Chapter II: Preface: 1.--Motives for Writing This Work

Justice to the men with whom I acted, and to the cause in which we were engaged, is my chief motive for engaging in this work. A secondary motive is the hope of being useful to our republican form of government in after ages by showing its working through a long and eventful period; working well all the time, and thereby justifying the hope of its permanent good operation in all time to come, if maintained in its purity and integrity. Justice to the wise and patriotic men who established our independence, and founded this government, is another motive with me. I do not know how young I was when I first read in the speeches of Lord Chatham, the encomium which he pronounced in the House of Lords on these founders of our republic; but it sunk deep into my memory at the time, and, what is more, went deep into the heart: and has remained there ever since. "When your lordships look at the papers transmitted us from America; when you consider their decency, firmness, and wisdom, you cannot but respect their cause, and wish to make it your own. For myself, I must declare and avow, that in all my reading and observation--and it has been my favorite study--I have read Thucydides, and have studied and admired the master states of the world--that for solidity of reasoning, force of sagacity, and wisdom of conclusion, under such a complication of difficult circumstances, no nation, or body of men, can stand in preference to the general congress at Philadelphia." This encomium, so just and so grand, so grave and so measured, and the more impressive on account of its gravity and measure, was pronounced in the early part of our revolutionary struggle--in its first stage--and before a long succession of crowning events had come to convert it into history, and to show of how much more those men were capable than they had then done. If the great William Pitt--greater under that name than under the title he so long refused--had lived in this day, had lived to see these men making themselves exceptions to the maxim of the world, and finishing the revolution which they began--seen them found a new government and administer it in their day and generation, and until "gathered to their fathers," and all with the same wisdom, justice, moderation, and decorum, with which they began it: if he had lived to have seen all this, even his lofty genius might have recoiled from the task of doing them justice;--and, I may add, from the task of doing justice to the PEOPLE who sustained such men. Eulogy is not my task; but gratitude and veneration is the debt of my birth and inheritance, and of the benefits which I have enjoyed from their labors; and I have proposed to acknowledge this debt--to discharge it is impossible--in laboring to preserve their work during my day, and in now commending it, by the fruits it has borne, to the love and care of posterity. Another motive, hardly entitled to the dignity of being named, has its weight with me, and belongs to the rights of "self-defence." I have made a great many speeches, and have an apprehension that they may be published after I am gone--published in the gross, without due discrimination--and so preserve, or perpetuate, things said, both of men and of measures, which I no longer approve, and would wish to leave to oblivion. By making selections of suitable parts of these speeches, and weaving them into this work, I may hope to prevent a general publication--or to render it harmless if made. But I do not condemn all that I leave out.

2.--QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE WORK.

Of these I have one, admitted by all to be considerable, but by no means enough of itself. Mr. Macaulay says of Fox and Mackintosh, speaking of their histories of the last of the Stuarts, and of the Revolution of 1688: "They had one eminent qualification for writing history; they had spoken history, acted history, lived history. The turns of political fortune, the ebb and flow of popular feeling, the hidden mechanism by which parties are moved, all these things were the subject of their constant thought, and of their most familiar conversation. Gibbon has remarked, that his history is much the better for his having been an officer in the militia, and a member of the House of Commons. The remark is most just. We have not the smallest doubt that his campaigns, though he never saw an enemy, and his parliamentary attendance, though he never made a speech, were of far more use to him than years of retirement and study would have been. If the time that he spent on parade and at mess in Hampshire, or on the Treasury bench and at Brooke's, during the storms which overthrew Lord North and Lord Shelburne, had been passed in the Bodleian Library, he might have avoided some inaccuracies; he might have enriched his notes with a greater number of references; but he never could have produced so lively a picture of the court, the camp, and the senate-house. In this respect Mr. Fox and Sir James Mackintosh had great advantages over almost every English historian since the time of Burnet."--I can say I have these advantages. I was in the Senate the whole time of which I write--an active business member, attending and attentive--in the confidence of half the administrations, and a close observer of the others--had an inside view of transactions of which the public only saw the outside, and of many of which the two sides were very different--saw the secret springs and hidden machinery by which men and parties were to be moved, and measures promoted or thwarted--saw patriotism and ambition at their respective labors, and was generally able to discriminate between them. So far, I have one qualification; but Mr. Macaulay says that Lord Lyttleton had the same, and made but a poor history, because unable to use his material. So it may be with me; but in addition to my senatorial means of knowledge, I have access to the unpublished papers of General Jackson, and find among them some that he intended for publication, and which will be used according to his intention.

3.--THE SCOPE OF THE WORK.

I do not propose a regular history, but a political work, to show the practical working of the government, and speak of men and events in subordination to that design, and to illustrate the character of Institutions which are new and complex--the first of their kind, and upon the fate of which the eyes of the world are now fixed. Our duplicate form of government, State and Federal, is a novelty which has no precedent, and has found no practical imitation, and is still believed by some to be an experiment. I believe in its excellence, and wish to contribute to its permanence, and believe I can do so by giving a faithful account of what I have seen of its working, and of the trials to which I have seen it subjected.

4.--THE SPIRIT OF THE WORK.

I write in the spirit of Truth, but not of unnecessary or irrelevant truth, only giving that which is essential to the object of the work, and the omission of which would be an imperfection, and a subtraction from what ought to be known. I have no animosities, and shall find far greater pleasure in bringing out the good and the great acts of those with whom I have differed, than in noting the points on which I deemed them wrong. My ambition is to make a veracious work, reliable in its statements, candid in its conclusions, just in its views, and which cotemporaries and posterity may read without fear of being misled.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

PAGE.

PRELIMINARY VIEW from 1815 to 1820 1

CHAP.

I. Personal Aspect of the Government 7

II. Admission of the State of Missouri 8

III. Finances--Reduction of the Army 11

IV. Relief of Public Land Debtors 11

V. Oregon Territory 13

VI. Florida Treaty and Cession of Texas 14

VII. Death of Mr. Lowndes 18

VIII. Death of William Pinkney 19

IX. Abolition of the Indian Factory System 20

X. Internal Improvement 21

XI. General Removal of Indians 27

XII. Visit of Lafayette to the United States 29

XIII. The Tariff, and American System 32

XIV. The A. B. Plot 34

XV. Amendment of the Constitution, in relation
to the Election of President and Vice-President 37

XVI. Internal Trade with New Mexico 41

XVII. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
in the Electoral Colleges 44

XVIII. Death of John Taylor, of Caroline 45

XIX. Presidential Election in the House of Representatives 46

XX. The Occupation of the Columbia 50

XXI. Commencement of Mr. Adams's Administration 54

XXII. Case of Mr. Lanman--Temporary Senatorial
Appointment from Connecticut 56

XXIII. Retiring of Mr. Rufus King 57

XXIV. Removal of the Creek Indians from Georgia 58

XXV. The Panama Mission 65

XXVI. Duel Between Mr. Clay and Mr. Randolph 70

XXVII. Death of Mr. Gaillard 77

XXVIII. Amendment of the Constitution, in relation
to the Election of President and Vice-President 78

XXIX. Reduction of Executive Patronage 80

XXX. Exclusion of Members of Congress from
Civil Office Appointments 82

XXXI. Death of the ex-Presidents, John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson 87

XXXII. British Indemnity for Deported Slaves 88

XXXIII. Meeting of the first Congress Elected under
the Administration of Mr. Adams 91

XXXIV. Revision of the Tariff 95

XXXV. The Public Lands--Their Proper Disposition--Graduated
Prices--Pre-emption
Rights--Donations to Settlers 102

XXXVI. Cession of a Part of the Territory of Arkansas
to the Cherokee Indians 107

XXXVII. Renewal of the Oregon Joint Occupation
Convention 109

XXXVIII. Presidential Election of 1828, and Further
Errors of Mons. de Tocqueville 111

XXXIX. Retiring and Death of Mr. Macon 114

XL. Commencement of General Jackson's Administration 119

XLI. First Message of General Jackson to the
two Houses of Congress 121

XLII. The recovery of the Direct Trade with the
British West India Islands 124

XLIII. Establishment of the _Globe_ Newspaper 128

XLIV. Limitation of Public Land Sales--Suspension
of Surveys--Abolition of the Office
of Surveyor General--Origin of the
United States Land System--Authorship
of the Anti-slavery Ordinance of
1778--Slavery Controversy--Protective
Tariff--Inception of the Doctrine of Nullification 130

XLV. Repeal of the Salt Tax 143

XLVI. Birthday of Mr. Jefferson, and the Doctrine
of Nullification 148

XLVII. Regulation of Commerce 149

XLVIII. Alum Salt--The Abolition of the Duty
upon it, and Repeal of the Fishing Bounty
and Allowances Founded on It 154

XLIX. Bank of the United States 158

L. Removals from Office 159

LI. Indian Sovereignties within the States 163

LII. Veto on the Maysville Road Bill 167

LIII. Rupture between President Jackson and
Vice-President Calhoun 167

LIV. Breaking up of the Cabinet, and Appointment
of another 180

LV. Military Academy 182

LVI. Bank of the United States--Non-renewal
of Charter 187

LVII. Error of De Tocqueville, in relation to the
House of Representatives 205

LVIII. The Twenty-second Congress 208

LIX. Rejection of Mr. Van Buren, Minister to
England 214

LX. Bank of the United States--Illegal, and
Vicious Currency 220

LXI. Error of Mons. de Tocqueville, in relation
to the Bank of the United States, the
President, and the People 224

LXII. Expenses of the Government 229

LXIII. Bank of the United States--Recharter--Commencement
of the Proceedings 232

LXIV. Bank of the United States--Committee
of Investigation Ordered 235

LXV. The Three per Cent. Debt, and Loss in
not Paying it when the Rate was Low,
and the Money in the Bank of the
United States without Interest 242

LXVI. Bank of the United States--Bill for the
Recharter Reported in the Senate, and
Passed that Body 243

LXVII. Bank of the United States--Bill for the
Renewed Charter Passed in the House
of Representatives 250

LXVIII. The Veto 251

LXXIX. The Protective System 265

LXX. Public Lands--Distribution to the States 275

LXXI. Settlement of French and Spanish Land
Claims 279

LXXII. "Effects of the Veto" 280

LXXIII. Presidential Election of 1832 282

LXXIV. First Annual Message of President Jackson,
after his Second Election 283

LXXV. Bank of The United States--Delay in
Paying the Three per Cents.--Committee
of Investigation 287

LXXVI. Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt 291

LXXVII. Sale of United States Stock in the National
Bank 294

LXXVIII. Nullification Ordinance in South Carolina 297

LXXIX. Proclamation against Nullification 299

LXXX. Message on the South Carolina Proceedings 303

LXXXI. Reduction of Duties--Mr. Verplanck's
Bill 308

LXXXII. Reduction of Duties--Mr. Clay's Bill 313

LXXXIII. Revenue Collection, or Force Bill 330

LXXXIV. Mr. Calhoun's Nullification Resolutions 334

LXXXV. Secret History of the "Compromise" of
1833 342

LXXXVI. Compromise Legislation; and the Act,
so called, of 1833 344

LXXXVII. Virginia resolutions of '98-'99--Disabused
of their South Carolina Interpretation--1.
Upon their Own Words--2.
Upon Contemporaneous Interpretation 347

LXXXVIII. Virginia Resolutions of 1798--Disabused
of Nullification by their Author 354

LXXXIX. The Author's own View of the Nature
of Our Government, as being a Union
in Contradistinction to a League--Presented
in a Subsequent Speech on Missouri
Resolutions 360

XC. Public Lands--Distribution of Proceeds 362

XCI. Commencement of the Twenty-third
Congress--The Members', and President's
Message 369

XCII. Removal of the Deposits from the Bank
of the United States 373

XCIII. Bank Proceedings, on Seeing the Decision
of the President, in relation to the
Removal of the Deposits 379

XCIV. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
to Congress on the Removal of the Deposits 381

XCV. Nomination of Government Directors,
and their Rejection 385

XCVI. Secretary's Report on the Removal of
Deposits 393

XCVII. Call on the President for a Copy of the
"Paper Read to the Cabinet" 399

XCVIII. Mistakes of Public Men--Great Combination
against General Jackson--Commencement
of the Panic 400

XCIX. Mr. Clay's Speech against President Jackson
on the Removal of the Deposits--Extracts 402

C. Mr. Benton's Speech in Reply to Mr. Clay--Extracts 406

CI. Condemnation of President Jackson--Mr.
Calhoun's Speech--Extracts 411

CII. Public Distress 415

CIII. Senatorial Condemnation of President
Jackson--his Protest--Notice of the
Expunging Resolution 423

CIV. Mr. Webster's Plan of Relief 433

CV. Revival of the Gold Currency--Mr. Benton's
Speech 436

CVI. Attempted Investigation of the Bank of
the United States 458

CVII. Mr. Taney's Report on the Finances--Exposure
of the Distress Alarms--End of the Panic 462

CVIII. Revival of the Gold Currency 469

CIX. Rejection of Mr. Taney--Nominated for
Secretary of the Treasury 470

CX. Senatorial Investigation of the Bank of
the United States 470

CXI. Downfall of the Bank of the United States 471

CXII. Death of John Randolph, of Roanoake 473

CXIII. Death of Mr. Wirt 475

CXIV. Death of the last of the Signers of the
Declaration of Independence 476

CXV. Commencement of the Session, 1834-'35:
President's Message 477

CXVI. Report of the Bank Committee 481

CXVII. French Spoliations before 1800 487

CXVIII. French Spoliations--Speech of Mr.
Wright, of New-York 489

CXIX. French Spoliations--Mr. Webster's Speech 505

CXX. French Spoliations--Mr. Benton's Speech 514

CXXI. Attempted Assassination of President
Jackson 521

CXXII. Alabama Expunging Resolutions 524

CXXIII. The Expunging Resolution 528

CXXIV. Expunging Resolution: Rejected, and
Renewed 549

CXXV. Branch Mints at New Orleans, and in the
Gold Regions of Georgia and North
Carolina 550

CXXVI. Regulation Deposit Bill 553

CXXVII. Defeat of the Defence Appropriation, and
loss of the Fortification Bill 554

CXXVIII. Distribution of Revenue 556

CXXIX. Commencement of Twenty-Fourth Congress--
President's Message 568

CXXX. Abolition of Slavery in the District of
Columbia 576

CXXXI. Mail Circulation of Incendiary Publications 580

CXXXII. French Affairs--Approach at a French
Squadron--Apology Required 588

CXXXIII. French Indemnities--British Mediation--
Indemnities Paid 600

CXXXIV. President Jackson's Foreign Diplomacy 601

CXXXV. Slavery Agitation 609

CXXXVI. Removal of the Cherokees from Georgia 624

CXXXVII. Extension of the Missouri Boundary 626

CXXXVIII. Admission of the States of Arkansas and
Michigan into the Union 627

CXXXIX. Attempted Inquiry into the Military
Academy 638

CXL. Military Academy--Speech of Mr. Pierce 641

CXLI. Expunging Resolution--Peroration of
Senator Benton's Second Speech 645

CXLII. Distribution of the Land Revenue 649

CXLIII. Recharter of the District Banks--Speech
of Mr. Benton--The Parts of Local and
Temporary Interest Omitted 658

CXLIV. Independence of Texas 665

CXLV. Texas Independence--Mr. Benton's
Speech 670

CXLVI. The Specie Circular 676

CXLVII. Death of Mr. Madison, Fourth President
of the United States 678

CXLVIII. Death of Mr. Monroe, Fifth President of
the United States 679

CXLIX. Death of Chief Justice Marshall 681

CL. Death of Col. Burr, Third Vice-President
of the United States 681

CLI. Death of William B. Giles, of Virginia 682

CLII. Presidential Election of 1836 683

CLIII. Last Annual Message of President Jackson 684

CLIV. Final Removal of the Indians 690

CLV. Recision of the Treasury Circular 694

CLVI. Distribution of Lands and Money--Various
Propositions 707

CLVII. Military Academy--Its Riding House 712

CLVIII. Salt Tax--Mr. Benton's Fourth Speech 714

CLIX. Expunging Resolution--Preparation for
Decision 717

CLX. Expunging Resolution--Mr. Benton's
Third Speech 719

CLXI. Expunging Resolution--Mr. Clay, Mr.
Calhoun, Mr. Webster--Last Scene--Resolution
Passed and Executed 727

CLXII. The Supreme Court--Judges and Officers 731

CLXIII. Farewell Address of President Jackson--Extract 732

CLXIV. Conclusion of General Jackson's Administration 733

CLXV. Retiring and Death of General Jackson--
Administration of Martin Van Buren 735

PRELIMINARY VIEW.

FROM 1815 TO 1820

The war with Great Britain commenced in 1812 and ended in 1815. It was a short war, but a necessary and important one, and introduced several changes, and made some new points of departure in American policy, which are necessary to be understood in order to understand the subsequent working of the government, and the VIEW of that working which is proposed to be given.

1. It struggled and labored under the state of the finances and the currency, and terminated without any professed settlement of the cause for which it began. There was no national currency--no money, or its equivalent, which represented the same value in all places. The first Bank of the United States had ceased to exist in 1811. Gold, from being undervalued, had ceased to be a currency--had become an article of merchandise, and of export--and was carried to foreign countries. Silver had been banished by the general use of bank notes, had been reduced to a small quantity, insufficient for a public demand; and, besides, would have been too cumbrous for a national currency. Local banks overspread the land; and upon these the federal government, having lost the currency of the constitution, was thrown for a currency and for loans. They, unequal to the task, and having removed their own foundations by banishing specie with profuse paper issues, sunk under the double load of national and local wants, and stopped specie payments--all except those of New England, which section of the Union was unfavorable to the war. Treasury notes were then the resort of the federal government. They were issued in great quantities; and not being convertible into coin at the will of the holder, soon began to depreciate. In the second year of the war the depreciation had already become enormous, especially towards the Canada frontier, where the war raged, and where money was most wanted. An officer setting out from Washington with a supply of these notes found them sunk one-third by the time he arrived at the northern frontier--his every three dollars counting but two. After all, the treasury notes could not be used as a currency, neither legally, nor in fact: they could only be used to obtain local bank paper--itself greatly depreciated. All government securities were under par, even for depreciated bank notes. Loans were obtained with great difficulty--at large discount--almost on the lender's own terms; and still attainable only in depreciated local bank notes. In less than three years the government, paralyzed by the state of the finances, was forced to seek peace, and to make it, without securing, by any treaty stipulation, the object for which war had been declared. Impressment was the object--the main one, with the insults and the outrages connected with it--and without which there would have been no declaration of war. The treaty of peace did not mention or allude to the subject--the first time, perhaps, in modern history, in which a war was terminated by treaty without any stipulation derived from its cause. Mr. Jefferson, in 1807, rejected upon his own responsibility, without even its communication to the Senate, the treaty of that year negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, because it did not contain an express renunciation of the practice of impressment--because it was silent on that point. It was a treaty of great moment, settled many troublesome questions, was very desirable for what it contained; but as it was silent on the main point, it was rejected, without even a reference to the Senate. Now we were in a like condition after a war. The war was struggling for its own existence under the state of the finances, and had to be stopped without securing by treaty the object for which it was declared. The object was obtained, however, by the war itself. It showed the British government that the people of the United States would fight upon that point--that she would have war again if she impressed again: and there has been no impressment since. Near forty years without a case! when we were not as many days, oftentimes, without cases before, and of the most insulting and outrageous nature. The spirit and patriotism of the people in furnishing the supplies, volunteering for the service, and standing to the contest in the general wreck of the finances and the currency, without regard to their own losses--and the heroic courage of the army and navy, and of the militia and volunteers, made the war successful and glorious in spite of empty treasuries; and extorted from a proud empire that security in point of fact which diplomacy could not obtain as a treaty stipulation. And it was well. Since, and now, and henceforth, we hold exemption from impressment as we hold our independence--by right, and by might--and now want the treaty acknowledgment of no nation on either point. But the glorious termination of the war did not cure the evil of a ruined currency and defective finances, nor render less impressive the financial lesson which it taught. A return to the currency of the constitution--to the hard-money government which our fathers gave us--no connection with banks--no bank paper for federal uses--the establishment of an independent treasury for the federal government; this was the financial lesson which the war taught. The new generation into whose hands the working of the government fell during the THIRTY YEARS, eventually availed themselves of that lesson:--with what effect, the state of the country since, unprecedentedly prosperous; the state of the currency, never deranged; of the federal treasury, never polluted with "unavailable funds," and constantly crammed to repletion with solid gold; the issue of the Mexican war, carried on triumphantly without a national bank, and with the public securities constantly above par--sufficiently proclaim. No other tongue but these results is necessary to show the value of that financial lesson, taught us by the war of 1812.

2. The establishment of the second national bank grew out of this war. The failure of the local banks was enough to prove the necessity of a national currency, and the re-establishment of a national bank was the accepted remedy. No one seemed to think of the currency of the constitution--especially of that gold currency upon which the business of the world had been carried on from the beginning of the world, and by empires whose expenses for a week were equal to those of the United States for a year, and which the framers of the constitution had so carefully secured and guarded for their country. A national bank was the only remedy thought of. Its constitutionality was believed by some to have been vindicated by the events of the war. Its expediency was generally admitted. The whole argument turned upon the word "necessary," as used in the grant of implied powers at the end of the enumeration of powers expressly granted to Congress; and this _necessity_ was affirmed and denied on each side at the time of the establishment of the first national bank, with a firmness and steadiness which showed that these fathers of the constitution knew that the whole field of argument lay there. Washington's queries to his cabinet went to that point; the close reasoning of Hamilton and Jefferson turned upon it. And it is worthy of note, in order to show how much war has to do with the working of government, and the trying of its powers, that the strongest illustration used by General Hamilton, and the one, perhaps, which turned the question in Washington's mind, was the state of the Indian war in the Northwest, then just become a charge upon the new federal government, and beginning to assume the serious character which it afterward attained. To carry on war at that time, with such Indians as were then, supported by the British traders, themselves countenanced by their government, at such a distance in the wilderness, and by the young federal government, was a severe trial upon the finances of the federal treasury, as well as upon the courage and discipline of the troops; and General Hamilton, the head of the treasury, argued that with the aid of a national bank, the war would be better and more successfully conducted: and, therefore, that it was "_necessary_," and might be established as a means of executing a granted power, to wit, the power of making war. That war terminated well; and the bank having been established in the mean time, got the credit of having furnished its "sinews." The war of 1812 languished under the state of the finances and the currency, no national bank existing; and this want seemed to all to be the cause of its difficulties, and to show the necessity for a bank. The second national bank was then established--many of its old, most able, and conscientious opponents giving in to it, Mr. Madison at their head. Thus the question of a national bank again grew up--grew up out of the events of the war--and was decided against the strict construction of the constitution--to the weakening of a principle which was fundamental in the working of the government, and to the damage of the party which stood upon the doctrine of a strict construction of the constitution. But in the course of the "Thirty Years" of which it is proposed to take a "View," some of the younger generation became impressed with the belief that the constitutional currency had not had a fair trial in that war of 1812! that, in fact, it had had no trial at all! that it was not even in the field! not even present at the time when it was supposed to have failed! and that it was entitled to a trial before it was condemned. That trial has been obtained. The second national bank was left to expire upon its own limitation. The gold currency and the independent treasury were established. The Mexican war tried them. They triumphed. And thus a national bank was shown to be "unnecessary," and therefore unconstitutional. And thus a great question of constitutional construction, and of party division, three times decided by the events of war, and twice against the constitution and the strict constructionists, was decided the last time in their favor; and is entitled to stand, being the last, and the only one in which the constitutional currency had a trial.

3. The protection of American industry, as a substantive object, independent of the object of revenue, was a third question growing out of the war. Its incidental protection, under the revenue clause in the constitution, had been always acknowledged, and granted; but protection as a substantive object was a new question growing out of the state of things produced by the war. Domestic manufactures had taken root and grown up during the non-importation periods of the embargo, and of hostilities with Great Britain, and under the temporary double duties which ensued the war, and which were laid for revenue. They had grown up to be a large interest, and a new one, classing in importance after agriculture and commerce. The want of articles necessary to national defence, and of others essential to individual comfort--then neither imported nor made at home--had been felt during the interruption of commerce occasioned by the war; and the advantage of a domestic supply was brought home to the conviction of the public mind. The question of protection for the sake of protection was brought forward, and carried (in the year 1816); and very unequivocally in the _minimum_ provision in relation to duties on cotton goods. This reversed the old course of legislation--made protection the object instead of the incident, and revenue the incident instead of the object; and was another instance of constitutional construction being made dependent, not upon its own words but upon extrinsic, accidental and transient circumstances. It introduced a new and a large question of constitutional law, and of national expediency, fraught with many and great consequences, which fell upon the period of the THIRTY YEARS' VIEW to settle, or to grapple with.

4. The question of internal improvement within the States, by the federal government, took a new and large development after the war. The want of facilities of transportation had been felt in our military operations. Roads were bad, and canals few; and the question of their construction became a prominent topic in Congress common turnpike roads--for railways had not then been invented, nor had MacAdam yet given his name to the class of roads which has since borne it. The power was claimed as an incident to the granted powers--as a means of doing what was authorized--as a means of accomplishing an end: and the word "necessary" at the end of the enumerated powers, was the phrase in which this incidental power was claimed to have been found. It was the same derivation which was found for the creation of a national bank, and involved very nearly the same division of parties. It greatly complicated the national legislation from 1820 to 1850, bringing the two parts of our double system of government--State and Federal--into serious disagreement, and threatening to compromise their harmonious action. Grappled with by a strong hand, it seemed at one time to have been settled, and consistently with the rights of the States; but sometimes returns to vex the deliberations of Congress. To territories the question did not extend. They have no political rights under the constitution, and are governed by Congress according to its discretion, under that clause which authorizes it to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." The improvement of rivers and harbors, was a branch of the internal improvement question, but resting on a different clause in the constitution--the commercial and revenue clause--and became complex and difficult from its extension to small and local objects. The party of strict construction contend for its restriction to national objects--rivers of national character, and harbors yielding revenue.

5. The boundaries between the treaty-making and the legislative departments of the government, became a subject of examination after the war, and gave rise to questions deeply affecting the working of these two departments. A treaty is the supreme law of the land, and as such it becomes obligatory on the House of Representatives to vote the money which it stipulates, and to co-operate in forming the laws necessary to carry it into effect. That is the broad proposition. The qualification is in the question whether the treaty is confined to the business of the treaty-making power? to the subjects which fall under its jurisdiction? and does not encroach upon the legislative power of Congress? This is the qualification, and a vital one: for if the President and Senate, by a treaty with a foreign power, or a tribe of Indians, could exercise ordinary legislation, and make it supreme, a double injury would have been done, and to the prejudice of that branch of the government which lies closest to the people, and emanates most directly from them. Confinement to their separate jurisdictions is the duty of each; but if encroachments take place, which is to judge? If the President and Senate invade the legislative field of Congress, which is to judge? or who is to judge between them? or is each to judge for itself? The House of Representatives, and the Senate in its legislative capacity, but especially the House, as the great constitutional depository of the legislative power, becomes its natural guardian and defender, and is entitled to deference, in the event of a difference of opinion between the two branches of the government. The discussions in Congress between 1815 and 1820 greatly elucidated this question; and while leaving unimpugned the obligation of the House to carry into effect a treaty duly made by the President and Senate within the limits of the treaty making power--upon matters subject to treaty regulation--yet it belongs to the House to judge when these limits have been transcended, and to preserve inviolate the field of legislation which the constitution has intrusted to the immediate representatives of the people.

6. The doctrine of secession--the right of a State, or a combination of States, to withdraw from the Union, was born of that war. It was repugnant to the New England States, and opposed by them, not with arms, but with argument and remonstrance, and refusal to vote supplies. They had a convention, famous under the name of Hartford, to which the design of secession was imputed. That design was never avowed by the convention, or authentically admitted by any leading member; nor is it the intent of this reference to decide upon the fact of that design. The only intent is to show that the existence of that convention raised the question of secession, and presented the first instance of the greatest danger in the working of the double form of our government--that of a collision between a part of the States and the federal government. This question, and this danger, first arose then--grew out of the war of 1812--and were hushed by its sudden termination; but they have reappeared in a different quarter, and will come in to swell the objects of the THIRTY YEARS' VIEW. At the time of its first appearance the right of secession was repulsed and repudiated by the democracy generally, and in a large degree by the federal party--the difference between a UNION and a LEAGUE being better understood at that time when so many of the fathers of the new government were still alive. The leading language in respect to it south of the Potomac was, that no State had a right to withdraw from the Union--that it required the same power to dissolve as to form the Union--and that any attempt to dissolve it, or to obstruct the action of constitutional laws, was treason. If, since that time, political parties and sectional localities, have exchanged attitudes on this question, it cannot alter the question of right, and may receive some interest from the development of causes which produce such changes. Secession, a question of speculation during the war of 1812, has become a practical question (almost) during the THIRTY YEARS; and thus far has been "compromised," not settled.

7. Slavery agitation took its rise during this time (1819-'20), in the form of attempted restriction on the State of Missouri--a prohibition to hold slaves, to be placed upon her as a condition of her admission into the Union, and to be binding upon her afterwards. This agitation came from the North, and under a federal lead, and soon swept both parties into its vortex. It was quieted, so far as that form of the question was concerned, by admitting the State without restriction, and imposing it on the remainder of the Louisiana territory north and west of that State, and above the parallel of 36 degrees, 30 minutes; which is the prolongation of the southern boundary line of Virginia and Kentucky. This was called a "compromise," and was all clear gain to the antislavery side of the question, and was done under the lead of the united slave state vote in the Senate, the majority of that vote in the House of Representatives, and the undivided sanction of a Southern administration. It was a Southern measure, and divided free and slave soil far more favorably to the North than the ordinance of 1787. That divided about equally: this of 1820 gave about all to the North. It abolished slavery over an immense extent of territory where it might then legally exist, over nearly the whole of Louisiana, left it only in Florida and Arkansas territory, and opened no new territory to its existence. It was an immense concession to the non-slaveholding States; but the genius of slavery agitation was not laid. It reappeared, and under different forms, first from the North, in the shape of petitions to Congress to influence legislation on the subject; then from the South, as a means of exciting one half the Union against the other, and laying the foundation for a Southern confederacy. With this new question, in all its forms, the men of the new generation have had to grapple for the whole period of the "Thirty Years."

8. The war had created a debt, which, added to a balance of that of the Revolution, the purchase of Louisiana, and some other items, still amounted to ninety-two millions of dollars at the period of the commencement of this "View;" and the problem was to be solved, whether a national debt could be paid and extinguished in a season of peace, leaving a nation wholly free from that encumbrance; or whether it was to go on increasing, a burthen in itself, and absorbing with its interest and changes an annual portion of the public revenues. That problem was solved, contrary to the experience of the world, and the debt paid; and the practical benefit added to the moral, of a corresponding reduction in the public taxes.

9. Public distress was a prominent feature of the times to be embraced in this PRELIMINARY VIEW. The Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816, and before 1820 had performed one of its cycles of delusive and bubble prosperity, followed by actual and wide-spread calamity. The whole paper system, of which it was the head and the citadel, after a vast expansion, had suddenly collapsed, spreading desolation over the land, and carrying ruin to debtors. The years 1819 and '20 were a period of gloom and agony. No money, either gold or silver: no paper convertible into specie: no measure, or standard of value, left remaining. The local banks (all but those of New England), after a brief resumption of specie payments, again sank into a state of suspension. The Bank of the United States, created as a remedy for all those evils, now at the head of the evil, prostrate and helpless, with no power left but that of suing its debtors, and selling their property, and purchasing for itself at its own nominal price. No price for property, or produce. No sales but those of the sheriff and the marshal. No purchasers at execution sales but the creditor, or some hoarder of money. No employment for industry--no demand for labor--no sale for the product of the farm--no sound of the hammer, but that of the auctioneer, knocking down property. Stop laws--property laws--replevin laws--stay laws--loan office laws--the intervention of the legislator between the creditor and the debtor: this was the business of legislation in three-fourths of the States of the Union--of all south and west of New England. No medium of exchange but depreciated paper: no change even, but little bits of foul paper, marked so many cents, and signed by some tradesman, barber, or innkeeper: exchanges deranged to the extent of fifty or one hundred per cent. DISTRESS, the universal cry of the people: RELIEF, the universal demand thundered at the doors of all legislatures, State and federal. It was at the moment when this distress had reached its maximum--1820-'21--and had come with its accumulated force upon the machine of the federal government, that this "VIEW" of its working begins. It is a doleful starting point, and may furnish great matter for contrast, or comparison, at its concluding period in 1850.

Such were some of the questions growing out of the war of 1812, or immediately ensuing its termination. That war brought some difficulties to the new generation, but also great advantages, at the head of them the elevation of the national character throughout the world. It immensely elevated the national character, and, as a consequence, put an end to insults and outrages to which we had been subject. No more impressments: no more searching our ships: no more killing: no more carrying off to be forced to serve on British ships against their own country. The national flag became respected. It became the Ægis of those who were under it. The national character appeared in a new light abroad. We were no longer considered as a people so addicted to commerce as to be insensible to insult: and we reaped all the advantages, social, political, commercial, of this auspicious change. It was a war necessary to the honor and interest of the United States, and was bravely fought, and honorably concluded, and makes a proud era in our history. I was not in public life at the time it was declared, but have understood from those who were, that, except for the exertions of two men (Mr. Monroe in the Cabinet, and Mr. Clay in Congress), the declaration of war could not have been obtained. Honor to their memories!

THIRTY YEARS' VIEW.