Chapter XV

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.

European writers on American affairs are full of mistakes on the working of our government; and these mistakes are generally to the prejudice of the democratic element. Of these mistakes, and in their ignorance of the difference between the theory and the working of our system in the election of the two first officers, two eminent French writers are striking instances: Messrs. de Tocqueville and Thiers. Taking the working and the theory of our government in this particular to be the same, they laud the institution of electors, to whom they believe the whole power of election belongs (as it was intended);--and hence attribute to the superior sagacity of these electors the merit of choosing all the eminent Presidents who have adorned the presidential chair. This mistake between theory and practice is known to every body in America, and should be known to enlightened men in Europe, who wish to do justice to popular government. The electors have no practical power over the election, and have had none since their institution. From the beginning they have stood pledged to vote for the candidates indicated (in the early elections) by the public will; afterwards, by Congress caucuses, as long as those caucuses followed the public will; and since, by assemblages called conventions, whether they follow the public will or not. In every case the elector has been an instrument, bound to obey a particular impulsion; and disobedience to which would be attended with infamy, and with every penalty which public indignation could inflict. From the beginning these electors have been useless, and an inconvenient intervention between the people and the object of their choice; and, in time, may become dangerous: and being useless, inconvenient, and subject to abuse and danger; having wholly failed to answer the purpose for which they were instituted (and for which purpose no one would now contend); it becomes a just conclusion that the institution should be abolished, and the election committed to the direct vote of the people. And, to obviate all excuse for previous nominations by intermediate bodies, a second election to be held forthwith between the two highest or leading candidates, if no one had had a majority of the whole number on the first trial. These are not new ideas, born of a spirit of change and innovation; but old doctrine, advocated in the convention which framed the Constitution, by wise and good men; by Dr. Franklin and others, of Pennsylvania; by John Dickinson and others, of Delaware. But the opinion prevailed in the convention, that the mass of the people would not be sufficiently informed, discreet, and temperate to exercise with advantage so great a privilege as that of choosing the chief magistrate of a great republic; and hence the institution of an intermediate body, called the electoral college--its members to be chosen by the people--and when assembled in conclave (I use the word in the Latin sense of _con_ and _clavis_, under key), to select whomsoever they should think proper for President and Vice-President. All this scheme having failed, and the people having taken hold of the election, it became just and regular to attempt to legalize their acquisition by securing to them constitutionally the full enjoyment of the rights which they imperfectly exercised. The feeling to this effect became strong as the election of 1824 approached, when there were many candidates in the field, and Congress caucuses fallen into disrepute; and several attempts were made to obtain a constitutional amendment to accomplish the purpose. Mr. McDuffie, in the House of Representatives, and myself in the Senate, both proposed such amendments; the mode of taking the direct votes to be in districts, and the persons receiving the greatest number of votes for President or Vice-President in any district, to count one vote for such office respectively; which is nothing but substituting the candidates themselves for their electoral representatives, while simplifying the election, insuring its integrity, and securing the rights of the people. In support of my proposition in the Senate, I delivered some arguments in the form of a speech, from which I here add some extracts, in the hope of keeping the question alive, and obtaining for it a better success at some future day.

"The evil of a want of uniformity in the choice of presidential
electors, is not limited to its disfiguring effect upon the
face of our government, but goes to endanger the rights of
the people, by permitting sudden alterations on the eve of an
election, and to annihilate the right of the small States, by
enabling the large ones to combine, and to throw all their votes
into the scale of a particular candidate. These obvious evils
make it certain that _any uniform rule_ would be preferable to
the present state of things. But, in fixing on one, it is the
duty of statesmen to select that which is calculated to give
to every portion of the Union its due share in the choice of
the Chief Magistrate, and to every individual citizen, a fair
opportunity of voting according to his will. This would be
effected by adopting the _District System_. It would divide
every State into districts, equal to the whole number of votes
to be given, and the people of each district would be governed
by its own majority, and not by a majority existing in some
remote part of the State. This would be agreeable to the
_rights_ of individuals: for, in entering into society, and
submitting to be bound by the decision of the majority, each
individual retained the right of voting for himself wherever
it was practicable, and of being governed by a majority of the
vicinage, and not by majorities brought from remote sections
to overwhelm him with their accumulated numbers. It would be
agreeable to the _interests_ of all parts of the States; for
each State may have different interests in different parts;
one part may be agricultural, another manufacturing, another
commercial; and it would be unjust that the strongest should
govern, or that two should combine and sacrifice the third.
The district system would be agreeable to the _intention_ of
our present constitution, which, in giving to each elector a
separate vote, instead of giving to each State a consolidated
vote, composed of all its electoral suffrages, clearly intended
that each mass of persons entitled to one elector, should have
the right of giving one vote, according to their own sense of
their own interest.

"The general ticket system now existing in ten States, was the
offspring of policy, and not of any disposition to give fair
play to the will of the people. It was adopted by the leading
men of those States, to enable them to consolidate the vote
of the State. It would be easy to prove this by referring to
facts of historical notoriety. It contributes to give power and
consequence to the leaders who manage the elections, but it is
a departure from the intention of the constitution; violates
the rights of the minorities, and is attended with many other
evils. The intention of the constitution is violated, because
it was the intention of that instrument to give to each mass
of persons, entitled to one elector, the power of giving an
electoral vote to any candidate they preferred. The rights of
minorities are violated, because a majority of _one_ will carry
the vote of the whole State. This principle is the same, whether
the elector is chosen by general ticket or by legislative
ballot; a majority of _one_, in either case, carries the
vote of the whole State. In New-York, thirty-six electors are
chosen; nineteen is a majority, and the candidate receiving
this majority is fairly entitled to count nineteen votes; but
he counts in reality, thirty-six: because the minority of
seventeen are added to the majority. Those seventeen votes
belong to seventeen masses of people, of 40,000 souls each, in
all 680,000 people, whose votes are seized upon, taken away, and
presented to whom the majority pleases. Extend the calculation
to the seventeen States now choosing electors by general ticket
or legislative ballot, and it will show that three millions of
souls, a population equal to that which carried us through the
Revolution, may have their votes taken from them in the same
way. To _lose_ their votes, is the fate of all minorities,
and it is their duty to submit; but this is not a case of
votes _lost_, but of votes _taken away_, added to those of the
majority, and given to a person to whom the minority was opposed.

"He said, this objection (to the direct vote of the people) had
a weight in the year 1787, to which it is not entitled in the
year 1824. Our government was then young, schools and colleges
were scarce, political science was then confined to few, and
the means of diffusing intelligence were both inadequate and
uncertain. The experiment of a popular government was just
beginning; the people had been just released from subjection
to an hereditary king, and were not yet practised in the art
of choosing a temporary chief for themselves. But thirty-six
years have reversed this picture. Thirty-six years, which
have produced so many wonderful changes in America, have
accomplished the work of many centuries upon the intelligence
of its inhabitants. Within that period, school, colleges, and
universities have multiplied to an amazing extent. The means of
diffusing intelligence have been wonderfully augmented by the
establishment of six hundred newspapers, and upwards of five
thousand post-offices. The whole course of an American's life,
civil, social, and religious, has become one continued scene of
intellectual and of moral improvement. Once in every week, more
than eleven thousand men, eminent for learning and for piety,
perform the double duty of amending the hearts, and enlightening
the understandings, of more than eleven thousand congregations
of people. Under the benign influence of a free government,
both our public institutions and private pursuits, our juries,
elections, courts of justice, the liberal professions and
the mechanic arts, have each become a school of political
science and of mental improvement. The federal legislature,
in the annual message of the President, in reports from heads
of departments, and committees of Congress, and speeches of
members, pours forth a flood of intelligence which carries its
waves to the remotest confines of the republic. In the different
States, twenty-four State executives and State legislatures
are annually repeating the same process within a more limited
sphere. The habit of universal travelling, and the practice of
universal interchange of thought, are continually circulating
the intelligence of the country, and augmenting its mass. The
face of our country itself, its vast extent, its grand and
varied features, contribute to expand the human intellect, and
to magnify its power. Less than half a century of the enjoyment
of liberty has given practical evidence of the great moral
truth, that, under a free government, the power of the intellect
is the only power which rules the affairs of men; and virtue and
intelligence the only durable passports to honor and preferment.
The conviction of this great truth has created an universal
taste for learning and for reading, and has convinced every
parent that the endowments of the mind, and the virtues of the
heart, are the only imperishable, the only inestimable riches
which he can leave to his posterity.

"This objection (the danger of tumults and violence at the
elections) is taken from the history of the ancient republics;
from the tumultuary elections of Rome and Greece. But the
justness of the example is denied. There is nothing in the laws
of physiology which admits a parallel between the sanguinary
Roman, the volatile Greek, and the phlegmatic American. There is
nothing in the state of the respective countries, or in their
manner of voting, which makes one an example for the other. The
Romans voted in a mass, at a single voting place, even when the
qualified voters amounted to millions of persons. They came
to the polls armed, and divided into classes, and voted, not
by heads, but by centuries. In the Grecian Republics all the
voters were brought together in one great city, and decided the
contest in one great struggle. In such assemblages, both the
inducement to violence, and the means of committing it, were
prepared by the government itself. In the United States all
this is different. The voters are assembled in small bodies, at
innumerable voting places, distributed over a vast extent of
country. They come to the polls without arms, without odious
distinctions, without any temptation to violence, and with every
inducement to harmony. If heated during the day of election,
they cool off upon returning to their homes, and resuming their
ordinary occupations.

"But let us admit the truth of the objection. Let us admit that
the American people would be as tumultuary at their presidential
elections, as were the citizens of the ancient republics at
the election of their chief magistrates. What then? Are we
thence to infer the inferiority of the officers thus elected,
and the consequent degradation of the countries over which
they presided? I answer no. So far from it, that I assert the
superiority of these officers over all others ever obtained for
the same countries, either by hereditary succession, or the most
select mode of election. I affirm those periods of history to
be the most glorious in arms, the most renowned in arts, the
most celebrated in letters, the most useful in practice, and
the most happy in the condition of the people, in which the
whole body of the citizens voted direct for the chief officer
of their country. Take the history of that commonwealth which
yet shines as the leading star in the firmament of nations. Of
the twenty-five centuries that the Roman state has existed, to
what period do we look for the generals and statesmen, the poets
and orators, the philosophers and historians, the sculptors,
painters, and architects, whose immortal works have fixed upon
their country the admiring eyes of all succeeding ages? Is it
to the reigns of the seven first kings?--to the reigns of the
emperors, proclaimed by the prætorian bands?--to the reigns of
the Sovereign Pontiffs, chosen by a select body of electors
in a conclave of most holy cardinals? No--We look to none of
these, but to that short interval of four centuries and a half
which lies between the expulsion of the Tarquins, and the
re-establishment of monarchy in the person of Octavius Cæsar. It
is to this short period, during which the consuls, tribunes, and
prætors, were annually elected by a direct vote of the people,
to which we look ourselves, and to which we direct the infant
minds of our children, for all the works and monuments of Roman
greatness; for roads, bridges, and aqueducts, constructed;
for victories gained, nations vanquished, commerce extended,
treasure imported, libraries founded, learning encouraged, the
arts flourishing, the city embellished, and the kings of the
earth humbly suing to be admitted into the friendship, and
taken under the protection, of the Roman people. It was of this
magnificent period that Cicero spoke, when he proclaimed the
people of Rome to be the masters of kings, and the conquerors
and commanders of all the nations of the earth. And, what is
wonderful, during this whole period, in a succession of four
hundred and fifty annual elections, the people never once
preferred a citizen to the consulship who did not carry the
prosperity and the glory of the Republic to a point beyond that
at which he had found it.

"It is the same with the Grecian Republics. Thirty centuries
have elapsed since they were founded; yet it is to an ephemeral
period of one hundred and fifty years only, the period of
popular elections which intervened between the dispersion of a
cloud of petty tyrants, and the coming of a great one in the
person of Philip, king of Macedon, that we are to look for that
galaxy of names which shed so much lustre upon their country,
and in which we are to find the first cause of that intense
sympathy which now burns in our bosoms at the name of Greece.

"These short and brilliant periods exhibit the great triumph of
popular elections; often tumultuary, often stained with blood,
but always ending gloriously for the country. Then the right
of suffrage was enjoyed; the sovereignty of the people was no
fiction. Then a sublime spectacle was seen, when the Roman
citizen advanced to the polls and proclaimed: '_I vote for Cato
to be Consul_;' the Athenian, '_I vote for Aristides to be
Archon_;' the Theban, '_I vote for Pelopidas to be Bæotrach_;'
the Lacedemonian, '_I vote for Leonidas to be first of the
Ephori_.' And why may not an American citizen do the same?
Why may not he go up to the poll and proclaim, '_I vote for
Thomas Jefferson to be President of the United States?_' Why
is he compelled to put his vote in the hands of another, and
to incur all the hazards of an irresponsible agency, when he
himself could immediately give his own vote for his own chosen
candidate, without the slightest assistance from agents or
managers?

"But, said Mr. Benton, I have other objections to these
intermediate electors. They are the peculiar and favorite
institution of aristocratic republics, and elective monarchies.
I refer the Senate to the late republics of Venice and Genoa; of
France, and her litter; to the kingdom of Poland; the empire of
Germany, and the Pontificate of Rome. On the contrary, a direct
vote by the people is the peculiar and favorite institution of
democratic republics; as we have just seen in the governments
of Rome, Athens, Thebes, and Sparta; to which may be added the
principal cities of the Amphyctionic and Achaian leagues, and
the renowned republic of Carthage when the rival of Rome.

"I have now answered the objections which were brought forward
in the year '87. I ask for no judgment upon their validity
at that day, but I affirm them to be without force or reason
in the year 1824. TIME and EXPERIENCE have so decided. Yes,
_time_ and _experience_, the only infallible tests of good or
bad institutions, have now shown that the continuance of the
electoral system will be both useless and dangerous to the
liberties of the people; and that '_the only effectual mode
of preserving our government from the corruptions which have
undermined the liberty of so many nations, is, to confide the
election of our chief magistrate to those who are farthest
removed from the influence of his patronage_;'[1] that is to
say, TO THE WHOLE BODY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS!

[1] Report of a Committee of the House of Representatives on Mr.
McDuffie's proposition.

"The electors are not independent; they have no superior
intelligence; they are not left to their own judgment in the
choice of President; they are not above the control of the
people; on the contrary, every elector is pledged, before he
is chosen, to give his vote according to the will of those
who choose him. He is nothing but an agent, tied down to the
execution of a precise trust. Every reason which induced the
convention to institute electors has failed. They are no longer
of any use, and may be dangerous to the liberties of the
people. They are not useful, because they have no power over
their own vote, and because the people can vote for a President
as easily as they can vote for an elector. They are dangerous
to the liberties of the people, because, in the _first_ place,
they introduce extraneous considerations into the election of
President; and, in the _second_ place, they may sell the vote
which is intrusted to their keeping. They introduce extraneous
considerations, by bringing their own character and their
own exertions into the presidential canvass. Every one sees
this. Candidates for electors are now selected, not for the
reasons mentioned in the Federalist, but for their devotion
to a particular party, for their manners, and their talent at
electioneering. The elector may betray the liberties of the
people, by selling his vote. The operation is easy, because he
votes by ballot; detection is impossible, because he does not
sign his vote; the restraint is nothing but his own conscience,
for there is no legal punishment for his breach of trust. If
a swindler defrauds you out of a few dollars in property or
money, he is whipped and pilloried, and rendered infamous in
the eye of the law; but, if an elector should defraud 40,000
people of their vote, there is no remedy but to abuse him in the
newspapers, where the best men in the country may be abused, as
much as Benedict Arnold, or Judas Iscariot. Every reason for
instituting electors has failed, and every consideration of
prudence requires them to be discontinued. They are nothing but
agents, in a case which requires no agent; and no prudent man
would, or ought, to employ an agent to take care of his money,
his property, or his liberty, when he is equally capable to take
care of them himself.

"But, if the plan of the constitution had not failed--if we
were now deriving from electors all the advantages expected
from their institution--I, for one, said Mr. B., would still
be in favor of getting rid of them. I should esteem the
incorruptibility of the people, their disinterested desire to
get the best man for President, to be more than a counterpoise
to all the advantages which might be derived from the superior
intelligence of a more enlightened, but smaller, and therefore,
more corruptible body. I should be opposed to the intervention
of electors, because the double process of electing a man
to elect a man, would paralyze the spirit of the people,
and destroy the life of the election itself. Doubtless this
machinery was introduced into our constitution for the purpose
of softening the action of the democratic element; but it also
softens the interest of the people in the result of the election
itself. It places them at too great a distance from their first
servant. It interposes a body of men between the people and
the object of their choice, and gives a false direction to the
gratitude of the President elected. He feels himself indebted to
the electors who collected the votes of the people, and not to
the people, who gave their votes to the electors. It enables a
few men to govern many, and, in time, it will transfer the whole
power of the election into the hands of a few, leaving to the
people the humble occupation of confirming what has been done by
superior authority.

"Mr Benton referred to historical examples to prove the
correctness of his opinion.

"He mentioned the constitution of the French Republic, of the
year III. of French liberty. The people to choose electors;
these to choose the Councils of Five Hundred, and of Ancients;
and these, by a further process of filtration, to choose the
Five Directors. The effect was, that the people had no concern
in the election of their Chief Magistrates, and felt no interest
in their fate. They saw them enter and expel each other from the
political theatre, with the same indifference with which they
would see the entrance and the exit of so many players on the
stage. It was the same thing in all the subaltern Republics of
which the French armies were delivered, while overturning the
thrones of Europe. The constitutions of the Ligurian, Cisalpine,
and Parthenopian Republics, were all duplicates of the mother
institution, at Paris; and all shared the same fate. The French
consular constitution of the year VIII. (the last year of French
liberty) preserved all the vices of the electoral system; and
from this fact, alone, that profound observer, NECKAR, from the
bosom of his retreat, in the midst of the Alps, predicted and
proclaimed the death of Liberty in France. He wrote a book to
prove that 'LIBERTY WOULD BE RUINED BY PROVIDING ANY KIND OF
SUBSTITUTE FOR POPULAR ELECTIONS:' and the result verified his
prediction in four years."