them near Manila. It was learned afterward that those craft were two English frigates, which had become separated from the body of the squadron in a great storm; as was also the case with the "Namur," which had lost its masts and had been forced to put in at Canton. Hence their total squadron numbered sixteen sail.

The thirtieth, the bombardment continued, and the vessels fired some shots from their cannons. [64] From the city four chaloupes were seen which had overturned; they were coming ashore with men and war supplies. The same accident happened to a champan which they had captured in the days preceding. This accident had happened through the violence of the west wind which had freshened. This was at four in the afternoon, and at six, a bomb-ketch made shore opposite the reduct of San Antonio Abad.

October first, the Indians of Passay reported that a raft had made the shore, which was built of large masts, small masts, and yards that had belonged to the bomb-ketch; that this raft had on it the moorings, and artillery of the above bomb-ketch. They reported that they had seen many people drowned on the beach. Upon this report, the native cavalry was detached in order that they might seize those effects. But when they arrived at the place, they were repulsed by the enemy's musketry, who had hastened from their general quarter of Malate and from the powder factory in order to protect the raft and its load.

At daybreak of the second, the enemy placed in operation a battery of eight twenty-four pounders against the flanked angle of the bastion of the foundry, and against the face which looked upon their camp. That battery was so well served, that at ten in the morning, all the parapet of that part was on the ground. At the same time, they directed their mortars (nine in number and of various calibers) toward the bastion itself. The flagship and another vessel bombarded the same bastion on the side looking seaward, with such fury that along the shore and beyond the walls on the landside, more than four thousand twenty-four pound balls were collected. But what molested us still more was the musketry of the enemy, which was placed in the tower and church of Santiago, which they had arranged for that purpose by opening in all the roofs several windows so that they dominated us. They saw also all that occurred in the city, and although the greatest efforts and the most powerful attempts were made to batter down the church with our artillery, we were unable to do it, or to dislodge the enemy from that post. But it is incredible that our bastion being open without a parapet on either side, it is incredible, I say, that of the various officers who sustained it, and of all the musketeers and artillerymen who were obliged to fire in barbet, there were killed only two artillerymen, two musketeers, and three pioneers, in spite of a desperate fire which all those men suffered from five different parts. It is true that more than twenty wounded and maimed were taken out, among whom was a lieutenant belonging to the artillery who lost his right arm. The greater part of the officers were wounded and bruised from blows with stones, and had contusions, but that did not prevent them from sticking to their posts. The vessels ceased their fire at orisons. That of the camp continued all night with the same activity, so that the artillery of our bastion having been dismounted, they were obliged to abandon that post, leaving there only a few sentinels without shelter.

At the same time, various assemblies and parties of Indians from the provinces were formed to the number of five thousand more or less. But only two thousand five hundred Pampangos were found who were deemed capable of undertaking anything. Consequently, it was resolved to make a sortie. [65] It was to be undertaken at the close of the night of the third, as follows. The Pampangos were to form in three columns. The first column was to attack the church of Santiago on the side where the enemies had their batteries of cannons and mortars. The second was to hurl itself on Malate and Ermita where the general quarters were located. The third was to invest by the sea side. Those three columns were to be supported by two pickets of musketeers, commanded by the sargento-mayor of Cavite, two captains, and four subalterns. At the hour set, our Pampangos and pickets sallied out in the best order, but scarce had they set foot outside the Parián gate, when they began to utter loud cries in disorder and make a great racket. That allowed the camp of the enemy to get into readiness to receive them. In spite of that, the Pampango troops entered their camp, killed the advance sentinels, and caused great damage to the enemy. Those Indians themselves suffered no less from the hostile musketry. They would have suffered still more if confusion had not reigned there; for the enemy, in their fear of killing one another, did not dare to play some cannon loaded with grape, which they had prepared and posted in different places. The pickets seeing this disorder, halted before the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, whence they fired against the church of Santiago, thus protecting the retreat of the Pampangos, which took place at nine in the morning. The action was bloody on both sides. One soldier of the pickets was killed and eight wounded. The mortality among the Pampangos was heavy. It was learned afterward that the enemy having lost some of their officers, who were killed in the action, had had more than sixty Pampangos, whom they had captured and taken prisoners, hanged in their camp. That action so intimidated and disconcerted all the other Pampangos that they all retired to their respective villages, so that there remained very few of them who would return to Manila.

That action did not at all interrupt the fire of the battery against the bastion of the foundry, so that when daybreak came, it could be seen that an eighteen-pounder cannon had fallen into the ditch, and it could not be recovered. The greater part of the face and the terreplein of the same bastion had also fallen, and their ruins had dried up the ditch. But what caused the greatest anxiety was that the engineer recognized that the enemy was busy making a new battery for the purpose of dismounting the artillery, the collateral flanks of the bastions San Andrés and San Eugenio, which flanked and defended the entrance to the covered way and the approach to the breach. In fact, that battery began to play at noon with so great activity, that it dismounted the cannons of the flanks in two hours time, overthrew the parapets, and killed some fusileers and pioneers. Twice were other parapets made with beams and bags of sand, but each time they were in ruins the moment after. Consequently, the men were obliged to retire from those bastions. The bastion of San Andrés did not suffer so much, for it was stronger. However, it had one cannon of the caliber of eighteen, which was placed in the elevated flank, dismounted. We had no other hope than in another cannon of equal caliber, of the two which were in this flank, for while we still had two cannons of the caliber of four in the low place, the latter could be of but little service.

Our captain-general, having been informed of everything, called the council of war in the afternoon of the same day; and that council lasted until the night. The master-of-camp, the sargento-mayor of the city, the sargento-mayor of Cavite, the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment, those of the militia, and the deputies of the merchant body, of the city, and of the various ecclesiastic orders were present, all being introduced by the ordinary engineer. The latter, having reported the fatal condition of the place, advice or opinions were mutually given. All, with the exception of the military men, were of the opinion to continue the defense, by making use of the ordinary means for the repairs necessary to the bastions, and by making ditches, etc. The military men thought that we ought to capitulate. [66] But having asked them whether they thought that we ought to capitulate immediately, they answered no, and that they said it only because the breach had commenced, and that it would be practicable next day, and it would be difficult to make the ditches and repairs necessary to prevent the city from being taken by assault.

Having been informed of everything, our captain-general gave the orders and made all the preparations necessary for beginning the work, and for making the proposed ditches. He watched all the operations and all the movements of the enemy. [67]

At dawn on the fourth, the enemy began to fire shells into the city. They set fire to several of the buildings, and together with the shot from the mortar batteries and the fusillade from the tower of Santiago, which resembled a shower of hail, threw the garrison and the inhabitants into great consternation, which gradually increased. [68] All the day of the fourth, and the following night, were passed in this perplexity, no means being found by which to escape the danger. Although orders for the ditches and the defense of the breach were renewed, in order to prevent the assault, and activity was redoubled and the necessary efforts made, yet there was no means of executing any of those things, because of the continual and deadly fire of the enemy.

Consequently, there was no means of getting the bearers of fascines to work. Finally, at six o'clock in the morning of the fifth, the enemy's troops left their posts in three columns. The first directed its course toward the breach; the second toward the royal gate; and the third marched along the highway surrounding the covered way, toward the east and bordering on the plaza de armas.

The few soldiers left us occupied the gorge of the bastion of the foundry, the royal gate, the flank of the bastion of San Andrés, and the curtain joining them. The enemy were supported by their batteries and by the fusileers of the tower of Santiago, who poured in a steady fire. Consequently, it was impossible for ours to occupy the breach in order to defend the approach. The approaching columns discharged two rounds with their muskets, by which they swept the two collateral bastions, the curtain, and all the posts which could oppose them. Finally, all together, they mounted the breach, and seized the bastion of the foundry. At the same instant they attacked the royal gate, which they battered down with axes and iron levers.

After some slight opposition on our side, some officers who were there, not being able to defend those posts, the enemy fired from there on the other posts which they seized also following the cordon, and went to present themselves before the fort whither the governor and captain-general had retired.

At that moment, the militia, the regular troops, and the Indians who were in that fort, threw themselves in disorder from the top of the walls. Many threw themselves into the river, where a number of them were drowned. Consequently, when the captain-general reached the fort, he found only the castellan, Monsieur Pignon, his second, and one artilleryman. The few troops that he found were in confusion and were throwing themselves from the wall. The enemy's column which entered by the royal gate directed its course toward the plaza de armas and seized the palace. [69] That which marched by the highway, took the small fort which defends the bridge across the Pasig River. Thence it went to the city, entering by the Parián gate. [70]

The fort flung a white flag, and terms of capitulation were proposed, which the British officers refused to accept. At the same moment the colonel pressed the fort to surrender, else indeed hostilities would be continued and arms used. The captain-general pressed and greatly embarrassed, resolved to go in person with the colonel, under the good faith of the guaranty of his person in order to treat concerning the capitulation with the general. In fact, they discussed the matter at length in the palace. The archbishop desired to have military honors accorded, insisting on this point several times but not being able to obtain it. He was compelled to give an order for the surrender of the fort, and all the men were made prisoners of war with the exception of the captain-general. The military were granted the honor of keeping their swords and the repeated demands of the captain-general could obtain nothing else. [71]

The city was given over to pillage, which was cruel and lasted for forty hours, without excepting the churches, the archbishopric, and a part of the palace. Although the captain-general objected at the end of twenty-four hours, the pillage really continued, in spite of the orders of the British general for it to cease. He himself killed with his own hand a soldier whom he found transgressing his orders, and had three hanged. [72]

In the doings of that day, the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment, two captains, two subalterns, about fifty soldiers of the regular troops, and thirty of the commerce militia were killed on our side, and many were wounded.

In the other doings, and especially in the last sortie, more than three hundred Indians were killed, and more than four hundred wounded.

The number killed on the side of the enemy we have not been able to learn exactly. It has been learned only by some circumstances, that in the review made two days after the taking of the place, the enemy had lost more than a thousand men, among whom were sixteen officers. Among those officers, was a sargento-mayor of Drapert's regiment, who was killed on the day of the assault by an arrow; and the commandant of the regiment of Chamal, who was killed by a musket ball, as he was watching with a glass the approach from the tower of Santiago. The vice-admiral [73] was drowned when coming ashore in a small boat which overturned; and the same accident caused the death of some sailors and soldiers.

The forces of the enemy consisted of fifteen hundred European soldiers, chosen from Drapert's regiment, and from the battalion of the volunteers of Chamal; two artillery companies of sixty men apiece; three thousand European sailors, fusileers and well disciplined; eight hundred Sepoys, with muskets, forming two battalions, and fourteen hundred of the same troops destined for the fascines. That formed an army of six thousand eight hundred and thirty men.

The two mortar batteries, which, as has been said, were of different caliber, threw more than five thousand bombs into the city. [74] The land batteries and those of the ships fired more than twenty thousand shots from twenty-four pounders, and ruined the city in many places. The enemy sent about twenty-five shells, which set fires in five different places; and if all diligence had not been employed, the city, or the greater part of it, would have been in ashes. Manila, December 23, 1762.

ANDA AND THE ENGLISH INVASION, 1762-1764

[The following is synopsized and translated from a series of documents bound together under the following modern title: "Documents for the history of the invasion and war with the English in Filipinas, 1762-1764; faithfully copied from the originals in 1765."]

[Anda y Salazar, [75] in a letter written from Bulacan, October 8, 1762, to the archbishop, Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra, states that in accordance with his appointment by the latter as visitor-general of the provinces, he appoints the necessary persons for the performance of that duty, forms a court, and goes to Bulacan on October 4. There on presenting his credentials he is recognized by the alcalde-mayor José Pasarin. Manila is taken by assault by the British next day, and the president and auditors of the Audiencia remaining in the city are taken prisoners. Citing laws clxxx and lviii of título xv, book ii, of the Recopilación [76] Anda declares that, by virtue thereof, the Audiencia is continued in him alone; and since the archbishop (who has been acting as governor and president of the Audiencia) is also a prisoner, the duties of the office of governor and captain-general devolve upon him. He says:]

Having been aware of the respect and love with which the natives venerate their parish priests, ministers, and missionaries, and that these, by means of their greater knowledge of the nature, customs, and civilization of the natives, can maintain them and incite them to the defense of the country, against the English enemy: I have considered it fitting and necessary to send the present to your Excellency, by which, in the name of Don Carlos III, the Catholic king of España, I request and ask you, and in my own name, petition you, by means of the curas, rectors, and other members of the secular clergy of your diocese, to be pleased to represent to, persuade, and inform the natives of their obligation to maintain themselves as vassals of their natural king and sovereign, and to conserve this country under his dominion and fidelity, and to defend it from the English enemy, so that the latter may not make them their tributaries. For notwithstanding the loss of Manila, if the natives remain firm in their loyalty to their sovereign, the islands can be conserved and defended. In order to obtain this, I am ready to follow and conform to the useful orders of your Excellency with the understanding of your flock, and to those of the curas of the doctrine, with the understanding of their parishioners. I hope that the curas will, through their zeal, instruct, animate, and encourage the natives thoroughly in the matters that may be necessary at this critical time; and that your Excellency, immediately on receiving this despatch, may be pleased not to neglect this useful measure (so that it may so appear for all time) and aid me by having the missionary ministers, each one by his particular despatch, answer immediately, for the profit and advantage that the incidents and events may require, and return the despatches to me, so that I may file them with the papers of their kind. [77]

[The archbishop answers this letter under date of Manila, October 10, as follows:]

In your Lordship's commission granted with the preëminence that is fitting, you will proceed according to your prudence and to present circumstances. The first point is the Catholic faith. 2d, loyalty to the king, our sovereign. 3d, to faithfully observe the treaties which are now being drawn up with the British chiefs, for good faith is the rule of all good operations. Your Lordship had my commission before the surrender. The just procedure of your Lordship must be moderated to this event and to this time.... [78]

[To the above, Anda replies on October 20. [79] Citing the contents of the archbishop's letter, he says that his actions are to be governed by laws lvii [80] and lviii of título xv, of book ii of the Recopilación and since the governor is at present not able to govern, upon him devolves the duty of preserving peace and administering justice. "In this province [Bulacan], I have obtained not only complete quiet, but all its inhabitants are inclined not to admit any other religion than that which they profess or other dominion than that of our Catholic monarch." So long as certain thorns in his path do not contradict the principal object of loyalty to the king and religion, Anda winks at them, and does not inflict punishment. He continues:]

I said and I repeat that the presidency and government fell to the royal Audiencia; and I add that the latter is conserved and continued in me, that I am the sole and only minister, that by my absence from that capital because of the commissions confided to me at a convenient time, I remained free from the enemies, and as such capable and proper by law, so that in my person is met the prescriptions of law clxxx of the above-cited book and título, since my associates are lacking and have been imprisoned with your Excellency in the fatal loss of that capital.

[By a law which he has made in his capacity as Audiencia and governor, on October 5, [81] he has enjoyed and enjoys, and will continue to enjoy the titles of governor, captain-general, president, and Audiencia, which fell to him in view of said laws. But he will use them only until archbishop and Audiencia are at liberty when he will yield them all, and exercise only his commission. The first two points in the archbishop's letter could have been excused, as it might have been taken for granted that Anda would observe them. The third needs explanation, for he cannot see that he is bound by the treaty that is being made with the British, and he will defend the rest of the provinces with his life. He continues:]

Neither before nor since the surrender of that city, did your Excellency, or anyone else have, or do you possess any power to surrender to the enemy the domain of these islands--before, because you were not sovereign of them, but only administrator; since, because not even this weak title was left to you, nor the power of liberty. And since the enemy entered by assault and at discretion, they only have a right to what the sack gave them in itself in the territory gained by them. The rest is absurdly and ill surrendered, and contrary to all rights of war. Consequently, if this letter reaches you in time, I summon your Excellency, in his Majesty's name, once and a thousand times, not to go to the pass of signing the surrender of these islands. And should it be already signed, I protest to your Excellency the wrong and that I shall in no wise obey so unjust and absurd a treaty. If the British wish to dominate this country, their chiefs know that it must be by first gaining it with their arms according to right of war, but to surrender it through the panic of terror, like children, would be a vileness and treason, which I shall not permit so long as I am governor, and which does not belong to my loyalty. Your Excellency also tells me that I received your commission before the surrender, and that my just proceedings must be regulated to this event and to this time. I answer also by asking your Excellency to please explain a trifle more clearly in regard to the security that I alone shall have by my just proceedings, which cannot be one jot turned aside from loyalty to the king (whom may God preserve) and besides from these provinces, without giving or allowing terms for their foreign execution to the slightest degree. [82] Your Excellency gave me your commission before the surrender of that city, in order that I might maintain these provinces under the dominion of his Majesty after the fatal event which was feared. [83] In any other way the commission would have been superfluous. And is it possible that without regarding consequences, your Excellency tells me to faithfully observe the treaties with the British leaders, and that I regulate my just procedures to the result and the time of the surrender of that city? If your Excellency, although a vassal of the king of España, his minister, and so honored, counsels me after this manner, what is allowed to the British leaders? [84] Your Excellency knows that when I left that capital, you did not give me the royal seal, without which no Audiencia provision can be despatched. I beg your Excellency to please have it sent to me, or to have the lieutenant of the grand Chancillor come to exercise his employment, if he is not detained in that capital.

[The archbishop answers Anda's letter on the twenty-third, ordering him to present himself before him by the twenty-fifth, without fail. He sends the translation of a passport given by the English, which he attests (while keeping the original), so that Anda may come safely.] [85]